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South Asia II: NSI Pathway Indicators

*Pakistan's Future: Analysis of the Fragmentation and
"Muddling Through" Hypotheses*

Understanding the
Human Side of the
Environment

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Pakistan's Future: *Analysis of the Fragmentation and "Muddling Through" Hypotheses*

Introduction

NSI's contribution to the futures portion of the South Asia SMA Follow-on effort explores the potential pathways associated with two hypothetical Pakistani futures—national Fragmentation and Muddling. We started with theoretical propositions about the nature of, and points along, the pathways, tested these against historical cases, refined our characterizations of the paths, and then applied these to look at Pakistan from today forward. At any point we might observe, in a state such as Pakistan, evidence consistent with any number of future pathways. For this reason, our approach was not to determine solely which path Pakistan is on, but where the balance of the evidence lies—which path may be dominant—and then search for indications and warnings (I&W) of what we should expect to see as further evidence of that path. The general paths provide a framework that easily could be applied to assess conditions in any state: for example, where Turkey is relative to a fragmentation outcome or whether Afghanistan is moving forward or slipping backward in political, economic, and social development.

NSI first defined and delineated the Fragmentation and Muddling pathways, and then identified a set of primary economic, social, and political markers drawing on empirical analysis and theoretical work. We then undertook a series of structured case studies to identify and distinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions for each pathway and to identify the most likely temporal orderings along each path. This research provided us with a descriptive analysis of each of the pathways: their necessary antecedent conditions, catalyzing events that propelled movement down a pathway, markers associated with that pathway, and any buffers or barriers that acted as roadblocks to further progression toward a fragmentation or muddling outcome.

This report first presents the findings of our analysis of Pakistan's current position on the fragmentation and muddling pathways. This includes indicators and warnings (I&W) of further movement along each pathway, both those that signal increasing instability and those that suggest a strengthening of state social and political institutions and conditions. The second section of the report provides greater detail regarding the definition of each of the pathways and their associated markers. The third section presents an overview of the findings from our structured case study analyses that informed the development of the final marker lists for each pathway. Detailed case study summaries and analysis are provided in the appendix to this report.

Summary of Results

Since Pakistan's loss of East Pakistan (current day Bangladesh) in 1971, a number of Pakistan scholars and observers have warned of further fragmentation of the state. Causes cited range from internal social cleavages to a nefarious U.S. government plot to weaken Pakistan (Choussedovsky, 2012). A second school of thought, however, proposes that Pakistan's future will be characterized by "Muddling through"—that is, achieving neither positive political, economic, and social growth nor complete failure in these areas. This report identifies indications and warning measures associated with these two potential future pathways for the state of Pakistan.

At any point we might observe, in a state such as Pakistan, evidence consistent with multiple future pathways. For this reason, our approach was not to determine which single path Pakistan might be on but to

1. use the data to suggest which might be the dominant path;
2. use the general path models to highlight key political, economic, and social "pathway markers" as indicators of movement along one path; and
3. provide suggestions of what conditions and events analysts should watch for in terms of further evidence of that path.¹

Below are summaries of the key findings of this study. The full pathway models and analyses of these in the case of Pakistan appear in the main body of this report.

Finding 1: Fragmentation

While most of the precipitating conditions are present, fragmentation of the Pakistani state is not imminent.

Nearly all of the antecedent conditions, necessary conditions, and important pathway markers for fragmentation are present in Pakistan today: state sovereignty contested violently by insurgent groups (e.g., in Balochistan, the FATA, and Kashmir); enduring disputes between geographically-associated social, ethnic, and economic groups; publically expressed conflict among elites in a country where political rivalries are numerous and intensely regional; and some public discontent over how the state is run. *What explains Pakistan's failure to fragment?*

¹ General Fragmentation and Muddling pathways were derived from empirical analyses and theoretical work and tested against historical case studies. The necessary antecedent conditions were identified for each path as well as the catalyzing events that propelled movement down a pathway. In addition, the generalized pathways included markers as well as buffers or barriers that act as roadblocks to further progression down either the Fragmentation or Muddling paths. The final, fully-delineated general pathways were then applied to an analysis of where Pakistan currently stands. The general paths constructed provide a framework that easily could be applied to assess conditions in any state. For example, where Turkey is relative to a fragmentation outcome or whether Afghanistan is moving forward or slipping backward in political, economic, and social development.

First, the absence of either a suitably catalyzing event or a willing external sponsor blocks the emergence of a single group with sufficient capacity to defeat the Pakistani state and break away successfully. Second, internal buffers—including institutional weaknesses at the provincial level that hinders attempts to devolve power and emerging signs of the Sharif government's willingness to negotiate grievances with groups in FATA and Balochistan—serve as important buffers to fragmentation; however, most importantly, the external existential threat posed by India persists as a uniquely powerful and credible impetus for Pakistan's disparate parts to remain united behind a common identity and narrative of victimization.

I&W for movement toward fragmentation

- A catalyzing event such as the 1970 cyclone in Bangladesh or publication of the Awami League's Six-Point Program
- The appearance of a sponsor willing to provide the financial and/or security support to enable a group to break away from the central government (Pakistan's status as a nuclear state may have raised the cost of this activity for neighboring states)
- The removal of buffers manifest for example in increased repression by the government; unwillingness to negotiate with disaffected groups; and normalized relations with India that weaken common narratives of Pakistani national identity and strengthen or incentivize regional identities

Fragmentation Sub-paths

Three versions of a path to state fragmentation were considered in this analysis:

Divorce: An intentional and mutually-negotiated division of territory. In Pakistan—especially in the foreseeable future—this would require either the direct participation or acquiescence of the military particularly with regard to the disposition of military capabilities. A divorce path to fragmentation does not require a split within the military.

Conflict: Limited violence to all-out war. As noted, this is distinct from instances of civil conflict where the main objective of fighting is regime change (as in a revolution). Thus, for a conflict path to emerge, there must be at least one party with intent to separate territorially from the current state. In Pakistan, it appears most likely that for militarized conflict of a scale sufficient to fragment the state to occur, the military would have to be involved on one or both sides of the conflict.

Dissolution: Central government authority increasingly devolves to the provinces until they are functionally independent.

Finding 2: Muddling

Overall, the dominant trajectory of social and political development is slow decline (“Muddling Down”); although, there are signs that improvement is possible. Economically, the overall trajectory is flat (“Muddling through”) in large part due to the downward pull of political and social markers.

Political Markers: As of the date of this report (October 2013), data on political markers suggest that political development in Pakistan is on a downward path as nearly all of the key “Muddling Down” path markers—contested national sovereignty; weak and ineffective governing institutions; a weak and often biased justice system; uneven and insufficient internal revenue generation; contested civilian, military and judicial roles; limited provision of government services; and politics heavily influenced by corruption and patronage—are both present and substantial. Moreover, many of these path markers are quite well established at levels that presage continued deterioration. For example, Pakistan’s decades-long experience with weak governing institutions, biased justice, and uneven provision of services persistently weakens popular support for, and grants of, legitimacy to the government, which further weakens institutions and provision of services. In another example, fewer than one million Pakistanis (0.7% of the population) filed income taxes in 2001. At that time, the Taskforce on Tax Reform noted that “if taxes relative to GDP do not increase significantly, without new levies, Pakistan cannot be governed effectively, essential public services cannot be delivered, and high inflation cannot be avoided” (Taskforce on Reform of Tax Administration, 2001). However, tax revenues cannot be increased unless the tax base is increased or tax evasion is eliminated. More than ten years later, the government has failed to introduce general sales tax reform, raise energy prices, or reduce subsidies in the power sector, all of which would significantly increase government revenues (The World Bank, 2011).

Three Muddling Sub-paths

The “Muddling through” path

Muddling Up. A state is considered to be on a Muddling Up path for a specific marker if the trend over time is up and there is evidence that the importance of the marker is recognized.

Muddling Along. Muddling Along denotes that the trend over time for a marker is flat and no discernable, effective action is being taken to improve the marker.

Muddling Down. Muddling down is defined by a downward trend for a marker over time with no evidence that action is being taken to improve performance.

I&W for further decline toward political instability

- Evidence that governing institutions are remaining weak and ineffective—such as increasing public criticism of and protest against the government and the call for better and/or more equitably distributed services such as energy and education—suggest that satisfaction with and loyalty to the government is receding leaves open space for radicalized political actors that would not necessarily seek liberalized and stable governance
- Strengthening of sub-national identities and/or alliances among insurgent, opposition, or grievance groups

I&W for reversal of the political “Muddling Down” trajectory

- Government efforts to apply rule of law fairly across all groups and significant reductions in human rights abuses by the state
- Consistent and adequate internal revenue generation and continued improvement in representation of minority views
- Resolution of internal sovereignty challenges

Economic Markers: Despite continued poor conditions and difficulties with economic planning and management, economically, Pakistan appears to be on the cusp between slow decline (“Muddling Down”) and a flat trajectory (“Muddling through”). Many of the markers common to economic “Muddling Down” pathways are present and significant in Pakistan. However, there are also important markers of slow but positive economic development (“Muddling Up”) to suggest an overall “Muddling through” trajectory. Even as several markers show continued deterioration over time or remain stagnant at detrimental levels, others show positive signs of improvement and buffers to complete economic failure appear to play a key role.

GDP growth appears to be on the decline, if somewhat unevenly. Real GDP growth has averaged only 3% over the last four years and has been on a volatile negative course since the early 1980s. Some growth spurts, like the one from 2004-2007, saw growth averages over 7%, but overall Pakistan’s economic growth has been insufficient, relative to its population growth (The IMF estimates that 7% GDP over an extended period is needed to absorb Pakistan’s nearly 2 million new labor market entrants each year IMF 2012). The result is high underemployment, unpaid employment, informal employment, and employment abroad: none of which maximize the productivity of Pakistan’s human capital.

Poor economic management, limited foreign investment, and a reliance on foreign aid/loans are also significant markers for Muddling Down in Pakistan.² At the same time, Pakistan’s reliance on international aid has remained high and Pakistan ranks in the bottom third of 185 countries surveyed on ease of doing business there primarily due to its poor record on enforcing business regulations (World Bank, 2011). For example, Pakistan introduced a patent law in 2000, but does not have an effective system in place to prevent the issuance of marketing approvals for copies of patented pharmaceutical products. Pakistan authorities continue efforts to uphold intellectual property rights, but the country remains on the priority watch list of the U.S. Trade Representative (U.S. Office of the Trade Representative, 2013).

Despite the frequency of markers of a “Muddling Down” pathway, current economic conditions in Pakistan also include important markers of positive growth. For example, while insufficient energy resources hamper the economy, Pakistan boasts transportation infrastructure and irrigation systems adequate to support fundamental commerce in agriculture and manufacturing. The challenge is to maintain the infrastructure that exists and to expand these networks going forward. Pakistan also has relatively low unemployment rates, even if official numbers are artificially suppressed by sizable employment in the informal economy. Although Pakistan’s economy is not widely diverse, commodity prices for primary exports, like cotton, have grown. Continued improvements for these markers could help to reduce Pakistan’s reliance on foreign aid to balance its accounts. Finally, it is also encouraging to note that, even though inefficiencies of enforcement and management appear to be restricting the formal economy, Pakistan has sought to meet World Trade Organization expectations by creating appropriate regulations and policies that foster growth, making the prospects for future growth and

² The Millennium Challenge Corporation ranks Pakistan in the 8th percentile among low-income countries for fiscal policy, 35th for trade policy, 36th for control of corruption, and 55th for natural resource protection.

Muddling Up more favorable. To date, economic failure in Pakistan appears to have been buffered significantly by a thriving informal economy that provides access to jobs and alternative regulations or services that ensure supplemental productivity alongside the formal economy.

I&W for movement toward economic collapse

- Evidence showing that financial institutions continue to weaken
- Precipitous reduction or loss of alternative funding sources
- Continued government budget deficits
- Deterioration of transport, water, electricity infrastructure, and security, leading to capital flight and loss of foreign investment

I&W for movement toward economic development

- Diversification and growth in industrial production
- Reduced losses and business expenditures related to corruption
- Continued improvements in representation and governing legitimacy

Social Markers: The majority of the path markers for social disintegration are both present and significant in the case of Pakistan. Additionally, many of the markers show continued deterioration over time or remain stagnant at detrimental levels. However, unlike political and economic Muddling, Pakistan faces significant barriers to positive development (“Muddling Up”) in the social sphere. As of October 2013, only two of the path markers, but nearly all of the barriers commonly associated with positive societal development, are present in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s trajectory of socially “Muddling Down” is driven largely by its entrenched social divisions and high degree of cleavage between both religious and ethnic groups. For the most part, its provinces are distinct ethnic enclaves; its cities mirror the same divisions by neighborhood. Both Urdu and English are recognized as official languages, but Punjabi, Pashto, Sindhi, and Balochi are all dominant languages in their respective provinces. In addition to the distinct ethnic makeup of the provinces, Pakistan has three semi-autonomous regions: the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the disputed territories of Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. The FATA has no representation in the National Assembly and Kashmir resembles an area under martial law, with strict Pakistani government oversight and heavy military presence.

In light of these circumstances, violent political action and terrorism are common, particularly in the FATA and Balochistan, where the Pakistani Taliban and related groups espousing Islamic extremism and Baloch nationalist insurgents respectively have openly engaged in conflict with the Pakistani Army for more than five years. In both cases, the government is perceived as illegitimate for its inability to provide equal access to goods and services or proportional representation in decision-making. For example, Balochis have a long-standing grievance that their province provides 36% of Pakistan’s natural gas supply, yet piped gas is only available to four of Balochistan’s 28 districts (International Crisis Group, 2006). As the violence that characterizes these frontier areas is also present as a microcosm in urban areas, with Karachi being the prime example, organized criminal outfits such as D-Company and the Lyari gangs have taken advantage and also contribute to high crime rates in the cities.

With Punjabis, Sindhis, and Muhajirs holding the majority of political power nationally and operating exclusive patronage networks, Pashtuns and Balochis, among others, have played the part of the marginalized in Pakistani society either through institutionalized discrimination (biased justice and under-representation) or through relative deprivation (fewer resources allocated for development). According to the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index (HDI), between 1980 and 2012 Pakistan's HDI rose by 1.3% annually from 0.337 to 0.515 today, which gives the country a rank of 146 out of 187 countries with comparable data. The HDI of South Asia as a region increased from 0.357 in 1980 to 0.558 today, placing Pakistan below the regional average (UNDP, n.d.). Balochistan and the predominantly Pashtun province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) have the highest poverty rates based on the government's most recent Socio-Economic Living Standard Measurement Survey (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2011).

In addition to these social cleavages and socio-economic inequalities, markers for out-group focused religious extremism and violence are also present in Pakistan. Various degrees of Islamic extremism in particular can be found across the FATA, Balochistan, Kashmir, and other areas of the country, influenced by wealthy Arab donors to seminaries and mosques or local sectarian leaders. Though a majority of Pakistanis adheres to the teachings of Sunni Islam, some Shi'a Islam and Christian communities also exist. Violent clashes between extremists in these sects are not uncommon.

Despite entrenched cleavages and widespread insecurity, there are some markers for social Muddling Up. Most notably, upward social mobility is significant and present. Pakistan's middle class has experienced steady growth, signaling an increase in opportunity for many. Further, though overall poverty levels remain high, Pakistan has the inherent capacity to meet the basic needs of its population with more effective and efficient application of effort. Pakistan's largest cities are also examples of relatively positive ethnic integration and present notional models for achieving more tolerance in peripheral areas.

As with political Muddling and Fragmentation, the most significant buffer to social disintegration or continued Muddling Down in Pakistan appears to be the perceived presence of an external threat, which creates a common national identity to trump religious, ethnic, or regional ones. In Pakistan, the common perceived external threat is most often India (Balochistan and Kashmir), but in certain social contexts (the FATA) may also be the United States, due to frequent drone strikes. Should the willingness of the current Sharif government to negotiate with Baloch nationalists and Islamic insurgents in the FATA lead to real dialogue and institutional action that addresses the grievances of those who see themselves as marginalized, ethnic cleavages may soften and perceived inequality or relative deprivation may subside, as well as give extremists less credibility. Mitigating or removing these kinds of barriers could be the first step towards socially Muddling Up in Pakistan.

I&W for movement toward social collapse

- Further institutionalization of discrimination or marginalization of particular groups
- Continued rise in crime and violent dispute resolution

I&W for movement toward social development

- Expansion of social norm barring out-group focused violence
- Major social groups no longer perceive marginalization or discrimination and have equal access to public goods
- Safe and relatively secure environment, low crime
- Sustained economic growth

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Defining Pathways

One of the challenging aspects of this type of analysis is to determine the relationship between various markers as well as how they contribute to our identification of a particular pathway. The analogy of road signs is helpful. A signpost might tell you what type of road you are on and what direction you are travelling (I-10 West) without giving you the specific destination at the end of that road. Other signs (New York, 200 miles), tell you exactly where you are headed, but the destination is still far enough away that there are opportunities to get lost or change your destination. Finally, some signs leave you little doubt where you are headed and no possibility of change (Holland Tunnel, exit only). The pathway markers we have identified for Pakistani futures work in a similar manner. Some are common to more than one future outcome. Others are early markers, leaving plenty of opportunity for a change in path, while others signal the state has moved inexorably toward one or another future outcome.

One of the most complex parts of this analysis is to determine which type of sign each pathway marker variable represents. The objective is to develop a means for analysts and planners to recognize changes in Pakistan's trajectory (for example moving away from Muddling through toward a different pathway) and to provide clues as to which additional path markers to watch for. It is important to reiterate that we consider these pathways and the outcomes they lead to as ideal types. That is, like all models, we see them as simplified reflections of reality. We do not expect that conditions in Pakistan would correspond absolutely to any single pathway at any point in time. On the contrary, we expect to see markers corresponding to a number of pathways at most points in time. Thus, the more appropriate question to ask of our analyses will be not "Which pathway is Pakistan on?" but "What does current evidence is the dominant pathway, i.e., where is the balance of the evidence?"

Defining Fragmentation

For the purposes of the South Asia Follow-on, we define the endpoint of the Fragmentation pathway as the break-up of an existing state³ into separate, independent political units. This means that rather than the myriad of ways that nation-states' border might change (e.g., border disputes, external edict,⁴ etc.) or instances of civil conflict where groups fight over control of the entire state (e.g., the Iranian Revolution), Fragmentation pathways include only those scenarios that involve one or more groups seeking to form a new state from some portion of the territory that presently comprises Pakistan.

³ Throughout this analysis, the term "state" is used to define an independent political entity that controls a territory and population and is recognized by the international community as a state.

⁴ For example, during the colonial era, world powers determined borders and defined states across large areas of the globe; however, these changes were externally imposed, rather than reflecting the population's desire for political autonomy and, therefore, are not consistent with the definition of fragmentation.

Fragmentation outcomes relevant to Pakistan are those in which some sub-national group (ethnic, religious, tribal, or class-based) desires greater autonomy and seeks to achieve this by gaining independent control over part of the territory of the state.

The outcome of a fragmented Pakistan could occur completely peacefully or could involve the use of limited or major force. Initial analysis suggests three pathways to fragmentation in Pakistan's future:

1. **Divorce:** An intentional and mutually negotiated division of territory. In Pakistan—especially in the foreseeable future—this would require either the direct participation or acquiescence of the military particularly with regard to the disposition of military capabilities. A divorce path to fragmentation does not require split within the military.
2. **Conflict:** Limited violence to all-out war. As noted this is distinct from instances of civil conflict where the main objective of fighting is regime change (as in a revolution). Thus, for a conflict path to emerge there must be at least one party with intent to separate territorially from the current state. In Pakistan, it appears most likely that for militarized conflict of a scale sufficient to fragment the state to occur, the military would have to be involved on one or both sides of the conflict.
3. **Dissolution:** Central government authority increasingly devolves to the provinces until they are functionally independent.

The speed at which the fragmentation outcome is reached, as well as the extent of instability along each pathway, can vary. As with different outcome paths (i.e., Fragmentation vs. Muddling), we expect that markers of divorce, conflict, or dissolution fragmentation paths could occur simultaneously. For example, in early 1970, the weight of evidence showed a divorce by East Pakistan to be the dominant pathway. However, in March of that year, violent clashes between the military and protesters represented early indication of a shift from divorce to a conflict pathway (Husain, 2010).

Fragmentation sub-paths

Common Antecedents. Social cleavages and a basis for dispute between different and geographically-identified ethnic, religious, class, or ideological groups appear to be necessary antecedent conditions for fragmentation along any of the paths (Cornell, 2002; Galtung, 1965; Gurr & Moore, 1997; Gurr, 1994; Shaykhutdinov & Bragg, 2011; Zartman, 2005). When social cleavages are combined with a history of political favoritism, disparities in access to resources or oppression of one group over another, both the lines of division and the source of dispute, are present and the potential for fragmentation is increased (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier, 2000a; Lujala, Gleditsch, & Gilmore, 2005; Ross, 2004; Sambanis, 2004; Seidman, 2000; Shepard, 2002; Soysa & Neumayer, 2007). For example, consider the case of the former Yugoslavia where geographically and religiously self-identified groups had long-standing animosity over what was perceived as unequal development and wealth distribution. These became powerful mobilizers of popular support for autonomy and secession, particularly when driven by strong political leaders (Bakke, 2008; Bovingdon, 2004; Zartman, 2005)—in some cases toward divorce, in others violent conflict.

Divorce

This Fragmentation pathway is characterized by 1) increasing division among elites with regard to the direction of the state and 2) attempts to consolidate their power and influence within a particular region of the country. In some cases, this desire for separation may be precipitated by economic considerations, such as dissatisfaction with allocation of resources or the discovery of a valuable natural resource (e.g., oil) in a particular region (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier, 2000a, 2000b; Lujala et al., 2005). In other cases, it may reflect a region's dissatisfaction with its share of political power at the national level. In Pakistan, the divorce path is also likely to involve 3) alliances between military leaders and competing elites attempting to bolster their position. This process of elite division and alliance building is followed or accompanied by 4) public discussion by elites and others of autonomy for individual regions, 5) which elicits little or no opposition from the population. In the final stages, 6) parties negotiate the terms of the division of the state. This pathway is potentially the fastest route to fragmentation and may be only moderately destabilizing, depending on the degree of disagreement between the parties over the final disposition of territory and resources. Historical cases of fragmentation through divorce include Czechoslovakia.

Conflict

An apparent requirement for this path is that 1) at least one of the sides is unwilling to accept a change in the status quo (e.g., the present boundaries of Pakistan) and ultimately is willing to fight in order to preserve it. This path is characterized by 2) threats of force and/or the eventual use of force by one or both sides to either forestall separation or cause it to occur. Thus, markers of a conflict path include 3) violent suppression of separatist groups by the central government or 4) violence such as targeted killing of government officials, bombing of public buildings, or attempts to seize territory by opposition groups. In some cases, such as the former Yugoslavia, the violence may escalate to the level of civil war before the fragmentation outcome is finally achieved.

Because of the presence of armed conflict, this is potentially the most destabilizing Fragmentation pathway. The time to reach a resolution would depend considerably on the relative coercive capabilities of the competing sides and the level of external intervention. Historical cases of fragmentation via conflict are the break-up of Yugoslavia (Serbia vs. Bosnia-Herzegovina) and Pakistan-Bangladesh.

A special case: Military Fracture

In states with a politically powerful military such as Pakistan, fragmentation might also be precipitated by divisions among top military leaders (i.e., fracture of the military), which could follow either a divorce path or, more likely, a conflict path. Early signs of movement on to this pathway would be 1) inconsistent policies and activities within the military and 2) public statements and actions that signal discord among military leaders and factions. Such disagreements could relate to the role of the military, the nature of military organization, foreign and security policy, or reflect an internal struggle for control between ethnic or religious-based military factions. As a state moves further down a conflict Fragmentation pathway, markers such as 3) public violence involving senior officers and 4) alliances between military factions and civilian elites would be expected to appear. In the final stages, 5) armed conflict for control of military assets and territory would be likely.

Dissolution

Both the divorce and intra-military Fragmentation pathways represent disputed outcomes. It is plausible, however, that fragmentation may occur incrementally and peacefully through the gradual devolution of authority from the central government to the regions. This Fragmentation pathway is fundamentally different from the divorce and conflict pathways as it is instigated by the central government; autonomy and control are given, rather than taken. As regions gain greater control over policy and revenue generation, the relevance of the national government to the population decreases. In the intermediate stages of this pathway, therefore, we would expect to see 1) groups calling for regional autonomy, 2) public support for autonomy growing, and 3) public interest in the national government (e.g., measured by national election turn-out for democracies) decreasing. As states move further down the dissolution pathway, 4) regional governments take responsibility for policy areas more central to national government authority, such as trade, rule of law, foreign relations, and finally security. At the same time, 5) the military could start to deal directly with provincial governments rather than only the national government. If the national government does nothing to retain or regain authority, over time it could either be abolished, and the regions formally separate, or remain as a figurehead with little or no actual power. This Fragmentation pathway has the potential to be the least destabilizing, although it is also likely to be the longest to reach a definitive outcome, and is historically rare. The most common case to fit this pathway is the breakup of the former Soviet Union.

Table 1 lists the markers for all three Fragmentation sub-paths. Those marked with an “x” are not expected to be necessary conditions for that specific sub-path.

Table 1: Fragmentation Pathway Markers

MARKER		DIVORCE	CONFLICT	DISSOLUTION
POLITICAL				
Division among elites	Conflict over how state run	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Conflict among civilian elites	Yes	X	X
	Conflict among mil leaders	X	Yes	X
	Conflict w/in mil becomes public	X	Yes	X
Alliances btw civilian and military factions		Yes	X	X
Voter turn-out national elections		X	X	Decreasing
Autonomy	Public discussion by leaders	Yes	X	Yes
	Popular opinion	Not opposed	X	Supports
Devolution	Policy implementation	X	X	Increasing
	Revenue collection	X	X	Increasing
	Policy making	X	X	Increasing
	Civ-mil relations at province level	X	X	Increasing
Attempts by factions to consolidate power in specific geographical area		Yes- civilian	Yes - military	Yes
Movement of military assets		X	Yes	X

Use of force	By the government, directed against pro-independence groups	X	Yes	X
	By pro-independence groups, directed against the government	X	Yes	X
	Between military factions	X	Yes	X
ECONOMIC				
Uneven development	Govm't investment varies by region	Yes	X	Yes
Natural resources	Discovery of valuable resources in single region	Yes	X	Yes
	Disagreement over redistribution of resource wealth to regions	Yes	X	Yes
SOCIAL				
Social cleavages		Yes	Yes	Yes

Defining Muddling

The Muddling pathway is applicable to any state that is not actively and clearly in the process of fragmenting or failing. In this sense, almost all states can be said to be somewhere on a Muddling path. Unlike the Fragmentation pathway, which describes a primarily political phenomenon with a discrete outcome, the Muddling pathway is not associated with a specific and generalizable outcome. Rather, it is associated with an assessment of the changes apparent in a specific country over time, across political, economic, and social dimensions. For this reason, there is a broader list of markers for Muddling than there are for Fragmentation. More importantly for analysis, comparison across cases must be made in terms of the nature of changes seen in specific countries, rather than by comparing the levels of political, economic, and social development across cases. In other words, where a state is on a Muddling path is not a function of a set of generalizable thresholds (e.g., stable democracy or particular level of economic development). Rather, it is determined by comparison to where that particular state stood on the markers in previous periods of time. We also assume that a state could be at different places in terms of political liberalization, economic growth, and development and social tolerance and integration so explored these separately.

Political Dimension

The Muddling path excludes cases where a state is in the process of fragmentation or has clearly failed. It assumes, therefore, that there is some form of government at the national level (although there is no expectation regarding regime type), which exercises sovereignty over the entire territory of the state and provides the basic functions required for security and economic activity. How well the government fulfills these functions, and whether it is doing better, worse, or the same as in the past, will determine which Muddling sub-path the state is most likely on. Research examining democratizing nations suggests that in order to consider a political system legitimate, all citizens and political actors recognize that the political system is the only game in town and agree to follow the rules adopted and use the institutions

in place to seek goods and services and to voice political grievances or needs (Bova, 1991; Huntington, 1993; Mainwaring, 1992; O'Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1986; Przeworski, 1991).

Governing performance can be thought of as how well a government delivers broadly-defined “goods” sought by individuals and groups in the political system. Performance itself is a function of three goods sought from governing systems: representation of one’s interests or “political voice;” security or the provision of rule of law and justice; and the provision of various social services. In order to provide services to citizens, the government must possess the governing capacity to do so. Specifically, the government must have the bureaucratic strength to provide services and the revenue needed to provide them. Institutions must be built and staffed by qualified individuals, and the government must have the ability to raise revenue, typically through taxation (Bermeo, 1992; Bova, 1991; Diamond, 1992; Geddes, 1991; Wesolowski, 1990). In developing or post-conflict states, as the ability to increase revenue and the bureaucracy strengthen visibly, citizens often expect the government to provide better or an increasing array of services (Brunetti, Kisunko, & Weder, 1998; Brunetti, 1997; Feng, 2001; Fosu, Bates, & Hoeffler, 2006; Miljkovic & Rimal, 2008; O'Donnell et al., 1986; Svensson, 1998; Valenzuela & Valenzuela, 1978). Researchers have shown in many areas around the globe that the failure or lack of capacity of a political system to provide goods or services often leads to a perceived lack of legitimacy by political actors and constituents (e.g., consider bread riots in France, failure to distribute oil revenue in the Sudan.) Finally, a dearth in any of these three can have a negative effect on governing stability the Muddling trajectory of state. A full list of the political markers for Muddling, and their values over time for each Muddling sub-path, is show in in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Muddling Pathway: Political Markers

POLITICAL MARKERS		Muddling UP	Muddling ALONG	Muddling DOWN
National gov'm't sovereignty	Strength of national gov'm't sovereignty	No serious threat to sovereignty	Sovereignty of national government contested	Sovereignty of national government contested
Institutional strength	Overall capacity of state institutions	Increasing Importance recognized	Weak, and no effective attempts to improve	Becoming weaker, and no attempts to improve
	Corruption / mismanagement	Diminishing. Problem acknowledged, policies in place to address	High and generally tolerated - no effective policies to improve	Increasing and generally tolerated - no policies to improve
	Rule of law	Strengthening Importance recognized	Weak, no effective policies to improve	Becoming weaker, and no attempts to improve
	Internal revenue generation	Sufficient for G&D	Insufficient for G&D	Insufficient for G&D and decreasing
	Financial: credit	Sufficient for G&D	Insufficient for G&D	Insufficient for G&D and decreasing
	civ-mil-judicial power struggle	Diminishing. Problem acknowledged	Ongoing	Worsening

Provision of Services	Education	Improving Importance recognized	Insufficient, no real attempts to improve	Falling, no action to improve
	Health	Improving Importance recognized	Insufficient, no real attempts to improve	Falling, no action to improve
	Job creation	Sufficient for G&D	Insufficient, no real attempts to improve	Falling, no action to improve
Infrastructure investment	Energy	Sufficient for G&D	Insufficient, no real attempts to improve	Falling, no action to improve
	Water	Sufficient for G&D	Insufficient, no real attempts to improve	Falling, no action to improve
	Roads	sufficient for G&D	Insufficient, no real attempts to improve	Falling, no action to improve
Civic engagement	In general	Good, and increasing	Low	Decreasing
	Influence of patronage networks on politics	Decreasing; disadvantages acknowledged	Considerable and generally tolerated	Low and not well tolerated by government
	Access to govmt for people	Improving Importance recognized	Low	Decreasing
	Parties responsive to population	Improving Importance recognized	No, or only to specific groups	Decreasing
	Representation of minorities and women	Improving Importance recognized	Poor and no real attempts to improve	Poor and worsening, no attempts to improve
Human, civil, and political rights		improving, prioritized by government	No improvement, not a government priority	Worsening, not a government priority
Equality of opportunity (economic/political) for all groups		improving, prioritized by government	No improvement, not a government priority	Worsening, not a government priority
Social identity	Strength of national identity	Strengthening	Constant and low	Low and weakening
	Strength of regional (sub-state) group identity	Not increasing	Stronger than national	Stronger than national and increasing in salience
	Presence of perceived external threat to nation	Decreasing	Steady	Increasing

Economic Dimension

The economic markers of the Muddling pathway are designed to capture the key elements of state's economy that influence its capacity to grow and develop. Research demonstrates a relationship between economic capacity and the credibility of established institutions that either assist or hinder economic relationships. Low credibility of rules results in low economic growth. Specifically, unclear property rights, surprising or repetitive reversals of economic policy by the government, uncertain contract enforcement and high corruption decreases the credibility resulting in low levels of economic

growth and development (Brunetti et al., 1998; Brunetti, 1997; Feng, 2001; Fosu et al., 2006; Miljkovic & Rimal, 2008; O'Donnell et al., 1986; Svensson, 1998; Valenzuela & Valenzuela, 1978). In states with low levels of rule of law, uncertainty and risk discourage investment at all levels. For example, if property rights are not guaranteed, landowners will not be willing to improve their land and thus increases in production will be lost.

Observed over time, the value of economic capacity provides a measure of economic growth; however, growth is unlikely to be sustainably and resilient without development. Economic development involves qualitative change and restructuring in a state's economy. Rather than just *more* economic activity (measured in monetary terms), there is *different* economic activity that generates technological and social progress. Efforts to advance the economic development of a state typically involve infrastructure construction or improvement (e.g., roads and highways, railways, shipping channels, communications systems, power supplies, etc.) as well as expansion of labor force skills. A full list of the economic markers for Muddling, and their values over time for each Muddling sub-path, is show in in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Muddling Pathway, Economic Markers

ECONOMIC MARKERS		Muddling UP	Muddling ALONG	Muddling DOWN
Labor force	Unemployment rate	Low	High	Rising
	Enough educated / skilled for growth & devel	Yes	No, no policies in place to improve	Decreasing, no policies in place to improve
Institutional strength	Financial regulation strength	Strong and improving	Weak, and no real attempts to improve	Weakening, and no attempts to improve
	Corruption / mismanagement	Low	High and generally tolerated	Increasing and generally tolerated
	Financial Infrastructure investment	Good and increasing	Low	Low
Economic resilience	Trade Balance	Balance or surplus	Deficit, but steady	Deficit increasing
	Economic Diversity	Yes and improving	Low and no real attempts to improve	Decreasing, and no attempts to improve
	Ability to attract foreign investment	Sufficient for G&D, but economy not dependent	Insufficient for G&D, no real attempts to improve	Decreasing, and no attempts to improve
	Reliance on international aid / loans	No	Yes	Increasing
Economic growth	Rate of growth	> pop growth	<pop growth	<pop growth
	Sustainability of growth	Yes	No	No

Social Dimension

Quality of life is determined partly by the ability to meet basic physical needs, but also by how well individuals and groups are doing compared to others (equity). When different groups and individuals within a state have different priorities, it can be particularly difficult for the government to satisfy or even respond to the interests and preferences of all. Researchers of psychological frustration-aggression theory pose that when these needs go unmet for an extended period, frustration increases, which can lead to violence. Frustration among certain groups and individuals can also emerge when they cannot determine where to seek resources or who or what is responsible for the provision of resources or services. This may contribute to increasing competition and exacerbation of existing social divisions in society. In a political system in which groups' needs are, or are perceived to be, unmet or unequally met, frustration can lead them to seek assistance through external or violent means or both, causing social instability and insecurity.

Social cleavages and a basis for dispute between different and geographically-identified ethnic, religious, class, or ideological groups is a source of social instability and hinders a state's ability to move from Muddling Down or Along, to Muddling Up (Cornell, 2002; Galtung, 1965; Gurr & Moore, 1997; Gurr, 1994; Zartman, 2005). When social cleavages are combined with a history of political favoritism, disparities in access to resources or oppression of one group over another, both the lines of division and the source of dispute are present. This creates increased potential for social and political unrest (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier, 2000a, 2000b; Ross, 2004; Sambanis & Zinn, 2005; Sambanis, 2004; Seidman, 2000; Shepard, 2002). A full list of the social markers for Muddling, and their values over time for each Muddling sub-path, is shown in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Muddling Pathway, Social Markers

SOCIAL MARKERS		Muddling UP	Muddling ALONG	Muddling DOWN
Quality of Life	Basic needs satisfaction	High % pop (all groups / regions)	No improvement across majority of groups / regions	Decreasing across majority of groups / regions
	Equal access to services	Yes	No	No
	Social mobility	High	Low for many groups / regions	Low for many groups / regions and worsening
Social cleavages	Presence of cleavages	Weakening and not salient	Salient and stable	Salient and strengthening
	Tolerance / integration btw groups	High and improving across all groups / regions	Low for many groups / regions	Low and falling for many groups / regions
Ideological Extremism	Public support of extremist views	Low and decreasing across all groups / regions	Constant across many groups / regions	Increasing across many groups / regions
Equity	Discrimination / marginalization of any group	Low and decreasing for all groups / regions	No improvement, not a government priority	Worsening, not a government priority

	Gender equality; empowerment of women	Good and improving	No improvement, not a government priority	Worsening, not a government priority
Security	Violent political action, terrorism, civil war, interstate war; government oppression	Minimal violent political action, and gov'm't oppression	Violent political action, and gov'm't oppression still not unknown	Violent political action, and gov'm't oppression common and increasing
	Crime, sexual assault	Low, and rates decreasing,	Rates constant	Rates increasing, no attempts to curb

Muddling Sub-paths

We define three sub-paths to Muddling that reflect this focus on the direction of change: Muddling Up, Muddling Along, and Muddling Down.

Muddling Up. A state is considered to be on a Muddling Up path for a specific marker if the trend over time is up and there is evidence that the importance of the marker is recognized.

Muddling Along. If the trend over time for a marker is flat and no real effective action is being taken to improve the marker can be detected.

Muddling Down. Muddling Down is defined by a downward trend for a marker over time, with no evidence that action is being taken to improve performance.

This definition of the sub-paths highlights another difference between the Muddling and Fragmentation pathways. The distinction between the Fragmentation sub-paths is a function of the presence or absence of specific makers. The Muddling sub-paths are comprised of the same markers; the determination of which sub-path a marker suggests is based on the change in that marker over time, not its presence or absence.

Structured Case Study Analysis

Once we created the initial markers list, we tested and refined the list by undertaking a structured case study analysis of state Fragmentation and Muddling. For Fragmentation, we examined both cases that resulted in fragmentation (creation of two or more independent states) and those where states have moved down a Fragmentation pathway but have not at this point fragmented. These latter cases are particularly important as they help us identify the buffers to state stability that are effective in counteracting the pressure for separation. For Muddling, we chose cases at different levels of development and stability in order to encompass all three Muddling sub-paths, and to gain a clearer picture of the interactions between the political, economic, and social dimensions of the Muddling pathway.

This analysis, combined with our review of the theoretical literature, provides a means of determining the completeness of our pathway marker lists and helps address outstanding questions regarding the interactions between individual markers and their contributions to the overall pathway.

The central questions examined in this stage of our analysis are:

1. Can we distinguish between necessary, sufficient conditions?
2. What are the dependencies between markers?
3. To what extent can we order the markers for a particular path?
4. What factors can buffer development along a particular pathway?
5. What (if any) markers are unique to a specific sub-path?
6. Are some markers more important than others?

Answering these questions enables us to construct a methodology for more precisely determining the dominant pathway a state is moving down at a particular point in time.

Fragmentation Cases

We examined six cases for our fragmentation study.⁵ Four cases resulted in a break-up of the state: Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, East Pakistan, and East Timor. Two cases resulted in no official break-up of the state: Afghanistan and Congo. Throughout the process of fragmentation, all cases moved from one dominant sub-path to another (see Table 5 below). In all cases, once significant conflict erupted, the outcome was either fragmentation through conflict or no fragmentation. In only one case—the Soviet Union—was dissolution a dominant sub-path at any time.

As we expected from theory and prior research, in all six fragmentation cases, there were significant social cleavages among geographically-associated (geo-located) ethnic, social, or economic groups that created the antecedent conditions for fragmentation. These social cleavages were reinforced in all cases by a lack of strong national identity. In most cases, this weak national identity competed with strong identity ties to sub-national grouping: ethnic, tribal, or historical. For example, the Afghan civil war mapped onto many pre-existing divides in Afghanistan: city/country, ethnic group, modernity/tradition, and secular/Islamic. It is clear that ethnic groups were generally geographically clustered and generally aligned with different sides in the civil war. The Pashtun south supported the pro-Islamic mujahideen groups like Hezb-e Islami and the Taliban while Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and some Pashtuns banded together to form the Islamic, but more secular Northern Alliance.

⁵ For detailed analysis of each case study, please refer to Appendix A to this report.

Table 5: Sub-paths Present in Fragmentation Cases

CASE	Dissolution	Divorce	Conflict	FINAL OUTCOME
Afghanistan	Yes	Yes	Yes	No fragmentation
Congo	Yes	Yes	Yes	No formal fragmentation
East Pakistan	no	Yes	Yes	Fragmentation through conflict
East Timor	no	Yes	Yes	Fragmentation through conflict
Soviet Union	Yes	Yes	No ⁶	Fragmentation through dissolution
Yugoslavia	Yes	No	Yes	Fragmentation through conflict

Dissolution sub-path markers

In all cases of Fragmentation, weak overall **capacity of state institutions**, antecedent conditions of **social cleavages**, and **public discontent over how the state was run** contributed to movement along a Fragmentation pathway. Overall, we found dissolution to be the least frequent sub-path to Fragmentation, and, with the exception of the Soviet Union, it was never a dominant pathway. Among the cases that exhibited some characteristics of dissolution, the most consistent markers were **attempts by factions to consolidate power** in geographical regions (all but Yugoslavia); **control of territory by opposition groups** (all but Bangladesh); and **popular support for autonomy** (all but Afghanistan). The only marker that was consistently found to be inconsistent with our expectation was **lack of government opposition to autonomy**; in all cases, there was at least stated opposition to breakup of the state.

The markers that were most specific to dissolution—those dealing with **devolution of national government authority**—were only found in two cases: the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Specifically, in both cases, devolution of policy making, policy implementation, and revenue collection preceded state fragmentation. This is not unexpected, however, given that there was no evidence that other cases moved far enough along the dissolution sub-path for these markers to become present. Voluntary devolution of central government authority and control of resources was the principal reason for classifying the Soviet Union as a dominant dissolution pathway fragmentation. From 1985-1991, the communist party, under Mikhail Gorbachev, restructured the Soviet political system and devolved political and economic authority to the republics in an effort to preserve the Union (“Milestones of Perestroika,” 2006; Olcott, 1991; PBS, n.d.) (Der Spiegel Online, 2006; PBS, n.d.). Even after it became clear that nationalist pressures from the republics made the continuation of the Soviet Union—

⁶ There were some instances of government use of force against pro-independence groups during the break-up of the Soviet Union, which is a marker of the conflict Fragmentation sub-path. However, as such incidents were few and isolated, rather than representing a pattern of behavior or strategy, we did not code the Soviet Union as having moved down the conflict path.

Gorbachev's goal—an impossibility and opposition within the Communist Party began to emerge, the process remained dominantly peaceful and uncontested (Beissinger, 2009; Brown, 2004; Pravda, 2010).

Divorce sub-path markers

In all cases where the divorce sub-path was present for some period, **social cleavages** were present and there was **public discontent over how the state was run** combined with **conflict among civilian elites and the national leadership over governance**. In the Soviet era in Afghanistan (1973-1989), there was widespread discontent and revolt over the implementation of communist/modernizing policies (e.g., land reform, women's rights, etc.) (Rubin, 1989). These reforms were perceived as a government attempted to erode traditional society, which caused a strong backlash from the periphery (Roy, 1996; Ghufan, 2001). The anti-Communist mujahideen movement was born from this discontent with widespread support from the public. These mujahideen groups evolved to become the protagonists in the Afghan civil war, moving Afghanistan from a dominant divorce to dominant conflict Fragmentation pathway.

National government opposition to autonomy and **lack of popular opposition to autonomy** were also present in all cases; however, the strength of effect varied across cases, being weaker in Congo and Afghanistan than the other cases. With the exception of Yugoslavia, there were attempts by factions to consolidate power in specific geographical regions where their group had dominance. In all cases where fragmentation occurred, there was **public discussion of autonomy among leaders**.

None of the markers identified in our initial list were consistently shown to have effects contrary to our expectations; however, some markers did work differently across cases. In all cases, there was some form of **international intervention**, but the impact this had on the eventual outcome for the state varied considerably. International arbitration is a marker of the divorce sub-path, but the purpose behind the arbitration differs across cases. In Congo, arbitration was intended to halt the fragmentation process whereas in East Timor, its purpose was to facilitate independence through peaceful means.

Other markers were only found to be present in some of the cases. In Congo and East Timor (as was also the case in Sudan), the **discovery of valuable resources** moved the state further down the Fragmentation path. Similarly, **international threats to withhold financial or military assistance to the national government** appear to have moderated national government resistance to calls for autonomy.

Conflict sub-path markers

With the exception of the Soviet Union, every case we examined was on a conflict path for at least some part of the fragmentation process, and those that did eventually breakup did so on a dominant conflict pathway, even if the final settlement was negotiated (as with East Timor). In addition to the common antecedent conditions for fragmentation, **contestation of sovereignty** and **government opposition to autonomy** were present in all conflict cases. By the end of the Afghan civil war, even though the country did not formally fragment, control was split between the factions. Kandahar became the real seat of Taliban power, Mazar-i-Sharif became the capital of the pro-government, Northern Alliance, which was quasi-independent state in the north, and the rest of the country was governed by independent, local warlords.

In all cases with a conflict path, there was also **public conflict among elites**. Although social cleavages were a necessary antecedent condition, to the Afghan civil war, it was the eruption of a traditional-modern divide that separated Afghanistan into two forces (Ansery, 2012). The **movement of military assets** and **government use of force against pro-independence groups** were also markers common to all conflict cases. As it became clear that the Soviet-backed Afghan government would fail in 1991-1992, military leaders abandoned the state to join either pro-Soviet or mujahideen forces, taking their forces and arms with them (Ansery, 2012).

All conflict cases were also marked by **international involvement** of various types, with various intents and effects. International aid (economic / humanitarian) was provided by various international actors to both national governments and pro-independence groups. This pattern is clearly evident in Afghanistan where the Northern Alliance received support from Russia, Iran, and others while Hezb-e Islami and the Taliban received funding and support from Pakistan's ISI, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Additionally, in East Pakistan, Congo and Yugoslavia, other international actors threatened to withhold financial assistance to national governments in order to decrease the violence. The overall effect of international intervention, therefore, is conditioned by the goals of those providing assistance. In some cases, the aim was to facilitate fragmentation (support pro-independence groups or withhold help to government); in others, the intent was to increase the resilience of the state (support the government) and prevent fragmentation.

Muddling Cases

We examined five cases for our analysis of the Muddling path. Three of these were dominantly Muddling Up cases: Botswana, South Korea, and Brazil. Two were dominantly Muddling Along cases: Bangladesh and Turkey. Overall, we found less consistency between the Muddling cases than was present in the Fragmentation cases. This is largely because the Muddling path is much broader than the Fragmentation path and includes a broad range of social and economic markers as well as political markers. For this reason, we also coded the markers by tier. Tier 1 markers appeared and were significant in all cases, Tier 2 markers appeared in all cases, and Tier 3 markers were present in a minority of cases. Linearity is not necessarily intended here; rather, the tiers 1-3 represent only how common the associated marker was in the case analyses. So for example, 'state ability to guarantee sovereignty' appeared as an important marker of positive political development in every case studied. As discussed in the previous section, Muddling is divided into three sub-paths—Muddling Down, Muddling Along, and Muddling Up—that are distinguished not by individual markers, but by the value those markers take over time.

Political markers

Overall, the findings from our case study analysis (Table 6) were consistent with our expectations regarding the probable markers of the Muddling path (see Table 2 above). The most consistently important political markers (Tier 1) were national sovereignty and institutional strength. In cases where **national sovereignty** is strong and uncontested, it is easier for governments to create the base conditions for development and security. **Institutional strength**, or the capacity of a country's governing and financial institutions, determines how efficiently both government and the private sector can work.

Also consistent with our expectations were the Tier 2 markers. Government capacity was shown to be critical to Muddling Up outcomes across most cases, specifically well-established **rule of law** and **human rights** protection, clearly **delineated power**, competent and even **provision of services**. This reflects the importance of security, accountability, and stability for development. Basically, for people to invest in their country—either economically or psychologically—they need to have some degree of certainty that the rules of the game are going to remain constant, and that the government will be able to enforce the rules, at least minimally, and provide protection for people and property.

The capacity of a government to provide services and rule of law is partially dependent on ability to generate revenue. **Internal revenue generation** through taxation is a critical part of this process. The Federal Revenue Service of Brazil has gained global renown for its tough and creative tactics and is considered critical to enabling the government meet its ambitious budget targets and improve Brazil's economic prospects. Brazil has a special tax enforcement unit commonly referred to as “the Lion,” not only because the lion is the agency's symbol, but because of the fervor with which they collect taxes from individuals and corporations (Soto, 2012).

Government legitimacy and the provision of opportunities for civic engagement and a sense of political efficacy, combined with a strong sense of **national identity**, also helped states move along the Muddling Up path. High legitimacy indicates public trust in and support of the established governing institutions. This makes it easier for governments successfully enact policies that impose short-term costs, but create the types of structural adjustments required for economic and social development. While governing legitimacy can be increased through greater transparency and responsiveness, reform does have the potential to bring long-standing grievances into the light. In the former Soviet Union, reforms introduced by Gorbachev in 1985 allowed free expression of long-repressed nationalist sentiments, which developed into calls for autonomy from central government control, first in the Baltics and eventually throughout the Soviet Union. These nationalist sentiments formed a strong basis for the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Finally, low levels of **official corruption and patronage** were markers of Muddling Up. Most generally, corruption can be considered as the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit (Nye, 1967; UNDP, 2011). Patronage creates inefficiency within a political system, as resources are not targeted where they are most needed but rather where the most influential want them to go, and appointments are less likely to be filled on the basis of merit, increasing the likelihood of mismanagement and poor policy implementation (Wellman & Wortley, 1989). Patronage networks and corruption are both a cause and consequence of weak civilian institutions and, thus, a potential driver of both short-term and longer-term governing and economic instability, which in turn is a barrier to Muddling Up (Wellman & Wortley, 1989).

In political systems based on patronage, there is an expectation among the population that politicians in power will favor their own ethnic group (Chandra, 2007; Varshney, 2001). In multi-ethnic states, therefore, patronage can exacerbate social cleavages, particularly when ethnic groups are geographically separate. The relationship between Balochistan and the central government in Pakistan illustrates this well. Prominent among the grievances expressed by Baloch tribal leaders are the way in

which resources are distributed among the provinces (by political influence, rather than need), the lack of investment in public services and infrastructure in the province, the exploitation of its natural resources, and the “baleful presence in the region of the Punjabi-dominated army alongside this neglect of the needs of the local population” (Synnott, 2009, p. 124). Thus, patronage networks are a barrier to Muddling Up as they prevent social mobility, reinforce social cleavages, and replicate them within political institutions, ensuring their continued political relevance and influence.

Table 6: Political Markers of Muddling Pathways

TIER	Muddling Up	Muddling Down
TIER 1		
Sovereignty	Strong / uncontested	One or more groups contesting
Institutional strength	Effective	Weak, ineffective
TIER 2		
Rule of law	Well-established; equally applied	Weak and biased justice system
Internal revenue generation	Consistent sufficient, equitable	Uneven and insufficient
Delineation of powers	Civilian, military and judicial roles well-established and respected	Civilian, military and judicial roles contested
Government services	Competent and even provision of services	Poor and/or uneven
Governing legitimacy	Civic engagement opportunities; popular sense of political efficacy	Government system seen as illegitimate by large groups
Human and civil rights	Respected; including equal protection of minorities and women	Chronic abuse of civil and human rights
National identity	Strong	Limited or conflicted
TIER 3		
Official corruption and patronage	Little influence on politics	Heavy influence on politics

Economic markers

The initial list of economic markers we developed was also supported by our case study analyses, which also enabled us to determine which of these markers were most common. Our findings suggest that transportation infrastructure and labor are the most consistently present markers of Muddling. When **road systems** are insufficient to allow for the adequate flow of people and goods, economic activity is hindered. Poor transportation also negatively affects quality of life by making it harder and more time consuming for people to reach their jobs, and more detrimental in the longer term to access health and education services, decreasing the speed of improvement on longer term human developmental goals.

Unemployment rates are a marker of Muddling sub-paths in all cases, with lowering rates indicative of Muddling Up and increasing rates consistent with Muddling Down. Unemployment rates over time not

only provide an indication of the level of economic activity and growth at the state level, they also provide a rough measure of the proportion of people in a country who are able to independently meet their basic needs. Economic development in the longer term, however, requires the development of a **skilled labor force**, capable of undertaking jobs that diversify the economy and increase resilience by decreasing reliance on primary industries and agriculture and encouraging foreign investment.

In nearly all cases of Muddling we examined, **economic growth** and economic diversity were associated with Muddling Up and their absence, or decrease, with Muddling Down. Economic growth is both a direct marker of Muddling Up, as well as an indirect contributor. Economic growth increases revenue potential for governments, enabling them to invest in infrastructure to further stimulate growth and service provision to increase human development potential. **Economic diversity** makes states less vulnerable to the vagaries of international market condition, or natural phenomena such as floods or droughts, which can cripple single commodity or agriculturally dependent economies.

The other markers that fell into Tier 2 create the conditions for or contribute to economic growth and development. **Water and irrigation infrastructure** is not only critical in many countries for agriculture, but the adequate and reliable supply of potable water is a critical factor in the rapid expansion of urban areas seen in countries such as Brazil that have experienced rapid economic growth. Poor water infrastructure leaves urban populations vulnerable to disease, and puts surrounding farmers in competition with growing cities for water access. Providing adequate water to both rural and urban populations can move states along the Muddling Up path by creating the conditions for both agricultural and manufacturing production as well as improved quality of life for individuals.

Infrastructure development, as well as the provision of services (such as health care and education) that build human capital requires resources. In many less developed countries, governments are reliant on **international aid and loans** for revenue. While this can relieve short-term needs, loans in particular can become a long-term burden as debt repayments divert increasing proportions of government revenue away from service and other public good provisions. In the longer-term, therefore, such reliance can move a state along a Muddling Down path, by decreasing the money available for economic and human development needs. Furthermore, the precarious nature of economies dependent on aid and loans makes them less attractive to private investors, another marker of Muddling Down.

Economic Muddling Up is also associated with states becoming more attractive to foreign investment and less reliant on international support in the form of loans or aid. Increasing **foreign investment** is one way for states to grow and develop their economy more quickly, as they do not have to wait to generate capital domestically. However, in order to be attractive to foreign or domestic investors, states need to reduce risk and the cost of doing business. One of the ways to do this is through building a strong **financial system** with efficient and reliable institutions and regulations.

Unlike most Latin American countries, Brazil has very strong financial regulations, and both its public and private domestic banks, which have long dominated the sector are very secure (Cardim de Carvalho & Pires de Souza, 2011). This regulatory strength was demonstrated by Brazil's ability to weather the

subprime crisis in 2008-9 with the additional presence of market discipline (Banco Central do Brasil, 2011).

Corruption has economic as well as political manifestations. Although we do not find support for the role of corruption in all Muddling cases, where present, it does have a pervasive effect. Although in some cases the ability to bribe petty officials and bureaucrats can speed up procedures and processing of paperwork, in general corruption increases the costs of doing business in a country (Islam, 2004; Nye, 1967). While certain forms of petty corruption may be commonplace and accepted within a specific state, the same procedures can present significant barriers to operation for foreign firms with different rules and norms.

Table 7: Economic Markers of Muddling Pathways

TIER	Muddling Up	Muddling Down
TIER 1		
Transportation infrastructure: Roads	Developed and maintained	Insufficient and poorly developed
Unemployment rate	Low and stable	Chronically high
Labor force	Sufficient skilled and educated to support growth & development	Insufficient skilled and educated to support growth & development
TIER 2		
Water and irrigation infrastructure	Well-developed and maintained	Poorly developed and maintained
Economic growth	Positive and sustained; sufficient to absorb population growth	Negative or insufficient to absorb population growth
Economic diversity	Economy diversified	Poor economic management and/or single sector/ commodity-based economy and limited exports
Foreign investment	Ability to attract foreign investment and export markets	Limited foreign investment government services
Financial system	Strong financial system, institutions and effective regulation	Weak/ineffective financial system, institutions and regulation
Reliance on international aid / loans	No reliance on aid, limited reliance on international loans	Major reliance on international aid/loans
TIER 3		
Corruption	Low	Significant

Social markers

Across all cases, **social mobility** was a consistent marker of Muddling Up. This is not surprising when the wider implications of social structures on the ability of people to adapt to changing circumstances are considered. Highly structured and entrenched social divisions limit the ability of those lower down the

social hierarchy to access opportunities such as education or training that might enable them to improve their **quality of life**. At both the societal and the individual level, these set the conditions for the presence of multiple markers of Muddling Down, most directly by limiting the potential for **integration** between groups, which can also contribute to **support for extremism** by reinforcing in-group out-group distinctions.

As discussed above, the ability to meet basic needs is influenced by access to services. **Equality of service provision**, therefore, can decrease the salience of social cleavages—a barrier to Muddling Up—by reducing groups' perception that they are relatively disadvantaged. Services can also contribute to social mobility by providing access to education for groups historically marginalized or without the economic means to pay for schooling.

TIER	Muddling Up	Muddling Down
TIER 1		
Social mobility	Social mobility possible	Highly structured and entrenched social divisions persist
TIER 2		
Basic needs	Basic needs of population met	Large groups unable to meet basic needs
Integration	Toleration/integration among social/ethnic groups	High degrees of intolerance and division between social/ethnic groups
Support for extremism	Deep seated social norms barring out-group focused extremism and violence	Presence of significant social or ethnic cleavages and/or major societal groups perceiving themselves as marginalized or discriminated against
Equality of service provision	Societal groups perceive they have equal access to public goods and services	Government system seen as illegitimate by large groups
TIER 3		
Physical security	Physically safe and relatively secure environment; low crime rates; low violence	Violent political action, terrorism, warfare; high crime rates

Buffers and Barriers to Fragmentation and Muddling

In order to accurately map a Fragmentation or Muddling pathway, it is essential to account for what factors prevent a country from moving further down a pathway, not just what pushes it along that path. With the assumption that all countries that have social cleavages and geographically clustered groups have the potential to fragment, including most cases where the country appears to be Muddling, we expanded our analysis across both sets of cases to determine whether there were any consistent factors halting progress along a downward trajectory (buffers) or preventing them from progressing along the Muddling Up path (barriers). The identified set of buffers and barriers are presented in Table 6: Pathway Buffers and Barriers below.

Table 8: Pathway Buffers and Barriers

Buffers and Barriers	Fragmentation	Muddling Down	Muddling Up
Related to National identity			
Presence of strong, charismatic, nationalist leader	Buffer		
Presence of divisive, charismatic, sectarian leader(s)			Barrier (pol/soc)
Presence of perceived external threat spurring sense of national identity	Buffer	Buffer (pol/soc)	
Related to Governance			
National government is perceived to be legitimate	Buffer	Buffer (pol/eco)	
All groups within a population feel treated equitably	Buffer	Buffer (pol/eco/soc)	
Institutionalized discrimination present			Barrier (soc)
Institutionalized discrimination addressed		Buffer (soc)	
Competent economic management	Buffer	Buffer (pol/eco/soc)	
Incompetent or ineffective economic management			Barrier (eco)
National government is willing to address grievances while able to maintain central decision authority	Buffer	Buffer (pol)	
National government is unwilling to address grievances equitably			Barrier (pol)
Government perceived as ineffective and/or unrepresentative			Barrier (pol/eco)
Alternative sources of public services available		Buffer (eco)	
Related to social structures			
Decreasing political salience of social cleavages	Buffer		
Perceived inequality between groups			Barrier (soc)
Well-established patronage networks			Barrier (pol/soc)
Long-standing racial/ethnic/social disputes			Barrier (pol/soc)
Related to economic structures			
Grey economy		Buffer (eco)	
Self-sufficient economic success	Buffer	Buffer (pol/eco/soc)	

National identity

All the states we examined, with the exception of South Korea, are comprised of multiple ethnic, religious, tribal, or historically identified groups. This creates multiple group identities, which may be in conflict with one another, and, as discussed above, when group identity ties trump national identity, the likelihood of fragmentation increases. There are, however, factors that can enhance an individual's sense of identification and connection to the state relative to their group. In Congo, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan, the **presence of a strong nationalist leader**, uniting the population, provided a buffer to the underlying conditions that threatened to push the country toward fragmentation. Strong nationalist leaders were also present at crucial periods in Turkey, Botswana, and Brazil, helping to strengthen national identification, which kept the countries from moving along a Fragmentation or Muddling Down path. Similarly, the **presence of divisive charismatic sectarian leader(s)** as in the case of Bangladesh, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan, can be a barrier to Muddling Up as their influence tends to keep group identities and social cleavages salient. National identity can also be strengthened relative to group (tribal, ethnic, etc.) by **the presence of a perceived external threat** to the state. This has clearly been a strong buffer to fragmentation in Afghanistan at various times, as well as contributing to the Cold War era stability of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In the Muddling cases, we see the threat from North Korea acting as a unifying force in South Korea, and a more diffuse sense of external threat among the Turkish population working to bolster national identity and counter fragmentary tendencies.

Governance

While multi-ethnic/racial/religious states are ubiquitous, not all social differences result in social cleavages, and not all social cleavages are equally destabilizing. The salience of social differences and their potential to drive a state further down a Fragmentation pathway can be buffered by several factors. If the **national governing body is perceived to be legitimate**, progression along a downward fragmentation trajectory may be buffered, as was in the case of Northern Ireland and South Korea. Legitimacy can be based on both political process as well as political outcomes, as indicated by perceptions of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation—the perception that you are worse off than others—can easily deepen social cleavages and provide a strong motivation for support for autonomy. When **all groups within a population feel treated equitably**, as indicated by a lack of institutionalized discrimination or equitable sharing of resources by the national governing body, perceptions of relative deprivation are harder to generate, buffering the potential impact of social cleavages and strong sub-national identities. In the case of Botswana, the national governing body extended the party coalition to the peasantry, institutionalizing cooperation, and demonstrating accountability and transparency in governance, which reinforced institutional strength, encouraged civic engagement, and bridged social cleavages. By giving “a broad cross-section of the society...effective property rights” (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001, p. 5) and the opportunity to participate in state formation, the national governing body not only allayed anxieties of expropriation or exploitation by the government, but also constrained political elites.

Similarly, when the national government proves itself to be a **competent economic manager**, as seen in Brazil, Botswana, and South Korea, capable of establishing the conditions for **self-sufficient economic success**, the potential for economic need to fuel calls for autonomy is decreased and Muddling Down is

buffered. Consistent with this, **incompetent or ineffective economic management** creates a barrier to Muddling Up by limiting the potential for service provision and economic development more broadly, as seen in the case of Turkey. Consistent with this, poor and declining government service provision is a marker for both Fragmentation and Muddling Down. However, a state's movement along the Muddling Down path for this marker can be buffered if there are **alternative sources of public services available**, although among the cases examined, we see this actually occurring only in Afghanistan.

Finally, consistent with the literature on governing legitimacy, we found that when the **national government is willing to address grievances while able to maintain central decision authority**, the impetus for autonomy, leading to fragmentation, is reduced and Muddling Down is buffered. The willingness to address grievances provides groups with a sense of political voice and representation within the existing state structure, which decreases the likelihood that group grievances will be a catalyst for fragmentation or remain a source of instability, as demonstrated in Afghanistan and for a short period of time in Yugoslavia. If the national government retains central decision authority during this process, its ability to effectively govern as well as provide services and security is protected, which also contributes to its overall legitimacy. Thus, failure to address grievances or to maintain central decision authority is also a barrier to progress, as seen in the case of Yugoslavia.

Social structures

As discussed, the presence of social cleavages is a necessary antecedent condition for all Fragmentation sub-paths, as well as being a marker of Muddling Down. Furthermore, we know from the literature that when social cleavages are combined with a history of political favoritism, disparities in access to resources or oppression of one group over another the potential for conflict and fragmentation is increased. It is logical, therefore, that we found **decreasing salience of social cleavages** to be a buffer to a downward trajectory as was the case in Brazil. Also consistent with prior research, we found that **perceived inequality between groups** perpetuated sources of grievance and intolerance between groups that decreases social mobility and increases the risk of sectarian conflict. By doing so these types of **long standing racial/ethnic/social disputes** create a barrier to Muddling Up. This is evident by the long-standing issues with the Kurdish population residing within the political borders of Turkey.

Economic structures

Scarcity and lack of economic opportunity hinder an individual's ability meet their basic needs, increasing reliance on government or other institutions to provide services and relief, as well as increasing the likelihood that inequalities between groups will become salient, all markers of Muddling Down. Overall, we also find that economic scarcity and insecurity provides a more favorable environment for the rise of separatist and nationalist groups seeking to gain independence from the state. Basically, when people feel they have nothing to lose, they are more likely to take risks, whereas when they feel that things are improving, they are both more content and more conservative (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1992).

For many people, economic performance is linked to government performance. Therefore, their support for and approval of a government will be tied to how well economic policies and programs perform. **Self-sufficient economic success**, that is economic success that is not reliant on foreign aid or loans, is,

therefore, a buffer to both Fragmentation and Muddling Down, as demonstrated in Brazil, Botswana, and South Korea. In the case of the Soviet Union, the general failure of Gorbachev's perestroika reforms to boost economic performance provided nationalist movements with increasingly salient reason to push for autonomy from the center, and eventually provoke fragmentation by dissolution.

An active **grey economy**, as demonstrated by the growing informal economy in Brazil, can buffer these effects by providing a market for unskilled labor, serving a population segment that might otherwise be unemployed (International Labour Office Governing Body, 2002). An active grey economy enables people to meet their basic needs without relying on poor or non-existent social services, which may have the added benefit of making some populations less vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups. Finally, the **presence of well-established patronage networks** is shown to be another barrier to Muddling Up. Entrenched political and economic patronage networks hinder economic development as well as social mobility and governing capacity (Khan, 2005; Moore, 1993). In addition, they perpetuate traditional class and ethnic divisions, ensuring their continued political and economic salience (Deshingkar & Grimm, 2004; Skeldon, 2006).

Generalized Fragmentation and Muddling Pathways

By comparing the results of our individual case study analyses in terms of the markers and buffers to fragmentation as well as the path each state took toward fragmentation, we developed a generalized Fragmentation pathway (Figure 1), as well as generalized political (Figure 2), economic (Figure 3), and social (Figure 4) Muddling pathway. Despite the linearity of the graphics, we are not suggesting that the boxes on the left, for example, must occur before those on the right—these are simply different categories of what we call “pathway markers” and buffers—high level observables—that we found to be consistent with eventual state fragmentation.




Figure 1: Generalized Fragmentation Pathway




Figure 2: Pakistan Fragmentation Pathway (as of October 2013)




Figure 3: Generalized Muddling Pathway: Political Dimension




Figure 4: Pakistan Muddling Pathway: Political Dimension (as of October 2013)




Figure 5: Generalized Muddling Pathway: Economic Dimension




Figure 6: Pakistan Muddling Pathway: Economic Dimension (as of October 2013)




Figure 7: Generalized Muddling Pathway: Social Dimension




Figure 8: Pakistan Muddling Pathway: Social Dimension (as of October 2013)

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Appendix A: Structured Case Study Analyses

NSI's contribution to the futures portion of the South Asia SMA Follow-on effort explores the potential pathways associated with two hypothetical Pakistani futures – national fragmentation and muddling. We started with theoretical propositions about the nature of, and points along the pathways, then tested these against historical cases and then refined our characterizations of the paths before applying them to the examination of Pakistan from today forward, presented in the above report. The general paths derived from theoretical research provide a framework that easily could be applied to assess conditions in any state.

As discussed in the body of this report, the Fragmentation and Muddling pathways were first defined and delineated, and a set of primary economic, social, and political markers of each was identified, drawing on empirical analysis and theoretical work. To further test the validity and generalizability of our markers we then undertook a series of structured case studies. These case studies also enabled us to identify and distinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions for each pathway, and to identify the most likely temporal orderings of markers along each path. This research provided us with a descriptive analysis of each of the pathways: their necessary antecedent conditions; catalyzing events that propelled movement down a pathway; markers associated with that pathway; and any buffers or barriers that acted as roadblocks to further progression toward a fragmentation or muddling outcome.

This appendix provides detailed case summaries and analysis for all cases examined. We examined six cases for our fragmentation study. Four cases resulted in a break-up of the state: Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, East Pakistan, and East Timor. Two cases resulted in no official break-up of the state: Afghanistan and Congo. These latter cases are particularly important as they help us identify the buffers to state stability that are effective in counteracting the pressure for separation. For Muddling, we chose cases at different levels of development and stability in order to encompass all three Muddling sub-paths, and to gain a clearer picture of the interactions between the political, economic, and social dimensions of the Muddling pathway. We examined five cases for our analysis of the Muddling path. Three of these were dominantly Muddling Up cases: Botswana, South Korea, and Brazil. Two were dominantly Muddling Along cases: Bangladesh and Turkey.

This analysis, combined with our review of the theoretical literature, provides a means of determining the completeness of our pathway marker lists and helps address outstanding questions regarding the interactions between individual markers and their contributions to the overall pathway.

The central questions examined in this stage of our analysis are:

1. Can we distinguish between necessary, sufficient conditions?
2. What are the dependencies between markers?
3. To what extent can we order the markers for a particular path?
4. What factors can buffer development along a particular pathway?
5. What (if any) markers are unique to a specific sub-path?
6. Are some markers more important than others?

Answering these questions enables us to construct a methodology for more precisely determining the dominant pathway a state is moving down at a particular point in time.

Afghanistan

Analysis

In many ways, Afghanistan is a deeply fragmented state in terms of ethnic and tribal divides, modern vs. traditional society, urban vs. rural society, central government vs. regional autonomy, etc. Yet, it has shown remarkable resilience as a state given near constant external interventions (British Empire, USSR, U.S.). How has Afghanistan remained resilient under these centrifugal forces? This case study will evaluate the factors pulling Afghanistan apart as well as those keeping it together since its founding in 1747 with a focus on the Afghan civil war from 1992-1996, which nearly split the country apart.

A historical case study approach is employed using the SMA South Asia fragmentation markers to guide data collection and analysis. The field of inquiry is not limited to one avenue of fragmentation. Instead, any support or lack of support for all fragmentation markers is examined. The evidence shows that Afghanistan experienced markers consistent with a Conflict (CON)/Fragmentation (FRAG) pathway during the Afghan civil war. While this case study focuses on the fragmentation pathway, elements of all four future pathways (Happily Ever After, Muddle Through, Fragmentation, and Extremist Transformation] have been included where appropriate. Therefore, the section below provides findings couched in the context of Afghanistan's long history.

Why focus on the Afghan civil war?

Although Afghanistan has been at war since 1979, we focus on the 1992-1996 Afghan civil war because it is the closest Afghanistan came to fragmenting. The period preceding the civil war (Soviet war in Afghanistan, 1979-1989) and the period after the civil war (Taliban takes control of the country, 1996-2001) are best explained by the Extremist Transformation pathway.

Afghanistan entered a civil war period (1992-1996) on the heels of the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-1989). In December 1979, the Soviet Army entered Afghanistan with the intent of subordinating the population that was uniformly opposed to communist ideology imposed by Afghanistan's Soviet-backed government. The invasion had the opposite effect than intended; it incited Afghans' dormant sense of nationalism, setting tinder to the already strong opposition—collectively known as the mujahideen (Olivier Roy, 1990). The embrace of communist ideology by a technocratic elite and the imposition of communist policies on the people of Afghanistan is consistent with a predominantly Extremist Transformation pathway.

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, Soviet-backed president Mohammed Najibullah faced a rapid decline in power. By the time he was forced out of office in 1992, President Najibullah had lost the monopoly on the use of force, lost control over his military commanders, and weakened government institutions to the point where they could no longer function (Ansery, 2012). During this same time period, former mujahideen militant groups were rapidly increasing their power and reach with support from the population outside of Kabul. When Najibullah was forced from office in 1992, an UN-supported

coalition government was quickly established. However, Kabul immediately came under attack by mujahideen groups unhappy with the power-sharing agreement. Only one month after the coalition government formed, the Afghan civil war began, lasting until the Taliban took control of the government in 1996. The Afghan civil war broke the country into what became three main warring groups: the pro-government groups in the north, fundamental Islamic militants in the south, and independent warlords in ungoverned spaces (Ghufran, 2001). The major players all vied for control of the entire country, but no group was able to defeat the others, resulting in a stalemate (Ansery, 2012). This period is predominated by the fragmentation pathway.

The Taliban eventually gained precedence over the other fundamental Islamic militants, took control of Kabul in September 1996, and declared itself the leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Oliver Roy, 1996). The Taliban remained in power of two-thirds of the country until a U.S.-led Coalition attack in October 2001 removed the Taliban from power. This period is consistent with an Extremist Transformation pathway. Once removed from power, the Taliban initiated a powerful insurgency to regain control of government that continues today. While this paper does not review the period from 2001-today, Afghanistan seem to be on an inflection point between the Muddling Through and Extremist Transformation pathways.

Is Afghanistan truly a case of fragmentation?

Afghanistan is not a clear-cut case of fragmentation. Some could argue that it is better described as a case of extremist transformation or even a failed state (which is not a pathway studied in this model). This illustrates the point that states can be on different pathways simultaneously or at least be at inflection points where more than one pathway or outcome is viable. We elected to study Afghanistan from a fragmentation point of view for many reasons, the primary one being that Afghanistan is still a nation-state despite sharing many characteristics of fragmented states. Afghanistan offers an interesting opportunity to illuminate markers of state resilience in the face of fragmentation forces. In the analysis below, we will discuss the markers consistent with a fragmentation pathway as well as the forces that gave Afghanistan the resilience to withstand these pressures.

What forces contributed to the fragmentation of Afghanistan?

Rapidly imposed modernization as a destabilizing force

Modernization, which is typically associated with growth and development (i.e., the Happily Ever After pathway), has been the cause of repeated discontent with the central government. In Afghanistan, modernization efforts have produced a backlash from the deeply conservative, tribal periphery (Ansery, 2012). Even seemingly laudable developments (such as the establishment of the first state-run secondary school, see next section) have led to long-term instability as they frequently challenged traditional norms including the role of women and patriarchy. The population's resistance to reforms and the government's unwillingness to listen to the rural population eroded civic engagement and national government legitimacy, two important markers of stability. While various leaders have sought to modernize Afghanistan, none of the reforms provoked such political unrest as those espoused by leftist leaders in the period preceding the Afghan civil war (1973-1992).

While the east (Russia/USSR) and west (British Empire/UK/U.S.) have always seen Afghanistan as a buffer state in the “Great Game”⁷ and have intervened in Afghan affairs at various times, the interventions primarily affected Afghanistan’s foreign policy and had only limited impact on the daily lives of most Afghans (Weinbaum, 1991). That changed with Daoud Shah and the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan’s (PDPA) bloodless, pro-Soviet military coup in 1973, which sought to introduce reforms that challenged the traditions and practices of the average Afghan (Rubin, 1989, p. 152; Englehart, 2007; Gossman, 2001). While friendly with the Soviet government, Daoud Shah’s reforms were largely focused on modernizing Afghanistan and were not particularly communist in nature. That changed with the Saur revolution and coup in 1978, which instituted communist reforms so alien to the population that even the Soviet Union advised the PDPA to ease back its efforts to staunch the growing outrage among the population (Collins, 2011, p. 25). Soviet influence and communist ideology was a foreign and unwelcome addition to Afghan society despite the existence of a pro-Soviet cohort in Kabul. This highlights the dangerous confluence of lack of civic engagement/erosion of national government legitimacy and extremist ideology that pushed Afghanistan towards fragmentation.

Daoud’s reforms “seemed almost designed to bring about an insurrection. Its main features were land reform, usury reform, and equal rights for women. All of these were unpopular. Land reform was particularly destabilizing. It was brutally applied and was most unpopular among peasants, who saw it as immoral and inconsistent with Islam” (Collins, 2011, p. 25). These reforms set tinder to the growing dislike for PDPA’s communist government (Shahrani, 2002). “The PDPA wiped out social mechanisms tradition had created to meet crucial needs of a traditional society without providing new institutions to meet those needs. When things started to go wrong, the feudal lords had no trouble convincing the penniless poor that the regime was attacking their interests, their lives” (Ansery, 2012, p. 180). The resentment generated by these modernization efforts made it easy for fundamental Islamic groups to take root in Afghanistan, a major driver of the Afghan civil war.

Externally imposed ideology masks the traditional-modern divide

The root cause of the civil war was the eruption of a traditional-modern divide that separated Afghanistan into two forces. “It was a war between the secular modernist impulse and the all-governing religion of Islam” (Ansery, 2012, p. 265). The Soviet war forced six million of Afghanistan’s estimated 20 million population into refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran where refugees had little option but to send their sons to madrassas where they were indoctrinated in a strict, fundamentalist version of Islam (Akhtar, 2008). These refugee boys had few options but to join the Taliban. With alleged support from the Pakistani government, the Taliban expanded its influence over southern Afghanistan and eventually successfully challenged Hezb-e Islami (the until-then primary Islamic fundamentalist group vying for power in Afghanistan) and the weak Afghan government for control of Kabul (Khalilzad, 1996). By 1996, the Taliban controlled two-thirds of the country, including Kabul, and claimed it represented the legitimate government of Afghanistan (Roy, 1996). The indoctrination of Afghan youth with extremist ideology was a major factor fueling the Afghan civil war.

⁷ A term coined by British officer, Arthur Conolly (1807–1842), that refers to the strategic competition between the British Empire and Russia for control of Central Asia.

During the Taliban regime, elements of the population were also opposed to (but less able to repel) the strict interpretation of Islam that militant leaders imported from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia that also challenged tribal practices and values. “To the people of Kabul, this did not feel like a regime change but an occupation. These new conquerors looked as foreign to them as had the blue-eyed Russians” (Ansery, 2012, p. 237). In some ways, the Islamic militant groups (Taliban and Hezb-e Islami) were external actors and representative of an elite-led revolution (EXT) (Ansery, 2012). Both groups emerged from the mujahideen movement, which fought against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Leaders from these groups emerged from safe havens in Pakistan, promoted rigid ideology inconsistent with Afghan religious tradition, and received funding primarily from external sources including Pakistan’s ISI and Saudi Arabia. Hezb-e Islami and the Taliban lacked true grassroots support, although their Pashtun ethnicity and emphasis on traditional values initially resonated with much of rural, southern Afghanistan.

So why has Afghanistan not fragmented?

Afghanistan has deep ethnic divides, weak government institutions, a history of near constant foreign interventions, and a clear antipathy towards enforced modernization efforts. So why has Afghanistan not fragmented? Analysis indicates that Afghans feel they have more to gain by banding together in the face of external intervention than by breaking into small, autonomous nations. This section explores these ideas in more detail.

Weak institutional strength balances modern and traditional forces

Center-periphery balance is critical in Afghanistan as defined by a relatively weak central government and strong regional power. Since the nation’s beginning, rulers knew that to successfully govern the multi-ethnic nation known as Afghanistan, they would have to create an intentionally weak central government that gave a great deal of autonomy to ethnic groups and tribes (Ansery, 2012; Giustozzi & Orsini, 2009). This loose federation gave the country the resilience it needed to let the different ethnic groups live according to their own practices and beliefs while also binding them together in the face of foreign intervention. However, this balance was upset by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901) who attempted to eliminate traditional tribal governance structures in favor of a centralized bureaucracy. According to Ansery (2012), what Amir Abdur Rahman Khan succeeding in doing was creating parallel systems that continued to diverge over time. Afghan leaders were never able to eradicate tribal structures, behaviors, and forms of governance; instead, the two systems co-existed in a precarious balance. Today, tribal society is still deeply entrenched in the periphery while a modern, relatively liberal society continues to grow in urban areas. This delicate balance between the center and the periphery has become the defining characteristic of Afghan governance. It is both a source of tension and resilience for Afghanistan as described below.

Time and again, the population has proven through violent protest that challenges to the center periphery balance are not well tolerated (Oliver Roy, 1996); Ghufuran, 2001). As mentioned above, in 1880, Abdur Rahman Khan (the “Iron Amir”) instituted a two tier system where individuals reported not only to the head of their tribe, but also to the district/provincial representative, giving individuals a direct connection to the government outside of tribal ties for the first time (Ansery, 2012, p. 89). Tribes

protested these changes but were harshly repressed. In 1926, Abdur Rahman's grandson, Amanullah Khan, also sought to reform and strengthen the central government at the expense of tribal representation, power, and autonomy (Ansery, 2012, pp. 210–212). Protest against these reforms forced Amanullah out of office in 1928. The next challenge to the center-periphery balance came in 1973 with the pro-Soviet coup led by Mohammed Daoud Khan and a second, more aggressively communist coup in 1978. However, both left-leaning governments overstepped the traditional center-periphery arrangement and the populace revolted against the new leadership, setting off the Soviet war in Afghanistan from 1979-1989 (Rubin, 1989, p. 152). Unlike the period of 1992-1996, this period cannot be defined as civil war because the Afghan government remained in power and because it brought in foreign, Soviet forces to repress the people.

After the Soviets withdrew in 1989, the Najibullah government eroded the power of the state so significantly that by the time he was overthrown in 1992, he had lost the monopoly on the use of force, lost control over his military commanders, and degraded government institutions to the point where they could no longer function (Englehart, 2007; Gossman, 2001a). By 1992, Najibullah only controlled 10 percent of the population—the city of Kabul. The memory of the government's modernization efforts and its failure to listen to the needs of rural, traditional Afghans allowed Islamic fundamentalist militants to rapidly increase their power and reach. The Afghan civil war began in May 1992 after the newly established coalition government excluded one of the largest militant groups, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, from power.

Afghanistan's history shows that stability has often been achieved in Afghanistan with a delicate center-periphery balance where the tribes support the central government as long as they are consulted and allowed a great deal of autonomy in their own geographic areas (Rubin, 1989, pp. 150-151). After each period of centrally-imposed reforms, the population protested, resulting in the reaffirmation of the traditional center-periphery balance so essential to Afghan resilience. Therefore, unlike many other countries efforts to increase institutional strength in Afghanistan often have a destabilizing effect.

National identity overcomes ethnic divides

Demographics are a major factor fueling instability in Afghanistan, but it is not the driving or sole factor affecting Afghanistan's stability. Ahmad Shah Durrani (b. 1722) is considered the father of Afghanistan. He united the Pashtun tribes for the first time in 1747 and governed other ethnic groups including the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turcomans, and Farsibans. Ahmad Shah used the army to integrate these disparate people and create a shared sense of identity, referred to as Afghaniyat, which is how Afghanistan obtained its name (Ansery, 2012).

Despite the various ethnic groups in Afghanistan, all with strong tribal traditions, Afghanistan had never fragmented along strictly ethnic or tribal lines prior to the Afghan civil war (Jones, 2008, pp. 10–12). Ansery (2012, p. 205) describes this situation aptly.

Non-Afghans sometimes say, 'Oh, these people have been fighting one another for a thousand years.' Not true. Before the Soviet invasion, the country's various ethnic, linguistic, and religious subgroups were not at war much except during the reign of the Iron Amir. They had learned to

accommodate one another and had evolved complex symbiotic interdependencies. Feuds, yes. Intertribal wars, yes, sometimes; but those involved warriors fighting warriors, not armies eviscerating one another's homes, farms, flocks, and families. The Soviet invasion and the Afghan response shattered age-old accommodations among groups and laid the groundwork for savage ethnic wars to come.

While Afghans do not have a strong national identity in the traditional sense (many would call themselves Pashtun or Tajiks first, for example), belonging to a state that protects them from external threats is important to Afghans (Ansery, 2012). There is currently little public support for the fragmentation of Afghanistan along ethnic lines. Polling from 2004 and 2009 suggests that the various ethnic groups in Afghanistan still believed a national identity was possible and preferable (Jones, 2008, p. 12; ABC News, 2009). Even the groups vying for power want to control the whole state, not just a part of it.

Regular foreign invasions unite the population

Afghanistan's history of resisting foreign invaders unites the Afghan people towards a common purpose, temporarily overcoming forces pulling it apart (Hatch DuPree, 2002). In this pathway analysis, we make a clear distinction between internal conflict and conflict with external actors. This distinction is particularly important in Afghanistan, which has engaged in multiple conflicts with foreign states (approximately five wars in 250 years) over control of the country. These kinds of war are not direct markers of internal fragmentation, and can, in fact, create a rallying effect that brings competing groups together (Ansery, 2012, p. 206). Such is the case in Afghanistan where the tribes often unite in the face of a threat to the nation's sovereignty. Therefore, while international interventions are generally considered destabilizing, they tend to reinforce Afghan's sense of national identity.

Conclusion

Afghanistan is a land of with multiple potential fracture lines (central vs. periphery, modern vs. tribal, secularism vs. fundamentalism and ethnic divides), beset by years of conflict and foreign invasions. Yet, it remains a single nation-state seemingly resistant to the forces that pull it apart. What holds Afghanistan together is a lingering sense of shared identity (*afghaniyat*) in the face of foreign or external intervention. However, it is not clear whether Afghan nationalism is strong enough in the long term to overcome the forces pulling it apart to create a stable, resilient government.

Bangladesh

Analysis

The evidence shows that Pakistan experienced markers consistent with a variety of fragmentation pathways beginning with some indication of movement towards a divorce pathway beginning in 1966. By 1970 Pakistan appeared to be on a dominant pathway of divorce, however events shifted Pakistan onto a conflict pathway by early 1971. Conflict remained the dominant pathway up to formal fragmentation on December 16, 1971, when the Pakistan Army surrendered to Indian and Bangladeshi forces (Husain, 2010).

When it was partitioned from British India in 1947, Pakistan consisted of two regions that were physically separated by 1,000 miles of Indian Territory and otherwise separated by pronounced linguistic, cultural, and ethnic differences: Bengali-speaking, Muslim-majority province of Bengal in the East and the mostly Urdu-speaking, Muslim-majority provinces of Punjab and Sindh in the West—The two halves were united for several decades, but tensions between them grew due to mounting economic and political inequities and progressively polarizing social differences (Akam, 2002; Choudhury, 1972; Hossain & Khan, 2006; Jabeen, Chandio, & Qasim, 2010; Jones, 2009; Nanda, 1972; Pavri, 2008). The distribution of wealth, political influence, military leadership, and the state's adoption and formalization of cultural norms and practices, all increasingly favored the West. This fostered the perception that the central government, located in West Pakistan, was “restricting the elevation of Bengali Muslims” in a bid to deny “opportunities for upward social mobility” (Jabeen et al., 2010, p. 115). Under these circumstances, the necessary antecedent conditions for fragmentation were present and the probability of fragmentation increased over time.

Rising discontent among the East Pakistani population with its greater economic deprivation vis-à-vis the West signaled the first markers of fragmentation. Despite the majority (55%) of the Pakistani population residing in East Pakistan, the region received a much smaller share of government revenue, which when coupled with higher population density, engendered “greater vulnerability to natural disasters, lower levels of productivity, income and consumption, the almost total absence of an industrial base and extreme backwardness in economic infrastructure” (Jabeen et al., 2010, p. 112). The perception in East Pakistan that economic policies and actions of the central government intentionally created and fostered such a severe disparity served to drive the wedge between the two regions deeper (Akam, 2002).

Along with the economic deprivation felt by East Pakistanis, pronounced linguistic, cultural, and ethnic cleavages increased the likelihood of fragmentation rather than buffering it (Choudhury, 1972). Instead of developing a common national identity for the two territories, West Pakistan sought to undermine East Pakistan's Bengali culture. One way of doing this was by imposing Urdu as the national language (Akam, 2002).⁸ When the central government began to unofficially adopt Urdu for official documents,

⁸ During the Language Movement of 1948 and 1952, Bengalis fought to have the mother tongue of the majority population (Bengali) be one of the official languages of the state, rather than Urdu, which was spoken by an elite minority in East Pakistan. Many scholars cite this movement as the first sign of the fight for Bengali independence from Pakistan (Ahmed, 2009; Hossain & Khan, 2006; Kumar, 1975; Nanda, 1972).

including money orders, currency, and letterhead, there was significant opposition from the East Pakistani masses (Jabeen et al., 2010; Zaheer, 1994). Rather than assisting in the formation of a national identity and uniting the country, the language controversy, coupled with the distinct cultural and ethnic differences, served to create an even larger divide between East and West Pakistan and, when tied with other inequities, was a significant marker of fragmentation.

The economic and social cleavages between the two regions continued to deepen over time, however the political divisions ultimately provided the impetus for fragmentation via divorce and conflict. In 1966, the Awami League, a Bengali nationalist party,⁹ proposed the Six-Point Programme¹⁰ calling for increased autonomy for East Pakistan. This public statement signaled increasing division among Pakistani elites and demonstrated stark disagreement over the direction of the state, suggesting that at this time Pakistan was headed down a dominant pathway of divorce to fragmentation (Hossain & Khan, 2006; Husain, 2010).

The Six-Point Programme, besides showing the divisions between elites, also found fertile ground with East Pakistanis' long-standing feelings of political, social, and economic deprivation and divergence (vis-à-vis West Pakistan). These feelings were intensified by the perceived failure of the central government to respond sufficiently to the damage caused by the devastating Bhola cyclone that hit East Pakistan in November 1970. Almost immediately following the cyclone, during the general election of December 1970, the population had a chance to express its grievances with West Pakistan. Running on a platform centered on the Six-Point Programme, the Awami League received overwhelming support from the East Pakistani population and gained an elected majority in the National Assembly (winning 160 out of the 300 seats available). Unaware of the significance of East Pakistani interest in the Six-Point Programme, President Yahya Khan was surprised by the election results, showing yet another disconnect between Pakistani elites (Husain, 2010; Khan, 1976; Mahajani, 1974; Nohlen, Grotz, & Hartmann, 2002; The Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists Geneva, 1972). This failure by elites in West Pakistan to weight East Pakistani interests equally, allowed the perceived inequities to grow and resulted in "a nearly complete polarization of political forces in Pakistan" (Department of State, The Office of Electronic Information, 1971, para. 2). This indicated even more clearly that the state was moving down a fragmentation pathway, with markers of both divorce and conflict, however due to the lack of two significant conflict markers, use of force and movement of military assets, divorce appears to be the dominant pathway.

⁹ The Awami League was founded in Dhaka in 1949 by Bengali nationalists as the Bengali alternative to the Muslim League (the dominant party in Pakistan). The Awami League was opposed to centralized government and grew under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

¹⁰ Awami League Six-Point Programme included the following items: (1) Lahore resolution of March 23, 1940...according to which the Moslem majority areas of the northwestern and eastern zones of India were to be grouped so as to constitute independent states with autonomous and sovereign constituent units; (2) Federal government shall deal only with defense and foreign affairs; (3) Two separate and freely convertible currencies shall be introduced into East and West Pakistan, and if not feasible, effective Constitutional provisions shall be introduced, including the establishment of a separate banking reserve for East Pakistan, to stop the flow of capital from East to West; (4) Fiscal policy, the power of taxation and revenue collection for East Pakistan shall be vested in East Pakistan; (5) Separate foreign exchange earning: East Pakistan will be empowered to establish trade links with foreign countries; (6) East Pakistan shall have a separate militia or paramilitary force (Nanda, 1972, pp. 330-331).

After the elections, the likelihood of fragmentation increased even more. Claiming an electoral mandate, the Awami League vowed to frame a new constitution based on the Six-Point Programme. According to the Programme, Pakistan would remain a united federation where the central government would be responsible for foreign affairs and defense and the provinces would enjoy “maximum autonomy” over economic issues and internal defense. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan Peoples’ Party, as well as President Khan and the military, opposed this new constitutional framework because they believed it would create a weak federation that would “result in a division of the country into two states” (The Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists Geneva, 1972, sec. 2).

In February 1971, the first indications of a conflict pathway emerged with the placement of military detachments and checkpoints in Dhaka. At the same time, President Khan dismissed the civilian cabinet, refused to accept the election results, and indefinitely postponed the National Assembly (which was due to convene March 3rd) in order to prevent the Awami League from taking its seats. While these actions were consistent with a divorce pathway, they demonstrated the strength of the central government’s opposition to autonomy and signaled a significant escalation in the confrontation between East and West Pakistan. President Khan’s actions precipitated a general strike in East Pakistan that shut down the government and initiated protests throughout Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Jessore. This resulted in additional indication of movement along a conflict pathway. Additional skirmishes between the army and civilian demonstrators took place over the next three weeks. Meanwhile, public discussions of autonomy continued, suggesting that fragmentation via a divorce pathway remained a strong possibility as well (Husain, 2010).

However, by the end of March 1971 Pakistan found itself firmly on a dominant conflict pathway to fragmentation as “Operation Searchlight” was undertaken and subsequent violent confrontations occurred. Despite President Khan’s attempt to broker discussions between Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman¹¹ and Bhutto, “Operation Searchlight” began on March 25th with the West Pakistani military’s attack at the University of Dhaka. The Pakistan army, on orders to kill the East Pakistani intellectuals, who were viewed as destroying the integrity of the Muslim nation, opened fire and intentionally killed 172 East Pakistani intellectual elites (The Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists Geneva, 1972). As the Major General Rao Forman Ali, who was in charge of premeditated military action stated, “if we have to leave the country, let’s make it as difficult as possible for the Bengalis” to rebuild without the intellectual guidance necessary for nation building (Choudhury, 1972, pp. 193–194). This attack signaled the start of the reported genocide and provides strong evidence that Pakistan was on the dominant conflict pathway of fragmentation (The Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists Geneva, 1972). On March 26th, in another attempt to weaken the growing support for the Awami League, President Khan labeled Rahman an enemy of Pakistan, charged him with treason, and outlawed the Awami League (Ali, 2010; Choudhury, 1972). By the next day, a full-scale civil war between East and West Pakistan had begun, with Bangladesh (East Pakistan) unofficially declaring its independence from Pakistan (Ali, 2010; Husain, 2010).

¹¹ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League.

The declaration of Bangladesh's independence ignited international interest as well as intervention. India¹² argued that "the present situation was grave and fraught with serious dangers for the peace and security of the region" (Kumar, 1975, p. 49). The influx of approximately 3-10 million East Bengalis seeking refuge in India placed serious strain on both the social and economic infrastructure of India (Ali, 2010; Datta, 2008; Mahajani, 1974). The developing refugee situation, reports of genocide, and armed conflict on its borders drew India into the conflict. India responded by providing military assistance and training to the Mukti Bahini (the Liberation Army of Bangladesh) (Mahajani, 1974). On November 22, 1971, the Indian military crossed the border, providing further assistance for Bangladesh in its struggle for independence (Ali, 2010; Husain, 2010; Kumar, 1975). India's provision of resources allowed Bangladesh to continue along the conflict pathway and halted any further movement along the divorce pathway. On December 16, 1971, the Pakistan Army surrendered to Indian and Bangladeshi forces, bringing the conflict to an end and resulting in the permanent fragmentation of Pakistan.

Conclusion

The inherent cultural and imposed economic divisions between East and West Pakistan, when combined with the dissatisfaction of East Pakistanis over perceived inequalities and mistreatment by the central government, proved to be highly combustible between December 1970 and March 1971. The December 1970 election resulted in "a nearly complete polarization of political forces in Pakistan" (Department of State, The Office of Electronic Information, 1971, para. 2) and set the nation on a path to fragmentation. Although a divorce pathway was dominant, the postponement of the National Assembly, the general uprising in East Pakistan, the resulting military action (genocide) against East Pakistan, and the involvement of India in support of East Pakistan (military support and sanctuary for Bengali refugees fleeing the genocide) clearly moved the country to a dominant conflict pathway of fragmentation. These events culminated in the complete fragmentation of the country into Pakistan and Bangladesh on December 16, 1971.

What does this tell us about the Fragmentation Markers?

The creation of Bangladesh, as a result of the fragmentation of Pakistan, demonstrates the importance of several key fragmentation markers. First, Pakistan occupied two separate and distinct geographic regions, separated by not only India, but also differing languages and culture. The cultural differences were agitated by the central government's decision to ostensibly ignore East Pakistan's traditions and make Urdu the national language, a language used predominantly by West Pakistan's elite and an even smaller population within East Pakistan. This ignited a rise of Bengali nationalism and diminished the desire to unite under a common Pakistani national identity. The move also signaled to an already divergent population that the central government was less concerned with their interests than its own

¹² Although there are allegations by several Pakistani and Indian journalists (Abedin, 2005; Swami, 2006, 2011) of involvement by the Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW - the Indian secret intelligence agency) in aiding the Bengali population to attain independence as early as March 1, 1971, at this time there are no official reports to substantiate these claims.

or with the potential effects of excluding them from political, economic, and social discourse and transactions. This failure of the central government to understand the importance of language as an element of social cohesion and shared national identity further divided the regions and laid the groundwork for East Pakistanis to unite behind a collective perception of relative deprivation and under a regional political party based on local, rather than national, identity that aspired to achieve greater equality and autonomy for East Pakistan within the existing political system. Without this divide in national identity it is possible that fragmentation would have followed a different trajectory in Bangladesh or not occurred at all.

A second factor important to the case of Bangladesh is timing. Natural disasters can have devastating effects on the political, social, and economic conditions in a country, no matter when they happen. However, in a country experiencing elements of fragmentation, the timing of a natural disaster and the response by the central government to it, can significantly alter the trajectory of the country, either moving it further along a fragmentation pathway or pushing it onto a different, non-fragmentation pathway. In the case of Bangladesh, the 1970 cyclone occurred one month before the national elections. The failure of the central government to adequately respond to the devastation in the East contributed to overwhelming popular support for Awami League candidates and the party's decisive victory. If the cyclone had occurred a year before the national elections, it is possible that the Awami League might not have received as much support at the polls. The timing of the cyclone and the election provided the opportunity for East Pakistanis to immediately express raw grievances by voting for candidates they believed sympathized with their most current interests.

Finally, the events leading to the fragmentation of Pakistan could have taken a different trajectory if the international actors involved had reacted differently. For the most part, all major international actors refused to engage in the conflict. However, India was arguably forced into action due to an influx of refugees and fighting on its borders. India's military and economic support for the independence of Bangladesh, absent other players, shortened the conflict pathway, provided support for pro-independence forces, and prompted a quick resolution to the dispute.

Congo

Analysis

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) has been on multiple pathways to fragmentation since it achieved independence in 1960. Even though the country has not formally fragmented or been partitioned in the intervening years, the markers of divorce, dissolution, and conflict have been numerous and, at times, severe. The most dominant path thus far has been conflict, but what this case demonstrates most clearly is that some nation-states, despite multiple markers to the contrary, remain remarkably resilient to fragmentation due to the strength of traditional forms of order, authoritarian leadership, or international intervention.

Post-Colonial Divorce

In the immediate post-colonial, independent era, the Republic of the Congo's most likely path to fragmentation was divorce. The country's new elite was divided between two primary parties in parliament. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba's *Movement National Congolais* (MNC) party favored African solidarity and nationalism, while President Joseph Kasavubu's *Alliance des Bakongo* (ABAKO) party leaned towards federalism and autonomy for the country's wealthier regions (Young & Turner, 1985). Other politicians, like Moise Tshombe in Katanga, sought to declare their mineral rich, native regions independent from the Congo altogether and were encouraged by their former Belgian colonizers, who provided troops to protect Western mining interests. In parallel to the elite divisions, Congolese soldiers in the army, most of whom were admitted to the lower ranks of service under colonial rule, mutinied after independence to demand faster Africanization of the force. The result was the departure of the mostly Belgian officer corps and a fracturing of the military into personality-based camps, which then aligned themselves with particular elites.

By the end of 1960, divisions between Lumumba and Kasavubu over the direction of the state developed rapidly. In seeking to end Katangan secession and retain state control of the province's vital mineral resources, Lumumba solicited Soviet military support. Kasavubu strongly opposed the decision and dismissed Lumumba from office on grounds of treason. Lumumba countered by asking parliament to reverse the dismissal and instead dismiss Kasavubu for treason. With the new parliament unable to resolve the dispute, then Army Chief of Staff Joseph Mobutu conducted his first coup, which preserved Kasavubu's leadership and deposed Lumumba. In the Cold War environment, the U.S. and Belgium strategically supported the alliance between Mobutu and Kasavubu, ostensibly given the Congo's wealth of uranium (Hesselbein, 2007; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). When Lumumba and his supporters established an alternative national government in Kisangani and attempted to raise an army to contest the authority of Kasavubu's transitional government, Mobutu loyalists in the military detained him. He was subsequently executed while in the custody of Katangan authorities in 1961, before the Congolese parliament could decide his fate, and that of the country, democratically.

After Lumumba's death, markers of divorce remained strong, however significant markers of conflict and dissolution also appeared. Along the divorce pathway, Tshombe and others continued to push for secession in Katanga, South Kasai, and Kivu. Katanga created a separate currency and negotiated a common defense policy with Kasai. However, when Tshombe agreed to abandon the cause in 1963 in

favor of being appointed prime minister in Kasavubu's transitional government, secessionists lost momentum. In other areas of the country, provincial leaders followed Lumumba's example and established competing governments as elites attempted to consolidate power. The various fractured pieces of the army not loyal to Mobutu chose sides in the disputes, as did international actors like France and Belgium, who had strategic interests or colonial legacies at stake. In the struggle for consolidation, markers of conflict arose. Civil unrest between local militia fighters grew and the authority of the central government became broadly contested at all levels. The transitional government's solution was the proposed 1964 Provisional Constitution, which sought to maintain centralized control and territorial integrity, but also to accommodate the multitude of regional interests. The new constitution proposed to split six provincial units into twenty-one, establish financial autonomy for the provinces, and call for provincial parliaments (Hesselbein, 2007; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). However, this only served to encourage a highly ethnicized decentralization of the Congo along a dissolution pathway. The hundreds of political parties formed in the wake of independence came to "represent different regions more than political ideas" (Hesselbein, 2007, p. 19; Korner, 1993, p. 100) and failed to form a stable ruling coalition.

Mobutu conducted a second coup in 1965 and assumed permanent control of the state. According to Hesselbein (2007, p. 24), more than support for Mobutu the lack of consensus and organization in other camps explains his success:

"Elite factions were far away from defining a common national project. Rather, the inability to pursue ambitions on a sub-national level and the exhaustion of forces let them agree to Mobutu's power seizure.... After there had not been a military solution to the problem of fractionalisation, a fraction of the military became a solution for political stability."

Ultimately, the Congo's path to fragmentation, whether by divorce or another sub-pathway, was buffered by Mobutu's seizure of power. However, its new leader's inability to reconcile political differences and establish a new and legitimate independent government demonstrated the immaturity of an elite that had not participated meaningfully in colonial administration. It also indicates that the former colonial state had remained bifurcated, with traditional authorities and customs continuing to hold more legitimacy than those of the central government (Mamdani, 2001; Young & Turner, 1985). In Congo, as elsewhere, colonialism, "once removed, gave way to a fragmented country, with competing power centers and disintegrated military forces." (Hesselbein, 2007, p. 24)

Divorce Gives Way to Conflict

During Mobutu's dictatorial rule, the Congo (renamed Zaire) continued to show indication of fragmentation by both divorce and dissolution, however conflict ultimately became the dominant pathway. Congo's elite factions unified behind Mobutu's one-party authoritarian regime initially with Western financial support in wealthier regions; leaders in less wealthy regions understood they would be stronger by association. Elites within Mobutu's vast patronage network also benefited significantly from his exclusive control of state resources and the so-called 'kleptocracy' that he oversaw (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Reno, 2006). However, Mobutu and the military were unable to foster consistent and

distributed policies of industrialization or sustain credible national security long-term, which eroded their collective legitimacy countrywide and Mobutu's own credibility within the government (Stearns, 2012). This erosion eventually provided the impetus for a conflict pathway rather than one of divorce.

The volatility of world copper and oil prices in the 1970s began the erosion of Mobutu's control and the country's long path to conflict by undermining Mobutu's economic programs. The Congo's mineral wealth was being used as a key driver of its modernization, urbanization, and industrialization. When commodity prices dropped dramatically GNP shrank by 5% and state investment in industry and infrastructure – already lopsided with 75% going to Katanga and Kinshasa – was reduced so that revenue could be redirected to debt repayment (Hesselbein, 2007, p. 30; Korner, 1988, p. 81). As a consequence, development of agro-industry, a promising diversifier and growth area for Mobutu's economy, regressed when internal terms of trade and transportation networks deteriorated. By the end of 1975, Mobutu was forced to seek IMF assistance to balance accounts, which set in motion a 42% devaluation of the currency, inflation, and widespread labor disputes over frozen wages (Hesselbein, 2007, p. 31).

At the same time, Mobutu's credibility as a guarantor of the nation's security was negatively impacted by his decision to invade Angola in 1975. The subsequent defeat of the Zairian army not only revealed its weakness, but cost resources that were critically needed domestically. The defeat also closed the Congo's access to the Benguela railway through Angola, as well as other railway transport routes to harbors in Beira and Maputo. The alternative, exporting minerals from the Congo through the ports of Durban and East London, increased costs and reduced mining revenue. Invasions by the *Front pour la Liberation Nationale du Congo* (FLNC) into Katanga in 1977 and 1978 further jeopardized Mobutu's control over critical mining resources; the military required international military assistance on both occasions to reclaim the area. After Mobutu finally agreed to IMF and World Bank surveillance of state resources in 1979, riots, student protests, and industry strikes became commonplace in Kinshasa. As a result, his previously unified elite backers began to return to the ethnic and regionally-based politics that characterized the post-independence path to fragmentation by divorce.

What ultimately put the Congo on a dominant path to fragmentation by conflict rather than divorce, however, was the continued deterioration of Mobutu's authority within the military and extended state security apparatus. Throughout the 1980s, Mobutu frequently reorganized the ranks and periodically accused senior officers of treason and executed them. Other leaders of questionable loyalty were replaced and large parts of the army were retrained. Mobutu also reorganized the secret services in April 1980 because of their perceived failures and the potential threat they posed to his position (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). When bombs were set off in Kinshasa in the mid-1980s and rebels loyal to Laurent Kabila, a former colleague of Lumumba, took the eastern town of Moba by force, Mobutu established a 20,000 strong anti-terror group (Hesselbein, 2007). This constant shuffling made it difficult to keep military or security activities consistent and professional and likely interfered with the maintenance of a stable chain of command. Additionally, the failing economy severely affected military resources. Units in peripheral areas of the country, mostly the eastern provinces, increasingly deserted for lack of pay and resupply, or extracted these from the population (Stearns, 2012). To make matters worse for the government, those that deserted often joined existing rebel groups or formed their own.

Mobutu's habit of providing sanctuary to a myriad of rebel groups opposed to governments in neighboring countries meant that the Congo offered deserters a range of options. The rapid deterioration of the economy also made smuggling and the sale of military assets more lucrative. As Mobutu's political allies dwindled, he relied more on the military to maintain state control by force, yet the quantity and quality of his security assets diminished at a similar pace (Stearns, 2012).

The final transition to a dominant conflict pathway occurred in the early 1990s when highly ethnicized civil wars in neighboring Burundi and Rwanda forced over a million Hutu refugees into eastern provinces of the Congo. Apart from the destabilizing social and economic effects, as well as the international attention that such a large refugee influx brought to the Congo's hinterlands, many of those fleeing Rwanda were members of the deposed regime's armed forces and had not been disarmed and demobilized at the border (Hesselbein, 2007; Mamdani, 2001; Stearns, 2012). Once resettled in the Congo, the former Rwandan army reorganized in the refugee camps and continued its conflict with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Mobutuist forces tried to pacify eastern parts of the country, but for reasons cited above lacked the capacity to match the RPF regulars or local militia.

The First Congo War began in 1996 with Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda backing rebels led by Laurent Kabila. As Kabila's forces advanced, most of Mobutu's remaining force refused to resist.¹³ Taking advantage of the sponsorship, Kabila went all the way to Kinshasa, overthrew Mobutu in 1997, renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and attempted to establish a government based on support he had built among the elite of Congo's eastern provinces. Instead, Kabila's government quickly failed when the high number of 'foreigners' occupying top positions undermined its domestic legitimacy. In an attempt to salvage his position, Kabila dismissed his foreign advisors, but by 1998 Rwanda and Uganda had become weary of Kabila's shifting alliances and turned against him by sponsoring new rebel groups in eastern Congo.

In August 1998 the Second Congo War began. With assistance from Angolan, Namibian, and Zimbabwean forces, Kabila held control of Kinshasa and southwestern areas of the country. The war reached a stalemate with the country informally partitioned into three regions (Kabila-aligned territory, Rwanda-aligned territory, and Uganda-aligned territory). Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and in 2002, a coalition of the UN and African leaders in neighboring countries, who opposed the breakup of Congo for fear of the effects it would have on their own states, brokered a settlement of hostilities – the Sun City Agreement -- and negotiated an accord to unify the country, avoiding fragmentation of Congo once again (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Stearns, 2012).

Kabila's son Joseph has led the Democratic Republic of Congo since formalization of the Sun City Agreement in 2002, although he continues to face the prospect of fragmentation. A Third Congo War is ongoing in the east, the economy remains largely informal, the legitimacy of the central government

¹³ The new Tutsi-dominated governments in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda considered their backing of Kabila's forces an operation to neutralize Hutu militia and deposed Rwandan regulars operating in the Congolese refugee camps (Hesselbein, 2007; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Stearns, 2012). By backing rebel forces instead of invading outright, the three countries hoped to avoid the ire and possible intervention of more powerful international forces (Stearns, 2012).

remains weak compared to customary regional and ethnic authorities, international influences remain strong, the army remains disintegrated, and initial markers of divorce and dissolution have reappeared amidst political wrangling over a new constitution that features similar provisions to the one proposed in 1964. Unless Joseph Kabila or another political figure can retain a legitimate monopoly of power at the center, fragmentation in DR Congo may yet occur.

East Timor

Analysis

The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (East Timor) is the 21st Century's first new nation-state and the result of fragmentation in the Indonesian archipelago. Formal fragmentation occurred on May 20, 2002, when East Timor declared itself independent from Indonesia in the wake of a UN sponsored referendum and the Indonesian military (TNI)¹⁴ withdrew from the territory. East Timor's pathway to fragmentation was predominantly one of conflict, with the island engulfed by fighting shortly after Portuguese colonialism ended. The initial markers of fragmentation by divorce were distinct, if short-lived, while the subsequent markers of fragmentation by conflict were severe and long lasting. As a case study in fragmentation, East Timor is most valuable as a demonstration of the decisive effects regional political dynamics and international intervention can have on an ostensibly localized struggle, where demands for autonomy and independence would otherwise have very little sway.

Post-Colonial Conflict

East Timor's pathway to fragmentation moved quickly from divorce to conflict in the post-colonial era. As Portuguese colonialism ended in 1975, the prospects for independence, Indonesian integration, or continued administration by Portugal were all equal.¹⁵ Though political parties were technically prohibited under Portuguese control, many East Timorese elites had formed political associations or unions that were prepared to negotiate and contest authority amidst Portuguese abdication. However, the immaturity and inexperience of the East Timorese elite, along with the institutional and administrative neglect that had characterized colonization, provoked disagreement among the parties almost immediately, despite their seemingly broad common nationalist interests.¹⁶ The *Uniao Democrática Timorese* (UDT) represented those who were closely aligned with Portugal, but favored a gradual transition from colonial rule to independence. Alternatively, the *Associação Social Democrata Timorese* (ASDT) sought to rebuild East Timor based on the traditions, customary forms of order, and tribal alliances that preceded colonialism and the *Associação Popular Democrata Timorese* (Apodeti) advocated integration with Indonesia as an autonomous province (Aucoin & Brandt, 2010). Their disagreements magnified the seemingly small political divisions between them and fomented general discontent with the running of the state. The ASDT evolved into the *Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente* (Fretilin), which gained wide popularity for its focus on indigenous identity and education, and formed a coalition with the UDT in favor of independence from Portugal rather than integration with Indonesia (Aucoin & Brandt, 2010). That partnership collapsed in short order, though, as the UDT and Apodeti instead formed a coalition of opposites supporting integration with Indonesia. Apodeti and UDT leaders believed their positions were more likely to be enhanced as governors under

¹⁴ *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI)

¹⁵ Beginning in 1749, Portuguese Timor was divided in half after Dutch forces invaded and fought over control of the island. The result of the conflict was that Portugal maintained control of the East and the West became part of the Dutch East Indies. When Indonesia gained independence from the Dutch after World War II, West Timor fell under Indonesian authority, centered in Jakarta. In the wake of the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal, that country's new leaders decided to dismantle the colonial empire maintained by previous administrations and withdrew unilaterally from East Timor.

¹⁶ In some instances, the contemporaries of the various parties were in fact related through family ties.

Indonesian authority than as minority representatives in an independent government led by the increasingly popular Fretilin (Jolliffe, 1978). The UDT and Apodeti also feared what they perceived to be Communist elements within Fretilin. Conversely, Fretilin accused the UDT and especially Apodeti of advocating neo-colonialism. The shifting alliances provoked all parties to consolidate support for their ambitions within specific geographic areas before the UDT conducted a coup and civil war erupted at the end of 1975.

As civil conflict ensued, Fretilin fighters quickly gained the upper hand on UDT forces. However, Indonesia invaded East Timor and buffered the country's final fragmentation from Portugal in December 1975. As the Indonesian military (TNI) advanced, Fretilin leaders in the capital of Dili hastily declared East Timorese independence. Their claims were immediately countered by a declaration of integration by Apodeti and UDT elements in Balibo, along the border with West Timor, who then submitted a petition to President Suharto for formal integration. Once the TNI gained full control of Dili, 'trustworthy' Apodeti and UDT leaders were convened as a provisional government and Suharto officially declared East Timor the 27th province of Indonesia in the summer of 1976. The U.S. and Australia did not oppose Indonesia's intervention at the time based on the pretext that it supported anti-Communist strategies and pacified a potentially destabilizing regional situation. The issue was particularly salient for Australia, which is closer to East Timor than Jakarta (Salla, 1995).¹⁷ For the relatively new Suharto administration, the invasion and annexation was touted as another positive step in the direction of unifying the former island colonies under one flag and "saved Australia from the prospect of having a 'Cuba on the doorstep'" (Shuja, 2000, p. 141).

Conflict under Indonesian Control

In the almost twenty-five years that followed Indonesia's annexation of East Timor, markers of fragmentation shifted almost exclusively to a conflict pathway. Facing severe repression by the TNI and pro-integration militia groups backed by the TNI, the armed wing of Fretilin, known as the *Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste* (FALANTIL), conducted an enduring resistance movement and controlled territory where sympathizing communities went to great lengths to protect rebel identities and movements (Aucoin & Brandt, 2010). Other pro-independence groups also emerged throughout the period, but were functionally subsumed by umbrella organizations formed by FALANTIL's leader, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, such as the *Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorese* (CNRT). In its relentless efforts to defeat FALANTIL and related forces and to compel East Timor's integration, the TNI reportedly resorted to such brutal tactics as forced migration, sexual slavery, forced sterilization, saturation bombing, and the extrajudicial elimination of entire villages (Aucoin & Brandt, 2010; Carey & Bentley, 1995; Cristalis, 2002; Dunn, 1983).

¹⁷ At the time, Indonesia had just avoided a Communist takeover of government in Jakarta and was particularly wary of any potential outpost for political radicalism, lest it be coopted by Communist forces or lend credibility to secessionist feelings at the outer edges of the archipelago and destabilize the staunch nationalist ambitions of the Suharto government to unite all the islands under one flag.

The turning point on East Timor's pathway to fragmentation happened in 1991. At the time, the alleged abuses of the TNI and East Timor's struggle for independence went largely unnoticed outside of the region, making it unlikely that fragmentation would occur. Without third-party pressure or intervention on East Timor's behalf, Indonesian power was presumably too much for pro-independence elements to overcome. However, on November 12th, Indonesian forces fired into a crowd of unarmed East Timorese demonstrators at the funeral of a rebel fighter in the capital of Dili. Foreign journalists filmed the incident (Santa Cruz Massacre), which led to the death of an estimated 200 East Timorese and drew international attention (Aucoin & Brandt, 2010; See also <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8NYdGad-Obs>). A year later, Indonesian authorities attempting to diffuse rising interest in East Timor's plight captured, convicted, and imprisoned Gusmão and televised his supposed denunciation of the pro-independence movement. Pro-independence figures Jose Ramos Horta and Bishop Carlos Filipo Ximenes Belo subsequently garnered more international attention for East Timor when they were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1996.

By the late 1990s, increasing international attention to East Timor's crisis started to boost the probabilities for fragmentation. Australia in particular, changed its political posture regionally and domestically and became more critical of Indonesian policy in East Timor. The Hawke government and then the newly elected Howard administration sought to focus more on human rights diplomacy and an activist approach to crisis in the region (Salla, 1995). This approach differed from that of the Whitlam government in the 1970s, which had advocated close ties with Indonesia above all else to foster security and economic prosperity in the region (Aucoin & Brandt, 2010; Margesson & Vaughn, 2009; Salla, 1995; Shuja, 2000; Wheeler & Dunne, 2001). Western interests (anti-Communism), which had originally supported Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in 1975 and subsequent annexation, were no longer relevant (Wheeler & Dunne, 2001). The death of five Australia-based journalists in Balibo in 1975, which the Indonesian government denied involvement in, was now widely believed to be the result of a deliberate execution by Indonesian forces to mask the brutality of the East Timor invasion (Aucoin & Brandt, 2010; Margesson & Vaughn, 2009; Salla, 1995; Shuja, 2000; Wheeler & Dunne, 2001). Public opinion in Australia also sympathized more with the East Timorese due to a common history fighting against Japanese forces on the island of Timor during World War II and efforts by refugees in Australia to raise support and awareness (Salla, 1995; Wheeler & Dunne, 2001). Nonetheless, President Suharto remained steadfast in his position and continued to deny East Timorese pleas for independence.

When President Suharto resigned in 1998 in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, his successor, Vice President B.J. Habibie, offered East Timor broad autonomy within the Indonesian state as a compromise and buffer to fragmentation. Under the terms of an arrangement between Indonesia, Portugal, and the UN, the UN agreed to sponsor a referendum in East Timor on autonomy. However, the deal also stipulated that the TNI would maintain security for the vote and that, if the option for autonomy within Indonesia was rejected by East Timorese voters, the UN would assume responsibility for a transition to independence (Aucoin & Brandt, 2010). Therefore, a vote rejecting autonomy effectively and suddenly offered East Timorese a divorce pathway to fragmentation amidst ongoing conflict. In the days leading up to the vote on August 30, 1999, the TNI generally failed to maintain security and may have directed pro-integrationist militia to violently discourage voters (Aucoin & Brandt, 2010; Cristalis, 2002; Kilcullen,

2011).¹⁸ However, greater than 98% of eligible voters participated and more than 78% rejected autonomy in favor of independence (Aucoin & Brandt, 2010; Margesson & Vaughn, 2009). The vote provoked a rampaging, scorched-earth campaign by pro-integration militias across East Timor, ostensibly intent on leaving nothing intact for an independent government to build on.

Fragmentation

The uncontrolled violence and reported genocide prompted the U.S. to cut military ties with Indonesia and drove a wave of international pressure calling for intervention. President Habibie had little choice but to request additional UN involvement as a peacekeeping force. By the end of October 1999, international security forces under Australian leadership regained control of East Timor and, by February 2000, the administrative authority of the state was transitioned to the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET). On May 20, 2002, with a new constitution in place and elections for a constituent assembly complete, fragmentation was achieved when UNTAET transferred authority to an independent East Timor state and Gusmão was elected the first president.

¹⁸ Most observers contend that the TNI deliberately organized and directed pro-integration militias to discourage voters and then left East Timor completely destroyed because senior leaders feared East Timorese independence would provoke and embolden secessionists elsewhere, such as in Aceh and Central Sulawesi.

Soviet Union

Analysis

By many accounts, the collapse of the Soviet Union was “both a remarkably rapid and peaceful process” (Pravda, 2010, p. 377). The speed with which such massive change was enacted makes the Soviet Union a unique example of fragmentation via the disestablishment of the state, where authority is devolved away from a central governing authority. In just six and a half years, from 1985-1991, major reforms were undertaken, the Communist Party monopoly on power was removed, proposals were made to devolve the central government’s authority to the republics, and the state itself was ultimately dissolved – all with limited use of force (Brown, 2011).

When Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed General Secretary of the Communist Party in March 1985, he introduced a series of political and economic reforms to the Soviet Union. Gorbachev wanted to stimulate a stagnant Soviet economy and restructure the Soviet political system to increase the political legitimacy of his government (Olcott, 1991; Pravda, 2010). His strategy involved two broad categories of reform: *glasnost* (openness), which increased political transparency and freedom of information and speech, and *perestroika* (restructuring), which decentralized the Soviet political and economic systems and introduced democratization. Gorbachev’s intention was for *glasnost* to “help create a groundswell of support for *perestroika*,” but instead it allowed ethnic nationalist groups to air long-standing grievances and criticize the Communist Party (Pravda, 2010, p. 358). Gorbachev did not anticipate that his reform of the Soviet political system would lead to Soviet citizens rejecting the legitimacy of Communist Party rule (Olcott, 1991). The reforms allowed free expression of long-repressed nationalist sentiments, which developed into calls for autonomy from central government control, first in the Baltics and eventually throughout the Soviet Union. These nationalist sentiments formed a strong basis for the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union.¹⁹

The importance of nationalism in mobilizing the populations of the republics cannot be overstated. “Nationalism exercised an unusual force of attraction within the Soviet society that was unparalleled by any other set of issues” (Beissinger, 2009, p. 336). Nationalist movements pushing for autonomy among the republics in place of central Soviet control were fueled by a number of significant grievances including the government’s history of brutality and repression, a “sclerotic political system” wracked by corruption that failed to provide sufficient social services, a failing economy, and a “deepening malaise and cynicism within society” (Beissinger, 2009, p. 336). The struggling Soviet economy further strengthened nationalist mobilization. Gorbachev’s *perestroika* reforms were largely unsuccessful in boosting economic performance and provided nationalist movements with increasingly salient reason to push for autonomy from the center and eventually provoke fragmentation by dissolution.

¹⁹ At this stage there were few indications that the Soviet Union was on any type of fragmentation pathway. In this case the outcome may be characterized as a type of ‘amicable divorce’ if we understand the issue as one that was opposed by the central government nearly to the end. However we have chosen to identify it as a case of dissolution because of the important role of multiple pre-Revolution nationalist movements and the central government’s willingness to decentralize and devolve power to the republics.

The swell of nationalism that moved through the Soviet republics put pressure on Gorbachev and the central Communist Party to respond. In an attempt to acknowledge the apparent discontent and preserve the Soviet Union, Gorbachev promised political and economic decentralization and increased opportunities for individual involvement in the political system (Olcott, 1991). Eventually, Gorbachev and the central Soviet government did restructure the political system and devolved some of the central government's authority to the republics. At the June 1988 Communist Party Conference, Gorbachev dissolved the Supreme Soviet, the highest legislative body of the Soviet Union, and replaced it with the Congress of the People's Deputies. This restructuring allowed ordinary people to participate in government for the first time (PBS, n.d.). Throughout 1989, nationalists, specifically in the Baltics, called for more devolution of political power to the republics. As a result, the central Soviet government gradually ceded "control of culture" to the republics and Gorbachev tasked the newly formed Congress People's Deputies with drafting legislation for republic economic autonomy (Olcott, 1991, p. 121). Then, in another example of restructuring the Soviet political system, a Presidential system and Constitution were adopted in February 1990, abandoning the monopoly on power held by the central Communist Party (Der Spiegel Online, 2006). This progressive restructuring of the Soviet political system and partial devolution of central government authority to the republics indicates that the Soviet Union was fragmenting along a dissolution pathway.

Being increasingly unsatisfied with the degree and pace with which Gorbachev and the central Soviet government addressed their grievances, and motivated by the swell of nationalist sentiment in the region, the Baltic republics became the first of the Soviet republics to declare independence from the Soviet Union—Lithuania on March 11, 1990, Estonia on March 30, 1990, and Latvia on May 4, 1990 (Der Spiegel Online, 2006; Global Security, n.d.; Graham, n.d.; Olcott, 1991; PBS, n.d.). Activists in the Baltic republics saw eastern European countries outside of the Soviet Union breaking free from Communist rule and used their successful independence movements as an example to follow. Gorbachev and the central Soviet government refrained from interfering in the fall of Communist regimes in eastern European countries like Poland and Hungary in 1989, which provided nationalists in the Baltics and throughout the Soviet Union with hope that Gorbachev's commitment to universal freedom of choice and the avoidance of force might constrain coercive action in response to independence movements within the Soviet Union (Pravda, 2010).

In a further effort to keep the Soviet Union intact following the Baltic independence declarations, the Soviet legislature passed a law on secession requiring a republic-wide referendum to pass by a two-thirds majority vote in order for any republic to be considered for secession from the Union. Furthermore, successful passage of the referendum would be followed by a mandatory five-year transitional period in which the conditions of the republic's exit from the Soviet Union were to be negotiated (Olcott, 1991). However, having already declared independence, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia rejected this measure and contended that it did not apply in their cases—reinforcing their desire to peacefully devolve into fully independent states (Olcott, 1991). This rejection was an adamant demonstration of the nationalist groundswell that led other republics to reject the legitimate authority of the central government and, because it became so widespread, severely weakened the power of the central Soviet government (Beissinger, 2009). The swell of nationalism strengthened to the point where

institutional constraints imposed by the central government to control it became largely ineffective. The weakening of Gorbachev's legitimacy and that of the central Soviet authority pushed the Soviet Union further along its path to dissolution.

Another remarkable feature of the Soviet Union's path to dissolution was the generally low incidence of violence (Pravda, 2010). "Never has an empire disintegrated with so little bloodshed" (Brown, 2011). Gorbachev was willing to tolerate nationalist sentiment so long as it did not threaten his paramount goal of preserving the Soviet Union (Olcott, 1991). However, when nationalist mobilization did begin to threaten the preservation of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev, remarkably, chose not to use excessive force to quell it. There are two notable explanations for the limited use of force by Gorbachev and the central Soviet government in controlling nationalist mobilization and preventing fragmentation. First, Gorbachev believed that the use of force was morally objectionable and offered no solutions to political problems (Pravda, 2010). Second, the freedom of information and news afforded by *glasnost*, paired with the swell of nationalist sentiment throughout the Soviet Union, meant any use of force by Gorbachev and the central Soviet government would be heavily politicized. Any attempt by the central government to use force to suppress nationalist unrest became embroiled in controversy (Beissinger, 2009). As a result, the Soviet Union's path to dissolution was mostly peaceful (Pravda, 2010).

Following the lead of the Baltic republics, the larger republics—Ukraine and, crucially, Russia, the largest republic in the Soviet Union—began declaring sovereignty over their territory and eventually independence from the Soviet Union. Over the course of 1990, every Soviet Republic issued a declaration of sovereignty vis-à-vis the Soviet government in what became known as the "parade of sovereignties" (Beissinger, 2009, p. 340; Olcott, 1991). "It is unlikely that the Soviet state would have ever collapsed had these revolts occurred in isolation from one another ... the fact that claims of sovereignty against the center had spread broadly throughout the fabric of Soviet society made rebellion difficult to contain" for Gorbachev and the central government (Beissinger, 2009, p. 341). Russia officially declared its sovereignty on June 12, 1990 under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, who confirmed that Union laws had no validity in Russian territory and a sovereign Russia would be willing to trade with the Baltic Republics (Olcott, 1991). Russia would later declare its full independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and Yeltsin became Russia's first elected President on June 12, 1991 (Brown, 2011; PBS, n.d.; Pipes, 1990, p. 78; Pravda, 2010). Once Russia declared its sovereignty, "the balance of the contest between center and republics began to shift decisively in favor of the latter" (Pravda, 2010, p. 359). Because Russian nationalism was long considered the linchpin of Soviet power, Russia supporting the nationalist mobilization and declaring its sovereignty rather than defending the preservation of the Union was a major factor in the ultimate dissolution of the Soviet Union (Beissinger, 2009; Brown, 2011).

In a final attempt to preserve the Soviet Union, Gorbachev and his remaining supporters in the leadership of the federal government negotiated a new Union Treaty between the spring and summer of 1991. The proposed Union Treaty was designed to keep a majority of republics, including Russia, within a much looser federation where far greater powers would be devolved from the center to the republics (Brown, 2011). Viewing the proposed Union Treaty as the final straw, hard-liners in the Communist Party and leaders of the military and KGB attempted a coup to displace Gorbachev and use force to establish

control over radical democrats and nationalists (Pravda, 2010). The *putschists* did not want Gorbachev to devolve even more central government authority to the republics and viewed the coup as a way to reverse the tide of liberalization and devolution and keep the Soviet Union intact and under the control of central leadership (Pravda, 2010). The poorly organized coup collapsed largely because of the determined resistance led by Boris Yeltsin, who rallied radical democrat and nationalist forces with considerable popular support in Moscow (Brown, 2011; Pravda, 2010). The Soviet people no longer feared the Communist Party, which resulted in significant public support behind Yeltsin and his resistance (Brown, 2011). The failed coup managed to strengthen the very forces the *putschists* had intended to defeat and ultimately accelerated the collapse of what remained of the Communist Party and federal power (Pravda, 2010). The attempted coup represents a brief period of conflict on the Soviet Union's pathway to fragmentation. However, the short, three-day conflict was quickly controlled and ultimately accelerated the Soviet Union along its path to final dissolution.

Following the attempted coup, it became clear that Gorbachev and any of his remaining allies had lost control of the effort to preserve the Soviet Union. The attempted coup weakened any remaining legitimacy that Gorbachev had as the leader of the Soviet Union. He was unable to get support from the republics on a looser union as proposed in the Union Treaty (Pravda, 2010). Additionally, Boris Yeltsin, whose popularity had soared after leading the resistance to the attempted coup, ordered the Soviet Communist Party to end its activities on Russian soil. As a result of these factors, a weakened Gorbachev resigned as the General Secretary of the Communist Party on August 24, 1991 (BBC, n.d.). The Communist Party was banned in Russia in November 1991 and on December 8 the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and "declared the final dissolution of the USSR" (Der Spiegel Online, 2006; Pravda, 2010). On December 25, 1991 Gorbachev resigned as President of the Soviet Union and the USSR dissolved.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union into independent nation-states, according to one scholar, was the "unintended result of Mikhail Gorbachev's policies—one that was made possible not just by the widening political space that *glasnost* afforded, but also by the social forces that moved into that space and utilized it to reconfigure regime and state" (Beissinger, 2009, p. 332). This scholar argues further that *glasnost* and *perestroika* were "the critical institutional conditions" that precipitated the collapse of the Soviet state (Beissinger, 2009, p. 335). However, without the underlying and repressed regional nationalism contained in the Soviet Union republics, the political opening represented by *glasnost* is unlikely to have led to such rapid dissolution of the state. Gorbachev never planned for his restructuring of the Soviet political system to lead to a nationalist mobilization that rejected the legitimacy of Communist Party rule (Olcott, 1991). The swell of nationalism that was able to move through the Soviet Union because of Gorbachev's reforms is the key factor in distinguishing the fragmentation pathway of the Soviet Union as dissolution. Nationalist movements played a critical role in weakening the legitimacy and control of Gorbachev and the central Soviet government, devolving authority from the center to the republics, motivating republican declarations of sovereignty and independence from the Union, and ultimately the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Yugoslavia

Analysis

Our analysis indicates that Yugoslavia transitioned to a fragmentation pathway by way of dissolution and conflict. It has been suggested that “the collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s is analogous to a case of multiple organ failure. The patient had been in delicate health for some time. Although its ailments [weak national institutions, poor economic management, weak national (Yugoslav) identity, and strong regional identity] and were not necessarily terminal, its survival required constant attention and careful treatment by a devoted staff of caregivers” (Wachtel & Bennett, 2009, p. 13). With the death of Tito, the devoted caregiver, in 1980, Yugoslavia succumbed to its many stressors, which ultimately resulted in the disintegration of the union after a 10-year period of movement towards fragmentation. During that 10-year period of time markers of both dissolution and conflict pathways were present.

In 1945, after German withdrawal from the region, Josip Tito’s resistance movement²⁰ emerged victorious and established a communist government in Yugoslavia. The Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (renamed the People’s Republic of Yugoslavia in 1946) was composed of six republics²¹ with distinct ethnic and social differences and “...a decentralized system of decision-making” (Coulson, 1993, p. 88). Yugoslavia was expelled from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)²² in 1948, due to conflict between Stalin and Tito. The split with the USSR left Yugoslavia economically isolated, searching for a new economic model and external economic support.

Striving to establish a socialist identity separate from the Soviet model of bureaucratic centralism, in 1950 Yugoslavia introduced policies of self-management, delegating economic control to the individual republics, with central government oversight to ensure cooperation (Coulson, 1993). In this context of enhanced control by the republics, the Yugoslav state did not have the ability to maintain economic stability, let alone provide economic growth opportunities for its citizens. This became a critical problem by the mid-1970s as “international credit tightened [and] remittances declined as European economies faltered” (Wachtel & Bennett, 2009, p. 20).

Beginning in 1974 the makers suggest that Yugoslavia was headed down a dual pathway to fragmentation, with a dominant dissolution pathway and a secondary pathway of conflict. The ailments that had plagued Yugoslavia since its establishment [weak central government, lack of economic opportunity and prosperity, and lack of a Yugoslav national identity] were further exacerbated by the new constitution adopted in 1974. The new constitution further weakened the central government by

²⁰ Colonel Draza Mihailovic supported by the royal government in exile (London), led the Chetnicks fought to re-establish the pre-war regime. Josip Broz Tito led the partisan resistance, which sought the elimination of the Serb-dominated monarchy and the establishment of a federation of nations and communism. The two movements initially cooperated against the Germans, but soon the relationship devolved into an all out civil war. While Allied forces initially supported Mihailovic, due to his ties with the London based royal government, after Tito and his forces experienced repeated successes and distanced themselves from communist Moscow, Tito became the more attractive leader to support.

²¹ SR Bosnia and Herzegovina; SR Croatia, SR Macedonia; SR Montenegro; SR Slovenia; SR Serbia: APK Vojvodina and APK Kosovo

²² The Soviet Union established “COMINFORM in 1947 to serve as a coordinating body for communist parties in Russia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Italy, France, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia”(“Yugoslavia expelled from COMINFORM,” n.d.).

granting the republic governments significant power (by devolving power over banking, education, and rule of law to the six republics) not only within their own region, but within the central government as well (Biondich, 2011). The central government was “unable to compete with the much stronger Republican governments,” (Wachtel & Bennett, 2009, p. 20) or rally support around federal issues. This transformed Yugoslavia “into a *confused, contradictory, and even self-destructive mixture of federation and confederation*” (Stojanović, 1997, p. 81). This devolution of power to the provinces, and the ability of the provinces to control federal matters is a significant marker of movement along a dissolution fragmentation pathway as it provided the opportunity for each republic to behave as “*de facto* independent states, with their own political and institutional priorities” (Biondich, 2011, p. 196). There was “very little reason for loyalty to the center, and indeed a central party apparatus was virtually nonexistent. So as each republic pursued its own interests, the interests of the federation as a whole had few representatives, and those who sought to advance those interests had few instruments with which to do so, apart from appeals to party unity” (Gagnon, 1991, p. 20).

Disagreement between the republics over economic reform continued (Coulson, 1993), but in 1983 after a drawn-out political battle between the republics and the central government, a long-term economic reform program which included a united Yugoslav market and reliance on private business for employment opportunities, was adopted (Gagnon, 1991). By 1989 Yugoslavia had accumulated massive foreign debt (\$19 billion), was suffering from stifling inflation (200% per month), and experiencing rising unemployment rates (Gagnon, 1991; Rogel, 2004). This combination of debt, inflation, and unemployment resulted in Yugoslavia’s inability to borrow money and, ultimately, its inability to sustain economic growth (D’Souza, 1994).

These economic issues, evidence of the overall weakness of the state institutions, reveal additional support for our contention that Yugoslavia was moving along a dissolution pathway. The 1974 constitution had “radically undermined links between the republics and the federation...[and] regional leaders had no reason to look for advancement in the central government apparatus” (Guzina, 2005, p. 19). This disconnect between the republics and the central government, combined with growing dissatisfaction and resentment over perceived economic inequities among the republics further undermined the strength of the central government, leading to regional leaders taking more control in an attempt to develop new economic opportunities in their respective republics. Additionally, there was no incentive for the wealthier republics to work together to solve the financial problems of the poorer republics, “Richer republics like Slovenia and Croatia refused to share their resources with the poorer republics...Within the federation there was uneven economic development among the different republics. Southern Serbia, Macedonia, Kosovo and parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina remained agricultural even after 40 years of planned development” (D’Souza 1994, p. 3029). With the expansion of the EU regional leaders began to consider the possibility “that smaller countries with per capita incomes and economic prospects not significantly better than those of at least some areas of Yugoslavia could be economically viable independent states as members of a larger block” (Wachtel & Bennett, 2009, pp. 27–28). The consideration, by the republics, of these opportunities is further evidence of movement along the dissolution pathway to fragmentation (Coulson, 1993; Guzina, 2005; Rogel, 2004).

As Yugoslavia struggled to maintain control and the republics sought economic improvement, the lack of a strong national, Yugoslavian identity became problematic with regional nationalism re-emerging (Biondich, 2011; Silber & Little, 1997). The lack of a Yugoslav identity had been evident since the founding of the country. In the Yugoslav census beginning after WWII “nationality was recorded...but there was no Yugoslav category” (Sekulic et al., 1994, p. 85). Under Tito’s rule, regional nationalist sentiments were suppressed as regional nationalists were forced into exile. Upon the death of the Yugoslavian charismatic leader the lack of a uniting national “Yugoslav” identity (Lendavi & Parcell, 1991), and the newly found freedom for the regional nationalists to express their interests, served to enhance the existing ethnic and social cleavages. This lack of a strong sense of Yugoslav national identity, combined with Milošević’s (the then President of Serbia) desire for strong Serbian nationalism, resulted in a lack of allegiance to even the idea of a unified Yugoslavia and intensified the existing divisions within Yugoslavia. For example, in April 1981 riots broke out in Kosovo as ethnic tensions, which had been brewing for years, came to a head, beginning a ten year period with increasing signs that fragmentation might be moving toward a dominant conflict pathway. By the end of May 1981 NATO estimated that 1.5 million Kosovars had been removed from their homes (90% of the population), approximately 225,000 Kosovo males were missing, and “at least 5000 Kosovars had been executed” by the Serbian military (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1999).

Socially, Tito provided a strong unifying force for Yugoslavia during a period in time where the republics were looking for cohesion to bolster their economic situation and to enhance their overall sense of security now that they were no longer part of the Cominform. Using the mantra of “Unity and Brotherhood,” Tito successfully unified the disparate regions under a common national Yugoslav identity. Tito’s suppression of regional nationalism unintentionally allowed regional nationalistic sentiments to brew and gain strength below the surface. This proved to be a significant issue for Yugoslavia after the death of Tito in 1980 when the regional nationalists were free to express their interests, primarily Milošević and his campaign of Serb nationalism. The “inability or unwillingness of the Yugoslav state to create a sufficiently large group of citizens with a shared national identity and the existence and growth of separate national narratives that directly competed with, and eventually overwhelmed, the Yugoslav narrative” (Wachtel & Bennett, 2009, p. 14).

While the lack of a strong unifying national identity was problematic in a country with an extremely diverse citizenry, the eventual breakup of the region was not the result of “ancient ethnic hatreds,” but rather the result of elite decision-making that led directly to war. This moved Yugoslavia from a dominant fragmentation pathway of dissolution to a dominant fragmentation pathway of conflict. The Yugoslav wars that began in 1991 pushed Yugoslavia further along the conflict pathway while at the same time demonstrating signs of dissolution. The continued weakening of the central government and the ever more salient social and ethnic cleavages provided an opportunity for a move from a peaceful transition to one of violence and ultimately genocide. As scholars point out, “...Yugoslavia did not die a natural death. Rather it was deliberately and systematically killed off by men who had nothing to gain and everything to lose from a peaceful transition from state socialism and one-party rule to free market democracy (Silber & Little, 1997, p. 25). “The breakup of Yugoslavia and the war the followed were the

direct result of a series of power struggles” (Rogel, 2004, p. 43) between the republics and Milošević’s desire for a strong Serbian state.

Additionally, the creation and expansion of the European Union (EU) served as an beacon of economic hope to the struggling republics, providing “an indication that smaller countries with per capita incomes and economic prospects not significantly better than those of at least some areas of Yugoslavia could be economically viable independent states as members of a larger block” (Wachtel & Bennett, 2009, pp. 27–28). The republics, now no longer tied to Yugoslavia for social or defense reasons, realized that they no longer needed to be politically or economically tied to the Federation for their success and viewed membership in the EU as preferable to maintaining their relationship with Yugoslavia. The conflict among elites over the direction of the Yugoslavian state, combined with the lack of national identity and the desire for more autonomous regional republics, fostered an environment rendering a political solution impossible, resulting in the conflict that emerged.

The fracture of Yugoslavia is due to not only the internal fissures created by the political and economic decisions by the elite, but also due to the underlying ethnic and social cleavages that were susceptible to exploitation. As one scholar notes, “Throughout Yugoslavia's entire history much depended on whether the decisive countries have incited the contradictions in Yugoslavia or its cohesion” (Stojanović, 1997, p. 75). Yugoslavia formally fragmented in 1991 and 1992 with Slovenia and Croatia declaring their independence on June 25th, the Republic of Macedonia in September, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in April of 1992. The region continued to fragment until 2008, with Montenegro declaring independence in 2006 and Kosovo in 2008. Conflict continues in the region to this day.

Muddling Case Studies

Botswana

Analysis

The Republic of Botswana has been described in some circles as an African “miracle” for the relative political stability, social cohesion, and remarkable economic growth it has achieved since independence in 1966. Botswana has distinguished itself among Sub-Saharan nations by choosing pragmatism and inclusion over the racial exclusion, kleptocratic, and authoritarian approaches that have predominantly characterized the region (Jensen, 2004). As such, Botswana’s progress has and continues to place it on a Muddling Up (MU) pathway. Economic development and sustainability has been strong throughout Botswana’s growth, but were most impressive in the immediate post-colonial period. Social integration and political legitimacy have also been strong and have played a critical secondary role in buttressing the country’s economic success. As a case study, Botswana is most valuable as a demonstration of development potential being largely fulfilled when struggles with the effects of Dutch disease²³ and rentier politics²⁴ were more likely.

Post-Colonial Political Developments

Botswana’s early development success in the aftermath of British colonialism is widely attributed to the strength and stability of its political institutions, which formed a vital foundation for economic growth and set the country on a MU trajectory (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Hjort, 2010; Poteete, 2009; Tsie, 1996). While most of Africa’s post-colonial, newly independent nations suffered from the erosion of traditional forms of order by the colonial administrations imposed on them, and then subsequently struggled to assimilate and establish former colonial political institutions as sovereign when power was returned to the indigenous elite, Botswana did not (Hjort, 2010; Tsie, 1996). Instead, the pre-colonial traditions (chieftainships) of the Tswana and other tribes survived and were adapted to be compatible with the minimal administrative structures imposed and left by the British (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Hjort, 2010; Tsie, 1996). This was important because it preserved the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state at the center and maintained a familiar platform for the provision of services and civic engagement both before and after independence. For instance, when the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) was formed, “it was clearly identified as the party of chiefs and therefore the inheritor of their legitimacy and institutions” (Hjort, 2010, p. 694). Hence, the results of elections held

²³ Dutch disease is the term given to the economic effects that are realized when a country's increased exploitation of one or more natural resources leads to real currency appreciation. Typically, the primary effect is that a stronger currency and higher exchange rate make the country's other exports more expensive, which in turn makes the manufacturing sector less competitive and subject to decline. The term was coined in 1977 by *The Economist* to describe the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands after the discovery of a large natural gas field in 1959.

²⁴ A rentier state is typically described as one being overly dependent on the external rents generated by a particularly valuable local resource (usually minerals or fuels). Where such rents are controlled by an elite few or the government and used to sustain patronage networks (kleptocracy) or finance government programs in lieu of taxation, institutions are generally ill formed and weak and diversification of the economy is stunted. As a result, rentier states are prone to fragmentation, particularly when the resource in question is depleted or loses value precipitously and external rents decrease.

prior to independence in 1965 remained credible after independence and politics continued to function largely as originally structured. By contrast, in neighboring countries, post-colonial political parties were often formed by urban elites or radical reformists who either rejected or had few credible connections to traditional institutions and had designs for rapid modernization. In Botswana, the landed elite and newly influential class of cattle accumulators, who had gradually come together under the leadership of Seretse Khama²⁵ (himself a chieftain) and formed the broadly popular BDP, continued to marginalize more militant factions like the Botswana People's Party (BPP). Where the BPP was perhaps inclined to do away with traditional chieftainships, the BDP promised a more integrative and gradual populist approach. "Free and fair elections have been held at five-year intervals..." in Botswana ever since, with the BDP still in power (Hjort, 2010; Polhemus, 1983; Tsie, 1996, p. 600).

In addition to the consistency of tradition and leadership, Botswana's elite were able to establish "...shared common values regarding domestic economic policy and foreign policy" among themselves and avoid the elite divisions that weakened institutions in neighboring countries (Tsie, 1996, p. 602). They also astutely extended the party coalition to the peasantry, institutionalizing cooperation, and demonstrating accountability and transparency in governance, which reinforced institutional strength, encouraged civic engagement, and bridged social cleavages. By giving "a broad cross-section of the society...effective property rights" (Acemoglu et al., 2001, p. 5) and the opportunity to participate in state formation, the BDP not only allayed anxieties of expropriation or exploitation by the government, but also constrained political elites. Furthermore, the accountability of local chiefs was increased, which allowed modernization programs to succeed in rural areas. "The popularity of the BDP amongst the peasantry [was] reinforced by the introduction of... programmes such as the Accelerated Rural Development Programme (ARDP), Arable Lands Development Programme (ALDEP), and the Accelerated Rain-fed Agricultural Programme (ARAP). Through [the ARDP], the Government spent P21.2 million on various rural development projects like new primary schools, clinics, the provision of clean pipe-borne water and tarred roads within major villages" (Tsie, 1996, p. 605). These projects and the institutions that delivered them have remained effective because the BDP maintains an independent audit and set up the Directorate of Economic Crime and Corruption to ensure transparency (Beaulier & Subrick, 2006; Good, 1994).

Botswana also set itself apart and on a MU pathway by creating and sustaining a highly educated and effective bureaucracy. Where the tendency for most post-colonial governments in Africa was to immediately indigenize the civil service and expel any remnant European or non-native support, Botswana instead retained the most competent elements of its bureaucracy, regardless of nationality, and instituted a long-term plan for transition. Seretse Khama noted soon after independence that his "...government [was] deeply conscious of the dangers inherent in localizing the public service too

²⁵ Seretse Khama was educated in South Africa and the UK before returning to Botswana to found the BDP and lead the country to independence. He was also the grandson of King Khama III, ruler of the Bamangwato people. His grandfather's legitimacy was an important legacy, giving Seretse a credible platform locally from which to build pragmatic policy. His education abroad most likely reinforced his appreciation for democratic governance and informed his intent for the BDP. His education also, most likely, gave him some critical legitimacy as he and the BDP negotiated independence from the British. In fact, he was so successful in his dealings with the British that Elizabeth II knighted him in 1966.

quickly” (Acemoglu et al., 2001, p. 18). Khama added that “precipitate or reckless action in this field could have disastrous effects on the whole programme of services and development of the Government” (Acemoglu et al., 2001, p. 18). Consequently, some 24% of Botswana’s senior civil servants were non-native at independence (Carroll & Carroll, 1997). However, by retaining a competent bureaucracy over a local one, Khama ensured that the rural and economic development policies of the BDP had the best chance of being delivered and executed properly, without graft, which would feed the continued legitimacy and strength of government institutions by enhancing the quality of life and provision of services (Lefko-Everett, 2004).

In the long term, the BDP continued to keep the Public Service Commission²⁶ independent and non-partisan, with the president able to appoint only select positions, such as Cabinet members. Additionally, the Commission reportedly began to recruit equally from all factions of society and base promotions exclusively on merit. The right to appeal selection and promotion decisions was also made available to encourage accountability and transparency. While the government attempted to develop the appropriate training and education facilities locally to ensure indigenous competency in civil service, in the interim many aspiring bureaucrats were trained overseas on scholarships given by international aid partners (Carroll & Carroll, 1997). Over time, indigenous training improved and the proportion of non-natives in senior positions dwindled to nearly zero (Carroll & Carroll, 1997). Most importantly, in terms of Botswana’s development success, the bureaucracy continues to carry the reputation of being committed to the values of service. The majority of Botswana “...do not look on the state as the area in which they can or should enhance their personal income...” and appreciate that “the rigorous enforcement of civil service codes requiring honesty further protects the state” (Carroll & Carroll, 1997, p. 474). This institutional strength is critical for Botswana as it moves along the MU pathway, particularly when it comes to managing the economy, where public intolerance for corruption limits inefficiency and waste.

Managed Economic Boom

Botswana’s phenomenal, yet prudent, economic growth and development has been key to its sustained progression down a MU pathway. “The new institutional economics attributes economic development, regardless of resource endowment, to policies and institutions that provide transparency, accountability, and tenure security. Institutions with these characteristics lower risk, increase time horizons, and encourage investment (North, 1990; De Soto, 2000)” (Poteete, 2009, p. 547). The firm foundation of Botswana’s institutions and the intelligent leadership of the BDP have allowed the country to prove this theory largely correct. When Botswana realized the value of its resource endowments and intense economic growth followed, the pre-existing legitimacy of the state’s institutions and the BDP provided enough leeway for the party to cautiously manage the boom rather than resort to rentier politics (Poteete, 2009). Additionally, although the breadth and diverse character of the BDP coalition made it vulnerable to internal fracturing amidst the uneven growth, potentially disparate internal interests were tied together through economic interdependencies to fortify tenure security. Both

²⁶ Controls and administers policies and regulations related to appointments, promotions, and general management or performance of the civil service workforce.

circumstances encouraged sustainable economic growth policies rather than ones that capitalized on short-term gains.

Botswana's most valuable resource endowment has been diamonds. However, the government had to take several precarious policy steps to reap the full rewards and avoid common pitfalls when the industry boomed in the 1970s. When the first diamond mine opened, the country was still a part of the Rand Monetary Area, meaning it did not have its own independent currency, but used the South African Rand (Poteete, 2009, p. 550). The advantage to this was that Botswana did not have to worry about the threat of real currency appreciation, which could imbalance its economy. However, Botswana's membership in the South African Customs Union (SACU) also meant that it could not substitute tariff policies for exchange rate policies to ensure it benefitted handsomely from exports of its newly discovered resource (Poteete, 2009, p. 550). Before opening a second mine, the BDP decided to create the Pula, a local currency that could be controlled more readily and reflected the divergence of the Botswana and South African economies (Poteete, 2009, p. 550). The creation of the Pula, though, left Botswana susceptible to real currency appreciation, which could increase the costs of exports and make other sectors of the economy less competitive. To prevent such an incidence of Dutch disease, the BDP made small adjustments to the exchange rate over time to maintain stability against the Rand. As the Rand depreciated against the US Dollar, so did the Pula. This ensured that "Botswana maintained a relatively stable real exchange rate with its main import currency, the Rand, and enjoyed a trend of real depreciation against its main export currency..." (Poteete, 2009, p. 551). The idea is that "a stable or depreciating real exchange rate should limit imbalances between booming and lagging sectors [of the economy]..." and prevent loss of competitiveness in the lagging sectors (Poteete, 2009, p. 551).

When the BDP stopped making adjustments to the exchange rate in the late 1990s, the Pula began to appreciate rapidly against the Rand, threatening the economy again. The BDP introduced heavy devaluations in 2004 and 2005 and adopted a crawling peg (which depoliticizes exchange rate policy). The Pula has gradually stabilized again, but the government's long-term success came with the short-term costs of unpopular devaluations, revenue fluctuations, and years of real depreciation, all of which were absorbed without causing serious instability politically or economically.²⁷

In order to guard against severe fluctuations in revenues, which affect consumption, Botswana accumulated foreign exchange reserves rapidly. "By the mid- 1980s, despite increasing government expenditure on development projects, foreign reserves could cover imports for up to a year and a half. Import cover continued to increase through the 1990s. At the end of 2012 Botswana had reserves to cover 13 months of imports ("Botswana Overview," 2013). Capital accumulation in Botswana, both in terms of national and domestic savings, far exceeds that of other African countries that have experienced periods of sustained economic growth" (Berthelemy & Soderling, 2001, p. 335; Poteete, 2009, p. 552). During periods when diamond prices have dipped, these reserves have indeed helped to stabilize domestic spending. By managing the country's economic boom cautiously and effectively

²⁷ By comparison, the Zimbabwean dollar was highly valued when it was introduced in the 1980s, but has since suffered from hyperinflation and economic collapse, making it the least valuable currency in the world.

regulating the financial sector, the BDP set the stage for sustainable economic growth. However, without the established legitimacy of its institutions and tenure security of the BDP, Botswana would have been hard pressed to achieve long-term currency stability and maintain its trade balance, both of which have helped to keep it on a HEA pathway.

Botswana's government also took other notable steps to improve its control of local diamond mining and economic outcomes. Most notably, it entered into a joint venture with De Beers that makes DEBSWANA, the company that manages Botswana's diamond mines, 50% owned by each ("De Beers - The Group of Companies," 2008, "Debswana," 2013; Tsie, 1996). "This alliance between Botswana and one of the world's most powerful mining conglomerates has enabled the Botswana government to acquire substantial economic and financial muscle, which has driven rural development programmes like ARDP, ALDEP, ARAP and various Drought Relief Schemes [sic]" (Tsie, 1996, p. 613). The government's heavy investment in infrastructural development associated with the mines has also proven to be increasingly valuable. In 1969 when the SACU agreement was renegotiated, Botswana secured a higher share of the customs revenue pool. Over the years, in tandem with its infrastructural improvements, "SACU revenue accruing to Botswana grew from P73.9 million in 1971 to P852.6 million in 1992" (Tsie, 1996, p. 613). "...SACU receipts remain the largest source of revenue (or 31.1%), followed by mineral revenue (or 30.1%). The expected decline in mineral related revenue in FY12/13 and FY13/14 is almost fully countered by expected increases in SACU receipts" ("Botswana Overview," 2013). With the extra revenue, Botswana balanced its budget in the 1972/73 financial year and ended its dependence on British grants-in-aid, significantly strengthening its internal revenue generation, its financial credit, and the financial sector in general, which contributes to the strength of state institutions, the local quality of life, and provision of services (Tsie, 1996).

In conjunction with its management of the diamond industry, the BDP has also taken careful steps to ensure the health of the cattle industry, which was the original backbone of the economy. Beginning in 1975, The Beef Protocol, agreed to between Botswana and the European Union, "provided a lucrative market in which Botswana beef is bought at 30 per cent or more above world market prices" (Tsie, 1996, p. 611). A 2009 Economic Partnership Agreement between the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the EU replaced the original Protocol and allowed Botswana beef to be sold duty and quota free within the EU ("Southern African Development Community (SADC) - Trade - European Commission," 2013). With these market advantages, over time Botswana's cattle-based bourgeoisie has steadily diversified into commerce, manufacturing and real estate, making the cattle industry a secure economic base for the middle class to transform "its economic power from a quasi-capitalist rural base to a more urban-dependent fully capitalist environment" (Tsie, 1996, p. 611). Ultimately, "because [Botswana] was politically more stable than either Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique or even Zimbabwe, it increasingly became a preferred location for foreign private investment. In addition, through careful monetary management and financial discipline, the Botswana Pula became one of the strongest currencies in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s" (Tsie, 1996, p. 612).

Social Integration

The strength of Botswana's institutions and the success of its economic development policies are critically reinforced by its social cohesion, which also indicates progress down a MU pathway. The culture of the Tswana, who make up most of Botswana's population, has long been a stabilizing force. Even though Botswana's ethnic diversity is high and it ranks highly on ethnic fractionalization indices, disruptive conflict has not occurred (Hjort, 2010). This is largely due to a sense of nationalism and common identity that has been cultivated and institutionalized by the Tswana since the 19th Century (Hjort, 2010). Additionally, the tradition of the Tswana to integrate minorities made the prospect of a modern Botswana state less threatening, more tolerable, and familiar in terms of its mechanics to ethnic factions that might otherwise have resorted to the use of force as a means of achieving representation or acquiring power.²⁸ The latter was the case for many of Botswana's neighbors, particularly Angola and the DR Congo. The result for Botswana was that independence came not on the basis of radical ideology and a demand for drastic reform of colonial structures, but as elite-controlled, gradual modernization based on pre-existing notions of hierarchical leadership and inclusive polity.²⁹ By all indications, Botswana continues to reject extremist views and bridge ethnic cleavages in favor of steady development along the HEA pathway.

Besides a strong and inclusive national identity, the Tswana culture also has a tradition of public accountability and consensus building. Both complement a modern parliamentary system of decision-making. The "...pre-colonial Botswana centred on the *kgotla* [community council]. Every administrative unit, from the state itself down through the ward, had its own *kgotla* where all adult males could contribute to the debate" (Hjort, 2010, p. 695). Additionally, some tax measures introduced in pre-colonial administration were successfully rejected by negative public opinion. "Thus, the salience of dissent and public opinion—solidified in Tswana culture before and during the early days of colonialism—constrained the chiefs, colonizers, and politicians in Botswana during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (Beaulier & Subrick, 2006, p. 107; Hjort, 2010, p. 696).

The Tswana culture has also benefitted Botswana in other unique ways. Gender equality in Botswana is generally well regarded. This is partially due to the fact that Tswana customs allowed women to possess cattle, "...and household heads were required to allocate cattle to their wives" (Hjort, 2010, p. 699). Women now comprise some 30% of legislators, senior officials and managers ("Botswana Overview," 2013). Likewise, inter-tribal unity is so ingrained in Tswana social consciousness that "Seretse Khama...took the remarkable decision to transfer property rights over sub-soil diamonds away from his native Ngwato tribe (on whose territory the newly discovered deposits were located) to the government, to prevent conflict among tribes over the control of diamond wealth" (Hjort, 2010, p. 704).

²⁸ Botswana also benefitted from the fact that it was not a desirable or particularly valuable region worth fighting over for most of its colonial and pre-colonial existence. The Kalahari Desert covers much of the country and diamonds were not discovered or seen as valuable until after independence.

²⁹ It is worth noting that Botswana also did not have to reconcile any ethnic tensions brought about by colonial realignment of the traditional political and social order. In many cases, British colonialism disproportionately empowered a controllable ethnic minority as a new elite, creating critical ethnic imbalances at independence that led to violent conflict.

At an individual level, the overall quality of life for the average Batswana has increased significantly in the wake of the country's phenomenal development. "The provision of social services by the state in the form of health facilities, schools, clean pipe-borne water and other welfare services" far outpaces other nations in Sub-Saharan Africa (Tsie, 1996, p. 600; Beaulier & Subrick, 2006, p. 113). The Botswana Export Development and Investment Authority claims that adult literacy is 82.9% and that the Ministry of Education and Skills Development has been allocated a 31.1% share of all government ministry funds in the 2011/2012 budget proposal ("Human Development - Education," 2010). Botswana's progress is also reflected in its current ranking of 119 on the Human Development Index, which is above South Africa, Namibia, and Swaziland (UNDP, 2013). According to the United Nations Development Program, between 1960 and 1992, only Malaysia had higher absolute increases in human development indicators than Botswana (Tsie, 1996).

Future Challenges

Even though most markers suggest that Botswana is on a MU pathway, there are still some pending challenges. In order to stay on a MU pathway and prevent a slide towards muddling through, the BDP and other leaders in Botswana will have to find ways to meet these challenges and sustain economic growth and the improvement of social quality of life, particularly as diamond revenues begin to wane in the coming years. The government estimates that "...the main diamond deposits will be exhausted between 2025 and 2030" ("Botswana Overview," 2013). While careful management of the diamond boom has benefited local development initiatives, increased investments in infrastructure, and helped to create a favorable financial and business environment for foreign investment, more diversification of the economy is required if waning revenues from diamond exports are to be replaced by new production in other sectors. Diversification is also increasingly necessary as a means of addressing high unemployment rates (currently reported at 17.8%) (Statistics Botswana, 2013). Botswana also needs to shrink its public sector. A middle-income country like Botswana should maintain a public sector that represents 25%-30% of GDP rather than the current level of 35% ("Botswana Overview," 2013). Finally, Botswana needs to comprehensively address pockets of extreme poverty, which remain problematic in some rural areas. Combined with the high unemployment rates, these areas have kept Botswana's income inequality figures among the highest in the world ("Botswana Overview," 2013). Making matters more serious, many of these areas of extreme poverty are devastated by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, leading to the second highest HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate in the world ("Botswana Overview," 2013). Botswana must improve its education and health outcomes in these areas to continue making progress along the MU pathway ("Botswana Overview," 2013).

Brazil

Analysis

Introduction

An old cliché states “Brazil is the country of the future...and always will be.” Even at the turn of the 20th century, when Brazil most closely resembled a semi-feudal, patronage-based society, it was clear the country had the size, human capital, ambition, and natural resources to become a major player on the international stage. Today, Brazil is the seventh largest economy in the world after experiencing two decades of remarkable economic growth: millions of Brazilians ascended to the middle class, college enrollment doubled, employment and wages rose, and social inequality diminished (Rohter, 2013). Brazil has strengthened its political institutions, economic infrastructure, and social practices since returning to democracy in 1985. If one only looks at Brazil from 1985 to about 2010, it is clear that Brazil was on the fast track to achieving its goals.

However, since 2011, it has become clear that Brazil’s success engendered a new challenge: providing public goods and services commensurate with its world-class economy. In his 1968 book, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Samuel Huntington suggests that in rapidly growing economies, often the demand for public services eclipses the government’s ability to provide them. “[I]nstitutions cannot develop at the pace required by the fast-growing expectations of a population recently empowered by prosperity, literacy, more information, and a newfound expectation—indeed hunger—to shape its own better future” (Naím, 2013). In June 2013, tens of thousands of people took to the streets to demand higher quality health care and education as well as reduced governmental corruption.³⁰ Anti-government protests again broke out in dozens of cities on Brazil’s Independence Day, 7 September. The Brazilian government is responding to the protests by enacting legislation to improve the quality of government services and fight corruption,³¹ but is trying to do so at a time when Brazil’s economy has begun to slow significantly. It is not yet clear whether the government is resilient enough to meet the population’s demands and weather the economic downturn.

³⁰ The immediate spark to the protests was an increase in bus fares in a country where a minimum wage worker can spend as much as 30% of his monthly salary on bus fares (Arias, 2013). However, the protests quickly became less about the bus fares and more about the government raising prices for services that are not up to standard. The fare increases were seen as an outrage especially since the average tax rate is 37%, which is considered a heavy tax burden for a country where discontent with the provision of basic services is high (Amann & Baer, 2012).

³¹ List of legislation and actions taken or promised by the Brazilian government since June 2013

- Passed by House: Legislation to knock down a widely derided bill that would have stripped some prosecutors from the ability to investigate acts of corruption among lawmakers
- Passed by House: bill to dedicate oil royalties to education and health care, potentially adding tens of billions of dollars to those budgets in the coming decade
- Executive Branch: a promise to improve the health service by employing more than 4,500 foreign doctors, mainly from Cuba, to work in underserved regions in the country
- Legislature: Legislation increasing prison sentences for corruption is being introduced
- Supreme Court Action: Brazilian Supreme Court joined the fray, ordering the arrest of lawmaker Natan Donadon, who was sentenced to a 13-year prison term for embezzlement in 2010. He had used legal loopholes to avoid jail time, and was still serving in Congress
- Local: Over a hundred cities have lowered their bus fares by an average of 7 percent

Complicating the assessment of the Brazilian government's resilience to crises is the interventionist nature of the Brazilian military, which has initiated five coup d'états³² since the founding of the Brazilian republic in 1889. Historically, the Brazilian military has seen itself in a guardianship or caretaker role and has stepped in to tamp down or ameliorate the causes of instability whether they originate in economic shocks, rapid demographic changes, or threatening political movements. So far, the protests and the economic downturn have not risen to the level of crisis necessary for the military to intervene, nor is there any fear of a coup, but the situation gives the civilian government a chance to prove its resiliency and institutional capacity. Until the Brazilian government can prove its ability to govern effectively in the face of these challenges, the old cliché remains relevant today.

History of Instability & Military Interventions

To understand resilience in Brazil, we need to begin with the period that precipitated the 1964 coup since it represents the most severe crisis Brazil has faced in modern times. Janio Quadros took office in January 1961 marking the first time that a standing president had peacefully transitioned power to an elected member of the opposition (Davila, 2013). This auspicious beginning precipitously declined when Quadros resigned only seven months later citing the inability of Congress to cooperate with his agenda. The military blocked the ascension of Vice President Joao Goulart seeing him as a radical leftist. The military eventually allowed Goulart to assume office under pressure from Congress and the public. However, "[t]he return of presidential powers made the military, particularly the army officer corps, highly suspicious of the Goulart administration as the political left became more aggressive in its calls for change" (Skidmore, 1999, p. 154).

The military was justified in its fears. By 1963, Goulart proposed nationalizing oil refineries, instituting land reform, removing restrictions preventing illiterate civilians (39% of the population) from voting as well as allowing enlisted military officers to unionize (Davila, 2013). These proposals challenged traditional sources of political power: the landed elite, commercial interests, and the military—at a time when the economy was heading for a crisis. By 1963, inflation was over 100%, foreign investment neared zero, and the balance of payments went into deficit (Skidmore, 1988). Fearing that the country was on the

³² The military has intervened in Brazilian politics six times since 1889—all but one a coup.

1. 1889—The military staged a coup to depose Emperor Dom Pedro II. While Pedro II was beloved by the people, the country was ready to put aside its colonial legacy. The "First Republic" was nominally a constitutional democracy, but was in effect a coffee-based oligarchy.
2. 1930—The military used the economic shock of the Great Depression to wage a coup to remove the coffee-based oligarchy and landed elites from power, empower the emerging urban middle class, and install a populist leader Getulio Vargas.
3. 1937—The military waged a coup to keep Getulio Vargas in power in the face of a democratic election.
4. 1945—The military staged a bloodless coup to depose Vargas and return to representative democracy.
5. 1961—When the democratically elected President Janio Quadros suddenly resigned from his post in 1961, the military stepped in to try to prevent Vice President Goulart from assuming the presidency due to fears that he was too radical/leftist to lead the country. The military allowed him to assume the presidency on condition that Congress gained parliamentary powers. The powers of the presidency were restored to Goulart by a plebiscite in 1963.
6. 1964—The military staged a coup to remove Goulart from power and install a series of right-wing generals-turned-presidents.

verge of a socialist revolution and economic demise, the military waged a coup on 1 April 1964 installing General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco as president. It is instructive to note that the military intervened due to three main issues: fear of severe economic upheaval, social revolution, and challenges to the political establishment. Essentially, the military intervened to provide stability.

To understand military interventions as a source of stability for the state, one has to grasp the “legalist” tradition of the Brazilian military. The military distinguishes its interventions in civilian government from military dictatorships in other parts of the world due to its firm belief that its interventions derive legitimacy from the existence of a crisis, its respect for the constitution,³³ maintenance of “representative elections,”³⁴ and the intention to return power to civilians once the crisis has been resolved (Skidmore, 1988, 1999). The military can point to a history of relatively bloodless coups and the lack of major initial public opposition to the coups as further proof of its legitimacy in temporarily taking power. Therefore, the population perceives the military’s actions as having some legitimacy to restore political and economic stability.

Another reason military interventions augmented stability is that military leaders could implement necessary, but unpopular, policies to mitigate the causes of instability—something elected civilian officials had trouble doing. For example, prior to the 1964 coup, inflation rose to over 100% and President Goulart was unable to get Congress to pass economic stabilization legislation (freezing wages, reducing public spending and subsidies for public services and utilities) because it was so unpopular with the people that officials feared they would be unelectable if it passed (Skidmore, 1999). The military had the power and unity to implement these macroeconomic reforms, which led the economy to one of its strongest periods of growth from 1968-1980, known as the Brazilian Miracle (Davila, 2013).

The military returned the government to civilian rule in 1985 once its initial objectives had largely been achieved: the implementation of macroeconomic reforms that resulted in the “Brazilian Miracle” and abatement of fears of a socialist revolution. The military was also motivated to return to civilian rule due to the tarnished image of the military government abroad, which both restricted foreign investment and fostered distaste for authoritarianism from young officers (Skidmore, 1999). As it promised in 1964, the military returned a more stable (but far from perfect) nation to the people. Since 1985, the military has returned to the barracks and remained out of politics, giving the civilian government leeway to strengthen and test its own resilience (Freedom House, 2012).

Certainly, the military has played a significant role in Brazil’s economic development and helped it weather economic crises due to its ability to act decisively and in unison, toward a common goal, and it

³³ Coincidentally, there have been six constitutions and six military interventions since 1889.

1. 1891 – Old Republic Constitution
2. 1934 – Third Constitution (the first one being the Imperial Constitution in 1824)
3. 1937 – Estado Novo Constitution
4. 1946 – Fifth Constitution
5. 1967 – Sixth Constitution
6. 1988 – Citizen Constitution

³⁴ Unlike in many other Latin American military regimes, the Brazilian military maintained carefully controlled executive and legislative election cycles to 1) maintain a semblance of democracy and 2) prevent a personality-based dictatorship (Davila, 2013).

met with little popular resistance due to its legalist approach, record of success, and sheer power (Davila, 2013; Skidmore, 1999). However, while the “legalist” nature of military interventions gives the military a semblance of legitimacy, as governors the military has also engaged in activities inconsistent with political development including removing democratically elected officials from power, stripping citizens’ political rights including violent repression of dissent, and rewriting the constitution to suit its own needs (Davila, 2013).

Testing the Resilience of the Civilian Government

Since the return to civilian governance in 1985, the government has slowly and steadily improved institutional capacity, continued to implement necessary macroeconomic reforms, and decreased social inequalities. From 1985 to the present, millions of Brazilians ascended to the middle class, college enrollment doubled, employment and wages rose, and social inequality diminished (Rohter, 2013). However, as mentioned in the introduction, Brazil’s success appears to have created a new challenge to stability: meeting the demands of the population for better quality services and lower levels of government corruption at a time when the Brazilian economy has slowed significantly. The question remains: Does the Brazilian government have the resilience to maintain stability and growth? In previous crises, the Brazilian military intervened based on three conditions: severe economic crisis, social unrest, and challenges to the political establishment. Two of these conditions exist at muted levels today: economic decline and social unrest. How the government deals with these issues may indicate the stability and resilience of the government as compared to 1963.

Economic Development

The civilian government has proven its ability to implement structural economic changes in the face of economic declines. In 1994, the Real Plan introduced significant reforms in the form of “a new currency (the real); the deindexation of the economy; an initial freeze of public sector prices; the tightening of monetary policy; and the floating of the currency, with a floor specified for its value vis-à-vis the dollar” (Clements, 1997, pp. 44-45). These macroeconomic reforms allowed Brazil to create a solid foundation upon which to grow and attract foreign investment through low inflation rates and high interest rates. Brazil’s economy continued to grow through the 2008-2010 world economic crisis due to Brazil’s commitment to strong fiscal policies enabled by the Real Plan. The World Bank concluded in 2012 that “Brazil’s overall macroeconomic framework is solid and sustainable in the medium term. The main risks to the outlook relate to the external environment [which are] mitigated by high foreign reserve levels (about US\$380 billion), favorable external debt composition, a current account fully covered by foreign direct investment, and an overall low degree of trade openness.”

A solid economic foundation allowed for the rise of millions of people out of poverty. Approximately 40 million people joined Brazil’s middle class since 2001, which now accounts for 95 million people—or 52 percent of the total population (Government of Brazil, n.d.; Meyer, 2013). Equally as important, the poorest segment of Brazilian society has not been forgotten. In 2003, President Lula da Silva instituted the *Bolsa Familia* (Family Grant), a welfare program aimed at reducing inequality and improving the lives of Brazil’s 48 million poorest citizens (Freedom House, 2012). The plan provides US\$50 per month for low-income families who keep children vaccinated and in school. *Bolsa Familia* is credited with reducing

extreme poverty from 17.3% of the population in 2001 to 10.2% in 2007 (Freedom House, 2012). However, despite its laudable advances, the Brazilian economy is not immune to fluctuations.

Today, Brazil is facing an economic decline that threatens its continued growth. GDP growth rates slowed to 0.9% in 2012 compared to 7.5% in 2011 (World Bank, 2013). In June 2013, Standard and Poor's lowered its rating of Brazil's economic outlook to the lowest investment grade rating possible as a result of "slow economic growth, expansionary fiscal policy that was likely to lead to an increase in the government's debt burden, and 'ambiguous policy signals' in decision-making" (Leahy, 2013). Brazil's 12-month average inflation rate is 6.15%, not far from exceeding the government-set, acceptable inflation range of 2.5%-6.5%, meaning that the government may have to step in to curb rising inflation (Jelmayer, 2013). Analysts suggest that Brazil's government need to decrease spending on pensions (currently 10% of GDP), decrease red tape associated with corruption and protectionist policies, and update labor laws to make Brazil more competitive internationally (The Economist, n.d.). As in 1963, some of these reforms would be highly unpopular, such as restructuring pensions, but are necessary for continued economic growth. It is unclear whether the government will be able to work together and convince the population of the need to tighten the belt to improve economic prospects.

Social Unrest

Brazil's economic success (until 2011) appears to have created a new challenge: providing public goods and services commensurate with a developed, industrialized economy, and to have fueled another: government corruption. With regard to the provision of services, Huntington (1968) suggests that in rapidly growing economies, public demand for services often eclipses the government's ability to provide them. Over several weeks in June 2013, tens of thousands took to the streets in dozens of cities across Brazil to demand higher quality health care and education as well as reduced governmental corruption. Protests once again broke out across the nation during military parades celebrating Brazil's independence day on 7 September (Romero, 2013). Both times, the riots were put down violently by police officers in riot gear. The government's response to the protests—using violence by para-military forces to repress dissent—both underlines the severity of social unrest and that the lack of more appropriate tools to address dissent.

Causes of Social Unrest

A poll conducted in Brazil just after the June 2013 protests found that 48% of respondents felt that health care was the principal problem facing the country with education (13%) and corruption (11%) following (Folha do Sao Paulo, 2013). The 1988 constitution made health care a right of every citizen. This guarantee extended health services to millions of Brazil's poorest citizens who were previously denied even basic care (World Health Organization, n.d.). But the lack of modern, state-of-the-art public hospitals and clinics as well as long wait times to see specialists or to have surgery forces those with resources to seek health care in the private sector ("Flying in Doctors," 2013). Additionally, as many as two-fifths of Brazilians lack access to local primary care because there are not enough doctors willing to work in remote or poor areas. Lack of access combined with low quality care has resulted in 60% of health care spending taking place in private institutions—"a higher share than in most other Latin American countries, and higher even than in the United States" (Economist, 2011). The failure of the

Brazilian government to provide high quality health care erodes public confidence in its institutional capacity as well as prospects for the future of the country.

In the poll cited above, education was identified as the second largest challenge facing the country. The progress Brazil has made in education since the return to democracy in 1985, while significant in relative terms, remains insufficient to satisfy the demands of Brazil's youth who want to enter the global marketplace. For example, Brazil increased expenditure per student on primary and secondary education by 149% between 2005 and 2009, yet overall expenditure on education remains below the OECD average as a percentage of GDP (OECD, 2012). Furthermore, while Brazil quadrupled average educational attainment from an abysmal 1.8 years in 1960 to 7.2 years in 2010, it lags behind many of its emerging economy peers in terms of literacy, school attendance, investment, school performance, and graduation (Amann & Baer, 2012).³⁵ The rise of the middle class combined with the high tax burden Brazilians carry has resulted in a demand for high quality primary and secondary education the government struggles to provide.

Corruption was identified as the third largest challenge facing the country. According to a 2012 poll published by Transparency International "the credibility of Brazil's political institutions has sunk to rock bottom: 81% of Brazilians think political parties are corrupt and 72% think Congress is corrupt" (Boadle, 2013; Transparency International, 2012). In 2008, corruption in the National Congress of Brazil was so rampant that 40% of deputies had pending court cases ranging from tax evasion to murder (Freedom House, 2012)³⁶. The judiciary is also "inefficient and subject to political and economic influence" (Freedom House, 2012). While the executive branch is known to be equally corrupt, President Dilma Rousseff has fought corruption, going so far as dismissing several cabinet level officials for "abusing the public trust" (Meyer, 2013). Corruption cost businesses US\$41 billion in 2010, and nearly 70% of corporations in Brazil report paying bribes in order to get business done with the Brazilian government (Stewart, 2010). Notably, the military is seen as the country's least corrupt institution.

The Brazilian government realizes that corruption is a threat to Brazil's continued political, economic, and social development. President Dilma Rousseff recently began cracking down on cases of blatant corruption by public officials. Tens of mid- and high-ranking officials have been fired or arrested by federal police on corruption charges since 2011 (Rocha, 2011), and, on 27 June 2013, the Brazilian Senate approved a bill to strengthen the sentences for corruption convictions. "Under the new law, corruption will be considered a 'heinous crime' and those found guilty will not be eligible for parole or amnesty... It will apply to government officials who take advantage of their job to demand favours and to those who embezzle public funds. It will also apply to individuals or institutions who offer bribes to officials" (BBC News, 2013). Pervasive corruption erodes the government's legitimacy.

³⁵ In fact, on an index of cognitive skills and educational attainment, Brazil ranked 39 of 40 countries measured, below neighboring Argentina and Chile (Pearson, 2012).

³⁶ Deputies are granted parliamentary immunity and can only be tried by the Supreme Court.

Brazil's difficulties with providing essential services and reducing corruption illustrates how making progress, even significant progress, is not enough to put a country on a trajectory of durable growth and development—the services provided and the ways in which they are provided must meet public expectations. Social unrest is fed by a perceived lack of government responsiveness. But social unrest is not always a destabilizing force: it can be seen as a form of civic engagement. In a *New York Times* editorial, former President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva argued that demonstrations are a natural part of democracy that helps keep the government responsive to the people. He wrote, “the demonstrations are largely the result of social, economic, and political successes. In the last decade, Brazil doubled its number of university students, many from poor families. We sharply reduced poverty and inequality. These are significant achievements, yet it is completely natural that young people, especially those who are obtaining things their parents never had, should desire more” (Lula da Silva, 2013). Brazil enjoys free and fair elections, which is one way citizen can exert their political voice, but when electoral options fail to represent their views, political protest is a secondary avenue for political voice. The Brazilian government's ability to respond to these voices constructively could improve political legitimacy, institutional strength, social integration, and civic engagement.

Conclusion

The defining feature of the Brazilian political system from 1889-1985 was military intervention in time of perceived national crisis. Yet since 1985, Brazil has strengthened its political institutions, experienced strong economic growth, and reduced social inequalities. However, recent discontent rising from increased expectations for better government services and lower corruption combined with a slowing economy may provide a serious challenge that will test the resiliency of the civilian government. It remains to be seen whether government can overcome the cliché that “Brazil is the country of the future...and always will be.” One could argue that Brazil's flaws—quality of essential services, pervasive corruption, slowing economic growth—preclude Brazil's characterization as a success story; however, resolving this challenge peacefully could prove to be a source of political resilience for the nation. It would build off progress already made in instituting economic reforms, supporting the elevation of 40 million people to the middle class, and nascent anti-corruption reform. How the Brazilian government responds to the slowing economy and social unrest will determine whether the country continues on its upward developmental trajectory or retracts into political instability. Thus, it seems like the old cliché remains relevant today.

South Korea

Analysis

This case study explores the Muddling Along pathway markers using South Korea as a case study. A historical case study approach is employed, using the SMA South Asia Muddling Along markers to guide data collection and analysis. Overall the evidence suggests that South Korea has been, and continues to be on a Muddling Upwards trajectory. As a Muddling Along case study, South Korea exemplifies countries that developed their economies first and, only once growth was sustained, liberalized and built capacity in the political sphere. South Korea's road to overall positive development began in the early 1960s with significant focus on economic growth and development. It was only after significant economic improvements had been achieved that democratization and political liberalization became a primary objective.

The years following South Korea's partition in 1948 were a time of economic and social hardship in the country. At the time, the economy was primarily agrarian, underdeveloped, and heavily dependent on foreign aid (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013). By 1961, the still dire economic conditions together with political dissent and widespread public calls for change prompted a military coup led by General Park Chung-Hee ("Country Profile: South Korea," 2005). For the next 26 years (1961-1987), military and former military leaders dominated South Korea's political leadership. Although those years were characterized by internal power struggles and repression of political dissent (on the grounds of the threat posed by North Korea) (Freedom House, 2013), they were also a time of unprecedented economic growth—largely the result of the leadership's commitment to economic growth above all else, including civil liberties. While South Korean standards of living rose consistently, democratic growth and political development remained constrained through the late 1980s ("Country Profile: South Korea," 2005). The change was marked by Korea's first free, fair, and direct presidential election held in 1987 (Domjahn, 2013).

Economic Development

Significant development of South Korea's economy began under the strict, authoritarian rule of General Park Chung-Hee. In fact, the years of the Park Chung-Hee-led government (1961-1979), have been identified as "the key period in which South Korea was promoted from the Third World economic league" (Minns, 2001, p. 1026). Park Chung-Hee "established the basis for strong state intervention oriented to the goal of rapid industrialization" (Minns, 2001, p. 1026). During this time the economy grew at an average annual rate of nearly 9% and per capita income increased more than a hundredfold (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013). However, it is important to consider that although Park led the governments that instituted the policies that guided South Korea to achieve such rapid economic growth, he also presided over violent repression of political dissent and other human rights abuses as political development was put on hold.³⁷ It appears to have been Park's belief that South Korea could not function as a democracy until a higher level of economic development was achieved—he once

³⁷ Park Chung-Hee had little patience for dissidents, jailing, torturing, and even executing those who got in his way (Domjahn, 2013; Yi, 2013).

wrote that “the gem without luster called democracy was meaningless to people suffering from starvation and despair” (Schuman, 2010a).

Specifically, the Park government’s strategy was to use interventionist state economic controls to restructure the economy into one driven by industrial exports—the government was reportedly “obsessed with exports” (Minns, 2001, p. 1028).³⁸ Reforms included state control of finance, maintenance of a low-wage economy during expansion, state-determined allocation of resources for investment, price setting, regulation of domestic and offshore capital movement, assignment of annual export targets for larger firms, 50% tax cuts on export earnings, subsidized credit for exporters, and nationalization of the banking system (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013; Minns, 2001). As a result, by 1970 the state controlled 96.4% of the country’s financial assets which allowed economic planners to distribute resources to economic sectors deemed vital to industrial development (Minns, 2001). The rapid growth was also aided by the existence in South Korea of a labor force with an abundance of skilled and educated workers. In addition, government-sponsored programs encouraged the growth of family-owned industrial conglomerates, known as *chaebol* (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013). Foremost among these were Hyundai and Samsung, which would eventually help “South Korea’s export-led industrialization drive transform[ed] the poor, agrarian country into one of the world’s leading economies” (Freedom House, 2013), and facilitate its transformation into one of the world’s most highly industrialized nations (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013). South Korea’s development from dependence on primary exports to an innovative economy that develops and exports high technology products indicates solid development of the once weak economy.

Brief Economic Crisis

South Korea’s economic success was briefly halted by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Growth had slowed during the 1990s and when the crisis hit, the country had little choice but to accept a \$57 billion USD bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—then the largest such rescue in IMF history (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013). In fact, the Asian financial crisis had exposed structural weaknesses in the South Korean economy. Foreign reserves were insufficient, foreign borrowing was extensive, and corporate debt/equity ratios were extremely high (“Country Profile: South Korea,” 2005). “The surge in debt, a result in part of government policies that failed to rein in a corporate culture that favored expansion over profits, became a significant vulnerability” (“Country Profile: South Korea,” 2005, p. 9). The crisis made it clear that South Korea had to reform the *chaebol* and liberalize its economy. In the past, South Korean companies were shielded from competition and heavily supported by tight links with the government and banks, which allowed them to borrow and invest freely while building up large debt burdens (Schuman, 2010b). The 1997 crisis ended this government-banking-corporate relationship and forced South Korean companies to become truly profitable, independent, and internationally competitive for the first time. Following the Asian financial crisis, foreign investors began to play a much

³⁸ Government and business leaders targeted specific industries for development—the first targeted industries were textiles and light manufacturing; followed in the 1970s by such heavy industries as iron, steel, and chemicals; and eventually the focus shifted to high-technology industries including automobiles, electronics, and information technology (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013).

larger role in the South Korean economy creating an influx of foreign money, ideas, and people, which has contributed to the recovery and continued development of South Korea's economy (Schuman, 2010b). While the 1997 Asian financial crisis created short-term economic instability in South Korea, it helped to reform weaknesses in the country's economic structure and ultimately helped to create a more stable economy that appears better able to sustain long-term economic growth. South Korea's resilience to overcome the shock of the 1997 Asian financial crisis provides further evidence that the country is on a Muddling Upwards trajectory.

Political Development

The first large-scale, public push for democratization in South Korea occurred in May 1980 when demonstrations against government repression broke out in the city of Kwangju. Despite the fact that the demonstrations were violently suppressed, the demonstrations kick-started a pro-democracy movement among students, labor unions, churches, and Korea's parliamentary opposition (Adesnik & Kim, 2008). In 1987, after years of sustained popular protests, the military leadership succumbed to public pressure and allowed free and fair democratic elections (Adesnik & Kim, 2008; "Country Profile: South Korea," 2005). The military leadership's handpicked successor, Roh Tae-Woo, won the December 1987 presidential election as opposition parties failed to unite around a single candidate. In 1993 Kim Young-Sam was elected president becoming the nation's first non-military chief executive in three decades ("Country Profile: South Korea," 2005; Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013). Kim Young-Sam sought to extricate any remaining military leaders from power and reassert civilian authority over the military. Shortly after taking office, he purged thousands of bureaucrats, military leaders, and businessmen, released thousands of political prisoners, and launched a major anti-corruption initiative including arresting former Presidents Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013; Freedom House, 2013). Democratic representation in government has continued to improve since 1987, driven by Presidents Kim Dae-Jung, elected in 1997, and Roh Moo-Hyun, elected in 2002, the first leaders to come from an opposition party ("Country Profile: South Korea," 2005; Schuman, 2010a). Furthermore, in 2012, Park Geun-Hye, the daughter of Park Chung-Hee, was elected the first female President of South Korea.

South Korea's transition to free, fair, and direct elections in 1987 has allowed the country to develop its political sphere. South Korea has become a fully functioning modern democracy that has remained under control of democratically elected leadership (CIA, 2013). The military no longer holds power over the country. The government has become entirely civilian, as the Korean military was completely depoliticized in the early 1990's, and the president is now the commander of the armed forces (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013; Lee, 2004). The civilian-military power struggle has been resolved. Access to the government and democratic representation has improved, which was portrayed when opposition parties won presidential elections in 1997 and 2002 and when South Korea elected its first female president in 2012. Since the transition to free, fair, and direct Presidential elections, "all the major players in South Korean politics have taken turns governing the country—adversaries and longtime dissidents Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, who struggled valiantly for democracy against authoritarian regimes, as well as the radical leftists and pro-North Korean '386 generation' (a term coined to denote those ... who went to college during the 1980s and were born in the 1960s), who

spearheaded violent uprisings against the military-backed governments”—making them responsible stakeholders (Chaibong, 2008, p. 131). Civil society has grown, evident through the development of freedom of speech and press laws. “The open and almost completely unregulated expression of views in South Korea can be seen as a proof of active civil society in a democratized South Korea” (Cha & Lee, n.d.). While corruption still exists in the South Korean government, President Kim Young-Sam and subsequent presidents have launched anti-corruption campaigns to remove corrupt individuals and strengthen government legitimacy. South Korea’s transition to free, fair, and direct presidential elections in 1987 and the overall political development that has resulted indicates a Muddling Upwards trajectory. “Korea is one of those rare countries that has jumped from a developing to a developed nation. Korea has managed this feat because it has become a more innovative economy. Some Koreans argue that the country couldn’t have become more innovative without democracy” (Schuman, 2010a).

Social Development

Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, South Korea has made steady progress with respect to social development. Living standards in South Korea have improved steadily as a result of the country’s economic success. Life expectancy has increased significantly (currently 81 years, one year higher than the OECD average)³⁹ and mortality rates have slowed (currently 4.01 deaths per 1,000 live births), reflecting an overall increase in living standards (CIA, 2013; “Country Profile: South Korea,” 2005; “OECD Better Life Index,” n.d.; Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013). The availability of medical services has increased enormously and now covers the basic needs of the country to a satisfactory level. Public health and sanitation has also greatly improved (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013).

Because South Korea has one of the most ethnically homogenous societies in the world, ethnic-based social cleavage has not been a barrier to positive development (Domjahn, 2013; Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013). South Koreans exhibit a strong social cohesion. They “identify with their nation and their companies understanding economic development as an individual as well as societal goal” (Domjahn, 2013, p. 18). The population’s social cohesion is further strengthened by the country’s long-standing rivalry with North Korea (Domjahn, 2013).

Additionally, South Korea’s highly motivated and well-educated population, which has contributed to the economic development and success that has helped stabilize the country along a Muddling Upwards trajectory, provides indication of positive social development.⁴⁰ South Korea has placed a high importance on educating its people and has consistently invested in doing so. Over 7% of South Korea’s GDP is invested in education. Private investment in education amounts to 2.8% of GDP, which is the highest value of all OECD countries (Domjahn, 2013). The continued investment in education has created a South Korean population that is one of the best educated in the world with a literacy rate of

³⁹ In 1960, life expectancy in Korea was 16 years below OECD average (“OECD Better Life Index,” n.d.).

⁴⁰ “A well-educated and well-trained population is essential for a country’s social and economic well-being. Education plays a key role in providing individuals with the knowledge, skills and competences needed to participate effectively in society and in the economy” (“OECD Better Life Index,” n.d.).

97.9% (CIA, 2013). South Korea's commitment to and development of education at all levels has been strong enough to support its industrialization and overall economic development (Domjahn, 2013). This highly educated population creates an educated and skilled workforce capable of sustaining economic growth and development. South Korea's development of a highly educated population able to support its innovative, technologically advanced economy indicates positive social growth.

Today, problems remain with social equality and crime against women in South Korea. Sexual harassment and disparities in pay between men and women exist. Additionally, rape and child abuse continue to be problems. South Korea is a significant country of origin, transit, and destination for the human trafficking of women and children for the sex trade ("Country Profile: South Korea," 2005). Although this has not created social instability, it does indicate that South Korea still has progress to be made in terms of social development. However, there are signs that social equality and the empowerment of women is improving. South Korean women have persistently campaigned for complete legal equality and have gained enhanced property ownership rights (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013; Freedom House, 2013). Additionally, in November 2012 punishments for sex crimes were increased including raising maximum sentences to lifetime imprisonment, increasing public access to sex offender identities, removing statutes of limitations, and increasing the age range for chemical castration (Freedom House, 2013). While South Korea still has progress to be made when it comes to social equality and empowerment, these recent events provide indication of continued positive social development and a Muddling Upwards trajectory.

Conclusion

Since its partition in 1948, South Korea has become one of Asia's most affluent countries ("South Korea profile," 2013). "From autocracy to democracy, from war to peace, and from poverty to riches, this nation has seen it all" (Thomas White Global Investing, 2010). The economic and societal development of South Korea is "without doubt a success story" (Domjahn, 2013, p. 16).

Economically, South Korea has transformed itself from an underdeveloped, agrarian country into the world's 12th largest economy (CIA, 2013) as an industrialized nation that exports technologically-advanced products (Domjahn, 2013; Freedom House, 2013). It has developed into an innovative economy that "designs and develops products, infuses them with the latest technology, and then brands and markets them worldwide, with style and smarts" (Schuman, 2010b). The country possesses a highly educated workforce that is more than sufficient for economic growth and development and the unemployment rate was only 3.2% in June 2013 (Taborda, 2013). The 1997 Asian financial crisis helped spur efforts to reform structural weaknesses in South Korea's economy, ultimately helping create a more stable system capable of sustained, long-term economic development. South Korea, like much of the world, was effected by the 2008 global economic downturn; however, because of its stable economic infrastructure its economy was able to quickly rebound reaching 6.3% growth in 2010 (CIA, 2013). South Korea has demonstrated resilience in overcoming shocks to the system (i.e., the 1997 Asian financial crisis and 2008 global economic downturn). This resilience, combined with the country's overall economic success, provides indication of a country on a Muddling Upwards trajectory.

Politically, after more than two decades of largely military dictatorship, South Korea transitioned to free, fair, and direct democratic presidential elections in 1987. This transition has made it possible for the country to develop its political sphere. Since the transition, democratically elected leadership has remained in control of the country and leaders from opposition parties have been elected president. Voter turnout for the 2012 presidential election was 76% (“OECD Better Life Index,” n.d.) and, in a historic decision, voters elected Park Geun-Hye as the first female president of South Korea. Since adopting free, fair, and direct democratic elections, South Korea has been politically stable, the civilian-military power struggle has been resolved, access to the government and democratic representation has increased, and civil society has grown—all of which indicate a Muddling Upwards trajectory.

Socially, South Korea’s population is one of the best educated in the world and this largely homogenous population exhibits a strong social cohesion. Living standards in South Korea have steadily improved since the end of the Korean War as a result of the country’s economic success. While problems still exist with social equality and crime against women, there are signs that these problems are becoming more widely recognized and legislation has been passed to address some of these issues, further indication of positive social development and a country Muddling Upwards.

Turkey

Analysis

This case study explores the Muddling Down and Muddling Up pathways using Turkey as a case study. A historical case study approach (1987-present) is employed, using the SMA South Asia markers to guide data collection and analysis. The markers for both pathways are wide ranging and numerous along the same political, economic, and social lines; however the observations expected, both in terms of strength and direction, are different for each pathway. The muddling up pathway is characterized as a country that exhibits increasing stability in the political, economic, and social realms. The muddling down pathway is characterized by chronic weakness of the state, without major deviation from the current status quo; that is, neither precipitous decline nor obvious improvement in political performance, economic growth and development and social conditions is observed. It is also the case that the country's economic, political and social conditions could be at different positions on this path at any one point in time.

Overall, the evidence suggests that Turkey appears to have been on a muddling up pathway until May of 2013; however, a close examination of individual markers reveals that the current political turmoil and economic conditions have moved Turkey onto the muddling down path. Turkey's mid- and long-term trajectory is unclear as the country struggles to overcome the internal conflict that has threatened its economic and international standing.

A Country in Turmoil & Initial Steps Toward Change

Since the establishment of the state of Turkey, the country has experienced fluctuating political, economic and social stability. Economic and social conditions worsened in the late 1970s and the civilian government was overthrown by a military coup (Ahmadov, 2008; Harris, 2011; Haynes, 2010). As conditions continued to deteriorate martial law was declared in 1980 (Ahmadov, 2008; Harris, 2011) indicating that Turkey was experiencing a period of declining stability, or overall a muddling down pathway. The worsening conditions within the country attracted the attention of the European Community (Ahmadov, 2008; Harris, 2011) - a community Turkey had long aspired to fully join - resulting in pressure for Turkey to lift martial law. In a bid to enhance Turkey's attractiveness for full membership, its martial law was lifted with the election of the first democratic/civilian government since 1980. However, full membership in the European Union will require additional changes in Turkey's political, social, and economic sectors; changes that could also succeed in moving Turkey away from muddling down and towards a muddling up pathway.

The Rocky Ascent

In 1987, following the lifting of martial law, Turkey formally submitted a bid for full membership in the European Union signaling its commitment to reforms necessary for economic, political, and social development. The conditions for membership, many of which align with typical markers of positive development, require candidate countries to establish and implement democratic institutions that provide rule of law, protection of human rights, and the ability to operate a functioning market economy (European Commission, 2013).

While Turkey's accession process is on-going,⁴¹ according to some scholars Turkey has made significant strides in subordinating "the political powers of the popular praetorian military" to civilian control, and has institutionalized civil-military relations to align with "practice in the EU" (Sarigil, 2011, pp. 270–272). Turkey's economic team led by Prime Minister Erdogan and Deputy Prime Minister Babacan has implemented numerous changes, focusing on rebuilding the fundamental economic structure of the country and investing in infrastructure, education, health and technology (Sachs, 2013).

Political Development: Although the military had previously interjected itself into the democratic process⁴² and had been seen as a significant component of Turkey's political system for 26 years, since 1987 it has allowed the civilian government to function without interference.⁴³ Following the return to civilian rule, Turkey's parliament was committed to reforming the political, bureaucratic, and judicial systems (Koker, 1995). The strengthening of the civilian leadership and the increased capacity of state institutions suggests that Turkey is on a muddling up trajectory.

Another area of importance for EU membership and a possible sign of progress toward a muddling up pathway is improvement of governmental services such as education, health, and job creation – all areas where there has been observable improvement since 1987. For example, while there are still deficiencies noted in the Turkish educational system, the European Commission recently reported that increased education spending in Turkey has "generated a positive impact on educational attainment and schooling rates" (European Commission, 2012, pp. 41–42). Health care services have improved due to the implementation of the Health Transformation Program (HTP), which has made health care both accessible and affordable for the entire population (World Health Organization, 2012). In addition, since 2001, more than 1.5 million new jobs have been created in Turkey (Ozturk, 2011). Survey data suggests that during the early 2000s Turkish citizens were generally satisfied with service provision. For example, in a national survey only 3% of respondents were dissatisfied with health services and only 8% were dissatisfied with education (Adaman, et al., 2001, p. 38 as cited in OECD, 2010). Although inequalities remain (European Commission, 2012; World Health Organization, 2012) Turkey has experienced improvement in the provision of these services, suggesting a positive trajectory along the muddling up pathway.

⁴¹ Membership in the European Union requires countries to enter and complete three distinct phases: "When a country is ready it becomes an official candidate for membership – but this does not necessarily mean that formal negotiations have been opened; The candidate moves on to formal membership negotiations, a process that involves the adoption of established EU law, preparations to be in a position to properly apply and enforce it and implementation of judicial, administrative, economic and other reforms necessary for the country to meet the conditions for joining, known as accession criteria; and, when the negotiations and accompanying reforms have been completed to the satisfaction of both sides, the country can join the EU (European Commission, 2013).

⁴² In the form of military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980

⁴³ The military has not interfered with the civilian government due to awareness that a civilian government is a necessary element for candidacy to EU membership, an outcome that is perceived to be beneficial to the entire country, including the military.

Recognition by a government of the importance of investing in, and maintaining the state's energy, water and transportation infrastructure as engines of economic growth and social stability appears to be a crucial aspect in development in these areas. Over the past 10 years, Turkey has invested \$75 billion in road infrastructure. Unfortunately, the country still needs to invest approximately \$350 billion in transportation to attain European standards (Anatolia News Agency, 2013). In addition to transportation infrastructure, Turkey has also invested significantly in improving its energy and water systems and a 2012 European Commission report notes that, "overall, in the area of energy, Turkey is at a moderately advanced stage of alignment" with EU standards (European Commission, 2012, p. 62). Water management lags a bit behind but attempts at improvement can be observed: recent investment has increased Turkey's wastewater treatment capacity and in 2011 established the Turkish Water Institute to advise on water management and help develop a national water policy (European Commission, 2012, p. 8).

Social Development: There do remain issues with social development in Turkey (e.g., human rights) but these appear to be improving particularly with regard to the Kurdish conflict⁴⁴, which has been on-going since 1984. The armed conflict that continued until 1999 resulted in the loss of approximately 37,000 lives and the destruction of approximately 3,000 Kurdish villages. When the AKP (Justice and Development Party) gained control of Parliament, it worked to resolve the conflict and engage Kurds in Turkish society (Onis, 2009). While the Kurdish conflict has not been completely resolved, the government has taken a strategy of actively engaging the Kurds in political decision making to continue to work toward resolution (Curtis, 2013; Somer, 2004). In 2002, the political efforts to resolve the conflict resulted in a reduction in the percentage of Turkish citizens who saw "'terror and security' as the greatest threats to the country dropping from 39.3 to 5.5%" (Somer, 2004, p. 236).

While the vast majority of Turkey's population is Muslim, it is not represented by a single form of Islam (Aras & Toktas, 2007, p. 1043). Moreover, Turkey's mode of secular government (and before that, Ottoman rulers) has been relatively tolerant of diversity and religious freedom, i.e., the coexistence of multiple belief systems. This explains the Turk's nominal support to date for extremist groups and others seeking to establish Islamic rule. The majority of Turkish citizens do not support al-Qaida and "75% [of the respondents] reject the idea that al-Qaida represents Muslims" (Aras & Toktas 2007, p. 1041). Unfortunately, this belief system does not ensure a lack of social cleavages or conflict between various groups.

Turkey's overall record on social development measures has improved since the 1980s. However, as mentioned above, the Kurdish conflict has not been completely resolved and there is additional

⁴⁴ The Kurdish population within Turkey, represented by the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), desires either a separate Kurdish territory or, at the very least a guarantee of political autonomy and improved human rights (BBC, 2012)

evidence of continuing conflict among other groups⁴⁵. Additionally, the current situation raises concerns about the stability of progress in this domain.

Economic Growth and Development: Overall, Turkey's economy has improved reflecting "gains in the management of public spending, business freedom and labor freedom..." (The Heritage Foundation, 2013). Under the direction of PM Erdogan and DPM Babacan, Turkey's economy is "diversified, [with an] innovative base of industry, construction, and services" and in 2013 had a solid 8.5% growth rate (The Heritage Foundation, 2013). Furthermore, Turkey's investments in transportation (particularly airports, and highways) have been lauded. High-speed intercity rail has made Turkey an attractive tourist destination and generated significant revenue (Sachs, 2013). Finally, Turkey's investment in education over the past two decades has resulted in a significant increase in skilled labor through increased education levels for men and women across all socioeconomic groups and regions (OECD, 2010, p. 21). While these changes demonstrate significant growth and development, recent internal events have called into question the stability of Turkey's ascent on the muddling up pathway.

May 2013- Present: Shaky Path

Political Growth & Development: While Turkey has demonstrated political growth and development since 1987 there are several key issues that run contrary to the expectations of a muddling up path. Corruption, is a significant problem in Turkey as it degrades popular perceptions of governing effectiveness and legitimacy (The Heritage Foundation, 2013).⁴⁶ A 2010 survey found that more than 25% of the respondents rated the judiciary as extremely corrupt and "26.2% of households who had contact with the judiciary paid a bribe in 2009" (Chene, 2012, p. 4). According to Transparency International "the judicial system faces structural weaknesses of inefficiency, backlog of cases, inadequate training of judges, etc. that undermine public trust in the institution" (Chene, 2012, p. 4).

Furthermore, it is reported that Turkey has "a very narrow and limited part of the population engag[ed] in civil society" (European Citizen Action Service, 2012). It has also been reported that "Turkey's approach to minorities remain[s] restrictive" (European Commission, 2012, p. 32). This has been accomplished "through limiting the use of minority languages in political campaigns and banning parties or associations based on ethnicity and religion" (Grigoriadis, 2006, p. 456) and via the 10% threshold rule. The 10% rule effectively prevents minority political parties from participating in parliament, which resulted in a two-party parliament in 2002, effectively ignoring 46.33% of the votes cast (Onis, 2009). These factors taken together indicate an inability of the government to represent all members of the Turkish population in a fair and equitable manner; this is likely to result in public demonstrations and low civic engagement.

Economic Growth and Development: While Turkey has experienced positive economic growth along with expansion of the educated segments of its labor force, numerous economic issues may not bode well for continued economic growth and development. First, while the unemployment rate dropped

⁴⁶ Turkey received a score of 4.2 on the 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean) Corruption Perceptions Index (Chene, 2012, p. 2).

significantly between 2009 and 2012 (decreasing from 13.7% in 2009 to 9.5% in 2012) (Gonenc et al., 2012), unemployment rose again in 2013 to 11.7%. It is unclear whether this rise is an aberration or whether it represents a trend in unemployment. As mentioned earlier, corruption is a problem that permeates not only the political sphere but the economic sphere as well (Sarlak & Bali, 2008; The Heritage Foundation, 2013). Combined with institutional weaknesses and an overburdened, inefficient judicial system corrupt practices “continue to hold back economic freedom and prevent more dynamic growth”(The Heritage Foundation, 2013). The informal economic sector continues to grow resulting in a loss of formal productivity (Gonenc et al., 2012), again contrary to expectations of positive development.

Turkey's dependence on foreign investment and its trade imbalance are probably the most serious economic problems facing the country; they also jeopardize Turkey's quest for EU membership (European Commission, 2012). In 2001, Turkey imported 11.193 billion Euros worth of goods more than it exported. This figure rose dramatically to 76.125 billion Euros in 2011, suggesting that Turkey is purchasing more than it is producing. This puts the country in a precarious position. In addition, Turkey is dependent on foreign investment, earning \$15.9 billion USD in FDI (foreign direct investment) in 2013. It is estimated that Turkey will need to receive in excess of \$200 billion USD in foreign loans within the next year to offset its current account deficit (Jones, 2013). Turkey's dependence on foreign money and vulnerability to investors' perceptions of risk has significant implications for its ability to remain on a muddling up pathway as “Turkey's economic future will not be in its own hands”(Santamaria, 2013).

Social Development: While Turkey has made some movement toward improving social conditions, its record on human rights remains troubling. Despite efforts to resolve the Kurdish conflict, even civilian-led governments have consistently taken a harsh stance against demonstrators, journalists, scholars, lawyers, and opposition politicians. In addition the government has inhibited Turkish citizens' freedom of speech by banning internet sites and jailing its academic and journalist critics (Marshall, 2013). An Istanbul-based editor commented that “the government does not differentiate between these two major things: freedom of expression and terrorism.” (Marshall, 2013, paragraph 20).

The latest confrontation, the 2013 protests over Gezi Park and the harsh government treatment of protesters demonstrates the lengths to which the Turkish government will go in order to curtail and silence opposition. To some observers, the government's response to the protests jeopardizes Turkey's economic future as well as its membership in the EU (Croft & Pawlak, 2013; Jones, 2013; Santamaria, 2013). As the European Union Enlargement Commissioner has stated, "Peaceful demonstrations constitute a legitimate way for these groups to express their views in a democratic society. Excessive use of force by police against these demonstrations has no place in such a democracy" (Benitez, 2013). While the European Commission acknowledges that “some progress was made on the observance of international human rights law...important reforms are needed to strengthen human rights structures” (European Commission, 2012, p. 19).

Conclusion

The bottom-line is that Turkey has progressed in the three domains (social, political, and economic) due to their desire to be an active member in the international community, specifically the European

Community. However, due to the lengthy and unsatisfactory process for membership to the EU, the desire to conform to the EU guidelines is waning, resulting in a lack of concern for the impact of their actions on their EU application. Without the incentive for membership to the EU, it appears that Turkey has lost its momentum along the muddling along pathway, slipping down into muddling through on several markers, particularly economic and social markers.

This case study allowed for a close examination of the markers to determine which markers appear to be critical for movement and progression on the muddling up pathway. An analysis of Turkey suggests that in order to be on a *stable* positive pathway however, a country must be making progress in all three (political, social, and economic) areas. While Turkey has made progress in all three areas the *continued* movement along a muddling up pathway requires increasing economic independence and the ability to withstand international disapproval (e.g., threats to postpone EU talks and enforce stricter lending conditions) without suffering monetarily. Turkey has not yet met that condition.

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