

Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) & Minerva Research Initiative

South Asia Stability Assessment Academic Consortium

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This report represents the views and opinions of the workshop participants. The report does not represent official USG policy or position.

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Background

The Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) office provides planning support to the Combatant Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are not within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across the United States Government (USG) and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff/J-3/DDGO and executed by ASD (R&E)/RFD/RRTO.

The Minerva Research Initiative is a university-based research program which aims to provide deeper understanding of the social and cultural forces that shape regions of the world of strategic importance to the U.S. Started by former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to foster stronger connections between the Department of Defense and the academic social science community, its core is fundamental research, driven by some of the Nation's leading political and social scientists, to understand sources of present and future conflict. An increasingly important secondary role of the Minerva program is more short term: not to focus funded basic research on solving applied problems, but to connect decision makers to talented pools of academics whose research has given them relevant subject matter expertise.

Over the last several months, the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) and Minerva Research Initiative worked to convene an Academic Consortium to complement the South Asia Stability project. The objective of the project is to develop options for promoting geopolitical stability in South Asia in light of continuing regional rivalries, the eventual withdrawal of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) from Afghanistan, and the preponderance of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in the region. Deterrence of multiple, possible crisis scenarios is a central aspect of the effort. Members of the Consortium contribute knowledge and expertise either via short papers on topics of concern to the operational community or via webinars in support of the SMA office. The analyses of the effects of potential U.S. actions and associated risk assessments produced by this effort are intended to assist and inform USCENTCOM, USPACOM, USSTRATCOM, and JS planners/operators and others interested in stability and instability factors in South Asia.

The Consortium presentations reported in this document were geared toward the *Approaches to Countering Instability* component of the larger South Asia effort that explored the internal and external sources of stability and instability as well as options for mitigating negative trends. In addition to their value as stand-alone pieces, consortium insights were used as inputs to a number of the South Asia Stability project's sub-tasks including a Stability Risk Assessment event conducted by Pacific Northwest National Lab (PNNL) with input from Lawrence Livermore National Lab (LLNL), as well as the Pakistan Stability Model (PAK-StaM) analyses of the main economic, social, and political drivers of stability and instability in Pakistan.

Executive Summary

The Academic Consortium webinars were held in August 2012 on behalf of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) South Asia Stability project. The effort seeks to elicit knowledge about topics of interest to the operational community in support of the SMA South Asia Stability project. Academic Consortium presenters include Dr. Joseph Nye, Dr. Sumit Ganguly, Dr. Kanishkan Sathasivam, Dr. Martha Crenshaw, and Dr. Jocelyne Cesari.

Joseph Nye

Dr. Joseph Nye is University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and former Dean of the Kennedy School and is a member of the Aspen Institute's U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue¹ group. He spoke to members of the SMA team via teleconference on 15 October 2012.

Dr. Nye's discussion focused on strategic stability in South Asia given regional economic decline, the drawdown of ISAF forces in Afghanistan, shifting demographics in Pakistan, and the growing size and decentralization of the Pakistan nuclear stockpile. His points are briefly summarized below.

- The main concern in South Asia is no longer Pakistan's relationship with India or any other external actor, but the future of the Pakistani state and society itself. Not only has Pakistan's government and economy declined over recent years, the population is moving from a relatively pluralistic, Sufi-oriented society with a strong secular element to a more extreme, Salafi-oriented society.
- These changes give rise to new concerns about Pakistan's ability to maintain control of its growing, increasingly decentralized nuclear weapons program.
- The drawdown of ISAF forces in Afghanistan will have some effect on the strategic balance in South Asia, but it is not clear whether Pakistan, India, China, or even Iran will attempt to fill in the power vacuum.
- Slow economic growth in India is troublesome for regional stability. The question of how to get economic growth in India back to 8-9 percent and keep it there is critical to India's, and the region's, stability.

Sumit Ganguly

Dr. Sumit Ganguly, Indiana University, presented a talk on the prospects of stability in South Asia on 9 August 2012 as part of the SMA South Asia Stability project's Academic Consortium.

Dr. Ganguly's presentation on the prospects of stability in South Asia focused on systemic, national, and decision-making factors and their likely impact on regional stability in South

¹ For more information, please visit the Aspen Institute's website at <http://www.aspeninstitute.org/policy-work/aspen-strategy-group/about-USID>.

Asia. Among other matters, Dr. Ganguly discussed the impending U.S. drawdown of forces in Afghanistan; the growth and possible assertion of Chinese military power; political developments within India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; and leadership challenges in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. Dr. Ganguly concluded with a discussion of the implications of these developments for U.S. policy toward the region. Key findings from Dr. Ganguly's presentation are listed below.

- The implications of the United States drawdown in Afghanistan and a greater assertiveness of the People's Republic of China in the Indian Ocean will be the two most important systemic factors impinging on regional security in South Asia in the foreseeable future.
- There are a number of national-level factors throughout South Asia that will have an important impact on regional stability. These national factors include the future of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, the future of Indo-Pakistani relations, Pakistan's pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons, India's quest for ballistic missile defense, the plight of the Rohingya minority in Burma (Myanmar), the resurgence of Hindu-Muslim discord in India, and the resurrection of the Maoist movement throughout India.
- There are four potential leadership factors in South Asia that could have important consequences for stability in the region. These leadership factors include the looming transition of leadership in Bangladesh, the major challenges for Pakistani President Zardari in Pakistan, the shaky status of Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai in Nepal, and the uncertain prospects of the coalition regime in India.
- To assist in preventing instability in South Asia, United States policy must take serious consideration into how the U.S. carries out its withdrawal from Afghanistan and must also ensure that the government of India does not neglect the critical policy choices of its future.

Kanishkan Sathasivam

Dr. Kanishkan Sathasivam, Salem State University, presented a talk entitled, "Does Pakistan Have a Foreign Policy?" on 13 August 2012 as part of the SMA South Asia Stability project's Academic Consortium.

Dr. Sathasivam's presentation argued that in the post-9/11 regional strategic context, Pakistan does not have an identifiable, coherent foreign policy or foreign policy-making framework. Pakistan's current foreign policy essentially consists of a series of ad hoc policy decisions that have been reactive to regional strategic conditions and events. Furthermore, given its inability to generate a contemporary foreign policy-making framework, Pakistan has fallen back on its perceived historic grievances as the fundamental basis for these ad hoc foreign policy decisions.

Martha Crenshaw

Dr. Martha Crenshaw, Stanford University, presented an effort to map al Qaeda affiliates and analyze implications of these groups for stability in Pakistan on 17 August 2012 as part of the SMA South Asia Stability project's Academic Consortium.

Dr. Crenshaw's presentation introduced and explained the maps of terrorist organizations that have been developed as a reference tool for researchers. The purpose of the mapping project is to identify patterns in the evolution of terrorist organizations, specify their causes and consequences, and analyze the development of al Qaeda and its cohort in a comprehensive comparative framework. These maps identified patterns in the evolution of militant organizations since the 1970s and provide interactive visual representations of the groups over time. Countries that are or will be mapped are Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Algeria/Maghreb, Pakistan, Colombia, the Philippines, the Palestinian resistance movement, Italy and Germany in the 1970s and 1980s, and Northern Ireland. The maps that have been completed thus far by Dr. Crenshaw and her team include Iraq, Somalia, Pakistani Al Qaeda affiliates, and Italy. Dr. Crenshaw spoke about the Pakistan map and its implication for regional stability. Key findings and insights from this presentation are listed below.

- Pakistan is one of the most complicated, dense, and volatile landscapes of militant organizations
- Some of the complexity is due to the interaction of sectarian, jihadist, nationalist, and separatist militant groups
- State sponsorship creates rivalries between these groups
- Recently, controlling these groups has become harder now that they have established themselves as independent from their state sponsors

Jocelyne Cesari

Dr. Jocelyne Cesari, Harvard University, presented a brief on state and society relations and their influence on the political stability of Pakistan on 20 August 2012 as part of the SMA South Asia Stability project's Academic Consortium.

Jocelyne Cesari's Minerva research addressed an unexamined dimension in the politicization of Islam, that is, state actions and policies vis-à-vis religion in general and Islam in particular. Politicization in this context is broader than Islamism and encompasses the following.

- Nationalization of Islamic institutions and personnel
- Usage of Islamic references in political competition by state actors and opponents (Islamism)
- Religiously-motivated social unrest or violence;
- Internationalization of Islam-orientated political movements or conflicts

The research adopted an institutional approach to Islam in order to introduce state actions and policies into the analysis of political influence of cultural and religious changes at both the domestic *and* international levels. Institutionalization refers to the way new socio-political situations are translated into the creation or adaptation of formal institutions such

as constitutions, laws, and administrative bodies and agencies. This translation is salient over two matters: hegemonic status granted to on religion and state's regulations of religions. Hegemonic status refers to legal and political privileges provided to one religion over the others, usually the dominant religion.

Dr. Cesari's research showed that legal privileges characterize the majority of Muslim countries, where legal and political rights have generally been granted to the dominant orientation of Islam and highlights the correlation between institutionalization of Islam and politicization of religion. The political consequence is that religious norms become the substratum of social norms and political cultures in most of Muslim majority countries, as illustrated in the evolution of Pakistan from a State for Muslims to an Islamic State. In particular, Dr. Cesari's research shows that the hegemonic status of religion increases social and political violence across regions and religions. Such a political and social violence can affect regional stability. Due to the hegemonic nature of Sunni Islam, and the increasing Islamicization of the legal system, religious minorities and women are becoming increasingly vulnerable. Freedom of speech is more and more restricted to conform to a more "Islamically correct" public space. When in public spaces, citizens are cautious of what they say and how they act, in large part due to possible consequences from some religious actors that are rarely sanctioned by the Government. It is unclear how these restrictions will affect domestic and regional stability but it does create ground for political actors acting on religious ground.

Dr. Cesari noted that urbanization and the role of media must also be considered when analyzing the current situation in Pakistan. Recently, more Pakistanis are moving to cities which will ultimately weaken tribal legitimacy which has played an important role in the stability of the political system until now. New political players are emerging on the political scene, which may in turn threaten the traditional political and military elite. Additionally, media out of State control could be used as alternative forums to express opinions and discontent, further destabilizing the current system.

Dr. Joseph Nye

Joseph S. Nye Jr., is University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and former Dean of the Kennedy School. He received his bachelor's degree summa cum laude from Princeton University, did postgraduate work at Oxford University on a Rhodes Scholarship, and earned a PhD in political science from Harvard. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. In 2004, he published *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics; Understanding International Conflict* (5th edition); and *The Power Game: A Washington Novel*. In 2008, he published *The Powers to Lead* and his latest book published in 2011 is *The Future of Power*.

Strategic Stability in South Asia

While not an expert in South Asia, Dr. Nye has been a member of the Aspen Institute's U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue² group since its inception in 2002. The Dialogue serves to strengthen the diplomatic, military, and economic ties between India and the U.S. in the face of strategic international challenges. Annual meetings in both nations allow for leaders from academia, industry, media, and former and current government officials to engage in meaningful, frank dialogue. Dr. Nye's depth of academic and policy experience, couple with a decade of focused conversations with Indian counterparts, positions him to speak uniquely about stability and strategic balance in South Asia.

It is impossible to discuss strategic issues in South Asia without talking about Pakistan. It used to be sufficient to boil down strategic concerns in South Asia solely to the Indo-Pak relationship, but it is no longer a useful categorization. Pakistan has become a common problem for several countries in the region. The Pakistani state suffers from a weak government and economy. Its population is moving from a relatively pluralistic, Sufi-oriented society with a strong secular element to a more extreme, Salafi-oriented society—as dramatized with the atrocious attack on a girl in Swat who advocated for girls' education and children's rights. These changes not only give rise to concerns about the future of the Pakistani state but also about the state's ability to maintain control of its growing, increasingly decentralized nuclear weapons program. The main concern in South Asia is no longer Pakistan's relationship with India or any other external actor, but the future of the Pakistani state and society itself.

Another issue that could affect the strategic balance in South Asia is the drawdown of ISAF forces in 2014. Even though some troops will remain in the region to provide support to Afghan forces, it is unclear whether Pakistan, India, China, or even Iran will attempt to fill in the power vacuum. It is unclear what role external actors will play in South Asia. Below the surface, India is very frightened of Chinese involvement in the region. However, the Chinese are not very interested in India right now, so the relationship has a degree of asymmetry.

² For more information, please visit the Aspen Institute's website at <http://www.aspeninstitute.org/policy-work/aspen-strategy-group/about-USID>.

Additionally, slow economic growth in India is troublesome. Growth in India has tapered off in the last two years, so there is some concern about India's future stability. The question of how to get economic growth in India back to 8-9 percent and keep it there is critical to India's stability.

Discussion

Do you see any parallels between either the Peloponnesian War or World War I and South Asia today? Are there any similarities in terms of how the balance of power has become unstable, especially given that the fourth largest nuclear-armed state is becoming more insecure? Could a conflict or instability in one country drag the whole region or world into war?

There is a danger of a small outbreak of violence dragging the region into war. During the Peloponnesian War, the rise of Athens spurred Sparta to take actions to protect itself from perceived threats from Athens. It is possible that the rise of India power creates fear in Pakistan, which might cause it to take action to protect itself, but each state has someone to fear in the region. India is concerned about a rising China, Pakistan is concerned about a rising India, and Afghanistan is concerned about an unstable Pakistan. India and China are best positioned to manage their relationship successfully.

The issue of greatest concern in the region is Pakistan's drastic nuclear growth coupled with decentralization of the nuclear program. Pakistan feels it needs to take these actions due to India's conventional superiority and fear that India will seek to divide or partition Pakistan yet again. These actions make Pakistan vulnerable to fragmentation, posing a serious threat to regional stability.

Pakistan considers China to be its all-weather friend. Can China play a role to create a stable environment in Pakistan or is it more likely to stay on the sidelines?

It may be a heretical view, but perhaps the USG should want China to play a larger role in Pakistan. If China invests in Pakistan (e.g., mineral rights, ports, etc.), then it will no longer be a free rider and will have an interest in maintaining stability. So instead of being worried that China might become more involved in Pakistan, the USG should try to get them involved.

Regarding the China-Pakistan relationship, China thought of Pakistan as a counterbalance to India, which is why it provided Pakistan with nuclear assistance. It is a classic checkerboard pattern where the enemy of my enemy is my friend. However, the need for a counterbalance to India tapered down at the end of the Cold War. The Chinese seem uncertain about the future of Pakistan. Getting the Chinese to have a stake in the stability of Pakistan could be healthy. The Chinese have not thought their way through a crisis scenario yet, but they need to start doing so. If LeT or another Pakistan-based group conducts another Mumbai-like attack, it would put enormous pressure on the Indian government to respond with potential repercussions for China.

In your discussions with Chinese leaders, do they seem aware of the implications of their investment and labor practices on social stability? For example, the Chinese are building Gwadar Port with Chinese workers instead of local labor.

The Chinese are not culturally adept. It is not just in Gwadar, but in Africa too, where they bring in Chinese labor instead of using local labor, which led to riots and the killing of Chinese managers in Zambia. Investment decisions are made based on how best to get access to the raw materials that China needs to maintain its high rate of growth that sustains the legitimacy of the Communist Party in China. Chinese investments are driven by efficiency rather than consideration for stability in the region. The Chinese are beginning to realize that they have taken a short-term perspective on some of these issues. However, the Foreign Ministry in China is quite weak and it is not clear the foreign minister will be able to resolve this.

Pakistan is a fragile state. How would one start thinking about a failed nuclear state? The Soviet model seems very different—this is a new phenomenon.

One solace is that the Pakistani government, the army, and the ISI do not want to see this sort of failure. However, they do not trust the USG or India and feel they must geographically disperse their nuclear weapons to avoid pre-emption. However, by spreading the nuclear weapons around the country, it increases their vulnerability. Just last year, there was an attack on a naval base. While the attackers were not looking for nuclear weapons, it took an effort to hold the attackers back. If the army ever splits or if the army becomes weaker, it is rather worrying that some of these groups might seize nuclear weapons or fissile material.

The Pakistan military is thinking about this situation a great deal. They are stuck in a paradox where central control of the weapons makes them vulnerable to pre-emption, but dispersing the nuclear weapons make them vulnerable to attack by internal forces. The USG has tried to assist Pakistan, but there is a limit to what the Pakistanis will accept. The USG cannot even attempt a Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction plan like it offered Russia after the collapse of the USSR because there is not even that much trust in the US-Pakistan relationship.

There is a perception that the USG does not have a coherent policy towards Pakistan. Is it possible to change this?

At times, the USG has attempted to have a more coherent policy. Senator John Kerry tried to pass a multi-year aid package with clear priorities related to development attached. The trouble is that much of this has been difficult to implement due to reasons intrinsic to both the US and Pakistani government. The US Congress feels that aid should have conditions attached, but Pakistan feels that conditions are offensive to Pakistan's sovereignty and degrades trust between the two nations. Furthermore, aid does not always produce good feelings about the U.S. in Pakistan because it often privileges one group over another. Large-scale projects can often have a negative, rather than positive, effect. Small-scale projects

might be more productive. However, the problem with that is how can the USG send American contractors or aid workers into an extremely dangerous area? Proxies are not a good solution because they are too hard to control.

Some suggest that improving trade relations and reducing barriers sounds good from a policy point of view until one tries to sell the ideas to representatives from the US south where textiles are produced.

Furthermore, from the security perspective, one US objective is to defeat the remnants of al Qaeda and their Taliban supporters. This is often done using drone strikes. While these strikes are effective, they have exacerbated anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. It is possible to alter this practice by only attacking main targets, which usually result in less collateral damage, but when you consider concerns about Pakistan's nuclear surety and level of mistrust between U.S. and Pakistan, it becomes very difficult to have a coherent overall strategy. The different pieces of the puzzle do not always fit well together.

Looking 20-30 years from now, do you see Pakistan as a normal, functioning state? If so, how would that optimistic reality come about?

While it is possible that Pakistan will be a normal, functioning state 20 years from now, the USG needs to look at alternate scenarios. When managing estimates at the National Intelligence Council (NIC), it was important to ask what would make a situation turn out differently. Pakistan could split upon one of many potential fault lines. What if Baluchistan separates? All of the provinces in Pakistan have some resistance to the center. What if the civil-military divide becomes contentious? What if the primarily tolerant Sufi population shifts to become more Salafist? These are very serious concerns in Pakistan and it is possible to have conflict along any one of these lines.

If the USG objective is to have a Pakistan that can hold itself together as a state so it can control its weapons and not devolve into violence, the only tools the USG has are those mentioned in response to the previous question: increasing aid, reducing trade barriers, and pulling back on drone strikes. Ultimately, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is like a bad marriage in a legal system where divorce is not permitted.

Dr. Sumit Ganguly

Dr. Sumit Ganguly is a Professor of Political Science and holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University, Bloomington. He has previously taught at James Madison College of Michigan State University, Hunter College, the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and the University of Texas at Austin. A specialist on the international politics of South Asia, he has been a Fellow and a Guest Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC, and a Visiting Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and at the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. He is a member of the editorial boards of the *American Political Science Review*, *Asian Affairs*, *Asian Survey*, *Current History*, *International Security*, the *Journal of Democracy*, and *Security Studies*. He is also the founding editor of two refereed Routledge journals, *The India Review* and *Asian Security*. Professor Ganguly is the author, co-author, editor, and co-editor of twenty books on the contemporary politics of South Asia. His most recent book (with Rahul Mukherji) is *India Since 1980* (Cambridge, 2011). He is currently at work on a new book, *Deadly Impasse: Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century* for Cambridge University Press.

Prospects of Stability in South Asia

Dr. Sumit Ganguly presented the prospects of stability in South Asia. He discussed systemic, national-level, and decision-making factors of critical importance in understanding stability in South Asia. Among other matters, he discussed the impending U.S. drawdown of forces in Afghanistan; the growth and possible assertion of Chinese military power; political developments within India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; and leadership issues in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. He concluded with a discussion of the implications of these developments for U.S. policy toward the region.

Systemic Factors

At a systemic level, two factors are quite critical when looking at regional stability in South Asia over the next few years. The first factor is the significant reduction of the United States' military presence in Afghanistan. Russia will support this reduction as it has not fully supported the substantial U.S. military presence in Afghanistan—the Russians have not been particularly helpful to the U.S. in the northern areas of Afghanistan. India will be extremely anxious because it does not currently believe that the Karzai regime, in the absence of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and U.S. forces, will be resilient enough to stand up to challenges from the Taliban and other forces. Furthermore, India believes that Pakistan will try to exploit the resulting situation in Afghanistan as the U.S. reduces its footprint in the country. As a result, there will be intensified Indian and Pakistani competition in Afghanistan as the U.S. reduces its military and security footprint in the region. This will have important consequences for regional stability because in contrast to the years following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, today India has a very significant presence in Afghanistan; India is Afghanistan's fifth largest aid donor, has helped to train the Afghan army, and has a large diplomatic presence in the country. India will not simply allow Pakistan to step up its support for the Taliban and terrorist entities

such as the Haqqani Network. As a result, the Indo-Pakistani competition in Afghanistan is likely to have important consequences for regional stability.

In addition to the U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan, another issue that looms very large and could affect regional stability is China's increasing assertiveness in the Indian Ocean. This trend is visible through the growing Chinese naval presence in Sittwe on the Burmese coast, the development of a major port in the city of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and the development of the Gwadar port in Pakistan. It is clear that China's development of these ports increases the maritime domain awareness of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and enables China to develop fairly robust relationships with the maritime forces in the various countries. Also, notably, the PLA Navy is involved in the development of the port in Chittagong, which is the principal port in Bangladesh. All of these actions are provoking and increasing Indian anxiety. As a result, India is ramping up its capabilities in the Indian Ocean and has recently established an integrated military command in the Andaman Islands chain. There is going to be increasing naval competition between China and India in the years ahead. Additionally, the Indians will maintain a very close watch on Chinese capability to interdict Indian naval vessels in the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz. Although a conflict is not imminent, it is quite clear that elements of a naval rivalry are beginning to emerge between India and China.

India's relations with the U.S. will continue to carry implications internationally and domestically. Internationally, India will seek to have a degree of collaboration with the U.S. Pacific Fleet, but at the same time, India will not want to publicize this collaboration because of political implications at home. There is still residual anti-American sentiment in parts of India's political spectrum. Consequently, the Indian government will not want to make U.S. collaboration widely known, but at the same time, there will be growing interest in collaborating with the United States in all matters of naval exercises. However, this collaboration will have to be done with a great deal of circumspection out of fear of evoking the wrath of the India's left wing and the Communist parties. Although Communist parties are becoming less relevant in the Indian political context, a certain residual anti-Americanism exists in India's political culture.

Ultimately, the implications of the United States' drawdown in Afghanistan and a more assertive China will be the two most important systemic factors impinging on regional security in the foreseeable future.

National-Level Factors

There are a number of key national-level issues across the region in various countries that could have an important impact on regional stability.

Tamil Minority in Sri Lanka

The first national-level issue is the future of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. The Tamil minority in Sri Lanka feels beleaguered and besieged following the brutal civil war that started in 1983. The civil war ended about three years ago but left the Tamil minority

dissatisfied. There is a tremendous feeling of triumph amongst the majority community in Sri Lanka, particularly regarding the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the principal terrorist organization in the country. However, during the conflict, Sri Lankan armed forces crushed the Tamil forces without much regard to the Tamil minority. If this behavior persists it would be impossible to guarantee the stability of Sri Lanka. One could witness a possible resurgence of violence among the Tamil minority, which would likely receive considerable support from the substantial Tamil diaspora. The Tamil diaspora is watching the situation in Sri Lanka quite carefully and will wait to see if their compatriots in Sri Lanka are treated fairly. Ultimately, if the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka is continually marginalized, one could witness a resurgence of instability in the country.

Indo-Pakistani Relations

The second national-level issue that could impact regional stability is the question of Indo-Pakistani relations. In recent months, there have been minor changes to the Indo-Pakistani relationship, but it is clear that these changes are primarily cosmetic. The central issue of the Kashmir dispute remains unresolved. India has become rather complacent about Kashmir because violence has subsided, interference from Pakistan has declined, tourism has been revived, and a certain level of stability has occurred. Consequently, the Indian government has come to believe that all is well in Kashmir. However, this is not the case. There is a significant amount of resentment against the Indian state in Kashmir. As a result, there is much that the Indian government needs to do in Kashmir. Once Pakistan manages to stabilize itself domestically, it may well ramp up the support for insurgency in Kashmir, capitalizing on resentment towards the Indian government, thereby once again sending India-Pakistan relations into a downward plunge.

Pakistan's Pursuit of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

The third national-level issue is Pakistan's pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons to cope with India's conventional superiority. Pakistani possession of tactical nuclear weapons would lower the nuclear threshold dramatically in the event of another crisis with India. This would create widespread instability in a crisis because India would not know whether Pakistan would resort to the use of nuclear weapons. India would also be unaware of the red lines it would have to cross before Pakistan resorted to tactical nuclear weapons. The problem with tactical nuclear weapons is that the adversary, in this case India, may not particularly care to differentiate whether it was struck by a tactical or strategic nuclear weapon. A strategic nuclear weapon could trigger a much wider Indian response leading to a war that neither side particularly desires. Consequently, Pakistan's pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons is a deeply destabilizing enterprise. From the Pakistani standpoint, India's quest for ballistic missile defense is equally destabilizing because it raises fears that India's goal is escalation dominance. In the event of a crisis, if Pakistan were to resort to the use of nuclear weapons, India's ballistic missile defense could both significantly degrade Pakistani strike capability and heighten fears that India would conduct a first strike on Pakistani nuclear facilities. Unfortunately, India has done little to reassure Pakistan that its pursuit of ballistic missile defense is not a quest for a counterforce capability toward Pakistan.

Additionally, the issue of arms control in South Asia has not been tackled by Pakistan and India. At most, the two sides have engaged in limited confidence building measures.

Plight of Rohingya Muslim Minority in Burma

The fourth national-level issue is the plight of a very small Muslim minority community, The Rohingya, along the Burma-Bangladesh border. Burma does not consider these people to be citizens and has tried to push them back into Bangladesh's territory. Bangladesh, which has significant demographic problems of its own, does not want to absorb the Rohingya population either. Consequently, these people have become literally political footballs. The two Rohingya camps that do exist in Bangladesh are abysmal in quality, even by the low standards of South Asia. Consequently, this is a source of tension between Bangladesh and Burma and could lead to riots and violence in the future as the Rohingyas seek to re-enter Burma or refuge in Bangladesh. This issue could very easily spiral into a regional conflict between Burma and Bangladesh.

Hindu-Muslim Discord in India

The fifth national-level issue is a resurgence of Hindu-Muslim discord in India. The problems, risks, and dangers of Hindu-Muslim discord continue to exist, especially as a small minority within the Muslim community (a minority within the minority community) feels disenchanting and as though they are not being treated as equal citizens of India. Consequently, this minority may be prone to violence. This could generate a powerful backlash from the majority community and once again contribute to widespread Hindu-Muslim discord in India. Although not particularly likely, this possibility must be considered.

Resurgence of Neo-Maoist Violence in India

The sixth national-level issue is that India faces the possibility of a resurgence of neo-Maoist violence. Currently, 20 of India's 28 states are affected by Maoist organizations, which for the time being have been a bit dormant, but the situation could change quickly. The Maoists could one again strike with impunity. The tragedy is that the structure of India's politics makes it extremely difficult to pursue a national strategy to deal with the Maoists. Even if a particular state adopts a successful strategy to deal with the Maoists, given India's federal structure, the Maoists can flee into a neighboring state that is not as well governed, escaping the consequences of their actions. Unfortunately, since law and order under the Indian constitution happens to be a state subject, the quality of governance in states varies enormously. The national government has sought to develop an overall strategy to deal with the Maoist movement, but because of India's federal structure, they can only offer advice for dealing with Maoists and cannot enter a state to take over control of the situation. The only way the national government could take over control of dealing with Maoists in a state is by dismissing the state government, but this would have negative political consequences and is a strategy that most national governments are unwilling to adopt. Consequently, India has been unable to formulate a nation-wide strategy to suppress the

Maoist insurgency. The attempts at suppressing the insurgency have been driven by the various states, some of which have been done well while some have been done imperfectly. These are uncorrelated state responses to a nationwide problem afflicting 20 out of 28 states. This is a problem that is unlikely to go away any time in the future given the Maoist's resources, organization, and dedication in addition to the structure of limits of the Indian state in terms of dealing with the Maoist menace.

Leadership Factors

There are four potential leadership changes that could have important consequences for stability in the region.

Looming Leadership Transition in Bangladesh

The first factor is the looming leadership transition in Bangladesh. The current regime in Bangladesh, which is sympathetic to India, may or may not win the next election. If the current regime does not win re-election, a more right-wing government that is less sympathetic towards India will likely come into power. This transition of power could have three distinct consequences at national, regional, and international levels. First, at the national level, it would increase the insecurity of the Hindu minority within Bangladesh, which has been dwindling over the last several years because they feel increasingly insecure in a state where there is a degree of resurgence of radical Islam. The Hindu minority has been fleeing to other parts of the world including into India. Second, if the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) were to be elected, the plight of the Hindu minority could worsen and thereby cause domestic instability. The election of the BNP would also likely cause greater strains in the relationship with India because the BNP is known for its hostility towards India, which is known as the dominant regional power and will not take kindly to the BNP. Third, from an American standpoint, the U.S. should be watchful and vigilant of the BNP because in a previous incarnation in government, the BNP allowed radical Islamists to have a foothold within the country. There are fears that this could occur again and some of the radical Islamists could have ties to radical Islamists in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Ultimately, if there is a change in regime in Bangladesh, there could be important implications for national and regional stability and even American policy and security in the region.

Challenges Facing President Zardari in Pakistan

The second factor is the major challenges for Pakistani President Zardari in Pakistan—especially terrorism. Much of the terrorism in Pakistan is a consequence of its own flawed policy. Many of the individuals that are now turning their guns on the Pakistani state were actually given considerable leeway by the Pakistani military and, on occasion, even nurtured by the Pakistani military for use in Afghanistan and in Indian controlled Kashmir. However, many of these individuals and groups are now turning against Pakistan and the Pakistani military. This shift has created a very murky atmosphere where there are a number of extremist organizations that are well armed and dedicated to the use of force to achieve their goals. These extremist organizations constitute an important threat to the

long-term stability of the Pakistani state. Unfortunately, the Pakistani military and, more importantly, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate still believes that it can manipulate many of these groups and, therefore, is unwilling to crack down on them in any systematic fashion. Specifically, the ISI still gives considerable reign to the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which is an organization originally developed to create fear amongst the Indians and the Indian forces in Kashmir but is now beginning to attack American forces in Afghanistan. The LeT now has a global agenda and has ambitions of becoming a successor to al-Qaeda. It is not clear why the Pakistani state has not shut down LeT headquarters in Muridke, which is just outside of Lahore. Of late, LeT's principal leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, has been making highly inflammatory speeches about India, the United States, and Israel, and yet he faces no restrictions from the Pakistani state. Consequently, with the existence of entities like the LeT and their ability to roam free in Pakistan, stability must be seen as being fraught. The second challenge facing President Zardari is charges of corruption. President Zardari faces a particularly hostile Supreme Court that is seeking to oust him, presumably with the support of the Pakistani military.

The possibility of political and extremist factors causing instability in Pakistan is extremely high, compounded by its current economic woes. For example, there are parts of the country where electricity is shut down for several hours of the day affecting industrial production and household consumption. Unfortunately, the ability of the state to tackle the structural challenges and shortages is simply non-existent. Unless Pakistan addresses this issue, electrical shortages could become another source of instability as people may eventually riot in the streets given the chronic absence of reliable electrical power in major cities. Ultimately, because of all of these economic, strategic, and political reasons, Pakistan's stability is at considerable risk.

Bhattarai Regime in Nepal

The third factor is the shaky status of Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai in Nepal. The current regime is under pressure from monarchists and the opposition. Elections have been called for November of 2012. Consequently, Nepal also faces an uncertain future. It is believed that the monarchists, who were marginalized with the collapse of the monarchy, are attempting a comeback in concert with the military. If this occurs, one could once again see Nepal heading towards a second civil war, something that a desperately poor country does not need.

Coalition Regime in India

The last factor is the uncertain prospects of the coalition regime in India. A political paralysis has gripped India largely because Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is an aging man that is basically biding his time until 2014 when he may finally remit office. However, there is no clear prospect of succession within Manmohan Singh's Indian National Congress party. An opposition that senses weakness, but has nothing constructive to offer, compounds this political paralysis. Therefore, critical political decisions are not being made. In many ways, the electrical power crisis is a metaphor for what is ailing the country. People

know that the power grid desperately needs new investment and yet that investment is not taking place because of political reasons. Elections loom in 2014 according to the Constitution calendar, but many suggest that elections will occur in 2013 and a coalition regime is most likely to emerge.

No single party is expected to have a majority in Parliament following the elections and, as a result, the parties will have to come together to create a coalition. If the coalition partners prove to be the kind of coalition partners that the present regime enjoys in New Delhi, then one could witness a continuing trend of political instability in India because a fractious coalition will not be able to address critical public policy needs. This outcome could result in an increase in domestic instability in India. However, it is unknown if the present government will be able to realize that an election is looming and, thereby, be able to overcome the kind of paralysis that has gripped it and thus restore some degree of public confidence. Notably, there have been cabinet reshuffles recently—a new finance minister has been put into place and a new economic advisor has been announced. However, it remains to be seen whether these policy signals will actually be carried through or if these actions are simply cosmetic gestures designed to impress foreign investors but not address critical public policy issues including Naxalites and security, relations with a rising China, electrical power issues, and opening the economy to foreign investors. It remains to be seen whether the cabinet reshuffles will actually lead to meaningful results.

Implications for American Policy

In terms of South Asia regional stability, the principal implication for American policy is to take into serious consideration how the U.S. carries out its withdrawal from Afghanistan. If this withdrawal is done in haste, Afghanistan may not have the capacity to maintain political order and will thereby plunge into political instability. In addition, it is important to keep pressure on Pakistan as the withdrawal takes place to ensure that Pakistan does not think that it has the freedom to install a regime of its choice and, thereby, get into a struggle with India, which could have adverse consequences for American policy and further contribute to instability within the region.

The U.S. must also ensure that the government of India does not neglect the critical policy choices that have been outlined. India-U.S. relations matter—U.S. opinions have an increasing impact on Indian government. In large part, the Indians are inclined to listen to the U.S. because of a multi-pronged U.S. engagement with India that started under the second Clinton administration and has been carried through and developed by the Bush and Obama administrations. This is one issue that has enjoyed a degree of bipartisan support.

Discussion

What is India's tactical nuclear weapon capacity?

Dr. Ganguly responded that India has limited tactical nuclear weapons capacity and is not really investing in them. They have intermediate range ballistic missiles, but these are not battlefield missiles.

What is Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapon capacity?

Dr. Ganguly answered that Pakistan has developed these weapons, but the specific deployments remain classified. What is known is that the capabilities are in place and Pakistan currently has around 100 warheads. However, the number of these that are tactical or could be on a long-range missile remains classified.

What is the capacity of Pakistan's civilian government? Does it have enough capacity to address its challenges? What could be done to improve this capacity?

Dr. Ganguly responded that the civilian government in Pakistan is not the master of its own house. It faces a hostile Supreme Court, which takes up a large amount of the civilian government's energy and attention. The civilian government is also challenged by the Pakistani military, which is not entirely comfortable with the civilian government. However, the civilian government has shown interest in independence and has sought to curb the influence of the Pakistani military. Unless the civilian government shows some willingness to address these relationship issues, problems could engulf Pakistan.

What are the odds of the civilian government surviving if the Supreme Court managed to unseat President Zardari? Is there is any chance of a military coup?

Dr. Ganguly stated that chances are elections would have to be called again. Additionally, Dr. Ganguly does not believe that the Pakistani military wants to undertake a coup. Why would the Pakistani military want to take over responsibility for the problems that Pakistan is currently facing? In addition, undertaking a coup would place extraordinary pressure on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. As a result, it is unlikely that the Pakistani military coup would occur, even if President Zardari were removed from office.

Dr. Kanishkan Sathasivam

Dr. Sathasivam is the Chair of the Department of Political Science and William H. Bates Center for Public Affairs at Salem State University. He has previously taught at Carleton College and Texas A&M University. A specialist in international relations, Dr. Sathasivam has served as a consultant for a number of Department of Defense projects. He also serves on numerous editorial boards and is a member of the American Political Science Association and the International Studies Association among others. Dr. Sathasivam has written extensively on Pakistan, including his book *Uneasy Neighbors: India, Pakistan and US Foreign Policy*. His most recent book is *Keeping Up with the Joneses: Modeling Arms Races as Multi-State System Processes*.

Dr. Kanishkan Sathasivam, Salem State University, began by stating that one cannot talk about Pakistan or India without talking about the other. There can be no discussion about Pakistan's foreign policy without including India in the conversation.

Does Pakistan Have a Foreign Policy?

In May 2012, the civilian government and Parliamentary Committee unveiled its review of Pakistan's foreign policy. This review of foreign policy was unprecedented. In its history, Pakistan's Parliament and executive branch had never conducted anything similar. However, prior to the formal review, Pakistan's foreign policy was unidentifiable and incoherent. Following the review, the Pakistani establishment announced a new foreign policy framework.

Rationale for the State of Pakistan's Foreign Policy

There are three reasons why Pakistan historically did not have an identifiable, coherent foreign policy. First, Pakistan always had very weak domestic political institutions and processes, leading to a dysfunctional political system. This is elaborated upon in the Challenges to Foreign Policy Making in Pakistan section.

The second reason is Pakistan's regional and global strategic isolation. Since Pakistan's creation in 1947, the rest of the world viewed Pakistan as part of an India-Pakistan dyad. Within this dyadic relationship, India has received more interest and attention from the international community. Even in the eyes of Pakistan's supposed strategic ally, the United States, India has been viewed as a more favorable and beneficial partner than Pakistan—Pakistan has always been overshadowed by India.

Pakistan has always found itself in strategic isolation both regionally and globally. India has dominated the attention of regional states and maintained regional superiority in South Asia. In a global context, Pakistan is always second to India in the eyes of other states. Following the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, where Pakistan was almost destroyed as a nation, the new Pakistani civilian government, led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, attempted to create a coherent foreign policy. A key part of this approach was to expand Pakistani relations with Muslim and Arab countries in the Persian Gulf, specifically Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This approach was successful in the sense that Pakistan established close

security and military-to-military ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, Pakistan was never able to turn these ties into comprehensive international relations. By contrast, Saudi Arabia and the UAE both had relatively good, broad relations with India. Pakistan viewed Saudi Arabia as its brother Muslim country, and yet Saudi Arabia's relationship with India was much broader in scope and deeper in its character than its relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan felt regionally isolated, which had an adverse effect on its attempts at establishing a broad, meaningful foreign policy.

The third reason why Pakistan does not currently have a cohesive foreign policy is the domestic perception that Pakistan is not adequately respected internationally. The Pakistani people feel that, historically, their country has been disrespected. They feel that Pakistan is always taken advantage of and is always the victim. This is an issue that is very subjective. It is difficult to generate data to substantiate this perceived lack of respect. However, it is clear that it does exist

Pakistan's weak domestic political institutions and processes, regional and global strategic isolation, and perceived lack of respect are three broad categories of reasons why Pakistan has not been able to create a comprehensive, identifiable foreign policy framework.

Challenges to Foreign Policy Making in Pakistan

Pakistan's structural and procedural policy-making problems are the most important reason why Pakistan has not had an identifiable, coherent foreign policy. Pakistan's foreign policy challenges stem from the fact that since 1947, the Pakistani military dominated and controlled the country's foreign policy. The Pakistani military—not the Prime Minister's Office or the Foreign Ministry—is the institution that created and implemented Pakistan's foreign policy since the birth of the country. Historically, the Foreign Minister position of the Pakistani government had always been one of the least valuable and least useful positions in the establishment.

Dr. Sathasivam argued that Pakistan's military and Defense Ministry should not currently be making the country's foreign policy because they insert a strong military bias. With this sort of compliance driving foreign policy, it is no surprise that Pakistan has not had a clear, coherent foreign policy, although the military's foreign policy control has created a clear national security and defense policy.

The key result of Pakistan's foreign policy review was the attempt by the current civilian government to establish control over foreign policy, effectively taking control out of the hands of the military. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister both emphasized this transition of control as the key function of the foreign policy review. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister should ultimately be the ones making key foreign policy decisions, not the military. Pakistan's civilian government is making a concerted effort to develop a new foreign policy making framework, but there are serious doubts surrounding this, due in large part to the fact that the current Prime Minister and President are among the weakest civilian leaders that Pakistan has ever had.

To make things worse, Pakistan's political system has never been as fragmented and internally divided as it is today. Presently, there are five major centers of political power in Pakistan. First is the *Pakistani military*, which is indisputably the most powerful player in Pakistan's political system. In the current environment, it is unlikely that the Prime Minister would be able to make major foreign policy decisions without first being cleared by the Pakistani military. This makes the Chief of Army Staff, General Kayani, an incredibly powerful figure in Pakistan. Next, there is the civilian government, which is split between the ruling side and the opposition. The ruling side, led by the *Pakistan People's Party* (PPP), has been in a constant battle with the opposition, led by the *Pakistan Muslim League* (PML). Both sides are looking to undermine and sabotage each other. There is no goodwill or cooperation between the two sides. The fourth major center of political power is Pakistan's *Supreme Court*. No other Supreme Court in the world is as involved in a country's politics. The Supreme Court's ability to undermine decisions is indicative of the incredible level of weakness in the executive branch of Pakistan's civilian government. The fifth major center of political power is the *media*. The media, as an overall institution, is very powerful in Pakistan. The media is relatively free, open, and independent from the government, but is very hostile toward the civilian government. The media is equally hostile towards the military. These factors point to the media's perception of itself as an institution that can build political power and as an instrument that can shape public opinion. Ultimately, every one of the five major centers of political power in Pakistan—the military, the PPP, the PML, the Supreme Court, and the media—is opposed to the other in terms of the direction that Pakistan should take. If one of these powers agrees with a decision, the other four will disagree. As a result, Pakistan has an utterly dysfunctional political system.

Another area where Pakistan has had difficulty is in its attempts to broaden its foreign policy beyond simply security issues. Historically, there have been only three countries of importance in Pakistani foreign relations—India, Afghanistan, and the United States. However, lately the civilian government has worked to broaden Pakistan's foreign policy to include other countries. Pakistan is working to broaden its foreign relations with China beyond the strictly military relationship the two countries have historically maintained. In addition, Pakistan is working to build its relations with Russia. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have made trips to Moscow to strengthen the Pakistan-Russia relationship. Pakistan also attempted to revive its ties with countries in the Persian Gulf. Pakistani leaders maintain ties with Iranian leaders and have resisted strong U.S. efforts to isolate Iran. Specifically, Pakistan and Iran are pursuing the Iran-Pakistan (IP) Gas Pipeline despite strong U.S. opposition. In South Asia, Pakistan attempted to broaden ties with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Burma (Myanmar). These are all examples of Pakistan's efforts to broaden its foreign policy beyond relations with India, Afghanistan, and the United States. However, most experts believe that nothing substantial will come from these efforts.

A final foreign policy-related problem in Pakistan is the military's explicit policy of empowering Islamist militants. Their support occurred initially in Afghanistan and subsequently within Pakistan itself. Once the Pakistani military understood the value it could gain from having a relationship with Islamist militants in Afghanistan, it realized that

its relationship with these militants could be effective in driving India out of Kashmir. As a result, the Pakistani military bought into the idea, as a policy, that it would maintain and build a close relationship with Islamist militant groups in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Pakistan. This is a policy that has clearly backfired in Pakistan. Even the military, in private, has expressed this realization. The Islamist militants now have their own interests and believe that they no longer need Pakistani military support. From 1947 through the early 1990s, Islamist militants were narrowly limited to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and small sections of the North West Frontier Province. During this time period, the rest of the country was relatively free from the threats of Islamist militants. However, now these Islamist groups are heavily influential throughout Pakistan, making Pakistan's efforts to create a coherent foreign policy more difficult. Notably, Pakistan's closest friend, China, is very strongly opposed to any Pakistani efforts to empower Islamist militants.

Pakistani Response to Lack of Coherent Foreign Policy

Dr. Sathasivam stated that Pakistan is a country with a lot of baggage and historic grievances. Many of these grievances are perceived and are not actually real. But, when it comes to grievances, perception is reality so it does not matter if a grievance is real or not. As a result, Pakistan's democratic government is forced to pay attention to these historic grievances.

In the absence of a coherent foreign policy, whenever there is a problem or crisis, Pakistan commonly falls back onto these historic grievances and uses India, Afghanistan, or the U.S. as the scapegoat for Pakistan's problems. As an exaggerated example to make the point, if there is an earthquake in Pakistan, then India, Afghanistan, and the U.S. must have had something to do with it.

Another fallback for Pakistanis is to believe that the military is the only institution that can be trusted with maintaining the sovereignty and security of the nation. The military constantly reinforces this perspective with the Pakistani public—if the military is not in charge then surrounding countries will take over Pakistan. In this regard, the most specific instrument for the Pakistani military is reflective anti-Americanism. This was seen clearly following the Bin Laden raid. After the Bin Laden raid, the military was facing questions about its competency from the public and the media. The military's response was to promote anti-Americanism. Falling back on reflective anti-Americanism has been the Pakistani military's response to any negative press over the last 40 years.

Implications for Regional Stability and U.S. Policy

Dr. Sathasivam stated that the recent push by Pakistan's civilian government to take control of Pakistani foreign policy from the military is positive and should be encouraged. The United States Government (USG) should encourage, strengthen, and support the Pakistani Prime Minister's Office and Foreign Minister's Office. However, the United States must also be realistic. Ultimately, what should matter to the USG is conserving and preserving U.S. interests. It may turn out that having a strong, functioning civilian government in Pakistan is not in the best interest of the U.S. This may result in the U.S. having more common interests with Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Kayani.

It is difficult to say what is in the best interest of the U.S. On one hand, it seems appropriate for the U.S. to stand by the Pakistani civilian government, but on the other hand, this may not have the best results for United States interests.

In a recent speech, Pakistan Foreign Minister Khar stated that Pakistani foreign policy towards India, Afghanistan, and the United States should be less about hostility and more about cooperation and positive ties. Additionally, Pakistan's civilian government has accepted that the historic way in which Pakistan operates—focusing solely on security and defense—is not enough, and realizes that foreign relations must be expanded into trade, economic development, and social exchanges.

Discussion

Recently, in Turkey, an Islamist government took power into its own hands. Egypt has also seen political change since the Arab Spring. Could a similar change happen in Pakistan?

Dr. Sathasivam responded that there have been many comparisons of Pakistan to Turkey and Egypt. However, there is one key issue that divides Pakistan from these other countries. The current changes in Turkey and Egypt would have been unimaginable 30 years ago. Back then, the Turkish people were convinced that the potential for a war between Turkey and Greece was very real. Likewise, the people of Egypt were convinced they would be at war with Israel. However, for the past 30 years, neither of these wars has occurred. As a result, the mindset of the younger generations in Turkey and Egypt has moved beyond these attitudes and they no longer see the military as the sole protector of their country. This younger generation is now more concerned with economic and social rights than with security issues. In the case of Pakistan, this transition has yet to occur. To this day, the Pakistani people are obsessed with security threats from India. As a result, the Pakistani people still feel reliant upon the military for security protection.

It seems that the Pakistani and Indian business and middle classes are starting to recognize that opening trade relations between the two countries is essential.

Dr. Sathasivam responded that studies have shown military strength ultimately relies on economic strength. So, yes, opening trade between Pakistan and India is logical for both countries. There is no country in the region that could benefit more from an improved trade relationship with India than Pakistan.

The current civilian government in Pakistan is attempting to broaden its foreign policy relations with Russia and China. Is this an attempt by the civilian government to gain power in the foreign policy establishment in Pakistan? Is Pakistan's military interested in broadening its foreign policy relations with Russia and China?

Dr. Sathasivam answered that it is hard to say with precision because this is so recent, but it seems that this action is a combination of two things. First, it makes sense for the civilian government to want to broaden its relations with China because this keeps the Pakistani military happy—China is the Pakistani military's favorite ally. Broadening ties with Iran

signals anti-Americanism and the feeling that Pakistan can stand up against demands made by the U.S. Pakistan's attempts to broaden ties with Russia is targeted at sending a message to India because of the strong India-Russia relationship. Pakistan's attempts to broaden its foreign policy ties do have a domestic political aspect. In addition, Pakistan's new Foreign Minister seems to be from a new generation and is trying to create a normal, typical foreign policy for Pakistan. This normal foreign policy would include relations with a number of foreign countries, which is what the civilian government is trying to accomplish. The fact that the Foreign Ministry desires normal foreign relations is a good sign; however, it is important to note that the Foreign Ministry is by far the weakest establishment in the Pakistani government.

Dr. Martha Crenshaw

Dr. Martha Crenshaw is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies as well as Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. Dr. Crenshaw is also Professor of Government Emerita at Wesleyan University, where she taught from 1974 to 2007. She is a lead investigator with the national Center for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (NC-START) at the University of Maryland, funded by the Department of Homeland Security. In 2009, she received an award from the National Science Foundation/Department of Defense Minerva Initiative for research on mapping terrorist organizations. Dr. Crenshaw is a member of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Evaluating the Effectiveness of Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. Routledge published a collection of her published work since 1972, *Explaining Terrorism*, in 2011. Recent research projects include work on non-state terrorism deterrence and threats of retaliation.

Mapping Militants

Dr. Martha Crenshaw, Stanford University, welcomed participants and introduced the mapping militant organizations website, which she gave a tour of during the talk: <http://stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/>. The organizational structure of different families of terrorist organizations and their relationships over time are shown in the web-based tool. There have been previous studies of similar information through written reports, but presenting the information visually is easier for the end-user to understand and process.

When the project was first developed, a decision was made to use a relationship database with numerous inputs over time, rather than an Excel worksheet. No adequate software existed for this type of application, so Dr. Crenshaw's team developed their own. The software is continually updated to ensure that the site is easy to use, giving the team significant ownership of the site and the ability to respond to user feedback easily. While there is both an internal and external site, the internal site is used for editing and testing of new pages. Currently, the global al Qaeda map is internal; it will become public at the end of August 2012.

There are two main aspects to this project: maps and profiles. The maps provide visual representations of how relationships among militant organizations change over time. These maps have links to in-depth profiles of individual groups. Each map has multiple settings. A user may view active groups, inactive groups, or both; organizational events such as major attacks and leadership changes; and relationships including allies, splits, umbrella, affiliates, mergers, and rivals.

Information included in the full profile includes the following.

- Formation
- First attack
- Last attack
- Disbanded (if applicable)
- Profile was last updated
- Narrative summary

- Leadership, ideology and goals
- Name changes
- Size estimates
- Designated/listed
- Resources
- External influences
- Geographical locations
- Target and tactics
- Political activities
- Major attacks
- Relationships with other groups
- Community relationships

Another distinctive aspect of the project is the effort to provide a comprehensive listing of information sources. There are many different terrorism databases, but the information is inconsistent--some are free while others are classified, not objective, or not comprehensive. There was a need for a database that contained profiles that provide consistent information and sourcing for each group. The Mapping Militants research effort is the only one that provides sources for every data point contained in the database.

Currently there are four maps available on the external site: Iraq, Italy, Pakistan, and Somalia. For each of these maps, groups are placed on a continuum—far right groups are on the right, far left groups are on the left. The y-axis is measured in years, ascending from the top.




Figure 1: MAP OF MILITANT GROUPS (STANFORD 2012)

Figure 1 shows the major groups in Iraq. While the existence of some groups preceded the 2003 invasion, there was a flurry of activity after the invasion. A significant number of splinter groups were created; however, more data is needed on some of the Shia groups. The orange lines denote rivalries and the blue lines denote alliances. Dr. Crenshaw noted that when leadership changes are added to the map, none of the groups immediately disappear, but alliances do. This change in the settings of the map helps inform the story of the relationship between different groups. Additionally, if a user would like more

information about a group, they can click on the name of the group (the white box) for a thumbnail profile of the group and, if that is not enough, link to the entire profile.




Figure 2: Map of Far right groups in Italy (Stanford 2012)

Another case study is Italy; the map of the far right groups is in Figure 2. This is a historical case study showing many far right and far left groups. The map of rivalries and alliances in this case is extensive, indicating complex relations between the various groups.




Figure 3: Map of Somalia (Stanford 2012)

In the case of Somalia, there are only a handful of militant groups, but the groups that are mapped are quite interesting, as noted in Figure 3. There are rivalries between Al-Shabab and other groups, but these rival groups have the same goal as Al-Shabab. It seems logical that all of these groups would merge but they have not. The map also shows us the influence of leadership changes. If the settings are changed to highlight these transitions in Al-Shabab they align with the U.S. military activity. That is, the leadership changes are correlated to U.S. intervention indicating some level of effectiveness in U.S. action. Arguably, these changes have weakened Al-Shabab.

A Case Study: Pakistan

The Mapping Militants effort uses United Nations Resolution 1267—“those groups aligned with al Qaeda”—to define militant groups in Pakistan. If this definition were not used, the map would be very crowded due to the sheer number of militant groups operating in Pakistan. As this project is continually evolving, the team is considering separating the militant groups in to sectarian groups, Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) affiliated groups, and groups operating in Kashmir. If done this way, different relationships would become apparent that otherwise would not be seen. A map of some of the groups is located in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Map of Pakistan (StANFORD 2012)

A number of groups have existed in Pakistan for many years and, as time passes, more rivalries are seen. Pakistan has tolerated the existence of militant groups since its formation in 1947 as many of these groups were and are affiliated with the territorial dispute in Kashmir. On the map, one group can be traced over time and space, but that does not give the whole picture of the group due to the vast number of relationships each group has. In fact, some of the alliances that a group has are facilitated by ISI. Furthermore, when the government begins to put pressure on some groups, the name changes while the make up of the group remains the same.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is a good example of how tracking militant groups over time in Pakistan is challenging. For instance, the group has undergone over 13 name changes, which typically happens when the government applies pressure to a group, which happens frequently in Pakistan. Group size is also difficult to determine; therefore, estimates of size are clearly cited. Estimates are further complicated by uncertainty in the size and influence of diaspora supporters. The tool maps these diaspora and direct supporters geographically to better inform the user.

The map of Pakistan (see Figure 4) shows that LeT targets various Indian locations, and can essentially operate wherever it wants.

Political activities of groups, like LeT, are also examined in order to look at ties between violent groups and political allies. In many cases, the militant groups are, in fact, the armed wing of a political group. In fact, some supporters donate money to the legitimate political party with the intent of diverted those funds to the violent wing.

The Mapping Militants effort lists major attacks for each group. While the list is not designed to be comprehensive, it illustrates the kinds of tactics a group uses. The map also shows relationships between groups and with the general population. This information is critical in that it lets the user infer a group's degree of popular support—often gained through the provision of charitable services. LeT, for example, provides many charitable services and enjoys significant community support. Popular support for the group enhances its recruitment potential, its involvement in the community, as well as group cohesiveness.

Discussion

Does the Mapping Militants research show evidence of military or ISI support for groups in Pakistan?

Dr. Crenshaw noted that these links have no open recognition, as they are very covert. Most experts believe that Pakistani state support is an important feature of the groups' security policies. Some have made the argument that Pakistan has supported these groups because they are useful in regard to Pakistan's strategic weakness with India. However, during the revolution in Iran and subsequent U.S. involvement in the region, the Pakistani state has started to feel pressure to continue to support these groups from within the Sunni population. Moreover, there is a growing threat to the state from these various groups. Since 2001, and specifically since the formation of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), more groups are turning against the Pakistani state and now pose a threat to the nation that once supported them. The question now is how does Pakistan assuage their security concerns without relying on these groups? The answer is complicated, as these groups have become a part of Pakistani national identity. Furthermore, the U.S. would like Pakistan to sever these ties and move against these groups, but there is reluctance to do so. However, there is growing resentment of the militant groups in civil society because of the increase in domestic attacks, namely attacks on military targets. The military would like to eliminate the groups they do not like while protecting the groups that they favor. The map illustrates the fact that these various militant groups are closely tied and it would be difficult to sever these ties. It can be argued that Pakistan would benefit by severing all ties but, if that is done, the groups may turn against the Government. In addition, ISI support can be a source of rivalry between groups, provoking more violence.

Are there any other states where militant groups and the government/military are interdependent?

Dr. Crenshaw cited India and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as one example. In the early stages of Tamil resistance, India supported the LTTE over the other militant groups. The Indian government regarded this as a way to manipulate the situation in Sri Lanka. The decision to support LTTE and not another group contributed significantly to LTTE's dominance throughout the conflict. However, this Indian support did not last throughout the entire conflict. Once India discovered that it was impossible to control the LTTE, it sent in a peacekeeping force, which the LTTE quickly attacked, resulting in the death of 1,000 troops. A similar example is India attempt to control groups in Punjab.

From the U.S. point of view, other examples include Iranian support of Hezbollah, Shia groups in Iraq, and Iranian involvement in Syria. It is not uncommon for states to believe they can manipulate non-state actors, but these non-state actors are independent and capable of determining their own actions. The use of militant groups as proxies is dangerous and unreliable. Unless a state is using their own actor, such as their own military, they cannot maintain control.

What motivates a state to support proxies? Is it to remove the state from certain actions? Do these states consider proxies resources?

Dr. Crenshaw stated that it is a matter of resources, shared interest, deception and denial. It must be accepted that the groups genuinely believe what they say; for example, that militant groups in Kashmir believe the region should be governed by Sharia law, and are intent on seeing an Islamic based government in Kashmir. The militants believe in their cause and are looking for resources to ensure they can obtain their goal. For the state, groups are used as proxies to achieve state interest. With regard to state behavior, since the acquisition of Pakistani nuclear weapons, the state has taken more risks under the assumption that they could deter an Indian state attack. The restraint that India has shown in response to these actions has been interesting. After the Mumbai attack and the attack on parliament in 2001, there was no overwhelming response from India. However, this tolerance may run out soon. India has been enhancing its retaliation capacity. Pakistan is also hesitant to crack down on these groups because of the looming ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan still wants its interests to be advanced in Afghanistan and an easy way to ensure this is through these proxy groups. Finally, because all of these groups are so closely linked and intertwined, as illustrated on the website, any action against one group will affect all the others. Removing support from these groups would be a systemic change that the Pakistani state is not ready for.

Why do populations within a state support militant groups? Are the groups providing services that the government is not?

Dr. Crenshaw noted that if the groups were dissolved entirely, there would be a vacuum left and it is unclear who would fill it. Some militant groups provide social services that the state does not, such as education and disaster relief. These are areas where the state is weak. The Pakistani state is not very good at policing and/or securing areas. This creates a permissive atmosphere for violent extremist groups who do not fear punishment.

In an attempt to create a centralized Pakistani identity, the government has eliminated some political parties. Is the rise of ideologically driven militant groups an extra-institutional expression of ethnic identities, which the state has suppressed? One corollary of this is Hezbollah.

Dr. Crenshaw stated that many of the violent groups are the armed wings of political parties. For example, Pakistan's General Zia pushed the country into a jihadist national identity, leading the state to occupy the space that would normally be occupied by a civil

group. Furthermore, the ISI has undermined secular groups and replaced them with groups that they are able to control.

Dr. Jocelyne Cesari

Dr. Jocelyne Cesari, former MINERVA CHAIR (2011-2012), is affiliated at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. to conduct a research on Islam and Democratization in the context of the Arab Spring. She is currently a Senior Visiting Professor of International Relations at the School of Advanced International Relations at John Hopkins University where she co-directs the Global Politics and Religion Initiative. At Harvard University, she directs the International Research Program called “ Islam in the West” (see <http://cmes.hmdc.harvard.edu/research/iw>). (See also (www.islamopediaonline.org)). Dr. Cesari is a political scientist with a French background, tenured at the French National Center for Scientific Research in Paris, specializing in contemporary Islamic societies, globalization, and democratization. She has written numerous articles and books on Islam, Globalization, Democratization, and Secularism, Including *Muslims in the West After 9/11: Religion, Politics and Law* (Routledge, 2010) and a forthcoming book, *Islam Betrayed? The Making of Modern Islam and World Politics*.

State Society Relations and Their Influence on Pakistan Stability

Dr. Jocelyn Cesari welcomed all the participants and noted that this presentation is based on a Minerva research on State-Islam relations conducted in 2011 and 2012. The Minerva Initiative is a Department of Defense venture aiming to tap into the academic community, in particular specialists on Islam, China, terrorism, and Iraq. It is funded by the National Science Foundation. The research covered Pakistan, Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. This Minerva research aimed to go beyond the traditional “state versus Islam framework” to take into account the influence of the State on Islam and vice versa.

Recently, Pakistan has transformed from a state for Muslims to an Islamic State. When Dr. Jinnah became president following the partition from India in 1947, he envisioned Pakistan as a haven for Muslims, much like Israel was created as a haven for Jews. As such, the dominant Sunni trend of Islam was inscribed at the foundation of the national narrative but also granted legal and political privileges that other religious groups, Muslim or otherwise, did not receive. However, the Islamicization of civil and criminal laws that started under general Zia ul Haq (1977-1988) was a new step building on the initial foundation of the Muslim nation-state.

In Pakistan, and almost all Muslim majority countries, Islam has been established as the hegemonic religion. Hegemonic is different than dominant. A dominant religion exists when a majority of the population belongs to one religion. For example in the US, Christianity is the dominant religion, but it is not the hegemonic religion because it is not built into state institutions. A hegemonic religion displays the following characteristics.

- The constitution of the country officially recognizes one religion
- Religious foundations, learning institutions, and clerics are nationalized
- State schools teach the recognized religious doctrine
- The legal system includes provisions of religious law
- States restrict and control the activities of the official religion
- A ministry of religious affairs and administration manages the official religion
- The government regulates the use of religious symbols and activities

- The state's laws and policies limit religious freedoms
- Penalties are enforced for the defamation of the official religion
- The government interferes with worship
- Religious groups not recognized as the official religion are tacitly or explicitly discriminated against
- Minority groups do not receive government funds or resources for education, religious programs, or maintenance of property or organizations
- Domestic or foreign religious groups are forbidden to proselytize
- Conversion from the official religious group to another, if not fully forbidden, is severely restricted

The status of Islam in Pakistan meets most of the criteria listed above. All three of Pakistan's constitutions have stated Islam as the religion of the state. Additionally, clerics of the dominant Sunni group are civil servants. This is a major step in the politicization of Islam. No cleric can articulate any religious or social position that is validated by the state. Another element in the hegemonic status of Islam in Pakistan relates to compulsory Islamic teaching in public schools. This policy leads to almost all members of society having at least a working knowledge of the state version of Islam. For her research, Dr. Cesari conducted a detailed investigation of how Islam is presented in textbooks. To be a good Pakistani, one must be Sunni Muslim; this is the foundation of Pakistani national identity, leading to a conflation between national and civic identity and religious affiliation.

Islam also influences the legal system. Civil law is based on religious rules, regulating marriage, divorce, inheritance, and custody of children. Inter-religious marriages are not recognized. Furthermore, since Zia ul Haq there has been an Islamicization of criminal and penal codes, which has a significant impact on women's rights. For example, out of wedlock sexual relations, by choice or force, are defined as a crime.

	CONSTITUTION	NATIONALIZATION	LAW	EDUCATION	POLITICAL DISCOURSE
SCORE OF 5 Egypt UAE Sudan Saudi Arabia Pakistan Yemen Algeria Iran Morocco Afghanistan Malaysia Libya (under Qaddafi) Bahrain Bangladesh Jordan Comoros Kuwait Brunei Somalia Mauritania Qatar	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
SCORE OF 4 Syria Iraq Tunisia Oman	✓	✓	--	✓	✓
SCORE OF 3 Turkey Uzbekistan	--	✓	--	✓	✓
SCORE OF 2 Tajikistan				✓	✓
SCORE OF 1 Nigeria Chad Mali Kyrgyzstan Niger Turkmenistan	--	--	--	✓	--
SCORE OF 0 Albania Azerbaijan Kosovo Burkina Faso Guinea Sierra Leone Kazakhstan	--	--	--	--	--

Figure 5: Institutionalization of Islam³

Figure 5 is an overview of the degree of religion that permeates various aspects of a country's society. It is easy to see that a majority of Muslim majority countries have a score of five on all of these indicators meaning that Islam is the hegemonic religion.

For each country, data on Islam's role was methodically collected in the following categories.

- Nation-building and in the Constitution
- Nationalization
- The legal system
- The education system
- Political movements.

The data covers the period from the creation of each nation-state to present and introduce in detail the data in the above categories. According to this systemic review, out of the 41 Muslim-majority countries, 27 scored between a 3 and 5 on a five-point scale measuring the institutionalization of Islam using the five rubrics stated above.

The five conditions are not individually sufficient to secure the hegemonic status of Islam, and not all of these conditions hold the same weight, especially the inscription of Islam in the Constitution or the use of Islamic references in political discourse that in some countries can be merely symbolic. However, the conjunction of the nationalization, legal system, and

³ Lebanon provides an example of confessionalism, which proportionally allocates political power and represents the demographic distribution of the recognized religions. Indonesia, Gambia, and Senegal recognize all religions and legally provide education and resources for all religious institutions. As a result, these countries do not fit into the brackets provided here. *A caveat is in order: This table groups countries in a very unusual way (Saudi Arabia/Egypt for example) because it scores only institutional arrangements as they stand today. Therefore, it does not reflect nor contextualize the political and social forces at work in each country that are obviously very different and diverse.*

education conditions are probably necessary to secure a hegemonic status. In other words, if Islamic institutions are State institutions, Islamic law is part of the legal system, and Islam is engrained in the curriculum of public schools, Islam has a hegemonic status.

This institutionalization is correlated with politicization of Islam in two major ways: the existence of Islamic-based political parties and religious-based political violence. These two indicators are not automatically linked. In some situations, there are Islamic-based political parties without political violence, and sometimes both Islamic political parties and political violence exist.

A serious limit of the political parties indicator is that the main influence of political Islam is not reflected solely in political parties but in the strength of multiple Islamic social movements that develop social, professional, and cultural networks, granting them legitimacy outside the narrow scope of professional politics. It is particularly the case in Pakistan where Islamic parties do not perform well in elections but where Islamic movements and groups are particularly influential.

The greater institutionalization of Islam also correlates with religious-based political violence. Figure 6 and Figure 7 were built by compiling religious-based political violence conducted by State and non-State actors in each Muslim-majority country between 2006-2011.⁴ Incidents include terrorist attacks, state-led assaults against minority religious groups, and incarceration based on religious beliefs. 63 percent of the countries with a highly institutionalized level of Islam (score 5 to 3) experienced over 200 incidents.




Figure 6: Religious based political violence: scores of 5

⁴ Sources: U.S. State Department International Religious Freedom Reports; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database; Human Rights Watch World Reports




Figure 7: Religious based political violence scores 0-4

These two indicators of politicization of Islam, existence of political parties based on Islam and religiously based political violence, can evolve under the influence of malleable and volatile social and political factors, such as authoritarian nature of regimes, external intervention, civil war, ethnic conflicts or economic crises.

Consequences for Pakistan’s Domestic and Regional Stability

This Islamic hegemony carries important domestic consequences including increased intolerance among groups within civil society, particularly for women and religious minorities. In the last 20 years, intolerance of minority groups has grown steadily without punishment or consequence from the state for the perpetrators of religiously based political violence. Additionally, freedom of speech is becoming more restrained due to these threats.

Strategic Factors

The status of Islam as a hegemonic religion could be challenged primarily through urbanization and the media. Most of the Pakistani population now lives in urban centers. The traditional feudal system is beginning to weaken. In the new urban centers, a new political elite will rise, ultimately weakening the feudal system of political stability. The second factor, the role of media, is broader than social media. Most young people in Pakistan gather information from TV, newspapers, and radio as well as social media of all kinds. It is worth noting that, in general, the Pakistani youth is more interested in politics and current events than Western youth. Furthermore, the media represents many different voices and not just that of the state elite. This diversification of information, coupled with a strong, urbanized, middle class could lead to more democratization in the future. If various social groups in

Pakistan remain closed to diversification, and the gender divide is a significant factor in this status quo, Pakistan's political development will remain limited.

In the next step of her research, Dr. Cesari intends to address the question of how norms and group identities influence government capacity and performance by utilizing the political durability model created by Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI, for the research consortium on Afghan-Pakistan regional stability in support of the SMA South Asia Stability Project. More specifically, this model is relevant to Dr. Cesari's investigation because:

1. It builds on the historical and contextual specificities of each state and political actors and therefore is coherent with the methodology of the previous Minerva research mentioned above.
2. It captures the dynamic of social changes as well as the interactions between State, non State and external actors involved in each of the government performance functions that may influenced by beliefs and cultural norms.

Discussion

When did Pakistan move from a Muslim state to an Islamic state?

Dr. Cesari answered that it is a matter of "grandfathering" in that regimes do not change what the previous regime has done. This changes the way in which the new generation of Pakistanis ha been educated. The youth of Pakistan today are more conservative than in the past. Due to the incumbency of the system, it now requires more political courage to change the system. In the 1970s, small influential groups could have made this now monumental change.

What do the scores in Figure 6 and Figure 7 tell us?

Dr. Cesari noted the significant variation is between countries with score 3 to 5 and the rest of the 17 countries with score 0 to 2. The latter do not experience the same level of religiously based political violence.

In Turkey and Egypt, Islam was used as a vigorous force. Is this happening in Pakistan as well? Alternatively, Islam could be adjusting to changing global circumstances and if that is the case, how does this effect regional stability?

Dr. Cesari noted that there is a capacity for Pakistan political elites to adjust to political realities. Most of Islamists in Pakistan are social and religiously conservative, but not politically extremists. One major political initiative could be to diversify social and political positions in public space, to break the dominant Islamically correct discourse. Additionally, the urbanization of Pakistan is changing the balance of power for political groups, and this shifting balance have positive consequences. The political system has catching up to do to the changing population distribution.

Appendix A: Acronyms

ASD (R&E)/RFD/RRTO	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering/Rapid Fielding Directorate/Rapid Reaction Technology Office
BNP	Bangladesh Nationalist Party
DDGO	Deputy Directorate for Global Operations
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
ISAF	International Security Assistance Forces
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
JS	Joint Staff
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LLNL	Lawrence Livermore National Lab
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
PAK-StaM	Pakistan Stability Model
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PNNL	Pacific Northwest National Lab
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PRC	People's Republic of China
SMA	Strategic Multilayer Assessment
StaM	State Stability Model
TTP	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan
UAE	United Arab Emirates
US	United States
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USG	United States Government
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
VEO	Violent Extremist Organizations