



SMA White Paper: A Geopolitical and Cognitive Assessment of the Israeli-Palestinian Security Conundrum

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Foreword

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At the request of the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC) the J-39 Strategic-Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Branch undertook a Coordinator's Mission Review in July 2014 and concluded it in February 2015. This SMA project resulted in an unprecedented collaborative effort among over one hundred subject-matter experts from numerous organizations across the Department of Defense, U.S. Government Departments and Intelligence Agencies, Academia, Think Tanks, and Private Industry. The work of these subject-matter experts is summarized in this white paper.

The purpose of the review was to evaluate strategic risks and identify knowledge gaps in order to provide an increased understanding of potential future security environments and their implications for Palestinian security sector reform. The SMA team focused on producing analyses and tools to address USSC's questions, which were grouped into three broad categories: internal Palestinian security concerns; challenges to Israeli-Palestinian joint security; and the role of external actors in Israel-Palestinian security. The overall objective was to provide inputs to serve as ongoing planning and training resources for the Security Coordinator's office. The following document presents a brief summary of the key takeaways from each of the resulting reports.

Chief among the issues that were of concern to USSC was security sector reform in the context of challenges and opportunities of sovereignty in a state of limited arms. Challenges were to be highlighted by addressing the potential impact on the legitimacy and authority of Palestinian security forces in the event of cross-border incursions by Israeli forces in such an environment. Related is the challenge of unity governance under conditions of non-contiguity. USSC was also vitally interested in the role of the international community in supporting the security needs of a functioning future Palestinian state, from the perspective of earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy during third party monitoring missions, as well as examining the linkages between security, economy, and governance in such a state.

Among the key elements reflected in the white paper was a unique collaboration among teams of social scientists to develop and run a simulation exercise designed to identify the key flash points that might result from an increase in autonomy for the West Bank in light of differing security requirements. An international team of area experts, neuroscientists, and social media specialists collaborated with ICONS simulation designers to fashion a unique simulation exercise. USSC staff, along with subject matter experts from the region, took on roles in a fast-paced simulation that first explored areas in which confidence building could take place, followed by a phase of crisis management that put the confidence building to the test. Among the key findings were

indications of differing preferences for bilateral versus multilateral talks, potentially constructive use of differing communications pathways in crisis situations, the role that international actors in general, and the US in particular, can play in enhancing security, and key challenges for legitimacy in the face of overwhelming differentials in power and authority.

This white paper outlines insights derived from third-party monitoring missions. The effort derived interesting insights with respect to Israeli-Palestinian joint security and minimum thresholds for security forces. The effort also shed light into insights on internal community investment. Also of interest are case studies the SMA team produced that looked into other states that do not have a significant army. While these case studies are informative and provide interesting insights, the case of the Palestinians is unique with its own set of unique challenges.

This research effort began during a time of considerable optimism that the mission of Secretary of State John Kerry in 2013-2014 would bear fruit at least in terms of the adoption of a framework for an eventual peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, ultimately leading to a two-state solution. Notwithstanding the ultimate collapse of those talks in April 2014 and the fact that the peace process has been in limbo ever since, the authors of this report point out that if and when this process is restarted, the issues addressed in the Coordinator's Mission Review will again be front and center.

Taken together, the studies reported here can form the basis of effective security sector reform for the Palestinian Authority, and the carving out of a critical role for international actors in general, and the US in particular, in the event that peace talks are resumed and a framework agreement emerges.

Executive Summary

This report evaluates strategic risks and identifies knowledge gaps in our understanding of potential future security environments and their implications for Palestinian security sector reform. Work on this report began almost at the same time as the US-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian peace talks were launched by US President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry in July 2013. While those talks are now on hold, the questions dealt with in the report were geared toward issues that would need to be addressed in any framework agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Chief among the issues of concern was security sector reform in the context of challenges and opportunities of sovereignty in a state of limited arms, particularly when the stronger neighboring country demands an unspecified level of security. Challenges were to be highlighted by addressing the potential impact on the legitimacy and authority of Palestinian security forces in the event of cross-border incursions by Israeli forces in such an environment. Related is the challenge of unity governance under conditions of non-contiguity. We were also interested in the role of the international community in supporting the security needs of a functioning future Palestinian state, from the perspective of earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy during third party monitoring missions, as well as examining the linkages between security, economy, and governance in such a state.

Notwithstanding the breakdown of the peace talks in April 2014, followed by the Gaza War and subsequent Israeli elections, there is the sense that sooner or later, these issues will need to be addressed in an inevitable future two state solution to this conflict, and that therefore it is important to lay out these issues and some of their mechanisms in anticipation of this eventuality. In the view of the researchers who put the following reports together, these are still the right questions.

The seven questions were grouped into three broad categories: challenges to Palestinian internal security; challenges to Israeli-Palestinian joint security; and the role of external actors in Israel-Palestinian security. In addition, the SMA research team provided an analysis of the socio-political and social-cultural dynamics of the region by analyzing regional social media activity in Arabic. Finally, an international team applied key insights from psychology and neuroscience to the research questions posed.

Key Takeaways

Challenges to Palestinian Internal Security

Q1. What are the critical areas of security sector reform required to make civil society work within the Palestinian Authority and across the territories versus the status quo?

An analysis was conducted by the NSI team to identify Palestinian security sector reform measures that would assist in fostering a healthy and transparent relationship between the Palestinian security sector and Palestinian civil society in the West Bank. A two stage analytic method was used

to facilitate the identification of impediments, or barriers, to the provision of security by the Palestinian security sector consistent with acceptable practices of modern security forces and in alignment with civil societies expectations. The methodology enabled identifying security sector reform measures that can both strengthen and solidify the Palestinian security sector in a manner that is popularly accepted and sustainable with the Palestinian civil society. The analysis identified several areas of security sector reform measures and development: clarify confusion over roles and responsibilities of the Palestinian security sector, strengthen legitimacy of the security forces in the eyes of Palestinian civil society and the population, and improve equipping and training of the security forces.

[See also Neuroscience/Psychology analysis]

Q2. What are the challenges and opportunities for sovereignty in a state of limited arms?

While Palestinian leaders aspire to a fully sovereign state with defense capabilities, Israel insists on numerous restrictions to neutralize the threat potential. Decades of negotiations have sought common ground to bridge this considerable gap. In this study, ICONS Project researchers at the University of Maryland undertook an empirical analysis of states with limited arms, defined as *states with little to no dedicated, external defense capacity*. In practical terms, this translates to states without an established military (or only a symbolic force) and low or no military expenditures. Common challenges to sovereignty include a lack of capacity to maintain internal security or defend against non-state actors, dependence on international support, and an inability to cope with external threats. Common opportunities for sovereignty include having more resources to devote to crucial development needs, a more peaceful reputation that demonstrates to regional rivals that they are not a threat, and opportunities to more easily consolidate their independence and internal stability. Mechanisms to preserve sovereignty for limited arms states can be accomplished through the development of robust domestic security forces, international security guarantees and assistance, and international cooperation on defense. In some cases, states also gradually lift the arms limitations and remilitarize to better meet threats as conditions change.

Q3. What are the challenges of achieving unity government and maintaining effective security in non-contiguous states?

The challenges of non-contiguity are at the heart of the efforts to establish a viable Palestinian state. This report by the ICONS research team seeks to inform conversations about what challenges to anticipate and how they might be overcome by applying a comparative case study approach. The study identified common challenges to and mechanisms for preserving sovereignty. States with exclaves often face enormous obstacles to ensuring effective governance and security. Some stem from the local population itself, for instance local grievances due to isolation and state neglect and a lack of national sense of belonging. Others emphasize the vulnerability of exclaves without official or easily securable borders, which open the door to conflict and criminality. Finally, relationships matter immensely. Without communication and compromise, differences in law and culture can complicate the rules under which an exclave operates. In more extreme instances, a lack of trust between home state, host state, and exclave populations – or even openly hostile relations – can badly damage the viability of an exclave altogether. But some solutions exist to many common non-contiguous state challenges. Many states rely, for instance, on ongoing processes of negotiation with the host state to ensure access to and the smooth functioning of its exclave. Officially demarcating borders, opening up pathways to integrate with the surrounding state, and focusing on policies to improve exclave residents' welfare also help eliminate many sources of conflict before they emerge. In some cases, joint decision-making structures or enabling local problem-solving also mitigate the difficulties of administering territory from afar. Finally, the military solution

is a common, though possibly not entirely desirable option to preserve sovereignty, especially in the face of domestic threats.

[See also Neuroscience/Psychology analysis]

Israeli-Palestine Joint Security

Q4. What are the minimum thresholds for indigenous security forces in protecting its citizens and guarding its borders, particularly when the neighbor country demands an unspecified level of security?

Competing security challenges naturally surface for Israelis and Palestinians as they maneuver to gain West Bank areas for their respective homes. While multiple factors contribute to Israeli-Palestinian tension, this study sought to understand the political positions and security interests of Palestinians and Israelis in order to find potential areas of compromise as well as true sticking points. To achieve that aim, the NSI team conducted thematic and discourse analyses on the speeches of leaders across the breadth of the Israeli and Palestinian political landscapes. The analyses suggest that there are important areas of mutual concern that may serve as starting points for negotiation as well as areas of diametric opposition. These include the need for coordinated policing, access to and protection of holy sites and public places, concern about refugees and displaced persons, and management of border areas and crossings. Competing concerns include blockade and embargo of Gaza, Israeli-held Palestinian prisoners, and IDF activities in Palestinian areas.

Q5. With respect to cross-border arrests, prosecutions, and targeted lethal action, what are the challenges, risks, and opportunities to legitimacy and sovereignty between neighbors with competing security requirements?

Question 5 was addressed with two different methodologies. First, the NSI research team derived insights from an analysis of a conceptual map, or qualitative loop diagram that relates Israeli and Palestinian Authority (PA) sovereignty and legitimacy in the West Bank with Palestinian violence and cross-border and Israeli Defense Forces/ Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Unit (IDF/COGAT) activities. The relationships and feedback loops of Israeli and Palestinian security and political positions reflect the dynamics that drive the security challenges and risks that impact the effectiveness of PA security sector reform and institutional development. The loop analyses identify risks and suggest implications for international community activities. Key findings include:

- PASF capability enhancements can reduce PA legitimacy and limit the effectiveness of security sector reform
- PA governing legitimacy is a critical pre-condition for successful security sector institution building and PASF capacity development
- Israeli security activities have self-reinforcing adverse effects on PA legitimacy and development of security sector institutions
- Uncertainty about the final status of the West Bank and the mainstreaming of settlement populations undermine efforts to re-open settlement talks

In a separate analysis, the ICONS simulation group was charged with developing a simulation to address Question 5. The following objectives for the simulation were identified: (1) Gain insights

on opportunities/challenges to effective confidence-building and crisis management when faced with competing security requirements; (2) Identify capabilities and contingencies which will be most useful for helping the PASF cope with legitimacy issues; and (3) Provide insights that can be brought to the inter-agency/broader USG stakeholders as deemed appropriate. The problem space for the simulation exercise focused on potential IDF incursions into Palestinian-controlled territories (Area A on the West Bank). The scenario comprised of two phases – confidence building and crisis management. Key findings were organized into the categories of communications dynamics, political/media dynamics, and key tensions for legitimacy. Key findings addressed communications dynamics (PA preference for multilateral, Israeli preference for bilateral), preferred communications pathways, differing perceptions of international and US responsiveness, and political and media dynamics. Key tensions for legitimacy included misperceptions, the IDF presence, disagreements over investigations, the role of the NSF, PA frustration over competing priorities for their security and political leaders, the role of Israeli public opinion, and strain for the PA viewed as normal by Israel. [See also Neuroscience/Psychology analysis]

The Role of External Actors in Israel-Palestinian Security

Q6. What are best practices for international security forces in earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy during third party monitoring missions?

A third party monitoring mission could play a potentially significant role in guaranteeing a future Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. This report by the ICONS team aims to inform conversations about the ideal design by engaging in a qualitative comparative case study analysis of past missions. The report starts with a brief overview of the literature on third party monitoring and a presentation of characteristics that are helpful for analyzing and comparing missions. Five historical cases were selected for in-depth analysis: the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), the International Monitoring Team in the Philippines (IMT), the Truce/Peace Monitoring Group in Papua New Guinea (TMG/PMG), the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), and the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Strategies from each of the missions were collected and synthesized into a list of best practices for future missions. For **maintaining legitimacy**: obtain parties' consent and buy-in, establish clear expectations, demonstrate commitment and follow-through, allow for mission evolution, and develop exit strategy in conjunction with the parties. For **earning trust**: invest in pre-deployment training and diverse teams, exhibit impartiality through mission structure and action, serve as bridge between parties, foster good relations with locals, and work collaboratively with third parties and peace groups. For **creating transparency**: be visible and accessible, communicate regularly and publicly, develop clear structures and consistent operating procedures, explain when secrecy is required, and distinguish the mission from other actors. The report concludes with an appendix detailing the characteristics of a future Israeli-Palestinian third party monitoring mission focused on earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy. [See also Neuroscience/Psychology analysis]

Q7. With respect to the linkages between security, economy, and governance, and with recognition that each is needed to support a functioning state, where should the international community invest?

This report looks at the multiple factors that contribute to instability in the West Bank. Palestinians face escalating levels of economic, social, and governing instability that, in turn, serve to degrade the governing legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Using the NSI Stability Model (StaM) and Analysis, the NSI team identified key buffers and drivers of economic, social, and governing stability along with their second- and third-order effects. The report also identifies several considerations for analysts on where and how the international community can invest that may help to decrease

instability while avoiding investing in channels that could lead to further instability. The key findings include the following: Political stalemate on the West Bank degrades perception of PA legitimacy while the PASF is feared and seen as working with the IDF and violating human rights. Declines in foreign aid and continue VAT withholdings are causing a cascading of impacts that are crushing the economy, preventing payroll payments, harming the environment, and impairing basic human rights and needs. High unemployment among youth and inappropriate job training coupled with a climate of conflict could lead to uprisings in this group. Increased limits on protests and speech further a growing discontent and risk retaliatory actions.

The Arabic Twittersphere and International Security Forces in Palestine: A Social Media Analysis

Texas A&M University supported this study to derive rich contextual understanding of the socio-political and social-cultural dynamics of the region by analyzing regional social media activity in Arabic. Specifically, we examined regional discussion of international security force practice and examined public opinion in response to key events in the Arabic language Twittersphere. They also supported the ICONS simulation by constructing multiple social media injects that participants responded to over the course of the simulation. The scenarios were informed by Arabic language social media archival data and trends from 2012-2014. The Web Monitoring System, developed by Raytheon BBN Technologies and SDL plc with sponsorship from DoD/CTTSO provided access to the critical data and tools for analysis. Key findings included: Gaza occupied a greater deal of steady-state presence in the Arabic language Twitter discourse, while the West Bank reference was primarily event-driven; regional Twitter users interpreted key events through the lens of history; and neither signal moments nor gradual security efforts held enough valence to shift public opinion on Twitter within Palestine or the larger Arabic language Twitter community toward greater cooperation.

Neuroscience and psychology: Helping to Understand the Minds of Others

Key aspects of the study questions are fundamentally psychological, for instance involving trust or legitimacy. We apply key insights from psychology and neuroscience, discuss them in the Israel-PA context, and describe policy implications. We examine Questions 1, 3, 5 and 6.

Q1 Security sector reform: Critical areas of security sector activity are fundamentally psychological. (1) The security sector must be perceived as sufficiently fair or just. (2) The security sector must be perceived as “ours” by the population and its members. Unfortunately, the psychological bias towards one’s “in-group” also drives factionalism. Specific methods can foster in-group bias where desired, and bridge divides between groups. (3) To build legitimacy, the security sector must manage “prediction errors” in its day-to-day activities with the population.

Q3 Unity government: Human psychology helps to prevent unity government in geographically non-contiguous polities, e.g. between the West Bank and Gaza. (1) Unity between administrations and security sectors can be facilitated by: interventions to build trust and cooperation; methods to increase the salience of common aspects of identity across groups; and building an appropriate vision. (2) National identity or nationalism underlies government unity, and its development in the security sector should foster social cohesion without an anti-Israel centerpiece. (3) Further human motivations push the non-contiguous parts of states apart—self-interest; fear (e.g. a Security Dilemma); and honor (e.g. a Fairness Dilemma)—and we describe strategies to tackle each.

Q5 Impacts of cross-border actions: To anticipate psychological impacts during crises:

	Insight	Third party inputs
1	Escalation or de-escalation can result from events' predictability and unexpectedness	Help manage predictability, and use unexpectedness as a tool.
2	Controlling escalation involves not just minimizing escalatory factors, but also positive accommodative and conciliatory gestures	Help provide ideas and/or substantive political or other contributions.
3	Perceived fairness matters in shaping deals (e.g. in crises) and in security force procedures	Help provide ideas and/or substantive contributions to packages
4	Israeli deterrence concepts center on managing a psychological balance, and involve inherently escalatory forces	Help mitigate adverse effects of events in this deterrence paradigm.

We also provide: A course on Integrative Complexity that aims to improve empathy and minimize 'black and white' thinking regarding ingroup and outgroup (90-120 mins with videos and background materials); and a guide for rapid responses to modify the impact of negative events (e.g. spoilers).

Q6 Trust during third party monitoring missions: Trust is inherently psychological. (1) We describe evidence-based methods to build trust. We focus on those with field evidence. (2) We describe pitfalls to avoid. Common-sense isn't enough – seemingly sensible trust-building interventions can be ineffective or even totally backfire. (3) Trust-building efforts can be difficult when face-to-face interactions are dangerous (e.g. between security forces) or practically difficult (e.g. travel restrictions) – and here virtual methods provide a safe and cost-effective means of delivery. We provide an innovative guide to these virtual methods, and examine each method's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. We provide a toolkit of safe, cost-effective methods for each aspect of trust-building.

Part I. Challenges to Palestinian Internal Security

Chapter 1: Internal Palestinian Security Dilemmas

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Abstract

An analysis was conducted to identify Palestinian security sector reform measures that would assist in fostering a healthy and transparent relationship between the Palestinian security sector and Palestinian civil society in the West Bank. A two-stage analytic method was used to facilitate the identification of impediments, or barriers, to the provision of security by the Palestinian security sector consistent with acceptable practices of modern security forces and in alignment with civil society's expectations. The methodology enabled identifying security sector reform measures that can both strengthen and solidify the Palestinian security sector in a manner that is popularly accepted and sustainable with the Palestinian civil society. Our analysis identified several areas of security sector reform measures and development: clarify confusion over roles and responsibilities of the Palestinian security sector, strengthen legitimacy of the security forces in the eyes of Palestinian civil society and the population, and improve equipping and training of the security forces.

Introduction

The origins of the Palestinian security sector and the source of many barriers to the provision of security and justice can be traced to the 1993 Oslo I Accord. Article 8 of the declaration established that the responsibility for policing the Palestinian population would fall to a "strong [Palestinian] police force" within the West Bank and Gaza during negotiations over permanent boundaries. The responsibility for "external threats," the "overall security of Israelis," and security within other politically established boundaries would continue to remain with the Israeli government and corresponding Israeli security forces. The Oslo II agreement codified the "interim" boundaries that included dividing the West Bank into a complex and fragmented patchwork of three types of jurisdictions: 1) security responsibility held by the Palestinian Authority (Area A), 2) security responsibilities shared by Palestinian and Israeli forces (Area B), and 3) areas from which Palestinians were excluded and security responsibility was given to Israeli forces alone (Area C). This division of land and security responsibilities remains in place today and has fostered an opaque situation replete with confusion over responsibilities, frustration over political barriers to provision of security and justice, and a culture of fear and mistrust. In addition, the absence of important political mandates, publically available mission statements, and codified legal documents that clearly delineate the Palestinian security sector roles and responsibilities adds to the complex situation. Without a legal framework and guiding documents, the Palestinian security sector is operating sub-optimally within an environment that is confused, ripe for misinterpretation, and ambiguous in terms of job function, authorities, and chains of command, resulting in failure to provide security and justice in a transparent and accountable manner.

Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) Overview

As mentioned, Article 8 of the Oslo I Accord laid the groundwork for the current Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) (Amrov & Tartir, 2014b). While the 2008-2010 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan expanded the scope of the PASF beyond a ‘strong police force,’ the exact composition and responsibilities of the various entities remains unclear.¹ However, for purposes of this analysis, we use the USSC Campaign Plan definition, which lists the components of the PASF² as the Presidential Guard, General Intelligence, National Security Force, Security Intelligence, Civil Defense, Palestinian Civil Police, and Preventive Security Organization (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2012). We focused our analysis explicitly on the PASF performance in the West Bank and have limited it to the following PASF entities: Palestinian Civil Police (PCP), National Security Forces (NSF), and the PASF’s three primary intelligence services—General Intelligence (GI), Military Intelligence (MI), and Preventive Security Organization (PSO). Nevertheless, the analytical process established in this work can be used to produce assessments of additional PASF entities.

The PASF was designed to provide the Palestinian population with “security,” a term that is subject to debate in the Palestinian context. Many Palestinians tend to “equate security with ending Israel’s occupation and establishing sovereign control over their land” (Crouch, Meigs, & Slocombe, 2008, p. 6), and by extension, would expect their security forces to take steps toward attaining that type of security. The International Crisis Group (2010b, p. 4) summarizes the political tension within which the PASF exists:

Since the 1993 Oslo Accords and the emergence of the PA [Palestinian Authority] on Palestinian soil, the Palestinians’ basic strategic dilemma has been that of reconciling the demands of national liberation and resisting the occupation with the prerequisites of state building.

Operationally, the PASF appears to define its security role largely as protecting the Palestinian population by preventing attacks or events aimed at Israel or within the Palestinian Authority that would spark retaliation from Israel and likely result in Palestinian casualties (Atallah, 2013). The PASF is not intended to be a resistance force. Along with other Palestinian Authority institutions, it tends to walk the fine line between being seen as a legitimate authority for the protection of the citizens of an emergent Palestinian state on the one hand, and as ensuring the safety and security of Israelis on the other.

¹ Accessible legal documents that outline the composition of the PASF vary in details as small as the name of an office to as large as the number of institutions that compose the PASF itself.

² The literature varies in detail as to what comprises the PASF. For example, the PA Security Sector: Strategic Plan outlines the security services as: “General Intelligence (GI), Civil Defense (CD), Preventive Security Organization (PSO), Palestinian Civil Police (PCP), Military Intelligence (MI), National Security Forces (NSF), Presidential Guards (PG), and Customs Control” (Ministry of Interior, 2014). Other sources interpret the Palestinian security sector to include the Ministry of Justice, Palestinian Civil Police, the Attorney-General’s Office/Public Prosecution, the High Judicial Council, the Shari’a courts, the military courts, and the Palestinian Bar Association (Bailey, 2013). And yet another source states that there are “five separate organizations that constitute the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF): the National Security Forces (which includes an autonomous military intelligence branch), the Palestinian Civil Police, the Preventative Security Organization, the Presidential Guard, and the General Intelligence Service” (Zanotti, 2010, p. 11).

Civil Society Concerns

Civil society refers to individuals and organizations “whose activities take place outside of the state’s direct control...it includes non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations, religious groups, women’s organizations, youth and student groups, trade organizations, professional associations, cultural societies, and academia. It can also include the media” (Bastick & Whitman, 2013, p. 7). In the context of Palestinian security sector reform, this term refers to individuals and organizations that advocate on behalf of the government, the population, or the international community. For the purposes of our analysis, civil society is defined as individuals or organizations advocating on behalf of the Palestinian population or, in other words, individuals or organizations who work to ensure that the Palestinian security sector is functioning in alignment with the populations’ expectations and in accordance with international standards and acceptable practices.

Civil society can play a crucial role in overseeing and shaping the structures, policies, and practices of the Palestinian security sector to ensure that they are in accordance with expectations and acceptable security practices. Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian civil society has advocated for a strong Palestinian security sector to protect and police the Palestinian population (Amrov & Tartir, 2014a; Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, 2009; United Nations Development Program, 2012). However, civil society has routinely raised concerns with the existing Palestinian security sector forces, ranging from a lack of professionalism (PASSIA/DCAF, 2006) to gross human rights violations (Human Rights Watch, 2011, 2014b). In a 2009 report, the Geneva Centre of the Democratic Control of Armed Forces conveyed the following concerns with the Palestinian security sector from the perspective of civil society:

- A perception among the population that the Palestinian security sector lacks professionalism;
- A culture of fear among the population with regard to the Palestinian security sector;
- A perception that the Palestinian security sector lacks accountability for its actions;
- The politicization of the Palestinian security sector;
- Weak relations between civil society and the Palestinian security sector, with no clear complaint mechanisms; and
- A lack of a shared security policy, which translates to a lack of local focus and direction.

These concerns have been reiterated by other organizations along with the recent addition of concern over the ill-treatment and torture of Palestinians at the hands of the PASF (The Independent Commission for Human Rights, 2013). Additionally, some aspects of civil society have indicated a lack of trust in the PASF, citing Israeli security forces’ presence and activities within Palestinian political boundaries as suggestive of collusion and a failure of the PASF to protect the Palestinian population and identity (Kristoff, 2012; Sayigh & Shiqaqi, 1999). A 2012 report by the Centre for International Governance Innovation (p. 13) found:

Broad swaths of civil society protest what they see as a campaign of intimidation targeting critics of the PA and bemoan what most Palestinians consider the creation of a “police state.” This internal disaffection is perilous at a time when Palestinian security cooperation with Israel is on full display, and skepticism and cynicism toward the diplomatic process and prospects for a peace agreement remain high.

Purpose

- Identifying what established and acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces would be expected of the Palestinian security sector by Palestinian civil society.

Methodology

In order to truly explore a means of enhancing the relationship between Palestinian civil society and the PASF within the West Bank, it is important to address both the perceptual and physical aspects of that relationship. This includes examining socially acceptable codes of behavior together with PASF actions; both authorized and reported by civil society. Palestinian civil society can play an important role in the security sector, yet in the case of the PASF, there appears to be a disconnect between their articulation of issues and ability to effect change within the current environment. Without first establishing the proper modes of security force interaction between the PASF and the Palestinian population it is intended to protect, it is unlikely that any amount of material change will engage Palestinian civil society in positive ways.

To address this challenge and assess the performance of the PASF in the provision of security to the Palestinian civil society, we utilized a two-stage analytic methodology. First, we conducted a qualitative assessment comparing PASF functions and activities that are authorized based on legal documents with those that are reported via news reports and by civil society, and, second, we compared this with acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces. This was followed by a barrier analysis (Rieger, 2011) identifying internal and external barriers³ and their associated root causes in the provision of security that are not in alignment with Palestinian civil society's perspectives and expectations. Identifying and classifying barriers and root causes allows us to better identify security sector reform measures that can both strengthen and solidify the Palestinian security sector in a manner that is popularly accepted and sustainable with the Palestinian civil society.

Given the current political context, we utilize the following standard for expected performance and acceptable practices in the provision of security by the Palestinian security sector, "the provision of civil order and security for the Palestinian population of the West Bank at 'affordable costs, in full transparency and in an accountable manner'" (Bocco, de Martino, & Luethold, 2005, p. 5). This standard is in alignment with established and generalized acceptable practices⁴ and the expectations of the Palestinian population⁵ and Palestinian civil society⁶.

Stage One: Obtaining a Qualitative Understanding of Provision of Security

To address the question of what PASF functions and activities are authorized versus those that are reported, our team reviewed open-source information and conducted interviews with subject matter experts. Our objective was to understand and delineate the institutional security functions

³ In this context, a barrier is defined as a factor that is inhibiting the effectiveness of a security force, in terms of its ability to perform its mission requirements and gain the confidence and acceptance of the population it serves.

⁴ Bastick & Whitman, 2013; Davis, 2012; *Security Sector Reform Best Practices and Lessons Learned: Pragmatic Steps for Global Security*, 2009; Wulf, 2004

⁵ Aldar, 2014; Arab World for Research & Development, 2014; Bailey, 2013; Bocco et al., 2005

⁶ Amrov & Tartir, 2014a; Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN), 2013; Dana, 2013; Friedrich & Luethold, 2007; Munayyer, 2012; Palm, 2010; PASSIA / DCAF, 2006; Sullivan, 1996

and activities performed by the PASF that it is legally authorized to perform versus those that it actually does perform as reported via news reports and by civil society. We then compared these to acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces. To simplify and clarify our findings, we generated “living” Venn diagrams, allowing for rapid integration of information as it becomes available.

As shown in Figure 1, the Venn diagram represents the realm of possible functions and activities to be performed by the PASF. Each function and activity belongs to one or more of three possible sets:

- *Authorized*: functions and activities that the PASF is authorized to perform based on one or more legal documents.
- *Reported*: functions and activities that are reported as being performed by the PASF based on verification from one or more credible sources.
- *Acceptable Practices*: functions and activities that are acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces that is desirable for the PASF to perform.




Figure 1: Interpretation of Venn diagram regions

The overlapping regions of the three sets represent functions and activities with various interpretations, the ideal or optimal case being those functions and activities falling within the intersection of the three sets (as denoted by the gold star in Figure 1). This region represents the subset of functions and activities performed by the PASF that have a legal basis (authorized), are currently being performed (reported), and correspond to a known acceptable practice in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces.

After capturing our understanding of the authorized and reported functions and activities of the PASF within the Venn diagram, and identifying and capturing acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces, our team initiated an assessment of areas of alignment within and across the PASF. This analysis then provided an impartial perspective on current PASF performance, as defined by activity and function that facilitated the identification of

internal and external barriers, and their associated root causes, in the provision of security by the PASF in and out of alignment with Palestinian civil society perspectives and expectations.

Stage Two: Understanding the Impediments to the Provision of Security

Legal documents, news reports, and academic research were used to derive an initial list of barriers to the authorized and reported functions and activities associated with the PASF entities we assessed⁷. Where possible, these barriers were based on limitations to established and acceptable practices in the provision of security by the PASF as explicitly cited in the literature. More frequently, however, barriers were inferred based on outside factors or conditions that created challenges for the PASF. These challenges were hypothesized to impede effective and acceptable practices in the provision of security for the greatest number of Palestinians in the West Bank at “affordable costs, in full transparency and in an accountable manner” (Bocco et al., 2005, p. 5). Root causes of these barriers were inferred based on a literature review to identify potential underlying causes. These root causes should be considered hypotheses, representing likely relationships based on the evidence that was available.

Methodology Caveats

Given the limitations to information available in the open source and the dynamic situation on the ground, our analytic process sought to be as transparent as possible to facilitate integration of additional information as it becomes available. The Venn diagram analysis methodology and process used in this work should serve as a visual basis for discussion and facilitate analysis within and across the PASF, civil society, and international agencies charged with Palestinian security sector reform.

Key Findings

Our analysis identified several factors that serve as barriers to effective and acceptable practices in the provision of security for the PASF in the West Bank. Overall, our analysis identified five primary barrier categories in the provision of security by the Palestinian security sector—fear based barriers, clarity and alignment barriers, population engagement barriers, capability barriers, and legal barriers. Several external barriers, which are based on factors or influence outside of Palestinian control, were identified (e.g., culture of fear and limitations on movement or other activities). These factors are more difficult to overcome in the current environment in the West Bank and, in many cases, may be rooted in an intractable problem. However, several internal barriers, such as insufficient legal frameworks or lack of preparedness, that are within the control of the PASF were identified. This suggests that mitigating actions can be taken by the Palestinian Authority, in partnership with international partners, even given the currently limiting socio-political environment in the West Bank, to reduce or dampen their effect on the provision of security.

⁷ Detailed qualitative assessments of the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP), the National Security Forces (NSF), General Intelligence (GI), Preventative Security Organization (PS), and Military Intelligence (MI) were conducted and can be obtained in the full report: Desjardins, A., Pagano, S., Popp, R., & Rieger, T. (2015, February). The Palestinian security sector in the West Bank: Current functions, activities, and internal barriers to the provision of civil order. Strategic Multilayer Assessment Program, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Implications for International Activities

Drawing from our exploration of several entities within the PASF, and the findings from the barrier analysis, we have identified several high-level security sector reform measures and mitigation strategies. While many of the barriers uncovered in our analysis, shown in Figure 2 below, result directly from the unresolved final status of the Palestinian Authority and restrictions placed upon the PASF by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), there are several issues and leverage points internal to the Palestinian security sector that can, and should, be addressed in order to facilitate engagement with civil society.



Figure 2: Overview of primary barriers in the provision of security by the PASF

Specifically, our analysis suggests three security sector reform measures that are critical to the provision of security consistent with acceptable practices in modern security forces. These items represent top priorities for attention and action and invoke internal processes that are subject to Palestinian security sector control and thus have the potential to be malleable over time, likely resulting in effective security sector reform. Further, since many of the barriers reported are intertwined, the resolution of the issues below can have a net positive impact on multiple barriers and issues encountered.

Reform Suggestion 1

Generate clear, comprehensive, and codified, legal documents laying out the missions and duties of each PASF entity—this is of paramount importance to ensure accountability of and trust in the PASF, as well as its ability to ensure the safety of its citizens.

The very commonly reported violation perpetrated by the PASF against Palestinian civil society was a failure to ensure its safety, both psychological and physical. This was primarily due to the PASF's inability to completely and effectively engage in its duties—both those that are authorized/reported and those that are considered acceptable practices in the provision of security. The absence of a comprehensive legal framework guiding the PASF entities, redundancies in forces' missions and activities, lack of PASF autonomy from Israel, and what many Palestinians feel is excessive PASF cooperation with Israel are all factors prohibiting the PASF from ensuring safety as many Palestinians would have it. Additionally, without a legal framework, it is difficult to ensure

compliance with standards of service, obtain a high level of professionalism, and address issues with accountability—all of which are issues that are consistently raised by Palestinian civil society. International guidance and support of the PASF toward establishing a clearer and more comprehensive set of PASF guidelines, codified in law, would promote more effective administration of PASF duties and help to reduce perceived violations rooted in safety. Doing so would similarly improve the accountability of and trust in the PASF, as well as mitigating barriers to ensuring that the PASF both acknowledges Palestinian civil society and treats its members with respect.

The international agencies should seek to assist the PASF, with the assistance of Palestinian civil society, by guiding it toward the completion of these fully executed, formally codified documents. Legal documentation should be stated in clear language, include both organizational mission and specific duties, delineate lines of authority and purview for each organization, as well as specify the circumstances under which the functions and activities of PASF entities may or may not overlap and corresponding chains of command.

Finally, more comprehensive and coordinated documentation and training efforts, across the PASF entities are needed that help to form a superordinate (ingroup⁸) identity for the PASF, so that the various forces are working in support of one another. Doing so likely requires establishment of a single, overarching security philosophy that serves to guide all PASF entities. Presumably, doing so would also help to reduce opposition to security structure reforms delineated by the Palestinian Authority. International agencies can also guide the PASF toward this outcome through an emphasis on its common goals and broader Palestinian identity, though in service of this goal, it should take care not to characterize or emphasize the role of Israel as an enemy outgroup. The provision of greater safety should similarly shift the focus of Palestinian civil society from more local survival-based concerns to more global concerns focused on society as a whole, inclusive of the PASF, and in doing so, enables support for Palestinians' core identity.

Summary:

- Guide PASF toward completion of comprehensive legal documents that delineate PASF mission and duties in clear language
- Ensure that guidelines establish the lines of authority and purview within and across the forces
- Emphasize common Palestinian identity and goals as part of a superordinate ingroup, but avoid the pitfall of reinforcing Israel as the outgroup
- Work to establish a more cohesive security philosophy that can guide all of the PASF forces in pursuit of a common goal

Reform Suggestion 2

Re-establish the trust and legitimacy of Palestinian civil society in its security forces—this is a high priority goal, in order to promote civil society cooperation and adherence, as well as smooth the path for the PASF to perform its duties once these duties are more clearly and explicitly established.

The PASF violates the trust of its civil society in multiple ways. A major part of this distrust stems from the perception that the PASF is acting not in the interest of Palestinian civil society, but

⁸ An ingroup is a social group with which a person psychologically identifies (having a shared identity and common purpose).

instead in the service of Israel. The perception of illegitimacy is another major factor in decreasing trust in PASF entities. While the reality of Palestinian cooperation with Israel is not easily changed, the international agencies may want to focus its guidance of the PASF toward changing the perception that this cooperation constitutes collusion and that the needs of the Palestinian population are secondary—both of which serve to undermine trust. Changing Palestinians' perception can occur through the emphasis on the provision of mechanisms designed to enable Palestinian citizens' voices to be heard (i.e., acknowledgment) (e.g., by establishing formal complaint and feedback systems, not subject to retribution), as well as helping to train security personnel in the respectful and fair treatment of members of Palestinian civil society. Such treatment involves an emphasis on non-discriminatory treatment and the ceasing of human rights abuses such as violence perpetrated against those exercising their rights, illegal detentions, and other prohibited activities.

Pushing for greater transparency and accountability of the PASF with Palestinian civil society will also assist in moving toward this goal. In cases where formal judicial or other processes are not in place to enable internal investigation or review and accompanying recourse of PASF personnel. Working to establish a viable witness protection program is also critical for the conduct of investigations and the ability of Palestinian citizens to report crimes and abuses where they occur. Accountability can also be established through an emphasis on PASF entities taking responsibility for their missteps and apologizing to the population, where merited. Establishing a form of independent oversight, for example, through the appointment of an ombudsman, should help to solidify and maintain this accountability.

Emphasizing the proper selection of candidates for PASF positions in terms of background (e.g., life and professional experience) and representation of a broad range of demographics (e.g., age and education) should help to ensure a capable PASF workforce. Along those lines, it is also important to work toward reducing cronyism and other forms of selection bias in employment that has historically occurred within the PASF. Such actions will go a long way toward reestablishing Palestinian civil society's trust in its security forces and thus help to ensure greater adherence and cooperation.

Summary:

- Guide PASF toward establishing formal complaint and feedback systems, which will not result in retribution
- Establish protocols and training that facilitate respectful and fair treatment of members of Palestinian civil society, and avoid human rights abuses
- Emphasize the proper selection of candidates for PASF jobs at the individual and aggregate level
- Work to reduce cronyism and other forms of bias in employment selection within the PASF
- Encourage PASF entities to take responsibility for missteps and apologize to the population as needed when mistakes are made
- Work to establish an effective witness protection program
- Work to more generally increase transparency and accountability within the PASF
- Work to establish independent oversight, for example, through the appointment of an ombudsman to investigate citizens' complaints

Reform Suggestion 3

Improve the critical infrastructure and training required for the PASF to effectively implement its duties—though lack of sufficient equipment also poses a problem for the PASF in terms of execution of its duties, we perceive this may be less easily resolved at this time, due to the dependence of the Palestinian Authority for Israeli approval of material.

Though the fundamentals discussed in the prior two security sector reform suggestions should be given priority, and help to elucidate further the nature of the PASF's limitations and needs, this reform suggestion addresses shortfalls with critical infrastructure and training. The PASF communications infrastructure requires extensive updating and improvements in interoperability. Furthermore, training facilities should be centralized and training curricula should be streamlined where possible and differentiated where necessary. Proper training of PASF personnel is still seen as a high priority item by Palestinian civil society. The content of this training should be determined after a thorough audit of existing training both within and across each security force entity, as well as a needs assessment. In the design of this training, care should be taken to ensure that it maps back to the overarching security philosophy that we advise establishing above.

Summary:

- Prioritize the establishment and funding of an improved communications infrastructure for security
- Work to centralize training facilities for PASF forces
- Streamline training curricula to emphasize common principles and needs across PASF entities, while maintaining differentiation as needed
- Perform an audit of existing training
- Assess remaining training needs based on pain points after the higher priority goals have been met and/or barriers have been mitigated
- Ensure that training maps to the overarching security philosophy that should be established in advance

Conclusion

Overall, our analysis identified several internal and external barrier categories in the provision of security by the Palestinian security sector—fear based barriers, clarity and alignment barriers, population engagement barriers, capability barriers, and legal barriers. Several external barriers, which are based on factors or influence outside of Palestinian control, were identified (e.g., culture of fear, limitations on movement or other activities). However, as these factors are more difficult to overcome in the current environment in the West Bank, and in many cases may be rooted in an intractable problem, they were not addressed. Nevertheless, several internal barriers, such as insufficient legal frameworks or lack of preparedness, that are within the control of the Palestinian security sector were identified. Given that these are internal, and feasibly under the control of the Palestinian Authority, there are mitigating actions that can be taken by the Palestinian security sector in partnership with international partners, even given the currently limiting socio-political environment in the West Bank, to reduce or dampen the effect on the provision of security. Thus, drawing from our analysis, several high-level security sector reform measures and mitigation strategies emerged: clarify confusion over roles and responsibilities of the Palestinian security sector, strengthen legitimacy of the security forces in the eyes of Palestinian civil society, and improve equipping and training of the security forces. The analysis suggests that these three focus

areas are critical to the provision of security in the Palestinian security sector and are consistent with acceptable practices in modern security forces.

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Chapter 2: Challenges and Opportunities for Sovereignty in a State of Limited Arms

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Introduction

There is substantial disagreement about the exact structure and role of security forces in a future Palestinian state, but what is clear is that no Palestinian state will be established without limitations. While Palestinian leaders aspire to a fully sovereign state with defense capabilities, Israel insists on numerous restrictions to neutralize the threat potential. Decades of negotiations have sought common ground to bridge this considerable gap. In order to design an agreement that meets the needs of all parties and is sustainable, negotiators would benefit from study of the implications arms limitations have had for other states, and how they have endeavored to maintain sovereignty despite the inherent challenges limited arms brings.

In this study, ICONS Project researchers at the University of Maryland undertook an empirical analysis and a comparative case study approach to answer the question: *“What are the challenges and opportunities for sovereignty in a state of limited arms?”* Considering the conditions under which limited arms states operate – and investigating some of the common mechanisms used to overcome the challenges – the expectation was that new insights and ideas would come to light that can inform the design of effective proposals for establishing a Palestinian state that both meets Israel’s security requirements and ensures Palestinian sovereignty.

We begin with an overview of the parameters for “limited arms,” describe which states currently have arms restrictions, and examine the internal and external factors and trends that lead states to end up in this relatively rare category. Additionally, Israeli and Palestinian discourses regarding the issue of Palestinian defense capabilities is reviewed in brief. Next, a quantitative analysis is undertaken to determine which variables are correlated with a limited arms state’s ability to maintain sovereignty - we conclude that the most significant factor is the robustness of the *domestic* security forces. The report then examines in-depth five key case studies of states with limited arms: Costa Rica and Panama – paragons of an “army-less” state; Haiti – which demonstrates both the positive and negative impacts of international involvement; and Kosovo and Japan – examples of how demilitarization can be part of the road to post-conflict independence and statehood. Major themes regarding challenges and opportunities to sovereignty that limited arms often produce, and the mechanisms that states implement to protect sovereignty, are then synthesized in a concluding analytic section.

Overview of Limited Arms

Defining “Limited Arms”

This report defines states with limited arms as *states with little to no dedicated, external defense capacity*. In practical terms, this translates to states without an established military (or only a symbolic force) and low or no military expenditures. Some cases – i.e. autonomous regions, failed states, and dependencies – were excluded because they did not meet the basic requirements of a sovereign state.

The topic of individual states with limited arms is understudied. Reports documenting the history of individual cases do exist, but few serious studies – if any – provide broader analyses on how, why, or to what effect states limit their arms (Brenes 1998). This gap is not surprising given that only a small number of modern states have no military force. At the interstate level, arms limitations occur as demilitarized or buffer zones – usually imposed as temporary measures in the wake of conflicts between states. At the subnational level, arms limitations often take the form of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs during post-conflict transitions. Typically, this involves taking weapons out of the hands of all non-state armed groups, enabling the government to regain a monopoly on force (Muggah 2013).

Modern States with Limited Arms

Table 1 lists all 26 states that currently meet the criteria for “limited arms.” Japan was also included, despite being quite militarized today, because of its unique constitutional ban on offensive military forces. In the quantitative study, however, only the post-WWII years 1952-1961 were coded, since Japan’s demilitarized status was more relevant during that period. The right-hand column shows the eight to ten year spans used as observations for the regressions. Interestingly, the states that made the cut fall into three distinct categories: post-conflict states, European microstates, and island states.

Table 1: States with Limited Arms

State	Years Observed in Study
<i>Post-Conflict States</i>	
Costa Rica	1998-2007
Haiti	1998-2007
Japan	1952-1961
<i>Kosovo</i>	<i>Not used in quant. portion</i>
Panama	1998-2007
Solomon Islands	1998-2007
<i>European Microstates</i>	
Andorra	1998-2007
Liechtenstein	1998-2007
Monaco	1998-2007
San Marino	1998-2007
<i>Vatican City</i>	<i>Not used in quant. Portion</i>
<i>Islands</i>	
Antigua and Barbuda	1998-2007

Dominica	1998-2007
Federated States of Micronesia	1998-2007
Grenada	1998-2007
Iceland	1998-2007
Kiribati	1999-2007 (9 Obs.)
Marshall Islands	1998-2007
Mauritius	1990-1999
Nauru	1999-2007 (9 Obs.)
Palau	1998-2007
Samoa	1998-2007
St. Lucia	1998-2007
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	1998-2007
Tuvalu	1993-2002 (8 Obs.)
Vanuatu	1993-2002

Why States Limit their Arms

On the face of it, the decision to limit a state's arms is puzzling; logically, states without any military capacity would not be able to deter attackers and might fall prey to stronger forces. Despite this obvious increased vulnerability, a small number of states have maintained limited military forces and purely defensive national security strategies. Some states adopt a limited arms status voluntarily, while others do so as the result of negotiations or force. Regardless, most have realized some benefit from doing so. It is perhaps significant that – with the exception of Vatican City – all of the states are democratic. Moreover, few have faced foreign military threats since becoming limited arms states. That said, for several of them, demilitarization was spurred by a violent action – usually an internal conflict, coup, or foreign invasion (Barash 2013).

Domestic Factors

Internal political processes and realities typically either drive the need for a state to limit its arms or provide supporting rationales for doing so. In modern cases where states have limited their arms, one or more of the following domestic considerations are often at play:

- **Absence of threats.** For some states – especially island nations with few and distant neighbors and microstates in peaceful parts of Europe – there is a perception that there are no major threats from other states from which they need protection. Without the specter of future conflict, these states may choose to focus on domestic priorities.
- **Lack of capacity to maintain forces.** Some states with limited arms may face threats, but are wholly unable to provide for their own defense. These states often have small populations and limited resources.
- **Fear of military involvement in politics.** For states that have a history of military coups or other internal military interventions, separating guns and politics can be a top priority. A limited arms status must be achieved and maintained through shrewd political maneuvering on the part of leaders. The priority, moreover, must be political stability, rather than external power projection.

International Factors

In addition to the domestic factors outlined above, international factors – usually driven by other states – have also played a prominent role in states' decisions to limit their arms, often by either imposing the limitations or helping to guarantee security. Common international factors leading to or enabling arms limitations are:

- **Imposition by an intervening state.** In some cases, arms limitations have been imposed as the result of an international intervention. Perhaps the most famous example of this is Japan, which, after its defeat by the US military, was forced to disband its military and abide by a new set of US-approved rules. By abolishing the military, the intervening state eliminates a big source of opposition and also prevents military institutions from influencing political processes (Barash 2013).
- **Security guarantees from a more powerful state.** Many states have long-standing relationships with their former colonial powers or other neighboring powerful states. In those cases – like Monaco and France – external actors may provide security guarantees that then enable the state to comfortably maintain its sovereignty, despite having limited arms ("Settling in the Principality of Monaco" 2012). Another stronger form of guarantee is when that international guarantor is present in the limited arms state, either through existing military bases or as part of a peacekeeping operation.
- **Conditions of a negotiated peace agreement.** Limited arms can also come about as part of a negotiated settlement after a conflict. Serbia, for instance, would not agree to make peace with Kosovo if it remained armed, since it would continue to pose a security risk to both Serbia and its co-ethnics residing in Kosovo.

Limiting Arms as a Complex, Dynamic Process

As the above factors demonstrate, there are many paths to becoming a limited arms state. Achieving limited arms, however, does not happen in a day, nor is the status ever static. Demilitarization, for instance, has been on the African agenda for years, with states at various stages and with different ultimate visions. Many of the processes they have engaged in – downsizing military budgets, DDR programs, reforming security institutions, reorienting the military toward development and peacekeeping, and reformulating security paradigms – are similar to those pursued by those states listed in Table 1 above (Brenes 1998). On the flip side, there are precedents for the reverse process – remilitarization of limited arms states – when circumstances change and basic security needs are suddenly not being met.

Palestinian Arms Limitations

Unsurprisingly, there is substantial disagreement about the structure and role of security forces in a future Palestinian state. While Palestinian leaders aspire to a fully sovereign state with defense capabilities, Israel insists on numerous restrictions to neutralize the threat potential. Decades of negotiations have sought common ground to bridge this considerable gap (Aronson and Dermer 2012). The many debates, position papers, and proposals make clear that any negotiated two-state solution would require Palestinian acceptance of arms limitations in return for something approaching statehood (Luft 2001; Dermer and White 2012).

Israel, naturally, views the issue through a security lens; although some Israelis acknowledge the impressive progress Palestinian domestic security forces have made, past violence raises doubts

regarding Palestinian willingness or ability to control extremists. Allowing Palestine to develop full-fledged military force, moreover, would lead to fears that Palestinian forces might turn on Israel or arm terrorists (Ben-Naftali and Gross 2011; Eldar 2014). To Israel, this risk is plainly unacceptable. Instead, the Israeli vision for a Palestinian state – for those, that is, who support two states – maintains that it should be demilitarized, with an Israeli-vetted list of acceptable arms and equipment and no offensive military capabilities. The goal would be to give enough so that Palestinian domestic security forces could effectively police the state, but not engage in offensive operations or maintain defenses to resist invasion (Aronson and Dermer 2012). Additionally, Israel wants to maintain its privileged access (i.e. the right to conduct cross-border operations), base troops in the Jordan Valley, and continue exercising control over the electromagnetic spectrum, air, space, and sea (Sherwood 2014; Farkash 2011). Palestinians, in other words, would not have ultimate territorial sovereignty, but something more akin to autonomy.

For the Palestinians, however, sovereignty and a true end to the occupation are the ultimate goals (Aronson and Dermer 2012). Talk of any residual Israeli presence or special privileges in the West Bank is met with great opposition (Ellis 2014). With proper funding, training, and equipment, the Palestinian leadership expresses confidence that the security forces could effectively secure the state and its borders, and suppress any attacks against Israelis (Luft 2001; Eldar 2014). Past Palestinian positions indicate a willingness – not to demilitarize – but to adhere to limitations that are mutually agreed upon, between equal states. Restrictions could include anything from bans on equipment to signing agreements with Israel’s enemies, but many would willingly commit in exchange for sovereignty (Ravid 2013; Dermer and White 2012).

The important distinction between the Israeli and Palestinian positions is that Israel wants a Palestinian state to start with no capabilities and then set a list of permissions (Farkash 2011). Palestinians, however, would like to start with full capabilities and then agree on a list of limitations. Although they start at opposite ends of the spectrum, the two driving needs – Israeli security and Palestinian sovereignty – are not fundamentally at odds. In theory, their positions might converge near the middle with a list of agreed-upon permissions and restrictions and perhaps the insertion of an international third party to close the gap on tough issues like early warning in the Jordan Valley (Aronson and Dermer 2012; Ellis 2014). In order to design an agreement that meets the needs of all parties and is sustainable, it would benefit negotiators to deeply understand the implications arms limitations have had for other states, and how they have endeavored to maintain sovereignty, despite the inherent challenges limited arms brings.

Analysis of Cases of Limited Arms States

Quantitative and qualitative analyses of relevant cases were undertaken to better understand the dynamics behind the phenomenon of limited arms (see also Barr et al. 2015). In the following section, we summarize these findings and then draw relevant conclusions for the Palestinian case.

Quantitative Study: Factors Relevant to the Maintenance of Sovereignty in Limited Arms States

In this portion of the study we focus on three major categories of variables that have broad impact on state success: macroeconomics, institutional characteristics, and security characteristics. Based on anecdotal evidence and the broader literature, it would be expected that higher values for domestic security force capability, economic capacity and military capacity would be correlated with higher values for maintaining sovereignty. It would also be expected that membership in a Commonwealth or a defense agreement with the United States would be positively correlated with

sovereignty. However, **the results of the statistical analysis show that only the level of domestic security forces was statistically significant, indicating its positive effect on maintaining sovereignty.**

The results of a probit analysis show that for a state with limited arms and no domestic security forces, there is only a 38% probability of maintaining sovereignty. That figure increases to 71% with low level domestic security forces, 94% with medium level domestic security forces, and finally to less than a 1% probability of sovereignty being violated with highly robust domestic security forces

The strong correlation between domestic security force capacity and maintaining sovereignty, combined with the fact that 62% of sovereignty violations were of the *governance* component, suggests that the greatest threat to sovereignty in states with limited arms is the loss of *governance* capacity (i.e. the government can no longer govern and/or protect its own population). Having domestic security forces, even at their lowest capacity level, increases the chances of maintaining sovereignty from 38% to 71%. The inherent logic of the findings is strong – states without internal security capacity are prone to instability and less likely to be able to maintain control of the institutions and mechanism of governance.

Qualitative Analysis: In-Depth Case Studies

The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the existence of robust *domestic* security forces is highly correlated with a limited arms state’s ability to preserve its sovereignty. The following provides a brief overview and assessment of each of the five qualitative case studies.

The post-conflict states resonate most strongly with the Palestinian situation because of the need for transition and the establishment of a new status quo. Thus, those states – Costa Rica, Panama, Haiti, Kosovo, and Japan – were selected for in-depth review. Their diverse experiences provide important insights into the challenges and opportunities to sovereignty that often come with arms limitations, as well as mechanisms to help preserve it. Table 2 provides a brief summary of findings for each of the five post-conflict states in this study.

Table 2: Case Studies Overview

<u>Country</u>	<u>Overview</u>
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overview: Costa Rica disbanded its military in 1948 after a brutal civil war and the ban is now codified in their constitution. It has faced threats, mainly from non-state criminal actors and due to territorial disputes with Nicaragua. Costa Rica has, however, been remarkably capable of defending itself through diplomacy, international agreements, and its well-trained domestic security force. Today, Costa Rica actively promotes non-violent conflict resolution worldwide. • Assessment: Brightest example of a sovereign state without arms.
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overview: Panama abolished its military in 1994 after a US intervention crushed President Noriega’s military dictatorship. Although Panama faces some regional threats, especially from non-state criminal actors, removing the military’s influence in politics was an important, positive milestone. Today its domestic forces are quite robust, but under civilian control. • Assessment: Example of the value of robust, but depoliticized domestic security forces.

<p>Haiti</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overview; Haiti disbanded its military in 1995 after years of military coups and human rights abuses. The country has been plagued with violence and disasters and, due to its limited capacity, international interventions have been required to fill the security vacuum. Recently, however, Haiti has taken steps to reestablish its military. • Assessment: Example of the role of international intervention.
<p>Kosovo</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overview: Kosovo underwent demilitarization as part of its road to independence after a 1999 war with Yugoslavia. After the conflict, it relied heavily on international support as it took steps toward statehood. Today, Kosovo maintains a lightly-armed domestic security force, but is gradually preparing it to transform into a military. • Assessment: Model example of arms limitations as part of the road to independence.
<p>Japan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overview: Post-WWII, Japan’s constitution banned the development of a military. Despite the prohibition, it rearmed in a matter of years with US support, but maintained a pacifist, defense-only discourse. Over time, Japan evolved into one of the world’s military giants, but it still preserves limits on acceptable foreign military engagement. • Assessment: Shows the evolution of a pacifist state from limited to nearly full military capabilities, all within a self-defense discourse.

Analysis: Key Lessons for Preserving Sovereignty in Limited Arms States

This section summarizes key insights regarding the common challenges and opportunities to state sovereignty faced by limited arms states. In addition, a list of mechanisms used by limited arms states to preserve their sovereignty is also discussed.

Common Challenges to Sovereignty

- **Limited capacity to manage internal security and counter non-state actors.** Some limited arms states – especially those in which a disbanded military used to be heavily engaged in domestic security – find their domestic security forces, if they have them, are too weak to ensure internal security. They typically have fewer dedicated resources and capacity for defending against non-state actors – such as drug cartels and rebel movements – that may cross or operate within their borders. Even worse is if the domestic forces have to be developed from scratch. While it is important to take time to train them properly, a security vacuum sometimes persists in the meantime. Additionally, limited arms states may have weaker capacity to deal with other types of crises, like natural disasters and epidemics.
- **Dependence on the international community.** Limited arms states are sometimes deeply reliant on more militarized allies that serve as defense guarantors or international peacekeeping missions that ensure their stability. These relationships are often necessary and beneficial to the post-conflict state, but are usually also asymmetric. The influence the international actors have over the state, however, may deprive a limited arms state of some of its authority over its foreign policy decisions or subject it to other political pressure and manipulation. In this respect, too great involvement by an external third party, even if helpful, may erode some sovereignty.
- **Inability to counterbalance regional threats.** States with limited arms do not have the military capacity that is typically in place to deter states or transnational actors from violating

their sovereignty. Without the ability to partake in external military actions – or even defend itself in the case of more local issues like territorial disputes – a state’s ability to project power internationally must come from non-military means only. This makes it harder to gain influence as an international power or, in some cases, effectively establish itself as a full, sovereign state. Furthermore, the inability to engage in offensive operations raises criticism from some who feel that limited arms states are not shouldering their fair share of the burden of protecting collective global security.

Common Opportunities for Sovereignty

- **Increases resources available for other needs.** States with limited arms often are able to redirect resources from military expenditures to other needed areas. Resources may go to post-conflict reconstruction, socio-economic development, or other national priorities like environmental conservation. In other cases, there might not be notable improvements because the state’s budget is already extremely tight. On the flip side, securing resources is often the key difficulty for limited arms states that decide to remilitarize. In general, states that do not have a dedicated defense spending may ultimately view national security as a more integrated concept that encompasses economic, social, environmental, and political matters and rightly focuses on improving citizens’ quality of life as a key to security.
- **Promotes a peaceful image that assuages rival states’ concerns.** A limited arms state’s intentions cannot easily be misconstrued as seeking war, thus other states have less to fear from them and escalation of conflict is more avoidable. In regions with recent histories of conflict, this is an effective way to appease former rivals and deescalate tensions. Having limited arms also encourages states to bolster their use of political channels, diplomacy, and other non-violent processes of change. In some states with limited arms, the people view their peaceful status as a source of pride and the governments use the success of demilitarization as a talking point to promote peaceful foreign relations and dispute resolution mechanisms – both between states and between the government and its citizens.
- **Enables consolidation of statehood and internal stability.** Some states with histories of conflict find that banning their militaries actually opened up space for the development and consolidation of independent, democratic, and more internally stable countries. The absence of a military often reduces the threat of coups or the destabilizing impact when military leaders get embroiled in politics. Coupled with the fact that states no longer need to expend energy and resources on building defense capabilities, and the opportunities for and focus on peaceful political and institutional development increases. Demilitarization can also be a key factor enabling the end of conflict and the securing of agreements on the path forward toward independence, since the independence of the state with limited arms is not as threatening.

Mechanisms to Preserve Sovereignty

- **Develop robust domestic security forces.** States with limited external military capacity may, nonetheless, develop strong and capable domestic security forces. In many cases, an expanded role for police and other paramilitary forces is necessary to provide the state with both internal security and a first line of defense along its borders. One of the key differences between these domestic forces and traditional military forces is the element of civilian control, which mitigates the risks often associated with powerful and independent militaries.
- **Accept international protection and assistance.** Arrangements with a third party security guarantor – whether an individual state or a UN peacekeeping mission – are effective ways for a state with limited arms to obtain direct, targeted assistance to preserve sovereignty. Hosting

international actors who also have a vested interest in the state's stability can fill in gaps in internal security, deter potential attacks, and create a stable space in which the state can begin to develop proper institutions that can take over those functions when they are ready. International allies and peacekeepers also often dedicate significant resources and technical support to ensure those institutions work. It is true that inviting large international interventions may lead to a temporary lessening of sovereignty overall. However, it can also be viewed as a temporary phase, after which the state will emerge more prepared to defend itself and its sovereignty.

- **Join - and employ - collective security arrangements and peaceful dispute resolution.** Gaining admission to an international or regional organizations that ensures members' defense can be an effective security buffer for a state with limited arms. Here lies an important distinction between transferring or ceding sovereignty to a third party and transferring the *defense* of sovereignty. In addition to membership in multilateral organizations, some limited arms states also secure bilateral treaties and other arrangements that promote peaceful dispute resolution and ensure mutual defense - or a neutral or non-aligned stance - if threats to sovereignty do occur. This kind of regional and international alliance building is, in reality, one of the strongest mechanisms to deter potential attackers.
- **Remilitarize gradually and intentionally.** While some states maintain a limited arms status indefinitely, for others, the need for limited arms changes with the evolving security environment in which they find themselves. When the international community leaves or rival states start exercising their military muscles, the desire to remilitarize can gain traction - especially in states where the barriers to engaging are self-imposed. That said, most states recognize the sensitivities and local and international concerns that may result from the decision to rebuild a military structure that was usually limited for good reasons. With these concerns in mind, most limited arms states that remilitarize do so gradually and are as explicit as possible about their intentions.

Conclusion

A future Palestinian state will likely be subject to some form of arms limitation. While Palestinian leaders aspire to a fully sovereign state with only slightly limited defense capabilities, Israel insists on heavy restrictions to neutralize the threat potential. In this report, an empirical analysis and comparative case study approach sought to answer the question: *"What are the challenges and opportunities for sovereignty in a state of limited arms?"*

After defining what is meant by "limited arms" and the factors and trends that states in this category face, the short list of modern states with limited arms is reviewed. A brief discussion of Palestinian and Israeli discourses regarding the future Palestinian defense capabilities provides some context on why the issue is so vital to negotiations. From the quantitative analysis, it is concluded that the most significant factor in a limited arms state's ability to ensure sovereignty is the robustness of its *domestic* security forces. The in-depth examination of five key case studies of states with limited arms then follows with its own set of insights: Costa Rica and Panama are paragons of an "army-less" state; Haiti demonstrates the dual impact of international involvement; and Kosovo and Japan provide examples of how demilitarization can be part of the road to post-conflict independence and statehood. The major themes regarding challenges and opportunities to sovereignty and the mechanisms that states implement to protect that sovereignty, are synthesized in the final section and briefly summarized here:

Common challenges to sovereignty. Although specifics of the challenges vary by country, common issues include a lack of capacity to maintain internal security or defend against non-state actors, dependence on international support, and an inability to cope with external threats.

Common opportunities for sovereignty. Without a military, limited arms states often benefit from having more resources to devote to crucial development needs, a more peaceful reputation that demonstrates regional rivals that they are not a threat, and opportunities to more easily consolidate their independence and internal stability.

Mechanisms to preserve sovereignty. Many limited arms states seek to preserve their sovereignty through the development of robust domestic security forces, international security guarantees and assistance, and international cooperation on defense. In some cases, states also gradually lift the arms limitations and remilitarize to better meet threats as conditions change.

As the case studies demonstrate, the existence of arms limitations does not necessarily deprive states of sovereignty. In fact, states like Costa Rica and Japan have thrived despite – or even due to – their limited external military capacities. It is true that challenges to sovereignty are often exacerbated by the lack of defensive capabilities, but sometimes the benefits of not maintaining expensive forces can outweigh the negative consequences. By implementing thoughtful strategies like obtaining international security guarantees or maintaining robust domestic security forces, moreover, states with limited arms can ensure their sovereignty is protected. Understanding these states' past experiences may help negotiators design proposals on arms limitations that will hopefully enable both a sovereign Palestinian state and a secure Israel.

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Chapter 3: Governance and Security Challenges of non-Contiguous States – A Historical Perspective

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Introduction

The geographical complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict virtually assure that a future Palestinian state will be non-contiguous. Contributing factors include the split between the West Bank and Gaza, as well as potential land swaps in the West Bank that leave Palestinian communities interrupted by Israeli land. Even today, the Palestinian Authority faces difficulties managing its non-contiguous areas (often called *exclaves*). Given that non-contiguity would likely affect a future Palestinian state's ability to maintain its sovereignty, examining how other non-contiguous states have dealt with similar challenges is a useful and informative exercise.

In this report, a comparative case study approach and empirical analysis are applied to answer the question: *"What are the challenges of achieving unity government and maintaining effective security in non-contiguous states?"* By considering states that have encountered the challenges of non-contiguity, and investigating the mechanisms used to overcome them, we hope to provide negotiators and governing authorities with insights on how to effectively prepare for a non-contiguous Palestinian state – or, at a minimum, to better cope with the challenges of the current status quo.

The report begins with an overview of non-contiguity, including geographical definitions related to non-contiguity and some historical background. Then, a dataset of present-day non-contiguous states is provided, followed by an overview of general issues that non-contiguity raises and some of the most common ways non-contiguous territories' statuses are handled. Finally, the concept of non-contiguity as it relates to the Palestinian context is briefly discussed.

The next section delves into in-depth reviews of five carefully-selected case studies in non-contiguity. The first two cases – Angola's separatist region Cabinda and Russia's Kaliningrad oblast – present the challenges of managing a single major exclave. The other three – the shared town of Baarle in The Netherlands and Belgium; the Fergana Valley exclaves of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; and the tangled Cooch Behar exclaves of India and Bangladesh –illustrate the challenges inherent in managing exclave complexes. Following that, the results of the quantitative study are presented, revealing factors that affect non-contiguous states' ability to maintain security in their exclaves. A final lessons-learned section synthesizes the major challenges and key mechanisms to ensuring sovereignty in the face of non-contiguity.

Overview of Non-Contiguity

Understanding Non-Contiguous States

An uninterrupted territory with defined borders is usually thought to be essential to the essence and smooth functioning of a state. States generally adhere to some form of geographic vision –


whether shaped by natural boundaries, historical events, homogeneity of a population within a certain area, or larger conceptions of national purpose (e.g., US Manifest Destiny). National identity, as a result, often becomes linked to geography (Dijkink 1996). Despite this, many states over the years have, by design or accident, included territories separated from the mainland. When a state's geographic vision is broken into non-contiguous parts, the disruption often poses unique problems for ensuring sovereignty (Robinson 1953).

Geographic Definitions of Non-contiguity

Literature on state geographic boundaries offers a slew of – albeit non-standardized – terminology for describing types of territorial discontinuity. The most useful term is *exclave*, which refers to a territory of a state separated from it by the territory of one or more foreign states (Robinson 1953; Vinokurov 2006). A corollary concept – *enclave* – describes an exclave from the perspective of the surrounding state. For instance, Campione d'Italia is an Italian exclave (Italian territory), but a Swiss enclave (surrounded by Switzerland). Although the two terms are often interchanged, an exclave may be surrounded by many states and/or foreign territorial waters, while an enclave must be fully surrounded by only *one* foreign state (Whyte 2002). To illustrate, the main types of exclaves are depicted in the diagram of three states (Figure 1) – A, B, and C – and their five non-contiguous territories. The territories labelled A₁-A₄ are all exclaves of A because they are not connected to A via land (or by A's territorial waters). In addition:

- A₁ is an enclave because B fully surrounds it
- A₂ is not an enclave because it borders two states
- A₃ is not an enclave because it borders water in addition to a foreign state
- A₄ is a counter-enclave (or counter-exclave) because it is an exclave within exclave B₁
- B₁ is an exclave of B and an enclave of A.

Figure 1: Exclave types



The interconnectedness of the states in the diagram demonstrates that effective management of a non-contiguous territory does not depend only on the state that owns it (also called the mainland, home state, or motherland). Instead, robust and cooperative relationships between the home state and the surrounding (or host) states – as well as good relations between each involved state and the exclave population – are vital to enable the successful provision of governance and security, as well as respect for sovereignty overall (Vinokurov 2007)

Another consideration is that non-contiguous arrangements are rarely as neat as in the diagram. Exclave complexes – multiple exclaves clumped together in one region – are a case in point (Vinokurov 2007). There are also many territories that do not meet the technical definition of an exclave, but are nonetheless exclaves in practice. Proposed categories often include: (1) Quasi-exclaves – non-contiguous fragments which have somehow resolved their non-contiguity (for instance, if a bridge was built between A and A₄), (2) Pene-exclaves – technically contiguous, but due to weather or topography are usually only accessible via the territory of another state (for instance if A₃ bordered A's territorial waters, but there was no ferry service), (3) Temporary exclaves – created by an arbitrary political line, like an armistice, and (4) Virtual exclaves – treated as an exclave of a state to which it is not strictly a part (Robinson 1959).

A few other forms of non-contiguity are worth mentioning, although they are beyond the scope of this study. Archipelago states and states with islands may have fragments separated by foreign territorial waters or the Exclusive Economic Zones of another state, and thus be formally considered exclaves (Whyte 2002). At the subnational level, there are innumerable examples of exclaves belonging to different administrative districts and also examples of enclaved groups, communities that hold the same nationality as those around them, but are ethnically, religiously, or linguistically distinct (Eide 1995).

In this study, the term exclave is given preference since it describes a broad spectrum of non-contiguity and frames the territory in terms of its home state, rather than from the perspective of the surrounding state(s). It is important to note for readers looking to investigate the topic further, however, that the term *enclave* is also widely used in discussions of many of the examples covered here. Regardless of the technical definitions of exclaves, enclaves, and other fragment varieties, the key characteristic that makes such a territory meaningful is its *degree of separation* from the rest of the home state (Minghi 1963). It is this practical distance that leads to real challenges and, thus, is the core factor of interest in this research.

A Historical Perspective on Non-contiguity

Generally speaking, the creation of exclaves occurred during three historical periods: (1) pre-Westphalia, (2) during and after colonialism, and (3) following the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Vinokurov 2006). To a great extent, when an exclave was established determined the nature of many of the challenges it would later face. The discussion below will focus exclusively on the period following the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

The final era of exclave creation followed the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. With once monolithic territories becoming suddenly divided, subnational and administrative non-contiguities that did make a difference before suddenly mattered (Vinokurov 2007). For instance, Dubrovnik became separated from the newly independent Croatia and the Russian village of Dubki became isolated when Estonia became a state (Gardner and Krie 2005). In modern times, an estimated 250 or so enclaves survive, predominantly in Western Europe, along the edges of the former Soviet Union, and in South Asia (Schendel 2002). In addition, many exclaves have been exchanged or united with their previously inaccessible home states thanks to the construction of new infrastructure. The surviving exclaves mostly linger on due to international unwillingness to exchange them, national or local pride, and a lack of pressing need to do away with them (Jacobs 2011).

Modern Non-Contiguous States

Data Set of States with Non-Contiguous Territories

For this study, a unique data set was compiled of all known non-contiguous states existing today. A *non-contiguous state* is defined here as a state with a territory that is separated (either completely or in practical terms) from the mainland by a foreign land border. There were, however, some exclusions to eliminate cases which might not be relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian case, including: unpopulated lands, colonies, dependencies, territories separated only by foreign waters (i.e. islands), and all non-contiguous states resolved before 1850, and states with exclave populations under 200 people. Also excluded were territories that are currently occupied by a host state or are

only *de facto* independent. The full list of cases considered is in Table 2. While all were used in the quantitative analysis, the most relevant cases (marked in italics) were chosen for the in-depth qualitative portion of this study.

Table 2: States with non-contiguous territories

State	Territory
<i>Angola</i>	<i>Cabinda</i>
Armenia	Artchvašen
Austria	Kleinwalsertal Alpine Valley, Jungholz
Azerbaijan	Nakhichevan
<i>Bangladesh</i>	<i>Cooch Behar exclave complex</i>
<i>Belgium</i>	<i>Baarle-Nassau exclave complex</i>
Bosnia & Herz.	Sastavci
Brunei	Temburong District
Canada	St. Regis, Campobello Island
Croatia	Dubrovnik
Cyprus (Rep.)	Ormidhia, Xylotymbou
East Timor	Oecusse-Ambeno
Germany	Busingen am Hochrhein., Konstanz, Münsterbildchen, Roetgener Wald, Mützenich
<i>India</i>	<i>Cooch Behar exclave complex</i>
Italy	Campione d'Italia
<i>Kyrgyzstan</i>	<i>Barak</i>
Namibia	Impalila Island
Oman	Madha, Musandam
<i>Russia</i>	<i>Kaliningrad, Dubki</i>
Spain	Llívia
Switzerland	Stein am Rhein, Schaffhausen
<i>Tajikistan</i>	<i>Varukh</i>
<i>The Netherlands</i>	<i>Baarle-Hertog exclave complex, Zeeland</i>
Turkey	Eastern Thrace
US	Point Roberts, Province Point, Alaska
<i>Uzbekistan</i>	<i>Sokh, Shakhimardan,</i>

General Trends

Non-contiguous territories tend to have a much greater influence than their typically small size and populations would suggest and they pose unique obstacles to the effective functioning of the state (Ratner 1996; Falah 2005). Chief among the concerns is usually access. Whether because of geographical barriers or hostile neighbors, exclaves are often isolated from the mainland – and this may contribute to the state’s ability to ensure a reasonable quality of life for the residents, as well as secure its own sovereignty over it (Vinokurov 2006). Related to that, ensuring border security in a state with a non-contiguous territory takes on a whole new dimension as the distance may complicate its military defensibility (Gibler 2014). Moreover, high transportation costs, limited market access, and difficulty supplying basic goods and services often negatively impact the

territory's economic and development opportunities (Sutton and Payne 1993; Minghi 1963). The relationship with the host state(s) may also be complex, requiring creative solutions to routine issues – like service provision and freedom of movement – or bigger questions regarding sovereignty or control over the exclave (*European Small Exclaves* 2009; Berger 2010b). Finally, the isolation and uncertainty exclave populations have about the future affect their sense of identity and belonging to the state (Vinokurov 2006).

There are many innovative ways states have dealt with these challenges. Often, administration is made easier by giving the territory a high level of autonomy so that it can self-govern, rather than wait for the mainland to address its concerns. Even without full autonomy, the decentralization of certain powers, as in a federal system, can relieve some of the strains of governing from a distance (McBeath and Helms 1983). To cope with economic disadvantages, exclaves may be given favorable economic statuses and federal subsidies or even develop opportunities for tourism. Alternatively, some states allow greater economic integration of the exclave with the state in which it is enclaved (Gardner and Krie 2005).

Taken to the limit, these non-contiguous territories sometimes end up being absorbed by the host state, either through official land swaps, territorial leasing, or even conquest (van Efferink 2009). The ease with which an exclave can be eliminated relies heavily on the sentiments of the residents of the exclave, the mainland state, and the host state (Gardner and Krie 2005; Robinson 1959).

Ultimately, the study of non-contiguous states does not provide a singular narrative. On the one hand, there are cases of success, where exclaves have existed in peace with their home and host states. In 2009, for instance, the mayors of five small European exclaves – Campion d'Italia, Busingen am Hochrhein, Llivia, Baarle-Hertog, and Baarle-Nassau – convened for a conference on how their history of adaptation, cooperation across borders, and focus on citizens' needs can serve as positive examples for other enclaved peoples (*European Small Exclaves* 2009). Unfortunately, however, a good portion of non-contiguous territories also remain poor, neglected, and contested or – like Azerbaijan and Armenia's exclaves – occupied (Gardner and Krie 2005). The case studies in the following section reveal lessons from a few of these paths, both optimistic and challenging.

Non-contiguity in the Israeli-Palestinian Context

If Palestine gained statehood, it would almost certainly end up with numerous exclaves. In fact, it would face two distinct types of non-contiguity: the West Bank-Gaza split (which would make Gaza the world's most populous exclave) and possibly several non-contiguous fragments in the West Bank, interrupted by Israeli settlers' land (Vinokurov 2007). Creating a cohesive state that encompasses these many non-contiguous parts would require special political measures to overcome the likely barriers to movement, trade, development, etc. (Tharoor 2014). The key phrase in most discussions about a future two-state solution is *viability*. Without territorial integrity – or robust measures to counteract the negative effects of separated territory – a Palestinian state may, in fact, not ever be viable (Kotef and Amir 2011). Non-contiguity, then, is at the heart of the debate over how to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Even under today's status quo, however, *de facto* exclaves of the most challenging kind are already part of daily life. Gazans are physically, politically, and economically divided from West Bank Palestinians and blockaded by Israel from land, sea, and air. Entry and exit are completely dependent on obtaining Israeli or Egyptian permission (Hasson 2010). There have long been discussions of implementing a corridor between Gaza and the West Bank, what Bill Clinton's plan

referred to as “permanent safe passage” (Rothem 2011). The political obstacles to doing so, however, are great.

Moreover, the West Bank’s separation into different administrative and security zones – Areas A, B, and C – has also created an intense fragmentation into what has been described as “an archipelago of truncated spaces” (Hasson 2010). Israeli checkpoints within the West Bank intensify this separation by limiting freedom of movement, even between Palestinian towns. The effect is a fragmentation of “both the space and the Palestinian social fabric living within it.” Complicating matters even further, many of these dividing lines are unmarked and constantly shifting, leaving residents uncertain even about where the divisions fall (Kotef and Amir 2011).

While checkpoints may be dismantled, Israeli settlements are far more complicated. Settlement construction throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem has continued to expand at a rapid pace over the past decade. According to many experts, it is the biggest obstacle to creating a Palestinian state with any sense of territorial integrity (Tharoor 2014). The notion of Israeli “ethno-territorial exclaves” has been discussed as a possible, but undesirable solution. During the most recent peace talks under US Secretary of State John Kerry, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu even floated the idea and was, as expected, met with almost universal opposition; Israelis argued the security for Israeli exclave residents could not be guaranteed and Palestinians decried the idea that any settlements might remain (Newman 2014).

Ultimately, the withdrawal of settlers, mutual land swaps, and construction of a corridor to Gaza could minimize the severity of Palestinian non-contiguity. Many believe, however, that the failure to resolve the majority of the territorial issues will preclude the establishment of two separate, sovereign states (Tharoor 2014). The following case studies aim to show how other states have survived and even thrived, despite the challenges presented by their exclaves.

Summary of Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis

Case Study Analysis

From the data set of non-contiguous states presented in Table 2 above, five cases were selected. To address the challenges relevant to the Gaza Strip, Angola’s exclave, Cabinda (the site of a mainly low-intensity separatist struggle) and Russia’s Kaliningrad oblast (an exclave suffering from economic grievances in a difficult neighborhood) were covered. The second group of case studies looks at exclave complexes, more akin to the West Bank situation. These were analyzed by region, rather than country, in order to better capture the interplay along both sides of the border. Reviewed are the town of Baarle shared between The Netherlands and Belgium, the exclaves in the Fergana Valley where Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan meet, and the most complex border situation of all: the Cooch Behar exclaves of India and Bangladesh.

The Table 1 briefly summarizes the five cases selected for in-depth qualitative review, from which lessons were derived.

Table 1: Case Studies Overview

<u>Country</u>	<u>Overview</u>
Angola (Cabinda)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overview <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Cabinda is an oil-rich region that became part of Angola in 1975, after the Portuguese colonizers left. For years, the Angolan government has been

	<p>fighting separatist rebels in Cabinda, FLEC, who claim they are marginalized and exploited.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Angola maintains a very strong military presence in the exclave and there has been only minimal international intervention. <p>● Assessment: Provides example of the difficulties of fighting a separatist threat and logistical challenges of providing security in an exclave.</p>
<p>Russia (Kaliningrad)</p>	<p>● Overview</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Kaliningrad has a long history of rule by both Germans and Russians, but was annexed by the Soviets in 1945. The residents remain strong supporters of Russia, but have often also felt marginalized. ○ Russia granted Kaliningrad special economic status to address the region's poor development. It is strategically important because it has Russia's only ice-free European port and is home to the Russian Baltic Fleet. Russia has used it to counterbalance NATO influence. <p>● Assessment: Reveals how exclaves can be strategic assets in a difficult neighborhood, but also the challenges of a lack of easy access.</p>
<p>The Netherlands & Belgium</p>	<p>● Overview</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ There are a total of 30 Dutch and Belgian exclaves in the town of Baarle. Seven of the Dutch exclaves are counter exclaves. Their origins are medieval treaties and land sales. ○ Despite some minor land disputes, The Netherlands and Belgium also developed successful mechanisms to consult and make policy on common issues affecting the exclaves. <p>● Assessment: Documents a long history of generally amicable relations along a complex border, as well as ideas to manage administrative issues.</p>
<p>Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan & Uzbekistan</p>	<p>● Overview</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ There are several exclaves in the Fergana Valley, most of which are located in Kyrgyzstan. After the breakup of the USSR, they became a source of border conflicts, ethnic tension, and other struggles. ○ The region's governments have invested considerable resources to develop infrastructure bypassing border crossings, but residents still have limited access. Mining of borders have also led to civilian casualties. <p>● Assessment: Shows how security-focused policies can undermine opportunities for cooperation.</p>
<p>India & Bangladesh</p>	<p>● Overview</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ There are approximately 162 exclaves divided between India and Bangladesh, including a counter-counterexclave. This difficult border arrangement has been an issue since India and Pakistan split in 1947 and persisted when East Pakistan became Bangladesh. ○ Despite decades of dialogue and promises to resolve the issues, the exclaves remain a point of tension and source of border conflicts. The exclaves are difficult to govern and residents of the exclaves are perpetually underserved, even ignored. <p>● Assessment: Demonstrates the human cost of failing to properly manage exclaves, particularly the results of underdevelopment and neglect.</p>

Empirical Findings

The quantitative section of the report presents a traditional, empirical approach in order to more easily observe the relationship between variables related to population, non-contiguous characteristics, and regional history and the effective maintenance of security in non-contiguous territories. According to the model, a history of regional conflict around the non-contiguous territory correlates dramatically with failure of the state to provide security. A history of regional conflict means a reduction of 68% in the likelihood of maintaining effective security. Put another way, only 24% of observations with a history of regional conflict also showed maintenance of effective security, whereas that percentage was 90% for observations without a history of conflict.

Analysis: Key Lessons for Preserving Sovereignty in Non-Contiguous States

The cases analyzed in both the qualitative and quantitative sections of this report demonstrate how difficult it can be to maintain general sovereignty – and, specifically, governance and security – over a non-contiguous territory. At the same time, they also provide many useful insights into what mechanisms states have used – successfully or not – to maintain their sovereignty. This section synthesizes those key lessons.

Governance and Security Challenges

The challenges that non-contiguity introduces range from minor inconveniences to existential threats. It can be very difficult for a state to maintain access to its territory in order to govern it, much less actually provide security. The following are the seven main categories of challenges derived from the case studies and the empirical analysis:

- **Grievances due to isolation and neglect.** Because of limited access and freedom of movement, high transport costs, and hostile neighbor relations, residents of exclaves are often separated from their fellow co-nationals and neighbors by more than geography. Exclaves are more likely to be poor and underdeveloped and, often, the economy suffers from high unemployment and increased barriers to trade. In some cases, the state is barely present or unable to provide even basic services like electricity and water. Local grievances due to isolation and neglect often lead to civil unrest.
- **Lack of national identity/sense of belonging.** When an exclave is culturally and socially isolated from the rest of its home state – in addition to the physical separation – chances are good that these weak ties translate to a decrease in its residents' feelings of national identity and belonging to the state. When coupled with economic and political grievances, this severe disassociation from the state can lead to domestic insurgencies and threat of secession.
- **Conflict over borders/lack of demarcation.** A significant source of conflict for states with exclaves is simply their inability to agree on which state has rights to what land and where the official borders lie. Claims and counter-claims may be difficult to sort out after years of practice and a history of competing agreements. The lack of demarcated borders can affect everything from how a state can secure its borders to who has control of resources.
- **Indefensibility and vulnerability to crime.** Securing and defending the borders of non-contiguous territories can be a challenge because of distance, even when the borders are properly demarcated. These areas are often sought out by criminals – and even terrorists – since law enforcement is generally weak or nonexistent. Because of their porous borders and

strategic location between countries, moreover, exclaves have historically been hubs for smuggling.

- **Differences in law and culture.** The challenge of reconciling different laws and cultures is particularly difficult when two states are intertwined through their exclaves and must jointly make decisions about how the region will operate as a whole. Even in situations where one exclave is surrounded by one foreign state, tensions in everything from customs regulations to language can present additional barriers to the smooth functioning of residents' daily lives.
- **Lack of trust and cooperation between authorities.** A great deal of trust and cooperation is required for an exclave to be viable. When states have trouble working together at the national level, issues like an exclave's access, service provision, and economic integration often go unresolved. In addition, tensions between the national government and local exclave authorities also arise, particularly when the national government is anxious to maintain strong control, while the exclave authorities would rather pursue local solutions to local problem.
- **Hostile neighbors.** As the empirical analysis demonstrated, there is a high correlation between a history of regional conflict and a state's ability to maintain security in its exclave. Evidence from the case studies demonstrates that all other challenges are increased by a tense or antagonistic relationship between an exclave's home state and host state.

Mechanisms to Preserve Sovereignty

Despite the fact that non-contiguity can pose significant challenges to maintaining governance, security, and overall sovereignty, there are many mechanisms – some basic and some highly creative and unique – which states have utilized over the years to mitigate negative impacts. The success rates of these mechanisms vary considerably.

- **Negotiate with host state over exclave states.** An important factor is the quality of relations between the home state and the state that hosts its exclave. Often, continual negotiations are needed to address issues as they arise and change over time. For instance, negotiations may focus on establishing corridors, trade regulations between the host and exclave communities, or even land swap agreements to exchange the exclaves once and for all.
- **Officially demarcate borders.** Some states spend years in negotiations trying to determine the border lines once and for all. When bilateral negotiations are not capable of resolving long-standing disputes, however, some states have instead successfully turned to international mediation or arbitration (like the ICJ) or independent border commissions as trusted means to objectively and definitively resolve where the borders officially lie.
- **Integrate exclave with surrounding region.** One of the most practical – but perhaps politically difficult – ways to resolve the local grievances of exclave residents is by enabling their access to and economic relations with the surrounding state. In the worst cases of exclave neglect and isolation, this integration may occur illegally as a necessary tool for survival, regardless of official state policies. In the best cases, however, rules for mutually-beneficial economic exchange and even joint projects are fostered and encouraged.
- **Invest in residents' welfare and national integration.** Many states realize special efforts and policies are required to counteract the unavoidable higher costs and inconveniences of living in an exclave. These often take the form of economic privileges and wealth sharing agreements. This may also, however, stretch to encompass policies to promote national cohesion and integration of exclave population into the national political apparatus. Despite the obvious challenges, ignoring the needs of the exclave population and its integration with the rest of the state can lead to domestic unrest and, thus, enhance the state's problems.

- **Develop joint decision-making structures with surrounding state.** Thanks to the closeness of communities living in exclave complexes, joint consultation on development and other projects affecting the region are often essential. Some states, albeit in regions without major security threats, have built shared social spaces and common institutions and even coordinated service provision and city planning. The most remarkable and intertwined cases are even able to develop joint decision-making structures across local authorities in order to facilitate such work without compromising sovereignty.
- **Empower local problem-solving.** In some cases, states have been reluctant to cede any power whatsoever to an exclave's local authorities. Where the state is not involved, committees for managing local affairs – even carrying out law enforcement duties – often fill the vacuum. In cases where the state is comfortable operating in a more decentralized way, however, officials on the local level have had success in creating local solutions to their own local problems, either through community activism and monitoring or through more formal procedures for engagement between local officials from across both sides of the border.
- **Secure the exclave with military force.** When security threats – whether militants, smugglers, or unfriendly neighbors – are present, some states choose to militarize the exclave or even conduct security operations in the region around it to weed out the threats. Military posturing and campaigns of this sort can serve as a deterrence to potentially hostile actors. That said, it almost inevitably also results in the further isolation of the exclave's population from the surrounding communities, which can then lead to greater economic troubles and local grievances.

Conclusion

The challenges of non-contiguity are at the heart of the efforts to establish a viable Palestinian state. This report seeks to inform conversations about what challenges to anticipate and how they might be overcome by applying a comparative case study approach and empirical analysis to answer the question: *“What are the challenges of achieving unity government and maintaining effective security in non-contiguous states?”* The study has identified common challenges to and mechanisms for preserving sovereignty. They are synthesized in a final lessons-learned section, summarized here:

Challenges to Governance and Security. States with exclaves often face enormous obstacles to ensuring effective governance and security. Some stem from the local population itself, for instance local grievances due to isolation and state neglect and a lack of national sense of belonging. Others emphasize the vulnerability of exclaves without official or easily securable borders, which open the door to conflict and criminality. Finally, relationships matter immensely. Without communication and compromise, differences in law and culture can complicate the rules under which an exclave operates. In more extreme instances, a lack of trust between home state, host state, and exclave populations – or even openly hostile relations – can badly damage the viability of an exclave altogether.

Mechanisms to Preserve Sovereignty. The good news is that creative – if sometimes difficult – solutions exist to many common non-contiguous state challenges. Many states rely, for instance, on ongoing processes of negotiation with the host state to ensure access to and the smooth functioning of its exclave. Officially demarcating borders, opening up pathways to integrate with the surrounding state, and focusing on policies to improve exclave residents' welfare also help eliminate many sources of conflict before they emerge. In some cases, joint decision-making structures or enabling local problem-solving also mitigate the difficulties of administering territory

from afar. Finally, the military solution is a common, though possibly not entirely desirable option to preserve sovereignty, especially in the face of domestic threats.

Non-contiguity is not an ideal arrangement for a state to deal with. That said, there are numerous past examples from which to draw lessons and even inspiration. By anticipating the difficulties a non-contiguous Palestinian state may face, negotiators, governing authorities, and international assistance may step in – perhaps with creative solutions applied in other cases – to ensure that a Palestinian state is able to overcome the obstacles to maintaining sovereignty.

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Part II. Challenges to Israel-Palestinian Joint Security

Chapter 4: Competing Security Challenges

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Abstract

Competing security challenges naturally surface for Israelis and Palestinians as they maneuver to control territory and maintain their security. While multiple factors contribute to Israeli-Palestinian tension, this study sought to understand the political positions and security interests of Palestinians and Israelis in order to find potential areas of compromise as well as true sticking points. To achieve that aim, the NSI team conducted thematic and discourse analyses on the speeches of leaders across the breadth of the Israeli and Palestinian political landscapes. The analyses suggest that there are important areas of mutual concern that may serve as starting points for negotiation as well as areas of diametric opposition.

Introduction

Conflicting demands, deep-seated interests, and a volatile past and present characterize Palestinian-Israeli security relations. Nevertheless, there are areas of common interest and cooperation and in many Israeli and Palestinian camps the desire for more. The following question was posed by the SMA team: *What are the minimum thresholds for indigenous security forces in protecting its citizens and guarding its borders, particularly when the neighbor country demands an unspecified level of security?*

This study proposes that the most critical issue in determining Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) thresholds are not the material conditions (e.g., weapons, transportation) associated with security provision, but the security-related political interests and positions of Israeli and Palestinian stakeholders. The most critical aspect in determining the composition and responsibilities of PA security forces is the politics of resolving competing Israeli and PA security interests. NSI used thematic content analysis to identify the most salient components of security as expressed by Palestinian and Israeli stakeholders. We also captured the valence -- positive or negative -- that stakeholders assigned to security issues. In order to identify and compare the ways in which Palestinian leaders from Hamas, Fatah, the PLO, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Palestinian Authority describe their most important security issues against how leaders across the Israeli political spectrum describe their own.

In international dispute resolution, tolerances for compromise solutions often center on the different saliences and valences negotiating partners hold on key issues. Deconstructing and mapping the range of issues can help identify the limits of tolerance and compromise. Certainly,

Key Findings

Mutual Concerns

- Need for coordinated policing
- Access to and protection of holy sites and public places,
- Concern about refugees and displaced persons
- Management of border areas and crossings

Competing Concerns

- Blockade and embargo of Gaza
- Israeli-held Palestinian prisoners
- IDF activities in Palestinian areas

the challenge is complex, as opposing security interests exist not only between Israeli and Palestinian stakeholders but within each group as well. However, considering that maintaining security is a major concern for both Israeli and Palestinian groups, the need to find areas for workable cooperation is great. While in some areas Israel and Palestine have opposing demands, such as demilitarization and sovereignty (International Crisis Group, 2010), there are also issues in which key political actors have common interest, e.g., the Government of Israel and the Abbas-led Palestinian Authority on countering terror attacks on Israel orchestrated on Palestinian soil (Aldar, 2014). This report examines a multitude of Israeli and Palestinian security concerns as identified from the natural language of representatives of numerous stakeholders. The identification and exploration of the security concerns, strength of sentiment, and comparative analysis of these issues could serve as a baseline for further exploration of cooperation for Israeli and Palestinian security forces.

Method

The method used to assess how stakeholders in Palestine and Israel viewed security concerns was thematic analysis, which involves coding relevant themes and ways of using language (rhetorical devices). Previous research conducted by NSI and the literature for thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), critical discourse theory (van Dijk, 2003; Fairclough, 2001), and grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) provided the basis for the coding methodology. These approaches stress the need for capturing the point of view expressed by the populations of interest and avoiding research biased by the investigator's agenda. NSI's thematic analysis approach provides an analysis sensitive to the concerns and cultures of the various Palestinian and Israeli stakeholders who impact the coordination of security in the region.

While there are multiple ways to explore competing Palestinian and Israeli notions of security, the approach taken by the NSI team focused on the actual dialogue and language used by stakeholders to describe different aspects of security as they relate to the West Bank and Israel. The discourse analysis used in this study involves coding segments of Israeli and Palestinian political leaders' public security-related statements including the rhetorical devices (ways of using language); emotive themes (politically and culturally salient issues that amplify the importance); and the valence (positive or negative) of a security concern.

A set of documents capturing the rhetoric of Palestinian and the Israeli leaders from 2014 was assembled. Eighty percent of the corpus captured speeches and quotes from January through October of 2014. This corpus was compiled from open-source websites of online newspapers, news portals, official government pages, and research and analysis organizations as well as online translations (from the Hebrew and Arabic vernacular) provided by the Raytheon BBN WMS (Web Monitoring System) tool. When possible, original sources in the vernacular were used, although secondhand sources (usually containing extensive quotes) were also used, in both the vernacular and in English translation. Featured Palestinian speakers included key leaders of Hamas, Fatah, the PLO, PIJ members, and religious figures. Israeli speakers spanned the political spectrum represented in the Knesset as well as the Israeli police force, Shin Bet, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and community groups. A total of 264 documents were analyzed and coded by marking segments of text with at least one of 153 codes, where each code represented a specific *security concern* such as, Border Crossing or Access to Holy Site; a politically or culturally relevant *theme* such as, Makah, Honor, or Homeland; or uses of language, such as metaphor, intensifiers, or

hyperbole.⁹ As shown in Figure 1, 35 security concerns, grouped into five categories, were identified in the Palestinian and Israeli speeches.

Based on the applied codes, we developed a Security Concern Sentiment (SCS) metric to provide a quantitative measure of the importance of security concerns across the political spectra of Israeli and Palestinian groups. For each security concern, the SCS metric scores were presented graphically in box plots to show strength and valence (+/-) of each group’s sentiment, along with minimum and maximum scores to show the range of sentiment exhibited by the groups¹⁰ (Appendix ??).

Key Findings

Patterns of common and divergent security interests emerged among the 35 concerns, and are shown in Figure 1 below.¹¹




Figure 3: Palestinian and Israeli Security Concerns

Common Security Concerns Shared by Palestinians and Israelis

1. Coordinated policing (both groups agree on need for policing, yet reasons differ¹²)

⁹ The examined communications were taken during the height of the Gaza conflict, so there was most likely an increased focus on Gaza-related security issues. Another challenge was finding speeches or interviews from lesser-known individuals to balance the representation from higher profile groups. In addition, not all stakeholders mentioned every security concern.

¹⁰ To see the details, see Kuznar, L. and M. Yager (2015), Intensity and Overlap of Political Security Tolerances for Israeli and Palestinian Stakeholders, available from the SMA office or Dr. Larry Kuznar at LKuznar@NSIteam.com.

¹¹ To see a more comprehensive report of analyses, see Kuznar, L. and M. Yager (2015), Intensity and Overlap of Political Security Tolerances for Israeli and Palestinian Stakeholders, available from the SMA office or Dr. Larry Kuznar at LKuznar@NSIteam.com.

2. Access to holy sites (concern for *own* holy sites and public spaces)
3. Concern about refugees and displaced persons
4. Security of border areas
5. Access to border crossings (Palestinians want safe passage while Israel more focused on contraband)
6. Humanitarian aid
7. Safety of public spaces

Most Contested Security Concerns between Palestinians and Israelis

1. Barrier wall
2. Blockade and embargo of Gaza
3. Status of Palestinian prisoners
4. Perspectives on collective street action
5. Israeli-held Palestinian prisoners (PA most negative)
6. IDF activities in Palestinian areas (PA most negative; Israel most positive)
7. Terrorist organizations
8. Rioting and demonstrations (Palestinians view as positive while Israel views as problem)

Table 1 depicts the sentiment for the 35 security concerns. As the legend below (Figure 2) reveals, the dark grey shading is extremely important while the dark burgundy color is extremely negative and the deepest green is extremely positive. Issues upon which steak holders share the same basic color (grey, green or burgundy) are issues upon which steak holders have the same valence (positive or negative), but may differ upon in terms of the strength of sentiment with which they hold those valences. These issues are ones in which the steak holders have shared concerns and can either cooperate or perhaps make some compromises where they do not feel as strongly. Issues upon which steak holders have opposed views will be green / burgundy. These issues may not be reconcilable, but may be off in negotiated settlements.

Legend	Sentiment	Score
	Moderately Important	0 to 0.1
	Strongly Important	0.1 to 0.2
	Extremely Important	> 0.2
	Moderately Positive	0 to 0.1
	Strongly Positive	0.1 to 0.2
	Extremely Positive	> 0.2
	Moderately Negative	0 to -0.1
	Strongly Negative	-0.1 to -0.2
	Extremely Negative	< -0.2
(blank)	No Comment from Stakeholders	

Figure 2: Legend for summary chart of security concerns

traded

¹² "Israelis desire effective policing to curb riots, rock throwing, weapons interdiction, combatting terrorists, and protection of travelers, while Palestinians primarily cite keeping arrests lawful and mention effective policing and coordination of security in the abstract." –excerpt from Appendix A in NSI full report

Table 1. Quick Glance Palestinian Israeli Security Concern Sentiments

Security Concern	Constituencies							
	Israel Opposition	Israel Govt	Israel Security	Israel Community	Israel PM	Palestinian President	PA / PLO	Non-state
Coordinated Security Policing								
Border Crossing								
Humanitarian Aid								
Public Spaces								
Access Holy Sites								
Border Areas								
Settler Violence	Dark Red		Dark Red			Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Aggression against Holy Sites		Dark Red	Dark Red			Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Civilian Casualties	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
General Aggressive Action	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Terror Attacks	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Massacre		Dark Red			Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Assassination	Dark Red					Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Refugees Displacement	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Infrastructure Damage	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red			Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Criminal Activity		Dark Red	Dark Red		Dark Red	Dark Red		Dark Red
Kidnapping	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Spies		Dark Red			Dark Red			Dark Red
Smuggling	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red		Dark Red			
Bombing								Dark Red
Execution							Dark Red	Dark Red
Weapons Explosives	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red		Dark Red	Dark Red
Rocket Attack	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Tunnels	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red			Dark Red
Terrorist Organization	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red		Dark Red	Dark Red
Terrorists	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red		Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Rioting Demonstrations	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red		Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Demilitarization ¹³		Dark Red	Dark Red		Dark Red			Dark Red
Air Strikes	Dark Red				Dark Red			Dark Red
Wall		Dark Red		Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Prisoners		Dark Red	Dark Red		Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Army Incursion Raids		Dark Red	Dark Red		Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Artillery		Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red		Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Siege		Dark Red				Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red
Blockade Embargo		Dark Red	Dark Red		Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red	Dark Red

Some security concerns are likely due to the recent Gaza conflict, and may not necessarily represent issues that are perennially important to the degree reflected in this study.

Issues most likely attributed to Gaza conflict

Because the analysis took place at the height of the Gaza conflict, security concerns most likely attributable to Gaza include:

¹³ Hamas only, in Non-State

- Rocket attacks
- Tunnels
- Israeli airstrikes
- Weapons/explosives
- Civilian casualties

Some issues, as raised by stake holders in the study, were related to issues in the West Bank.

West Bank

The security concerns most associated with the West Bank include:

- Prisoners
- Settler violence
- Kidnapping
- Refugees/displaced persons
- Access to holy sites
- Aggression v. holy sites
- Rioting & demonstrations.

Implications for International Agency Activities

Knowing the mutual and opposing security concerns among Palestinian and Israeli groups provides the opportunity to identify potential areas of cooperation, compromise or impasse where security improvements would be most successful or perhaps not possible. The researchers recommend a “listen, look, compromise, identify, and train” approach, where international agencies pay attention to stakeholder issues, looks for areas of compromise that are generally based in mutual concerns, find collaborative win/win solutions, identify security echelons that can implement solutions, and provide targeted training to PASF personnel on how to implement solutions.

Implications for Shared Security Concerns

One often cited mutual concern among groups is the need for improved and coordinated policing. The international community could respond to the need for coordinated policing via clarification of the roles of different security forces in the region, PASF training, systems improvements, PASF interdepartmental coordination, and through collaborative training to improve PASF and IDF relations. Following are suggested policing priorities based on concerns expressed by the various stake holders.

Similarly, the additional security concerns shared by Palestinian and Israeli groups—improving safety, protection and access to holy sites and public spaces; helping increase safety among refugees and displaced persons; securing border areas; providing safety for Palestinians as they enter border crossings while ensuring prohibition of contraband; and facilitating safe access to and receipt from humanitarian aid—could also be aided through specialized PASF training and PASF and IDF coordination efforts.

Implications for Divergent Security Concerns

Divergent security concerns expose potential challenges for coordination of PASF and IDF. While these disagreements could express irreconcilable differences, they could also represent potential

bargaining chips for use in negotiations. The important thing to note is that these issues will continue to be divisive if solutions through peace talks are not found. The most divisive issues include: the existence of the barrier wall; blockade and embargo of Gaza; perspectives on collective street action (Israelis regard it as rioting, Palestinians regard it as legitimate demonstration); Israeli-held Palestinian prisoners; IDF activities in Palestinian areas; operation of terrorist organizations on Palestinian controlled lands.

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Chapter 5a: Legitimacy and Sovereignty in an Environment with Competing Security Requirements

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Abstract

This report presents insights from an analysis of a conceptual map, or qualitative loop diagram, that relates Israeli and Palestinian Authority (PA) sovereignty and legitimacy in the West Bank with Palestinian violence, and cross-border Israeli Defense Forces/ Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Unit (IDF/COGAT) activities. The relationships and feedback loops of Israeli and Palestinian security and political positions reflect the dynamics that drive the security challenges and risks that impact the effectiveness of PA security sector reform and institutional development. Key findings include:

- PASF capability enhancements can reduce PA legitimacy and limit the effectiveness of security sector reform
- PA governing legitimacy is a critical pre-condition for successful security sector institution building and PASF capacity development
- Israeli security activities have self-reinforcing adverse effects on PA legitimacy, and the development of security sector institutions
- Uncertainty about the final status of the West Bank and the mainstreaming of Israeli settlement populations undermine efforts to re-open settlement talks

Introduction

The following question was posed by the Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) team: *With respect to cross-border arrests, prosecutions, and targeted lethal action, what are the challenges, risks, and opportunities to legitimacy and sovereignty between neighbors with competing security requirements?*

This chapter presents insights from the analysis of a qualitative West Bank security dynamics loop diagram constructed around Israeli and PA sovereignty and legitimacy, Palestinian and Israeli settler frustration and violence, and IDF/COGAT activities in the West Bank.¹⁴ A qualitative loop diagram is a visual heuristic for grasping complex recursive relationships among factors such as those that connect Israeli and Palestinian security. It is intended to serve as a “thinking tool” for analysts, practitioners, and decision makers. Once produced, the “map” of the direct and indirect relationships between legitimacy, sovereignty, and Israeli and Palestinian “cross border” activities can be used to explore those relationships, test hypotheses about them, and provide a broad picture of second and third-order effects on critical nodes in the system. For those involved in advocating for stability in Palestinian-Israeli relations, a clear understanding of the system that links Israeli and Palestinian internal politics to cross-border security is a critical prerequisite for identifying

¹⁴ While these types of diagrams are often referred to as “causal loop” diagrams, no presumptions of direct causation are made in these analyses. In addition, although they resemble system dynamics models, as used here they are neither computational models nor intended to be strictly predictive. Rather, loop diagrams are a useful means of uncovering unanticipated or non-intuitive interaction effects embedded in this incredibly complex environment.

areas in which international agency activities might have the greatest positive impact. Before turning to the loop diagrams, however, a brief discussion of the concepts of *sovereignty* and *legitimacy* in the context of the occupied Palestinian territories is warranted. This is followed by a discussion of important features and nodes excerpted from the complete diagram.

Sovereignty

The concept of the *sovereignty* of a governing authority is relatively straightforward when applied to nation-states. Sovereignty is indicated by a government's international recognition, and its supreme and independent authority over civil and security matters within a specified territory. In the context of Israeli-Palestinian affairs, however, the issue of sovereign control in the West Bank territories is neither straightforward nor typical. In fact, there is no actor with internationally recognized *de jure* sovereignty over the West Bank. The state of Israel was recognized by the United Nations in 1949 within the borders of the territory it held following the 1948 War over Partition. During the 1948 War, the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan occupied the West Bank of the Jordan River (i.e., the remainder of the British Mandate out of which the Kingdom has been carved). In 1950, in a bid to secure land and for reasons of its own political legitimacy and Hashemite religious tradition, Jordan annexed the West Bank and administered it until it was lost to Israel during the 1967 War. For reasons primarily related to internal politics, Israel never moved to annex the West Bank and is considered by international law to be an occupying force. In 1988, following a final episode in his chronic conflict with Yasser Arafat and the PLO, King Hussein relinquished all Jordanian claims to the West Bank in favor of the PLO.

The 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or Oslo II Accord, was intended as a short-term arrangement—a first step toward staged Israeli military withdrawal from the occupied West Bank and final status negotiations. As a consequence, it did not significantly alter the legal structures to which West Bank Palestinians are subject.¹⁵ From 1967 until the present, Israeli citizens in the West Bank have been subject to Israeli civilian law, while Palestinians living in the West Bank have been subject to local statutes and the Israeli military regulations at the legal core of the Occupation Authority or Civil Administration. Oslo II divided the West Bank into three areas each with a different designation of governing authority, if not sovereignty. Two decades later, Area A, by far the smallest of the three areas, contains the majority of the West Bank Palestinian population. In what we might think of as *Palestinian civil authority*, Oslo II devolved control over civil issues and policing in Area A to the Palestinian Authority. In practice, however, Israel retains the final word on security in Area A. Area B is mainly rural and can be described as *Palestinian and Israeli shared authority*: the PA retains civil control and shares policing and security matters with Israel although, again, Israeli forces have the last word in what is defined as a security matter. Area C, which includes Israeli settlements, Palestinian villages and farms, IDF-designated military security zones, and a nature preserve remains under *full Israeli authority* (i.e., civil and security). Today the situation in the West Bank is as follows: the PA has limited *de jure* but no *de facto* sovereignty in the West Bank and Israel has *de facto* sovereignty over all areas of the West Bank, but has *de jure* sovereignty over none.

¹⁵ Kelly, Tobias. 2009. *Law, Violence and Sovereignty among West Bank Palestinians*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 4.

Legitimacy

The *legitimacy* of a governing authority is a concept that is related to, but distinct from sovereign authority and control. While the notion of sovereignty is most commonly associated with a state's control of a specific territory, *legitimacy* resides in the perceptions of those governed. It is the perception among a majority of a population that a governing authority has the *right* to govern. People who view their government as legitimate accept the rules determined by that authority, self-identify with that authority, seek public goods (e.g., security, justice) from its institutions, and voice their political grievances or needs within the systems established by that government. One of the hallmarks of a stable state is close alignment of governing legitimacy and sovereign control. An important indicator of state instability is the emergence of opponents who work outside established institutional means (e.g., elections, the justice system) to challenge a government. All insurgencies and revolutions begin with challenges to the legitimacy of a government's right to govern. When citizens look to alternate institutions and authorities to meet their need for legal redress or public goods (e.g., traditional tribal councils, religious organizations), the legitimacy of a regime is also challenged. When opposition groups take up arms against the regime, they are challenging its sovereignty.

There is an important distinction to be drawn between a government's legitimacy and its popularity. The circumstances of Israel and the Palestinian Authority illustrate the differences well. While Israeli governments (e.g., the Likud-led coalition) might be unpopular among some citizens, with the exception of a small population of ultra-orthodox who for religious reasons do not recognize the existence of the state of Israel, Israel's system of governance is perceived by Israelis across the political spectrum as legitimate. While there are those who oppose certain government policies or incumbents, there are few who challenge the entire institutional structure of the government. Contrast this to the legitimacy Palestinians attribute to the Civil Administration in the occupied territories, which certainly is not seen as a legitimate representative of Palestinian views, rights and interests. Finally, while the popularity of the Palestinian Authority has risen and fallen over time, there is fundamental debate among Palestinians about the legitimacy of the PA to govern Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. More than just opposing political parties, the split between the Fatah-led PA and Hamas has at times (e.g., the 2007 Battle of Gaza) reflected a serious conflict over which group is the more legitimate representative of the Palestinian cause and people.

Qualitative Loop Diagrams

The process of building and exploring loop diagrams is particularly useful for illuminating the drivers of complex relationships among explanatory factors. They are also a useful way to uncover unanticipated or non-intuitive interaction effects. Loop diagrams consist of "nodes" and "edges." Nodes are the factors or components of a system—in many cases, its variables.¹⁶ "Edges" are the lines that indicate the relationships between nodes. As used in this study, edges represent unweighted, correlative (rather than strictly causal) relationships. Unless indicated by a minus sign (-), the relationships between connected nodes are positive, meaning that as the antecedent or "parent" node increases or decreases, the successor does the same. Edge lines with a minus sign

¹⁶ The 46 nodes that comprise the West Bank security dynamics diagram include the legitimacy of the PA, Israeli support for Government of Israel (GoI) actions, Israeli and Palestinian "cross border activities," as well as the intervening factors that explain variation in each. Cross-border activities are defined broadly as: attacks by Palestinians on Israeli civilians and security forces in Israel or the West Bank; harassment and attack by Israeli civilians on Palestinians; and observable Israeli security operations, arrests, prosecution and imprisonment and targeted killings of Palestinians in the West Bank.

indicate an inverse relationship between an antecedent node and its successor. That is, as the parent increases or decreases, the successor does the opposite. The feedback loops that represent recursive relationships among nodes can take two forms: they can be negatively or positively “reinforcing” (indicated by an “R” in the diagrams) where change in one node propagates through a single or series of other nodes to return and magnify the effect on the initial node; or, they can be “balancing” (indicated by a “B”) in which the initial positive or negative effect associated with a node is dampened or “balanced” as it propagates through the system.¹⁷ The following sections discuss some of the key insights that emerge from examining the qualitative loop diagram constructed to describe West Bank security dynamics.

To clarify presentation, the diagrams shown in the body of the report are excerpted from the full diagram. Nodes shown in blue indicate largely Palestinian actions or perceptions, red are primarily Israeli, and green are international.¹⁸

Distinctive Aspects of PA Governing Legitimacy

From the mid-1960s onward, there has been a split in Palestinian politics between those who demanded militant resistance in order to liberate all Palestinian lands under foreign control, and more moderate voices—including Palestinians living in the occupied territories—who have been more willing to pursue Palestinian self-governance via negotiation and political means. Acceptance of the terms of the Oslo I and II accords signed by Yasser Arafat codified the significant shift that had taken place in Fatah’s public approach toward Israel. Since the 1990s, and particularly following the rise of Hamas, Fatah’s shift in approach has been at the center of the debate over the governing legitimacy of the PA.

The section of the loop diagram in Figure 1 shows two important dynamics that regulate PA governing legitimacy as it relates to the security situation in the West Bank. On the one hand, the pink “R” indicates the positive reinforcing relationship between the progress of the phased, institution-building strategy instantiated in the Oslo Accords (for simplicity henceforth referred to as the **Oslo approach**) and popular perceptions of **PA governing legitimacy**. When the PA is able to point to “progress” along an Oslo-like path, its credibility and legitimacy increases, however, unfortunately the reverse is also true. When movement toward settlement




Figure 1: PA Legitimacy

¹⁷ The implications of reinforcing versus balancing feedback in the qualitative loop diagrams explored in this study are slightly different than is typical of many mechanical or electrical systems in which reinforcing loops are associated with ever-increasing or exponential growth and are often considered destabilizing while balancing feedback is associated with system stability. However, rather than potentially ever increasing factors (analogous to continuous variables in empirical studies), the majority of nodes in the West Bank security system diagram are naturally limited. For example, constructs such as legitimacy have no natural numeric values and are best measured in terms of more or less popular regard; satisfaction cannot reasonably exceed 100%, etc. There are, however, a few nodes that might serve either as barriers or sources of exponential growth on small areas of the West Bank diagram. The two most significant are Jewish immigration to Israel and the dollar amount of international aid.

¹⁸ A copy of the complete diagram is available on request from the primary author at aastorino@NSIteam.com.

based on a non-violent Oslo strategy appears stalled, the perceived legitimacy of the PA falls.

The orange “R” in Figure 1 highlights the second dynamic impacting popular perceptions of the governing legitimacy of the PA: the central role of the concept of *resistance* in the Palestinian national psyche. **Resistance** has been an essential theme in Palestinian music, art, literature, and political discourse and remains a highly resonant basis for what it means to be Palestinian (i.e., the Palestinian national consciousness).¹⁹ In many ways, the **Oslo approach** stands in opposition to this long-standing aspect of Palestinian national identity. The fact that opposition groups like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) champion resistance sets up a direct alternative to the Oslo approach, and the Palestinian Authority that evolved from it. Perceived failures of the PA, including accusations of corruption and unfair treatment, can easily be used by opponents to “prove” that the PA has insufficient allegiance to the Palestinian nation.²⁰ Again, the credibility of the PA’s claim to governing legitimacy and that of the Oslo approach are either directly reinforcing or directly degrading. When one seems to fail, both suffer, and the appeal of the more-established, resistance-based approach toward the occupation is strengthened. This is the crux of the rivalry and division between those who support Fatah and the PA approach and those who favor a **resistance-based approach** more closely associated with Hamas and other opposition groups.

The overall **legitimacy of PA governance** is degraded both internationally and domestically by its inability to establish credible authority over Hamas and other Palestinian actors. This is not just an issue of perceived legitimacy; Israeli limits on PASF capacity and freedom of movement hamper the PA’s capability as well.²¹ In this way the issue of Gaza plays a significant, although not explicit, role in this analysis. To be clear, however, the real issue is not Gaza itself, but the continued salience of the notion of resistance as fundamental to Palestinian political identity. Even though Hamas remains centered in Gaza and in large measure isolated from efforts to develop the security sector in the West Bank, power struggles and divisions over the efficacy of PA versus Hamas leadership play a critical role in the prospect for successful development of PA security forces in the West Bank.

Current Circumstances Prohibit the International Community Ideal: A Virtuous Loop Connecting PASF Capability and PA Legitimacy

Security from an external threat is the first and most important purpose of any governing authority. The loop diagram in Figure 2 below shows a number of feedback loops around development of PASF capacity.

¹⁹ The salience of the narrative of “resistance” in Palestinian politics is such that it is used even by President Abbas in reference to the PA’s allowance of non-violent, or “wise resistance; in other words, peaceful resistance through demonstrations, slogans, et cetera” (Remarks on National Reconciliation and Security to PBS, New York, 9 June 2010. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 40(1), pp. 183-186.) While Hamas has not agreed to disarm and commit to non-violence, its insistence on militarized resistance may be receding, at least until it succeeds in gaining some relief for the people in Gaza who lost so much during the conflict with Israel in the summer of 2014.

²⁰ For example, in December 2014, a wide majority (80%) of West Bank respondents reported a preference for importing Hamas’ armed or civil resistance strategy into the West Bank; this was even the case among self-reported Fatah supporters (62%).²⁰ In the same poll, just over 40% of West Bank respondents felt that armed resistance was the most effective way of establishing a Palestinian state next to the state of Israel whereas 24.9% felt that negotiations would be most effective.

²¹ Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. 2013. “Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining: How Internal Divisions Generate Civil Conflict, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 57 (3), July 2013, pp. 659-672.

There are two intersecting “virtuous loops,” or positive reinforcing feedback associated with PASF capacity. First, the purple “R” describes a virtuous loop from **PASF capacity development** through **PA provision of effective security for Palestinians** and **legitimacy of the Oslo approach**. Second, the green “R” maps a virtuous loop from **PASF capacity development** through **PA provision of effective security for Palestinians** and Palestinian popular regard for the PASF on the other. As shown, improved security enhances the **legitimacy of the Oslo approach**, which feeds directly to the success of **PA security sector institution building**, reinforcing **PASF capacity development**.




Figure 2: Virtuous and other PASF Capacity Loops

In essence, the diagram suggests that if Palestinians feel less embattled in their homes, *and* security improvements are attributed to PASF activity, the credibility of the (Oslo) phased, institution-building approach and the PA itself is enhanced. Observable results support Oslo and the PA. Governing legitimacy, - the popular belief that an entity has the right to govern a population - is a necessary condition for building effective and stable security sector institutions. In fact, legitimacy is what makes stable institutionalization of governing authority possible. (Note that what are perceived as oppression and subjugation are often attempts to institutionalize security practices in the absence of governing legitimacy). As a result, the legitimacy of the Oslo approach and thus the PA’s governing legitimacy, is a necessary pre-condition for the success of security institution-building assistance to the PASF. As shown in Figure 2, the reinforcing loops around the purple and green “Rs” intersect with the reinforcing relationship between **Oslo** and **PA legitimacy** (pink “R”). Together these interconnected, reinforcing loops describe the logic of international efforts to aid

Palestinian security development and help establish the Palestinian institutional structures necessary to support a final, two-state solution.

Risk associated with Corruption

Unfortunately, there are a number of risks associated with this ideal, virtuous pathway that could limit or even reverse the intended positive effect of efforts to help build PASF capacity and professionalism. First, as noted, serious accusations of **corruption** have dogged the **legitimacy of the PA** and its institutions since its inception. Current polls show little sign of change: in December 2014, a full 83.8% of West Bank respondents confirmed their belief that PA governing institutions are considered corrupt.²² The importance of this deficit in terms of West Bank security reforms should not be discounted. Even if Palestinian security institutions were no longer considered suspect, it is unlikely that police forces and security institutions that operated in the context of a government thought to be highly corrupt could stay clear of that taint for long, especially as these are precisely the organizations that implement anti-corruption campaigns.

Risk associated with the PASF's security capacity paradox

Figure 2 shows another, perhaps less intuitive, risk associated with PASF capacity enhancement: Palestinian perceptions that **PA security forces favor security for Israeli citizens** over protecting their own constituents. The paradox arises from the fact that the same circumstance—improved security provided by the PASF—can, simultaneously, reinforce (the loop around the red “R”) and impede (green “B”) further capacity development. The reinforcing dynamic surrounding **PASF capacity/development** (red “R”) should be positive when Israeli officials view the PASF as **providing effective security for Israelis** in the West Bank, prompting enhanced **GOI perception of the legitimacy of the PA**. This can help ease IDF restrictions on further development of the PASF, in turn allowing its organizations to provide more effective security services for all. **PA provision of effective security for Israelis** is a critical trust-building activity and demonstrates the professionalism and reliability of the Palestinian forces.

The loop around the green “B” is a balancing loop whereby PASF improvement in the near-term can stymie the possibility of longer-term development. The feedback loop around the green “B” suggests that when the Palestinian public perceive developments in **PASF capacity** as serving the needs of Israeli security over their own (**PASF preference for Israeli security**), the result is a direct loss of **Palestinian satisfaction with the PASF**. Further, the perception that Palestinian “national” forces are being used to protect Israelis from Palestinians also contradicts the very idea of **PA legitimacy**, i.e., that it is the legitimate representative of Palestinian rights and interests. Again, reduced **PA legitimacy** impairs efforts at **security institution building** and eventually **PASF capacity**. Unfortunately, when observable improvements in the PASF occur while Palestinians continue to experience threats to their security from Israeli sources, the case against the PA and by extension the PASF is not difficult to make.²³ Although it may seem optimal to international actors, in order to meet their near term capacity-building objectives, to operate within

²² Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) Palestinian Public Opinion Poll #54, 15 January 2015 (conducted Dec. 2014). <http://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/poll-54-Dec2014-English%20new.pdf>

²³ According to a December 2014 poll, 82% of Palestinians reported that they were worried that they would be “hurt at the hands of the Israelis” and 83% believe Israel’s intention is to “annex Palestinian territories and expel its population or deny them their political rights.” Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) Palestinian Public Opinion Poll #54, 15 January 2015 (conducted Dec. 2014). <http://www.pcpsr.org>.

the loop that demonstrates to Israel the value of the PASF for Israeli security, this comes with a significant risk to PA legitimacy and, consequently, the longer-term capacity and stability of the PASF. It can directly damage the legitimacy of PA institutions and counter popular support for the more moderate **Oslo approach**, while strengthening the popular appeal of armed resistance. West Bank Palestinians' belief that the PASF provides more effective security for Israelis is not easily countered given public expectations that the role of the PASF should be to protect Palestinians. Simply establishing that the PASF treats Palestinians and Israelis in the same manner is unlikely to satisfy this deficit because 1) there is at present no single, common legal code to which both Palestinians and Israelis on the West Bank are subject, and 2) the IDF continues to operate in the West Bank and has not committed in word and deed to treat Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank equally.

Risk associated with Israeli Security Actions

Finally, Figure 3 below shows the paths by which the most severe IDF security operations (**Israeli arrests/ imprisonment, targeted killings, seizure/ destruction of property**) in the West Bank degrade **PA legitimacy** and, thus, the ultimate success of international programs to build durable security sector institutions and as a stable foundation for eventual resolution of the conflict. In order for the feedback loops to remain positive, improvements in **PASF capabilities** must be accompanied by the perceptions of Palestinians living in the West Bank that their security situations have also improved. Unfortunately, at present, there is scant evidence to support this belief.




Figure 3: Impact of Israeli Security Actions on PA Legitimacy

UN statistics on Palestinians injured, structures demolished, and Israeli raids and arrest of Palestinians in the West Bank during the single week from 10-16 March 2015 tell the story.²⁴ Unsatisfactory security (a negative value on **Palestinian popular satisfaction with security**) reinforces Palestinian people's sense of being under siege and highlights the occupation under which they continue to live.

As shown, popular dissatisfaction with security enhances the **legitimacy of resistance strategies** and, in so doing, reduces the perceived efficacy and attractiveness of the **Oslo approach** (orange "R"), and damages the **legitimacy of the PA** government in the eyes of the Palestinian public. Without physical evidence of improved security, PA legitimacy is damaged and the feedback that increases the probability of durable **institutional capacity building** is broken or significantly weakened. Israeli security actions can weaken **PA legitimacy** in a second way when those activities generate public dissatisfaction with the PASF, e.g., for failing to act or protect Palestinians.

Reinforcing Sources of Palestinian Social Tension & Violence

It should be little surprise to anyone who has witnessed life in the West Bank and Jerusalem that there exist countless sources of social frustration for Palestinians living in the West Bank. In fact, one of the more striking features of the full West Bank security dynamics diagram is the number of direct and indirect sources of frustration for Palestinians, even at this high level of abstraction (in the full diagram **Palestinian social frustration** is the single most connected node). **Palestinian social frustration** is important to the dynamics of West Bank security because it can induce spontaneous or opportunistic violence, such as throwing stones at IDF patrols (**threats to/attacks on IDF, Israelis in the West Bank**), as well as provoking attacks that require more coordination, e.g., suicide bombings inside Israel (**Palestinian cross-border attacks**).

The assumption underlying this section of the model is that politically motivated violence, rather than purely criminal violence, is of greatest concern. Political, economic, and/or social grievances are a prerequisite to such violence. As grievances are experienced, they manifest in social frustration and tension. Palestinian social frustration is driven by multiple grievance factors. Some arise from conditions internal to the Palestinian population, such as the previously discussed Fatah/PA-Hamas political and strategic rivalry and corrupt practices. Others stem from both the PA and Civil Administration, including economic pressures (e.g., unemployment, stymied development) and restrictions on freedom of movement and access to resources that extend to nearly every aspect of daily life. Lastly, there are also sources of Palestinian social stress and tension that have their roots in Israeli electoral politics and concern with the peace process. Of these, two of the most potent sources of Palestinian frustration are **IDF activities in the West Bank**, which appear as an **affront to Palestinian national sensitivities** and the very idea of a **Palestinian national identity**, and the **Israeli settlements**, the second most connected node in the West Bank security diagram.

²⁴ Source: UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Protection of Civilians Weekly Report*, Reporting period: 10 – 16 March 2015; <http://www.ochaopt.org/poc10march-16march.aspx>. As of 16 March 2015, the year to date figure for injuries in the West Bank was 258; and structures demolished was 150 for Area C plus East Jerusalem.

Risk Associated With IDF Activities—An Affront to Palestinian Identity

As discussed in the previous section, IDF activities in the West Bank set off a downward spiral that damages PA legitimacy and stunts development of Palestinian security institutions. **IDF presence in the West Bank**—particularly in Area A where Palestinian security forces are supposed to have security responsibility—feeds two reinforcing feedback loops involving PA legitimacy. First, as shown in Figure 4a, IDF actions are a direct **affront to Palestinian sensitivities and national identity** and add to overall **social frustration/tension** levels. This increases the **likelihood of local attacks on Israeli civilians and security forces** in the West Bank, which in turn increases domestic **pressure in Israel for IDF security activities** (aqua "R").²⁵




Figure 4a: Aqua "R" around IDF Activities

As shown in Figure 4b, increased **social tension/frustration** also decreases **PA legitimacy** by demonstrating the failure of the PA to provide the most basic public service: security for its citizens. The fact that this failure is generated by IDF activities in the West Bank offers counter-evidence to




Figure 4b: Burgundy "R" around IDF Activities

PA claims of strength and legitimacy. Because PA legitimacy and PASF credibility are necessary prerequisites for the success of **security sector reform and institution building**, **IDF activities in the West Bank** can pose an indirect, but potentially potent, challenge to those efforts. In addition, impeding PASF ability to provide effective security for Palestinians feeds the critical challenges presented by Hamas and others to the stability of the Fatah-led PA government (**legitimacy of resistance identity/strategy**). As the effects of **IDF activities** propagate through the system, the ability of the PASF to establish a safe and secure environment for both Palestinians and Israelis erodes (burgundy "R"). This is precisely the condition that has been used as justification for more and more

²⁵ In fact, in the past, IDF rules of engagement (ROE) in the territories called for soldiers to stand off from Palestinian civilians in recognition of the ease with which their presence might aggravate Palestinian national sensitivities and damage Palestinian regard for the PA and PASF.

visible Israeli security operations in the West Bank—ironically the same operations that help to destabilize security conditions in the first place.

Risk Associated With Uncertainty About the Future of the West Bank.

Israeli and Palestinian uncertainty about the permanence of current West Bank territorial divisions appears to generate different paths to decreased security depending on whether the response comes from the Palestinian community or Israelis. As shown in Figure 5, Palestinians’ perception of the **relative permanence** of the arrangements can generate **frustration**. By contrast, Israeli governments ideologically akin to, or including, Benyamin Netanyahu appear to have been motivated by a belief in the **relative impermanence of the current status** in the West Bank and Jerusalem. The possibility that a negotiated settlement would seek to remove territory from Israeli control has fueled the idea of “creating facts on the ground” by pumping money and populations into accelerated and large-scale **settlement construction** in the occupied territories. **Settlement construction** also feeds a reinforcing insecurity loop (brown “R” in Figure 5) in which the resulting **affront to Palestinian national identity** adds to **Palestinian frustration** and the likelihood of

Palestinian violence, in turn, increasing the **sense of insecurity among the Israeli public**. Historically, even among less hawkish elements in Israel, unrest in the Palestinian territories tends to foster **political outcry and pressure** for the Government of Israel to demonstrate that it is able to provide security for its constituents, typically by taking a more aggressive approach to West Bank security. Of course, **IDF activities** in response to public pressure for increased security in the West Bank are most effective in terms of




Figure 5: Uncertainty about West Bank Future

Israeli domestic politics when they are visible. Unfortunately, as already discussed, this is precisely the condition that is most likely to drive further Palestinian frustration and violence.

The Changing Impact of Settlements

Israeli settlements in the West Bank are one of the most critical sources of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. They pose a sprawling physical affront to Palestinian national identity and appear to confirm Israel’s ability to act with impunity in the Palestinian territories, fuelling the Palestinian social frustration that generates violence. More simply they also place settlers, IDF soldiers, and

difficulty in controlling its population and forging unity with Hamas and other political opponents, have been used by Israeli leaders in the past as justification for pulling out of, or refusing to engage in, peace talks. In provoking Palestinian frustration and heightening the prospect of Palestinian violence in the West Bank, Israel is, therefore, able to forestall serious peace talks while it continues to build “facts on the ground.”

The Growing Import of Settlements in Israeli Domestic Politics

For many religious Israelis, Zionists settlements secure a hold on the lands they believe God gave to the Jews. For more secular and center-right Israelis, settlements serve as an increasingly important means of satisfying housing demand in Israel and providing ready entry into Israeli middle class living. Increasingly, settlements are populated by so called “quality of life settlers”—immigrants, many from Russia and Arab countries, and young families lured by government subsidies and taxpayer funded housing and education, settle in bedroom communities within commuting distance of Israel.²⁷ According to the 2013 Global Property Guide, the average cost of an apartment in Tel Aviv was USD 640,000, and USD 430,000 in Jerusalem, while in a settlement within commuting distance of Jerusalem a family might purchase a four-bedroom single family home around USD 200,000.²⁸

As a consequence of cheaper prices, the demand for housing in West Bank settlements increased 50% between 2013 and 2014.²⁹ In short, the issue of settlements now involves mainstream Israelis more so than in the past. Gone are the days when settlers could be associated only with religious and right wing parties. A new, larger demographic of young, secular families now reside in settlements, with ties across the Israeli political spectrum. This political broadening of the settler population may make it increasingly difficult for future Israeli government to negotiate the dissolution of the settlements (Figure 6, dotted black line). No longer is it only right wing or strongly Zionist parties that are incentivized to support current settlements. Rather, many parties in a wider spectrum now have constituents living in illegal settlements.³⁰ A new demographic demanding security in the West Bank has been created by economic conditions in Israel, and it is one that is more diverse and not as easy for center and center-left parties to ignore. Even if new settlement construction were to cease, it is likely that this expansion of the settler demographic will keep pressure on even a more dovish Israeli government to provide security for these areas and maintain the settlers’ quality of life. The implication for future Palestinian and Israeli peace negotiators is that relocating or removing these families (e.g., as was done in Gaza or the downtown Hebron settlements) appears, for all intents and purposes, to have been taken off the negotiating

²⁷Global Property Guide, January 5, 2014 “Israel's property market continues to gather pace” <http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Middle-East/Israel/>; *Al Jazeera*, “Israeli settlers lured by subsidies,” 23 Aug 2012 <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/08/201282211420708214.html>.

²⁸In February 2015, Israel announced tenders to build 450 new settlements in East Jerusalem and in the West Bank, and the Palestinian Foreign Ministry responded by filing a case with the International Criminal Court (Feb 1, 2015, Middle East Monitor, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/>)

²⁹This is not to say that the issue of settlements is not hotly debated in Israeli politics—even from within Prime Minister Netanyahu’s own government.

³⁰This apparent move toward the right in Israeli opinion regarding the occupied territories is not just an issue of housing and settlement. Bar-Tal and Halperin (2014) find that there is currently resurgence in the broader population of a number of Israeli “sociopsychological barriers”—fears and prejudices regarding Palestinians and the Palestinian territories—that have generally been associated with the political right. For example, the authors report that despite apparent acceptance of a two-state solution, Israeli rejection of Palestinian national rights has been on the rise and cite a 2008 poll where the majority of the Israeli public saw the West Bank as “liberated” (55%) rather than “occupied” territory” (32%). Bar-Tal, Daniel and Eran Halperin (2014). “Societal Beliefs and Emotions as Socio-Psychological Barriers to Peaceful Conflict Resolution,” *Palestine-Israel Journal*, Vol 19(3) (<http://www.pij.org/detail>).

table. If current trends continue, it is extremely difficult to imagine a future Israeli government strong enough to succeed in that type of activity.

Findings & Implications

In response to the original question, it is clear that cross-border arrests and attacks are violations of sovereign control of borders. As Israel is an internationally recognized sovereign state, when Palestinians cross into Israel illegally and/or for the purpose of terrorist attacks, they violate Israel’s sovereign right to secure borders. Whether Israel’s activities in the West Bank are violations of Palestinian “sovereignty” is less clear. A case can be made that they are not violations of Palestinian state sovereignty because sovereignty has not been granted. However, these activities do have a significant impact on the Palestinian population, reinforcing the reality of the occupation under which Palestinians continue to reside. In so doing, they serve to fuel the Palestinian social grievance and frustration triggers the cycle of Palestinian violence and Israeli response that has continued unabated for over sixty years. IDF security activities, settler harassment, and violence against Palestinians also undermine the legitimacy of the PA government and the phased, institution-building Oslo approach that it represents. This is also a cycle of activity that is in direct contradiction with US efforts to help build security sector and other institutions that would eventually serve the state of Palestine.

It is an understatement to say that the long history of Israeli and Palestinian conflict over legitimate, sovereign control of the West Bank is complex and multi-layered. Readers who have made it this far hopefully will have gained an added appreciation for just how intertwined the activities, perceptions, domestic politics, and security concerns on the two sides are. The qualitative loop diagrams discussed in this report have highlighted some of these. However, there are many other relationships and “what ifs” that could be explored using the full West Bank Security Dynamic diagram that served as the basis of this study. Readers are encouraged to do their own explorations of this high-level map. The key insights from this study are outlined below along with some suggestions as to how these may impact international community activities and policies.

Insight/Risk	Implications for International Community Activities
<p>PASF capability enhancements can reduce PA legitimacy and limit the effectiveness of security sector reform</p>	<p>Emphasize PASF role in protection for Palestinian citizens in PASF training and activities. PASF capability enhancements and training geared toward providing publically observable protection for Palestinians especially in areas associated with Palestinian livelihoods (e.g., orchards) and other areas traversed by Israeli settlers.</p> <p>It should be noted that the analysis presented here suggests that emphasizing the PASF role to protect Palestinians is advantageous—even if it reduces IDF willingness to accede to additional PASF developments. In this context, the loss of added PASF enhancements would be less costly to the PA in the long run than gaining capability that is seen as favoring Israeli security. Of course, if training and strategic communications are not supported by actual behaviors (e.g., easing roadblock times, ensuring unimpeded access to holy sites, providing legal aid in attaining permits, objecting to land seizures, etc.), they could further weaken popular regard for the PASF.</p> <p>Carefully track both aspects of the PASF Security Paradox. PASF capability enhancements that improve security for Israelis and may improve Israeli willingness to allow further PASF development also diminish PA</p>

	<p>legitimacy and eventually PASF capability by reinforcing Palestinian beliefs that the PASF is more concerned with protecting Israelis than with providing security for Palestinians.</p>
<p>Israeli security activities have self-reinforcing adverse effects on PA legitimacy and the development of security sector institutions</p>	<p>Advocate for a return to more restrictive IDF Rules of Engagement in the West Bank including restrictions on live fire, roadblocks, and training exercises along with visible reduction in IDF presence in Areas A & B to reduce Palestinian social tension and, if representing observable change, help stabilize the day-to-day security situation.</p> <p>Recognize that demonstrable improvement in Palestinian satisfaction with security conditions on the West Bank with the least possible sign of Israeli forces is critical for mission success.</p> <p>Recognize that IDF activity in the West Bank can represent an affront to Palestinian national sensitivities and thereby increase the level of Palestinian grievance that produces Palestinian unrest and violence against Israelis. It also undermines the legitimacy of the PA.</p>
<p>Uncertainty about the final status of the West Bank and the mainstreaming of Israeli settlement populations undermine efforts to re-open settlement talks</p>	<p>Recognize that US policy supporting an “independent, viable and contiguous Palestinian state” has led Israeli governments to create “facts on the ground” and literal barriers to negotiated settlement via land confiscation and military and settlement construction. To Palestinians, US statements, together with settlement construction, can ring hollow or at best are confusing given the intimation of sovereignty associated with “statehood.”</p> <p>Recognize and track changes in settler demographics and the general move of Israeli politics to the right. Paradoxically, a relatively more moderate/ mainstream settler population will make eventual settlement talks—and, in particular, a two-state solution—significantly more difficult to achieve. This is because support for settlers and settlements has spread across a much larger segments of Israeli political parties than in the past. In addition, rapid immigration of Eastern Europeans following the end of the USSR has shifted Israeli politics to the right, benefiting those most likely to support settlement programs.</p>
<p>PA governing legitimacy is a critical pre-condition for successful security sector institution building and PASF capacity development</p>	<p>Emphasize security and non-security service provision and inclusiveness to enhance PA legitimacy. Other activities to strengthen PA governing legitimacy (e.g., inclusion of alternative views, dependable provision of services) are essential for PA legitimacy and ultimate success of security sector institution building.</p> <p>Recognize the push-and-pull in Palestinian politics—particularly where security issues are concerned—between the more patient, phased, institution-building approach agreed to in the Oslo II Agreement and the salience to Palestinian national identity of the concept of <i>resistance</i> that makes it so easy to undermine the Oslo approach.</p> <p>Push training and/or technologies to help PASF or other institutions limit corruption and inequitable treatment of Palestinians from within the PA. Public communications campaigns may be helpful to reduce the “lore” associated with PA corruption and malpractice that continue to mar the legitimacy of the Palestinian government and its institutions.</p>

Chapter 5b: A Simulation Study: Challenges, Risks, and Opportunities to Legitimacy and Sovereignty between Neighbors with Competing Security Requirements

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
Introduction

Simulation Capstone for Study of Security Reform

The ICONS Project at the University of Maryland was charged with developing a simulation to address the following question: *With respect to cross-border arrests, prosecutions, and targeted lethal action, what are the challenges, risks, and opportunities to legitimacy and sovereignty between neighbors with competing security requirements?*

In consultation with the leadership of other teams contributing to this study, it was determined that a role-play simulation was the most appropriate methodology for addressing the question. Furthermore, this simulation would constitute the culminating event for the overall study, and as such, all the other research teams would contribute to the design and evaluation of the simulation. Figure 1 provides an integrative framework for the overall effort.

Figure 1: Integration Framework



Why simulate?

A simulation approach was decided upon because the dynamics of the conflict are extremely idiosyncratic, limiting the value of either a traditional empirical analysis or a case study approach. Simulation is flexible in a very fluid situation: we can change scenario elements and adapt injects up to the day-of, as events on the ground dictate. In addition, spoilers can drive or change the desired narrative, and institutional stakeholders can overestimate the predictive value of their own analysis because of limitations in their point of view.

The following objectives for the simulation were identified:

- Gain insights on opportunities/challenges to effective confidence-building and crisis management when faced with competing security requirements.
- Identify capabilities and contingencies which will be most useful for helping the PASF cope with legitimacy issues, so international actors can effectively focus its resources for ministry-level institutional capacity building
- Provide insights that can be brought to the inter-agency/broader USG stakeholders as deemed appropriate.

The particular problem space in which the Palestinian security apparatus operates provides a unique challenge both to those forces themselves as well as to those international actors charged with assisting them in their mission. The problem space for the simulation exercise focused on potential Israel Defense Forces (IDF) incursions into Palestinian-controlled territories (Area A on the West Bank). When the Palestinian security forces cooperate fully with the IDF, they risk loss of legitimacy due to perception of co-optation, and risk loss of sovereignty due to institutional failure. When Palestinian forces are completely uncooperative with the IDF during such incursions, they risk the loss of sovereignty due to unilateral abridgement by the Government of Israel. This situation presents difficult challenges to all parties concerned.

Although the format of the simulation allows for its use in exercises designed to evaluate policy alternatives and to determine best courses of action under varying circumstances on the ground, the ICONS exercise that was run for this project was designed only to be a proof of concept at this stage.

Simulation Design

Simulation Structure

The simulation ran for two hours a day over the course of three days – from January 6-8, 2015. In addition, several tailored training sessions were held prior to the simulation and a one hour debrief for all participants was conducted immediately following the simulation, for a total of about eight hours. All simulation activities took place online and participants were geographically dispersed in Jerusalem, Washington DC, and London. Participants were also able to sign on asynchronously to catch up with the latest developments and to submit brief reports outside of the simulation's regular periods of operation, and most took advantage of this feature. The simulation was run on ICONSnet, a distributed, Internet-based simulation platform maintained by the University of Maryland.

ICONS Simulation Features

Injects and Exogenous Actors: A series of injects were pushed out by the Control Team to establish the initial scenario, respond to teams' actions, add new elements to the simulation, and generally shape the contours of play. Many injects were pre-set, while others were created during the course of the game itself. Injects took the form of news articles, intelligence reports, individual messages, and social media. In addition to managing the injects, the control team also portrayed actors outside of the scope of the existing Israeli, Palestinian, and international teams' roles – for instance international actors like the Government of Egypt, domestic actors like Hamas and settler groups, and other elements of each team's respective governments and intelligence services.

Communication Mechanisms (Messaging, Conferencing, Actions, and Alerts): Participants were able to communicate within and across teams using ICONSnet messaging and conferencing functions. The messaging system worked in a similar fashion to email, enabling participants to compose, reply to, and forward messages. Injects were received both through the messaging system and through alerts. Participants were also able to take "actions" – i.e. inform other participants that they had taken active measures – which also appeared as alerts. In addition, participants could open conferences, which operate like chat rooms, to hold meetings and press conferences.

Map and Resources: A customized, interactive map of the region was developed specifically for the simulation. The Google maps image of Israel/Palestine was overlaid with information that would be potentially useful to participants, like settlements, political and border lines, checkpoints, and Areas A, B, and C. Events that took place during the simulation were also marked on the map. See Figure 2 for images of the messaging system and map. Additional information – including PA security force structures and facilities – was provided in a resource section.

Figure 2: ICONSnet Messaging and Map

The screenshot displays the 'Israeli-Palestinian Security Simulation' web application. The top navigation bar includes 'Home', 'Messages', 'Conferences', 'Actions', 'Social Media', 'Map', 'Resources', and 'Admin'. The 'Messages' section shows a list of recent messages with columns for 'Msg', 'From', 'To', and 'Subject'. The 'Map' section shows a map of Israel/Palestine with various locations marked and a control panel on the right for toggling map features.


Msg	From	To	Subject
878	PA President	Director General - PA National Security Force; Head of PA General Intelligence	RE[1]:old times
877	Head of PA Gener...	Director General - PA National Security Force; PA President	old times
876	Head of Israeli ...	COGAT; Head of Shin Bet; Israeli Minister of Defense; Israeli PM	RE[4]:Presenting at briefing
875	Israeli PM	COGAT; Head of Israeli Central Command; Head of Shin Bet; Israeli Minister of Defense	RE[3]:Presenting at briefing
874	Israeli Minister...	COGAT; Head of Israeli Central Command; Head of Shin Bet; Israeli PM	RE[1]:Presenting at briefing

Partner Contributions

The design of the simulation benefited from input from several other SMA research teams.

- The project team from Texas A&M contributed extensively to the development of social media in the simulation, creating personalities and storylines (through sample Twitter posts) based on their study of Palestinian and broader Arab social media. See Figure 3.
- The psychology and neuroscience team, especially Drs. Nick Wright and Sara Savage, provided a pre-simulation study guide in concepts important to the simulation, designed post-round questionnaires for the participants, observed the entire simulation, and analyzed communications dynamics for insights valuable to the project.
- The NSI team's reports on the force structure and resource distribution of the PASF were included as resources for simulation participants.

Figure 3: ICONSnet Social Media Features



Team Composition and Control Team

Main Participants

The simulation design called for Israel and Palestinian Authority teams, as well as a team representing the interests of the international community. Members of the Israel and PA teams were drawn primarily from think tanks in Washington DC, Jerusalem, and London, as well as

journalists and independent consultants. Members of the control team included ICONS staff members, as well as SMEs. Table 1 lists the participants' roles.

Table 1: Participant Roles

<u>Team/Role</u>	<u>Played by</u>
<i>International Team:</i>	
US Security Coordinator	SMEs
US Secretary of State	
Office of the Quartet Rep, Head of Mission	
US Ambassador	
International Security Sector Programs Rep.	
<i>Palestinian Team:</i>	
Palestinian Authority President	SMEs
Prime Minister/Minister of Interior	
Close Aide to the President	
Head of General Intelligence	
Director-General National Security Force	
<i>Israeli Team:</i>	
Prime Minister	SMEs
Head of Central Command	
Minister of Defense	
Head of COGAT	
Head of Shin Bet	
<i>Control Team (ICONS staff and SMEs)</i>	
Strategic Manager	Jon Wilkenfeld
Inject Manager	Devin Ellis
Jerusalem Liaison/Social Media Manager	Lauren Barr
Israeli Actors	SMEs
Palestinian Actors	
International Actors	

Additional Control Team Roles

In addition to the main participants listed above, the Control Team had a variety of built-in roles through which they could push the simulation's narrative forward. Participants also had the ability to send messages directly to these Control-operated roles. See Table 2. For questions related to the technology or general format of the simulation, participants could also contact the actor named Simcon, which was also managed by the Control Team.

Table 2: Additional Control Team Roles

<u>Team/Role</u>
<i>International Actors:</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arab League • Government of Egypt • Government of Jordan • Office of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs • Office of the US Secretary of State

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United Nations Secretariat
<i>Palestinian Actors:</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Palestinian Intelligence • Head of Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) • PLO Executive Committee • Fatah Central Committee
<i>Israeli Actors:</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Israeli Intelligence • Chief of the General Staff, IDF • Israeli Political-Security Cabinet • Israeli Attorney General • Head of District Coordination Offices (DCO) • Head of Border Police

Standard and Social Media Actors

In addition to the standard Control Team actors, a variety of fictionalized standard media and social media actors were also available for the Control Team to use in regular news injects or Squawker and FacePlace (meant to mimic Twitter and Facebook respectively). See Table 3.

Table 3: Standard and Social Media Roles

<i>News Outlets</i>	
Jamee'an Liberal News	<p><i>Selection of Logos:</i></p>
Palestine Central Online News	
Al Watan Al Filistini Al Youm	
The Israeli Liberal Review	
Hadashot HaYom	
The Conservative Tribune of Israel	
Egypt News Week	
Al-Juzr News	
US News Wire	
GNN – Global News Network	
<i>Israeli Social Media Profiles:</i>	
Orit Tamir	Reps. Orthodox Israelis
Avraham Yoseph	Reps. settler/extreme right Israelis
Gila Avital	Reps. secular/center-right Israelis
IDF	Reps. Israeli security sector perspective
Stand with Israel	Administrator of the “Stand with Israel” Faceplace page, served as our catch all for including additional perspectives
<i>Palestinian Social Media Profiles:</i>	
PalActivist	Catchall activist and anonymous organizer

Laila Hamdan	Reps. moderate, but angry Palestinian street
Mohammed Talal	Reps. more extreme Palestinian perspective
TulkaremMayor	Reps. local Palestinian political actors
HereinGAZA	Reps. the voice of Gazans
End the Incursions!	Administrator of the “End the Incursions!” Faceplace page, served as our catch all for including additional perspectives
<i>International Social Media Profiles</i>	
RussianTimesArabic	Reps. news reports from an international perspective
EgyptLovesPalestine	Reps. pro-Palestinian international voice
Rachel Bloom	Reps. pro-Israeli international voice

Simulation Content

Opening Scenario

After consultation with project SMEs, a scene-setting document was prepared. This document was intended to bring all participants up to speed on the basic parameters of the Israel-Palestinian Authority security situation postulated for the start of the simulation.

Scenario

Introduction

As the simulation begins, the status quo between Israel and the Palestinian Authority remains largely unchanged. Sporadic violence throughout the West Bank and Jerusalem – and the accompanying high rhetoric from both sides – continues to be an issue, but for now concerns over an imminent uprising have largely abated. With the conflict still simmering, Israelis and Palestinians have returned to the uneasy, but long-standing relations they have sustained for much of the last decade.

The Palestinian Authority

Life in the West Bank continues to be tense as residents face the daily frustrations of living under occupation and respond with a mix of violent and non-violent actions. The leadership of the Palestinian Authority is focusing much of their attention these days on suppressing militants who they believe threaten stability in the West Bank. However, these efforts are generally unpopular with the West Bank's population, as indicated by recent polls showing approval ratings for the PA president hovering around 30% and an ever decreasing perception of legitimacy for the PA, overall. Despite applying to join numerous international organizations (though not the ICC), most Palestinians feel they are still far from achieving their own state.

Meanwhile, earlier attempts to form a unity government that includes Hamas have failed, and Fatah and Hamas have reverted to governing in their separate domains. Despite occasional gestures toward unity, no serious talks have been held for months, and the hostility and mistrust between the PA president and Hamas leaders has only intensified. For its part, the Palestinian Authority is

not rushing in to resolve the rift, instead anticipating that Hamas's popularity will fall as the quality of life in Gaza worsens.

The Government of Israel

At present, the Israeli government is dominated by center-right forces, although opposition from more leftist parties is not insubstantial. Due to strong divisions within the cabinet over the future of peace negotiations, settlement expansion, and other issues related to Israeli policies in the West Bank, progress on that front has been more or less put on hold. The one continuing priority is to monitor and contain threats both to settler communities and to Israel proper.

Beyond the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the top of the agenda at present consists of budget issues and how to effectively address the high cost of living, especially for young Israelis. However, the increasing pervasiveness of anti-Arab sentiment and dangerously radical views among settlers and other Jerusalem-based groups is becoming increasingly hard to ignore.

Status of Security Coordination

As usual, security coordination between Israeli and Palestinian forces is ongoing behind the scenes. In fact, high-level security officials say it is stronger than ever, especially in the realm of intelligence sharing. The Shin Bet, for instance, boasts good working relationships with the Palestinian General Intelligence (GI) and Preventive Security Organization (PSO). The two sides cooperate most regularly to combat their mutual threat: suspected militants in the West Bank. It is common for Israelis to ask Palestinian forces to make arrests, or for Palestinian forces to step aside to allow IDF forces to carry out operations themselves, even in areas where Palestinian forces have control over security.

Despite the prevalence of these efforts, and PA officials' occasional public remarks in support of them, the PA insists on keeping the extent of the security relations as secret as possible. Although some argue security coordination is in Palestinians' national interest, among the Palestinian population, it is widely perceived to be "collaboration" with Israel, and it diminishes the PA's legitimacy as a supporter of the Palestinian resistance. Every new report of an Israeli cross-border incursion only raises the level of Palestinians' anger and frustration at their inability to exercise sovereignty and secure their own state.

Diplomatic Horizon

Making matters more challenging, formal peace negotiations have not been held in quite a while and there have been few serious efforts to restart them. Both Israelis and Palestinians are disillusioned with the prospects for a two-state solution, and unilateral actions, such as expanding Israeli settlements or Palestinian attempts to join international organizations, seem to push the parties' positions further apart.

However, the U.S. Secretary of State has indicated that Middle East peace is one of the United States' top priorities. He is scheduled to visit Tel Aviv and Ramallah two weeks from now and there are rumors that, in his separate meetings with the Israeli prime minister and PA president, he will propose a new initiative to kick off the renewal of negotiations.

Simulation Phases

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The simulation was designed to run in two stages, with injects to create crisis situations that would put stress on existing Israeli-Palestinian security arrangements. The following is a brief description of the two phases of the simulation – confidence building and crisis management – and an indication of the types of injects that were used in the two phases.

Phase I: Confidence-building

Overview: The simulation began with news of a failed Israeli raid in Tulkarem (Area A). PA forces – either intentionally or because of a miscommunication – did not stand down from their posts and a shoot-out between Israeli and Palestinian troops led to the death of a Palestinian police officer and the injury of one Israeli. International mediators should try to facilitate a quiet process of confidence-building to push the parties to improve their mechanisms for security cooperation in the wake of this damaging incident.

Terms of Success: (1) The international team successfully engages Palestinian and Israeli officials in a confidence-building process.
(2) Parties agree on mechanisms to improve security cooperation
(3) The original targets of the Israeli raid are apprehended.

The simulation began with two critical news reports. The first, from the Israeli press, stated:

Bungled IDF Raid Blamed On PA Refusal to Stand Down, PA Officer Dead

Jerusalem

An Israeli operation to arrest several terrorist operatives in the city of Tulkarem last night went awry when Palestinian security forces apparently failed to stand aside for Israeli troops. In the resulting shoot-out, Israeli soldier Natan Greenberg (28) was injured and Israeli forces killed one Palestinian police officer. Palestinian officials claim the policeman, Ibrahim Said (32) was not on duty and was unaware that Israeli forces would be conducting a raid in the neighborhood. Two other Palestinian men were reported to be with him at the scene of the altercation, although they were not in uniform. The original targets of the raid were not apprehended.

Confrontations like this are rare in a time when Israeli and Palestinian security cooperation is generally perceived to be good. Palestinian troops usually withdraw to their barracks when Israeli forces enter to carry out missions on Palestinian territory, including arrest raids like this one. Similarly, an Israeli military spokesperson said that the IDF prefers to scrap all but the most critical missions if it appears they will result in clashes with Palestinian security forces. Some explain the security operation's failure as a result of a lack of communication between Israeli and Palestinian forces, but others suggest that the Palestinian police officer might have been trying to guard the suspected targets of the raid and intentionally trying to thwart the Israeli

The second news report was from the Palestinian press:

Widow Says Slain Palestinian Police Officer Was on His Way Home

Tulkarem


The widow of slain police officer Ibrahim Said, says her husband was on his way home when he was shot in cold blood by IDF forces. Less than an hour before the incident, she received a call from him saying he would be home shortly. "The Israelis say he was trying to attack them, but he didn't even know they were there. All he wanted," she said, "was to come home and eat dinner like a normal person."

Friends of Said, who were walking with him when the altercation took place, dispute claims by an Israeli spokesman that he was threatening soldiers before they shot him. According to them, when Said saw the IDF unit approach, he immediately raised his hands in the air and made his police-issued sidearm visible to indicate that he was not hiding anything.

Said leaves behind his wife and three young children. His widow says she will do whatever it takes – including seeking international support – to ensure the Israeli soldiers involved in her husband's death are held accountable for their crime.

The remainder of the first phase was intended to flow along the following lines:

Figure 5: Inject Flow – Phase I




Phase II: Crisis Management

Overview: In a “successfully-executed” Israeli incursion in Jericho (Area A), Israeli forces enter the home of a Palestinian police officer, killing one son and arresting two others on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack. The police officer initiates a police officers’ strike and massive protests erupt on the streets in solidarity. On the first night, the Jericho Police Training School is destroyed. Israeli and Palestinian security forces must then try to diffuse intifada-level protests in the face of an incapacitated police force and other challenges like support for protests from local Palestinian politicians, rising crime, and calls to bring down the PA or launch terrorist attacks.

- Terms of Success:**
- (1) Protests are contained and deescalated.
 - (2) The police strike is ended and PASF remains intact.
 - (3) The international team coordinates between Palestinians and Israelis and has positive impact on the crisis management process.

The remainder of second phase was intended to flow along the following lines:

Figure 6: Inject Flow – Phase II



It should be noted that the simulation was designed so that the basic beginning situation would evolve from initial settings and pre-prepared injects. Particularly in Phase II, the manner in which the parties to the conflict and the international team members chose to attempt to manage the evolving events dictated later phases of the simulation. Careful post-simulation analysis was undertaken, and revealed major themes and turning points, as well as critical areas of potential cooperation and areas in which members of the international community might play positive roles in diffusing crisis situations. The following summary sections provide some critical insights into communications dynamics, political and media dynamics, and key tensions for legitimacy.

Major Findings

Communications Dynamics

Preference for Bilateral or Multilateral Talks

- The **Palestinian team** sought to involve the international team in discussions throughout the simulation as they felt appropriate to the subject matter at hand
- **International team** members agreed that continuous, open engagement with all parties

without overstepping bounds was the best role in an essentially bilateral crisis

- The **Israeli team** consistently maintained a preference for bilateral over multilateral contact
- The **Israeli team** at all times sought to limit third party involvement and consistently rejected offers for trilateral communication and/or mediation – they had a strong preference to keep all contact with the PA bilateral

Communication Pathways

- During the initial incident and subsequent incidents, the **Israeli and Palestinian teams** reached out to one another and coordinated at various levels appropriate to functional security cooperation
- Tensions between the **Israeli and Palestinian** teams were most present in the communication of the PASF and Central Command over the role and visibility of the IDF
- The channel between the two security chiefs (**PA General Intelligence and Shin Bet**) was important to the bilateral communication and remained in use throughout the simulation
- The **Israeli team** communicated with the US primarily at the **Sec State level** (through the Control team)

International Team and US Responsiveness

- The International team was pleased by the level of coordination they were able to achieve between agencies, and felt tight coordination between US actors in particular was beneficial to response
- The **Palestinian team** felt the US actors were not responsive enough to their requests for support and help in facilitating trilateral contact
- **US actors**, conversely, felt they were as proactive and as engaged as they could be, given realistic constraints on their role, the need to wait for policy guidance from Washington, and the reluctance of the Israeli team to accept third party involvement
- The **Israeli team** received US involvement (through control) at the SecState level relatively cordially, but this did not result in concrete trilateral de-escalation efforts – rather GOI and PA agreed to let the SecState announce an agreement reached in bilateral negotiation

Political/Media Dynamics

Palestinian Team

- The Palestinian team faced immediate internal legitimacy issues and moved to project solidarity with the Palestinian sentiment, while privately negotiating with the Israelis to try and minimize actions like IDF deployments that could further inflame tensions
- The PA President condemned loss of Palestinian life in the media, attempted to co-opt emerging protests by making them official, and sending high ranking PA politicians to funerals and marches
- The PA focused on keeping governors on board through direct meetings with the president and other top officials less concerned with other Palestinian political actors (i.e. Fatah and PLO officers, high profile leaders living outside the West Bank)
- Though Hamas' role in simulation was limited, the Palestinian team discussed strategies to deal with Hamas' attempt to capitalize on the emerging crisis

Israeli Team

- The Israeli team focused primarily on creating public assurance that the situation in the West Bank was under control and not a threat to Israeli security or interests
- The Israeli team used a sophisticated media strategy including official releases, targeted leaks,

live press conferences, and the deployment of surrogates in international and US media, including members of Congress

- The Israeli team remained confident during most of the simulation that public-facing PA statements were primarily rhetoric designed to assuage Palestinian public opinion

International Team

- The International team attempted to be “responsible” in their public statements – paid close attention to Palestinian and Israeli social media as a supplement and ‘check’ on what they were being told by the Israeli and PA teams

Key Tensions for Legitimacy

- **Misunderstandings:** Despite efforts to establish and maintain bilateral communication, misunderstandings between the PA and GOI remained problematic and potentially led to escalation
- **IDF Presence – Provocation or Precaution:** Despite the IDF’s attempt to keep a low profile, the PA felt the mere presence of soldiers at certain locations and junctures inflamed tensions – what the Israelis viewed as necessary security precautions the PA viewed as both unnecessary and potentially provocative
- **Disagreements over investigations:** The question of investigation(s) into the original Tulkarem incident remained a point of friction throughout, especially over who would lead it and how civil society would be involved. This eventually torpedoed a joint investigation (modeled on the Tibon Committee) that was under discussion. In the end, parallel investigations by the IDF and PA were all that could be agreed on
- **Role of NSF:** Despite the pressures of the walk out among some PCP, and calls for a wider strike, PA was prepared to plug any security gap by activating NSF as necessary
- **PA Security v. Political leaders:** The Palestinian team did experience frustrations internally between competing priorities for security officials and political leaders
- **Israeli public opinion:** Outstanding questions about whether the Israeli team would have been able to still give the PA the benefit of doubt/breathing room if they had been under greater pressure from Israeli public
- **Strain:** The PA was clearly more strained by the situation and the threat it posed to their legitimacy. The Israeli team felt it was the kind of crisis that can be handled routinely – raising serious questions about what would happen if there were more pressure on GOI (IDF having to fire on settlers, for example). The security cooperation model worked and held in part because of the asymmetric levels of stress on the two teams

Psychology/Neuroscience Findings

As noted earlier, a team of neuroscientists assisted in preparing simulation training materials and followed up with extensive post-simulation analysis. The following are a few brief highlights.

Four Points for Use during Crises

(1) Escalation or de-escalation can result from events' predictability and unexpectedness. The international community can help manage predictability, and use unexpectedness as a tool. (e.g. use prior coordination; increase bandwidth; predictable noise)

(2) Controlling escalation involves not just minimising escalatory factors, but also positive

accommodative and conciliatory gestures. The international community can help provide ideas and/or substantive political or other contributions. (e.g. expand area of free movement of PCP; Friday no special limitations of access to Temple Mount; liberalise Gaza crossing)

(3) *Perceived fairness matters when shaping deals and in procedures.* The international community can help provide ideas and/or substantive contributions to packages. (e.g. multiple parts to deals)

(4) *Israeli deterrence concepts center on managing a psychological balance, and involve inherently escalatory forces.* The international community can help mitigate adverse effects of events within this deterrence paradigm. (e.g. apologies, post-crisis)

Integrative Complexity (IC) Analysis for the Security Simulation

(1) *Engagement with differing perspectives (higher IC) increased through the simulation.* Messages start (Session 1) at IC score 1.12, move to 2.19 (Session 2), decrease slightly to 1.74 (Session 3). Conferences resolve at scores 2, 3 and 4. Results are in line with IC literature; gains in IC predict peaceful conflict resolution.

(2) *Emotive 'black and white' (low IC) communications were repaired by perspective-taking.* Subsequent communications increase in complex logical reasoning. Repair of deleterious effects of low IC was often initiated by the International Team, eventually exercised by all teams, enabling more complex reasoning to proceed. Pattern of **stress-repair-gain** is an achievement, and by no means automatic. (IC drops without mediating third party or IC training).

(3) *Perspective-taking motivates cognitive effort* as it keeps a wider range of important human values 'alive' in the negotiation process in the face of cognitive miserliness, stress, fatigue and ideological defences.

(4) *Perspective-taking seems to have enabled individuals' logical processing to get back on track.* In contrast, extremist mindsets (e.g. **some** spoilers) **are socially shared**, and probably need support on the level of the **group**, not just the individual.

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Part III. The Role of External Actors in Israel-Palestinian Security

Chapter 6: Third Party Monitoring Missions: Best Practices for Building Legitimacy, Trust, and Transparency

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Introduction

Proposals for third party monitoring have been advanced and debated throughout the many iterations of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Although prospects for resolution seem distant given today's difficult political and security environment, many serious proposals both past and present have involved third party monitoring mechanisms in one form or another. Given this, identifying effective options for the structure and functions of such missions merits further study.

In this report, a comparative case study approach is adopted to answer the question: *"What are best practices for international security forces in earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy during third party monitoring missions?"* By considering relevant past missions' successes and failures in these areas, negotiators and implementers will be better equipped to design effective proposals for monitoring missions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict environment.

The report starts with a brief overview of the literature on third party monitoring and a presentation of characteristics that are helpful for analyzing and comparing missions. The next section elaborates on the methodology used to select five cases for in-depth analysis: the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), the International Monitoring Team in the Philippines (IMT), the Truce/Peace Monitoring Group in Papua New Guinea (TMG/PMG), the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), and the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).

Each of the five third party monitoring missions is then reviewed and evaluated for the effectiveness of the strategies used to establish legitimacy, trust, and transparency. While the EUMM, IMT, and TMG/PMG were highly or moderately successful overall, the SLMM and UNMEE met with both internal and external challenges. In the next section, the strategies from each of the missions are collected and synthesized into a list of best practices for future missions. The report concludes with a review of monitoring missions in the Arab-Israel conflict, and a set of recommended characteristics for any future mission for Israel-Palestine.

Defining Third Party Monitoring Missions

Despite its significant role in numerous conflict and post-conflict settings, third party monitoring has rarely been a subject of independent study in political science or policy literature. It is largely subsumed in the broader literature on peace operations (Samset 2004a). In its simplest form, monitoring is "the process of gathering information about a particular activity." (Boulden 2000). However, putting this simple premise into practice in real conflict environments quickly becomes

complex. In this section of the report, third party monitoring as it exists within the broader field of international peace operations is described, and a series of characteristics are proposed that can serve as a basis for comparing and analyzing different missions.

Monitoring in the Context of Peace Operations

From armed intervention to post-conflict peacebuilding, there are many ways third parties can become involved in supporting the management and resolution of international conflicts. Within the broad universe of these third party peace operations, monitoring has long been a prominent and integral component. Initially, most third party monitoring occurred immediately after ceasefires were signed. Once the belligerents were separated, monitoring duties were the primary function of post-ceasefire missions. Occasionally, missions did work related to securing buffer zones and overseeing the implementation of demilitarization programs, but they rarely went beyond that (Boulden 2000). This model is known as traditional or “first generation” peacekeeping and it was dominant from 1948 until around 1989 (Mays 2010).

The end of the Cold War, however, marked a significant shift in the purpose and structure of most peace operations. After 1989, so-called “second generation” peacekeeping emerged, integrating additional responsibilities in the political, humanitarian, and military realms (Mays 2010). The range of responsibilities expanded to include verifying adherence to agreements; supporting demining efforts; providing temporary public administration; overseeing elections; establishing a secure environment; upholding law and order; facilitating confidence-building; protecting aid convoys; providing direct humanitarian assistance; and running disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999).

Significant expansion in the complexity of peace operations drastically impacted the nature of monitoring as well. Monitoring today is more likely to occur as a component of an integrated, multifaceted mission – and missions exclusively dedicated to monitoring are rare. Instead, it is not uncommon for the same third party to be involved in negotiating, implementing, and monitoring a peace agreement, as well as supporting post-conflict development (Potter 2004a). In addition, monitoring is no longer carried out solely by armed military troops, but may also be done by civilians (Hoglund 2011). The range of monitoring functions has also expanded to encompass the monitoring of peace accord implementation, civilian safety and security, disarmament, compliance with bilateral or multilateral agreements, human rights, elections, and a host of other duties in addition to traditional ceasefire monitoring. Furthermore the preponderance of new technologies – from cell phones to satellites – continues to enhance monitoring capabilities (Boulden 2000).

Characteristics of Third Party Monitoring Missions

Third party monitoring missions – and peace operations more broadly – vary tremendously in their composition and mandate. They range from large missions with thousands of personnel and complex mandates to missions consisting of a few dozen personnel with narrow objectives. Similarly, while some missions last for decades, others are in and out within a year. To aid comparison and analysis across various missions, seven core characteristics – or categories of important features – are identified below. These characteristics will be noted for each case study and, later on in the analysis, conclusions will be drawn regarding their impact on establishing legitimacy, trust, and transparency.

- **Identity and strength of third party:** Although the United Nations is the most obvious international entity to serve as a third party, regional organizations – like NATO and the African Union – are increasingly common. Coalitions of states and non-governmental organizations – like the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue – have also taken on monitoring roles. While many missions are authorized under Chapter Six of the UN Charter (or Chapter Six-and-a-Half, where belligerents give prior consent), other missions are established by agreements between the parties themselves. Mission strength, moreover, ranges from a dozen to many thousands of monitors, composed from military, police, and/or civilian personnel. Additionally, the composition of the mission personnel can matter as much or more than the legal entity responsible for the operation.
- **Mission duration:** Missions may last months or decades. They may be explicitly temporary (with mandate renewal necessary every six months or so) or be established without specific deadlines or milestones for their withdrawal. It is important to note that many missions originally conceived as one-year projects end up turning into long, multi-year operations. Longer missions, moreover, tend to evolve along with the conflict in question.
- **Phase of conflict:** Monitoring can occur at virtually any point in a conflict – (1) during violent conflict, (2) after a ceasefire, (3) after a partial agreement, (4) after a full peace agreement, or (5) during post-conflict transition. The phase of conflict typically dictates the nature of the monitoring. For instance, a focus on monitoring the separation of belligerents is important when fighting is ongoing, but once the fighting stops and agreements signed, missions often shift focus to verification and implementation.
- **Mandate complexity:** Mandates range from monitoring-only to combinations of multiple military, political, and/or humanitarian functions. Standard operating procedures (i.e. as defined by the mandate, status-of-forces agreement, and rules of engagement) help to define other important elements of the mission – including whether personnel will be armed and to what extent they will engage with the parties.
- **Level of monitoring:** Monitors have differing authorized functions and capabilities from mission to mission. The levels of monitoring can be broadly summarized in four categories, each incorporating a range of potential functions, from maintaining and patrolling buffer zones to writing reports on parties' compliance to facilitating dispute resolution when agreements are breached. The four categories are: (1) Observation - passive watching and/or inspection, but without a mandate to judge; (2) Verification - observe, judge, and report violations of an agreement; (3) Oversight: observe – and assist in ensuring – party compliance with an agreement; and (4) Enforcement - observe and enforce compliance with an agreement.
- **Presence of other peace operations:** The presence or absence of concurrent peace operations impacts the environment in which a third party monitoring mission operates. The nature of the relationships between various missions – whether the missions collaborate, compete, or perform complementary functions – provides a more comprehensive picture of the operating context. Of equal importance is the timeline of peace operations. Is this the first mission or a successor to a prior mission? How many missions came before or after it?

Methodology: Comparative Case Study Analysis

The core research question is how international security forces can *maintain legitimacy, earn trust, and create transparency*. These terms were broadly defined and this report begins with the assumption that these three concepts are valuable and desirable to any third party monitoring mission. The objective of this analysis is to draw lessons on what factors contributed to success or failure in achieving these goals by comparing across representative monitoring missions. From the universe of historical cases of third party monitoring, five in-depth case studies were carefully

selected. The practices of each mission in achieving (or failing to achieve) the goals were analyzed, along with the similarities and differences in the mission characteristics, as defined in the previous section. From this analysis, specific best practices are identified, as well as typical patterns that inhibit or undermine their implementation.

The five case studies were selected based on a rigorous process and started with the compiling of a list of all peace operations from 1946-2012 (270 missions total). In this study, Mullenbach's (2013b) definition was adapted to define "peace operations" as a deployment of military and/or civilian personnel by a third party into a conflict or post-conflict situation to fulfill military, humanitarian, or political functions for the purposes of assisting with containing, managing, or resolving the conflict. The full universe of cases was drawn from Mays (2010), Heldt and Wallenstein (2006), Diehl and Balas (2014), and Mullenbach (2013a).

The comprehensive list of 270 peace operations was then narrowed to include only cases for which monitoring is a core component of the mission's mandate – a total of 127 cases. Monitoring is defined as the full spectrum of activities discussed in the definition section, including the monitoring of ceasefires, agreement implementation, troop withdrawal, and disarmament demobilization and reintegration (DDR). However, activities predominantly viewed as "peacebuilding" (i.e. the monitoring of elections, human rights, civilian police, and war crimes tribunals) were excluded.

The list of 127 monitoring missions was then further narrowed based on the following characteristics to ensure relevance to the Israeli-Palestinian case:

- **Conflict parties:** The primary conflicting parties were two states OR a state and a separatist/autonomous region. Each party must have had control over a distinct geographic area, although all members of a party need not reside in those same locations.
- **Borders/Territory:** A core driver of the conflict revolved around borders and/or territory (i.e. the desire to control territory or define borders was central to the conflict). However, land conflict must have been between inhabitants of the land, and not foreign colonizers.
- **Consent:** Parties must have, at least tacitly, consented to the presence of third party monitors. Consent could have been indicated through a peace agreement, ceasefire agreement, memorandum of understanding, or other verifiable means.
- **Conflict duration:** The conflict must have lasted for 10 years or more. This was used as a proxy indicator for protracted conflict.
- **Mission duration:** The third party monitoring mission must have been on the ground for at least three years. This requirement, in addition to mirroring the expected parameters of a monitoring mission between Israelis and Palestinians, also ensured there was enough material with which a mission's success in the metrics of interest – legitimacy, trust, and transparency – could be judged.

Discarding missions that did not meet these criteria reduced the list to 28 cases. Five cases were ultimately selected to provide the broadest array of alternative trajectories for examination. Three of the selected cases – the EUMM (Georgia), the IMT (Philippines), and the TMG/PMG (Papua/New Guinea) demonstrate clear successes in achieving trust, transparency, and legitimacy, and the remaining two – the SLMM (Sri Lanka) and UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea) – exemplify challenges to these goals.

Summary of Case Studies

In the report, considerable details are provided on each mission – especially on its successes and challenges in ensuring legitimacy, trust, and transparency. Table 1 briefly compares the missions according to their core characteristics and suggests a bottom line assessment.

Table 1: Case Studies Overview

<u>Mission/ Duration</u>	<u>3rd Party</u>	<u>Monitoring /Phase</u>	<u>Mandate</u>	<u>Other International Operations</u>	<u>Assessment</u>
EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) 2008-pres.	EU (200, civilian)	Oversight (Post-ceasefire)	Prevent conflict, build confidence, facilitate normalization (unarmed)	– S. Ossetia Joint Pkpg Force (1992-2008) – CIS Collective Pkpg Forces (1994-2009) – UN Observer Mission in Georgia (1993-2009) – OSCE (1994-2008)	Calming, consistent presence helped restore stability, but Russia presented obstacles to full implementation
Int'l Monitoring Team in the Philippines (IMT) 2004-2008; 2010-pres.	Malaysia, regional coalition (40-60, military/civilian)	Verification (Post-ceasefire/ interim peace agreement)	Monitor ceasefire (unarmed)	– OIC Monitoring Team (1996-2002)	Highly-regarded by all parties, serves as a vital and measurable deterrent to violence
Truce/Peace Monitoring Group in Papua New Guinea (TMG/PMG) 1998-2003	NZ/ Australia, regional coalition (300, military/civilian)	Observation (Post-ceasefire/ peace agreement)	Monitor ceasefire/ agreement, foster confidence -building (unarmed)	– UN Political Office/ UN Observer Mission-Bougainville (1998-2005) – Bougainville Transition Team (2003)	Emphasis on cultural competence and relationship-building helped mission create space for peace
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) 2002-2008	Norway, regional coalition (60, military)	Observation (Post-ceasefire)	Monitor ceasefire (unarmed)	<i>None</i>	Reported violations, but was not effective or visible and was too closely linked to Norwegian facilitators
UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) 2000-2008	UN (4,200, military)	Verification (Post-partial peace agreement)	Verify agreement, de-mine, foster int'l coordination (armed)	– Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (2000-2007) – Organization of African Unity Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (2000-8)	Initial success ended in failure after the parties turned against mission and forced it to evacuate

Analysis: Best Practices for Third Party Monitoring Missions

Review of the five cases above highlights some of the most effective practices in maintaining legitimacy, earning trust, and creating transparency. Although conditions do not yet seem ripe for an Israeli-Palestinian monitoring mission, the successes and challenges of the five missions can inform future efforts in that direction. In this section, the most relevant best practices for each of the three elements of interest are synthesized.

Overview of Best Practices for Third Party Monitoring Missions

Maintaining Legitimacy

The strength of a third party monitoring mission's legitimacy is established well before mission deployment. Whether the parties agree to the mandate terms and structure, and how expectations are framed, sets the stage for the mission's success. Even a mission that starts with legitimacy, however, can lose it easily if it fails to follow through with commitments or adapt to changing conditions. Finally, the way a mission defines its end goal and exit timeline is crucial. Gradual, consensus-based exit strategies help demonstrate commitment through to the very end.

- **Obtain parties' consent and buy-in.** If conflicting parties do not fully agree to the terms, structure, and activities of a mission before it begins, it can be difficult to execute a mandate effectively. Securing the parties' prior support increases the likelihood international and domestic stakeholders will also accept and cooperate with the mission. Securing real consent may require compromise in areas where parties have strong preferences, like what states may contribute and whether to arm the mission. Without buy-in, the mission risks being seen as a top-down imposition, rather than an invited guest participating in a process the parties own.
- **Establish clear expectations.** An unambiguous mandate – including the mission's obligations, powers, and limitations – is vital for ensuring a mission continues to be perceived as legitimate. Competing ideas about what a mission is supposed to do can lead to conflict and a loss of support. Moreover, setting expectations early on will ensure that the mission is perceived as doing exactly what the parties agreed to.
- **Demonstrate commitment and follow-through.** Once a third party commits, follow-through is essential. Missions that do what they promise are always more highly-regarded. On the other hand, breaking promises – by not enforcing consequences for violations, for example – can erode credibility. Waning international support or resources may also indicate a lack of commitment and result in the parties ignoring the mission. Similarly, pulling out early may reward bullying behavior and show that the mission should not be taken seriously.
- **Allow for mission evolution.** Conditions are often quite dynamic following a ceasefire or a peace agreement and a rigid mission that cannot adapt risks becoming irrelevant. To ensure a mission can evolve, flexibility may be incorporated into the mandate, adaptations may be made during mandate renewal or in new peace agreements, or the head of the mission may be granted authority to reinterpret the scope or activities. Care should be taken, however, to ensure that any changes have the parties' consent and do not exceed the mission mandate.
- **Develop an exit strategy in conjunction with the parties.** Missions are usually meant to be temporary, but often overstay their welcome. Providing for regular mandate renewal is one way to send a clear signal about intentions. Pulling out too fast or too early – or politicizing the withdrawal – can also reduce parties' confidence in the mission. To ensure a smooth transition,

the third party should consult with all stakeholders to develop a feasible exit strategy that everyone can agree to. Effective plans are usually phased, focus on events or milestones – rather than hard deadlines – and also plan for the post-mission transition.

Earning Trust

The main key to earning trust is regular engagement and demonstrations of good will. The best way to reduce the initial barriers to trust is to ensure monitors are culturally competent by hiring diverse teams and providing pre-deployment training. Carefully considering how a mission reflects its impartiality to all parties is crucial, as well. Beyond that, most successful missions invest heavily in relationship building. This can be done by taking advantage of the mission's unique position to serve as an interlocutor between sides and address local needs and concerns. In addition, trust can be strengthened through collaborative relationships with other third parties.

- **Invest in pre-deployment training and diverse teams.** Most monitors are soldiers trained in war, not peacebuilding, and they often encounter cultural and linguistic barriers in theatre. Pre-deployment training in culture and language can enhance monitors' ability to interact effectively within the conflict context. Missions also benefit from employing diverse teams that include women and people with country expertise. Mixed military/civilian missions may further enhance their capabilities and ability to connect with different stakeholders. Diverse teams, however, usually benefit from internal training on how to work together effectively.
- **Exhibit impartiality through mission structure and actions.** A perception of impartiality – that is, fair and equal treatment of all parties, not passive neutrality – is essential to earning trust. Missions should consider the perception of structural elements (like where to locate field offices and whether personnel should be armed), national and ethnic composition of staff, formation of parallel relationships with conflict parties, and equity in reporting practices. This can be especially difficult when the parties have a highly asymmetric relationship. While there are no easy answers, the best strategy is simply to remain aware of different stakeholders' perceptions and try to address their concerns about bias head on.
- **Serve as a bridge between parties.** Because missions have contact with multiple sides, monitors are uniquely positioned to facilitate communication and confidence-building between the parties and between each party and its own constituencies. Building confidence and assisting in dispute resolution is a hugely valuable service that demonstrates the mission's good will and intentions and helps to deepen relations with each side.
- **Foster good relations with locals.** Missions can build trust by ensuring accessibility (like patrolling in remote areas or creating hotlines), offering services (like transport to meetings), and addressing local concerns (like ensuring complainants are protected). In many cases, it takes time and effort to overcome a population's suspicions and fear of speaking out. Engaging with locals sincerely and regularly demonstrates a mission is a friendly presence, and increases the likelihood they will share vital information. It also helps the third party get to understand the context more intimately and anticipate or prevent escalations in tension.
- **Work collaboratively with third parties and peace groups.** Often, multiple groups – both local and international – work on the peace process simultaneously. Good communication and coordination between the monitoring mission and civil society groups, local authorities, and other third parties is essential for gaining the confidence of all actors and establishing the mission's place within a sometimes competitive operating environment.

Creating Transparency

Creating transparency requires conscious and consistent communications and information management so that the parties, local stakeholders, media, and international community are aware of what the monitoring mission is doing and why it is doing it. Distributed field offices and frequent patrols help make the monitors' presence known and communicating about the mission in public forums shows the mission is active and impactful. Maintaining consistent operating procedures – and justifying when secrecy is used – also helps. Finally, distinguishing the mission from other peacekeeping components clarifies its intentions and independence.

- **Be visible and accessible.** Unseen, monitors are ineffective deterrents and may be perceived as elusive or obscure. To combat this, missions often invest in decentralized field offices and patrols that make their way to remote regions on a regular basis. This helps ensure the mission's presence is widely felt and that the parties and the locals are aware of them. More than that, it provides a way for people to reach out to the mission when problems arise. To further set the mission apart, many monitors wear distinctive uniforms and display their country or organization's flag. The biggest barrier to broadcasting a mission's presence is when personnel or resources are too limited to adequately cover the area of responsibility.
- **Communicate regularly and publicly.** A robust, outward-facing communication strategy is essential to effectively exert pressure on the parties, inform local and international stakeholders about the mission's findings, and disseminate information about the peace process and the mission's role in it. Missions can communicate through the media or their own channels, like newsletters, radio shows, and hand-distributed fliers. Excessive reliance on non-public channels, on the other hand, can create a perception of unwarranted secrecy and undermine public knowledge and trust of the mission.
- **Develop clear structures and consistent operating procedures.** An organizational structure that is clear, logical, and publicly known demonstrates a mission's professionalism and ensures stakeholders know who is in charge and who to approach for various issues. More than that, maintaining consistent operating procedures helps to prove a mission is objective and implementing fairly. When the procedures for a mission to collect, report, and act on its findings are known, it increases popular perceptions about its transparency.
- **Explain when secrecy is required.** Sometimes, maintaining an element of secrecy is important – for instance, if party consent was contingent on certain reports remaining private or the head of mission determines certain information should be handled in diplomatic back channels. In those cases, the best way a mission can preserve an element of transparency is by communicating the process by which the information is being handled and providing, if possible, a public justification for why it is not being shared more widely.
- **Distinguish the mission from other actors.** A monitoring mission's transparency is more easily established when its identity and purpose are distinct from other components like humanitarian groups and political processes. Monitoring missions tied to the mediator, for instance, raise particular questions over whether the mission will have incentives to monitor objectively or will rather be subservient to the mediator's political objectives.

Conclusion

A third party monitoring mission could play a potentially significant role in guaranteeing a future Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. This report aims to inform conversations about the ideal design by engaging in a qualitative comparative case study analysis of past missions to answer: *“What are best*

practices for international security forces in earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy during third party monitoring missions?"

The overview of literature on third party monitoring provided an understanding of the role and characteristics of monitoring missions – from size to mandate complexity. After explaining the robust case study selection process, the five cases – the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), the International Monitoring Team in the Philippines (IMT), the Truce/Peace Monitoring Group in Papua New Guinea (TMG/PMG), the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), and the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) – are reviewed in-depth and evaluated for the effectiveness of their strategies to establish legitimacy, trust, and transparency. The best practices, synthesized in a final analytical section, are summarized here:

Legitimacy. The missions with the strongest legitimacy start with the full consent and buy-in of the conflicting parties themselves and they set clear expectations from the beginning. The missions have the flexibility to adapt to new conditions, but make those changes – including their exit strategies – in consultation with the stakeholders. Importantly, legitimate missions follow through with their commitments so that the parties take them seriously.

Trust. Missions that build a high level of trust focus on relationships. They tear down cultural and linguistic barriers by ensuring their teams are diverse and well trained. Their emphasis on impartiality is exhibited both in the mission structure and the actions of their personnel. Moreover, they strive to be a bridge between parties – thus establishing their good will and role in building confidence – and they engage with the local populations, civil society, and other third parties to build strong and cooperative bonds that help prevent conflict before it starts.

Transparency. Finally, missions that are considered transparent do not necessarily share all. Instead, they are highly visible and accessible and maintain a variety of public channels – from patrols to pamphlets – to communicate that they are there and what they are there for. Even when secrecy is necessary, explaining why some information must be private and maintaining overall clear and consistent structures and operating procedures helps reinforce that the missions are operating according to impartial and professional standards. Missions that are able to uphold their independence from other actors, moreover, fortify their unique identity and intentions.

Taken together, these best practices in ensuring legitimacy, trust, and transparency form the basis of a successful third party monitoring mission. None of them are simple to implement, but diligent preparation and effort is necessary for a complex conflict situation.

Appendix: Monitoring in the Arab-Israeli Region

Introduction

Over the course of 60-plus years of conflict, six monitoring missions – among them some of the oldest and longest-serving peace operations in history – have been deployed to the region for the purposes of monitoring the borders between Israel and its neighbors, supervising troop disengagement and redeployment, and observing compliance with various agreements. They are: the UN Truce Supervision Office (UNTSO), the UN Emergency Force I and II (UNEF I and UNEF II), the UN Disengagement Observers Force (UNDOF), the UN International Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). Despite the sometimes significant challenges

they faced, these missions set an overall hopeful precedent for the establishment of a positive future role for monitoring in the region – especially if their mistakes are learned from.

Characteristics of a Future Israeli-Palestinian Third Party Monitoring Mission

Based on the experiences of prior missions and Israeli and Palestinian preferences as expressed in numerous negotiations and proposals, the characteristics of a future third party monitoring mission can be extrapolated. This preliminary outline both provides some important context for reading the case studies in the following sections and serves as a baseline for the analysis of best practices.

- **Identity and strength of third party:** Israeli opposition to the UN will require a different arrangement – perhaps through NATO (with a UN mandate) or an independent, multinational force similar to the MFO – and the United States is expected to lead any future mission, since it is the only party both Israelis and Palestinians trust. Based on recent American proposals, the size is expected to be on the low end of the roughly 600-7,000 personnel range from past missions.
- **Duration of mission:** Although many earlier missions were intended to be temporary, all have ended up lasting nearly a decade (some much longer). A final peace deal will most likely be implemented in phases, so the mission may require an evolution in structure and functions over time, as the transition progresses. Also, key to the mission's success will be determining the rules for renewal and withdrawal so that problems like TIPH I and UNEF II's expired mandates and the disaster of UNEF I's early pullout can be avoided.
- **Conflict phase:** The general vision seems to be of a mission that will deploy following an agreement, and only with the consent of the parties. UNIFIL is a stark reminder of what can happen when a mission launches in the midst of a chaotic conflict and Egypt's removal of consent for UNEF I amidst escalating tensions between the parties raises an important question regarding how to deal with changes in parties' moods and the conflict environment.
- **Mandate complexity:** Among the roles suggested for a third party are supervising the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian territory, patrolling border crossings, supervising de-escalation, and participating in dispute resolution and confidence-building. Monitoring will clearly be the key component, but it is quite likely the mission may include additional military and political functions. Clearly rules of engagement – for instance whether personnel can be armed – will need to be carefully defined.
- **Level of monitoring:** Proposals differ greatly on the extent and amount of responsibility that should be given a monitoring mission. For example, while some propose the mission should monitor both security and political adherence to agreements, others advocate for security monitoring only. In general, Israelis prefer a more limited observation-only mission, while Palestinians insist the mission be involved in verification and oversight.
- **Presence of other peace operations:** Any new mission will need to create its own space within the veteran missions still on the ground – UNTSO, UNDOF, UNIFIL, MFO, and even TIPH II. Bureaucracy and territoriality should be approached with care. Ideally, a new mission will take advantage of the expertise and long history the older missions have to offer. Doing so will ensure the new mission is optimally prepared to engage effectively – and cooperatively – to fulfill its mandate.

Conclusion

This appendix endeavors to provide important regional context to the discussion about future monitoring efforts between Israelis and Palestinians. The review of the six Arab-Israeli-focused

monitoring missions demonstrates the strong historical precedent for monitoring in the region. The overview of the – albeit more limited – efforts to monitor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict further illustrates both the challenges and opportunities for an international monitoring presence. Immediately following that, the main Israeli and Palestinian discourses regarding future monitoring are presented. These perspectives are much more understandable once the long history of monitoring, and each party's experiences with it, is taken into consideration. Finally, all of this information is synthesized into a review of the range of possibilities for a mission that might engage in monitoring in the future. There are many options to choose from and the hope is that, by using the past as a guide for the future, a more effective mission can be designed and implemented.

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Chapter 7: Optimizing the Impact of International Community Investment in Security, Economy, and Governance to Support a Functioning State

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Abstract

This report examines the multiple factors that contribute to instability in the West Bank. Palestinians face escalating levels of economic, social, and governing instability that collectively degrade the governing legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Using the NSI Stability Model (StaM), the NSI team identified key buffers and drivers of economic, social, and governing stability, along with their second- and third-order effects. The report also identifies several considerations for analysts on where and how the international community can invest to help decrease instability in the West Bank, while avoiding making investments in channels that could lead to further instability.

Introduction

The following question was posed by SMA:

“With respect to the linkages between security, economy, and governance, and with recognition that each is needed to support a functioning state, where should the international community invest?”

The situation in the West Bank is unique in that it includes areas that are governed solely by the Palestinian Authority (PA), areas that are under joint administration of the PA and Israel, and areas that are completely under Israeli control. Recognizing the complexity of the situation, the NSI team employed its Stability Model (StaM)³¹ to illuminate the economic, social, and governing stressors (instability drivers) that lead to instability, as well as the economic, social, and governing capacities for resilience (stability buffers).

Key Findings

- *VAT withholdings and declining foreign aid are causing a cascade of impacts that are crushing the economy, undermining the legitimacy and capacity of the PA, and impairing basic human rights and needs.*
- *Political stalemate on the West Bank degrades perception of PA legitimacy, while the PASF is feared and seen as working with the IDF and violating human rights.*
- *High youth unemployment and inappropriate job training, coupled with a climate of conflict, could lead to uprisings among younger Palestinians.*
- *Increased limits on protests and speech further a growing discontent and risk retaliatory actions.*

³¹ The model, originally called the “Durability Model,” and its User’s Guide were first developed in response to a request to the SMA team by ISAF to measure the impact of actions and policies on developing stable and durable political, economic, and social systems in Afghanistan. A more detailed discussion of the use and development of conceptual models, as well as examples of the application of the original Durability Model (State STAM) to Afghanistan, are available from Dr. Belinda Bragg of NSI at bbragg@NSIteam.com.

NSI's (StaM) represents both a conceptual framework and an analytic methodology to guide users through a systematic process of obtaining a *rich contextual understanding* of the operating environment. The StaM aids users not only in identifying the factors that explain the stability or instability of a nation-state, region, or other area of interest, but also in making the connections between and among the various stability factors apparent—allowing users to derive all implications of a potential engagement strategy. The StaM methodology involves an iterative process of “tailoring” or customizing the generic framework to a specific geographic or political area of interest. The output of a StaM effort includes identification of immediate and longer-term buffers to political, economic, and social stability and sources of population resilience, as well as immediate and longer-term drivers of instability and collapse. Once a tailored StaM has been prepared, it can be used to address further questions; these include questions regarding the impact of external actors or the most effective and stability-promoting means of engaging with the AOI.

The generic StaM framework, shown in Figure 1 below, consolidates political, economic, and social peer-reviewed quantitative and qualitative scholarship into a single stability model based on these three dimensions, and, critically, specifies the relationships among them. As such, the StaM represents a cross-dimension summary, which draws on rich traditions of theory and research on stability and instability from diverse fields, including anthropology, political science and international relations, social psychology, sociology, and economics.




Figure 4: Generic StaM

Five key assumptions, shown in Table 1 below, serve as the foundation of the generic StaM.

Table 1: Five Key Assumptions of the StaM

StaM Assumptions
<i>A1: Political, economic, and social stability are necessary, but not sufficient, to explain or predict the durability (overall stability) of a political system.</i>
<i>A2: A governing system will be stable if it is perceived by its constituents to meet their needs (i.e., provides material or non-material “goods”) and expectations.</i>
<i>A3: Constituent needs and expectations are culturally and contextually dependent and adaptive.</i>
<i>A4: The primary “goods” expected from a governing authority are the provision of internal order and external security sufficient for people to meet their physical and psychological needs.</i>
<i>A5: People do not seek to change systems from which they benefit. Dissatisfaction with the provision of goods by a governing authority reduces the perceived legitimacy of and encourages opposition to that entity.</i>

The overall stability of an AOI—which can be defined within the StaM as either a nation-state, sub-state region, or city—is defined as a compound function of its political, economic, and social stability. Note that the StaM is agnostic to form of governance. Democratic governance is not presumed. It is also agnostic to the type of economic system, and typically will include formal, grey (or informal), and black economic elements. Finally, within the StaM, neither overall stability nor social stability suggest violence- or unrest-free societies, but those where social structures are known and durable, and social cleavages and conflicts are for the most part manageable. Furthermore, stability does not imply a lack of change. Rather, it denotes the flexibility and resilience of a system to adapt to changes over time, without economic, social, or political consequences that threaten the viability of the system.

In applying the StaM to Palestinians in the West Bank, three questions in particular were examined:

1. *What are the factors that most significantly contribute to governing, economic, and social stability in the West Bank?*
2. *Are there factors, commonly associated with stability, that have no effect or divergent effects on stability in the West Bank?*
3. *What are the primary effect dependencies among factors?*

Assessing Stability in the West Bank

The purpose of the StaM is to enable an analyst to systematically and comprehensively examine the conditions within an AOI that have potential to influence the stability of that system. All of the components of the generic StaM have the *potential* to influence the stability of a system, and were included in the model because theory and prior research has demonstrated that specific conditions and combinations of these components either increase the probability of instability, or bolster the stability of economic, social, or political systems. However, this does not mean that in every AOI every component of the generic StaM will prove to be either a driver of instability or a buffer of stability. Whether a component of the StaM influences stability in a specific AOI will depend on three basic factors: a) its conditions (e.g., what percentage of the population has access to basic health care); b) the population’s perception of those conditions (e.g., are people satisfied or dissatisfied with the level of access), and c) how those conditions and perceptions affect other components of the model (the crosscutting effects).

The West Bank has significant threats to governing, economic and social stability. While these threats dovetail with each other in a multifaceted, nonlinear way, causing a complex combination of secondary and tertiary effects, the key findings of the West Bank StaM analysis are presented in a simplified linear manner for the sake of illustration.

Drivers of Economic Instability in the West Bank

Approximately 70% of PA revenue comes from Value-Added Tax (VAT) revenues and import duties that are collected by Israel and then remitted to the PA each month (World Bank, 2012). While the Paris Protocol³² that initially created the re-routing of PA VAT revenue by Israel and subsequent monthly disbursement payments of the VAT to the PA was originally meant to serve as a five-year interim agreement, it still governs Israeli-PA economic interactions today (Sprig & Heyn, 2012). However, the original agreement of the protocol is being violated, as it stipulates that a meeting between the PA and Israeli finance officials will take place every month and that VAT claims will be paid within six days of meeting (Kamisher, 2014). Instead, there has been a practice of Israel withholding VAT revenues to control and/or punish the PA (Sprig & Heyn, 2012). For example, when the PA filed a claim with the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the end of December in 2014, President Benjamin Netanyahu responded with a statement that Israel would withhold VAT (as had been done on previous occasions³³)—resulting in a reported loss of \$127 million USD (Al Jazeera, 2015).

Economic stability is defined in the StaM as the ability of the economic system to withstand internal or external shocks to the system including changes in the global economy. A stable economy is able to grow, respond and adapt to changing domestic and international needs. The stability of the economic system is measured in StaM as a function of two broad underlying factors: economic capacity and economic growth and development.

Although the Arab League stepped in on that occasion to provide emergency funds to cover the frozen VAT revenue and save the PA from temporary bankruptcy so that they could pursue their war crimes claim with the ICC (Deger, 2015), overall donor aid has been in serious decline. In 2010, donor aid reached a total of \$1.15 billion (World Bank, 2012), but had dropped by 50% by 2012 (Browning, 2013). Other sources show that foreign donations went from \$1.8 billion in 2008 to \$750 million in 2011 and 2012 (Browning, 2013). Due to multiple hits to the PA economy, it became necessary for the PA to rely on foreign aid for day to day budgetary needs, so the declines in funding have been felt in numerous places (Karim, 2013). In fewer than two years, the PA arrears have totaled over \$1 billion, leading to major budgetary deficits across departments (Unigovskaya, Sasin, Kock, & Janius, 2013).

As a consequence of the inability to pay its bills, the PA faces significant hurdles in meeting its constituents' basic needs. Dependent on Israel for all of its electricity, the PA owes over \$150 million in unpaid bills (mostly from Gaza), which has moved Israel to impose usage restrictions during parts of the day (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 2014). Another outcome of the PA's economic distress is its failure to pay for and/or maintain infrastructure, which has led to deteriorating roads, a decrease in public transportation, and degradation of physical maintenance structures, water and sewage treatment plants. Other negative impacts of economic distress on infrastructure include degradation of environmental remediation projects, telecommunication services and towers, the

³² Also known as the Protocol of Economic Relations established as part of the Oslo Accords where Israel collects customs taxes on goods imported into the Palestinian Territories, along with VAT and revenue from goods sold in Israel but consumed in the Palestinian Territories.

³³ From 2006-Jun 2007; Mid 2008; Apr 2011; Nov 2011; Dec 2012-Jan 2013; Dec 2014-Feb 2015*completion date of NSI report (Kanfani, 2012; Kock & Qassis; 2011; Kashmisher, 2014; Deger, 2015).

agricultural water supply, food transportation and safety, and even payment of pensions and salaries (World Bank, 2012; World Bank, 2013a; World Bank, 2013b; Deger, 2015; Kanafani, 2012; Sherwood, 2013).

A looming pension crisis may be on the horizon, as current pension payments are already suffering from payment limitations; meanwhile, pension demands are about to significantly increase once the current labor force retires³⁴ (World Bank, 2012). Coupled with this issue, public sector employees—which include PASF (Palestinian Authority Security Forces) personnel—representing 15% of jobs in the West Bank and 40% of jobs in Gaza (United Nations, 2012)—are not paid on time or at all. Many of these public servants have missed work due to non-payment, as have members of the National Security Forces (NSF) (International Crisis Group, 2013).

Rising food costs and increased spending pressure for healthcare paint an even dimmer picture. The barrier wall and border crossings, along with the partitioning of Palestinians into defined borders (Areas A, B, & C) have made food less accessible and driven up prices on items allowed to enter the Areas. It has been estimated that 1.26 million Palestinians, representing 27% of the population, are food insecure (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013).³⁵

While the PA budgets languish from the myriad of economic impacts, Palestinians not only suffer from lost wages from the nonpayment of pensions and public sector jobs, they also struggle with unemployment: 2014 saw unemployment rates at 16% (over 45% in Gaza) with a 25.3% unemployment rate for West Bank youth under age 30; new and small business opportunities are not any better, as growth is thwarted by a cumbersome, slow, and difficult bureaucratic process (Unigovskaya et al., 2013). There also appears to be a shift in economic sector jobs³⁶ that is adding to high unemployment rates, as the technical and vocational education and training (TVET) have not adapted to changes in demand, and the system is producing graduates with skill sets that do not necessarily match available jobs (World Bank, 2012).

Faced with deficits and rising unemployment, the PA sought to explore an oil reservoir along the armistice line north of Jerusalem, and estimates reveal that the reservoir could net \$1 billion over the course of the next ten years (The Economist, 2014). The obstacle is that the reservoir is in Area C—the area under Israeli control. This rich Dead Sea region also includes valuable minerals, potash, bromine, salts, and other resources, along with tourism opportunities. If utilized, GDP could increase by 10% (estimates show increases would be 9% from mineral exploitation and 1% from tourism) (Sherwood, 2013). Israeli restrictions currently prevent PA exploitation of these resources.

³⁴ To put this situation in perspective, unfunded pension liabilities represented approximately half of the total budget shortfall at the end of 2012 (Unigovskaya et al., 2013).

³⁵ Common Food Security Framework has recently been developed (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013), but it is not yet apparent how successful the effort will be.

³⁶ The service sector, real estate, communications, and professional and public services between 2012 and 2013. with declines in agriculture, manufacturing, construction, wholesale/retail trade or repair of motor vehicles, financial and insurance activities, and education, suggesting an emerging shift from raw materials and production of goods to the delivery of services.

Drivers of Social Instability in the West Bank

Grave economic threats lead to frustration, fear, anger, that often results in social instability. As addressed in the previous section, water and food security are becoming more tenuous for many Palestinians. Many are also losing their homes from expired permits, or cannot afford housing, as the availability of affordable housing is obsolete (World Bank, 2012). Those in refugee camps may be displaying advancing signs of social instability, as Palestinian forces have largely lost control over a number of camps, including camps located near Jenin, Jerusalem, and Nablus (Frykberg, 2014). Refugees in the camps live in general poverty, suffering from poor living conditions including an acute lack of sewage system access, which raises the likelihood of water-borne disease (United Nations, 2012). Increased violence in some camps has fostered a greater reluctance by the Israeli government to loosen its grip on the West Bank (Frykberg, 2014).

*For the purposes of the StaM, **Social Stability** is attained within a population when a significant proportion of the population is able to provide for, and improve their quality of life and the relationships among sub-groups (group dynamics) serve to reduce the population's social, physical and psychological uncertainty.*

Social tensions may be aggravated by the lack of options open to Palestinians to express their political and social needs and opinions. There has not been an election since 2006, and the few speech freedoms that were granted by Oslo have since eroded. For example, protests require increasingly difficult to obtain permits, and when granted, are often shut down by PASF or Israel Defense Forces (IDF), especially if they become openly critical of the PA (Freedom House, 2012). The ability of journalists and newspapers to communicate on behalf of the people is also severely restricted, as a 1995 law codifies that journalists may be fined and jailed—and newspapers closed—for publishing “secret information,” or anything construed as harmful to the PA (Freedom House, 2012).

Interestingly, in spite of the contentious climate, the West Bank has experienced relatively low crime rates until recently, when overall criminal activity rose in the areas of trafficking, drugs, and cyber-crime (United Nations, 2012). In addition, the number of protests escalated in 2013, motivated by a range of issues, including showing solidarity with hunger strikes by prisoners, teacher and union wages and benefits, and social services (International Crisis Group, 2013).

Drivers of Governing Instability in the West Bank

The PA Fatah leadership is vulnerable to growing governing instability. When people feel out of control, they will work assiduously to regain control, or a sense of control—either directly, through violent or non-violent political actions, or by seeking solutions from leadership. As previously stated, Palestinians have not been able to vote in an election in almost ten years and have had little recourse for expressing their voice. Politically, the Palestinian population has been split between potential

*For the purposes of the StaM analysis, we define **Governing Stability** as the ability of core political institutions to function as a collective authority, adapt and respond to changing social and economic demands, and withstand internal and external shocks to the state, region or city under their jurisdiction. Governing stability is modeled as a function of three contributing factors: perceived governing legitimacy, governing performance, and governing capacity. It is important to note that the model was designed to apply both to formal and informal governing systems, rules and institutions.*

leadership solutions: (1) the Oslo evolutionary strategy of the formation of a Palestinian state (Fatah, the current government) and (2) a hardline resistance to Israeli occupation (Hamas, the main rebelling faction). The danger is that some argue that this growing divide between the two factions has the potential of inciting a new Intifada as protests escalate (International Crisis Group, 2013).

A potential bridge between Hamas and Fatah was the formation of a Unity Government, but it was weakened after the PA's cooperation with Israel's investigation into the 2014 kidnapping of Israeli teenagers, as the PA was viewed as supporting Israel over Palestinians (Ruorden, 2014). The incident may have also led to increased support for Hamas (Rosen, 2014). Still, a majority of Palestinians (59%) believe that both Hamas and Fatah tend to act in their own interests instead of national interests (Toameh, 2013).

Most Palestinians view the formation of the PA as a national achievement, yet they are frustrated with its failure to gain peace (Shikaki, 2014). Because the Fatah-led PA has been harmed by public views of widespread corruption, inability to handle increasing deficits, and non-payment of salaries, along with not providing necessary services, the PA faces a "loss of electoral legitimacy" (Shikaki, 2014). As previously indicated, the lack of elections since 2006 feeds the frustration.

Corruption is another challenge facing the existing PA government (Chalabi, 2013). The PA government is weakened by the lack of having a proper management and human resources legal framework in place along with needed improvements to its structure, training, and budgets (United Nations, 2012). While the PA is making strides for improvement by introducing integrated planning and budgeting functions in a publicly available national development plan, corruption is still prevalent (Chalabi, 2013).

The police and court system have performance issues that impact their legitimacy and stability. On top of corruption issues, the Palestinian security forces have been known to employ excessive force (Human Rights Watch, 2014). One Palestinian was widely quoted as saying, "few respect the Palestinian security forces, but we do fear them" (International Crisis Group, 2010, p. 35). Possibly compounding the negative perceptions of the PA security forces, methods employed in the judicial process for those violating the law have at times been extreme.

The StaM analysis found that Palestinians face multiple barriers in the court system, including time, cost, language, and procedural barriers, along with inadequate notification of relevant orders and declarations. Fear and lack of confidence in the courts also act as deterrents to seeking redress. Palestinians are also significantly limited from seeking compensation from the Israeli state for certain conduct by its agents pursuant to the Civil Torts (Liability of the State) Law 2005, as amended in 2012 (Human Rights Council, 2012, p. 10).

Implications for International Community Activities

The implications for international community activities appear in the following four sections that recap the main findings from the StaM analysis. In short, overall investment channels that may help reduce instability include:

- Investment in PASF training that reinforces human rights could enhance its performance, which in turn may improve its perception among Palestinians and, by extension, Palestinian perception of the PA as a whole.

- Investment or aid that helps to integrate and improve VAT and income tax administration could incentivize compliance and improve PA efficiency.
- Supporting Palestinian access to Area C for commercial opportunities could help buffer against PA financial collapse.
- Improving basic living conditions, employment opportunities, and removing obstacles to small business and entrepreneurial ventures.
- Removing limitations to speech freedoms in the press and for protests, and providing safe avenues to air grievances and/or provide feedback on PASF performance.

Key Findings

VAT withholdings and declining foreign aid are causing a cascade of impacts that are crushing the economy, undermining the legitimacy and capacity of the PA , and impairing basic human rights and needs.

Value-added tax (VAT) and related revenues such as import duties currently constitute 70% of the PA's operating revenue (Deger, 2015; World Bank, 2013). The Palestinian economy is heavily dependent on Palestinian Authority spending, including public sector salaries. The VAT revenue is used to support a majority of public sector salaries and public services in the West Bank, and it has been estimated that PA public sector salaries directly support one-fourth of the population, providing a monthly "blood transfusion" for the economy (Abukhater, 2011; Deger, 2015; Gisha, 2011; Jabarin, 2011; Lynfield, 2013; The Jerusalem Fund, 2013).

The Government of Israel has repeatedly used withholding or threats of withholding of the collected taxes as a leverage point on the PA (Sprig & Heyn, 2012). Freezing of payments tends to occur during periods of heightened security and diplomatic tensions (The Jerusalem Fund, 2013). Given PA dependence on these revenues, VAT withholding can act as a driver of short-term economic instability with ripple effects into other StaM dimensions. In this case, international emergency funding that allows the PA to pay public sector salaries is a significant buffer to stability.

Given the PA's generally precarious fiscal situation, exacerbated by recent reductions in international aid, tax withholdings of any duration can place the Palestinian economy into a "downward spiral" to severe fiscal crisis (Kock & Qassis, 2011; Lynfield, 2013; World Bank, 2013b). When withholding VAT revenue leads to missed and/or delayed wage payments to PA-supported workers, the nearly immediate result is decreased spending by a significant portion of the population, which further decreases PA revenue and overall economic stability

The impact of VAT withholding also has second and third order effects across all stability dimensions. The inability of PA-employed staff to afford to travel to their work (Lynfield, 2013), and strikes protesting salary non-payment, have caused school closures and limited medical services (Zeiger, 2013). While security force personnel and other public employees have in the past simply refused to show up for work until they were paid. These types of events become short-term drivers of governing instability as they reduce the overall capacity of the PA to provide the public services that citizens generally expect of legitimate governments. In the longer-term, these spillover effects of Israeli VAT withholding could reduce the capacity of the PA to develop the governing institutions and stable governing practices intended to form the foundation of a Palestinian state—a central objective of U.S. policy.

The PA has sought to diversify revenue through increasing property tax, establishing a large tax payer unit in the Ministry of Finance, and increasing VAT collection efforts (Duenwald, Kock, & Unigovskaya, 2013; World Bank, 2012). Although a majority of tax payers do not file returns, *a system that integrates VAT and income tax administration could incentivize compliance by reducing costs to the taxpayer, as well as improve overall efficiency for the PA*. International evidence has shown that such measures could increase tax collections and overall government revenue (World Bank, 2012). Not having VAT revenue withheld by Israel as a punitive measure (and one that violates the Paris Protocol) would make this possible.

The PA's strong dependence on VAT revenues suggests that their provision is essential to the work that the international community undertakes in the areas of maintaining economic, social, and governing stability in the West Bank (Deger, 2015). Given the potentially devastating impact of prolonged VAT revenue withholdings by the GOI on the economic, social, and governing stability of the West Bank, it is crucial to invest in potential mitigating buffers. Emergency international support for the provision of salaries and pensions would provide a short term buffer, while assisting the PA in diversifying its revenue stream and improving their revenue administration process are necessary for longer term economic stability.

The stalled peace process is instigating factional divide and degrading the perception of PA legitimacy, while the PASF is feared and seen as working with IDF and violating human rights.

The StaM analysis found that the key to governing stability in the West Bank is the degree to which the people approve of the PA and its strategy toward a final settlement. The challenge is if Palestinians do not accept the authority of the PA, and Israel continues to deny Hamas access, there is no other effective Palestinian governance alternative in the West Bank.

Public perception of the PASF also feeds into the perception of the PA, as it serves as its policing arm, and when the PASF is viewed as abusive and violating human rights—and seen as working with the IDF— PA governing legitimacy and stability are also impacted.

To help remedy PASF performance, and thereby its perception as it extends to the PA, investments in training are important. To support this claim, a 2012 survey indicated that 68% of Palestinian respondents believed that improved training of police and security forces was “very important” (United Nations, 2012). Sayigh notes, “Despite greatly expanded donor assistance since 2007, the PASF has yet to acquire more than the most basic training capability” (Sayigh, 2011, p. 8).

Training could include basic human rights protection, conflict resolution, abuse prevention, and communication. Training could also be provided to create trainers (using a “train the trainer” model) in the field who would then be equipped to extend training to additional and new troops. Having PASF expertise in conflict resolution and negotiation, emergency medical services, and psychological trauma response could also help in responding to and deterring high stakes situations. Placing such values on the expertise found in human rights protection, trauma response, conflict resolution, and empathic styles of communication that foster active listening skills would aid in the steps toward an effective peace resolution.

High unemployment among youth and inappropriate job training, coupled with a climate of conflict, could lead to uprisings in this group.

Unemployed youth have time on their hands, anger about the living conditions, and energy to react. Therefore, *improving basic living conditions and helping to provide employment opportunities* will be an important investment to promote stability, deter retaliation, and ensure progress toward a peace process.

As evidenced, the Palestinian economy is transitioning in its economic sectors—from one of raw materials and production of goods to delivery of services. Current TVET training is producing graduates based on an old economy that is adding to the high youth unemployment rates. *Investing in training that better matches the changing sectors would help.* In addition, removing obstacles for small business and investing in innovation and entrepreneurship may help the youth and cross the gender divide to better empower and employ women.

Investment in the telecommunications sector, including the import of telecommunications equipment, use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and building additional towers could support employment needs. Expanding vocational training to address technology skills could further support growth in employment, while also propelling potential new innovation and entrepreneurial inventions.

Increased limits on protests and speech further a growing discontent and risk retaliatory actions.

Social tension can be reduced when the people feel heard and understood, so taking steps to provide *safe communication outlets* can aid in overall stability in the West Bank.

The PASF can help *by simplifying the protest permitting process* and not being so quick to shut down a protest—or at least providing other ways in which people can express their grievances.

For instance, mechanisms can be put into place and/or PASF personnel can direct people's attention to channels where they can express their views through articles published by outside agencies or through independent surveys, or through a safe and anonymous complaint process. Reform efforts can also be aimed at *increasing press freedoms* that also allow journalists to safely address PA government action.

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Part IV. Cross-cutting analyses: Neuroscience, psychology, and social media

Chapter 8: The Arabic Twittersphere and International Security Forces in Palestine: A Social Media Analysis

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TAMU supported the study to derive rich contextual understanding of the socio-political and social-cultural dynamics of the region by analyzing regional social media activity in Arabic. Specifically, we examined regional discussion of international security force practice and examined public opinion in response to key events in the Arabic language Twittersphere. We also supported the ICONS simulation by constructing multiple social media injects that participants responded to over the course of the simulation. The scenarios were informed by Arabic language social media archival data and trends from 2012-2014. The Web Monitoring System, developed by Raytheon BBN Technologies and SDL plc with sponsorship from DoD/CTTSO provided access to the critical data and tools for analysis.

In the Arabic language Twittersphere, discourse was focused more so on Palestinian issues than on a specific region. Gaza was more evident in Twitter content than the West Bank, primarily due to the sampling time period for this project: August – December 2014. Discourse focused on the West Bank increased after the announcement of new Israeli settlements in November 2014. Settlements were the primary issue around which communities of discourse formulated concerning the West Bank. Conversely, discussion of issues in Gaza ranged from human rights, to infrastructure, to other security concerns.

While confidence-building measures for international security forces may shift opinion for citizens in the West Bank, our data do not indicate they will build confidence for citizens across the region. Our data did not indicate much engagement with the key components of Questions 6 and 7³⁷ in the Arabic language Twittersphere.

Key Findings

- Gaza occupied a greater deal of steady-state presence in the Arabic language Twitter discourse, while the West Bank reference was primarily event-driven.
- Regional Twitter users interpreted key events through the lens of history.

³⁷ Q6: What are best practices for international security forces in earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy during third party monitoring missions?

Q7: With respect to the linkages between security, economy, and governance and with recognition that each are needed to support a functioning state, where should the international community invest?

- Neither signal moments nor gradual security efforts held enough valence to shift public opinion on Twitter within Palestine or the larger Arabic language Twitter community toward greater cooperation.

Tools & Methodology

This study utilized the Web Monitoring System (WMS), a technology developed by Raytheon BBN Technologies and SDL plc with sponsorship from DoD/CTTSO. Our analysis captured a broad spectrum of the Arabic language Twittersphere seeded by approximately 330 influential Arabic language Twitter users, representing a cross-section of the Arabic speaking states across the Middle East, Levant and Gulf States³⁸. User influence was determined based on a combination of numerous variables: number of tweets posted in a 24 hour period, topics of tweets, number of followers, occupation, and societal status (i.e. activist, political commentator, religious figure etc.). However, each country exhibited different characteristics of influence (e.g. varying degrees of technical, governmental and cultural limitations). As a result, the number of profiles from any particular country is loosely based on the degree of technological saturation as well as the number of active tweeters in the Twittersphere.

The WMS captures between .5-1 million tweets per day of all original content from the seed list, all retweets of these users, and all mentions of these users on Twitter. Thus, the corpus of data functions as a proxy for regional public opinion on Twitter.

We conducted a search of Arabic language Twitter discourse from the months of August 2014-December 2014 in two phases.

- In the **first phase**, we examined treatment of key terms that indicated **discussion of international security force practice** (e.g. “Palestine security United States”, “Palestine security Canada”, “Palestine security Netherlands”, “Palestine legitimacy Turkey”, “Palestine legitimacy United States”, “Palestine Canada legitimacy”, etc.). We assessed to what extent public opinion revolved around involvement of specific countries as well as foreign security intervention in the aggregate.
- In the **second phase**, we examined **signal moments where there was potential for change of attitude**, specifically the November synagogue massacre in Jerusalem, and the series of events involving the Temple Mount in the fall of 2014. We conducted observation of Arab public opinion on Twitter in response to these key events.

³⁸ Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen

Phase 1 Findings

Gaza occupied a greater deal of steady-state presence in Arabic language Twitter discourse, while the West Bank was primarily event-driven.




Figure 5: West Bank discourse increased in early November when announcement was made of additional settlements being built in the West Bank




Figure 6: There were also event-driven peaks in discussion on Gaza but overall, the amount of discourse remained comparatively higher than that oriented around the West Bank

Points of contention were primarily oriented around Gaza with the exception of sacred sites. These included grievances concerning border closings, the Al Aqsa mosque and issues surrounding governance. Concerning governance, there was a great deal of redistributed content from Russia Today concerning potential reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Russia Today Arabic consistently appeared as a key node of distribution for events within the region both in this study and previous studies of influencers in the Arabic language Twitter community.




Figure 7: Network clusters each represent tweets expressing outrage at new settlements being constructed in the West Bank. This was the sole issue around which discussion centered.




Figure 8: Within each network cluster, tweets represented a variety of concerns around the conflict in Gaza, including human rights, infrastructure and freedom of the press. This indicates a wider range of issue coverage and discussion around activity in Gaza than the West Bank.

Based on our data, key actors are focused on Gaza. At the same time, our results speak to broader regional dynamics, rather than only the West Bank. International security configurations and efforts should be promoted with the acknowledgement that where regional and national actors are primarily concerned are Palestinian issues at large, as opposed to either Gaza or the West Bank.

Phase 2 Findings

Our analysis of signal moments in the fall of 2014 included the series of events surrounding Temple Mount security and the massacre in the Jerusalem synagogue. These events were selected as ones with potential to shift public opinion to either be more amenable to external security intervention and cooperation between parties, or to hinder support for security cooperation between Israeli and Palestinians.

Concerning the Temple Mount conflict, events spiked between October 15- December 15, beginning with the assassination attempt of activist Rabbi Yehuda Glick and the subsequent closure of the Temple Mount by Israeli security forces. President Abbas described the closure as a declaration of war; the subsequent visit of a right-wing Israeli MP to the Dome of the Rock further stoked tensions.

The Arabic language Twitter response to these events included an extremely strong re-affirmation of the Temple Mount's sanctity and centrality to Islam. In particular, there were thousands of retweets from a prominent Kuwaiti sheikh affirming what Allah stated about the site in the Hadith. This was accompanied by rejection of Jewish claims to the site.




Figure 9: Thousand retweets from Kuwaiti sheikh Nabil al Awadhy affirming the sanctity of the Temple Mount as stated in the Hadith during conflicts over the site from 15 October – 15 December.

Concerning the Jerusalem synagogue massacre, the majority of tweets in the Arabic language Twittersphere were unsympathetic towards the incident. Instead, users highlighted perceived hypocrisies in news coverage of the synagogue attack. In particular, users highlighted the Deir Yassin massacre of 1948, where Zionists massacred the Arabic Palestinian village of 600. Users also highlighted an arson attack on a masjid in the West Bank that was not covered by news media. Throughout this discourse was continued outrage over settlement disputes.

The screenshot shows a web interface for WMS2. At the top, there are navigation tabs: DASHBOARD, TRIAGE, and ANALYTICS. Below these are sub-tabs: Sources, Watchlist, Clips, Bookmarks, and Search Results. A search bar contains the text 'synagogue massacre'. The main content area displays '438 results for synagogue massacre' and 'Page 1 of 9'. A list of tweets is shown, each with a profile picture, a blue bird icon, and text mentioning the Deir Yassin massacre. The tweets are from users like @omaroraini, @meesho_vip1, @Sati201, @reeem1133, @AnasAldroubi, @s3ud_4u, and @abmsj_.

Figure 10: The majority of “massacre-centered” discourse centered on attention drawn to a historical massacre on Palestinian territory in 1948.

Conclusions

Whether examining steady-state discourse about the West Bank or examining discourse about the West Bank through key events, we found that signal moments drive public opinion and discourse more so than gradual security efforts. This is in large part a reflection of the media type examined in this study: social media is generally a reactive messaging tool, unless users are attempting to brand new ideas. Reactions to signal moments were consistently uniform for both actors within Palestine and in the larger Arabic language Twittersphere. The users that we analyzed interpreted key events through the lens of history. Rather than raising calls for more solidarity and security cooperation, terror events such as the Jerusalem massacre were compared to historical massacres perpetrated by Zionists in the region. Thus, within our sampling frame, neither signal moments nor gradual security efforts held enough valence to shift public opinion within the larger region.

Recommendations

One of the primary findings of this study is that security collaborations and efforts do not penetrate the larger Arabic language Twittersphere. We recommend the international community explore partnership with existing media initiatives in the State Department (or other departments) to promote security collaborations on social media platforms. When advertised, Israeli efforts to improve security environments for Palestinians have been shown to have positive effects on support for the peace process and for decreasing violent behavior.³⁹ We suggest that the international community develop relationships whereby influential users tweet about beneficial security collaborations occurring in the region, especially where they promote a relative degree of freedom, lack of constraint and a focus on normalcy for Palestinians.

³⁹ Longo, Matthew. Canetti, Daphna. Hite, Nancy (2013). “A Checkpoint Effect? Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Travel Restrictions in the West Bank.” *American Journal of Political Science*.

Chapter 9: Neuroscience and psychology: Helping international actors understand the minds of others

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Introduction

To negotiate, cooperate or compete successfully with others, we should know what motivates them and how they make decisions. Neuroscience combined with psychology and the social sciences tells us much about both this human motivation and decision-making. We identify key relevant insights from psychology and neuroscience, and combine this with: evidence on their implementation in the field; historical and contemporary case studies; and insights from counterinsurgency theory and practice. We adapt this to the Israel-PA context and provide detailed, clear, usable written resources for international actors to use.

Of course, neuroscience is no panacea, but we need the best evidence to negotiate, and neuroscience provides an important extra source of evidence. If policy-makers want to be *realistic*, they must understand the world as it is – and this includes how humans *really* make decisions, based in our biology.

Question 1: Security sector reform

Question 1: What are the critical areas of security sector reform required to make civil society work within the Palestinian Authority and across the territories versus the status quo?

We discuss three critical areas of security sector activity that are fundamentally psychological.

(1) Perceived fairness: legitimacy

The security sector must be *perceived* as sufficiently fair or just. This is central to legitimacy, which can be thought of as the “rightfulness” of the system. Indeed, perceptions of what is fair and just permeates the thinking of actors in Israel-Palestine, as illustrated by a recent PA report that titles its first section “The Unjust and Unsustainable Status Quo.”⁴⁰

Humans are prepared to reject unfairness at substantial cost, and this is rooted in our biology. In a classic example called the ultimatum game, one individual gets an amount of money (e.g. \$10) and proposes a split with a second player (e.g. \$9 for herself, \$1 for the second person). The other individual then decides whether to accept the offer (in which case both get the split as proposed) or reject the offer (in which case both players get nothing). Despite receiving an offer of free money,

⁴⁰ Moving Beyond the Status Quo: Safe Guarding the Two-State Solution. The Palestinian National Authority’s Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee September 23rd, 2012 New York, USA

the second player rejects offers involving less than 25 percent of the money around half the time.⁴¹ Inequality is closely tracked in the human brain, and even non-human primates reject unfairness. Examples of this motivation driving China, Japan and Iran are described in detail elsewhere.⁴²

Policy implications of four aspects of fairness
<p>(a) Distributional fairness: This relates to unfair distributions of punishments and rewards between people or groups. This matters because: (i) the PCP and PASF need to understand the motivations of potential criminals or armed political actors to deter them; and (ii) the PCP and PASF must also anticipate when key audiences perceive their actions unfair as this may lead to rejection of their actions that reduces their legitimacy. How much will key audiences perceive that events reflect unequal treatment of people/groups?</p> <p><i>Recommendation:</i> Practitioners should ask: “How fair did the audience understand the event to be?”</p> <p>(E.g., were recent similar actions by those in another group not punished; and if the action was a response, how far was it perceived as proportional?)</p>
<p>(b) Procedural fairness: Was the action <i>performed</i> in an unfair way? E.g., as in any policing, did the audience perceive that appropriate procedures were followed?</p> <p><i>Recommendations:</i> Justice should be seen to be done. Provide information on procedures. Provide easily accessible justifications of the fairness of the decision-making process. Provide adequate complaints procedures that avoid overly bureaucratic and legalistic language.</p>
<p>(c) Horizontal and vertical inequality: In addition to inequality between richer and poorer members of a society (vertical inequality), there can also be inequality between groups or factions in a society (horizontal inequality). Both matter.</p> <p><i>Recommendation:</i> Understand that people may reject perceived unfair treatment of their group, even if this reduces overall inequality in society. Thus, giving material incentives (or withholding punishments) to other groups may be counterproductive.</p>
<p>(d) Fairness is subjective: Fairness often causes discord, because what is fair from the various parties’ perspectives can be incompatible. This can lead to a Fairness Dilemma (see Q3).</p>

Table 1. Policy implications of four aspects of fairness

(2) “Our” security sector: Good ownership and bad factionalism

The security sector must be perceived as “ours” by the population and the security sector’s members. Unfortunately, the same psychological bias towards one’s “in-group” that helps drive this perceived “ownership” also drives division and factionalism.

- (a) Increased “ownership” of the security sector as “ours” by the broader PA society will increase its legitimacy and credibility.⁴³ Increase perceived ownership by:

⁴¹ Colin F Camerer, *Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction*, vol. 9 (Princeton University Press Princeton, NJ, 2003).

⁴² Nicholas D Wright and James L. Schoff, “China and Japan’s Real Problem: Enter the Fairness Dilemma,” *The National Interest*, November 2, 2014; Nicholas D Wright and Karim Sadjadpour, “The Neuroscience Guide to Negotiations With Iran,” *The Atlantic*, January 14, 2014.

- (i) Broad and open recruitment procedures where possible; (ii) enhanced accountability and complaints procedures; and (iii) symbols of independence from donors.
- (b) Reduce existing factionalism in the security sector and help prevent further factionalism. Increase cohesion by:
 - (i) Provide a clear vision and common purpose for the PASF. However, one must try to avoid adverse effects of some themes in this vision (e.g. a common enemy) on external relations (e.g. with Israel or Gaza). Alternative content could include the vision of being *professional* law enforcement forces. (ii) Interventions to bridge the gap where groups are already divided (e.g. trust building in Q6 below).

(3) Managing day-to-day “Prediction errors”: producing predictability and managing expectations

A core insight from neuroscience is that an action’s impact is crucially modulated by its associated “prediction error”. This prediction error is simply defined as the difference between what actually occurred, and what they expected. The bigger an action’s associated prediction error, the bigger the action’s psychological impact. E.g., this explains the psychological impact of “strategic surprise” (something occurs but wasn’t expected, so has a big prediction error and big impact) while recurrent events lose that impact (they occur and are expected, so has a small prediction error and impact).

To build acceptance and legitimacy among populations, one must manage the “prediction errors” that accumulate in day-to-day activities with them. This involves:

- (a) Producing predictability:** In a predictable environment, events are well expected – there are few prediction errors. Recent neuroscience work suggests predictability is itself desirable.⁴⁴ This concurs with David Kilcullen’s⁴⁵ argument that generating predictability is central to successful counterinsurgency (COIN). The foundation of his book “Out of the Mountains” is the “theory of competitive control,” where “*populations respond to a predictable, ordered, normative system, which tells them exactly what they need to do, and not do, in order to be safe.*”
- (b) Managing expectations:** When a population expects something and it is not delivered, this leads to a prediction error. This is why managing expectations to prevent prediction error is critical. We see this in counterinsurgency theory, e.g. as David Kilcullen recently stated⁴⁶ a major way things “*can go wrong is you can create expectations for programmes which then don’t deliver. And that can lead to resentment, which actually ends up empowering the radical group.*”

Question 3: Unity Government

Question 3: What are the challenges of achieving unity government and maintaining effective security in non-contiguous states?

Psychological forces push non-contiguous parts of states apart from one another (e.g. the West Bank and Gaza), and serve to bring them together. We identify four here (Fig. 1).

⁴³ Yezid Sayigh, “Policing the People, Building the State: Authoritarian Transformation in the West Bank and Gaza,” *Carnegie Middle East Center*, February 28, 2011.

⁴⁴ Karl Friston, “The Free-Energy Principle: A Unified Brain Theory?,” *Nature Reviews Neuroscience* 11, no. 2 (2010): 127–38.

⁴⁵ David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla* (Oxford ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013).

⁴⁶ IRRRC, “Interview with David Kilcullen,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 93, no. 883 (2011).




Figure 1. Psychological forces push non-contiguous parts of states apart, and bring them together.

(1) Why psychology makes geographical non-contiguity matter so much

Psychology is a key reason why geography matters. Unfortunately, being geographically divided into separate groups can be a salient psychological feature – serving as a focal point around which people naturally divide into separate groups.

(2) Unity government: Unity of administration and security sectors

Policy options to increase unity in the administrations and security sectors in a non-contiguous state include:

- (a) Regular contact and undertaking common tasks to build cooperation, relationships and routinize contact. This should be high “bandwidth” (i.e. between many levels in the administration), e.g. “cigarettes and humus” at the higher levels and other techniques at lower levels. This is especially challenging when face-to-face meetings may be dangerous, in which case virtual methods may be safer and more cost-effective (see Q6 below).
- (b) As individuals often have multiple overlapping identities (e.g. a Palestinian, a person of a particular clan or profession, a woman) it is possible to focus individuals’ attention on a common identity across the groups.⁴⁷ Effects of focusing on specific aspects of identity are widespread, e.g. focusing on criminal aspects of identity increased dishonesty in prison populations.⁴⁸ Where possible, one should also avoid increasing the salience of group membership or divisions, as this tends to increase division⁴⁹.
- (c) Implement a common vision and goals for both sides. Both sides need a plausible, unifying path forward, even if it can initially only be a local professional security service.

(3) Nationalism, national identity and state unity

⁴⁷ Samuel L. Gaertner and John F. Dovidio, “A Common Ingroup Identity: A Categorization-Based Approach for Reducing Intergroup Bias,” in *Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination* (New York, NY, US: Psychology Press, 2009), 489–505.

⁴⁸ World Bank, World Development Report, Mind Society and Behavior (2015) pp67-8

⁴⁹ Nicholas Sambanis, Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, and Moses Shayo, “Parochialism as a Central Challenge in Counterinsurgency,” *Science* 336, no. 6083 (May 18, 2012): 805–8, doi:10.1126/science.1222304.

The state or nation that underlies a government administration will have some form of national identity or nationalism. That national identity matters particularly in the security sector, where one may be asked to lay down one's life. For example, consider the difficulties of the Iraqi Army versus ISIS in 2014, where Iraq has a weakly coherent national identity. Palestine as a whole (the West Bank and Gaza) must have a national identity and national narrative that: fosters social cohesion and enables the people to defend national interests when necessary; encourages acceptable internal policies (e.g. human rights); does not airbrush uncomfortable chapters from its history; and shouldn't have an anti-Israel centerpiece.

Defining oneself strongly in opposition to others may not best facilitate longer term stability of relationships. However, Palestinian nationalism has alternative positive elements. It is one of multiple overlapping and important identities, with others involving the village/clan, pan-Arab nationalism, pan-Islamism and previously pan-Syrianism. Palestinian nationalism is also developing, and there are many possible future paths that it could take. One cannot ignore an anti-Zionist element, which may be exacerbated by recent debates within Israel⁵⁰, but must put that within a richer history of the evolving Palestinian nationalism, key elements of which could help develop a unifying nation and government.

Finally, I note that this issue of national identity and nationalism receives perhaps less interest in the COIN or nation-building literatures than might be expected. For example, in the prominent Rand book "A beginner's guide to nation-building"⁵¹, a search reveals no results for either "nationalism" or "identity". Although some such as Francis Fukuyama recognize its importance.⁵² The relative lack of attention to group identities and COIN was also noted in a recent paper that sought to address the subject.⁵³

(4) Self-interest, security dilemma and fairness dilemma

Thucydides, the father of realism, suggested a trio of human drives behind war⁵⁴. These three motivations push the non-contiguous parts of states apart: self-interest (that can be incompatible between groups), fear (that can cause a Security Dilemma); and honor (that can cause a Fairness Dilemma).

In a security dilemma, each side's fear of the other side's capabilities and uncertain intentions leads to countermeasures that feed a vicious cycle.⁵⁵ Policies to address a security dilemma include reassuring allies while reducing uncertainty through transparency and clear deterrence. Reducing this fear is necessary, but insufficient in this case.

In the Fairness Dilemma⁵⁶ each side is driven to take actions they see as self-evidently right and just, even at high cost to themselves – but which the other side considers unfair, aggressive or risk-taking. One does not necessarily have to be afraid or uncertain of the other's motivations and capabilities; the rejection of unfairness or pursuit of justice can drive one to act.

⁵⁰ <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/03/a-country-that-never-wanted-me/>

⁵¹ James Dobbins et al., "The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building" (RAND, 2007), <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG557.html>.

⁵² Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy* (Profile Books, 2014).

⁵³ Sambanis, Schulhofer-Wohl, and Shayo, "Parochialism as a Central Challenge in Counterinsurgency."

⁵⁴ Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War: And the Preservation of Peace* (New York: Anchor, 1996).

⁵⁵ Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (April 1, 1999): 49-80.

⁵⁶ Wright and Schoff, "China and Japan's Real Problem."

Policy recommendations for the Fairness Dilemma form a strategy we call “one step back, two steps forward”. First, looking back, all sides could learn from examples of overcoming the fairness dilemma – not just the lesson of German apologies, but also lessons to all sides from Northern Ireland and other cases. The importance of apologies⁵⁷ must not be minimized, but they can only ever be half the story and they must be accepted. And the strategy involves two steps forward. A first step forward is anticipating factors that may exacerbate the fairness dilemma – and a crucial example is helping develop forms of nationalism and group identities that will not inflame this dynamic. In a second step forward, the parties should develop a rules-based structure for dealing with disputes – and it is the process that is important in providing a path forward.

Question 5 Impacts of cross-border actions

Question 5: With respect to cross-border arrests, prosecutions, and targeted lethal action, what are the challenges, risks, and opportunities to legitimacy and sovereignty between neighbors with competing security requirements?

We aim to help the international community better understand others’ decision-making and better forecast others’ reactions to events, so helping the international community prevent inadvertent escalation in a diplomatic or military confrontation. Our main analysis provides four points for use during crises – that provides a “checklist for empathy” and helps put you in others’ shoes:

(1) The neural phenomenon of prediction error

Escalation or de-escalation can result from events’ predictability and unexpectedness.

This is because, as described above, an action’s impact is crucially modulated by its associated “prediction error”. This prediction error is simply defined as the difference between what actually occurred, and what was expected. The bigger the associated prediction error, the bigger the action’s impact.

Uses for the study include: (1) Understanding prediction errors can help the international community to better understand events in diplomatic or military confrontations. A prediction error framework forecasts widespread and important effects (inadvertent escalation, surprise, etc.) and simplifies existing strategic concepts so it can be operationalized without extra analytical burden.⁵⁸ (2) The international community can help manage the predictability of events for parties during a crisis (e.g. by increasing bandwidth of communication between them). (3) Prediction error provides a tool to increase or decrease the impact of the international community actions (e.g. use more or less unexpected methods to send messages).

Policy Options in Table 2 below.

⁵⁷ Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel C. Sneider, “History Wars in Northeast Asia,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 10, 2014.

⁵⁸ e.g., Wright, 2014, SMA White Paper on Neuroscience and Deterrence, DoD Joint Staff.

Helping the international community understand the psychological impacts that events have on others	
Core idea: Throughout crises and limited wars, an action's associated prediction error always affects that action's degree of impact on the decision-making of audiences.	
1	<p><i>When anticipating an event's psychological impact, ask: "How unexpected was the event from that audience's perspective?"</i></p> <p>For the audience of interest, describe the event's associated prediction error from their perspective and how that changes its signaling impact.</p> <p>Specific instances include:</p> <p>a. <i>Domain-specific effects</i> Actions in certain domains are inherently less well understood and so give larger prediction errors. E.g. cyber actions.</p> <p>b. <i>Cross-domain responses</i> Following an action, we tend to expect a response in a particular domain, so a response in a less expected domain causes more prediction error and impact. The domain an audience expects may relate to the original action's domain⁵⁹, previous promises to act in a certain way, or established behavioral patterns.</p> <p>c. <i>Geography</i> Distant responses likely cause more prediction error.</p> <p>d. <i>Novelty and first times</i> These cause increased prediction error, e.g. Israel's successful Iron Dome deployment; Palestinian suicide bombing in the Second Intifada.</p>
2	<i>Manipulate predictability</i> Signpost diplomatic or military moves a day before to reduce their impact (e.g. via backchannels); act without warning to increase their impact.
3	<i>Anticipate effects of "insider knowledge"</i> Actions likely have greater impact on the recipient than you understand; and this matters most when you have much greater "insider knowledge" of your actions.
When the international community receives actions themselves	
Core idea: Prediction errors are unavoidable, so we must manage their effects on ourselves.	
1	<i>Manage effects of prediction errors</i> Large impacts from prediction error on international community decision-makers should be considered when reacting. E.g. learning of IDF actions via social media.
2	<i>Learning</i> Prediction errors are the best material to improve our models of the world.
Longer term aim for the international community	
1	Reducing the amount of prediction errors that accumulate from all events over time (i.e. increasing predictability; creating order) is a central idea behind influential theories for gaining population support in challenging environments (e.g. David Kilcullen ⁶⁰).

Table 2 Predictions errors and policy options

⁵⁹ E.g. in the Vietnam conflict the U.S. response to torpedo boat attacks was to attack that same boat class; Thomas Crombie Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966).

⁶⁰ For example, systems of competitive control are a central idea in *Out of the Mountains* (2013), which in the definition on page 126 are "the local armed actor that a given population perceives as best able to establish a predictable, consistent, wide-spectrum normative system of control is most likely to dominate that population and its residential area".

(2) Controlling escalation involves not just minimizing escalatory factors, but also positive accommodative and conciliatory gestures

Conciliatory gestures are natural and common: They are often needed to control escalation and enable de-escalation. Crisis dynamics and how to control escalation cannot be understood without understanding conciliatory and accommodative gestures.

Policy options: The international community can help provide ideas and/or substantive political or other contributions to accommodative gestures by both sides in crises (e.g. from the training event during this SMA project: expand free movement area of PCP; Fridays no special limits of Temple Mount access; liberalize Gaza crossing).

(3) Perceived fairness matters in shaping deals and in procedures

The international community can help provide ideas and/or substantive contributions to packages. E.g. enabling multiple parts to deals so they can be divided in a way perceived as fair on both sides.

Policy options: To anticipate an action's psychological impact, for each audience we can ask: "How fair did they understand the event to be?"

(4) Israeli deterrence concepts center on managing a psychological balance, and involve inherently escalatory forces

The international community can help mitigate adverse effects of events within this deterrence paradigm.

Israeli deterrence concepts differ from dominant US ideas.⁶¹ They aim to decrease rather than totally prevent violence, and use actions (not just threats) to maintain the rules of the game and a psychological balance with an adversary. This involves inherently escalatory forces. The first arises as responses aim to be greater the adversary expects (which generates prediction errors and raises the expected scale of subsequent actions); and second a number of psychological factors (see below) give the action greater impact on the adversary and onlookers than may be understood by those making it. Understanding these mismatched perceptions matters as they threaten actions' perceived legitimacy. Within such a deterrence paradigm Israelis may perceive their deterrent actions are legitimate, but this may not be seen as such by others and so may affect the legitimacy of the side on which the action is taken.

Policy Options:

(a) For those making the action (e.g. IDF) ask: "How do they understand the action's impact?" They may underestimate the impact of their action for psychological reasons, including: First, one has "insider knowledge" of one's own actions, so they are more unexpected to others and so cause more prediction error and impact on the other. Second, actions may seem subjectively fair and just to oneself but not those receiving them. Third, humans tend to perceive their own actions as driven more by circumstance but others' driven more by intention.

(b) Mitigating adverse effects within this deterrence paradigm: (i) for specific actions: First, if there is a clear overreaction then consider apologies. Second, if there is collateral damage then consider apologies and compensation. (ii) Longer term: Israeli deterrence concepts inherently consider chains of multiple events. In these chains, deterrent actions or punishments cannot be the only tools. For example, after crises or large actions to "mow the lawn", this creates a good opportunity

⁶¹ Discussed in Mark Vinson (forthcoming, An Israeli Approach to Deterring Terrorism, PRISM V.5,N.3); and Thomas Rid (2012, Deterrence beyond the State: The Israeli Experience, Contemporary Security Policy).

for positive actions in which the international community can be ready to contribute to the process of rebuilding relationships.

Q6 Trust in during third party monitoring missions:

Question 6: What are best practices for international security forces in earning trust, creating transparency, and maintaining legitimacy during third party monitoring missions?

Trust is inherently psychological: something one values is at risk, in a situation where what happens to it depends on somebody else's decision. Here we consider trust-building during more stable periods, including a future point involving substantial third party monitoring by security forces in an overarching agreement (i.e. rather than in crises). As shown in Fig. 2. The international community must consider trust between Israelis, Palestinians and third parties (e.g. international security forces); and also the bandwidth of trust.




Fig. 2. Trust is central to interactions between the three parties. The bandwidth of these interactions is also important, e.g. junior-to-junior and senior-to-senior levels; civilian-to-civilian and military-to-military.

Methods to build trust: Various interventions are shown to build trust or reduce prejudice between groups. Methods with field evidence include⁶²:

- (1) Cooperative learning: Sessions are engineered so that students must teach and learn from one another. For example, teachers give each student one piece of the lesson plan, requiring students to put the pieces of the “puzzle” together collectively.
- (2) Media and entertainment interventions: Books, radio, television, and film are vivid and popular couriers of many kinds of social and political messages. For example, in a year-long field study nearly 600 Rwandan citizens, prisoners, and genocide survivors either listened to a soap opera about two communities struggling with prejudice and violence, or one on health.⁶³ It affected perceptions of social norms and behaviors on intermarriage, open dissent, cooperation, and trauma healing.
- (3) Discussing opinions about intergroup relations brings benefits (and potential pitfalls). For example, white university females' opinions about a racial incident on campus conformed to the publicly expressed opinions of confederates who were randomly assigned to condone, condemn, or remain neutral in their reactions.⁶⁴
- (4) Contact between groups can reduce prejudice between them. For example, a study randomly assigned white teenagers to Outward Bound camping expeditions that were either all white or racially mixed.⁶⁵ Those from the mixed group later reported less prejudice.

⁶² Here I draw in particular on the excellent review by Elizabeth Levy Paluck and Donald P. Green, “Prejudice Reduction: What Works? A Review and Assessment of Research and Practice,” *Annual Review of Psychology* 60 (2009): 339–67.

⁶³ Elizabeth Levy Paluck, “Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict Using the Media: A Field Experiment in Rwanda,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 96, no. 3 (2009): 574–87, doi:10.1037/a0011989.

⁶⁴ Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., “Condemning and Condoning Racism: A Social Context Approach to Interracial Settings,” *Journal of Applied Psychology* 79, no. 6 (1994): 993.

⁶⁵ Donald P. Green and Janelle S. Wong, “Tolerance and the Contact Hypothesis: A Field Experiment,” *The Political Psychology of Democratic Citizenship*, 2008, 228.

Avoiding pitfalls: Many sensible-sounding interventions are ineffective or even counterproductive⁶⁶: Many trust-building programs between groups center around common-sense efforts, e.g. mixed-group athletic teams to foster friendships, or dialogue programs to foster critical examination of ideological disagreement. But common sense can fail or backfire.

"Norms" (i.e. social rules) affect behavior, but should be used according to simple rules: The impact of norms is illustrated by providing simple normative messages to households as door hangers ("99% of your neighbors think it's a good idea to turn off the lights when you leave home"), which have measurable, long-term impact on energy usage⁶⁷. In Rwanda immediately after the genocide, a radio soap opera that presented specific norms of intergroup reconciliation measurably shifted intergroup behaviors.⁶⁸ But in the Congo, adding another common sense component to the soap opera intervention (a call-in talk show) completely nullified the positive effects of the soap opera.⁶⁹ *Context matters*: An example is "perspective-taking" (asking someone to see the conflict through the other's eyes), which generally improves attitudes towards the target individual and their group.⁷⁰ But in the context of asymmetric conflicts (e.g. between Israelis and Palestinians) this benefit only affects the empowered group. This was shown in Israel-Palestine, where perspective-taking did not change Palestinian attitudes, which were only changed when they could share their perspectives and be listened to by a member of the other group ('perspective-giving').⁷¹

Policy implications:

- In messaging, remove reference to common undesirable behaviors/perceptions
- In messaging, include (true) information implying desirable normative behavior
- In asymmetric conflict, the psychological needs of the groups likely differ, and the same intervention may have asymmetric effects across the groups. E.g. If opening dialogue, allow disempowered group's member(s) the opportunity to speak first

Increasing the bandwidth of trust-building and use of social media: "International security forces engaged in third-party monitoring missions maintain their legitimacy in part by the relationships they develop with local leaders. Building trusting relationships with leaders at top-, mid-, and local-levels is essential in addressing incitement that leads to tension between groups, often along national, ethnic or religious lines. Social media can be used to facilitate conflict early warning and early response so that rising tensions can be counteracted before violence erupts."⁷²

A toolbox of online methods for trust-building without face-to-face meeting:⁷³ Trust-building efforts can be difficult when face-to-face interactions are dangerous (e.g. between security forces) or practically difficult (e.g. travel restrictions). Virtual methods provide a safe and cost-effective means of delivery. We provide an innovative guide to these virtual methods, and examine each

⁶⁶ This is adapted from Emile Bruneau's contribution to the SMA neuroscience and psychology full report.

⁶⁷ P Wesley Schultz et al., "The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social Norms," *Psychological science* 18, no. 5 (2007).

⁶⁸ E.L. Paluck, "Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict Using the Media: A Field Experiment in Rwanda," *J Pers Soc Psychol* 96, no. 3 (2009).

⁶⁹ "Is It Better Not to Talk? Group Polarization, Extended Contact, and Perspective Taking in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo."

⁷⁰ CD Batson et al., "Empathy and Attitudes: Can Feeling for a Member of a Stigmatized Group Improve Feelings toward the Group?," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 72 (1997).

⁷¹ E.G. Bruneau and R. Saxe, "The Power of Being Heard: The Benefits of 'Perspective-Giving' in the Context of Intergroup Conflict," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* (2012).

⁷² From Joseph Bock's contribution to the SMA neuroscience and psychology full report.

⁷³ From Hewstone and Lollot's contribution to the SMA neuroscience and psychology full report.

method's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. We provide a toolkit of safe, cost-effective methods from which the international community can choose for each aspect of trust-building (e.g. more in-depth for more senior contacts). These are summarized in Table 3 on page 127..

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Mode	Brief description <i>Intergroup contact that takes place...</i>	Target audience	Climate	Considerations
Asynchronous Text-Based	... over written text (e.g., e-mail / blogs). Communication is staggered.	All personnel (especially lower level)	As initial point of contact after periods of protracted violence (very tense climate) – can get used to interacting with the ‘other’. Set the foundations for the development of working trust	Used as initial point of contact. Must be frequent (weekly) Ultimately leads to more intimate forms of online contact and then direct contact.
Synchronous	... over written text (e.g., chat programs). Communication happens in real-time.	All personnel (especially lower level)	As initial point of contact (tense climate).	Either initial point of contact or follows asynchronous text-based chat. Must be frequent (weekly) Ultimately leads to more intimate forms of online contact and then direct contact.
Asynchronous Audio	... over voice channels (e.g., VoIP programs).	All personnel	If both sides want to engage in talks, but are concerned about anonymity.	Continuing communications (after a series of (a) synchronous text-based communications) but still anonymity needs to be maintained. Must be frequent.
Synchronous Video	... over audio and visual channels (e.g., Skype).	All personnel (especially higher level / key political figures)	Both sides should agree to talks. Not ideal if both parties want to remain anonymous.	Arguably, synchronous video contact is the richest form of online contact. Thus, from an intergroup contact perspective, it is the most effective mode of online contact in developing working trust. For lower level individuals, must be in combination with the other forms of online contact. This mode is, however, resource heavy.
Virtual Online	...in a virtual online world (e.g., Second Life ^b).	All personnel	Good if people want to meet while maintaining some level of anonymity. Takes place on ‘neutral’ territory in virtual world.	Some individuals may find it a bit of a gimmick. Resource heavy.
Online Games	...no contact <i>per se</i> but is a means of acquainting people with issues and constraints faced by the other side (e.g., Peace Maker).	All personnel (especially lower level)	Any climate.	Helps obtain a different perspective of the conflict and the constraints the other side faces. Ideal game—Peace Maker—is free to download.

Table 3. Summary table of the various forms of online intergroup contact. From Hewstone and Lollot’s contribution to the full report.

^a Working trust is different from more traditional definitions of trust. Working trust emphasizes the working relationship and being able to trust that the other person is committed towards the goal that the two work towards.

^b Second Life is a virtual world where individuals can select an avatar and interact with other individuals on a virtual landscape via audio and text-based methods.