Impact of Kurdish Independence in the Region

1. How have regional governments responded to Ma’soud Barzani’s announcement of a referendum on Iraqi Kurdish independence to be held in September? 2. How have different sub-state groups responded, to include different Kurdish factions in Iraq and across borders? 3. How are the Kurds using the independence referendum to leverage their interests?

Author | Editor: Canna, S. & Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

Why now?

President Ma’soud Barzani has been promising a referendum on Kurdish independence since 2014, so we have to ask the question why now? The non-binding referendum, if approved, will not necessarily mean a declaration of independence (Atran, Rasheed, Wahab). Barzani has admitted that the purpose of the referendum was not to declare independence but to gauge the opinions and rights of the Kurds in Iraq (Anonymous 2). But there are several factors potentially driving Barzani’s decision to announce a referendum now.

1. Strengthen a long-term bid for greater autonomy (Atran, van den Toorn)
2. Create a better negotiating position in any settlement that follows the liberation of ISIS-controlled territory including oil-rich regions (Anonymous 1, Anonymous 2, Atran, Hamasaeed, van den Toorn, Wahab)
3. Push to permit foreign/military aid to go directly to Erbil rather than through Baghdad (Atran)
4. Consolidate Barzani credibility as well as his political, military and economic hold over Erbil and large portions of the KRG (Anonymous 2, Atran). Barzani’s credibility will be particularly important to either secure his legacy as he steps down from the presidency at the end of his term this year or to provide a justification for a third unconstitutional term (van den Toorn)
5. Shore up domestic support for Barzani’s administration, which is facing a “legitimacy crisis” due to 1) the inability of the KRG to pay salaries on time or in full, 2) that Parliament has not met in nearly two years, and 3) that Barzani is in his second “unconstitutional” term (these all contribute to the “crisis of legitimacy,” not just salaries, though that is a big one (Anonymous 1, Anonymous 2, Hamasaeed, van den Toorn)
6. To authenticate Barzani’s nationalist credentials particularly at a time when the PKK is gaining influence across the Kurdish territories transnationally and inside the Kurdistan Region (Anonymous 2)
7. In rejecting all of the above reasons, Amjed Rasheed—a Kurdish specialist at Durham University— stated (in a minority opinion) that Kurdish leadership “genuinely believes that it is a time of the Kurds to achieve their inspiration and dream to become an independent state.”

Expected Outcome for Kurds

The Movement for Change (Gorran) along with the Kurdistan Islamic Group (key oppositional Kurdish political parties) declined to participate in the committee organizing the referendum (Anonymous 1, Atran, Gulmohamad, Wahab). An expert who prefers to remain anonymous concluded, “What you see is that for perhaps the first time in Iraqi Kurdish modern history, the independence project – and thus, Kurdish nationalism itself – has been politicized” internally among Iraqi Kurds. Christine van den Toorn, director of the Institute for Regional and International Studies at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani, expects that the referendum will increase divisions within Kurdish political parties as well as between political elites and the people—essentially along the lines of those in favor vs. those against the referendum.

A second anonymous contributor argues that it has already led to targeted threats against those Kurds, mainly independent and opposition groups, who oppose the referendum without a functioning parliament in place. This group, mobilized under the No to a Referendum movement, includes over 100 journalists and writers thus far. Also, the deputy head of the KDP faction in the defunct Iraqi Kurdistan parliament announced on the KDP information website that a campaign against the referendum “will be punished by the court of people and history will never be merciful.” Erbil police also just official closed the Standard Institute office, which is a civil society organization, for “criticizing Peshmerga and the referendum.” Other journalists have received death threats for opposing the referendum.

Hamasaeed suggests that the referendum was essentially part of a long-term Kurdish shaping operation preparing the groundwork for a future Kurdish state. Kurds are particularly motivated to act now, while they still have leverage given their role in fighting ISIS, to push for independence in the event that Nouri Al- Maliki and a pro-Shia/anti-Kurdish government comes to power in the upcoming elections (Wahab). Therefore, success from a Kurdish perspective is a referendum that does not result in a firm public or international “no” (Hamasaeed).

However, the second anonymous contributor disagrees with the assertion that the Kurdish are motivated to act now. She notes that the referendum “is a tactic to divert domestic and international attention away from the Kurdistan Region’s deep-seated internal problems. It is part of the post-ISIS preparations being made among many groups to leverage Baghdad. Even within the KDP officials know that ‘now is not the time’ and that the region needs to build up its institutions first. This can be perceived as a desperate measure by Barzani as he faces challenges to his authority, namely by the PKK, which has gained influence in his region, and a rising Baghdad.”

Regional Responses

There is no official international support for the referendum at this time. Reactions range from mild opposition (not against greater Kurdish independence, but think the timing is not right) to strongly worded opposition. Kurdish leaders were reportedly not surprised by foreign governments’ negative reaction to the announced referendum (Gulmohamad, Rasheed, Wahab). The United Nations has also stated that it will have no role and does not support the referendum. Given this, the second anonymous contributor questioned who would be the independent actors to monitor the referendum vote?

Countries with Kurdish populations strongly opposed to Kurdish independence

As might be expected, countries with Kurdish populations—Turkey, Syria, and Iran—strongly oppose any movement towards Kurdish independence in Iraq (Anonymous 1, Atran). These countries include Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq (Atran).
Turkey called the referendum a “grave mistake” (Anonymous 1, Anonymous 2, Atran, Gulmohamad, Hamasaeed, Wahab, Waziri). Scott Atran, a researcher who conducts field research in Iraqi Kurdistan, suggested that a concerted push for independence could trigger increased Turkish military action not only against the PKK in Iraq, including near the Iranian border, but also more sustain cross-border incursions and de facto holding of Kurdish Iraqi and Syrian (YPG) territory. However, Sarhang Hamasaeed, USIP’s Director of Middle East Programs, questioned whether there is a difference between the public statements of countries, like Turkey, and what they privately discuss with Kurdish leadership. Some speculate that the Kurds would not make an announcement like this if there were not tacit approval or expectation of tacit approval from Turkey (Hamasaeed, Rasheed, van den Toorn, Waziri).
Iran is strongly opposed to Kurdish independence in Iraq (Anonymous 2, Rasheed, Wahab, Waziri), but some say it has not been as vocal as Turkey because the government does not believe this referendum will actually lead towards independence (Anonymous 1, Anonymous 2, van den Toorn). In fact, the referendum—if interpreted as a sign of increasing internal Kurdish divisions—could increase Iranian influence over Kurdish parties in eastern Kurdistan (Anonymous 1). But Atran argues that the Iranians are taking the threat of Kurdish independence seriously with Qassim Soleimani, head of Iran’s Quds Force, demanding that the Kurdish flag be removed from Kirkuk. Hoshang Waziri states that an independent Kurdistan is a red line for Iran—that it will never accept a smaller, Shia-led Iraq.
The Iraqi government also opposes the ability of any one group deciding “the fate of Iraq, in isolation from other parties,” according to Iraqi government spokesman Saad al-Haddithi (Gulmohamad, Rasheed, Wahab). Abadi recognized the Kurds’ political aspirations for greater autonomy, but suggested the time is not ripe for these discussions. Hamasaeed reminded readers that Iraq is in an election season and political leaders stated opposition might be driven by efforts to look strong and patriotic. Moreover, other provinces, such as Basrah, oppose the Kurdish referendum and notions of independence because they would not permit the KRG to take resources and territories that they believe are an integral part of the Iraqi state. A key issue is the disputed territories and whether they will be included in this referendum.

Most other governments think the time is not right

Most other governments with interests in the region—UK, US, EU, Germany, and Russia—are either not supportive or not encouraging at this particularly point in time (Anonymous 1, Gulmohamad, Rasheed, van den Toorn, Wahab). They fear independence would be a distraction in the fight against ISIS (Anonymous 1, Gulmohamad). The US is concerned that a successful push for autonomy would weaken the Abadi government and embolden his pro-Iran rivals, which would undercut long-term US security relations with Iraq (Wahab). The US State Department and US Government does not support the referendum (Anonymous 2).

Regional Kurdish groups support the referendum

Despite evidence of divisions among Kurdish political parties for the referendum, regional Kurdish groups that have fought with the Peshmerga—including the PKK (Turkey), YPG (Syria), and the PAK (Iran) support the referendum (Atran, Rasheed). There are conditions of PUK support (which is fractured), which is that the Kurdish parliament is first reactivated and that all of the disputed territories are included (Anonymous 2).

Shia groups in Iraq strongly oppose the referendum

Shia groups, including the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), strongly oppose the referendum. Additionally, the State of Law bloc—a Shia-led coalition in parliament—rejected the referendum, which would lead to the division of the country.

Iraqi Sunni group have mixed response

Some Sunni tribes and militia would accept Kurdish independence if they, too, could have autonomy in Sunni areas (Atran). However, Sajida al-Afandi, an influential parliamentarian of the Sunni Union of National Forces stated, “Neither the domestic nor the foreign circumstances are currently ripe for Kurdistan’s secession from Iraq.” Sunni groups are particularly opposed to Kurdish territorial ambitions in disputed areas such as Kirkuk. However, some Sunni Arabs in disputed territories prefer the Kurds to the Shia militias for now (Rasheed, van den Toorn), but this support “is ephemeral and transient” until ISIS is defeated and Sunnis Arab have a new opening to renegotiate their position with the government in Baghdad. Kurds seek to capitalize on this. Other Sunni Arab groups reject Kurdish overreach and have joined Hashd or are waiting for the return of ISF, federal government forces and authority (van den Toorn). The Sunni Arabs have also been less vocal because many are living inside the Kurdistan Region at this moment and are dependent on Masud – at least for the time being (Anonymous 2).

Non-Kurdish minorities want to be left alone

Non-Kurdish minorities in disputed territories, particularly Ninewa, want their autonomy and to be left alone (van den Toorn). While KRG officials claim they have support from minorities, populations near Ninewah most likely would prefer a united province under a united Iraq. The referendum is likely to expose and exacerbate tensions between minority groups and the KRG. Minority groups are also divided (Anonymous 2). Some do support the KDP and Barzani while others lean toward Baghdad. These loyalties are also transactional and can change over time, depending upon who can provide services, security, and jobs.

What does this mean for the US?

A second expert, who prefers to remain anonymous due to frequent travel to the region, stresses that it is essential that the USG does not overreact to this move. She argues that the US has significant leverage over the Kurds and should not give in to the threats Barzani makes. It should not officially endorse or support the referendum, or any other unilateral measure taken by the KRG that seeks to bypass official state institutions. Much of this is for public consumption in the West, as well as to his local constituencies. She warns that “[b]y overly coddling and enabling Barzani, the US will dissuade any necessary negotiation that needs to take place between Baghdad and Erbil, as well as institution building that is sorely needed in the Kurdistan Region. The US should avoid stirring the ire and tensions among local groups seeking their own form of self protection and autonomy, let along the Iraqi government, by supporting the KRG’s extension of territories through a unilateral move (referendum). This is particularly important given the outcomes of the anti-ISIS campaign and the extensive territories that the Kurds have expanded their de-facto control. The U.S, should continue to emphasize its commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Iraqi state. It should enhance Iraqi state institutions and continue to channel any support to Iraqi sub-state actors through the Iraqi government. Any future resolution to Iraq’s territories and borders should be negotiated between the KRG and Baghdad.”

According to this second anonymous expert, many Kurds state that the only people really making an issue of this are non-Kurds. “Barzani can back away from the threat of pushing for independence because he has done so already, and can even use the failure to do so as a conspiracy by outsiders against Kurds. He can play the victim card as save face. Also there is no significant challenge to Barzani at this time – not from Arabs or other Iraqi Kurdish groups. The only real threat is from the PKK.”

Contributing Authors

Anonymous 1, Anonymous 2, Scott Atran (ARTIS), Weston Aviles (NSI), Zana Gulmohamad (Sheffield University), Sarhang Hamasaeed (United States Institute of Peace), Amjed Rasheed (Durham University), Christine van den Toorn (American University of Iraq, Sulaimani), Bilal Wahab (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Hoshang Waziri (Independent)

 

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