

# **DETERRENCE IN THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY: AN EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD**

## **VOLUME II - Appendix G: Typologies**

**1 October 2007**

**Prepared for  
US Strategic Command Global Innovation and Strategy Center  
(USSTRATCOM/GISC)**

**Prepared by  
Strategic Multi-Layer Analysis Team  
Nancy Chesser, Editor  
703 697-0211  
Nancy.Chesser@js.pentagon.mil**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

## **Appendix G: Typologies**

### **Deterrence Typology for State/Non-State Actors (Includes Decision Making Approaches and Collection and Analysis Sources)**

This Deterrence Typology was created to assist in the development of deterrence options and plans for State and Non-State Actors. It can be used as a stand alone document for identifying important information to characterize and understand State or Non-State Actors. It can also assist in the development of initial questions that should be answered about either type of actor to be deterred.

This typology represents the merged product of three separate efforts to identify and categorize (a) the most relevant factors influencing the behavior and decisions of State and Non-State Actors and (b) the underlying elements of Decision Making by individuals and groups. Because it is the product of negotiation and consensus, some of the detail and richness of the descriptions developed specifically for State and Non-State Actors has been lost. However, the resulting merged product should be more valuable as a single resource for either type of Actors.

The section on Decision Making and the Decision Maker should help the user better understand which elements of the previous sections may be most influential in a specific scenario or situation and how they may impact the Decision Maker's behavior. While the section on Decision Making Approaches may be one of the most important for understanding and affecting an Actor's decision calculus, the information needed to make a determination about an approach may be difficult to ascertain without sufficient information about previous decisions made in a variety of situations and about the current context. Although a set of implications for each decision making style has been included to aid analysis and development of potential deterrence options, it is recommended that the user vet decision making approach determinations with appropriate subject matter experts.

This typology is organized into five (5) sub-typologies deemed relevant to describing the factors likely to impact an actor's decision making process about a particular issue or action. The five sub-typologies are: Objectives, Motivation, Capabilities, Functional and Structural Environment (including the physical and human terrain), and Decision Making (see Table of Contents – next page). The overall format of the Deterrence Typology provides a brief definition of each sub-typology followed by a list of indicators of the sub-typology and observables. Suggested collection and analysis sources are enumerated under the observables.

The Deterrence Typology should be referred to for additional detail, definitions, and examples before and during completion of the Guiding Questions.

#### **Collection & Analysis Caveats:**

1. Collection sources are representative versus exhaustive.
2. "Analysis" implies the use of content analysis, pattern analysis (including nodal), trend analysis, change detection, and anomaly detection. Any additional factors are directly noted in the relevant section.

See the Annex for Information Sources and Methods

## Table of Contents

Appendix G: Typologies.....	i
I. Typology of Objectives.....	1
I.A. Change Status Quo .....	1
I.A.1. Gain control of territory .....	1
I.A.2. Spread ideology .....	2
I.A.3. Harm, capture or kill non-combatants and/or destroy their property (terrorism) .....	3
I.A.4. Harm, captures or kill military/para-military personnel .....	3
I.A.5. Acquire WMD .....	4
I.A.6. Improve its security (e.g.: state seeks end to routine military exercises by rival or get rival to end WMD program) .....	5
I.A.7. Acquire resources (e.g., water, oil, state invades oil-rich province; warlord seeks control of diamond mine).....	8
I.A.8. Expand or deepen influence (State or Non-State): (e.g. terrorist group seeks recruits or to establish new branches in new locations; actor seeks control over another state).....	9
I.B. Preserve status quo (motivation: security from threat to status quo).....	11
I.B.1. Address emerging external threat .....	11
I.B.2. Address emerging internal threat (Previously: Seeks to avert internal threat) ..	12
II. Typology of Motivations .....	15
II.A. Sub-typology of Ideologies .....	15
II.A.1. Extremist religious ideology .....	15
II.A.2. Apocalyptic ideology .....	17
II.A.3. Single-issue ideology (ecology, animals, etc.) [Caveat: Must first identify the single issue].....	18
II.A.4. Leftist/Communist ideology .....	19
II.A.5. Rightist ideology [Must first determine whether rightist ideology is conservative or reactionary].....	20
II.A.6. National chauvinist ideology .....	21
II.A.7. Ethno-Nationalist ideology .....	22
II.B. Amass wealth (e.g., economic growth for a state, profit for an organized crime group) .....	23
II.C. Power (e.g., creation or expansion of sphere of influence).....	25
II.D. Maintain Security from External threats .....	26
II.E. Security from perceived internal threat .....	27
II.F. Prestige or status.....	28
II.G. Legitimacy .....	29
III. Typology of Capabilities.....	32
III.A. WMD capability .....	32
III.A.1. Nuclear Capability (make, buy, steal).....	32
III.A.2. Biological Capability (make, buy, steal).....	32
III.A.3. Chemical Capability (make, buy, steal) .....	33
III.B. Conventional military capabilities: assess capability to achieve military objective ....	34
III.B.1. Heavy mobile strike force .....	34
III.B.2. Light conventional force .....	34
III.B.3. Unconventional/guerrilla/terrorist capabilities .....	35

III.B.4. Force projection capability (strategic-long range; tactical-short range) .....	35
III.C. Relationship to Other Actors – Global presence .....	36
III.C.1. (State): Allies .....	36
III.C.2. (State): Position in international organization (IO) .....	36
III.C.3. (Non-State): Sponsorship by State actor .....	36
III.C.4. (Non-State): Relationships with other Non-State groups .....	37
III.D. Economic capabilities .....	37
III.D.1. (State): Currency reserves .....	37
III.D.2. (State): Government-influenced or owned private businesses .....	37
III.D.3. (Non-State): Funding sources .....	38
III.D.4. (Both) Net asset position .....	38
III.E. Adaptability .....	38
III.E.1. Distributed infrastructure network .....	38
III.E.2. Reserve organizational capacity (e.g., personnel, resources) .....	38
III.E.3. Reserve/redundant infrastructure .....	38
III.E.4. Evidence of ability to change rapidly .....	38
III.F. Control of Natural Resources .....	39
III.F.1. Requirements for use/access to resources .....	39
III.F.2. Exclusive possession .....	39
III.G. Communications/PR Capabilities .....	40
III.H. Territory Controlled .....	40
III.H.1. Size of territory controlled .....	40
III.H.2. Strategic value of territory controlled .....	41
III.H.3. Economic value .....	41
III.H.4. Territorial markers .....	41
III.I. Technological Sophistication and Access to Technology .....	42
IV. Functional/Structural Environment (Human and Geographic Terrain) .....	43
IV.A. Geographic Factors .....	43
IV.B. Indicator example: Stage of Development (political, socio-economic, etc.) .....	44
IV.C. Indicator example: Cultural Factors .....	45
IV.D. Indicator example: Government (State) or Organizational (Non-State) Structure .....	46
V. Typology of Decision-Making: who decides? .....	47
V.A. Nature of decision-making unit .....	47
V.A.1. Single individual—Formal Leader – source of authority is legitimate, from official position .....	47
V.A.2. Single individual—Informal Leader – source of authority from expertise, constituencies/connections, possession of important information, etc. ....	49
V.A.3. Single individual—Member of a category or class acting on his/her own (e.g., youth between the ages of 13-22; mothers of suicide bombers, etc.) .....	50
V.A.4. Group—Single perspective/ideology (e.g., Cuba, PRC Politburo, etc.) .....	50
V.A.5. Group—Multiple perspectives/ideologies .....	51
V.A.6. Group with subgroups .....	52
V.A.7. Coalitions .....	53
V.B. Characteristics of Individual Decision Maker .....	53
V.C. Enabling factors/Constraints on Decision Maker(s) .....	56
V.C.1. Ideology (as a unifying and/or identifying factor) .....	56

V.C.2. Cohesion - the bonding together of members of an organization/unit that sustains their will and commitment to each other.....	58
V.C.3. Embeddedness (of members) in the group – related to identity .....	59
V.C.4. Stress/Time pressures.....	60
V.C.5. Decision Framing (view outcomes from loss or gain perspective).....	61
V.C.6. Leader strength – observables are sources of leader’s support.....	62
V.C.7. Decision making TTPs (use observables to determine nature of TTPs: formal or informal, consensus, majority rules, etc.) .....	63
V.C.8. Culture.....	63
V.C.9. Relationships outside the group .....	64
V.D. Decision-Making Approaches/Modes .....	64
V.D.1. Rational – application of cost-benefit analysis to decisions; highly relevant decision to actor(s); enhanced by diversity within group .....	64
V.D.2. Heuristic – follow pre-defined/accepted norms .....	65
V.D.3. Sense-Making – decision making in an uncertain situation or environment; trying to understand a situation or environment by probing it (actions/decisions) and making adjustments on the basis of the response received .....	68
V.D.4. Expert – Reliance on subject matter experts or authority figures; NOTE: Once the experts are identified, their decision making TTPs must be determined .....	70
ANNEX: Collection & Analysis Information Sources and Methods .....	72
ANNEX-1. Information sources and methods.....	72
ANNEX-2. C&A Resources: brief descriptions and summaries .....	84

## I. Typology of Objectives

### I.A. Change Status Quo

#### I.A.1. Gain control of territory

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Official territorial claim	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• WWW (e.g., ICOW data set: <a href="http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~phensel/icow.html">http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~phensel/icow.html</a>)</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Service for fee</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li></ul>
Military Occupation of territory	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Service for fee</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li><li>• Imagery</li></ul>
Collect taxes in territory	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Service for fee</li><li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li></ul>
Purchasing territory	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Service for fee</li></ul>

### I.A.2. Spread ideology

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Amount of funding provided to ideologically similar groups elsewhere	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>
Increase in ideological schools/number of students	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Madrasah registry in Pakistan, possibly other countries</li> <li>• Right-wing paramilitary camps (Southern Poverty Law Center)</li> <li>• Other similar registries/databases</li> </ul>
Increase in external proselytization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>
Proliferation of ideological communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>

**I.A.3. Harm, capture or kill non-combatants and/or destroy their property (terrorism)**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Carries out or funds deadly terrorist attacks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Carries out or funds hostage-taking actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

**I.A.4. Harm, captures or kill military/para-military personnel**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Carries out or funds deadly attacks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Carries out or funds hostage-taking actions	Same as above
Captures or destroys military equipment	Same as above



### I.A.5. Acquire WMD

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Buy critical WMD components	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Make critical WMD components	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Steal critical WMD components	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Acquire critical WMD knowledge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

**I.A.6. Improve its security (e.g.: state seeks end to routine military exercises by rival or get rival to end WMD program)**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Actor’s statements of perceived threat from regional actor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Actor’s statements of perceived threat from global actor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Perceived threat from government (for Non-State actor)	

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Unresolved legal state of war (State only)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Unresolved security issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> </ul>
Targeted by insurgent or rival groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Targeted by externally-based Non-State threats (State only)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Perceived growth of competitor’s armed capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Perceived threatening shift in competitor’s military disposition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Attempts to or acquires arms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Perceived negative shift in alliances	
Actor seeks to shift/create alliances	

**I.A.7. Acquire resources (e.g., water, oil, state invades oil-rich province; warlord seeks control of diamond mine)**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Actor's statements of intent or need to acquire resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Actor attempts to acquire desired resources (e.g., water, oil fields or oil companies)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Perceive economic pressures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

**I.A.8. Expand or deepen influence (State or Non-State): (e.g. terrorist group seeks recruits or to establish new branches in new locations; actor seeks control over another state)**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Recruitment Non-State (See Ideology)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>
Actor seeks regime change in third country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Actor makes coercive threat against state	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Rise in and intensity of communications to external audiences	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Increase or broadening scope of communications reflecting pursuit of increase in influence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Create or expand alliances	

**I.B. Preserve status quo (motivation: security from threat to status quo)****I.B.1. Address emerging external threat**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Movement of military forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li></ul>
Abrogating treaties and agreements (added by C&A COI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Financial Intelligence</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Service for fee</li><li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li></ul>
Statements of intent (e.g., news releases, communications, web postings, published statements)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li></ul>
Pre-emptive strike	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Financial Intelligence</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li></ul>



Observables	Collection and Analysis
Forming new alliances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>
Increase intelligence collection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>

**I.B.2. Address emerging internal threat (Previously: Seeks to avert internal threat)**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Tighten internal security and control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Attempts to create a crisis to divert attention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Co-optation (e. g., political marriages, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>
Reallocation of resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> </ul>
Purges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Political dialogue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Intervention in neighboring countries (e.g., against rebel supporters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

## II. Typology of Motivations

- Caveats:
  - Highly context dependent
  - Stated motivations may not reflect actual and/or full intentions
  - Consider cost of public and private statements
  - More than one can apply

### II.A. Sub-typology of Ideologies

- Caveat:
  - Refers to extremist ideologies where membership is motivated to engage in potentially violent activity

#### II.A.1. Extremist religious ideology

Definition: an ideology justified by reference to one or more deities that justifies violence to change the social order in accordance with its values

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Actor communications explicitly justify action by appeal to extremist interpretation of religious values	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions (e.g., Sharia law)</li><li>• DoS/INR</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic /Lit search</li><li>• Blue Allies</li><li>• Industry (e.g. “coast watchers”, etc...)</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments or Orgs</li><li>• Informational “honey pots”</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li></ul>
Desecration of sacred artifacts of other religions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions (e.g., Sharia law)</li><li>• DoS/INR</li><li>• U.N. and other international organizations (e.g. OAS)</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic /Lit search</li><li>• Blue Allies</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments or Orgs</li></ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Violent actions justified in the name of religion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Participation in demonstrations in favor of religious extremist view	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• DoS/INR</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Blue Allies</li> <li>• Industry (e.g. “coast watchers”, etc...)</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments or Orgs</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots” (flash riot)</li> </ul>
Members dress in accordance with extremist religious interpretation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• DoS/INR</li> <li>• U.N. and other international organizations (e.g., OAS, human rights watch)</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic /Lit search</li> <li>• Blue Allies</li> <li>• Industry (e.g. workplace structures, etc...)</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments or Orgs</li> <li>• “Charities” (e.g. Bonyads)</li> <li>• INDOC</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Members follow strict/rigid dietary restrictions/proscriptions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

### II.A.2. Apocalyptic ideology

Definition: ideology seeking the end of the world or a destruction of the existing world order and its replacement by a new one

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Actor’s public statements advocate bringing about end of world or end all existing socio-political structures to bring about new world order	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>
Actor’s actions are consistent with appeals to bring about end of world	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>
Patterns, trends, changes, inconsistencies and anomalies between statements and actions and amongst statements and amongst actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

**II.A.3. Single-issue ideology (ecology, animals, etc.) [Caveat: Must first identify the single issue]**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Actor's public statements advocate specific single-issue cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Actor's actions are consistent with raising consciousness/awareness of their cause	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Patterns, trends, changes, inconsistencies and anomalies between statements and actions and amongst statements and amongst actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>

#### II.A.4. Leftist/Communist ideology

Definition: an ideology that claims to defend the working class against other classes, and prescribes government ownership over large parts of the economy

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Actor's communications explicitly justify action by appeal to class interests (e.g., redistribution of wealth and Gov't control of economy)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Financial Intelligence</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Service for fee</li><li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li></ul>
Actor's actions are consistent with appeals to class interests and leftist ideals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Financial Intelligence</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Service for fee</li><li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li></ul>
Patterns, trends, changes, inconsistencies and anomalies between statements and actions and amongst statements and amongst actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li><li>• Service for fee</li></ul>



### II.A.5. Rightist ideology [Must first determine whether rightist ideology is conservative or reactionary]

Definition: Right-Wing Conservative - seek to preserve the established order, or to return to the traditions of the past. (see: [www.tkb.org](http://www.tkb.org)).

Right-Wing Reactionary -seek to overthrow the current political order in order to return to a past way of life; often have an inaccurate perception of the past. (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan wants the American south to return to its pre-Civil War social order. (see: [www.tkb.org](http://www.tkb.org)).

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Actor's communications explicitly justify action by claim of national superiority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Actor's actions are consistent with appeals to self interests and rightist ideals (e.g., hyper-nationalists)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Patterns, trends, changes, inconsistencies and anomalies between statements and actions and amongst statements and amongst actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

### II.A.6. National chauvinist ideology

Definition: an ideology that emphasizes claims of national superiority over other nations while dehumanizing other groups

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Actor's communications explicitly justify action by claim of national superiority (e.g. dehumanize other groups)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Financial Intelligence</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li><li>• Service for fee</li></ul>
Actor's actions are consistent with appeals to self interests and national chauvinist ideals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Financial Intelligence</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li><li>• Service for fee</li></ul>
Patterns, trends, changes, inconsistencies and anomalies between statements and actions and amongst statements and amongst actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li><li>• Service for fee</li></ul>

### II.A.7. Ethno-Nationalist ideology

Definition: an ideology that justifies demands for political autonomy or independence for a particular ethnic group (the ethnic group may be distinguished on the basis of language, religion or sect, race, or other cultural attributes).

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Actor's public statements advocate need for recognition of rights/privileges/benefits/political access for specific ethnic group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• "Charities"</li><li>• Informational "honey pots"</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li></ul>
Actor's actions are consistent with appeals for recognition of rights/privileges/benefits/political access for specific ethnic group (e.g., demand for territory on an ethnic basis)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• "Charities"</li><li>• Informational "honey pots"</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li></ul>
Patterns, trends, changes, inconsistencies and anomalies between statements and actions and amongst statements and amongst actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Informational "honey pots"</li><li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li></ul>

**II.B. Amass wealth (e.g., economic growth for a state, profit for an organized crime group)**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Commits illegal activities that create wealth (e.g., extortion, kidnapping, counterfeiting, theft, drug trafficking)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> </ul>
Conducting legitimate activities that create wealth (e.g., investments, setting up charitable organizations, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> </ul>
Takes financial risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Actor communications reflecting need for or intent to improve financial position	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> </ul>
Leading economic indicators show downward trend [State only] (e.g., GDP, unemployment rate, etc., for state)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>
Trade/current accounts deficit (State only)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> </ul>

## II.C. Power (e.g., creation or expansion of sphere of influence)

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Official or unofficial statements of goal of expanding influence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Increased diplomatic activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Actor’s taking on trappings of state authority (Non-State only)	

## II.D. Maintain Security from External threats

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Actor's statements of perceived threat from regional actor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Financial Intelligence</li><li>• Medical</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• "Charities"</li><li>• Informational "honey pots"</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li><li>• Service for fee</li></ul>
Actor's statements of perceived threat from global actor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li></ul>
Territorial claim to strategic territory	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Informational "honey pots"</li><li>• Service for fee</li><li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li></ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Provocative (e.g., public communications, troop movements, encroachment on markets, boycotts, blockades, sanctions, support for insurgents, military buildup, change in intelligence capabilities, etc.) actions by external (regional or global) actor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Actions to strengthen defenses (e.g. hardening targets, repositioning troops, creating alliances, procuring arms)	

## **II.E. Security from perceived internal threat**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Evidence of schism development within group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Internal assassinations	
Purges, security crackdowns	
Martial law, abrogation of civil rights, emergency legislation	



## II.F. Prestige or status

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Actors' communications suggest lack of deserved respect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>
Construction/expansion of monuments/state symbols	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• "Charities"</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> </ul>
Seek leadership roles/membership in international/regional organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Acts of magnanimity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

## **II.G. Legitimacy**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Actor’s claim on legitimacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Attempts to gain widespread acceptance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Invests resources toward achieving legitimacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Engages in socially responsible activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Engages in the political process (constructive or destructive)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>

### III. Typology of Capabilities

#### III.A. WMD capability

##### III.A.1. Nuclear Capability (make, buy, steal)

Level of capability:

- Large capability
- Small capability
- Could probably acquire
- No capability
- Don't know

Covert or Overt?

- Covert
- Overt
- Don't know

Observables	Collection and Analysis
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Financial Intelligence</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Informational "honey pots"</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li><li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li></ul>

##### III.A.2. Biological Capability (make, buy, steal)

Level of capability:

- Large capability
- Small capability
- Could probably acquire
- No capability
- Don't know

Covert or Overt?

- Covert
- Overt

- Don't know

Observables	Collection and Analysis
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

### III.A.3. Chemical Capability (make, buy, steal)

Level of capability:

- Large capability
- Small capability
- Could probably acquire
- No capability
- Don't know

Covert or Overt?

- Covert
- Overt
- Don't know

Observables	Collection and Analysis
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

### **III.B. Conventional military capabilities: assess capability to achieve military objective**

#### **III.B.1. Heavy mobile strike force**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Numbers and quality of tanks and APCs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Organization, training and morale of units	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

#### **III.B.2. Light conventional force**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Force size	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Organization, training and morale of units	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

### **III.B.3. Unconventional/guerrilla/terrorist capabilities**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Own forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Proxy forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>

### **III.B.4. Force projection capability (strategic-long range; tactical-short range)**



### **III.C. Relationship to Other Actors – Global presence**

#### **III.C.1. (State): Allies**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Diplomatic support from third countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• National Intel</li></ul>

#### **III.C.2. (State): Position in international organization (IO)**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Membership in IO bodies: UNSC, IAEA, etc	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• National Intel</li></ul>

#### **III.C.3. (Non-State): Sponsorship by State actor**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Financial Intelligence</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li></ul>

### III.C.4. (Non-State): Relationships with other Non-State groups

Observables	Collection and Analysis
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• </li> </ul>

### III.D. Economic capabilities

#### III.D.1. (State): Currency reserves

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Foreign currency reserves	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>

#### III.D.2. (State): Government-influenced or owned private businesses

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Annual revenue of relevant large businesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>

### **III.D.3. (Non-State): Funding sources**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Financial Intelligence</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• “Charities”</li><li>• Informational “honey pots”</li></ul>

### **III.D.4. (Both) Net asset position**

## **III.E. Adaptability**

### **III.E.1. Distributed infrastructure network**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Financial Intelligence</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Informational “honey pots”</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li><li>• Service for fee</li><li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li></ul>

### **III.E.2. Reserve organizational capacity (e.g., personnel, resources)**

### **III.E.3. Reserve/redundant infrastructure**

### **III.E.4. Evidence of ability to change rapidly**

### **III.F. Control of Natural Resources**

#### **III.F.1. Requirements for use/access to resources**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Laws, regulations, treaties, ritualized permissions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Financial Intelligence</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Informational “honey pots”</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li><li>• Service for fee</li><li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li></ul>

#### **III.F.2. Exclusive possession**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Absence of outside investment; nationalized industry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li></ul>

### III.G. Communications/PR Capabilities

Type : (a) informal; (b) traditional long-distance communication, (c) phone lines; (d) cellular communications; (e) internet; (f) mass media

Observables	Collection and Analysis
(a) marketplaces, international meetings/conferences, community gathering places, word of mouth/runners; (b) line-of-sight/earshot; (c) internet access	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• “Charities”</li><li>• Informational “honey pots”</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li><li>• Service for fee</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li></ul>
persistence versus episodic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>•</li></ul>

### III.H. Territory Controlled

#### III.H.1. Size of territory controlled

Observables	Collection and Analysis
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Service for fee</li><li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li></ul>

### **III.H.2. Strategic value of territory controlled**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Location and/or resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li></ul>

### **III.H.3. Economic value**

### **III.H.4. Territorial markers**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Fenced boundaries, obelisk-like markers, use of burial facilities to legitimize control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Informational “honey pots”</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li><li>• Service for fee</li><li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li></ul>

### III.I. Technological Sophistication and Access to Technology

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Educational level; literacy rate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Financial Intelligence</li><li>• Medical</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li></ul>
Internet penetration	

## IV. Functional/Structural Environment (Human and Geographic Terrain)

### IV.A. Geographic Factors

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Physical geography - Key resources (oil wells, water wells, pastures, arable land, key transportation routes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Physical geography – Terrain (strategic/military advantage/disadvantage)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Political geography – regional situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>



Observables	Collection and Analysis
Rural or urban	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Population	

#### **IV.B. Indicator example: Stage of Development (political, socio-economic, etc.)**

Levels: emerging, developing, developed, failing

Observables	Collection and Analysis
State: GNP, per capita, rule of law, etc	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Non State: Group Factors	

#### IV.C. Indicator example: Cultural Factors

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Source of identity – tribal, national, ethnic, kin group, national, religious, regional, socio-economic, Sodalities (e.g. cross-cutting voluntary organizations, Elks, Rotary, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Value system (norms) – e.g., meritocracy, guilt, honor/shame	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Orientation toward group – individualist/collectivist; hierarchical/horizontal (see also under enabling factors/constraints for groups/group members)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

**IV.D. Indicator example: Government (State) or Organizational (Non-State) Structure**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Level of authoritarianism (State only)	
Level of democracy (State only)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Cohesion (Non-state)	
Vertical vs. horizontal (Both State and Non-state)	
Centralized vs. Distributed (Both)	
Institutionalization (Non-state only)	

## V. Typology of Decision-Making: who decides?

NOTE TO USER: Need to look at -and- for: indicators that may be contraindications, frequency of indicators, strength of indicator, etc.,

- Who the decision maker is may be dependent on the decision being made

### V.A. Nature of decision-making unit

#### V.A.1. Single individual—Formal Leader – source of authority is legitimate, from official position

- Example: North Korea

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Political structure/law enables Leader to act unilaterally	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Informational “honey pots”</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li></ul>
Leader has shown past ability to exercise authority to act unilaterally (e.g., remove rivals from power)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Informational “honey pots”</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li></ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Leader's decisions are implemented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Internal or external recognition of leader's authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

**V.A.2. Single individual—Informal Leader – source of authority from expertise, constituencies/connections, possession of important information, etc.**

- Examples: Abdel Rachman (blind sheik – Al Qaeda), Pierre Vallieres (FLQ), Julius Cesare Evola (Black/Neo-Fascist Terrorism-Italy), Turabi

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Leader's decisions are implemented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>
Has shown past ability to exercise authority to act unilaterally (e.g., remove rivals from power)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>
Internal or external recognition of leader's source of authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Has no formal, state-sanctioned authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>

**V.A.3. Single individual—Member of a category or class acting on his/her own (e.g., youth between the ages of 13-22; mothers of suicide bombers, etc.)**

[This category was added late and has not been fully developed]

**V.A.4. Group—Single perspective/ideology (e.g., Cuba, PRC Politburo, etc.)**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Group’s formal communications attribute key executive decisions to group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>
Statements from the group communicate a single perspective or ideology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Group's decisions are implemented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>
<b>CONTRAINDICATION</b> An individual group member has shown past ability to make decisions unilaterally (i.e., contraindication for group making the decision)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

#### **V.A.5. Group—Multiple perspectives/ideologies**

- Example: Knesset, most Western Governments

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Group's formal communications attribute key executive decisions to group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Statements from group members communicate dissenting opinions or perspectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>



**V.A.6. Group with subgroups**

- 2 or more groups that share in the decision-making process; subgroup may have responsibility for specific type of decisions. Multiple decision makers bound by similar constraints; may be more applicable to State Actors (e.g., U.S., Iran)

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Formal documents/rules divide (not delegate) decision-making authority among subgroups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>
Decision-making procedures follow rules of including multiple decision-making subgroups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>
Subgroups issue decisions on their own	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>
Subgroup disagreement is accepted/tolerated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>

#### V.A.7. Coalitions

Characteristics (coalition is heterogeneous, members must be capable of operating independently, members have own followings and sources of funding, members have power base independent of each other, temporary, members typically operate in different territories, etc.)

- Examples: UN, NATO, OPEC, EU, mafia, Mujahedin Shura Council in Iraq, etc.

Observables	Collection and Analysis
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li></ul>

#### V.B. Characteristics of Individual Decision Maker

Key characteristics of the individual; factors influencing the individual decision maker

**Note:** Key characteristics may enhance/facilitate the decision maker's effectiveness or constrain it (i.e., strengths and weaknesses). Strengths and weaknesses are context-dependent.

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Demographics (e.g., age, date of birth, gender, ethnic group, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Informational "honey pots"</li></ul>
Personality (e.g., risk taker versus risk averse; Big Five personality factors (i.e., conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness, extraversion, neuroticism); needs for achievement, power, affiliation; narcissism, etc. )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Informational "honey pots"</li></ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Major Experiences (that would be expected to shape and define the individual—e.g., extensive foreign travel, deaths of family members, awards for significant feats, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> </ul>
Occupational History	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> </ul>
Expertise (education and training-domestic and foreign; knowledge)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> </ul>
Network of influential others (who decision maker knows-people, groups, nations, opinion leaders, etc.).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Decision-making history	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
<p>Most important issues for decision maker (e.g., vulnerability):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What do they really want?</li> <li>• What are they willing to give up?</li> <li>• What are they not willing to give up?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

**V.C. Enabling factors/Constraints on Decision Maker(s)**

NOTE: In addition to providing insight into the group and their likely behavior, these enabling factors and constraints can be manipulated to influence and shape the behavior of group members

**V.C.1. Ideology (as a unifying and/or identifying factor)**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Communications express ideology as important to group identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• NGO</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• Economic and Industrial</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Financial Intelligence</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• “Charities”</li><li>• Informational “honey pots”</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li><li>• Military information disclosure channels</li></ul>
All/majority of communications express similar interpretation of ideology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li><li>• Legal actions</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li><li>• Department of State</li><li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li><li>• WWW</li><li>• Academic Research</li><li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li><li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li><li>• National Intel</li><li>• Third-party Governments</li><li>• Informational “honey pots”</li><li>• Education (INDOC)</li><li>• Service for fee</li><li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li></ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Group's ideology is used to justify group decisions and behaviors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• "Charities"</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>
Ideology is basis for group membership (e.g., recruitment/selection, induction)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• "Charities"</li> <li>• Informational "honey pots"</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

**V.C.2. Cohesion - the bonding together of members of an organization/unit that sustains their will and commitment to each other**

Observables affecting group cohesion	Collection and Analysis
Homogenous membership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Single or small number of issues that define the group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Threatening events experienced recently (common fate, common enemy, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> </ul>

Observables affecting group cohesion	Collection and Analysis
Group longevity (Non-State primarily, but can be important for subgroups within the State, e.g., councils, departments, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>•</li> </ul>

### **V.C.3. Embeddedness (of members) in the group – related to identity**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Dependence on group members for important needs (e.g., survival, security, companionship, access to mates/jobs/land, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>
Responsibilities in the group to other members (through position/role in group (e.g., leader, logistics, expertise, finances, etc.); connections to others, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>



#### V.C.4. Stress/Time pressures

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Known time constraints on actions/decisions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Emergency/Crisis situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Threatening situation/Fear	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Internal strife or conflict (for group leader may be a personal crisis)	

**V.C.5. Decision Framing (view outcomes from loss or gain perspective)**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Actions taken to recover/reclaim something of value to the group (e.g., something closely related to group identity)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Position in socio-economic hierarchy (implications related to position)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

**V.C.6. Leader strength – observables are sources of leader’s support**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Charismatic personality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Position in wealth and/or status hierarchy (in group, nation, subgroup, tribe, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Control of weapons/ money/ information/ important resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

**V.C.7. Decision making TTPs (use observables to determine nature of TTPs: formal or informal, consensus, majority rules, etc.)**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Governance structure in group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> </ul>
Information on past decision making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>

**V.C.8. Culture**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Individualist versus collectivist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>
Power-oriented versus egalitarian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Shame versus guilt avoidance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

#### **V.C.9. Relationships outside the group**

### **V.D. Decision-Making Approaches/Modes**

#### **V.D.1. Rational – application of cost-benefit analysis to decisions; highly relevant decision to actor(s); enhanced by diversity within group**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Evidence of multiple inputs into decision making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>
Deliberative cognitive style (as evidenced from existing profiles about decision maker(s) and amount of time devoted to making decisions—although the latter may also suggest other attributes of the decision maker )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Sufficient amounts of needed information for the decision at hand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

***Implications of rational decision making approach for deterrence options:***

- Need to understand the actor’s goals and values and the strength and importance of their goals
- Need to understand the difference between where the actor wants to be and their current condition; the material factors at play in a situation and what the actor says
- Need to know the actor’s ability to delay gratifying or satisfying their goals and wants (the actor’s discount rates)
- Need to know if there are any constraints on the information available to the actor that would affect their benefit-cost analysis

**V.D.2. Heuristic – follow pre-defined/accepted norms**

Indicants: group members highly dependent on reference group; strong in-group versus out-group prejudice (i.e., “us” versus “them”); socially homogenous group; imitation of high-status individuals (heroes)

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Limited time to make decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Resources already committed to an action/decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>
Group leader’s public commitment to an action/decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> </ul>
Previous actions based on strong stereotypes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Type of goal/objective to be achieved (approach versus avoidance)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Either insufficient information available or information overload	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Importance placed on symbols	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> </ul>



Observables	Collection and Analysis
Reliance or imitation of cultural norms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>

***Implications of heuristic decision making approach for deterrence options:***

- Critical to understand the relevant norms guiding behavior (including cognitive behavior—making decisions)
- Actor may employ fairly predictable tactics based on following norms/heuristics; may be particularly resilient to change
- Actor vulnerable through the data, information, and heuristics used; can exploit the boundaries associated with the norms/heuristics
- Need to understand the Actor’s sensitivity to alternatives and consider including similar choices or alternatives to those likely to be chosen by the Actor

**V.D.3. Sense-Making – decision making in an uncertain situation or environment; trying to understand a situation or environment by probing it (actions/decisions) and making adjustments on the basis of the response received**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Crisis or emergency situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

Demographic indicators (high proportions of young to old; evidence of change in normative gender roles; change in identity of referent groups)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>
Emergence of a new or different crisis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• Relevant multilateral organizations</li> <li>• Economic and Industrial</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• “Charities”</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> <li>• Military information disclosure channels</li> </ul>
Emotionality evident in speeches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• USG (non-DoD) information</li> </ul>

***Implications of sense-making decision making approach for deterrence options:***

- Actor is vulnerable to priming (making certain information/data/facts more salient than others; bringing certain information/data/facts to the foreground to shape how the actor understands a situation)
- Actor most vulnerable to priming early in the perceived or actual crisis

- Can influence how the actor frames (constructs the perceived reality) the situation and seeks information
- Time may be a critical factor, as the Actor is likely to accept the first useful explanation for a crisis or uncertain environment and make decisions on that explanation

**V.D.4. Expert – Reliance on subject matter experts or authority figures;  
NOTE: Once the experts are identified, their decision making TTPs must be determined**

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Evidence of advisors and/or authority figures (e.g., religious leaders, etc.) in decision making situations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>
Highly differentiated governance structure in group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>
Highly complex or differentiated decision or activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• U.N. and other International Alliances</li> <li>• NGO</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Informational “honey pots”</li> <li>• Education (INDOC)</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

Observables	Collection and Analysis
Evidence of leader's inexperience or lack of expertise with decision or activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indigenous/Regional Media</li> <li>• Legal actions</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Intel (US &amp; foreign)</li> <li>• Department of State</li> <li>• WWW</li> <li>• Academic Research</li> <li>• Allies and Coalition Partners</li> <li>• National Intel</li> <li>• Financial Intelligence</li> <li>• Third-party Governments</li> <li>• Service for fee</li> </ul>

***Implications of expert decision making approach for deterrence options:***

- Can target the potential deterrence actions to the experts
- Need to find the relevant experts for a specific situation or issue and understand the experts':
  - Approach to the issue or situation and to decision making
  - Source of authority
  - Emphasis regarding risk (especially regarding the issue or situation)
  - Sensitivity to alternatives
- Can most likely influence experts within their domain of expertise and their lexicon (language structure)

## **ANNEX: Collection & Analysis Information Sources and Methods**

### **ANNEX-1. Information sources and methods**

#### **1. Indigenous/Regional Media**

##### **a. Potential Collection Sources**

- i. Print
  - 1. Local news papers and magazines
  - 2. Posted reading material in public areas
- ii. Broadcast
  - 1. Locally driven news & commercials
- iii. “Indigenous internet”
  - 1. Origin of the web page
  - 2. Location of the author
  - 3. Location of audience
  - 4. Type of content
- iv. Captured media (e.g. electronic, magnetic, and optical digital storage)
  - 1. Online transfer
  - 2. Offline transfer (e.g. CDs, DVDs, or cassette tapes that are distributed person to person)

##### **b. Analysis**

- i. Organizations
- ii. Relationships
- iii. Activities
  - 1. Deception
  - 2. Propaganda
  - 3. Media warfare
  - 4. Legal warfare
  - 5. Psychological warfare
- iv. Products

#### **2. Legal actions**

##### **a. Potential Collection Sources**

- i. International or regional forums
  - 1. U.N.
  - 2. Relevant bilateral or multilateral organizations
  - 3. Treaties
    - a. Library of Congress Treaties Search Page ([thomas.loc.gov/home/treaties/treaties.htm](http://thomas.loc.gov/home/treaties/treaties.htm))
    - b. United Nations Treaty Collection ([untreaty.un.org](http://untreaty.un.org))
    - c. et al.
- ii. National forums
  - 1. Laws, decrees, or regulations
    - a. Global Legal Information Network ([www.glin.gov](http://www.glin.gov))
    - b. Guide to Foreign and International Legal Databases ([www.law.nyu.edu/library/foreign\\_intl/](http://www.law.nyu.edu/library/foreign_intl/))

- c. Frederick K. Cox International Law Center War Crimes Research Portal ([law.case.edu/War-Crimes-Research-Portal/](http://law.case.edu/War-Crimes-Research-Portal/))
      - d. American Society of International Law ([www.asil.org/](http://www.asil.org/))
      - e. Others as applicable
    - 2. Islamic law
      - a. Centre of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law (CIMEL) at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London
      - b. Index Islamicus (database indexes literature on Islam and the Muslim world of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.)
      - c. Sharia law
        - i. Islamic Law Subject Guide ([www.library.uq.edu.au/findits/findit.php?title=Islamic+Law](http://www.library.uq.edu.au/findits/findit.php?title=Islamic+Law))
        - ii. Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, by Eugene Cotran (Editor)
    - 3. Extra-legal actions
      - a. Signature and ratification embodies principles in law which is then automatically, and unquestionably, enforced
      - b. Signature and ratification result in laws which may, or may not, be enforced according to circumstances and political convenience
      - c. Signature (with or without ratification) is treated as a diplomatic public relations gesture totally unrelated to intentions regarding any form of enforcement
  - b. Analysis
    - i. Organizations
    - ii. Relationships
    - iii. Activities
    - iv. Products
3. Law Enforcement Intel (US & foreign)
- a. Potential Collection Sources
    - i. FBI
      - 1. Office of Law Enforcement Coordination (OLEC)
      - 2. Communication Analysis Section
      - 3. Terrorist Financing Operations Section
      - 4. National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)
      - 5. Others as applicable
    - ii. U.S. Coast Guard
    - iii. Customs and Border Protection
    - iv. Domestic regional & local law enforcement intelligence
      - 1. New York Police Department Counter Terrorism Bureau
      - 2. Los Angeles Police Department Counter Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau
      - 3. et al.
    - v. Bilateral & multilateral law enforcement

1. INTERPOL (186 member states)
  2. German Bundeskriminalamt (federal criminal police), investigate acts of terrorism
  3. French Directorate of Territorial Security, tracks foreign criminals and terrorists operating in France
  4. et al.
  5. International Associations, Unions and Organizations
    - a. The International Association of Chiefs of Police
    - b. [www.copnet.org](http://www.copnet.org)
    - c. et al.
- vi. DoS
1. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
4. Department of State
- a. Potential Collection Sources
    - i. Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
      1. Office of Economic Analysis (INR/AN/EC)
      2. External Research Staff (INR/AN/RES)
      3. Intelligence Policy and Coordination (INR/IPC)
      4. Office of Intelligence Liaison (INR/IPC/IL)
      5. et al.
    - ii. Information disclosure channels
      1. Speeches
      2. Communiqués
      3. Bilateral & multilateral negotiations and talks
      4. Treaties and agreements
      5. Official and unofficial visits
      6. Official government (organization) information
  - b. Analysis
    - i. INR Products
5. U.N. and other International Alliances
- a. Potential Collection Sources
    - i. United Nations
      1. United Nations Common Database (UNCDB) (provides selected series from numerous specialized international data sources for all available countries and area).
      2. U.N. Reports
        - a. ILO - International Labour Organization
        - b. FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization
        - c. UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
        - d. WHO - World Health Organization
        - e. World Bank Group
          - i. IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

- ii. IDA - International Development Association
  - iii. IFC - International Finance Corporation
  - iv. MIGA - Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
  - v. ICSID - International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
  - f. IMF - International Monetary Fund
  - g. IMO - International Maritime Organization
  - h. ITU - International Telecommunication Union
  - i. IFAD - International Fund for Agricultural Development
  - j. UNICEF - United Nations Children Fund
  - k. UNIDO - United Nations Industrial Development Organization
  - l. UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
  - m. INCB - International Narcotics Control Board
  - n. others as applicable
- ii. International Alliances (with or without US participation)
  - 1. European Union (EU)
  - 2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
  - 3. World Trade Organization (WTO)
  - 4. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
  - 5. et al.
- iii. Analysis
- iv. Products

## 6. NGO

- a. Potential Collection Sources
  - i. Personal contacts & interviews
  - ii. Library & archive databases
  - iii. Broadcasts
  - iv. Internet research
    - 1. International Organizations and Related Information  
([www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/intl.html#listsNGOs](http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/intl.html#listsNGOs))
  - v. Others?
- b. Analysis
  - i. Organization
    - 1. Operational (primary purpose is the design and implementation of development-related projects)
      - a. Community-based (serve a specific population in a narrow geographic area)
      - b. International (carry out operations in more than one country)
    - 2. Advocacy (primary purpose is to defend or promote a specific cause)
  - ii. Relationships
  - iii. Activities
  - iv. Products

## 7. WWW

- a. Potential Collection Sources



- i. Email
- ii. Instant Messages
  - 1. Yahoo IM
  - 2. ICQ
  - 3. AOL IM
  - 4. et al.
- iii. WebPages
- iv. Blogs (blog search engine Technorati is tracking more than 86 million blogs)
- v. Social media applications
  - 1. Wikipedia (reference)
  - 2. MySpace (social networking)
  - 3. YouTube (video sharing)
  - 4. Second Life (virtual reality)
  - 5. Digg (news sharing)
  - 6. Flickr (photo sharing))
  - 7. et al.
- vi. Wiki (collaborative online authoring)
- vii. Web Cams
- viii. Multimedia (e.g. Internet radio, Internet TV)
- ix. Streaming media
  - 1. Podcast
  - 2. chat room
  - 3. Webcast
  - 4. et al.
- x. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
  - 1. Skype
  - 2. embedded online game VoIP
  - 3. et al.
- xi. Peer-to-Peer Networks (file sharing)
  - 1. Napster
  - 2. Gnutella
  - 3. BitTorrent
  - 4. et al.

## 8. Academic Research

- a. Potential Collection Sources
  - i. Peer reviewed journals
  - ii. Conference proceedings
  - iii. Library and archive literature search
  - iv. Pre-print & re-print databases (academic manuscript and working paper archives)
    - 1. Social Science Research Network ([www.ssrn.com](http://www.ssrn.com))
    - 2. ERPA - European Research Papers Archive Analysis ([eiop.or.at/erpa](http://eiop.or.at/erpa))
    - 3. others as applicable
  - v. Graduate student dissertations
    - 1. Dissertation Abstracts Online

vi. University efforts

1. The Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE), led by the University of Southern California, evaluates the risks, costs, and consequences of terrorism, and guides economically viable investments in countermeasures that will make our Nation safer and more secure.
2. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), led by the University of Maryland, informs decisions on how to disrupt terrorists and terrorist groups, while strengthening the resilience of U.S. citizens to terrorist attacks.
3. The University Affiliate Centers to the Institute for Discrete Sciences (IDS-UACs) are led by Rutgers University, the University of Southern California, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and the University of Pittsburgh. They collaborate with IDS, based at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, to conduct research on advanced methods for information analysis and the development of computational technologies to protect the Nation.
4. The Regional Visualization and Analytics Centers (RVACs) are led by Penn State University, Purdue University, Stanford University, the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, and the University of Washington. They collaborate with the National Visualization and Analytics Center, based at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, to conduct research on visually-based analytic techniques that help people gain insight from complex, conflicting, and changing information.
5. et al.

b. Analysis

9. Allies and Coalition Partners

- a. Potential Collection Sources
- b. Analysis

10. Relevant multilateral organizations

- a. Potential Collection Sources
- b. Analysis

11. Economic

- a. Potential Collection Sources
  - i. Trade & commerce
    1. Contacts and Contracts
    2. Ownership and influence
  - ii. Financial & monetary
    1. Contacts and Contracts
    2. Ownership and influence
  - iii. Industry
    1. “coast watchers”

2. "FedEx"
3. Business intelligence
  - a. OSINT
4. Workplace strictures
5. Govern control of assets
6. Geospatial Analysis
  - a. Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
  - b. SIGINT activities & analysis
  - c. Google Earth
  - d. The GIS Gateway:  
[http://www.census.gov/geo/www/gis\\_gateway.html](http://www.census.gov/geo/www/gis_gateway.html)
  - e. Metadata Information
  - f. EconLit: [www.econlit.org](http://www.econlit.org)
  - g. U.S. Census Bureau: Current Industrial Reports:  
<http://www.census.gov/cir/www/>

## 12. National Intel

- a. Potential Collection Sources
  - i. Director of National Intelligence
    1. National Counter-proliferation Center (NCPC)
    2. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
  - ii. HUMINT
    1. Defense Intelligence Agency
    2. Central Intelligence Agency
  - iii. IMINT
    1. Airborne
    2. National
    3. Commercial
  - iv. SIGINT
    1. Service Cryptologic Elements
    2. National
  - v. MASINT
  - vi. OSINT
    1. Open Source Center (FBIS)
    2. Print
      - a. Periodicals
      - b. Books
      - c. Newspapers
      - d. Conference proceedings
    3. Internet
      - a. Email
      - b. Instant Messages
        - i. ICQ
        - ii. AOL IM
        - iii. Yahoo IM
        - iv. others

- c. WebPages
  - d. Blogs (blog search engine Technorati is tracking more than 86 million blogs)
  - e. Social media applications
    - i. Wikipedia (reference)
    - ii. MySpace (social networking)
    - iii. YouTube (video sharing)
    - iv. Second Life (virtual reality)
    - v. Digg (news sharing)
    - vi. Flickr (photo sharing))
    - vii. others
  - f. Wiki (collaborative online authoring)
  - g. Web Cams
  - h. Streaming or Multimedia media
    - i. Internet TV (Webcast)
    - ii. Internet radio
    - iii. Podcast
    - iv. Chat room
    - v. others
  - i. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
    - i. Skype
    - ii. embedded online game VoIP
    - iii. others
  - j. Peer-to-Peer Networks (file sharing)
    - i. Napster
    - ii. Gnutella
    - iii. BitTorrent
    - iv. others
- 4. Broadcast
  - a. Radio
  - b. TV
- 5. Counterintelligence (including offensive CI) & Law enforcement
- b. Analysis
  - i. All source
    - 1. JIOC products
    - 2. DIA products
      - a. Dynamic Threat Assessment
    - 3. Service reporting
    - 4. CIA products
  - ii. All-Source Types of Analytical Reporting:
    - 1. Order of Battle
    - 2. Performance and Characteristics
    - 3. Indications and Warning
    - 4. Situational Awareness and High-Interest Current Events Monitoring
    - 5. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
    - 6. Country Studies

- 7. Force Employment (Doctrinal and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures)
- 8. Network and Nodal Analysis
- 9. Force Protection (Threat Warning) and Consequence Management
- 10. Personnel Recovery and NEO
- 11. ISR Management and Sensor Cross-cueing
- iii. Term reporting
  - 1. All source/Multi-Source
    - a. ICAs? What is this?
    - b. NIEs
    - c. JIOC products
    - d. DIA products
    - e. Service reporting
  - 2. Single source

### 13. Financial Intelligence

- a. Potential Collection Sources
  - i. Domestic
    - 1. Department of Treasury
      - a. Office of Terrorist Finance and Financial Crime (TFFC)
      - b. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA)
      - c. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
      - d. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
      - e. et al.
    - 2. Wall Street
      - a. Private sector security projections
      - b. Business Executives for National Security (BENS)
      - c. Insurance industry risk assessments
      - d. Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC)
  - ii. International
    - 1. Interpol
    - 2. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
    - 3. Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
    - 4. U.N. Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee
    - 5. Wall Street
    - 6. et al.
- b. Analysis

### 14. Medical (e.g. WHO)

- a. Potential Collection Sources
  - i. International health statistics
    - 1. WHO Statistical Information System (WHOSIS)
    - 2. World Bank Africa Database
    - 3. International Health Research Guide  
([www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/su/med/healthstat/international.html](http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/su/med/healthstat/international.html))
  - ii. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center

- iii. State Department publishes Background Notes, a series of publications on selected countries and regions
  - iv. Direct vendor shipping of medical materials
  - v. Medical professional recruitment
- b. Analysis

#### 15. Third-party Governments

- a. Potential Collection Sources
- b. Analysis

#### 16. “Charities”

- a. Potential Collection Sources
  - i. Unregistered with government oversight bureaucracy
  - ii. Intersection of high sympathy for radical beliefs, rich citizenry, and charities
    - 1. Economic, social and polling attitude data
  - iii. Money transfer networks (formal and informal)
    - 1. Fundraising front organizations (witting or unwitting)
      - a. Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence
      - b. Egmont Group (coordinating body for the international group of financial intelligence units (FIUs) )
        - i. Forensic accounting
    - 2. Cash Smuggling and Illegal Commodity Trading
      - a. DHS Customs and Boarder Patrol
  - iv. Logistical front organizations
    - 1. Office of Foreign Assets Control
      - a. Specially Designated Global Terrorist list
- b. Analysis

#### 17. Informational “honey pots”

- a. Potential Collection Sources
  - i. WWW
- b. Analysis

#### 18. Education (INDOC)

- a. Potential Collection Sources
  - i. University or professional training
  - ii. Specialty training
  - iii. Indoctrination
  - iv. Overseas education
  - v. Associations & Conferences
  - vi. Institutions
- b. Analysis
  - i. Products
    - 1. Educational Resources, Databases, and Search Engines
      - a. International Studies Association (ISA): <http://www.isanet.org/>

- b. Center for Strategic and International Studies ( CSIS ):  
<http://www.csis.org/>
- c. *International Engineering Consortium*: <http://www.iec.org/>
- d. Engineering Conferences International (ECI):  
<http://www.engconfintl.org/>
- e. The International Industrial Relations Association (IIRA):  
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/iira/about/>
- f. The International Political Science Association (IPSA):  
<http://www.ipsa.ca/en/home/home.asp>
- g. The American Political Science Association (APSA):  
<http://www.apsanet.org/index.cfm>
- h. Institute of Education Sciences (IES): <http://ies.ed.gov/>
- i. International Schools Association: <http://www.isaschools.org/>
- j. United Nations International School (UNIS):  
<http://www.unis.org/>
- k. Council of International Schools: <http://www.cois.org/>
- l. Indoctrination
- m. Jihad Watch: <http://www.jihadwatch.org/>
- n. Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/>
- o. WN Networks: <http://www.wnnetwork.com/>
- p. The Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT):  
<http://www.ict.org.il/>
- q. National Commission on Terrorism:  
<http://www.access.gpo.gov/nct/>
- r. Centre for Defence and International Security Studies:  
<http://www.cdiss.org/>

#### 19. Service for fee

- a. Potential Collection Sources
  - i. Commercial data brokers
    - 1. Thomson Gale ([www.galegroup.com](http://www.galegroup.com))
    - 2. Thomson Scientific ([scientific.thomson.com/isi](http://scientific.thomson.com/isi))
    - 3. LexisNexis
    - 4. British Library
    - 5. BBC Monitoring
    - 6. Omnimap (i.e., maps & charts)
    - 7. Commercial Imagery
      - a. DigitalGlobe
      - b. MDA's Geospatial Services
      - c. et al.
    - 8. Jane's
    - 9. Lloyd's of London
    - 10. Others as applicable
- b. Analysis
  - i. Products
    - 1. Risk assessment reports

- a. Forecast International ([www.forecastinternational.com](http://www.forecastinternational.com))
  - b. Political Risk Services ([www.prsgroup.com](http://www.prsgroup.com))
- 2. National Federation of Abstracting and Information Services (NFAIS)
- 3. Oxford Analytica (i.e., strategic forecasting)
- 4. Others as applicable

20. USG (non-DoD) information

- a. Potential Collection Sources
  - i. Department of State (DOS)
  - ii. Department of Commerce (DOC)
  - iii. Department of Treasury (DOT)
  - iv. Department of Justice (DOJ)
  - v. Department of Energy (DOE)
    - 1. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
    - 2. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
    - 3. Sandia National Laboratory (SNL)
  - vi. Department of Transportation (DOT)
  - vii. Department of Education (DOE)
  - viii. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
    - 1. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
    - 2. U.S. Customs and Border Protection
    - 3. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    - 4. Environmental Measurements Laboratory
    - 5. National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center
    - 6. Plum Island Animal Disease Center
    - 7. Transportation Security Laboratory
- b. Analysis

21. Information disclosure channels (intentional and unintentional)

- a. Foreign disclosure program
- b. Public affairs
- c. Civil affairs
- d. PHYSOP
- e. Support to public diplomacy
- f. Military publications
- g. Defense websites
- h. Participation in international conferences, symposia, and shows
- i. Military training & education
- j. Mil-to-Mil contacts
- k. Negotiations, talks, and other official visits
- l. Technologies
- m. Foreign military cooperation & sales
- n. Military Deception
- o. Offensive Counterintelligence Operations



## **ANNEX-2. C&A Resources: brief descriptions and summaries**

1. Indigenous/Regional Media: Indigenous, regional, or local media sources is highly beneficial when focusing on a specific area where national press does not cover the stories/news or the target is someone of importance on a local or regional level.
2. Legal actions: International legal cases and hearings are beneficial from an information gathering standpoint. The legal precedence the case lays out, allows the analyst to methodically build a social network of all the players, rulings, and historical and background information and significance to the events and actions.
3. Law Enforcement Intel (US & foreign): LEAs, both foreign and domestic, have increasingly become a vital partner and information source in the when collecting information. Whether it's information on individuals that have historically be detained and the information, sources, and networks each individual shares or the cases still pending with significant actionable intelligence value, LEAs are valuable to intelligence collection efforts.
4. Department of State: DOS provides open and classified updates and backgrounds on states, leaders, and international diplomacy and law on a daily basis. DOS covers a variety of areas including, but not limited to: Counterterrorism, Civil Rights, Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Rightsizing the U.S. Government's Overseas Presence, War Crimes Issues, Women's Rights and a variety of other Bureaus and Departments.
5. U.N. and other International Alliances: These organizations provide vital details and statistics on a variety of issues and interests. Because of their mission(s), these organizations are able to visit and travel to areas that may not be friendly to the analyst and their state of origin—their visits will produce data for others to ingest and interpret.
6. NGO: By definition, a non-governmental organization (NGO) is an organization that is not part of a government and was not founded by states. NGOs are therefore typically independent of governments. Therefore, NGOs have the ability to go where states and some international alliances cannot go—data and intelligence can be derived from NGO visits.
7. WWW: The internet or World Wide Web, is a rapid information collection tool for unclassified/open source information. Individuals have the ability to post information (anonymously) and collect information in a fast and efficient manner; all they require is a computer, internet access, and a power source.
8. Academic Research: Academia is a strong area and discipline for an analyst when seeking to collect information and data specific to a case. Professors and educators devote much of their lives and professions to reading, examining, and researching areas which cover the gamete of the human experience (and beyond). Often, university professors teach and focus in specific areas of their discipline and remain current in their area due to constant reading/research, seminars, and traveling.

9. Allies and Coalition Partners: Strategic partnerships enhance collection efforts immensely. Coalition partners and allies have similar collection abilities and means as the state of origin, however, partners may be treated differently with access to information and other non-state/state actors that the state of origin is unfriendly or at odds with.

10. Relevant multilateral organizations: By definition, these are organizations formed between three or more nations to work on issues that relate to all of the countries in the organization. Like many other international organizations, relevant multilateral organizations have the ability to work and exist in unfriendly locations. Multilateral organizations also collect and provide vital statistics, information, and insight through their work.

11. Economic and Industrial: Collecting data associated with a state/non-state actors' economic status and industrial capabilities is another way to become more familiar with their abilities and propensity to create, transport, and develop weapons to the ability to engage in international trade agreements, thus strengthening their international status and ability to coercively deter or manipulate other actors.

12. National Intel: The ability to collect actionable intelligence and information should primarily come from the national intelligence apparatus.

13. Financial Intelligence: Money provides actors the ability to obtain information, hardware, software, weapons, etc. The ability and chief function in tracking financial transactions or the amount itself, allows the analyst to track the sender, the purchased item, and ultimately all the parties involved.

14. Medical: A state/non-states' ability or status to provide aid, support, health recovery and emergency management services can tell an analyst what the targets' abilities are. For example, if the target state has a special radiation treatment center in a particular location, it might indicate that nuclear facilities or R&D laboratories are in the vicinity to provide emergency medical services. Additionally, an analyst can also gain insight into the target state by investigating medical journals, conferences, meetings, and any other publication or reporting mechanism to international organizations on the latest diseases, epidemics, and other odd health reactions due to the use or development of specialized weapons systems and advance technology efforts.

15. Third-party Governments: Third-party actors have the ability to gather information and interact with unfriendly actors to the state/actor of origin. Additionally, they also have use of their national intelligence apparatus as well.

16. "Charities": Tracking, observing, and investigating "charities" is another avenue when actively collecting intelligence. Combined with FinCEN, it provides the analyst the ability to see the amounts of funds being transacted; the frequency of movement and the origin and resting place of the donated funds—this provides a viable social network of the active players involved with these criminal and terrorist front organizations.

17. Informational "honey pots": "Honey pots" are useful for gauging the popularity or support for a variety of movements and organizations. Additionally, once a "honey pot" is considered a

trusted site or homepage, the analyst has the ability to interact with the visitors in an attempt to extract data and information.

18. Education (INDOC): Knowing what messages the youth and inhabitants of specific areas are being taught and inundated with can assist the analyst derive certain behaviors, dependencies, proclivities, and dispositions on a variety of topics and actions.

19. Service for fee: Paying individuals or contracting them for their unique abilities and skills can enhance your collection abilities. Again, while the analyst may not be a desired actor in a certain region or state, contracting a willing participant who is more desirable in that particular area can prove to be highly beneficial.

20. USG (non-DoD) information: The USG has a vast resource of departments and agencies that are not affiliated or serve, primarily, in a national defense function. For example, Department of Commerce, State, Agriculture, and others also provide information for their specific area that can ultimately assist analysts by providing information, elements, and data pertaining to the case.

21. Military information disclosure channels: Military information disclosure channels can provide key information and indicators to tactical and strategic movements, actions, developments, as well as offensive and defensive measures and postures.