

February | 2015



The Palestinian Security Sector in the West Bank

Current functions, activities, and internal barriers to the provision of civil order



Prepared for:
Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment

Understanding the
Human Side of the
Environment

www.NSITEAM.com

NSI Project Team

Ms. Abigail Desjardins, NSI
adesjardins@NSIteam.com

Dr. Robert Popp, NSI
rpoppp@NSIteam.com

Dr. Sabrina Pagano, NSI
spagano@NSIteam.com

Mr. Tom Rieger, NSI
trieger@NSIteam.com

Please direct inquiries to Abigail Desjardins at adesjardins@nsiteam.com



Cover Art:

1. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/images/article_images/middle-east/Palestinians-carry-large-flag-through-streets-of-nablus-on-independence-day.jpg

Table of Contents

List of Figures	v
List of Tables	vi
Executive Summary	1
Chapter One Introduction	4
<i>Background</i>	4
<i>Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) Overview</i>	5
<i>Civil Society Concerns</i>	6
Chapter Two Analytical Approach	8
<i>Venn Diagram Analysis Methodology</i>	8
<i>Barrier Analysis Methodology</i>	11
Chapter Three Barriers to the Provision of Security by PASF	12
<i>Fear-Based Barriers</i>	13
<i>Clarity and Alignment Barriers</i>	15
<i>Population Engagement Barriers</i>	18
<i>Capability-Based Barriers</i>	23
<i>Legal Based Barriers</i>	27
Chapter Four Findings and Reform Suggestions	31
<i>Reform Suggestion 1</i>	31
<i>Reform Suggestion 2</i>	32
<i>Reform Suggestion 3</i>	33
<i>Conclusion</i>	34
Chapter Five Topics for Further Analysis	35
<i>Provision of Dignity</i>	35
Appendix A: Palestinian Civil Police (PCP)	41
<i>Characterization and Mission</i>	41
<i>Size and Structure</i>	42
<i>Functions/Activities</i>	44
<i>Acceptable Practices</i>	45
Appendix B: National Security Forces (NSF)	51
<i>Characterization and Mission</i>	51
<i>Size and Structure</i>	52
<i>Functions/Activities</i>	56
<i>Acceptable Practices</i>	57
Appendix C: Intelligence Services: General Intelligence (GI), Preventive Security Organization (PSO), Military Intelligence (MI)	59
<i>Characterization and Mission</i>	59

Size and Structure..... 60
Functions/Activities..... 63
Acceptable Practices..... 66
Appendix D: Venn Diagrams & Sources68
Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) 68
National Security Forces (NSF) 70
Works Cited73

List of Figures

<i>Figure 1: Venn Diagram to Capture PASF Functions/Activities as Authorized, Reported, and/or Acceptable Practices</i>	9
<i>Figure 2: Interpretation of Venn Diagram Regions</i>	10
<i>Figure 3: Venn Diagram of PCP Functions/Activities as Authorized, Reported, and/or Acceptable Practices</i>	11
<i>Figure 4: Overview of Primary Barriers in the Provision of Security by the PASF</i>	12
<i>Figure 5: Palestinian Authority Organizations and Command Structure</i>	42
<i>Figure 6: Overview of PCP District Headquarter Locations</i>	43
<i>Figure 7: Venn Diagram of PCP Functions/Activities Within the Domain of Internal Practices and Policies</i>	47
<i>Figure 8: Venn Diagram of PCP Functions/Activities Within the Domain of Operations</i>	48
<i>Figure 9: Venn Diagram of PCP Functions/Activities Within the Domain of Investigative Authorities</i>	49
<i>Figure 10: Venn Diagram of PCP Functions/Activities Within the Domain of Training and Recruiting</i>	50
<i>Figure 11: Palestinian Authority Organizations and Command Structure</i>	53
<i>Figure 12: Overview of NSF Locations and Facilities</i>	54
<i>Figure 13: Venn Diagram of NSF Functions/Activities as Authorized, Reported, and/or Acceptable Practices</i>	58
<i>Figure 14: Palestinian Authority Organizations and Command Structure</i>	61
<i>Figure 15: Venn Diagram of GI Functions/Activities as Authorized, Reported, and/or Acceptable Practices</i>	67

List of Tables

<i>Table 1: Overview of Fear Based Barriers, Root Causes, and Primary PASF Entities Impacted.....</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>Table 2: Overview of Clarity and Alignment Barriers, Root Causes, and Primary PASF Entities Impacted.....</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>Table 3: Overview of Population Engagement Barriers, Root Causes, and Primary PASF Entities Impacted.....</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Table 4: Overview of Capability-Based Barriers, Root Causes, and Primary PASF Entities Impacted.....</i>	<i>23</i>
<i>Table 5: Overview of Legal Based Barriers, Root Causes, and Primary PASF Entities Impacted.....</i>	<i>27</i>

Executive Summary

The origins of the Palestinian security sector can be traced to the 1993 Oslo I Accord, which established divisive security and policing responsibilities between the Palestinians and Israelis and the Oslo II agreement, which codified interim boundaries, including the division of the West Bank into a complex and fragmented patchwork of different jurisdictions. These divisions of land and security responsibilities remain in place to this day and have fostered a unique, complicated, and at times perplexing situation for both the Palestinian security sector and the civil society it serves to protect. The environment in the West Bank is replete with confusion over security sector authorities and responsibilities, frustration over barriers¹ to the provision of security and justice, and fear and mistrust of the security sector forces. Moreover, the absence of publically available mission statements and codified legal documents, that clearly delineate the Palestinian security sector roles and responsibilities, adds to the complex situation.

At the request of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) staff, an analysis was conducted to identify security sector reform measures that would assist in fostering a healthy and transparent relationship between the Palestinian security sector and Palestinian civil society in the West Bank. To this end, we focused on assessing the performance of the Palestinian security sector in the provision of security to the Palestinian civil society via a two stage analytic methodology. First, we conducted a qualitative assessment comparing Palestinian security sector functions and activities that are authorized based on legal documents with those that are reported via news reports and by civil society, and, second, we compared this with acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces. To simplify and clearly convey our analysis, we utilized “living” Venn diagrams, which allows for the rapid integration of additional data and information as they become available. This was followed by a barrier analysis identifying internal and external barriers and their associated root causes in the provision of security that is not in alignment with Palestinian civil society perspectives and expectations. The identification and classification of barriers and their root causes facilitates the detection of points for security sector reform measures that can both strengthen and solidify the Palestinian security sector in a manner that is popularly accepted and sustainable with the Palestinian civil society.

Overall, our analysis identified five primary barrier categories in the provision of security by the Palestinian security sector—fear based barriers, clarity and alignment barriers, population engagement barriers, capability barriers, and legal barriers. Several external barriers, which are based on factors or influence outside of Palestinian control, were identified (e.g., culture of fear and limitations on movement or other activities). These factors are more difficult to overcome in the current environment in the West Bank and, in many cases, may be rooted in an intractable problem. However, several internal barriers, such as insufficient legal frameworks or lack of preparedness, that are within the control of the Palestinian security sector were identified. This suggests that mitigating actions can be taken by the Palestinian security sector in partnership with international partners, even given the

¹ In this context, a barrier is defined as a factor that is inhibiting the effectiveness of a security force in terms of its ability to perform its mission requirements and gain the confidence and acceptance of the population it serves.

currently limiting socio-political environment in the West Bank, to reduce or dampen their effect on the provision of security.

Thus, drawing from our analysis, several high-level security sector reform measures and mitigation strategies emerged. Our analysis suggests several focus areas for security sector reforms and development. Each is critical to the provision of security in the Palestinian Authority, is consistent with acceptable practices of modern security forces, and should facilitate civil society involvement.

Reform	Specifics	Page in Report
<p>Clarify confusion over roles and responsibilities—support the creation of clear, comprehensive, and codified legal documents laying out the missions and duties of each Palestinian security sector entity; this helps ensure accountability of and trust in the Palestinian security sector and its ability to ensure the safety of its citizens.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guide Palestinian security sector toward completion of comprehensive legal documents that delineate Palestinian security sector forces mission and duties in clear language; • Ensure that guidelines establish the lines of authority and purview within and across the forces; • Emphasize common Palestinian identity and goals as part of a superordinate ingroup, but avoid the pitfall of reinforcing Israel as the outgroup; • Work to establish a more cohesive security philosophy that can guide all of the Palestinian security sector forces in pursuit of a common goal. 	<p>p. 32</p>
<p>Strengthen legitimacy—take measures to re-establish the trust of Palestinian civil society in its security sector forces in order to promote cooperation and adherence, as well as smooth the path for the Palestinian security sector to perform its duties once they are more clearly and explicitly defined and established.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guide Palestinian security sector toward establishing formal complaint and feedback systems, which will not result in retribution; • Establish protocols and training that facilitate respectful and fair treatment of members of Palestinian civil society and avoid human rights abuses; • Emphasize the proper selection of candidates for jobs at the individual and aggregate level • Work to reduce cronyism and other forms of bias in employment selection; • Encourage organizations to take responsibility for missteps and apologize to the population as needed when mistakes are made; • Work to establish an effective witness protection program; • Work to more generally increase transparency and accountability; • Work to establish independent oversight, for example, through the appointment of an ombudsman to investigate citizens’ complaints. 	<p>p. 33</p>

<p>Improve equipping and training of forces—critical for Palestinian security sector to effectively execute its duties is having sufficient equipment and training, although this issue may be less easily resolved due to dependence of the Palestinian Authority for Israeli approval of materiel.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prioritize the establishment and funding of an improved communications infrastructure for security; • Work to centralize training facilities; • Streamline training curricula to emphasize common principles and needs across security organizations, while maintaining differentiation as needed; • Perform an audit of existing training; • Assess remaining training needs based on pain points after the higher priority goals have been met and/or barriers have been mitigated; • Ensure that training maps to the overarching security philosophy that should be established in advance. 	<p>p. 34</p>
---	--	--------------

The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Chapter one provides a brief introduction to the Palestinian security sector and the current environment. In Chapter Two, we discuss our analytic approach that serves as the basis for our assessment of the performance of the Palestinian security sector in the West Bank. In Chapter Three, we provide a barrier analysis identifying internal and external barriers and their associated root causes in the provision of security by the Palestinian security sector. In Chapter Four, we provide our findings and security sector reform suggestions. We then follow this with a discussion of topics for further analysis in Chapter Five. Several appendices provide detailed overviews of the Palestinian security sector entities assessed in this report.

Chapter One | Introduction

“Throughout the occupied Palestinian territories, in the Gaza Strip as well as the West Bank, Palestinians continuously face hardship in simply going about their lives; they are prevented from doing what makes up the daily fabric of most people's existence. The Palestinian territories face a deep human crisis, where millions of people are denied their human dignity. Not once in a while, but every day.”

-- International Red Cross, *Dignity Denied*, 2007

Background

The origins of the Palestinian security sector and the source of many barriers to the provision of security and justice can be traced to the 1993 Oslo I Accord. Article 8 of the declaration established that the responsibility for policing the Palestinian population would fall to a “strong [Palestinian] police force” within the West Bank and Gaza during negotiations over permanent boundaries. The responsibility for “external threats,” the “overall security of Israelis,” and security within other politically established boundaries would continue to remain with the Israeli government and corresponding Israeli security forces. The Oslo II agreement codified the “interim” boundaries that included dividing the West Bank into a complex and fragmented patchwork of three types of jurisdictions: 1) security responsibility held by the Palestinian Authority (Area A), 2) security responsibilities shared by Palestinian and Israeli forces (Area B), and 3) areas from which Palestinians were excluded and security responsibility was given to Israeli forces alone (Area C). This division of land and security responsibilities remains in place today and has fostered an opaque situation replete with confusion over responsibilities, frustration over political barriers to provision of security and justice, and a culture of fear and mistrust on both sides. In addition, the absence of important political mandates, publically available mission statements, and codified legal documents that clearly delineate the Palestinian security sector roles and responsibilities adds to the complex situation. Without a legal framework and guiding documents, the Palestinian security sector is operating sub-optimally within an environment that is confused, ripe for misinterpretation, and ambiguous in terms of job function, authorities, and chains of command, resulting in failure to provide security and justice in a transparent and accountable manner.

In early 2014, the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) staff reached out to the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) office to help identify the types of security sector reforms that would assist in fostering a healthy and transparent relationship between the Palestinian security sector and Palestinian civil society. Specifically, the USSC asked for assistance in identifying “*What are the critical areas of security sector reform required to make civil society work within the Palestinian Authority and across the territories versus the status quo?*” Assessing the options for security sector reform requires an evaluation of numerous issues, including the following: how Palestinian civil society sees the Palestinian security sector including an understanding of its expected performance; the degree to which functions and activities performed by the Palestinian security sector forces appear to be in or out of alignment with Palestinian civil society popular expectations; and, finally, an understanding of established and acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces that would be expected of the Palestinian security sector by the Palestinian civil society.

Given the current political context, we utilize the following standard for *expected performance* and *acceptable practices* in the provision of security by the Palestinian security sector, “the provision of civil order and security for the Palestinian population of the West Bank at ‘affordable costs, in full transparency and in an accountable manner’” (Bocco, de Martino, & Luethold, 2005, p. 5). This standard is in alignment with established and generalized acceptable practices² and the expectations of the Palestinian population³ and Palestinian civil society.⁴

The objective of this report is to provide the USSC staff with an impartial snapshot of the performance of a sub-set of the Palestinian security sector in the West Bank via a two stage analytic methodology. First, we conducted a qualitative assessment comparing Palestinian security sector functions and activities that are authorized based on legal documents with those that are reported via news reports and by civil society, and, second, we compared this with acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces. This was followed by a barrier analysis (Rieger, 2011) identifying internal and external barriers⁵ and their associated root causes in the provision of security that is not in alignment with Palestinian civil society perspectives and expectations. Identifying and classifying barriers and root causes allows the USSC to better detect points for security sector reform measures that can both strengthen and solidify the Palestinian security sector in a manner that is popularly accepted and sustainable with the Palestinian civil society.

Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) Overview

Article 8 of the Oslo I Accord laid the groundwork for the current Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) (Amrov & Tartir, 2014b). While the 2008-2010 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan expanded the scope of the PASF beyond a ‘strong police force,’ the exact composition and responsibilities of the various entities remains unclear.⁶ However, for purposes of this analysis, we use the USSC Campaign Plan definition which lists the components of the PASF⁷ as the Presidential Guard, General Intelligence, National Security Force, Security Intelligence, Civil Defense, Palestinian Civil Police, and Preventive Security Organization (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2012). Based on USSC guidance, we focused our analysis explicitly on the PASF performance in the West Bank and have limited it to the

² Bastick & Whitman, 2013; Davis, 2012; *Security Sector Reform Best Practices and Lessons Learned: Pragmatic Steps for Global Security*, 2009; Wulf, 2004

³ Aldar, 2014; Arab World for Research & Development, 2014; Bailey, 2013; Bocco et al., 2005

⁴ Amrov & Tartir, 2014a; Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN), 2013; Dana, 2013; Friedrich & Luethold, 2007; Munayyer, 2012; Palm, 2010; PASSIA / DCAF, 2006; Sullivan, 1996

⁵ In this context, a barrier is defined as a factor that is inhibiting the effectiveness of a security force, in terms of its ability to perform its mission requirements and gain the confidence and acceptance of the population it serves.

⁶ Accessible legal documents that outline the composition of the PASF vary in details as small as the name of an office to as large as the number of institutions that compose the PASF itself.

⁷ The literature varies in detail as to what comprises the PASF. For example, the PA Security Sector: Strategic Plan outlines the security services as: “General Intelligence (GI), Civil Defense (CD), Preventive Security Organization (PSO), Palestinian Civil Police (PCP), Military Intelligence (MI), National Security Forces (NSF), Presidential Guards (PG), and Customs Control” (Ministry of Interior, 2014). Other sources interpret the Palestinian security sector to include the Ministry of Justice, Palestinian Civil Police, the Attorney-General’s Office/Public Prosecution, the High Judicial Council, the Shari’a courts, the military courts, and the Palestinian Bar Association (Bailey, 2013). And yet another source states that there are “five separate organizations that constitute the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF): the National Security Forces (which includes an autonomous military intelligence branch), the Palestinian Civil Police, the Preventative Security Organization, the Presidential Guard, and the General Intelligence Service” (Zanotti, 2010, p. 11).

following PASF entities: Palestinian Civil Police (PCP), National Security Forces (NSF), and the PASF's three primary intelligence services—General Intelligence (GI), Military Intelligence (MI), and Preventive Security Organization (PSO). Nevertheless, the analytical process established in this work can be used to produce assessments of additional PASF entities.

The PASF was designed to provide the Palestinian population with “security”, a term that is subject to debate in the Palestinian context. Many Palestinians tend to “equate security with ending Israel’s occupation and establishing sovereign control over their land,” (Crouch, Meigs, & Slocombe, 2008, p. 6) and by extension would expect their security forces to take steps toward attaining that type of security. The International Crisis Group (2010b, p. 4) summarizes the political tension within which the PASF exists:

Since the 1993 Oslo Accords and the emergence of the PA [Palestinian Authority] on Palestinian soil, the Palestinians’ basic strategic dilemma has been that of reconciling the demands of national liberation and resisting the occupation with the prerequisites of state building.

Operationally, the PASF appears to define its security role largely as protecting the Palestinian population by preventing attacks or events aimed at Israel or within the Palestinian Authority that would spark retaliation from Israel and likely result in Palestinian casualties (Atallah, 2013). The PASF is not intended to be a resistance force. Along with other Palestinian Authority institutions, it tends to walk the fine line between being seen as a legitimate authority for the protection of the citizens of an emergent Palestinian state on the one hand and as ensuring the safety and security of Israelis on the other.

Civil Society Concerns

Civil society refers to individuals and organizations “whose activities take place outside of the state’s direct control...it includes NGOs, community-based organizations, religious groups, women’s organizations, youth and student groups, trade organizations, professional associations, cultural societies, and academia. It can also include the media” (Bastick & Whitman, 2013, p. 7). In the context of Palestinian security sector reform, this term refers to individuals and organizations that advocate on behalf of the government, the population, or the international community. For the purposes of our analysis, civil society is defined as individuals or organizations advocating on behalf of the Palestinian population or, in other words, individuals or organizations who work to ensure that the Palestinian security sector is functioning in alignment with the populations’ expectations and in accordance with international standards and acceptable practices.

Civil society can play a crucial role in overseeing and shaping the structures, policies, and practices of the Palestinian security sector to ensure that they are in accordance with expectations and acceptable security practices. Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian civil society has advocated for a strong Palestinian security sector to protect and police the Palestinian population (Amrov & Tartir, 2014a; Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, 2009; United Nations Development Program, 2012). However, civil society has routinely raised concerns with the existing Palestinian security sector forces, ranging from a

lack of professionalism (PASSIA/DCAF, 2006) to gross human rights violations (Human Rights Watch, 2011, 2014b). In a 2009 report, the Geneva Centre of the Democratic Control of Armed Forces conveyed the following concerns with the Palestinian security sector from the perspective of civil society:

- a perception among the population that the Palestinian security sector lacks professionalism;
- a culture of fear among the population with regard to the Palestinian security sector;
- a perception that the Palestinian security sector lacks accountability for its actions;
- the politicization of the Palestinian security sector;
- weak relations between civil society and the Palestinian security sector, with no clear complaint mechanisms; and
- a lack of a shared security policy, which translates down to a lack of local focus and direction.

These concerns have been reiterated by other organizations along with the recent addition of concern over the ill-treatment and torture of Palestinians at the hands of the PASF (The Independent Commission for Human Rights, 2013). Additionally, some aspects of civil society have indicated a lack of trust in the PASF, utilizing Israeli security forces presence and activities within Palestinian political boundaries as suggestive of collusion and a failure of the PASF to protect the Palestinian population and identity (Kristoff, 2012; Sayigh & Shiqaqi, 1999). A 2012 report by the Centre for International Governance Innovation (p. 13) found:

Broad swaths of civil society protest what they see as a campaign of intimidation targeting critics of the PA and bemoan what most Palestinians consider the creation of a “police state.” This internal disaffection is perilous at a time when Palestinian security cooperation with Israel is on full display, and skepticism and cynicism toward the diplomatic process and prospects for a peace agreement remain high.

In order to truly explore a means of enhancing the relationship between Palestinian civil society and the PASF within the West Bank, it is important to address both the perceptual and physical aspects of that relationship. This includes examining socially acceptable codes of behavior together with PASF actions; both authorized and reported by civil society. Palestinian civil society can play an important role in the security sector, yet in the case of the Palestinian Authority, there appears to be a disconnect between their articulation of issues and ability to effect change within the current environment. Without first establishing the proper modes of security force interaction between the PASF and the Palestinian population it is intended to protect, it is unlikely that any amount of material change will engage Palestinian civil society in positive ways. To address this challenge and assess the performance of the PASF in the provision of security to the Palestinian civil society, we utilized a two stage analytic methodology, which is described in the following chapter.

Chapter Two | Analytical Approach

The focus of our analysis was to provide an impartial snapshot of the PASF performance using a two stage analytic methodology. First, we conducted a qualitative assessment using Venn diagrams to illustrate PASF functions and activities that are (1) authorized based on legal documents, (2) reported based on news reports and by civil society, and (3) acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces. Second, we followed this with a barrier analysis (Rieger, 2011), from business and organizational psychology, identifying the internal and external barriers and their associated root causes in the provision of security by the Palestinian security sector.

In this chapter we describe our analytic methodology. A detailed discussion of the qualitative assessment using the Venn diagram methodology is provided in Appendices A-C for the PASF entities assessed, namely, the PCP, NSF and the PASF’s three primary intelligence services—GI, MI, and PSO. Chapter Three contains the barrier analysis which, after identifying and classifying barriers and their respective root causes, allows for a better understanding of how to strengthen and solidify the Palestinian security sector in a manner that is consistent with the Palestinian civil society expectations.⁸

Venn Diagram Analysis Methodology

To address the question of what PASF functions and activities are authorized versus those that are reported, our team reviewed open-source information and conducted interviews with subject matter experts. Our objective was to understand and delineate the institutional security functions and activities performed by the PASF that it is legally authorized to perform versus those that it actually does perform as reported via news reports and by civil society. We then compared these to acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces. To simplify and clarify our findings, we generated “living” Venn diagrams, allowing for rapid integration of information as it becomes available.

As shown in Figure 1, the Venn diagram represents the realm of possible functions and activities to be performed by the PASF. Each function and activity belongs to one or more of three possible sets:

- authorized—functions and activities that the PASF is authorized to perform based on one or more legal documents.
- reported—functions and activities that are reported as being performed by the PASF based on verification from one or more credible sources.
- acceptable practices—functions and activities that are acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces that is desirable for the PASF to perform.

⁸ Note that this analysis does not address possible dignity violations associated with socially acceptable codes of behavior for the PASF in the provision of security to the Palestinian civil society. In order to provide this type of assessment, a significant empirical analysis would be necessary, which is beyond the scope of this report.




Figure 1: Venn Diagram to Capture PASF Functions/Activities as Authorized, Reported, and/or Acceptable Practices

The overlapping regions of the three sets represent functions and activities with various interpretations as described in Figure 2 below, the ideal or optimal case being those functions and activities falling within the intersection of the three sets (as denoted by the gold star in Figure 2). This region represents the subset of functions and activities performed by the PASF that have a legal basis (authorized), are currently being performed (reported), and correspond to a known acceptable practice in the provision of security consistent with a modern security force. Given the limits to information available in the open source, our analytic process aspires to be as transparent as possible to facilitate integration additional information as it becomes available. The Venn diagram analysis methodology and process used in this work should serve as a visual basis for discussion and facilitate analysis within and across the PASF, civil society, and the USSC.

After capturing our understanding of the authorized and reported functions and activities of the PASF within the Venn diagram, and identifying and capturing acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces, our team initiated an assessment of areas of alignment within and across the PASF; we also categorized various barriers as authorized, reported, and/or in accordance with acceptable practices. This analysis then provided an impartial perspective on current PASF performance, as defined by activity and function that facilitated the identification of internal and external barriers, and their associated root causes, in the provision of security by the PASF in and out of alignment with Palestinian civil society perspectives and expectations.




Figure 2: Interpretation of Venn Diagram Regions

Venn Diagram Analysis Example

The Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) is used as an example to illustrate our Venn diagram analysis methodology.⁹ There are several categories of established and acceptable policing practices that are explicitly and legally authorized for the PCP to perform. These are protecting public installations/places of interest, searches and seizures, arrest authority, and responding to calls for help from the general public. Additionally, there are several reported PCP activities that align with acceptable policing practice categories, such as traffic and crowd control, surveillance, interrogation of suspects, management of detention and prison facilities, VIP security, and, to some extent, routine preventative patrols.

Figure 3 maps the PCP functions and activities that are explicitly authorized, reported, and are acceptable modern policing practices (see Appendices A and D, and the Works Cited for a full list of sources used). As shown, a fair number of functions and activities are consistent with acceptable practices, although less than half are authorized. Other reported functions and activities are neither authorized nor an acceptable policing practice.

⁹ See Appendix A for an overview of the PCP in terms of its characteristics, mission, size, structure, and an assessment of its authorized and reported functions/activities as well as established acceptable practices in the provision of security. In Appendix B, we provide a similar overview and analysis for the NSF; in Appendix C similar overviews and analyses are provided for the PASF's three primary intelligence services, namely, GI, MI, and PSO.

As of January 2015




Figure 3: Venn Diagram of PCP Functions/Activities as Authorized, Reported, and/or Acceptable Practices

Barrier Analysis Methodology

Legal documents, news reports, and academic research were used to derive an initial list of barriers to the authorized and reported functions and activities associated with the PASF entities we assessed. Where possible, these barriers were based on limitations to established and acceptable practices in the provision of security by the PASF as explicitly cited in the literature. More frequently, however, barriers were inferred based on outside factors or conditions that created challenges for the PASF. These challenges were hypothesized to impede effective and acceptable practices in the provision of security for the greatest number of Palestinians in the West Bank at “affordable costs, in full transparency and in an accountable manner” (Bocco et al., 2005, p. 5). Root causes of these barriers were inferred based on a literature review to identify potential underlying causes. These root causes should be considered hypotheses, representing likely relationships based on the evidence that was available.

The barriers analysis is described in more detail in the next chapter.

Chapter Three | Barriers to the Provision of Security by PASF

Our analysis identified several factors that serve as barriers to effective and acceptable practices in the provision of security for the PASF in the West Bank. In this context, as mentioned previously, a barrier is defined as a factor that is inhibiting the effectiveness of a security force, in terms of its ability to perform its mission requirements and gain the confidence and acceptance of the population it serves. Barriers can be internal to the Palestinian Authority, stemming from insufficient legal frameworks or lack of preparedness. Suggesting that, even within the current socio-political environment, there are actions that the PASF, with the assistance of the USSC or international community, can take to mitigate the internal barriers. Barriers can also be external, based in outside factors or influence (e.g., culture of fear, limitations on movement, or other activities), making them difficult to address in the current environment. Further, the root causes of barriers can be psychological (e.g., feelings of fear) or physical (e.g., checkpoints or other impediments to free) in their manifestation.

Overall, our analysis uncovered five significant barrier categories, each comprised of two or more specific barriers with multiple root causes. Figure 4 shows an overview of the barrier categories and barriers to the provision of security by the PASF. Each is discussed in detail below.





Figure 4: Overview of Primary Barriers in the Provision of Security by the PASF

Fear-Based Barriers



Barrier	Root Causes	Primary Impact
Culture of fear and oppression	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political opposition is squelched • No crime of torture in Palestinian Penal Code • Israeli tactics erode feelings of safety, instilling fear • Human rights abuses 	PCP, NSF
Ingroup-outgroup mentality reinforces self-interest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Land confiscation and demolition, lack of permits to build • Destruction of crops • Barriers set by Israelis prevent Palestinians from reaching their intended destinations 	ALL

Table 1: Overview of Fear Based Barriers, Root Causes, and Primary PASF Entities Impacted

Culture of Fear and Oppression Barrier

The first fear-based barrier was the existence of an overall culture of fear and oppression in the West Bank, which had its origins both in external and internal causes. This barrier primarily impacts the performance of the PCP and NSF, though some older reports indicate that the PSO and GI intelligence services are the most abusive (Human Rights Watch, 2008).

There are multiple root causes for this barrier. The first two are internal in origin. First, forceful policing of political opposition creates an atmosphere in which critics of the existing system are reluctant to publicly express their opinions (International Crisis Group, 2010b). This policing of opinion seems to have stemmed in part from the campaign against Hamas, which appears to have extended more generally to include quelling of secular opposition. Palestinian security force officers often work in tandem with Israeli officers to squelch protests, and PASF forces have also shared suspect names with Israel, resulting in the pursuit and punishment of individuals, without due process (Dana, 2014). This situation has led some Palestinians to remark that, “few respect the Palestinian security forces, but we do fear them” (International Crisis Group, 2010b, p. 35).

Second, there is no crime of torture listed in the Palestinian Penal Code or any provision that can be invoked to bring a case of abuse against the police, beyond mechanisms tied to ordinary assault (Bailey, 2013). Without a formal mechanism by which to bring a complaint against authorities, Palestinian citizens are subject to repeated potential violations of their rights and safety. Moreover, citizens may feel unable to voice their opinions and criticisms without retribution, another core feature of safety without which dignity is compromised.

The third root cause is external in origin—Israeli tactics erode feelings of safety, instilling fear. These tactics include purposeful attempts to make Palestinian citizens feel as if they are chronically being surveilled, pursued, and harassed (Waldman, 2014); degrading treatment at checkpoints and by Israeli settlers and Israeli military in the West Bank; the use of low flying jets to create disturbing sonic booms; and more aggressive and violent tactics causing physical harm or damage to homes or other property (Batniji et al., 2009). These forms of humiliation are described as being a form of control by Israelis over Palestinian lives (Giacaman, Abu-Rmeileh, Hussein, Saab, & Boyce, 2007).

The fourth root cause, human rights abuses, is both external and internal in origin. In addition to the Israeli tactics previously described, which engender fear and humiliation in recipients, Palestinians also face abuse as a result of PASF actions. Most notably, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights has indicated its concern over the torture and mistreatment of Palestinians by Palestinians since the eruption of conflict between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, with many of the torture tactics resembling those used in Israeli prisons (Batniji et al., 2009). These concerns are still current (Human Rights Watch, 2014a) and violate several core dignity themes, hindering the development of a strong and publically supported security sector

“His assertion that he was above the law by virtue of his role as a security official is disturbingly consistent with a climate of impunity for abuses by Palestinian security forces, Human Rights Watch said.”

(HRW, 2011)

Ingroup-Outgroup Mentality Reinforces Self-Interest Barrier


The second fear-based barrier identified was the ingroup-outgroup mentality reinforcing self-interest in the West Bank. When individuals are concerned about their basic safety and shelter, their focus tends to shift toward a “zero-sum” mentality, wherein people either obtain all of the available resources (“winners”) or none of the available resources (“losers”). Correspondingly, people may become more focused on “vital courage,” defined as the “inspiration for actions that improve one’s lot in life or that ultimately promote survival” (Snyder, Lopez, & Pedrotti, 2010), as opposed to “moral courage,” defined as “the authentic expression of one’s beliefs or values in pursuit of justice or the common good despite power differentials, disapproval, or rejection” (Snyder et al., 2010). Vital courage is inwardly focused and essentially addresses survival, whereas moral courage is outwardly focused and essentially addresses ideology. We suggest that, in the present Palestinian context, concerns about survival promoting vital courage detract from Palestinian’s focus on the greater good and goals (moral courage). As such, their relevant ingroup (the group with which they share an identity and sense of purpose) is not Palestinian society as a whole, inclusive of the PASF, but likely a more limited ingroup with local goals that emphasize survival. As such, social capital suffers and Palestinians’ trust in and cooperation with security personnel is likely reduced. Based on this line of reasoning, this barrier potentially impacts the performance of *all* security forces.

The root causes of this barrier are primarily external and are focused broadly on threats to survival. Because members of the PASF are seen as colluding with the IDF, and the PASF fails to prevent many of these threats, the impact is felt internally (Collard, 2014). The first root cause involves land confiscation and demolition, coupled with lack of permits to build. Palestinian homes are in danger due to aerial

bombing, direct demolition, or even occupation (Batniji et al., 2009). Further, regulations prohibit building on a majority of the land in the occupied Palestinian territory (Batniji et al., 2009), making recovery difficult. Destruction of crops by Israelis is a related second root cause. As reported both by the International Red Cross (2007) and Batniji (2009) and colleagues, many Palestinians are faced with the uprooting of their olive groves and fruit orchards, which endangers their livelihood and subsistence, amplifying their existing feeling of insecurity.

A third set of root causes are the physical barriers that inhibit or prevent freedom of movement. These physical barriers prevent the PASF from easily, efficiently, and quickly moving between the political boundaries to respond to emergencies or to carry out basic job functions. These barriers include separation walls, checkpoints, and detours (Human Rights Watch, 2014a; International Committee of the Red Cross, 2007). This impacts not only the civil population, but also members of the PASF who also are subject to these limitations.

Clarity and Alignment Barriers



Barrier	Root Causes	Primary Impact
Objectives at Odds	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National liberation and state-building objectives conflict with each other 	ALL
Lack of cohesiveness within and across security forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of autonomy from donors, exacerbated by the lack of an integrated approach to the PASF Different security philosophies and traditions and resultant lack of coordination Security sector led by Fatah loyalists 	ALL
Multiple and overlapping services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of coordination Vague and/or undefined legal framework that fails to specify the varying missions, duties, and inter-relations among security forces 	ALL

Table 2: Overview of Clarity and Alignment Barriers, Root Causes, and Primary PASF Entities Impacted

Objectives at Odds Barrier

The first clarity and alignment barrier identified was that Palestinian national objectives that guide the functions and activities of the PASF are at odds. Specifically, there is a tension between state building objectives and national liberation objectives (as popularly defined and understood) that has existed since the 1993 Oslo Accords and the arrival of the Palestinian Authority within Palestine (International Crisis Group, 2010b). This disconnect forms the root cause of this barrier. As discussed in a report by the International Crisis Group (2010b), this dilemma is illustrated by the opposition between the necessary

requirements for upholding the rule of law (which include the repudiation of unofficial armed conflict) and the requirements of state-building and resistance to oppression (which include reinforcing the Palestinian people's right to resist outside influence opposing the national cause). Given its broad reach, this barrier has the potential to impact all organizations within the PASF. To the extent that this barrier generally impedes PASF performance, it inhibits the provision of security within the Palestinian Authority.

Lack of Cohesiveness Within and Across Security Forces Barrier

The second clarity and alignment barrier identified is a lack of cohesiveness within and across the security forces. For example, “[t]he National Security Forces training team complains...that it spends ‘most of its time trying to re-educate the Gendarmerie delivered from the [Jordanian International Police Training Center] and reminding them that they are Palestine’s Army’” (Sayigh, 2011, p. 8). This quote illustrates a lack of ingrouping among PASF (in this case, NSF) personnel—that is, they do not share a common ingroup identity that unites them in their sense of purpose. As such, they are unlikely to work together toward a common goal supporting the aims of their organization, the PASF as a whole, or the Palestinian people. Due to the fundamental nature of this barrier, it impacts all organizations within the PASF.

First among the root causes of this barrier is that the West Bank security sector continues to suffer from a lack of autonomy from donors. It is argued that the emphasis of USSC and EU-funded training on building technical proficiency, rather than on providing political support, ensures that they are not involved meaningfully in promoting complementarity or integration among the various PASF organizations (Sayigh, 2011). This issue is exacerbated by the lack of an integrated overall approach to the PASF by the U.S. or EU, which both weakens the existing government's grip on its own security sector and greatly reduces commanders' motivation to participate in major reform (Sayigh, 2011). Even if greater autonomy were established, a competitive and thus uncoordinated structure was purposefully established as protection against opposition by those in power (viz., Arafat) between and among the varying security forces and in large part remains, despite more recent movement toward reform (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007; International Crisis Group, 2010b).

The second root cause is the different security philosophies and traditions of the various PASF organizations (PASSIA / DCAF, 2006), which contributes in turn to a lack of coordination in development plans, strategic frameworks, mission, and strategic objectives (Palestinian National Authority & Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, 2009; Sayigh, 2011). Much of this variation may be due to the competitive structure referenced above. The piecemeal nature of training, given its provision by various international instructors, also produces contradictions and enables stove piping and associated factional loyalties—as well as a more general isolation of the PASF organizations from one another (Sayigh, 2011).


A final root cause is that it appears that many members of the West Bank security sector retain their loyalty to Fatah, the previously dominant nationalist movement (Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN), 2013; Friedrich & Luethold, 2007; International Crisis Group, 2010b; Sayigh, 2011). This allegiance supersedes and thus prohibits full support of and involvement in the fledgling

Palestinian state. Interestingly, this problem may be due in part to outside funding and other support, which enables the West Bank PASF to avoid streamlining (unlike its Hamas counterpart that has had less support and thus needed to run more efficiently) (Sayigh, 2011). Further, government control over the West Bank PASF is weakened by a lack of integrated approach to the PASF by the United States and the European Union and the focus on technical rather than other forms of assistance; this structure allows PASF commanders to avoid taking responsibility for reform, which would likely include a reduction in sectarianism (Sayigh, 2011). At the same time, lack of cohesiveness among the PASF organizations appears to be rooted in the fact that previous security sector reform and reorganization occurs in the absence of democratic governance and established constitutional order (Sayigh, 2011).

Multiple and Overlapping Services Barrier

The final clarity and alignment barrier uncovered was the existence of multiple and overlapping services among the various organizations in the PASF, an issue that is internal to Palestine in its source. Similar to the lack of cohesiveness barrier, a lack of coordination among the various forces (lack of ingrouping) serves as a major root cause, along with a second root cause in a vague and undefined legal framework that fails to specify the varying missions, duties, and inter-relations among the security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Other social psychological forces may be at play and form a final root cause. These include diffusion of responsibility (wherein each actor or set of actors defers responsibility for an action to others when in the physical or perceived presence of others) (Darley & Latane, 1968). Due to this lack of clarity and lack of explicit coordination, reported activities appear to be duplicated across the organizations (e.g., crowd control and arrests).

Population Engagement Barriers



Barrier	Root Causes	Primary Impact
Lack of trust and respect for the PA from the population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Palestinian security cooperation with Israel perceived as a betrayal / PASF viewed as a pawn of Israel • Decreases in overall social cohesion due to Israeli activities • Unlawful detentions 	PCP, NSF, PS, MI, GI
Low levels of perceived legitimacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perception of corruption • Assault and injury to people • Use of biased methods of personnel recruitment or information elicitation • Low transparency in legal framework or into force activities • Lack a mechanism to obtain feedback • Lack of independent oversight • Belief that security forces do not represent the population 	PCP, NSF

Table 3: Overview of Population Engagement Barriers, Root Causes, and Primary PASF Entities Impacted

Lack of Trust and Respect for the PA from the Population Barrier

The first population engagement based barrier uncovered was the lack of trust and respect for the PASF from the population (Bocco et al., 2005), which primarily has its origins in internal causes. This barrier impacts the performance of all the PASF entities we assessed, namely, the PCP, NSF, and the PASF’s primary intelligence services—GI, MI, and PSO. In an older survey, the PSO was shown to be the least trusted among the PASF’s intelligence organizations, with only 23 percent of respondents having no trust in it at all (Bocco et al., 2005). However, it is unclear whether this finding still holds. Further, those higher in socioeconomic status or education, or those living in cities, generally have lower levels of trust in authorities such as security organizations than the less economically well off or those living in rural areas (Bocco et al., 2005). These generally lower levels of trust are likely to be reduced further in reaction to repeated activities by the PASF that oppress or otherwise negatively impact Palestinian citizens.

“In the West Bank, Palestinian Authority (PA) security services beat peaceful demonstrators, detained and harassed journalists, and arbitrarily detained hundreds.”
 - Human Rights Watch, 2014

There are three root causes for this barrier. The first of these is the perception of Palestinian security sector cooperation with Israel, which is seen as a betrayal by Palestinians because “[t]he oppressor becomes your own people” (Collard, 2014; Middle East Monitor, 2014). For example, Palestinians’ protests are often swiftly suppressed by internal security forces (Collard, 2014), producing feelings of anger among the Palestinian people at the lack of support and protection from their own security sector. Exacerbating the problem, sometimes this action will come at the hands of men in civilian clothes, identified as security employees (Human Rights Watch, 2014a). The lack of uniform confuses the population, hinders the development of trust, and facilitates the belief in a lack of transparency and accountability for the PASF. The security sector’s collaboration with Israel is, for some, even seen as evidence that the PASF are pawns of Israel, doing Israel’s bidding and working in the service of Israel not for the Palestinians (Amrov & Tartir, 2014a; Blackwell, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2010a). Statements by Abbas that assert that the nature of the relationship with Israel is “sacred” (Rosen, 2014) underscore this point and contribute to Palestinian frustration. As one West Bank denizen related, “[When Palestinians cooperate with Israelis on security, under the Oslo accords], it’s a humiliation for our rights and it’s a humiliation for us as they protect the Israelis in attacking us” (Collard, 2014; Middle East Monitor, 2014). Some sources report that members of the PASF (in this case, the PCP) avoid reacting violently to protests, and even appear to look ashamed at enforcing security policies rooted in cooperation with Israel (Middle East Monitor, 2014). Nonetheless, the overall perception of betrayal by the PASF forces continues to generate mistrust and a lack of respect for organizations within the PASF.

“It is a question of respect. Nothing undermines Palestinian civilians’ respect for their security services more than Israeli incursions into the heart of our cities”

- A West Bank Governor
(International Crisis Group, 2010, p. 19).

Decreases in overall social cohesion due to Israeli activities represent a second root cause of this barrier. As one example, Israeli actions that place psychological and physical pressure on Palestinians (e.g., patients using Israeli medical facilities who have sometimes been accused as collaborating with the Israeli system) which can impact Palestinians’ trust in their fellow Palestinians (Batniji et al., 2009). This undermining of social cohesion poses a threat to the Palestinian ingroup identity whose locus centers on a common enemy, Israel. This distrust in others may become generalized and extend to Palestinian authorities such as the security services. This is particularly the case when the security forces fail to prevent Israeli incursions (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2007), as illustrated by the quote from a West Bank governor.

Unlawful detentions are another major root cause of lack of trust and respect in the Palestinian security sector. As of 2007, the PSO, MI, and GI intelligence organizations systematically detained and interrogated Palestinian citizens, in direct contravention of the Penal Procedure Law No. 3 of 2001 (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). Arbitrary detainment of activists, leaders, and supporters of Hamas and affiliated institutions was perpetrated by Fatah; release of detainees was often refused, despite court orders and legal requirements to bring detainees before a prosecutor within 24 hours (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Arrest campaigns for Hamas-affiliates were primarily extra-judicial, with few court orders actually issued. Moreover, detainees were rarely informed of the reason for their detainment and their

lawyers had trouble obtaining access to them (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Collectively, these events and issues serve to undermine the Palestinian people's belief that they can rely on the PASF to conduct its activities fairly and with respect for the people it serves.

Low Levels of Perceived Legitimacy Barrier

The second population engagement based barrier low levels of perceived legitimacy primarily impacts the PCP and NSF.¹⁰ Survey results have consistently shown the Palestinian public to be dissatisfied with the security sector and having little confidence in its performance (Bocco, De Martino, Friedrich, Al Hussein, & Luethold, 2006; Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), 2012). Further, this perception occurs within the greater context of a legitimacy crisis both for Fatah and Hamas, as well as leadership and political factions more generally (Tartir, 2014).

This barrier appears to have a rich and varied list of root causes. First among these is the overall perception of corruption among the Palestinian Authority leaders and, by extension, among the security forces. For example, the latest survey by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research on the PA security sector found that just around half of respondents in the West Bank (48%) believe in the "existence of corruption in the PSS" (2012). In this context, corruption may cover a variety of activities, including bribery for appointment or promotion (e.g., within the PCP), patronage or nepotism, inefficiency and misuse of funds (extending to embezzlement and money laundering), other unwarranted promotions, excessive spending, exploitation of professional positions for personal gain, tax evasion, and inappropriate payment to individuals no longer engaged in employment—though these activities are not limited to the PASF (Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN), 2013; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006). The most common reported forms of corruption in the Palestinian Authority (as of a 2013 assessment based on 2012 polling) are nepotism and cronyism, and other forms of favoritism in the selection of individuals for positions (Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN), 2013). A Corruption Crimes Court was in fact established in September of 2012 (Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN), 2013). Despite broader acknowledgement of the corruption issue, assessments nonetheless indicate that there is little interest among the security forces in addressing corruption or associated factional loyalties (PASSIA / DCAF, 2006). This may be due in part to a perceived need to increase salaries to the levels paid in the Civil Service (PASSIA / DCAF, 2006). Unfortunately, the availability of sources on corruption in Palestine is somewhat limited (Chene, 2012), although a recent AMAN report indicates that corruption as a whole is still widespread (Balousha, 2013). Available data from 2009-2011 appear to support the premise that perception of corruption continues, even in the face of some degree of improvement and the absence in many cases of personal experiences of corruption when dealing with public officials (Chene, 2012). However, these data do not speak directly to perceived corruption within the PCP or NSF.

A second root cause of low levels of perceived legitimacy is that these forces perpetrate assault and injury upon the Palestinian people, seemingly without accountability. In 2011, the PCP received 106 public complaints, including charges that indicated the PCP inflicted injuries on Palestinians and engaged in assault (Bailey, 2013). In several incidents, the police have also responded with excessive force to

¹⁰ Though see section on the GI for an overview of its perceived shortfalls and abuses.

peaceful demonstrators (e.g., Human Rights Watch, 2014b)). Notable among these incidents is one on Earth Day in 2011 in Ramallah, wherein the security bodies established multiple check points to prevent individuals from participating in the assembly or otherwise detained these individuals (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2014). Though there is reason, based in a 'prior notification requirement' in the Law on Public Assemblies, to believe that assemblies are not prohibited, the police actively suppress these assemblies—as in a second example of attempted protest in 2012 to a visit to the region by Israeli Minister Ehud Barak (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2014). More recently, on April 2nd of 2014, Palestine agreed to oblige its government to “respect, protect, and fulfill the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, and to investigate and punish abuses by security forces,” as stipulated in international human rights conventions (Human Rights Watch, 2014c). However, available evidence suggests that this obligation may not consistently be honored (Human Rights Watch, 2014c).

A third root cause is the use of biased methods of personnel recruitment and information elicitation. The general lack of trust in the PASF may contribute to a lack of desire of Palestinians to enlist, thereby further diminishing effective personnel recruitment and overall capacity. Also problematic is a reliance on a confession-based system, which often allows or encourages coercion (Human Rights Watch, 2008), likely increasing the perception that the PASF operates unfairly and fails to use appropriate methods in the performance of their duties.

A fourth root cause is that the legal framework for the various security forces, inclusive of the PCP, is unclear to experts and essentially unknown to the Palestinian citizens (Amnesty International, 2013). Transparency is also lacking in the tracking of PCP and other forces' activities. For example, a 2013 report found, that “there is no information about the number and types of criminal offences reported, the number and types of criminal offences investigated at the police level, the number and types of criminal offences investigated under public prosecution supervision, the number and types of investigated cases closed at the police stage, and the number and types of cases resolved informally at the police level” (Bailey, 2013, p. 27). The lack of transparency is particularly problematic with respect to detainment. For example, though the International Red Cross has regular access to facilities, its findings are not published or otherwise made publically available, preventing major issues from being made known (Human Rights Watch, 2008). As indicated by Human Rights Watch, visits [to detainees] must be pre-arranged and “prisoners are sometimes moved, apparently to avoid inspection” by organizations such as the Independent Commission for Human Rights (Human Rights Watch, 2008, p. 7). Overall, the security sector in the West Bank chooses what type of information and content to make publically available, and when. Because of this, some argue that, “In practice, human rights are bestowed or withheld as a matter of discretion, rather than as an obligation under the PA's Basic Law” (Sayigh, 2011, p. 20). The inability of media institutions to fully perform their oversight role underscores and continues to prevent fuller transparency into this range of issues (Abu Tu'aimeh, 2008).


A fifth root cause is the lack of a mechanism by which the Palestinian population can regularly and effectively provide feedback to help assess the quality, efficacy, and appropriateness of the PASF. As noted above, absence or deficiency in information regarding number and types of crimes can contribute to society's inability to assess and provide feedback on PASF performance. As such, agencies like EUROL

COPPS, which provides assistance to the PCP, lack critical information to determine the composition of duties for a PCP force operating under the mantle of a future Palestinian state (Kristoff, 2012).

A sixth root cause is the general lack of independent oversight. As discussed in both Human Rights Watch and PASSIA/DCAF reports, Palestinian civil society is essentially weak due in part to its inability to provide effective oversight for the security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2008; PASSIA / DCAF, 2006). In a 2005 survey, a majority of respondents (75 percent) considered the need for an ombudsman to investigate citizens' complaints to be "very important"—adding those rating this item as "rather important" brings the percentage up to 96 percent (Bocco et al., 2005). Moreover, despite parliamentary reports citing human rights abuses and corruption, there is a lack of willingness from the Palestinian Legislative Council to provide oversight to the security sector, de facto legislative control over the Palestinian Authority is essentially non-existent, and oversight activities in practice have little influence (PASSIA / DCAF, 2006). A 2013 AMAN report indicates that a "lack of oversight in official, private, and civil Palestinian institutions" continues (as discussed in Balousha, 2013).

A final root cause arises from the belief that the PASF does not represent the people they are charged with protecting and may preferentially serve specific groups or factions. Many citizens even perceive a sense of purposelessness in police activities (McIver, 2004, as cited in Kerckanen, Rantanen, & Sundqvist, 2008). As discussed by Dana (2014), the Palestinian security sector remains far from one that serves an overarching national cause. In contrast, actions such as their coordination with the Israeli occupation appear to work against national interest. Overall, the Palestinian security sector is thought to operate based on the goals and conditions specified by both Israel and the United States. When actions such as peaceful (or other forms of) resistance (to Israel and its influence) are repudiated, the security sector forces are acting primarily in the service of Israel, not Palestine. As Dana goes on to describe, the security sector's very existence is dependent on meeting Israeli stipulations and addressing their concerns.

Capability-Based Barriers



Barrier	Root Causes	Primary Impact
Limitations due to Israeli activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities Restrictions on Palestinian Security Force movement and weapons Coordination with Israeli occupation vs. the national interests of the Palestinian people 	PCP, NSF
Low empowerment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Israeli limitations on freedom of movement Need to coordinate with Israel 	PCP (Area B), NSF (Area A)
Lack of preparedness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Insufficient investigative experience Lack of forensic facilities Lack of a witness protection program Inadequate training facilities and readiness Poor communication Inadequate equipment capability Low educational attainment rates 	PCP

Table 4: Overview of Capability-Based Barriers, Root Causes, and Primary PASF Entities Impacted

Limitations Due to Israeli Activities Barrier

The first capability based barrier uncovered, which has primarily external causes, are limitations due to Israeli activities. Strong U.S. support for Israel in the context of Israel’s ongoing occupation of Palestinian territory (and thus implicit or explicit support for its activities) serves to further limit the Palestinian Authority from undertaking security responsibility (PASSIA / DCAF, 2006). This barrier should primarily impact the PCP and the NSF, impeding them from protecting the public.

"When we ask to move our troops somewhere, Israeli authorities say they will check. Sometimes they agree after two or three hours, but most of the time they don't get back to us so we know the answer is no."

Adrian Damiri, official spokesperson of the Palestinian security forces

The first root cause is Israeli Defense Force (IDF) incursions into Palestinian cities. As noted by the International Crisis Group, these incursions create a feeling of humiliation among the Palestinian people, and undermine both the symbolic and actual power of native institutions, such as the Palestinian security forces (International Crisis Group, 2010b). Further, attacks by Israeli settlers on Palestinians are a frequent occurrence, yet are infrequently investigated by the police, and rarely identify specific perpetrators when they are conducted (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2007). Human Rights Watch details more recent instances of unlawful killing of civilian Palestinians in the West Bank as a result of Israeli incursions (Human Rights Watch, 2014a).

A second major root cause is the set of explicit or *de facto* restrictions placed on Palestinian security force activities by Israel, which limit their self-management and self-determination. These include restrictions on PASF areas of operation (see also discussion on restriction of freedom of movement in

the following section on low empowerment), as well as restrictions on availability of Palestinian weapons, including the confiscation of security force personnel's registered weapons (International Crisis Group, 2013).

A third root cause is the privileging of coordination with the Israeli occupation over the national interests of the Palestinian people, as discussed in the earlier section on legitimacy. As stated, Dana (2014) discusses how the Palestinian security sector is thought to operate based on the goals and conditions specified by both Israel and America. As such, the security forces are inherently restricted.

Low Empowerment Barrier

The second capability-based barrier, which has both internal and external causes, was low empowerment. This barrier primarily impacts the PCP in Area B and the NSF in Area A, and in both cases deals with lack of autonomy from Israel. The first root cause is Israeli limitations on Palestinian movement. A notable factor here is the construction of the separation wall in 2002, which reduced freedom of movement in the West Bank (Batniji et al., 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2008, 2014a). Freedom of movement restrictions is in fact pervasive and impacts all members of Palestinian society, including PASF personnel. For example, Israel is thought to see the PCP as a threat and, as such, does not grant the PCP priority in passing through roadblocks, even in the face of a police emergency (Kerckanen et al., 2008). As Batniji and colleagues indicate, "Indirect threats have their origins in an interlocking web of checkpoints, barriers, border closures, curfews, and the permit system imposed by Israel. These restrictions affect every aspect of Palestinian life, such as the ability to travel, work, marry, study, worship, and be with family" (Batniji et al., 2009; see also Human Rights Watch, 2014 and International Committee of the Red Cross, 2007).

"I watched these Shuhada Street boys risk death for the sake of a liberty so rudimentary and fundamental that my own children are not even aware of its existence, or its importance, or its simple human beauty: the right to walk down the street" (Waldman, 2014)

A second root cause is the need to coordinate with Israel. For example, the PCP are often unable to respond to calls for help without Israeli approval (Atallah, 2013). Similarly, the NSF often must wait for permission to move their troops, frequently receiving no answer (Atallah, 2013). The problem lies in part in the allocation of Areas A through C under the Oslo Accords in 1993 (with A under Palestinian control, B under Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control, and C under Israeli control), such that Palestinian forces that need to pass through Area C or perform functions and activities such as arrests must first attain the permission of Israel (Atallah, 2013).

"In the West Bank, the donor focus on a conventional 'train-and-equip' approach at the lower levels of the PASF has no doubt improved skills on the street, but has failed to generate a genuine institutional capacity to design, plan, and conduct training indigenously." (Sayigh, 2011, pg. 5)

Lack of Preparedness Barrier

A third capability-based barrier is the lack of preparedness within the PASF. This is an internal barrier that primarily impacts the PCP and its operational effectiveness. The first several root causes uncovered for this barrier are insufficient investigative experience, a lack of forensic facilities, and lack of a witness protection program are suggested by a 2008

Human Rights Watch report (Human Rights Watch, 2008). However, because little description or supportive evidence was offered in this report conclusions based on these should be tempered.

Some convergent validity exists for the first two issues given the establishment of a program funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) intended to “improve the application of scientific methods and techniques to the investigation of crime” and “strengthen the foundations of and operational tools for modern forensic science and forensic medicine services in the occupied Palestinian territories” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011; see also 2015). The existence of this program suggests that forensics and investigations required improvement. The focus of this CIDA-funded program launched by the Palestinian Authority and UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011) includes developing and bolstering forensic science and forensic medicine aimed at facilitating the investigation of crime. The establishment of a (temporary) forensic science laboratory training facility is intended to enable that goal, including a focus on services such as drug, chemical and trace evidence analysis, firearms evidence examination, tool mark comparison, and document examination (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011). The program also includes an emphasis on training aimed at developing administrative and management skills. The project, which officially launched in Ramallah in December of 2011, is ongoing and intended to be completed by late March of 2015 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2015). A relatively recent (January 2014) visit supported by EUPOL COPPS of a senior Palestinian police officer to Norway for the purpose of becoming familiar with international best practices, including investigative skills, similarly suggests that investigative experience within the Civil Police may need improvement (EUPOL COPPS, n.d.).

While there is little discussion in the available literature of the lack of a witness protection program and a designated organization for administration as a problem for the effective administration of security in Palestine, such a gap clearly limits the ability for police to obtain quality information during their investigations. Moreover, a witness protection program is considered a best practice for law enforcement.¹¹ As such, the absence of such a program represents a root cause of the PASF’s (and specifically, the PCP’s) lack of capability.

The fourth root cause is inadequate training facilities and readiness, which are considered poor in overall quality based on a lack of teaching space and supply of appropriate equipment for instruction (“Palestinian Civil Police Strategic Framework,” n.d.). At the same time, there are also some reservations about the readiness of the PCP and the NSF to perform their duties, and a perception that additional training may be needed. For example, in a 2012 survey that examined public perceptions of security sector reform, 68 percent of Palestinian respondents indicated that improved training of police and security forces was “very important” (United Nations Development Program, 2012). There may also be discrepancies between improved skills and the ability of the security forces to develop and execute training on their own. As Sayigh notes, “Despite greatly expanded donor assistance since 2007, the PASF has yet to acquire more than the most basic training capability” (Sayigh, 2011, p. 8).

¹¹ Author personal communication with U.S.-based law enforcement expert, November 14, 2014.

The fourth root cause is an ongoing issue of poor communication, including poor overall infrastructure and inadequate or non-existent equipment (Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN), 2013; Kerckanen et al., 2008). Much of the communications infrastructure was destroyed as a result of Israeli attacks during the Second Intifada in 2000, with few repeater stations remaining, and severely restricted radio coverage encompassing a radius of only a few kilometers from base stations that were themselves makeshift—with vehicle radio sets mounted on desks in the control room (Kerckanen et al., 2008). As Kerckanen et al. describe, equipment left intact was largely out of date and remaining systems were incompatible with one another; destruction of antenna masts in the West Bank, given its mountainous terrain, also had a particularly large impact. In the aftermath of the Intifada, much equipment intended to be used by the Palestinian security forces was also prohibited from release by Israel (Kerckanen et al., 2008). Many police stations operated without any communication system, instead having individual officers rely on their cell phones, and control rooms lack modern utilities, such as radio communication facilities, up-to-date telephones, faxes, and computers (“Palestinian Civil Police Strategic Framework,” n.d). A Communications Project funded by the UK was initiated in 2005 and aimed ultimately to improve Palestinian communication capacity. The project achieved improved voice communications within the security agencies, with 60-70 percent coverage within the West Bank, support for interoperability between the security forces, and improvements in command and control for both the PCP and the NSF (Kerckanen et al., 2008). Nonetheless, deficiencies persist (e.g., manner of communicating with radios is long and informal, straining available battery life and limiting available channels), existing technology is quickly aging, the need for additional training for efficacy and efficiency remains an issue, training facilities are poor, and maintenance is an ongoing problem (Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN), 2013; Kerckanen et al., 2008). In other words, despite improvements in capacity, the operational culture supporting effective communications remains lacking and likely suggests a much longer-term goal. As Kerckanen and colleagues note (pg. 3), “A functioning system of communication is of the utmost importance for each and every organization; for modern police and security structures, which are the cornerstones of the rule of law in every state and society, such a system is crucial.”


A fifth root cause is an inadequate equipment capability. An assessment by the Ministry of the Interior indicates that armaments, ammunitions, related logistic support, and equipment such as long-handled batons and riot shields are all lacking, prohibiting the PCP from the effective administration of their duties (“Palestinian Civil Police Strategic Framework,” n.d.). Moreover, the security forces need to receive authorization from Israel before purchasing equipment,¹² severely affecting the PASF effectiveness and autonomy.

A final root cause as discussed by Bailey (2013) is low educational attainment rates among the PASF, specifically the PCP, which has potentially grave repercussions on operational effectiveness. Moreover, the average level of education may limit the effectiveness of available training or suggest that alternative (perhaps more basic) training programs might be more effective. Almost 50 percent of the

¹² For example, even materiel requested by the USSC for the Palestinians has been rejected by Israel, purportedly because it would disturb the balance between the PA and IDF forces (netvision.net.il, 2014). This includes a rejected request for night vision goggles, body armor, and electronic communications systems that would help to remedy the ongoing deficits in communications capability.

police force has not completed secondary school and only 15.6 percent hold a Bachelor’s degree. Bailey goes on to speculate that these numbers could suggest that PCP may be unable to attract a sizable number of university graduates (Bailey, 2013). Bailey suggests that these problems might be remedied in part by more targeted graduate recruitment and support for high-achieving officers in the pursuit of higher education.

Legal Based Barriers



Barrier	Root Causes	Primary Impact
Failure to fully implement NDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Israeli occupation, with several broad areas of impact impeding Palestinian development • Internal political and administrative divide • Deteriorating economic situation and financial crisis, causing poverty and unemployment, particularly among women and youths 	ALL
Shortcomings of the Palestinian legal system and framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restrictions due to Oslo Agreements • Arafat assigning President with major powers, including administrative authority and a veto • Absence or vagueness/under-specification of a basic legal framework for security • Practice of copying and maintaining laws from neighboring countries, which has prohibited Palestinian legal development 	PCP, NSF, MI, GI
Failure to implement new security structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opposition to new structure within the security organizations • Vague and/or undefined legal framework specifying missions, duties, and inter-relations among security forces 	ALL

Table 5: Overview of Legal Based Barriers, Root Causes, and Primary PASF Entities Impacted

Failure to Fully Implement NDP Barrier

The first legal based barrier uncovered, which has primarily internal causes, was failure to fully implement the National Development Plan (NDP). Given its broad nature, this barrier should impact all of the security forces. The Palestinian NDP provides a useful discussion of the obstacles in place inhibiting its application. The first root cause is the Israeli occupation. The NDP lists multiple outcomes of this occupation that impede Palestinian progress (State of Palestine, 2014). These include: a) Israel having control over various aspects of Palestinians’ lives and resources and a mindset oriented around stifling Palestinian progress and

"...our policy priorities, and the challenges we face in implementing them, must be seen through the lens of this vision of freedom... Achievement of our policy agenda is subject to a complex set of intertwined external and internal challenges. The key challenges lie in the complex dynamics of international and domestic politics and the deleterious consequences of these on our economic situation and the living conditions of our citizens." (National Development Plan 2014-2016, p. 9)

development; b) widespread control of resource-rich areas of the West Bank that include East Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley; c) blockade of Gaza, creating insecurity and rolling back developmental progress; d) the presence of the wall and the existence of settlers occupying Palestinian land and demolishing homes; e) isolation of East Jerusalem and tactics designed to intimidate and displace Palestinians in that area; f) restrictions in Palestinian movement and ability to trade, thereby commandeering the Palestinian economy, and g) human rights violations, ranging from displacement and property destruction to detention without trial, arrest, and even murder.

The second root cause identified in the NDP is an internal political and administrative divide between Gaza and the West Bank (State of Palestine, 2014). As indicated in the Plan, risks associated with this rift include: a) distraction from the goal of national independence/statehood, b) an ineffectual legislative council in the West Bank, reducing democratic accountability, c) inequitable variations in development across Palestine, further entrenching existing economic divides and access to quality social services, and d) disruptions in national policy and planning, in turn giving rise to fiscal imbalances inconsistent with meeting the long-term needs of Palestinian citizens. Similarly, the creation of the Prime Minister's office in 2003 may have contributed confusion by creating uncertainties about lines of authority, as well as enabled the possibility for outside actors to exert undue influence by working to empower either the PM or the President, thus playing these individuals off of one another (subject matter expert, personal communication, December 12, 2014).

A third root cause identified in the NDP is the declining economic situation and financial crisis in Palestine, characterized by multiple features: a) declining growth rates headed toward stagnation paired with growth propelled by unsustainable external financing and expansion within unfruitful sectors, b) Israeli restrictions on movement and access to resource-rich areas likely to potentiate economic growth, c) a rapidly expanding trade deficit paired with rapidly decreasing private investment, d) downward pressure on revenues, and e) reductions in donor support, rendering fiscal obligations unmet. Collectively, these factors significantly impede Palestinian Development and achievement of the goals set forth in the NDP.

"If there is to be an authentic national security sector, then its forces must be fully restructured in a manner that relates to the real needs and expectations of the people. Above all, the Dayton's Doctrine must be completely replaced with values of dignity, self-determination and anti-colonial struggle. This, however, could never happen under the umbrella of Oslo"
(Dana, 2014)

Shortcomings of the Palestinian Legal System and Framework Barrier

The second legal based barrier is shortcomings of the Palestinian legal system and framework, an internal barrier impacting multiple forces, including the NSF, MI, GI, and especially the PCP. The first root cause of this barrier is restrictions due to the Oslo agreements. As discussed by Friedrich & Luethold (2007), Oslo regulates a majority of security issues, which may require amendment, though Oslo II rejected new legislation and forbid the President from promoting any legislation that would contradict the existing Agreements.

A second root cause of this barrier is former President of the Palestinian National Authority Yassir Arafat's prior monopolization of security decisions, which involved having assigned the President with

major powers, including administrative authority and a veto. As a direct result, the Palestinian Legislative Council to institute legislation in any domain in which the President was invested and felt was under his direct prerogative. Arafat in particular felt that the security sector was his domain, resisting any yielding of control, which for many years prohibited any efforts toward reform (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007).

A third root cause is the absence or vagueness/under-specification of a basic legal framework for security, particularly for the police (PASSIA / DCAF, 2006). There is neither a basic police law outlining the number and basic capabilities of the security forces nor a civilian police law, outlining the competencies of the Civil Police, specifically (Bailey, 2013; EUPOL COPPS, 2008). As such, “the Civil Police is [sic] effectively operating in a legal vacuum” (EUPOL COPPS, 2008, p. 9). Draft laws for security sector organizations such as the PCP were previously circulated (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007), though it is unclear at what stage of development these drafts presently are. When legal documentation does exist, it nonetheless continues to lack some of the necessary elements required for a comprehensive basic legal framework. For example, while Article 3 of the Law of Service in the Palestinian Security Forces delineates three Palestinian National Authority security branches—National Security Force, General Intelligence, and Internal Security Force—it fails to delineate the missions of these branches or their relationship to one another (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). As noted by Amnesty International, Law No. 8 of 2005, Service in the Palestinian Security Forces, in fact contains limited provisions focused on the PCP (Amnesty International, 2013). Further, as Friedrich and Luethold discuss, “the Law of Services in the Palestinian Security Forces is essentially a technical text. Functional differentiations between all components of the security sector would need to be laid down in a Basic Security Law” (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007, p. 38).

A fourth root cause is the unproductive practice of copying and maintaining laws from neighboring Arab countries, which has prohibited cohesive internal Palestinian legal development (PASSIA / DCAF, 2006). For example, police actions including those prescribing disciplinary and judicial penalties for violations are still regulated in the West Bank by elements of Jordanian Public Security Law, No. 38 of 1965. The governing law in Gaza is the Egyptian Law No. 6 of 1963 (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). The very fact that different, and likely outdated, laws apply within the West Bank and Gaza creates an internal tension that subsequently makes unification and institutionalization challenging. Further, these legal elements remain in effect unless they directly contradict subsequent legislation (Amnesty International, 2013). While problematic, this barrier does not result in a specific dignity violation. Nonetheless, similar to the clarity and alignment barrier focused on Palestinian objectives being at odds, to the extent that this barrier generally impedes PASF performance, it inhibits the proper treatment and preservation of the dignity of Palestinian citizens.

Failure to Implement New Security Structure Barrier

The final legal based barrier was the failure to implement the new security structure, which impacts all forces. This barrier has two root causes, the first of which is opposition to the new structure within the security organizations. This opposition arose in part because various security organizations objected to their subordination to the Ministry of the Interior and National Security (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007).

Further exacerbating the situation, several individuals in power within the Ministry objected to the Palestinian Authority policy emphasizing centralization and institutionalization, preferring instead a more decentralized and loosely structured organization for the security forces—the ultimate impact of which was an undermining of the Ministry of the Interior’s authority (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007).

The second root cause is again the vague and/or undefined legal framework clearly and comprehensively specifying the missions, duties, and inter-relations among the security forces. As Friedrich and Luethold indicate, while the Law of the Security Forces No. 8 of 2005/Law of Service in the Palestinian Security Forces Article 3 delineates the three organizations composing the Palestinian Authority security sector, the article fails to lay out the mission of these forces or their relationship to one another (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). Given the lack of an appropriate roadmap, implementation of a new security structure is greatly hindered and redundancies and gaps in services and mission are likely to continue until greatly clarity is achieved and this problem is resolved.

Chapter Four | Findings and Reform Suggestions

Drawing from our exploration of several entities within the PASF and the findings from the barrier analysis we have identified several high-level security sector reform measures and mitigation strategies. While many of the barriers uncovered in our analysis result directly from the unresolved final status of the Palestinian Authority and restrictions placed upon the PASF by the IDF, there are several issues and leverage points internal to the Palestinian security sector that can, and should, be addressed in order to facilitate engagement with civil society. Specifically, our analysis suggests three security sector reform measures that are critical to the provision of security consistent with acceptable practices in modern security forces. These items represent top priorities for attention and action and invoke internal processes that are subject to USSC and Palestinian security sector control and thus have the potential to be malleable over time, likely resulting in effective security sector reform. Further, since many of the barriers reported are intertwined, the resolution of the issues below can have a net positive impact on multiple barriers and issues encountered.

Reform Suggestion 1

Generate clear, comprehensive, and codified, legal documents laying out the missions and duties of each PASF entity are of paramount importance to ensure accountability of and trust in the PASF, as well as its ability to ensure the safety of its citizens.

Basis

The very commonly reported violation perpetrated by the PASF against Palestinian civil society was a failure to ensure its safety, both psychological and physical. This was primarily due to the PASF's inability to completely and effectively engage in its duties—both those that are authorized/reported and those that are considered acceptable practices in the provision of security. The absence of a comprehensive legal framework guiding the PASF entities, redundancies in forces' missions and activities, lack of PASF autonomy from Israel, and what many Palestinians feel is excessive PASF cooperation with Israel are all factors prohibiting the PASF from ensuring safety as many Palestinians would have it. Additionally, without a legal framework, it is difficult to ensure compliance with standards of service, obtain a high level of professionalism, and address issues with accountability—all of which are issues that are consistently raised by Palestinian civil society.

USSC guidance and support of the PASF toward establishing a clearer and more comprehensive set of PASF guidelines, codified in law, would promote more effective administration of PASF duties and help to reduce perceived violations rooted in safety. Doing so would similarly improve the accountability of and trust in the PASF, as well as mitigating barriers to ensuring that the PASF treats Palestinian civil society with both acknowledgement and respect.

The USSC should seek to assist the PASF, with the assistance of Palestinian civil society, by guiding it toward the completion of these fully executed, formally codified documents. Doing so should take precedence above support for training, since the provision of training without having the fundamentals in place may ultimately be ineffective. Legal documentation should be stated in clear language, include both organizational mission and specific duties, delineate lines of authority and purview for each

organization, as well as specify the circumstances under which the functions and activities of PASF entities may or may not overlap and corresponding chains of command.

Finally, more comprehensive and coordinated documentation and training efforts, across the PASF entities are needed that help to form a superordinate (ingroup) identity for the PASF, so that the various forces are working in support of one another. Doing so likely requires establishment of a single, overarching security philosophy that serves to guide all PASF entities. Presumably, this would also help to reduce opposition to security structure reforms delineated by the Palestinian Authority. The USSC can also guide the PASF toward this outcome through an emphasis on its common goals and broader Palestinian identity, though in service of this goal, it should take care not to characterize or emphasize the role of Israel as enemies outgroup. The provision of greater safety should similarly shift the focus of Palestinian civil society from more local survival-based concerns to more global concerns focused on society as a whole, inclusive of the PASF, and in doing so enables support for Palestinians' core identity.

Summary:

- Guide PASF toward completion of comprehensive legal documents that delineate PASF mission and duties in clear language
- Ensure that guidelines establish the lines of authority and purview within and across the forces
- Emphasize common Palestinian identity and goals as part of a superordinate ingroup, but avoid the pitfall of reinforcing Israel as the outgroup
- Work to establish a more cohesive security philosophy that can guide all of the PASF forces in pursuit of a common goal

Reform Suggestion 2

Re-establishing the trust of Palestinian civil society in its security forces is a high priority goal, in order to promote civil society cooperation and adherence, as well as smooth the path for the PASF to perform its duties once these duties are more clearly and explicitly established.

Basis

The PASF violates the trust of its civil society in multiple ways. A major part of this distrust stems from the perception that the PASF is acting not in the interest of Palestinian civil society, but instead in the service of Israel. The perception of illegitimacy is another major factor in decreasing trust in PASF entities. While the reality of Palestinian cooperation with Israel is not easily changed, the USSC may want to focus its guidance of the PASF toward changing the perception that this cooperation constitutes collusion and that the needs of the Palestinian population are secondary—both of which serve to undermine trust. Changing Palestinians' perception can occur through the emphasis on the provision of mechanisms designed to enable Palestinian citizens' voices to be heard (i.e., acknowledgment) (e.g., by establishing formal complaint and feedback systems, not subject to retribution), as well as helping to train security personnel in the respectful and fair treatment of members of Palestinian civil society. Such treatment involves an emphasis on non-discriminatory treatment and the ceasing of human rights abuses such as violence perpetrated against those exercising their rights, illegal detentions, and other prohibited activities.

Pushing for greater transparency and accountability will also assist in moving toward this goal. In cases where formal judicial or other processes are not in place to enable internal investigation or review and accompanying recourse, less formal grievance systems should be put in place. Working to establish a viable witness protection program is also critical for the conduct of investigations and the ability of citizens to report crimes and abuses where they occur. Accountability can also be established through an emphasis on organizations taking responsibility for their missteps and apologizing to the population, where merited. Establishing a form of independent oversight, for example, through the appointment of an ombudsman, should help to solidify and maintain this accountability.

Emphasizing the proper selection of candidates for PASF positions in terms of background (e.g., life and professional experience) and representation of a broad range of demographics (e.g., age and education) should help to ensure a capable workforce. Along those lines, it is also important to work toward reducing cronyism and other forms of selection bias in employment. Such actions will go a long way toward reestablishing Palestinian civil society's trust in its security forces and thus help to ensure greater adherence and cooperation.

Summary:

- Guide PASF toward establishing formal complaint and feedback systems, which will not result in retribution
- Establish protocols and training that facilitate respectful and fair treatment of members of Palestinian civil society and avoid human rights abuses
- Emphasize the proper selection of candidates for jobs at the individual and aggregate level
- Work to reduce cronyism and other forms of bias in employment selection
- Encourage organizations to take responsibility for missteps and apologize to the population as needed when mistakes are made
- Work to establish an effective witness protection program
- Work to more generally increase transparency and accountability
- Work to establish independent oversight, for example, through the appointment of an ombudsman to investigate citizens' complaints

Reform Suggestion 3

An emphasis should be placed on improving the critical infrastructure and training required for the PASF to effectively implement its duties. Though lack of sufficient equipment also poses a problem for the PASF in terms of execution of its duties, we perceive that this issue may be less easily resolved at this time, due to the dependence of the Palestinian Authority for Israeli approval of materiel.

Basis

Though the fundamentals discussed in the prior two reform suggestions should be given priority, and help to elucidate further the nature of the PASF's limitations and needs, this reform suggestion addresses shortfalls with critical infrastructure and training. The PASF communications infrastructure requires extensive updating and improvements in interoperability. Furthermore, training facilities should be centralized and training curricula should be streamlined where possible and differentiated

where necessary. Proper training of PASF personnel is still seen as a high priority item by Palestinian civil society. The content of this training should be determined after a thorough audit of existing training both within and across each security force entity, as well as a needs assessment. In the design of this training, care should be taken to ensure that it maps back to the overarching security philosophy that we advise establishing above.

Summary:

- Prioritize the establishment and funding of an improved communications infrastructure for security
- Work to centralize training facilities
- Streamline training curricula to emphasize common principles and needs across security organizations, while maintaining differentiation as needed
- Perform an audit of existing training
- Assess remaining training needs based on pain points after the higher priority goals have been met and/or barriers have been mitigated
- Ensure that training maps to the overarching security philosophy that should be established in advance

Conclusion

Overall, our analysis identified several internal and external barrier categories in the provision of security by the Palestinian security sector—fear based barriers, clarity and alignment barriers, population engagement barriers, capability barriers, and legal barriers. Several external barriers, which are based on factors or influence outside of Palestinian control, were identified (e.g., culture of fear, limitations on movement or other activities). However, as these factors are more difficult to overcome in the current environment in the West Bank, and in many cases may be rooted in an intractable problem, they were not addressed. Nevertheless, several internal barriers, such as insufficient legal frameworks or lack of preparedness, that are within the control of the Palestinian security sector were identified. Given that these are internal, and feasibly under the control of the Palestinian Authority, there are mitigating actions that can be taken by the Palestinian security sector in partnership with international partners, even given the currently limiting socio-political environment in the West Bank, to reduce or dampen the effect on the provision of security. Thus, drawing from our analysis, several high-level security sector reform measures and mitigation strategies emerged. The analysis suggests that the three focus areas mentioned above are critical to the provision of security in the Palestinian security sector and are consistent with acceptable practices in modern security forces.

Chapter Five | Topics for Further Analysis

This analysis suggests that large segments of Palestinian civil society perceive that the provision of security by the PASF has been deficient. PASF failure to treat citizens with dignity has been identified as a critical feature in group interactions and is related to the concept of justice—a central principle in the Palestinian psyche and culture (Hammack, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2008; Zanotti, 2010). These observations gather additional support from civil society and public opinion findings (Bailey, 2013; Bocco et al., 2005; International Crisis Group, 2010b; Marten, 2013).

The types of barriers identified in this analysis do give rise to dignity violations. An examination of PASF dignity violations represents an opportunity for a more comprehensive assessment of Palestinian security sector reform. More specifically, a focus both on eliminating barriers to dignity and on reinforcing and enhancing dignity itself¹³ can result in more positive outcomes and a strengthened relationship between the PASF and Palestinian civil society.

Provision of Dignity

An important question for future study is: *“Why have Palestinian security forces in the West Bank failed to engage Palestinian civil society and garner public support?”* This question may be partly addressed by examining PASF performance in domains relevant to or directly invoking dignity.¹⁴ Dignity violations can occur when people are denied the ability to live their lives freely and according to their plans or wishes. Put another way, dignity involves the capacity to live by one’s standards and principles (Killmister, 2010). To maintain dignity within the context of intergroup or intragroup relations requires the preservation of several elements: affirmation of core identity; inclusion/ingrouping; safety; acknowledgement/respect; benefit of the doubt; trust; empathy/understanding; autonomy; and accountability. Violations of these dignity elements are likely to result in a loss of dignity and associated feelings of shame and humiliation (e.g., Jacobson, 2009).

Research in social psychology and other fields indicates that when people feel they are treated without dignity or experience injustice, they respond with feelings of worthlessness, depression, and anger (e.g., Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998; Miller & Keys, 2001). Moreover, witnessing injustice or violation of another person’s dignity (even when one’s own dignity is intact) may produce strong feelings of moral outrage and a perception of the offending organization as “the enemy” (e.g., Pagano & Huo, 2007). In order both to satisfy Palestinian civil society and for the Palestinian Authority to meet its obligations, it stands to reason that the PASF must ensure that the people it is obliged to protect are treated with dignity and unbiased justice. Below we describe a dignity-based framework well suited for guiding analysis of intractable conflict situations.

¹³ See the work on elevation, an emotional response to moral excellence and human goodness. Arguably, the observation of virtuous acts by the PASF and subsequent dignity enhancements among the population might give rise to elevation, which is itself associated with pro-social action and a greater desire for affiliation with others (e.g., Algoe & Haidt, 2009).

¹⁴ Though not every dignity violation should represent a violation of justice, violations of procedural justice, which focuses on treatment, generally should result in violations of dignity to the extent that they are unfair or convey a lack of respect. While aspects of justice with respect to dignity are not addressed in detail here, future analyses could explore the relationships between these two constructs as they relate to provision of effective security.

Elements of Dignity

Each of the following elements constitutes a core feature of dignity, the violation of which can have negative consequences both on the individual and societal level, as well as impedes cooperation and the resolution of conflict.¹⁵ In order to provide an effective qualitative guide to understanding dignity from the Palestinian perspective, Hicks's (Hicks, 2011) dignity elements can be adapted and tailored to the Palestinian context. Note that these dignity elements may overlap with and reinforce one another.

Affirmation of Core Identity

To affirm the core identity of others, it is important to begin with the assumption that they have integrity and that they are neither inferior nor superior. Further, others should be allowed the opportunity to be their authentic selves, without judgment. Violations of human rights and other violations of Palestinians ultimately result in a challenge to the identity of the Palestinian people as people of equal worth and integrity, deserving of fundamental rights and respect. The perceived collusion between the PASF and the IDF may further challenge Palestinians' sense of core identity by calling into question the solidarity and sense of common fate and ideals within the Palestinian community. Furthermore, for successful security sector reform, it is critical that the Palestinians perceive their security forces as sharing, affirming, and protecting the Palestinian identity, the perceived collusion with and incursions into the Palestinian territory by Israel threatens this core component of dignity.

Inclusion/Ingrouping

To promote inclusion and ingrouping, it is important to make others feel that they belong, thus creating a sense of shared identity and group membership. Doing so affirms the fundamental human "need to belong" (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Within the Palestinian context, ingrouping can and/or should be relevant in two ways. First, to promote a coordinated society, where civil society and the PASF can smoothly operate in conjunction with one another, it is necessary that the two factions share a common sense of identity and purpose (i.e., common ingroup). Though Palestinian identity is in some ways strong, centered on a common outgroup (Israelis), there are also challenges to this identity—as discussed in the earlier chapter on barriers. A lack of common ingroup across the entirety of Palestinian society, inclusive of the PASF, interferes with the effective provision of security. Furthermore, in the absence of a superordinate goal or target (in this case, Israel), the basis for commonality and social cohesion may dissipate unless otherwise reinforced. On a much broader level, the dignity-based concept of ingrouping may also be important in the resolution of intergroup conflict between Israel and Palestine. A focus on a superordinate goal (e.g., peaceful and equitable co-existence) could promote this form of ingrouping (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998), thus reinforcing the dignity of both sides.

Safety

Without the assurance of safety, other concerns may be of little import. As such, safety is of paramount importance in enabling dignity, and is ensured when others are comfortable and free from harm, both

¹⁵ Though we suggest that these dignity elements would remain important across a variety of conflict *and* non-conflict scenarios, the strength of this framework lies in its applicability to the present Palestinian context, fraught with intergroup and intragroup tensions.

physically and psychologically (e.g., suffering humiliation), and free to speak without retribution. The most obvious violation of safety among the Palestinian people is the overall culture of fear and oppression in the West Bank (one of our identified barriers), perpetrated not only by the Israelis but also perhaps even more harmfully by the PASF because it represents a form of betrayal. In this way, Palestinians' safety is compromised in the physical sense, but their sense of protection and trust in their own people is also compromised, creating psychological harm. Palestinian safety is also endangered with the existence of capacity and procedural barriers within the PASF framework, which prohibit them from effectively and optimally engaging in their duties, which include the protection of Palestinians.

Acknowledgement / Respect

It is important to allow people the opportunity to express themselves and have input into the processes that affect them and their well-being. In other words, people should be allowed to have a “voice.” Doing so entails ensuring that people are heard and that their values and beliefs are respected, though this does not necessarily imply agreement with them (or the perceived “other side”). As discussed in the barrier chapter earlier, when people are aggressively or violently prohibited from peaceful assembly or free movement, restricted from providing feedback on the performance of their authorities, suffer repeatedly humiliated, or otherwise oppressed, they suffer from a lack of acknowledgement and respect. Additionally, according to Palestinian civil society, the population also lacks the ability to vocalize, or lodge, formal complaints against perceived injustices by the PASF in a safe and transparent manner. This inability negatively impacts popular perceptions of trust and respect in the PASF and by the PASF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, 2009).

Fairness

People should be treated justly and should not be subject to discrimination. Where merited, this entails ensuring either equality (i.e., same treatment or outcomes for all) and/or equity (i.e., outcomes proportional to individuals' or groups' inputs). Based on the situation, either procedural justice (treatment) and/or distributive justice (outcomes) should be emphasized. Lastly, agreements should be kept unless circumstances merit otherwise. As a result of discovered barriers, fairness comes into play in the Palestinian context in two ways. Fairness (and thus both justice and dignity) is violated as a result of the lack of legitimacy within the PASF. In one case, Palestinians feel as if the PASF do not represent them and their interests (in large part due to its cooperation with Israel), that these forces engage in corrupt activities (such as nepotism) and mask these and other inappropriate activities with a lack of transparency, and that the forces engage in abusive behaviors toward the population. These activities represent a violation of trust and the reality or potential for unequal or inequitable treatment or outcomes. At the same time, the PASF, and Palestinian society as a whole, are treated unfairly by Israel, with restrictions on their freedoms and violations of their security that are deeply entrenched in unjust patterns of treatment and allocation of outcomes.

Benefit of the Doubt / Trust

People should be treated as if they have integrity and are trustworthy. Within this context, dignity must be conceptualized as a “two way street”—that is, to receive dignity, one must give dignity. Starting out

with the assumption that the other person is not trustworthy can create a downward spiral of interaction; the opposite also holds true. As discussed in the barrier chapter earlier, there are many barriers that give rise to mistrust of the PASF, as well as the IDF. Due to the violations observed and perceived by the Palestinian people, they are unable to give these forces the benefit of the doubt, and instead assume that they are operating without integrity. This mistrust toward the security forces establishes the groundwork for mutual tensions between and among these different parties. When others' behaviors are understood through a frame of generalized distrust, attributions for each side's behaviors (whether Palestinian protests or security force road blocks) will likely be made to internal and stable causes that are negative (e.g., "they" always have bad intentions) (Kelley & Michela, 1980). In turn, this creates a situation ripe for mistreatment and misunderstanding.

Empathy / Understanding

To engage in effective empathy and understanding of the other, it is important to consistently try to take the perspective of the people on the other side and understand how they might feel. Doing so also involves believing what the other side has to say is important, and giving the other side an opportunity to explain their position while listening actively. The barrier of a culture of fear and oppression in the West Bank, along with purported human rights abuses perpetrated both by Israel and by the PASF reveal a lack of empathy and understanding for the plight of the other (in this case, the Palestinian people).

Autonomy

Ensuring that the other side feels as if they have some control over what happens to them and the capacity to engage in actions and decisions consistent with their needs and goals (assuming they do not impinge on others). It is also important to work to generate a feeling of hope in the other. Autonomy comes into play in the Palestinian context in multiple ways. Among these is the lack of autonomy of the Palestinian people on an individual level when they are restricted from freedom of movement and other activities necessary for daily functioning. Secondly, the PASF, and Palestinian society as a whole, is subject to the restrictions placed upon them by Israel, limiting their ability to effectively engage in their work, as well as compromising other aspects of self-determination.

Accountability

People and organizations should take responsibility for their actions (or lack thereof) and apologize or make reparation for transgressions, if necessary and as appropriate.¹⁶ Failures of accountability in the Palestinian context are due in large part to the perception of corruption within the PASF as well as the lack of appropriate implementation of the NDP, both with a marked absence of recourse or repercussion.

Brief Assessment of the Linkages Between Specific Barriers and Dignity Violations

In an effort to illustrate the potential benefits of conducting a dignity-based analysis that leverages and builds upon the barrier analysis work conducted here, below we provide a an initial mapping of the

¹⁶ Here, one might look to the literature on restorative justice to inform an appropriate reparative approach, and perhaps even self-regulatory behavior (e.g., Braithwaite, 2002; Tyler, 2006).

linkages between some of the barriers identified earlier and the potential violations to some of the core dignity themes.

The existence of the “culture of fear and oppression” fear barrier represents a potential violation of these core dignity themes:

- Benefit of the Doubt/Trust (in the PCP and NSF)
- Safety (of the Palestinian people)
- Autonomy (of the Palestinian people)
- Empathy/Understanding (lacking in the perpetrators of human rights abuses)
- Acknowledgement/Respect (of the Palestinian people)

The existence of the “ingroup-outgroup mentality” fear barrier represents a potential violation of these core dignity themes:

- Core Identity (of the Palestinian people)
- Inclusion/Ingrouping (disconnect between the PASF and the Palestinian people)
- Safety (of the Palestinian people)
- Benefit of the Doubt/Trust (of the Palestinian people for the PASF, as well as the IDF)

The existence of the “clarity and alignment” barrier represents a potential violation of these core dignity themes:

- Inclusion/Ingrouping (within the PASF)
- Safety (due to inaction by the PASF when lack of coordination results in lack of action for a particular security goal or need)

The existence of the “lack of trust and respect” barrier represents a potential violation of these core dignity themes:

- Trust (of the Palestinian people for the PASF, as well as the IDF)
- Fairness (toward the Palestinian people, from the PASF, as well as the IDF)
- Acknowledgement (toward the Palestinian people, from the PASF, as well as the IDF)
- Respect (toward the Palestinian people, from the PASF, as well as the IDF)

The existence of the “low levels of perceived legitimacy” barrier represents a potential violation of these core dignity themes:

- Accountability (of the PASF to the people)
- Safety (of the Palestinian people, from the PASF)
- Fairness (toward the Palestinian people, from the PASF)

The existence of the “limitations due to Israeli activities” barrier represents a potential violation of these core dignity themes:

- Autonomy (of the PASF from Israel and other actors)
- Trust (in the PASF from the Palestinian people)

The existence of the “low empowerment” barrier represents a potential violation of these core dignity themes:

- Accountability (of the PASF due to their yoking to Israel for decision-making)
- Autonomy (of the PASF from Israel)
- Fairness (toward the PASF and Palestinian people, from Israel)

The existence of the “failure to implement the NDP” barrier represents a potential violation of these core dignity themes:

- Accountability (of Palestinian organizations due to administrative and political divides)
- Autonomy (of the Palestinian people and its organizations from outside influence)
- Safety (of the Palestinian people, given economic decline and vulnerability to outside influence)

Building upon the identified barriers a focused examination of PASF dignity violations represents an opportunity for a more comprehensive and tailored assessment of Palestinian security sector reform. More specifically, a focus both on eliminating barriers to dignity and on reinforcing and enhancing dignity itself has the potential to result in more positive outcomes and a strengthened relationship between the PASF and Palestinian civil society.

Appendix A: Palestinian Civil Police (PCP)

Characterization and Mission

The Palestinian Civil Police (PCP), known locally as Al Shurta, is a sub-division of the PASF. It was established by the May 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement. The Palestinian Civil Police Strategic Framework lists its mission as “to establish a transparent, accountable Palestinian civil police organization with a clearly and leading identified role, operating within a sound legal framework, capable of delivering an effective and robust policing service responsive to the needs of society and able to manage [sic] effectively its [sic] human and physical resources.”

The PCP is intended to carry out standard policing (Bailey, 2013, p. 24). Its roles include the following.

- Preventing crime and maintaining public order (“Gaza-Jericho Agreement--Annex I,” 1994; U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014c; “Palestinian Civil Police Strategic Framework,” n.d.; IRIN News, Palestine Chronicle, 2012)
- Exposing criminals and assisting the Public Prosecutor in crime investigation (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b)
- Ensuring public protection and safety (*2003 Amended Basic Law | The Palestinian Basic Law*, 2003, n. Article 84, “Gaza-Jericho Agreement--Annex I,” 1994, “Palestinian Civil Police Strategic Framework,” n.d., p. 1; Bailey, 2013; Joint Programme on Strengthening Internal Police Accountability, National Anti-Corruption and Civilian Oversight (2012-2014), 2014, p. 1; U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b)
- Creating a secure environment, including the security of institutions, governmental headquarters, international organizations, and diplomatic missions (Bailey, 2013; U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b)
- Cooperating with local authorities and assist with their tasks and mission (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b)
- Fight violence and terrorism, including preventing acts of incitement (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b)
- Code of Conduct and Ethics

According to the recently released Code of Conduct and Ethics of the Palestinian Police (Joint Programme on Strengthening Internal Police Accountability, National Anti-Corruption and Civilian Oversight (2012-2014), 2014, p. 1), the PCP should adhere to eight core tenets.

- Enforce laws, regardless of danger
- Respect citizens; protect lives and property (“Gaza-Jericho Agreement--Annex I,” 1994, n. Article 3, “Palestinian Civil Police Strategic Framework,” n.d.)
- Be fair, just, and impartial in enforcement
- Acknowledge equality under the law
- Respect privacy and confidentiality
- Act ethically, and refrain from arrogance

- Prioritize official work, refrain from private work and nepotism
- Save the citizen, enforce the law, respect human rights

Moreover, the Code of Conduct and Ethics of the Palestinian Police also identified eight associated values for the PCP:

- Honesty
- Integrity
- Professionalism
- Sympathy
- Transparency and accountability
- Justice and equality
- Respect
- Quality and excellence

Size and Structure

As of January 2015 the head of the PCP is MG Hazem Attalla. The PCP is under the operational control of the Ministry of the Interior, following the Prime Minister’s guidance, and ultimately, the supreme commander of the security forces, President Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas]. (See Figure 5 below.)¹⁷




Figure 5: Palestinian Authority Organizations and Command Structure¹⁸

¹⁷ The Ministry of the Interior is granted oversight of the PCP through the Law of Service in the Security Forces, No. 8 of 2005 (Ministry of Interior (MOI), 2013).

¹⁸ Note: Figure reproduced from Zanotti (Zanotti, 2010, p. 13). Original Source: International security assessment dated June 2008, provided to CRS through U.S. government official.

The PCP coordinates activities with a district police HQ in each governorates on the West Bank, a police station in each major city, and 40 smaller police stations spread throughout communities within the West Bank (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2012, p. 4, 2014b), for a total of 78 police facilities in the West Bank (Bouris, 2012). According to a recent UNDP report (Bailey, 2013, pp. 24–25), there are 64 police stations in total in the West Bank; governorates with relatively high populations such as Nablus, Hebron, and Jenin have the largest number of police stations. Police personnel in the West Bank number 7,675, with 2,269 of these working in the Ramallah headquarters, and only 256 (3.3 percent) women (Bailey, 2013, p. 24). The UNDP assessment indicates that there are 319 police personnel per 100,000 inhabitants (as of 2011) in the West Bank (which does not take into account personnel working in detention/prison facilities). Bailey assesses this ratio as being about in the middle compared with regional comparators such as Jordan or Lebanon.

The PCP districts are the following (ordered from the largest police force to the smallest): Nablus, Hebron, Jenin, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Tulkarem, Qalqilya and Salfit, Jericho and Jerusalem suburbs (Bouris, 2012, p. 12). See Figure 6 below for an overview of PCP District headquarters locations. Additionally, the PCP has specialized units, such as a 300-member Guard and Protection Unit and a 700-member Public Order Unit (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b).




Figure 6: Overview of PCP District Headquarter Locations¹⁹

¹⁹ Note: Figure reproduced from USSC 103 PASF-LNO Overview 11 August 14 (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b) briefing.

Training

The European Union Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) is the lead in coordinating security assistance for the PCP (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2012, p. 4). Currently PCP training can be categorized into five broad groupings, or ‘Programs,’ each with individual courses (total of 250) covering 93 subjects (“Police Training Programme notes 6 June,” 2014).

- Basic training and development
- Operational professional development program
- Management and leadership development
- Law and Human Rights
- Administrative development

For training that occurs, most courses are administered in a new PCP training facility (“Police Training Programme notes 6 June,” 2014), the Palestinian College for Police Science. Others are administered elsewhere in the West Bank or internationally (“Police Training Programme notes 6 June,” 2014).

Functions/Activities

Authorized and Reported Activities

The Palestinian Authority recognizes the legal framework governing the PCP is vague and incomplete (Bailey, 2013, p. 24; “Palestinian Civil Police Strategic Framework,” n.d., p. 2). The functions/activities officially authorized and/or reported as functions/activities for the PCP include the following.

- Oversee and control traffic on main roads (International Crisis Group, 2010b; U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b)
- Perform crowd control (IRIN News, Palestine Chronicle, 2012; Zanotti, 2010, p. 24, n. According to CRS correspondence with EUPOL COPPS officials in December 2009)
- Protect public installations and places of importance (“Gaza-Jericho Agreement--Annex I,” 1994)
- Engage in surveillance (Bailey, 2013)
- Conduct investigations (Bailey, 2013; “Palestinian Civil Police Strategic Framework,” n.d.)
- Perform searches and seizures (Bailey, 2013; Friedrich & Luethold, 2007)
- Perform arrests (Bailey, 2013; “Palestinian Civil Police Strategic Framework,” n.d.)
- Conduct interrogations (Bailey, 2013)
- Manage detention and prison facilities in the West Bank (Bailey, 2013; “Palestinian Civil Police Strategic Framework,” n.d.)
- Enforce court judgments (Bailey, 2013)
- Respond to requests for help (“1993 Oslo Accords Signing Ceremony Speeches & Declaration of Principles,” 1993; Bailey, 2013)
- Perform VIP security (“Police Training Programme notes 6 June,” 2014)
- Engage in forensics and document security (“Police Training Programme notes 6 June,” 2014)
- Protect property

While the PCP presently does not participate in routine patrols (known as preventative patrols) or community policing efforts, these areas of policing are being covered with EUPOL COPPS. As such, we consider this activity to be reported, though with limitations, since it is in the training phase.

The PCP faces a number of challenges in the execution of its duties beyond the lack of funds and other resources (D. Cooke, personal communication, October 29, 2014).

- The PCP lacks a finalized legal framework to guide and govern its policing operations and activities.
- At the scene of crimes, the PCP is subordinate to the Public Prosecutor. The PCP notifies the Prosecutor in the case of a major crime. The Prosecutor will then attend and give direction at the scene, including the seizing of exhibits. The PCP lacks the power or authorization to interview suspects, unless the Prosecutor delegates this task to them.
- The PCP is not authorized to pull over vehicles with an Israeli license plate (“yellow plated” vehicles).
- The trifurcation of the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C introduces complexity into the PCP’s efforts because they cannot move freely across areas (from A to B or C) without obtaining the permission of Israeli authorities.²⁰ Requests for authorization typically are not granted in a timely manner, and in some cases remain unfulfilled.
- Even within Area A, over which the Palestinians have full responsibility, there are some roads or areas on which the PCP is not authorized to drive.
- If the Israeli Defense Forces enter Area A, members of the PCP are obligated to return to their offices.
- There are some portions of Area A in the West Bank that cannot be accessed without passing through an Area B or C, which creates logistic issues.

These limitations collectively appear to impact daily policing efforts, including the pursuit and investigation of criminals and criminal activities. Primary barriers to these efforts appear to be a lack of autonomy and a lack of an appropriate and comprehensive legal framework.

Acceptable Practices

To determine general civil policing acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with modern security forces, subject matter expertise was elicited from current law enforcement organizations to help to further expand upon information available through the literature. It is important to note that, because of information and time limitations, it is possible that some of the acceptable practices we identify as “not currently authorized and/or reported” are in fact part of PCP operations.

High Level

At a high level, the categories of policing acceptable practices that are explicitly authorized for the PCP were illustrated earlier in the example from Figure 3 in Chapter Two. These are protecting public installations/places of interest, searches and seizures, arrest authority, and responding to calls for help

²⁰ For reference, see Figure 6 for an overview of PCP District Headquarter location.

from the general public. Reported PCP activities that align with acceptable practice categories are traffic and crowd control, surveillance, interrogation of suspects, management of detention and prison facilities, VIP security (overlapping with the duties of the Presidential Guard), and, to some extent, routine preventative patrols.

A review of the information provided by law enforcement subject matter expert elicitation provides a much more granular view of the different types of acceptable practices in the provision of security consistent with a modern police force that is expected of the PCP. These items are broken down into several categories including internal practices and policies, operations, investigative authorities, training, and recruiting.

Internal Policies

Establishment of specific, written guidelines that outline acceptable and proper procedures is an internal policies acceptable practice. A code of ethics (as noted above) and a policy and procedures manual are currently authorized and reported. However, the implementation is too recent to understand the impact on civil society's expectations and satisfaction with the PCP. Drawing from established acceptable practices, other internal policies include better defined communication protocols, accessible formal complaint procedures, individual department mission statements with a clear link to the overall organizational mission, detailed emergency response plans, staff fitness requirements, shift guidelines including hours and breaks, personal appearance standards, professional standards, role definitions and resulting authorities, and policies relating to use of police property, equipment, and vehicles.

While the policy section defines rules and operational policies, there are also acceptable practices relating to how the police department is actually structured, and how it operates within those guidelines. In this structural subcategory, additional acceptable practices suggest that the PCP should work towards enhanced transparency with regard to finances, including establishing a separate finance department, to support decision making from a budgeting standpoint, and provide appropriate oversight of fund and resource allocation. Additionally, acceptable practices include establishing case management and review procedures, adequate communications infrastructure, evidence storage facilities and procedures, fleet maintenance, an internal affairs/anti-corruption unit, protocols for internal decision appeals, legal review procedures/liaison, records management, technical/IT management, and unit risk management functions. Court liaison personnel is both an acceptable practice and currently reported as active (Bailey, 2013), as is patrol management (inferred as reported based on training with EUPOL COPPS). Additionally, criminal intelligence (i.e., the collection of intelligence related to criminal activities) and public relations functions and activities also represent acceptable practices for similar law enforcement agencies. As mentioned earlier, these are all items that we were unable to identify as existing practices with the information and data publically available. However, they are all critical elements to keep in mind with security sector reform. Figure 7 below is an overview (Venn diagram) of the intersections among activities that are authorized, reported, and/or acceptable practices for the PCP within the domain of internal practices and policies. As Figure 7 shows,

a predominant number of high level functions and activities are consistent with acceptable practices, with very few being authorized and/or reported.

Palestinian Civil Police: Internal Practices/ Policies




Figure 7: Venn Diagram of PCP Functions/Activities Within the Domain of Internal Practices and Policies

Operations

Operations acceptable practices fall into three categories: custody, patrols, and operational policies. While facility management is a currently authorized and reported activity in the custody category (Bailey, 2013; “Palestinian Civil Police Strategic Framework,” n.d.), other acceptable practices within this category include court custody operations, protective custody operations, and regional custody operations. Under the patrol category, acceptable practices include having appropriate vehicles with proper markings (as applicable), appropriate weapons, database access, recognizable badges and identification, and unique uniforms. Communications systems do exist to some extent (“Palestinian Civil Police Strategic Framework,” n.d.); however, as noted above, they are largely inadequate.

Operational policies representing acceptable practices would cover topics such as arrest and handcuff procedures, computer use, crime or disaster scene integrity, handling of gang activity, hazardous material guidelines, protocols for interviewing suspects and witnesses, policies for specific types of incidents, how to respond to armed threats, how to respond to explosives threats, how to conduct searches, use of force guidelines, vehicle pursuit policies, and weapons policies (possession and use). Figure 8 below is a high level overview (Venn diagram) of the intersections between and among activities that are authorized, reported, and/or acceptable practices for the PCP within the domain of operations. As Figure 8 shows, most of the high level functions and activities are consistent with acceptable practices, with virtually none being authorized or reported. The one reported function and

activity is not authorized but consistent with acceptable practices; the one authorized function and activity is also reported and consistent with acceptable practices.

Palestinian Civil Police: Operations

As of January 2015




Figure 8: Venn Diagram of PCP Functions/Activities Within the Domain of Operations

Investigative Authorities

Acceptable practices relating to investigative authorities were also explored through subject matter expert elicitation. These items fall into two categories: general investigative crimes and major crimes. Under the general category, acceptable practices include having the capacity, structure, training and personnel to investigate crimes relating to assault, auto theft, burglary or robbery (and other kinds of theft), fraud, juvenile crimes, and sex crimes. In addition, there should be established acceptable practices and capability for informant handling. Surveillance, domestic violence, and crimes against children currently are acceptable practices that are both authorized and reported (Bailey, 2013; “PA Report of Security Sector Review 2011-2013,” n.d.).

In addition to general investigative capabilities, major crime investigation acceptable practices include having similar levels of effectiveness and capacity to handle drug trafficking, explosives disposal, homicide, kidnapping, or other forms of human trafficking, organized crime, serial or career crime, technical or cybercrime, and terrorism. Environmental crime investigation was an area that was both authorized and reported (State of Palestine, 2014), but not explicitly mentioned as an acceptable practice in subject matter expert elicitation. Figure 9 below is a high level overview (Venn diagram) of the intersections between and among activities that are authorized, reported, and/or acceptable practices for the PCP within the domain of investigative authorities. As Figure 9 shows, the predominant

number of high level functions and activities are consistent with acceptable practices, with very few being authorized or reported.

Palestinian Civil Police: Investigative Authorities




Figure 9: Venn Diagram of PCP Functions/Activities Within the Domain of Investigative Authorities

Training and Recruiting

Acceptable practices relating to police force training should include specific skill development in areas such as arrest procedures, crime scene investigation, evidence handling, radio and telephone operations, and information systems, specific types of general/investigative and major crimes, as well as traffic and crowd control. Of these, as noted above, forensics, traffic/crowd control, and crime investigation are both reported and authorized. Other training related acceptable practices should include continuing education or advanced skill development opportunities, and some type of probationary period following training.

On the recruiting side, acceptable practices include selecting candidates based on qualifications that include soft skills, basic educational competencies (e.g., literacy), and physical conditioning and strength requirements. All candidates should also first be screened through an extensive background check. Figure 10 below is a high level overview (Venn diagram) of the intersections between and among activities that are authorized, reported, and/or acceptable practices for the PCP within the domain of training and recruiting. As Figure 10 shows, the predominant number of high level functions and activities are consistent with acceptable practices, with very few being authorized or reported, but encouragingly those that are reported are also authorized and consistent with acceptable practices.

Palestinian Civil Police: Training and Recruiting

As of January 2015




Figure 10: Venn Diagram of PCP Functions/Activities Within the Domain of Training and Recruiting

While once again it is important to keep in mind that many of these acceptable practices may in fact currently be in place within the PCP, they should be done so at a level of competence and frequency where they represent a recognized and wide-spread practice. Adoption of these acceptable practices, tailored to the cultural and situational factors at hand, would further align the PCP with other more established law enforcement and policing agencies. It is beyond the scope of this work to determine the impact each of these acceptable practices would have on enhancing security for the PASF in the West Bank.

Appendix B: National Security Forces (NSF)

Characterization and Mission

The Palestinian National Security Force (NSF) is a sub-division of the PASF headed by Commander MG Nidal Abu Dukhan (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b). The Law of Service in the Palestinian Security Forces establishes the NSF as one of three branches of the Palestinian Authority, alongside the General Intelligence (GI) and Internal Security Forces (ISF). Since 2007, the NSF has derived its authority from Security Services Law and Presidential Decrees (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b).

The NSF is considered to be a paramilitary force authorized to use force in the execution of its duties (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). The NSF's mission and structure are analogous to that of a national army (International Crisis Group, 2010b; Zanotti, 2010) and, as explicitly stated by Commander Diab al Ali, are to build "a force to defend our people, and also to help the Palestinians build a nation" (Zanotti, 2010, p. 13). Alternatively, the NSF's mission also has been stated as, "[d]efeat[ing] illegal militias and armed extremist groups that exceed police capability; act[ing] as a national reserve force to provide additional security enforcement capacity; reinforc[ing] Civil Police when required to restore law and order in locations where it has been compromised, and provid[ing] rapid intervention capability against security threats to governmental control" (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b).

The NSF benefits from having a legal framework in place that stipulates the authorized and prohibited activities of its personnel, though these stipulations are at times vague or internally contradictory.²¹ The Law of Service in the Palestinian Security Forces No. 8 of 2005 (Article 7) stipulates that the NSF is a military body under the leadership of the Minister of National Security and the Commander-in-Chief, under which it performs its functions and derives its jurisdictions. Article 89 lays out more general aims that cover all of the PASF (Forces, 2008). These include acting in the service of the homeland and citizens in the implementation of the public interest, pursuant to all relevant laws and agreements. Officers are also required to perform their duties in an accurate and trustworthy manner, to cooperate with their colleagues on urgent matters, bear responsibility for the orders issued to them and for the smooth progress of work, and to preserve the dignity of their function and conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the respect due to their position. Articles 90 through 93 cover prohibited officer activities, including (but not limited to) working in politics or toward political objectives, revealing confidential information, performing acts for third parties, marrying a non-Arab spouse without permission, speculating in stock exchange markets, or gambling (Forces, 2008).

At the broadest level, the NSF are the armed forces of the country and, as such, their functions are defending the country and its people/providing national security (Pan, 2005; Zanotti, 2010, p. 13) and maintaining public order and security (*2003 Amended Basic Law | The Palestinian Basic Law*, 2003, n.

²¹ For example, a legal distinction has been made between 'military forces' (NSF) and 'security forces' (ISF) that suggest differentiation between external and internal security functions, in turn assigning these forces to the Ministries of National Security and the Interior, respectively. It should also be noted that the NSF is presently under the joint operational control of the Ministry of the Interior and National Security (MoINS), as they are currently structured as a single ministry. However, as some scholars note, this provision contradicts the stipulations set forth in *Article 1* of the *National Security Forces Draft Law*, wherein the *National Security Forces* are supposed to report directly to the President (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007, p. 38).

Article 84). Additionally, the NSF is oriented toward building the Palestinian state (Zanotti, 2010, p. 13) and providing command and control for security operations at both the national and governorate levels (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b). While some of these responsibilities can be open to interpretation, it is generally assumed that these powers include protecting against both external *and* domestic threats to Palestine's territorial borders (i.e., those over which the Palestinians presently have control), skies, and coasts (Luft, 1999). However, according to one subject matter expert with whom we consulted, given that the NSF does not have any current responsibility to protect the West Bank borders, and the Israeli stance is to demilitarize the future Palestinian state, these powers would ostensibly be precluded (subject matter expert, personal communication, December 12, 2014).

Experts indicate that the NSF deals with both crime and national security (Pan, 2005). Their responsibility is to provide strategic backup to other forces, such as the PCP, including when the police force is facing a security threat that exceeds its capability to provide an effective response (International Crisis Group, 2010b; U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014a, p. 34, 2014b). The NSF also has the capability to conduct the full range of security missions as assigned by the President, including counter-terrorism operations, although the NSF lacks the authority to independently make arrests (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014a, p. 34). Finally, while Israeli military sources state that the PASF (inclusive of the NSF) have freedom of movement (and presumably of authorized duties) in Areas A and B, where the majority of Palestinians live (Luft, 1999), other sources suggest that the need for Israeli-Palestinian coordination is also significant in Areas A and B, both for rural and urban roads (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014a). Notably, Area C cannot be entered without prior coordination and approval from Israeli authorities (Atallah, 2013).

Size and Structure

Articles 7 and 8 of the Law of Service in the Palestinian Security Forces address the structure of the NSF (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). The NSF is under the operational control of the Ministry of the Interior and National Security (MoINS), following the Prime Minister's guidance and, ultimately, the supreme commander of the security forces, President Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007; Zanotti, 2010, p. 12) (See Figure 11 below). The Ministry of the Interior is granted oversight of the NSF through the Presidential Decrees (Ministry of Interior (MOI), 2013). The appointment of its commander, who serves for three years with potential for a one-year extension, is by presidential decree (Forces, 2008; Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). The NSF Commander reports to the President, but coordinates institutional matters, including training, budgeting, and administration requirements, with the Prime Minister and Ministry of the Interior (USSC Brief, pg. 4).




Figure 11: *Palestinian Authority Organizations and Command Structure*²²

Members of the NSF are housed in barracks, assigned to different units, classified by military rank, and operate within a military command and control structure (Atallah, 2013; Zanotti, 2010). NSF personnel are deployed within 10 of the 11 West Bank governorates (with the exception of the Jerusalem governorate, which technically falls under Palestinian Authority control). The NSF is organized into area commands, special battalions, and garrison units (USSC Brief, pg. 4). Each governorate has an area command, led by an NSF Colonel or General who is responsible for all security operations throughout the governorate, and garrison units that provide supporting logistical and administrative functions within each governorate (USSC brief, pg. 4).

Estimates of NSF force size vary (from 7,000 to 15,000 members, depending on source and year) (International Crisis Group, 2010b; Luft, 1999; Pan, 2005; Zanotti, 2010). There are variations in reported number of battalions and composition as well. For example, one set of sources indicates that the NSF is composed of approximately 8,500 personnel, divided among nine battalions, a Headquarters, and a Rapid Response Unit (with 4,500 active and mobile troopers) (International Crisis Group, 2010b; U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b). Another source stipulates that, in addition to NSF headquarters (in Ramallah), the NSF includes 10 Special Battalions, a Rapid Response Unit, garrison units, and other specialized units including those oriented toward delivering medical services (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014a, p. 34) and an independent branch focused on military intelligence (Zanotti, 2010). See Figure 12 below for just one particular example of an overview of the NSF locations and facilities.

²² Note: Figure from Zanotti, 2010, pg. 13. Original Source: International security assessment dated June 2008, provided to CRS through U.S. government official.




Figure 12: Overview of NSF Locations and Facilities²³

Rapid Response Unit

The purpose of the NSF Rapid Response Unit (RRU) is to provide protection and support to PCP operations in cases where specialized tactics and equipment are required to mitigate casualties (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b). This can include several situations, such as the following.

- Barricaded gunmen and high-risk arrests
- Resolution of high-risk situations in densely populated terrain (e.g., refugee camps) while ensuring a minimum loss of life and injury, and minimum damage to property
- Hostage rescue
- Cadre for Special Training

Members of the RRU are previously trained NSF members with a high level of weapons proficiency and accuracy, enhanced shoot/no-shoot training and short-distance marksmanship, defensive tactics (including close quarters), capability to use special ammunition and weapons such as flash bang

²³ Note: Figure reproduced from (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b) briefing.

grenades, and proficiency with rappelling and roping techniques and the use of specialized weapons and equipment (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b).

Resources²⁴

Between 2007 and 2010, the U.S. State Department is reported by the U.S. Government Accountability Office to have allocated \$99 million dollars aimed at supporting the reconstruction of Palestinian Authority security infrastructure and capacity-building within the West Bank, as well as an additional \$392 million for the purposes of training and equipping what would become the NSF (Dana, 2014). We conducted multiple searches to decipher other sources of current or recent NSF funding. Available information was limited, though one source indicates that much of the initial USSC funding was supplied by Canada (Blackwell, 2013).

USSC has provided the necessary equipment for training and employment including the following (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014b)..

- Police Entry (Breaching) Equipment
- General Trooper Equipment (Uniforms & Standard Issue)
- Medical Equipment
- Tactical Gear
- Riot Gear

Resources also appear to include a variety of other equipment in addition to that listed above, including the following (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014a).

- Vehicles – including trailers, ambulances, and other vehicles
- Organizational (Recon) – such as video cameras, cameras, and binoculars
- Standard Issue – including field equipment such as sleeping bags, tents, canteen, etc.
- Specialty equipment – for example, rappelling equipment

Due to restrictions stipulated by U.S. law regarding the use of INL funding, the USSC provides only non-lethal support and equipment to the PASF as a whole, including the NSF (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2012, p. 5). This is accomplished with Israeli approval, and equipment may be submitted to end-use monitoring (Zanotti, 2010, p. 15).

Training

The USSC has provided facilities for training and employment within all governorates (Issacharoff, 2010). Training facilities and bases for the NSF in the West Bank were also funded through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance (Zanotti, 2010, p. 15). Among the security forces, the NSF is reported as having received the greatest amount of both training and general resources through INCLE funding (Zanotti, 2010).

²⁴ Due diligence for other sources of (current or recent) funding from other references was done; yet we were unable to find any definitive information.

Training encompasses weapons training, rapid reaction, crowd control, civil disorder management, high risk arrest, overall management, and ethics and human rights (International Crisis Group, 2010b). Training has included a U.S.-led program headed by the U.S. Security Coordinator, Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton (who served in this role from 2005-2010), in collaboration with the U.S. State Department, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). This program provided both financial and technical support aimed at train and equip programs (International Crisis Group, 2010b). Between 2007-2012, 6,000 personnel, composed of nine NSF special battalions and two Presidential Guard battalions, received training for gendarmerie-style duties at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC), located near Amman, as part of Dayton's program (Zanotti, 2010, 2014).

Elsewhere, reports indicate that 3,100 of these personnel were NSF members trained under Dayton's oversight in Jordan (Issacharoff, 2010). Dayton's vision was to have ten NSF battalions trained in Jordan over the longer term, with nine battalions for each of the nine governorates designated for security purposes, along with a final battalion as a strategic reserve (Zanotti, 2010). While Dayton was largely applauded for what was perceived as successful efforts to rebuild the NSF (e.g., Issacharoff, 2010), Dayton's involvement was also criticized by Palestinians themselves, in large part due to taking credit and making what were perceived as disparaging comments about their readiness to lead (International Crisis Group, 2010b). Despite these questions about Palestinian readiness to lead, others argue that, in addition to receiving training, Palestinian forces should be empowered to conduct not only internal training, but also to train other forces (Kristoff, 2012). Moreover, the Palestinian public places blame on Dayton and the NSF for human rights abuses, as well as an atmosphere of political intimidation (Zanotti, 2010, p. 32). Palestinian reactions to Dayton underscore the importance of remaining sensitive and vigilant to possible offenses (perceived or actual) in the administration of training—which play into the existing power dynamic between trainer and trainees, and can reduce the effectiveness of training when trainees clearly characterize the trainer as an outgroup member.

As indicated, from 2007-2012, NSF trained at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC). Previously, the main training facilities for the NSF were located in Gaza, though training and the overall state of readiness in the West Bank were negatively impacted as a function of the physical separation between Gaza and the West Bank and the prior obliteration (following the Second Intifada in 2000) by Israel of the security infrastructure (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). As of 2007, there was no centralized training institution for NSF personnel within the Palestinian borders (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007), although some INCLE funding was appropriated in 2010 for the development of training facilities for the NSF in the West Bank (Zanotti, 2010).

Functions/Activities

Authorized and Reported Activities

According to the Basic Law (*2003 Amended Basic Law | The Palestinian Basic Law*, 2003, n. Article 84), security forces such as the NSF are the armed forces of the country, and as such, their functions/activities are defending the country, serving the people, protecting society, and maintaining public order and security – while respecting rights and freedoms.

Specific functions/activities authorized and/or inferred as reported functions/activities for the NSF in the literature we have reviewed include the following.

- Providing strategic back-up for other forces (International Crisis Group, 2010b; Sanders, 2010; United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General, 2011)
- Engaging in crowd control – inferred through training (Human Rights Watch, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2010b)
- Managing civil disorder (Amnesty International, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2010b, n. Inferred through training)
- Performing arrests – with limitations (“Palestinian Authority,” 2011; Zanotti, 2010; USSC Brief, p. 34)²⁵
- Protecting borders – though current evidence of this activity is limited (Luft, 1999; Pan, 2005)
- (Combating) crime (Pan, 2005)
- Engaging in general security and security-related missions (“Gaza-Jericho Agreement--Annex I,” 1994, n. Articles IV–XII; Luft, 1999)
- Participating in Joint Mobile Units (“Gaza-Jericho Agreement--Annex I,” 1994, n. Article 2, Section 3), which includes:
 - Guarding checkpoints (Luft, 1999; Pan, 2005)
 - Conducting (Joint) patrols (“Gaza-Jericho Agreement--Annex I,” 1994, n. Article II, Section 3; Luft, 1999; Pan, 2005)
- Engaging in counter-terrorism (Special Operations Unit 101) (Najib, 2013)

Acceptable Practices

Acceptable practices for the NSF are defined as those that a typical modern security force would include within their span of activities or at least those that would appear to fall into that definition based on a literature review and subject matter expert input. Figure 13 below is a high level overview (Venn diagram) of the intersections between and among activities that are authorized, reported, and/or acceptable practices for the NSF. As Figure 13 shows, over half of the high level functions and activities are consistent with acceptable practices, with less than half of these being either authorized or reported and slightly less than half of the reported functions and activities are neither authorized nor consistent with acceptable practices which can be concerning.

²⁵ Though some sources (Human Rights Watch, 2011) indicate that the NSF is responsible for making joint arrests, an important limitation to these powers is that the NSF itself does not possess the legal authority to do so, but instead must act as strategic reinforcements and force protection for those organizations that are properly authorized for making arrests (Zanotti, 2010). In other words, they can be considered to cooperate with other law enforcement agencies in making arrests (Bob, 2014), which can include arresting members of militant groups, and assisting the Israeli government with prosecuting those arrested. In this capacity, they support the Civil Police, acting as a gendarmerie, with no official arrest powers (U.S. Security Coordinator, 2014a, p. 34; Zanotti, 2010).

National Security Forces

As of January 2015




Figure 13: Venn Diagram of NSF Functions/Activities as Authorized, Reported, and/or Acceptable Practices

There was only one acceptable practice—protecting borders—that was neither formally authorized nor reported in current (2007 or later) sources. Providing strategic backup for other forces (e.g., PCP) and engaging in counter-terrorism activities represent acceptable practices that are also reported as taking place, but are not explicitly authorized in the materials that were reviewed. Several acceptable practices, even though authorized, did not appear in the literature of reported current (2007 or later) activities. These include general security related missions, guarding checkpoints, and joint patrols with Israel (though the latter activity may resume, given recent working group discussions looking into joint Israeli-Palestinian coordination) (Eglash, 2013).²⁶ It is important to note that, while these activities may in fact be taking place, since no direct validation was found in the literature, they are not classified as reported. And finally, activities listed as active, but not legally authorized and are not necessarily acceptable practices for the NSF, incorporate those that would typically fall under the jurisdiction of the PCP; these include arrests, crime fighting, civil disorder management, and crowd control. No additional specific acceptable practices were noted, partly due to the unique position of the NSF related to security forces of other countries, and also due to the fairly specific mission of the NSF as noted above.

²⁶ However, this activity when executed may be taken on by the PCP, not the NSF (Eglash, 2013). Guarding checkpoints and joint patrols with Israel fall under the umbrella of Joint Mobile Units.

Appendix C: Intelligence Services: General Intelligence (GI), Preventive Security Organization (PSO), Military Intelligence (MI)

Characterization and Mission

The General Intelligence (GI) (Mukhabbarat al-Amma) service is a sub-division of the PASF that is authorized to use force (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007) and is explicitly mentioned in the *Oslo Agreements I* (1994) and *II* (1995) (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). At the broadest level, the role of the GI is to forestall “any act of violence or threat, whatever its aim, which is part of an individual or group criminal plan aimed at spreading terror amongst the people or causing them harm or putting their life, liberty or security in danger, or causing damage to the environment or public or private property” (USSC 103 PASF-LNO Overview 11 Aug 14).

The Preventive Security Organization (PSO) (al-Amn al-Wiqa'i) service was established in 1994 (by the name of the Preventive Security Force) by President Yasser Arafat in accordance with the Oslo Accords and considered by some sources to be the PASF’s most “powerful intelligence service” (Luft, 1999; Madhoun, 2006; Pan, 2005). Its primary mission is counterterrorism, monitoring opposition groups, and conducting reconnaissance and intelligence operations in Israel. Its main task, the protection of the Oslo peace process against internal opposition, involved action against Islamist factions and armed groups. According to its draft law, the PSO is also to uphold internal security and combat internal threats against the Palestinian Authority regime, including those aimed at international agreements, fighting regular crime, fighting economic crime, and combating corruption and counter-espionage (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007).

The Military Intelligence (MI) (Istkhbarat al-Askariya) service is a smaller intelligence agency not recognized by the Oslo accords that deals mostly with the arrest and interrogation of opposition activists considered a threat to the Palestinian Authority regime. Their mission has been primarily concerned with combating the radical Palestinian opposition; however, according to experts, under Arafat, the MI monitored groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad in an attempt to control their popularity and diminish the political threat they posed to Fatah. The MI duties include intelligence, counterintelligence, and analytical elements, and it is reported to also investigate illegal actions by other PASF intelligence and security agencies. It has been reported that the MI has also served as a counterintelligence organ inside other security structures.

During 2004 and 2005, the Palestinian Authority created laws²⁷ designed to further institutionalize its security branches, including specific laws for each branch. The law governing the General Intelligence Service is No. 17 (2005), ratified on October 26, 2005 (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007, p. 35). This law stipulates that the duty of the GI is to *focus on external (as opposed to internal) intelligence* (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). More specifically, the GI is intended to *focus on intelligence collection activities outside of the West Bank*. The GI is also intended to *conduct counter-espionage and liaise with the intelligence*

²⁷ Though these laws were still considered incomplete as of 2007 (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007).

agencies of other countries, as needed (Cordesman, 2006; International Crisis Group, 2010b). In contrast, the PSO, which is primarily concerned with internal counter-terrorism and monitors and polices opposition groups as well as gathers intelligence, is governed by the Law of Service in the Security Forces No. 8 of 2005 (Cordesman, 2006; International Crisis Group, 2010b; Madhoun, 2006; Pan, 2005). A draft law for preventive security – “Decree Law No. ()²⁸ of 2007 Concerning the Preventive Security” (Forces, 2008) lays out the duties and responsibilities for the PSO, but has to our knowledge never been officially codified into law by the PA. The MI is organized under the NSF and, to our knowledge, is, as such, governed by laws specific to the NSF.

The activities, mission, and responsibilities of the GI overlap considerably with those of the PSO and to a lesser degree the PCP (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007; International Crisis Group, 2010b). Likewise, the stated responsibilities of the PSO overlap with those of the PCP as well. The overlap is due in part to the divide and rule-policy of the late Arafat years and his refusal to endorse the creation of a legal framework for the security sector, which had a very negative impact on the delineation of tasks and responsibilities. The overlap is also due to the broad powers granted to the GI through Law No. 17, which contains multiple loopholes enabling internal intelligence work (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007) which is the purview of the PSO. For example, Article 6 in the Decree Law No. () of 2007 Concerning the Preventive Security states the duties and responsibilities of the PSO include working to protect the Palestinian “internal security” and the “internal security of the National Authority (Forces, 2008).” Article 7 in the Decree Law No. () of 2007 Concerning the Preventive Security states that, “officers of the Preventive Security...shall have the capacity of the Judicial Police” (Forces, 2008). Efforts have been made as part of Article 25 (5) of the General Intelligence Law No. 17 of 2005, to restrict security officers from engaging in political activities (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). Articles 13 through 15 of the *Law of Service in the Palestinian Security Forces* addresses the GI (Forces, 2008; Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). The Palestinian Authority has neither been able to implement a 2008 decree merging the two main intelligence agencies of the GI and PSO, nor to clarify the legal status of a third agency, the MI (Sayigh, 2011).

Code of Conduct and Ethics

The GI’s code of conduct was completed in 2011 (Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN), 2013). As of October 2013, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was reported to be working on a revision of this code of conduct (United National General Assembly: Report of the Secretary General, 2013). However, the document does not appear to be publically available. To our knowledge, a separate code of conduct does not exist for the PSO or MI.

Size and Structure

The GI is independent from other security organizations and under the direct authority of the President (see Figure 14 below) (Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN), 2013; Friedrich & Luethold, 2007; USSC 103 PASF-LNO Overview 11 Aug 14). At the same time, in 2005, President Abbas ordered a reorganization of the security branches. As part of this reorganization, the General Intelligence Service,

²⁸ This is precisely how the decree law is titled in the literature, so the blank parentheses are not inadvertent. See <http://www.palestinianbaselaw.org/presidential-decrees/presidential-decrees-issued-on-june-july-2007>.

though still reporting to the President, would be brought under simultaneous control of the Ministry of the Interior, to facilitate the reform process (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). This aspect of security forces organization is not represented in the figure below. Moreover, as part of the 2005 reorganization, the PSO was merged into the Internal Security Forces (along with the PCP and Civil Defense) and the MI was merged into the NSF as the Military Intelligence Department. Both the PSO and MI report up to the Minister of Interior (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007).




Figure 14: Palestinian Authority Organizations and Command Structure²⁹

According to Article 3 of the General Intelligence Law No. 17 of 2005, the GI shall be composed of a Head, Deputy, and a sufficient personnel base to enable the execution of its duties, in accordance with the structure established by the President (Forces, 2008). The same stipulation holds with respect to Articles 4 and 5 of the Decree Law No. () of 2007 Concerning the Preventive Security (Forces, 2008).

There appear to be somewhat conflicting reports regarding the head of the GI. In one Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) report, the head of the GI, who shall be part of the National Security Council, was first established in Article 1 as Ahmed Mohammed Shanyourah (Forces, 2008). In contrast, the Ma’an News Agency reports the first head of the General Intelligence as Amin Al-Hindi, followed by Tareq Rajab (Acting), Tawfiq Triawi, and then Muhammad Mansour (Ma’an News Agency, 2009; see also Friedrich & Luethold, 2007; GlobalSecurity.org, n.d.). The head of the GI is imbued with broad discretionary powers and is conferred a ministerial rank (without cabinet membership) according to Article 3 of the General Intelligence Law No. 17 of 2005 (Forces, 2008). The appointment of its commander (the Head of GI), who serves for three years with potential for a one-year extension, is by presidential decree (Forces, 2008; Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). According to Article 6, the Deputy shall be appointed by the President, following the nomination by the Head of Intelligence (Forces, 2008). The GI also has a small paramilitary strike force (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007).

²⁹ Note: Figure from Zanotti, 2010, pg. 13. Original Source: International security assessment dated June 2008, provided to CRS through U.S. government official.

In July 2002, Jibreel Rajoub in the West Bank and Mohammed Dahlan in Gaza formally commanded the PSO. Both men were well-known leaders of the first intifada, which began in 1987. Rajoub became the national security adviser to the PA, and Dahlan the civil-affairs minister in Abbas's government (Pan, 2005). In 2005, Brigadier-General Ziyad Habb Al-Reeh assumed leadership of the PSO in the West Bank. Unification and standardization of the Gaza and West Bank branches of the PSO later came under the command of Major-General Rashid Abu Shbak (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007).

Upon its merger into the NSF, the MI was headed by Major-General Moussa Arafat al-Qudwa, who had combined the posts of Head of MI and the Gaza NSF. He was later replaced by Brigadier-General Hisham Ibaid as Head of the MI (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007).

Resources

When the Special Forces created under Arafat were dismantled, their personnel were transferred to other organizations, including the GI Service. According to a relatively recent International Crisis Group report (International Crisis Group, 2010b, p. 2), the GI has 4,000 personnel. However, this estimate differs substantially from the 3,000 personnel reported in a report section relevantly entitled, "the Uncertain Size of the Current Palestinian Authority Security Forces" (Cordesman, 2006; see also GlobalSecurity.org, n.d.; Pan, 2005), as well as from force estimates of 7,000, with about 3500 in the West Bank and the other half in Gaza, cited elsewhere (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). The discrepancy may be due in part to the varying dates of estimation. Alternative explanations may also contribute to these inconsistent estimates. For example, as Pan indicates (2005), many of the GI agents work in plainclothes, which previously enabled Arafat to disguise the true number of personnel, and maintain the appearance of staying within quotas established by international accords.

According to our sources, members of the PSO are plainclothes officials serving in separate units in the West Bank and Gaza (Luft, 1999; Madhoun, 2006; Pan, 2005). There are conflicting reports on the PSO's estimated strength, all within just a few years of one another. According to Friedrich and Luethold (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007), the PSO had 8,000 agents in 2007, with 3,500 in the West Bank and 4,500 in Gaza. Another source indicates 3,000 total personnel, with 1,200 in Gaza and 1,800 in the West Bank (Cordesman, 2006). Still another source lists 5,000 members in separate units in the West Bank and Gaza (Pan, 2005).

Based on the limited reports we found on the strength of PASF's MI service, we believe it comprises of up to 500 to 600 plain-clothes agents who collect intelligence on the external military environment. Under Arafat, however, it acted primarily as an internal security organization for monitoring and repressing opposition from within Fatah (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007).

Training

Neither the GI nor the PSO take part in USSC-led training under INCLE funding (with the exception of senior leaders) (Zanotti, 2010). Given the reputation for human rights abuses in the GI, senior leaders undergo vetting for human rights, terrorist links, and criminal activity, and training that emphasizes human rights issues, with the goal of leaders conveying these ideas to their subordinates (Zanotti, 2010). As of 2007, the GI's main training facilities were located in Gaza, though, similar to the NSF, training and

overall state of readiness were negatively impacted in the West Bank as a function of the physical separation between Gaza and the West Bank and the obliteration of the security infrastructure by Israel following the Second Intifada (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). Moreover, there are no *unified and functional* training curricula for security personnel in this or other organizations, producing discrepancies in training across Gaza and the West Bank, even for personnel from the same security organization (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). Further, the varied background and training (from different international training organizations) of mid- and senior-level officers produces discrepancies in philosophical approach (e.g., concepts of security) as well as strategy, tactics, and management (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). Overall, recent open source information on GI training appears to be severely limited (perhaps due to the nature of their work); we were also unable to obtain any sources outlining or describing the scope and nature of the training for the PSO and MI.

Functions/Activities

Authorized and Reported Activities

Articles 8 through 16 of the General Intelligence Law No. 17 of 2005 lay out the duties and responsibilities of the GI service (Forces, 2008).³⁰ Articles 6 through 10 of the Decree Law No. () of 2007 Concerning the Preventive Security lay out the duties and responsibilities of the PSO service (Forces, 2008), although this draft law was submitted to the Palestinian Authority in January 2006, and to our knowledge has never been approved and implemented in legal documents. There are no comparable laws that lay out the duties for the MI, to our knowledge. Nonetheless, as indicated in International Crisis Group's 2010 report (2010b, p. 2), "While it [General Intelligence Law No. 17] defined the branch's overall responsibilities, it was imprecise and, crucially, failed to demarcate its work from that of Preventive Security [PSO] and Military Intelligence [MI]. Some elements – like the introduction of a deputy – have never been implemented (Crisis Group interviews, Palestinian security officials, August 2010)."

Article 8 grants the GI with the authority to operate outside the boundaries of Palestine (Forces, 2008). According to Article 9, the responsibilities of the GI Service include (Forces, 2008; Friedrich & Luethold, 2007) include the following.

- Preventing acts that threaten the safety and security of Palestine
- Combatting external threats to Palestinian national security (e.g., espionage, sabotage)
- Cooperating with similar agencies in friendly states

In the conduct of these responsibilities, the GI may engage in (USSC 103 PASF-LNO Overview 11 Aug 14) the following activities.

- Information gathering
- Stopping foreigners or locals traveling in or out of the country for security reasons
- Conducting surveillance and investigations using technical and other professional means

³⁰ All discussion of Articles in this section are referenced in (Forces, 2008), except where otherwise indicated.

Article 6 of the Decree Law No. () of 2007 Concerning the Preventive Security grants the PSO with the authority to operate inside the boundaries of Palestine. According to this article, the responsibilities of the PSO Service include the following (Forces, 2008).

- Working to protect the Palestinian internal security
- Following up on crimes which threaten the internal security of the National Authority (as well as working towards their prevention)
- Uncovering crimes which target governmental departments, public bodies and institutions

However, the broad and underspecified nature of these responsibilities leaves them open to some degree of interpretation. Moreover, this ambiguity may enable abuse in the service of these duties. For example, the GI is reported to have engaged in behaviors aimed at preventing domestic subversion, though human rights organizations indicate that, in the pursuit of this activity, the GI has overstepped its bounds by using abusive tactics, in some cases resulting in the death of detainees (Cobain, 2009). The GI has also performed breaches of the Palestinian Basic Law and the Penal Procedural Law by entering homes without a warrant and eavesdropping on calls in the absence of permission from the judiciary (Independent Commission on Human Rights, 2010). The PSO have similarly been accused of human-rights violations for abducting and torturing suspects (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007).

According to the Independent Commission for Human Rights (The Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR), 2013), the GI limits freedom of expression by detaining and questioning Palestinian citizens for expressing their opinions, particularly those that are in any way critical of the existing government or Islam, or on suspicion of advocating atheism (Independent Commission on Human Rights, 2010; Jerusalem Institute of Justice, 2012). ICHR also indicates that the GI prohibits the press from doing their work and enjoying media freedom by detaining and summoning journalists in the West Bank and banning the publication and distribution of magazines and further limits freedom of expression by detaining and summoning Palestinian citizens for peaceful participation in assemblies and disbanding assemblies by force (Independent Commission on Human Rights, 2010). This activity may include the interrogation of detainees, including the confiscation of detainees' mobile phones, as well as email and Facebook passwords. Further, the GI denies detainee requests to contact family, threatens to open "political files" on individuals or engage in beatings, and attempts to coerce detainees to inform on other citizens (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Finally, the GI denies citizens the right to obtain passports, using security concerns as a pretext, and often fails to bring detainees before judicial authorities. Though several of these activities (e.g., interrogations) are themselves authorized, the method by which the GI engages in these activities is generally called into question by human rights organizations.

The activities of the PSO and MI overlap with and impede the work of the PCP. These agencies did not originally fall under 'Judicial Police' as defined in Article 21 of the Penal Procedure Law No. 3 of 2001, though in November 2007, Abbas expanded the powers of the PSO to make arrests and run detention facilities (Sayigh, 2011). Article 7 in the Decree Law No. () of 2007 Concerning the Preventive Security states that "officers of the Preventive Security...shall have the capacity of the Judicial Police (Forces, 2008)." Additionally, Article 9 states that the PSO "shall define the established detention centres of the

Preventive Security” (Forces, 2008). These forces have engaged in arrest, interrogation, and prosecution of suspects both with and without legal basis (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007). Because the results of these activities are not generally recognized by the Palestinian Authority courts, criminals may escape punishment when information obtained is dismissed due to procedural errors or engaging in human rights abuses such as torture (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007).

In theory, articles delineating the conditions under which authorized functions and activities may be performed (e.g., for the GI) should provide the basis for circumventing human rights abuses. Article 10 stipulates the circumstances under which the functions and activities listed in Article 9 are in fact applicable (Forces, 2008). These include the following.

- An actor is communicating with foreign states to perform hostile acts against state of Palestine.
- An actor joins the service of a foreign army that is in a state of war with Palestine.
- An actor delivers or assists in the delivery of Palestinian defense secrets (military, political, economic, or social domains) to a foreign state.
- Any intentional act that may result in death, critical physical injury, or loss of freedom of:
 - Monarchs or Presidents of states, their spouses, or ascendants of descendants.
 - Heirs to the throne, deputies of the Presidents of States or Prime Ministers or ministers.
 - Persons in charge of public responsibilities or occupying public positions, in the circumstance where acts are directed toward them in their roles or capacities.
 - Ambassadors or diplomats accredited with the State of Palestine.
- The intentional sabotage or damage of public or private properties for public purposes that belong to or are subject to the authorities of a state connected with Palestine through diplomatic or otherwise friendly relations.
- The manufacture, possession, or acquisition of weapons, explosives, or other harmful materials with the intention of perpetrating any of the above acts in any state.
- Any act of violence or threat, given any motive or purpose, occurring in the implementation of an individual or collective criminal plot with the purpose of generating fear among or intimidating the population by harming them, or putting their life, freedoms, or security in danger, or by causing damage to the environment or to any facilities or public properties, or occupying or seizing control of them, or forfeiting land or subjecting a national resource to danger.

Additionally, the GI is authorized to collate information in approved jurisdictions, as well as request information from the agencies of the National Authority and others (Article 11). The Head of the GI may request from the Attorney General the “right to bring about legal decisions to prevent foreign nationals from travelling to or from Palestine” or to prevent citizens from travelling when this presents a national security threat (Article 11). The GI also has the authority of oversight and investigation, pursuant to the law (Article 11). The GI is also granted the capacity of the Judicial Police (Article 12) (see also Friedrich & Luethold, 2007) as is the PSO via Article 7 in the Decree Law No. () of 2007 Concerning the Preventive

Security. In the performance of these and other duties, the GI is to adhere to the rights and guarantees set forth in the Palestinian laws and relevant international law (Article 13).

Article 14 stipulates further that the GI shall:

- conduct preliminary investigations into incidents ascribed to detainees,
- exercise oversight,
- search, and
- investigate and inspect,

and may

- request the attachment of properties and detention of individuals,
- summon and interrogate individuals and hear their statements, and
- request data, information, and documents from any person or keep them and take actions it deem necessary, pursuant to the law.

Article 15 addresses the issue of foreign nationals. If the detainee is a foreign national, the GI must assist him or her in contacting the closest representative from the state from which s/he hails. The GI may also notify any other state of interest of relevant activities. Article 16 stipulates that the extradition of defendants must abide by relevant treaties between the National Authority and the state in question.

As previously noted, according to the law of the General Intelligence Service No. 17 (2005) and Article 9 of the General Intelligence Law No. 17 of 2005, the GI is authorized to conduct foreign intelligence gathering, conduct counter-espionage, and liaise with the intelligence agencies of other countries. Available documentation indicates that the GI does in fact engage in all of these activities, as well as internal intelligence-gathering (Friedrich & Luethold, 2007; GlobalSecurity.org, n.d.; Pan, 2005), and the prevention of domestic subversion (GlobalSecurity.org, n.d.). Additionally, from the list of activities detailed by the Independent Commission for Human Rights, it was stated or can be inferred that reported functions and activities for the GI also include the following: 1) [reported and authorized] combatting external threats, requesting detainment of individuals, summoning and interrogating individuals, information gathering; stopping locals from traveling from the country, and 2) [reported and unauthorized or abusive] entering homes without a warrant, eavesdropping on calls in the absence of permission from the judiciary, banning the publication and distribution of magazines, disbanding assemblies by force, detaining individuals for peaceful assembly or expressing opinions critical of the government or Islam, denying detainee requests to contact family, and threatening to open 'political files' on detainees, and attempting to coerce detainees to inform on others.

Acceptable Practices

Acceptable practices for all three of the PASF's intelligence services are defined as those that an intelligence agency would typically include within their span of activities. Given the unique nature of the operating environment, as well as the overall lack of information in the literature on tradecraft for intelligence agencies, no commonly accepted set of acceptable practices was found. That said, however,

there are likely clear guidelines that can be followed, including chain of command, treatment of suspects, etc., that may not be separate practices per se, but rather the manner in which these activities are performed. Therefore, this analysis focuses solely on authorized and reported activities, but the reader should keep in mind that the specific methods and tradecraft used by the GI when engaging in these activities should be considered as well, especially from a command and control and code of ethics point of view. Figure 15 below thus illustrates via a Venn diagram the relationship between functions and activities that were reported and/or authorized, as indicated above.³¹ As Figure 15 shows, nearly half of the functions and activities reported are also authorized.




Figure 15: Venn Diagram of GI Functions/Activities as Authorized, Reported, and/or Acceptable Practices

Among the functions and activities that are reported, some are specifically not authorized or represent abuses of human rights. These are noted in red (items o-v), and include entering homes without a warrant, monitoring calls without judicial permission, banning publication and distribution of some magazines, disbanding assemblies by force, detaining individuals for peaceful assembly or criticizing the government, denying detainees outside contact, creating “political files” on detainees, and coercing informants. In addition, two additional activities are not authorized, despite being reported; these include domestic intelligence gathering (GI’s primary mission is external intelligence) and preventing domestic subversion. Remaining items were covered earlier. There are likely additional acceptable practices from which the GI would benefit. However, determining those would require research among GI personnel, Israeli intelligence personnel, and other individuals who have deeper knowledge of how intelligence is gathered and analyzed in the West Bank and across governing entities. This was outside of the scope of this effort, but is a critical step in successful security sector reform.

³¹ Text in red font indicates items that are specifically *not* authorized and/or represent potential or actual human rights abuses.

Appendix D: Venn Diagrams & Sources

As described in Chapter Two, the NSI team utilized Venn diagrams to illustrate identified functions and activities of the PASF, along with acceptable practices in the provision of security by modern security forces. In this appendix, we provide the list of sources that were used for placing the functions and activities within the Venn diagrams for PCP, NSF, and GI that were shown in Appendices A-C earlier. These, in addition to the Venn diagrams, are intended to be living illustrations, updated as new information becomes available. Although we initially set out to capture where each function was authorized, it quickly became apparent that we were unable to remotely obtain this information with an acceptable level of confidence. Thus, while this column of information is incomplete this is a critical piece of information that should be included in future examinations of the PASF.

Palestinian Civil Police (PCP)

As of November 2014

Functions/Activities	Area	Code	Sources for Authorized (Legal) Functions/Activities	Sources for Reported Functions/Activities
Traffic Control	A	a		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. International Crisis Group. (2010). <i>Squaring the circle: Palestinian security reform under occupation</i> (No. 98). Ramallah, Palestine: International Crisis Group. 2. USSC 103 PASF-LNO Overview 11 August 14
Crowd Control/ Public Order	A	b		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. International Crisis Group. (2010). <i>Tipping point? Palestinians and the search for a new strategy</i> (No. 95). Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group. 2. Amnesty International. (2013). <i>Palestinian Authority: "Shut up we are the police": Use of excessive force by Palestinian Authority in the Occupied West Bank</i>.
Protecting Public Installations and Places of Importance	A	c	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Oslo Declaration of Principles in 1993, in which Article VIII envisages a "strong police force" for the Palestinians 	
Surveillance	A	d		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Bailey, S. (2013). <i>A review of Palestinian justice and security sector data</i>. Brussels, Belgium: United Nations Development Programme.
Investigations	A	e		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Bailey, S. (2013). <i>A review of Palestinian justice and security sector data</i>. Brussels, Belgium: United Nations Development Programme. 2. International Crisis Group. (2010). <i>Tipping point? Palestinians and the search for a new strategy</i> (No. 95). Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group.

As of November 2014

Functions/ Activities	Area	Code	Sources for Authorized (Legal) Functions/ Activities	Sources for Reported Functions/Activities
Searches and Seizures	A	f	1. Penal Procedure Law No3 (2001)	1. Bailey, S. (2013). <i>A review of Palestinian justice and security sector data</i> . Brussels, Belgium: United Nations Development Programme. 2. Friedrich, R., & Luethold, A. (Eds.). (2007). <i>Entry-points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform</i> . Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
Arrests	A	g	1. Penal Procedure Law No3 (2001)	1. Bailey, S. (2013). <i>A review of Palestinian justice and security sector data</i> . Brussels, Belgium: United Nations Development Programme. 2. Friedrich, R., & Luethold, A. (Eds.). (2007). <i>Entry-points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform</i> . Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
Interrogations	A	h		1. Bailey, S. (2013). <i>A review of Palestinian justice and security sector data</i> . Brussels, Belgium: United Nations Development Programme.
Managing detention and prison facilities	A	i		1. Bailey, S. (2013). <i>A review of Palestinian justice and security sector data</i> . Brussels, Belgium: United Nations Development Programme.

As of November 2014

Functions/ Activities	Area	Code	Sources for Authorized (Legal) Functions/ Activities	Sources for Reported Functions/Activities
Enforcing court judgments		j		1. Bailey, S. (2013). <i>A review of Palestinian justice and security sector data</i> . Brussels, Belgium: United Nations Development Programme.
Responding to requests for help		K	1. Oslo Declaration of Principles in 1993, in which Article VIII envisages a "strong police force" for the Palestinians	1. Bailey, S. (2013). <i>A review of Palestinian justice and security sector data</i> . Brussels, Belgium: United Nations Development Programme.
Witness protection		l		
VIP security	A	m		1. Police Programme Training notes 6 June (inferred through training)
Forensics and document security	A	n		1. Police Programme Training notes 6 June (inferred through training)
Protecting property		o		1. USSC 103 PASF-LNO Overview 11 August 14
Routine (preventative) patrols		p		1. Personal communication, D. Cooke, October 29, 2014 (inferred through training)
Community policing		q		1. Personal communication, D. Cooke, October 29, 2014 (inferred through training)

National Security Forces (NSF)

As of October 2014

Functions	Area	Code	Authorized (Legal)	Inferred
Strategic back-up for other forces (in time of crisis)		A		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. International Crisis Group. (2010). <i>Squaring the Circle...</i> 2. Performance Evaluation United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General. (2011). <i>Performance Evaluation of Palestinian Authority Security Forces Infrastructure Construction Projects in the West Bank</i> (No. MERO-I-11-03). United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General. 3. Zanotti, 2014. U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians (footnote)
Crowd control		B		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. International Crisis Group. (2010). <i>Squaring the Circle...</i> 2. Palestinian Authority: Thugs, Police Abuse Peaceful Protesters. (2011, February 16). <i>Human Rights Watch</i>. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/16/palestinian-authority-thugs-police-abuse-peaceful-protesters
Civil disorder management 2/6/15 20:05		C		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. International Crisis Group. (2010). <i>Squaring the Circle...</i> 2. Amnesty International. (2013). <i>Palestinian Authority: "Shut up we are the police": Use of excessive force by Palestinian Authority in the Occupied West Bank</i>. Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE21/006/2013/en/3502962f-76b0-45a8-adba-5cc7c4c5fa16/mde210062013en.html

As of October 2014

Functions	Area	Code	Authorized (Legal)	Inferred
Arrests – with limitations		D		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. International Crisis Group. (2010). <i>Tipping point? Palestinians and the search for a new strategy</i> (No. 95). Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group. 2. Palestinian Authority: Thugs, Police Abuse Peaceful Protesters. (2011, February 16). <i>Human Rights Watch</i>. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/16/palestinian-authority-thugs-police-abuse-peaceful-protesters
Protect borders		G		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pan, E. (2005). Middle East: Reorganizing the Palestinian Security Forces. <i>Council on Foreign Relations</i>. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/palestine/middle-east-reorganizing-palestinian-security-forces/p8081 2. Luft, G. (1999, June 14). The Palestinian Security Services - Between Police and Army. Retrieved September 25, 2014, from http://www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=767
(Joint) patrols (with other Israel)		I	GAZA-JERICO AGREEMENT ANNEX I, Article II, Section 3, 1994	
(Combat) crime 2/6/15 20:05		J		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pan, E. (2005). Middle East: Reorganizing the Palestinian Security Forces. <i>Council on Foreign Relations</i>. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/palestine/middle-east-reorganizing-palestinian-security-forces/p8081

As of October 2014

Functions	Area	Code	Authorized (Legal)	Inferred
Security and security-related missions		K	GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT ANNEX I: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Article IV, 1994, Security Arrangements in the Gaza Strip Article V, 1994, Security Arrangements in the Jericho Area Article VI, 1994, Security Arrangements Concerning Planning, Building and Zoning Article VII, 1994, The Crossing Points Article VIII, 1994, Rules of Conduct in Security Matters Article IX, 1994, Arrangements for Safe Passage Between the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area Article X, 1994, Passages Article XI, 1994, Security Along the Coastline and in the Sea of Gaza Article XII, 1994, Security of the Airspace 	1. Luft, G. (1999, June 14). The Palestinian Security Services - Between Police and Army. Retrieved September 25, 2014, from http://www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=767

As of October 2014

Functions	Area	Code	Authorized (Legal)	Inferred
Participate in Joint Mobile Units, which include		L	GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT ANNEX I, Article II, Section 4, 1994	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Guard Checkpoints 		L*	GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT ANNEX I, Article II, Section 4, 1994	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Pan, E. (2005). Middle East: Reorganizing the Palestinian Security Forces. <i>Council on Foreign Relations</i>. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/palestine/middle-east-reorganizing-palestinian-security-forces/p8081 Luft, G. (1999, June 14). The Palestinian Security Services - Between Police and Army. Retrieved September 25, 2014, from http://www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=767
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Joint Patrols (on occasion overlap function above (i)) <p>2/6/15 20:05</p>		L**	GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT ANNEX I, Article II, Section 4, 1994	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Pan, E. (2005). Middle East: Reorganizing the Palestinian Security Forces. <i>Council on Foreign Relations</i>. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/palestine/middle-east-reorganizing-palestinian-security-forces/p8081 Luft, G. (1999, June 14). The Palestinian Security Services - Between Police and Army. Retrieved September 25, 2014, from http://www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=767⁸

As of October 2014

Functions	Area	Code	Authorized (Legal)	Inferred
Counter-Terrorism (Special Operations Unit 101)	A	M		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Najib, M. (2013, October 28). New Palestinian counter-terrorism unit deploys to Jenin. <i>Jane's 360</i>. Retrieved from http://www.janes.com/article/29099/new-palestinian-counter-terrorism-unit-deploys-to-jenin

Works Cited

- 1993 Oslo Accords Signing Ceremony Speeches & Declaration of Principles. (1993, September 13). Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 2003 Amended Basic Law | The Palestinian Basic Law (2003). Retrieved from <http://www.palestinianbasiclaw.org/basic-law/2003-amended-basic-law>
- Abu Tu'aimeh, N. (2008). *The Palestinian Media and Security Sector Oversight*.
- Aldar, S. (2014, January 23). Palestinian Authority: Israel's security partner - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East. Retrieved August 8, 2014, from <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulseen/originals/2014/01/palestine-israel-security-cooperation-al-qaeda-global-jihad.html>
- Algoe, S. B., & Haidt, J. (2009). Witnessing excellence in action: the "other-praising" emotions of elevation, gratitude, and admiration. *The Journal of Positive Psychology, 4*(2), 105–127. doi:10.1080/17439760802650519
- Allport, G. (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice*. Reading, MA.: Addison-Wesley.
- Amnesty International. (2013). *Palestinian Authority: "Shut up we are the police": Use of excessive force by Palestinian Authority in the Occupied West Bank*. Amnesty International. Retrieved from <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE21/006/2013/en/3502962f-76b0-45a8-adba-5cc7c4c5fa16/mde210062013en.html>
- Amrov, S., & Tartir, A. (2014a, October 8). After Gaza, What Price Palestine's Security Sector? Retrieved from <http://al-shabaka.org/node/855>
- Amrov, S., & Tartir, A. (2014b, October 8). After Gaza, What Price Palestine's Security Sector? Retrieved December 19, 2014, from <http://al-shabaka.org/node/855>
- Arab World for Research & Development. (2014, July 23). Results of a West Bank only public opinion poll, and a specialized poll for opinion leaders focusing on the current war on Gaza. Retrieved August 7, 2014, from <http://www.awrad.org/page.php?id=OjoleDqP5ja9859017A64jtk4Fhd1>
- Atallah, D. (2013, February 21). Palestinian Security Forces Struggle to Maintain Security. Retrieved September 23, 2014, from http://www.americantaskforce.org/daily_news_article/2013/02/21/palestinian_security_forces_struggle_maintain_security
- Bailey, S. (2013). *A review of Palestinian justice and security sector data*. Brussels, Belgium: United Nations Development Programme.
- Balousha, H. (2013, May 6). Report Highlights Corruption In Palestinian Institutions - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East. Retrieved January 8, 2015, from <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/report-corruption-palestine-institutions-gaza.html>
- Bastick, M., & Whitman, T. (2013). *A women's guide to security sector reform*. Washington, DC: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and The Institute for Inclusive Security.
- Batniji, R., Rabaia, Y., Nguyen-Gillham, V., Giacaman, R., Sarraj, E., Punamaki, R., ... Boyce, W. (2009). Health as human security in the occupied Palestinian territory. *Www.thelancet.com*. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(09)60110-0

- Baumeister, R., & Leary, M. (1995). The need to belong: desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. *Psychological Bulletin*, 117(3), 497–529.
- Blackwell, T. (2013, January 14). Canada training Palestinian troops as part of controversial plan to create a security force in the West Bank. Retrieved from <http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/06/02/canada-training-palestinian-troops-as-part-of-controversial-program/>
- Bob, Y. J. (2014). Palestinian forces bust terror cell looking to attack Jewish-Israelis. Retrieved October 6, 2014, from <http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Palestinian-security-forces-turn-over-terror-cell-to-Israeli-courts-351509>
- Bocco, R., De Martino, L., Friedrich, R., Al Hussein, J., & Luethold, A. (2006). *Politics, Security and the Barrier: Palestinian Public Perceptions*. Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, and the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs Centre for Analysis and Perspectives.
- Bocco, R., de Martino, L., & Luethold, A. (2005). *Palestinian public perceptions of security sector governance*. Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Graduate Institute of Development Studies.
- Bouris, D. (2012). The European Union's role in the Palestinian Territories: state-building through Security Sector Reform? *European Security*, 21(2), 257–271. doi:10.1080/09662839.2012.665804
- Braithwaite, J. (2002). *Restorative Justice & Responsive Regulation*. Oxford University Press.
- Chene, M. (2012). Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Palestine. *U4 Expert Answer*.
- Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN). (2013). *Corruption Report: Palestine 2012*. Ramallah, Palestine. Retrieved from <http://www.aman-palestine.org/data/uploads/0bfc44bb277e94d8ea2f35df757148ca.pdf>
- Cobain, I. (2009, December 17). CIA working with Palestinian security agents. Retrieved January 13, 2015, from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/17/cia-palestinian-security-agents>
- Collard, R. (2014, July 22). Despite the Attack on Gaza, West Bank Palestinian Police are Still Working with Israel. *Public Radio International*. Retrieved from <http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-07-22/despite-attack-gaza-west-bank-palestinian-police-are-still-working-israel>
- Cordesman, A. (2006). *Palestinian Forces: Palestinian Authority and Militant Forces*. Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Crouch, J. D., Meigs, M. C., & Slocombe, W. B. (2008). *Security First: US Priorities in Israeli Palestinian Peacemaking* (Strategic Report). The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
- Dana, T. (2013, April 15). Palestinian Civil Society: What Went Wrong? *al shabaka: the palestinian policy network*. Retrieved from <http://al-shabaka.org/node/597>
- Dana, T. (2014, July 2). Israeli-Palestinian security collaboration called into question [Text]. Retrieved September 23, 2014, from <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/211102-israeli-palestinian-security-collaboration-called-into>
- Darley, J., & Latane, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: diffusion of responsibility. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 8(4), 377–383.

- Davis, R. (2012). Selected International Best Practices in Police Performance Measurement. RAND Corporation. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR1153.pdf
- DCAF 2009 The Palestinian Media and Security Sector Governance.pdf. (n.d.).
- Eglash, R. (2013, August 21). Israeli, Palestinian police may form joint patrols. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israeli-palestinian-police-may-form-joint-patrols/2013/08/21/a07bb84a-0a92-11e3-89fe-abb4a5067014_story.html
- EUPOL COPPS. (2008). The European Union's police mission for the Palestinian Territories. Retrieved October 18, 2014, from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EUPOL%20COPPS%20booklet.pdf>
- EUPOL COPPS. (n.d.). Palestinian prosecutor and senior Police officer participate in study trip to Norway. Retrieved January 9, 2015, from <http://eupolcopps.eu/en/content/palestinian-prosecutor-and-senior-police-officer-participate-study-trip-norway>
- Forces, G. C. for the D. C. of A. (2008). *The Security Sector Legislation of the Palestinian National Authority*. DCAF. Retrieved from [http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=rqMDPk5yxmoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA11&dq=%22Centre+for+the+Democratic+Control+of+Armed+Forces%22+%22civil+society+programmes+and+international%22+%22Geneva+Centre+for+the+Democratic+Control+of+Armed+Forces+\(DCAF\)%22+%22%2B41+22+741+77+00%3B+Fax:+%2B41+22+741+77+05%3B+e-mail:%22+&ots=NiyKZz5VW1&sig=6SsZZq7GbK2RG3DthpWoec2oDU](http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=rqMDPk5yxmoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA11&dq=%22Centre+for+the+Democratic+Control+of+Armed+Forces%22+%22civil+society+programmes+and+international%22+%22Geneva+Centre+for+the+Democratic+Control+of+Armed+Forces+(DCAF)%22+%22%2B41+22+741+77+00%3B+Fax:+%2B41+22+741+77+05%3B+e-mail:%22+&ots=NiyKZz5VW1&sig=6SsZZq7GbK2RG3DthpWoec2oDU)
- Friedrich, R., & Luethold, A. (Eds.). (2007). *Entry-points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
- Gaza-Jericho Agreement--Annex I. (1994). Retrieved August 28, 2014, from <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/gjannex1.html>
- Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Graduate Institute of Development Studies. (2009). *Palestinian Security Sector Governance: The View of Civil Society in Jenin* (Spotlight No. 3).
- Giacaman, R., Abu-Rmeileh, N. M. E., Hussein, A., Saab, H., & Boyce, W. (2007). Humiliation: the invisible trauma of war for Palestinian youth. *Public Health*, 121(8), 563–571; discussion 572–577. doi:10.1016/j.puhe.2006.10.021
- GlobalSecurity.org. (n.d.). General Intelligence (Mukhabbarat al-Amma). Retrieved from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/palestine/gi.htm>
- Hammack, P. L. (2011). *Narrative and the politics of identity: The cultural psychology of Israeli and Palestinian youth*. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
- Human Rights Watch. (2008). *Internal fight: Palestinian abuses in Gaza and the West Bank*. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch.
- Human Rights Watch. (2011, February 16). Palestinian Authority: Thugs, Police Abuse Peaceful Protesters. *Human Rights Watch*. Retrieved from <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/16/palestinian-authority-thugs-police-abuse-peaceful-protesters>

- Human Rights Watch. (2014a). World Report 2014: Israel and Palestine. Retrieved January 9, 2015, from <http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/israel-and-palestine>
- Human Rights Watch. (2014b, January 21). Israel/Palestine: Growing Abuse in West Bank. Retrieved August 22, 2014, from <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/21/israel-palestine-growing-abuse-west-bank>
- Human Rights Watch. (2014c, May 19). Palestine: No Action in Assault by Police. Retrieved from <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/19/palestine-no-action-assault-police>
- Independent Commission on Human Rights. (2010). *The Palestinian General Intelligence Services According to the Provisions of the Law*.
- International Center for Not-for-Profit Law. (2014). *NGO Law Monitor: Palestine*. Retrieved from <http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/palestine.html>
- International Committee of the Red Cross. (2007). *Dignity Denied in the Occupied Palestinian Territories*.
- International Crisis Group. (2008). *Palestine divided* (Update Briefing No. 25). Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group.
- International Crisis Group. (2010a). *Northern Nigeria: Background to conflict* (No. 168). Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group. Retrieved from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/168%20Northern%20Nigeria%20-%20Background%20to%20Conflict.pdf>
- International Crisis Group. (2010b). *Squaring the circle: Palestinian security reform under occupation* (No. 98). Ramallah, Palestine: International Crisis Group.
- International Crisis Group. (2013). *Buying Time? Money, Guns and Politics in the West Bank*.
- IRIN News, Palestine Chronicle. (2012, July 9). Between Security Reform and Occupation in the West Bank. Retrieved from <http://www.palestinechronicle.com/between-security-reform-and-occupation-in-the-west-bank/>
- Issacharoff, A. (2010). Keith Dayton to retire after five years of rebuilding PA forces. Retrieved January 24, 2015, from <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/keith-dayton-to-retire-after-five-years-of-rebuilding-pa-forces-1.317782>
- Jacobson, N. (2009). A taxonomy of dignity: a grounded theory study. *BMC International Health and Human Rights*, 9(1), 3. doi:10.1186/1472-698X-9-3
- Jerusalem Institute of Justice. (2012). *Hidden Injustices: A Review of PA & Hamas Human Rights Violations in the West Bank and Gaza*. Jerusalem, Israel.
- Joint Programme on Strengthening Internal Police Accountability, National Anti-Corruption and Civilian Oversight (2012-2014). (2014). Code of conduct and ethics of the Palestinian Police. Ministry of Interior. Retrieved from <http://www.ps.undp.org/content/dam/papp/docs/Publications/UNDP-papp-research-PCPCodeenglish.pdf>
- Kelley, H. H., & Michela, J. L. (1980). Attribution Theory and Research. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 31(1), 457–501. doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.31.020180.002325
- Kerkkanen, A., Rantanen, H., & Sundqvist, J. (2008). *Building capacity for the Palestinian Civil Police: EUPOL COPPS and Communications Project* (No. 3). Finland: Crisis Management Centre.

- Killmister, S. (2010). Dignity: not such a useless concept. *Journal of Medical Ethics*, 36, 160–164.
- Kristoff, M. (2012). *Policing in Palestine: Analyzing the EU Police Reform Mission in the West Bank*. Centre for International Governance Innovation. Retrieved from <http://issat.seroman.nxc.com.ua/mkd/content/download/16874/198365/file/CIGI-%20SSR%20Issue%20Papers%20No.%207.pdf>
- Luft, G. (1999, June 14). The Palestinian Security Services - Between Police and Army. Retrieved September 25, 2014, from <http://www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=767>
- Ma'an News Agency. (2009, September 17). Abbas appoints Majid Faraj head of Palestinian general intelligence. Retrieved January 12, 2015, from <http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=226151>
- Madhoun, H. (2006, May 30). The Palestinian Security Services: Past and Present. Retrieved January 18, 2015, from <http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=10400&CategoryId=21>
- Marten, K. (2013, June 26). The Bane of Palestinian Infighting. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/opinion/global/the-bane-of-palestinian-infighting.html>
- Middle East Monitor. (2014, June 24). Palestinians protest against PA-Israeli "Security Coordination." Retrieved December 9, 2014, from <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/12324-palestinians-protest-against-pa-israeli-security-coordination>
- Mikula, G., Scherer, K. R., & Athenstaedt, U. (1998). The Role of Injustice in the Elicitation of Differential Emotional Reactions. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 24(7), 769–783. doi:10.1177/0146167298247009
- Miller, A. B., & Keys, C. B. (2001). Understanding Dignity in the Lives of Homeless Persons. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, 29(2), 331–354. doi:10.1023/A:1010399218126
- Ministry of Interior. (2014, April 28). Palestinian Security Sector Strategic Plan 2014-2016. Retrieved from http://www.lacs.ps/documentsShow.aspx?ATT_ID=13298
- Ministry of Interior (MOI). (2013). *Security Sector Strategy "Summary" 2011-2013*. Palestine.
- Munayyer, Y. (2012). Palestinian Civil Society: Limits and potential in various context. Presented at the International Conference on Jerusalem, Doha, Qatar. Retrieved from <http://www.qatarconferences.org/jerusalem/doc1/doc40.pdf>
- Najib, M. (2013, October 28). New Palestinian counter-terrorism unit deploys to Jenin. *Jane's 360*. Retrieved from <http://www.janes.com/article/29099/new-palestinian-counter-terrorism-unit-deploys-to-jenin>
- netvision.net.il, imra at. (2014, January 8). Israel rejects request for PA body armor, night-vision goggles and electronic communication systems. Retrieved from <https://lists.capalon.com/pipermail/imra/2014-January/034408.html>
- Pagano, S. J., & Huo, Y. J. (2007). The role of moral emotions in predicting support for political actions in post-war Iraq. *Political Psychology*, 28(2), 227–255.
- Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). (2012). *Security Sector and Justice System Index*. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR). Retrieved from <http://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/presentation.pdf>

- Palestinian Civil Police Strategic Framework. (n.d.). Local Aid Coordination Secretariat (LACS). Retrieved from http://www.lacs.ps/documentsShow.aspx?ATT_ID=611
- Palestinian National Authority, & Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development. (2009). *Guidance on Developing Sector Strategies 2011-2013*. Palestinian National Authority, Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development.
- Palm, M. (2010). Accountability and Effectiveness of CSDP Missions: The Role of Civil Society. *Brüssel: European Peacebuilding Liaison Office*. Retrieved from http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/Working%20Groups/CSDP/EPLO_CSDP_WG_Study_Accountability_and_Effectiveness_of_CSDP_Missions.pdf
- Pan, E. (2005). Middle East: Reorganizing the Palestinian Security Forces. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/palestine/middle-east-reorganizing-palestinian-security-forces/p8081>
- PA Report of Security Sector Review 2011-2013. (n.d.).
- PASSIA / DCAF. (2006). Palestinian Security Sector Governance: Challenges and Prospects. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA).
- Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup Contact Theory. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 49(1), 65–85. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.65
- Police Training Programme notes 6 June. (2014). United States Security Coordinator.
- Rieger, T. (2011). *Breaking the fear barrier*. Gallup Press.
- Rosen, A. (2014, June 20). The New Palestinian Government Might Not Survive The West Bank Kidnapping Crisis. Retrieved August 7, 2014, from <http://www.businessinsider.com/palestines-government-might-not-survive-the-west-bank-kidnapping-2014-6>
- Sanders, E. (2010, March 26). Palestinian security forces walk a careful line. *Los Angeles Times*. Retrieved from <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/26/world/la-fg-palestinian-forces26-2010mar26>
- Sayigh, Y. (2011). *Policing the People, Building the State: Authoritarian Transformation in the West Bank and Gaza*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Sayigh, Y., & Shiqaqi, K. (1999). *Strengthening Palestinian public institutions*. Council on Foreign Relations, Press. Retrieved from <http://mefacts.org/cache/pdf/democracy/11702.pdf>
- Security Sector Reform Best Practices and Lessons Learned: Pragmatic Steps for Global Security*. (2009). The Stimson Center. Retrieved from <http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/security-sector-reform-best-practices-and-lessons-learned-repository/>
- Snyder, C. R. (Richard), Lopez, S. J., & Pedrotti, J. T. (2010). *Positive Psychology: The Scientific and Practical Explorations of Human Strengths* (Second Edition edition). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc.
- State of Palestine. (2014). National Development Plan: 2014-2016. Retrieved from http://www.mopad.pna.ps/en/images/PDFs/Palestine%20State_final.pdf
- Sullivan, D. J. (1996). NGOs in Palestine: Agents of development and foundation of civil society. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 25(3), 93–100.

- Tartir, A. (2014, July 5). Intra-Palestinian reconciliation: time for accountability. Retrieved January 8, 2015, from <http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=692862>
- The Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR). (2013). *The status of human rights in Palestine* (Annual Report No. 19).
- Tyler, T. R. (2006). Restorative justice and procedural justice: dealing with rule breaking. *Journal of Social Issues*, 62(2), 307–326.
- United National General Assembly: Report of the Secretary General. (2013). *Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem*. Retrieved from http://www.badil.org/phocadownload/International_and_Regional_Instruments/UNGA_Resolutions/A-68-502%20SG%20report%20on%20Israeli%20practices%20-%20English.pdf
- United Nations Development Program. (2012). *Public Perceptions of Palestinian Justice and Security Institutions*.
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2006). *Criminal justice assessment toolkit*. New York: United Nations.
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011, December 11). Improving forensic services in the occupied Palestinian territories. Retrieved from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/December/improving-forensic-services-in-the-palestinian-territories.html>
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2015). Forensic Service Assistance Programme for the Palestinian Authority.
- United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General. (2011). *Performance Evaluation of Palestinian Authority Security Forces Infrastructure Construction Projects in the West Bank* (No. MERO-I-11-03). United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General.
- U.S. Security Coordinator. (2012). *USSC Campaign Plan, 2012-01*.
- U.S. Security Coordinator. (2014a, July 2). *140702 USSC Master Brief (for CMR)*.
- U.S. Security Coordinator. (2014b, August 11). *USSC 103 PASF-LNO Overview 11 August 14*.
- Waldman, A. (2014, June 12). The Shame of Shuhada Street. Retrieved November 14, 2014, from <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/the-shame-of-shuhada-street-hebron/372639/>
- Wulf, H. (2004). Security sector reform in developing and transitional countries. *Security Sector Reform. Potential and Challenges for Conflict Transformation, Berlin*, 9–27.
- Zanotti, J. (2010). *U.S. security assistance to the Palestinian Authority*. Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service.
- Zanotti, J. (2014). *U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians* (p. 32). Congressional Research Service (CRS). Retrieved from <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22967.pdf>