



## SMA Reach-back

**Question (QL1):** *What are the factors that could potentially cause behavior changes in Pakistan and how can the US and coalition countries influence those factors?*

### Executive Summary

Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI

The experts who contributed to this Quick Look agree on an essential point: Pakistan's beliefs regarding the threat posed by India are so well-entrenched that they not only serve as the foundation for Pakistan's foreign policy and security behavior, but represent a substantial barrier to changing it behavior. Christine Fair a Pakistan scholar from Georgetown University is specific as to the target of any influence efforts – difficult as they may be: “the object of influence is not “Pakistan;” rather the Pakistan army” and so security behavior change if possible requires change in the Army's cost-benefit calculus.

The essential components of Pakistan's security beliefs are first that India is an existential threat to the state; and second that Pakistan is at a tremendous military and economic disadvantage to its stronger neighbor. Tom Lynch of the National Defense University adds a third: Pakistan's national self-identity as an “oppositional state, created to counter India.”<sup>1</sup> The nature of behavior change is relative and can occur in (at least) two directions: one aligning with the observer's interests (for the sake of brevity referred to here as “positive change”), and one in conflict with those interests (“negative change”). Encouraging positive change in Pakistani security behavior was seen by each of the experts as an extremely difficult challenge, and one that would likely require dramatic change in Pakistan's current internal and external security conditions. The experts also generally agreed that negative change in Pakistani behavior is easily generated with no need for dramatic changes in circumstance.

### Negative Change: Easy to Do

According to long-time Pakistan scholar and Atlantic Council Distinguished Fellow Shuja Nawaz, Pakistan's current state is to “to view its regional interests and strategies at a variance from the views of the US and its coalition partners.” Moreover, Pakistan's willingness to cooperate with US/Western regional objectives can deteriorate rapidly if the Pakistani security establishment believes those states have dismissed as invalid, or take actions that exacerbate their concerns. Specifically, actions that reinforce the perceived threat from India (e.g., Indian military build-up, interest in Afghanistan) or Pakistan's inferior position relative to India (e.g., US strengthening military and economic ties with India; Indian economic growth) stimulate negative change. Importantly, because the starting point is already “negative” relative to US interests, these changes can take the form

---

<sup>1</sup>These generate what Christine Fair (Georgetown) sees as three enduring security goals: resisting Indian regional hegemony, developing “strategic depth” sufficient to deny India another base from which to threaten Pakistan; and gaining Indian-administered Kashmir.

of incremental deterioration in relations, rather than obvious and dramatic shifts in behavior. Examples may include increased emphasis on components of Pakistan's existing nuclear weapons program, amplified use of proxy forces already in Afghanistan, or improved economic relations with Russia.

### **Levers Encouraging Positive Change: A difficult Challenge**

While the experts agreed that Pakistan's deep-rooted, security-related anxieties inhibit changes in behavior toward greater alignment with coalition objectives; they clearly diverge on what, if anything might be done to encourage positive change. Two schools of thought emerged: what we might (cheekily) refer to as a "*been there*" perspective; and a longer-term, *cumulative influence* view.

#### **"Been there" School of Thought**

Tom Lynch (NDU) argues that the security perceptions of Pakistan's critical military-intelligence leaders have been robustly resistant to both pol-mil and economic incentives for change<sup>2</sup> as well as to more punitive measures (e.g., sanctions, embargos, international isolation) taken to influence Pakistan's security choices over the course of six decades. Neither approach fundamentally altered security perceptions. Worse yet, punitive efforts not only failed to elicit positive change in Pakistan's security framework but ended up reducing US influence by motivating Pakistan to strengthen relations with China, North Korea and Iran. As a consequence of past failure of both carrot and stick approaches, both Lynch and Christine Fair (Georgetown) argue that motivating change in Pakistani security behavior requires "a coercive campaign" to up the costs to Pakistan of its proxy militant strategy (e.g., in Afghanistan by striking proxy group leaders; targeted cross-border operations)<sup>3</sup>. Moreover, Lynch feels that positive behavior change ultimately requires a new leadership. Raising the costs would set "the conditions for the rise of a fundamentally new national leadership in Pakistan" and be the first step in inducing positive behavior change. Lynch believes these costs can be raised while at the same time US engagement continues with Pakistan – in a transactional way with Pakistan's military-intelligence leadership and in a more open way through civilian engagement and connective projects with the people of Pakistan. However, Christine Fair points to US domestic challenges that mitigate against the success of even these efforts given what she argues is a lack of political will "in key parts of the US government which continue to nurse the fantasy that Pakistan may be more cooperative with the right mix of allurements."

#### **Cumulative Influence School of Thought**

Other contributors however believe are not ready to abandon the possibility of incentivizing positive change in Pakistan's foreign policy and security behavior. They argue that there are still actions that the US and coalition countries could take to reduce Pakistani security concerns and encourage positive change. Admittedly, the suggested measures are not as direct as those suggested by *abeen there, done that* approach and assume a significantly broader time horizon:

- **Do not by-pass civilian authority.** Equalize the balance of US exchanges with Pakistani military and civilian leaders rather than depending largely on military-to-military contact. Governing authority and legitimacy remain divided in Pakistan, and while

---

<sup>2</sup> Lynch cites the promoting Pakistan as an ally in the War on Terror, delivery of preferential military equipment and operational arrangements, and global debt relief among other efforts.

<sup>3</sup> See additional options as outlined in the material submitted by Dr.'s Fair and Lynch below.

dealing directly with the military may be expedient, analysis shows that by-passing civilian leadership and continuing to treat the military as a political actor inhibits development of civilian governing legitimacy, strengthens the relative political weight of the military, and will in the longer term foster internal instability in Pakistan and stymie development of the civil security, political and economic institutions necessary for building a stronger, less threatened state.<sup>4</sup> In this case the short-term quiet that the military can enforce, is off-set by increased instability down the road.

- **Reduce the threat.** A direct means of reducing the threat perceptions that drive Pakistani actions unfavorable to coalition interests is to actually alter the threat environment. One option suggested for doing this is to use US and ally influence in India to encourage that country to redirect some of the forces aimed at Pakistan. A second option is to develop a long-term Pakistan strategy (“not see it as a spin-off or subset of our Afghanistan or India strategies”) was seen as a way to signal the importance to the US of an enduring the US-Pakistan relationship.
- **Remember that allies got game.** Invite allies to use their own influence in Pakistan rather than taking the lead on pushing for change in Pakistan’s behavior. According to Shuja Nawaz, “...the Pakistanis listen on some issues more to the British and the Germans and Turks. The NATO office in Islamabad populated by the Turks has been one of the best-kept secrets in Pakistan!”

**Enlist Pakistan’s diplomatic assistance.** Finally, Raffaello Pantucci of the Royal United Services Institute (UK) suggests enlisting Pakistan to serve as an important conduit in the dispute that could most rapidly ignite region-wide warfare: that between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Pakistan has sectarian-based ties with Saudi Arabia as well as significant commercial ties with Iran. Although as MAJ Shane Aguero points out increased Saudi-Iranian hostilities could put Pakistan in an awkward position, Pantucci believes that the US and allies could leverage these relations to open an additional line of communications between the rivals. Importantly, doing so would also important signal US recognition of Pakistan’s critical role in the region, which would enhance “Pakistani sense of prestige which may in turn produce benefits on broader US and allied concerns in the country.”

**Contributors:** Shuja Nawaz (*Atlantic Council South Asia Center*), Hassan Abbas (*National Defense University*), Thomas Lynch (*Institute of National Strategic Studies - National Defense University*), MAJ Shane Aguero (*US Army*), Shalini Venturelli (*American University*), Raffaello Pantucci (*Royal United Services Institute - UK*), Christine Fair (*Georgetown University*)

**Editor:** Allison Astorino-Courtois (*NSI*)

---

<sup>4</sup> See Astorino-Courtois, Allison, Belinda Bragg, Danette Brickman, George Popp, Alex Stephenson and Richard Williams. *PAKStAM: Drivers and Buffers of Instability in Pakistan*, Strategic Multi-Layer Analysis for USSOCENT, 2013. Full report available from Allison Astorino-Courtois at [aastorino@NSIteam.com](mailto:aastorino@NSIteam.com), or the SMA office.

## Factors that could Cause Behavior Changes in Pakistan

Shuja Nawaz

Distinguished Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council

Pakistan remains a society and polity in flux, with a dysfunctional government and sharp divisions between a weak and disorganized civilian administration and a powerful, disciplined, and well organized military, led primarily by the Pakistan army and its chief. In the short run, tensions will arise in the transition from the current army chief General Raheel Sharif to his successor, especially given reports of tensions between the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the military on the support for Jihadi groups operating against both Afghanistan and India. This uneasy relationship will likely persist into the spring and summer of 2017 once a new chief is appointed at the end of November and then takes his time to assert his position within the army in the first place and then relative to the civil administration.

“Pakistan continues to view its regional interests and strategies at a variance from the views of the United States and its coalition partners...”

In the longer run, the impending elections of 2018 will occupy the minds of the political parties, and increasing pressure from India and Afghanistan on Pakistan will continue to heighten the paranoia of the Pakistani authorities about Indian designs to isolate Pakistan and encircle it. There are also persistent fears that the United States is decidedly tilting towards India as a potential economic and military partner in the region. Recall that Pakistani historian Ayesha Jalal once used the term “Paranoidistan” to describe this country.<sup>5</sup> Both civil and military leadership circles often operate on the basis of unverified information about Indian designs and US intentions. Pakistan fears that a growing Indian economy and military presence in the region will be used to coerce a smaller Pakistan into submission. The National Intelligence Council’s 2030 Scenario pointed to an ascendant Indian economy: “India will most likely continue to consolidate its power advantage relative to Pakistan. India’s economy is already nearly eight times as large as Pakistan’s; by 2030 that ratio could easily be more than 16-to-1,” according to the NIC report.<sup>6</sup> Despite its efforts to rely on support from China, Pakistan fears a diminution of its status in the region and will continue to use proxies against neighbors in the first instance while continuing to develop short-range nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery mechanisms to stave off any military or insurgent operations against it from India or its allies.

“The United States has failed to develop a steady relationship with Pakistan despite its potential leverage of direct economic and military assistance ...”

---

<sup>5</sup> Shuja Nawaz “Feeding Pakistan’s Paranoia”, *The New York Times*, May 9, 2011  
<http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/04/12/when-pakistan-says-no-to-the-cia/feeding-pakistans-paranoia> and Ayesha Jalal “Global Profiling of Pakistan: Problems and Prospect”,  
<http://www.induspk.org/107-the-nation/231-the-nation-article-2>  
<sup>6</sup> “India to become superpower by 2030: US Intelligence”, News18.com  
<http://www.news18.com/news/india/india-to-become-economic-superpower-by-2030-us-intelligence-526055.html>

The United States has failed to develop a steady relationship with Pakistan despite its potential leverage of direct economic and military assistance, including a large quantum of training for the best and brightest military officers from Pakistan, and assistance from US-dominated International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank. Pakistan continues to view its regional interests and strategies at a variance from the views of the United States and its coalition partners, while ostensibly working with the coalition forces in return for coalition support funding (or its successor arrangement).

The critical factors that will affect Pakistan's view of India and the United States in the next few years are:

- The below par state of the economy in Pakistan. Increased pressures from the return of migrant workers from the Middle East, and demographic pressures internally, leading to a sharp increase in the youth bulge and a rapid urbanization will add to Pakistan's difficulties at achieving stability at home.
- Lack of institution building and formal decision making systems in managing the economy. For example, the government was unprepared for the roughly \$7-4 billion "savings" windfall per annum that resulted from the drop in the price of imported energy in 2015 and beyond and frittered it away on inconsequential projects and pork barrel politics. A senior minister, who is a member of the prime minister's inner circle, told me the savings had "gone down the hole."
- Both Pakistan and the United States will have to do more with less in the next decade or so.
- A persistent dynastic and corrupt political system under which the major political parties are led by autocrats or run as family businesses. Opposing them, increasingly through extra-legal and subterranean operations are a growing number of extremist militant groups that use Islam as a rallying cry against the State and neighbors, including India and Afghanistan.
- A powerful military establishment that has created and continues to foster a "culture of entitlement" for its senior ranks and actively protects its turf even against the constitutionally superior civilian government.
- The Pakistan military remains organizationally stuck in a post-World War II mind set, with bloated administrative systems, relying on outmoded budgetary and management systems. It could achieve much-needed economies in its operations autonomously and with greater oversight and inquiry from the elected representatives in parliament. There is very little active oversight and accountability of military finances and management systems by the civilian rulers of Pakistan.
- The Pakistani military, particularly the army and air force, have been transformed in recent years into a force that is focused on fighting militancy and insurgency. Younger officers routinely are sent from the military academy to the border region. They are all battle inoculated and tend to view unfavorably the corruption of their civilian masters as well as the wealth acquired by senior military officers through acquisition of real estate through the proliferation of the defence housing schemes that provide windfall profits with relatively small investments.
- The multiple ethnic and sectarian wars within Pakistan will persist for some time to come and drain the ability of the state and the military to de-militarize and de-

radicalize Pakistani society. Political parties are beholden to jihadi groups with whom they have electoral alliances. Others use militant wings of their parties to amass wealth through kidnappings, extortion, and coercion.

- Persistent suspicions, particularly in the senior leadership of the army, that the United States aims to defang Pakistan's nuclear capacity and will countenance or even support Indian moves against Pakistan as a regional surrogate for the United States in that regard.
- Lack of a center of gravity in decision making inside Pakistan, with the civil and the military more often than not at loggerheads, and the United States largely depending on its mil-to-mil contacts to affect decisions inside Pakistan.

### What can the United States do?

The United States can work on multiple fronts to build Pakistani confidence in this relationship, while shifting the onus on to the Pakistanis to craft mechanisms for implementing, benchmarking, and reviewing projects and cooperative operations in both the civil and military sectors. Creating Pakistani ownership of these operations is critical to instilling confidence and fostering trust. This approach also makes it easier for the United States to turn off the aid spigot if Pakistan fails to meet its own self-imposed targets without the US being seen as arbitrary or antagonistic.

Pakistan needs to understand and verify that the United States does not wish to take away its nuclear capabilities but wishes to help safeguard its assets. Moreover, The United States must work to help Pakistan understand that it will not assist any foreign attempt to undermine Pakistan's sovereignty and independence. Finally, the United States must make it clear that it will bolster Pakistan's defence but not support offensive capabilities.

A number of approaches could be explored by the United States:

- Use US influence directly and through the IFIs to transform Pakistan's management of the economy, especially its longer-term strategies to deal with growing demographic pressures and changing economic situations in the Middle East. A more efficient system of employing economic aid, monitoring and reviewing its use at the provincial level, and setting of attainable targets by the Pakistanis themselves would engender great confidence among donors and potential donors. This will require transforming the Economic Affairs Division into a more professional and active body inside the Government of Pakistan. Pakistan tends to over promise and under deliver on economic aid. It needs to become more realistic in its planning and the US could help it draft achievable plans and projects. The US could follow the Chinese model of insisting on a strong US presence at the federal and provincial level to monitor progress of implementation. But this needs to be done in a quieter and low-key manner so the US is not seen as hegemonic.
- Help Pakistan achieve a bigger bang for its military dollars. This could be done by providing Pakistan advice and assistance in adopting a practicable taxonomy for defence planning and management, revamping the budget system so it is driven by results rather than wish lists of the military. Helping Pakistan understand the need for longer-term defence planning and budgeting along the lines of the quadrennial

“We should eschew the short-term fix and over-reliance on the military channel to solve problems as they arise. This undermines the civilians in Pakistan.”



- review in the United States may be a start. The US could provide expertise in the theoretical construct of such reviews and budgetary mechanisms without requiring Pakistan to share details of its expenditures with the United States. Use of NATO partners, especially the British in this process would make it less US-dominated and more palatable to the Pakistani military. If we can help the Pakistan military remove the fat inside its own system, it might help them understand that our intentions are good and they can do much more with what they have rather than constantly demanding more resources from their government and the United States.
- The United States could help improve Pakistan's defences while exercising greater influence over its offensive capabilities in the neighborhood. Pakistan has a relatively immobile land army. Provision of three helicopter fleets (50 helos each) with troop-lifting capacity for the long eastern border and another fleet of 50 helos for use in monitoring the western border and attacking insurgents in the difficult terrain of the western marches would enhance Pakistan's defences. Prohibitions on the movement of the western fleet to the eastern border could be imposed if the supply of helicopters were under a lease agreement rather than outright purchase.
  - Reducing Pakistan's huge fear of India's growing military might is a more difficult task. If Indian could be persuaded to shift one of its three strike corps facing Pakistan to the Chinese border, the signaling effect on Pakistan would be enormous. So long as a third of the Indian military budget continues to be spent on troops arrayed toward Pakistan, it is hard to convince the Pakistanis that India does not wish to coerce Pakistan into submission.<sup>7</sup>
  - The White House and Department of State need to work with the Pakistani government and the US Congress with the Pakistani parliament to help make government more open, inclusive, and pluralistic in running the country. In other words, make Pakistan truly the federation that its constitution has defined. A greater review and public scrutiny by parliament of economic and military matters would assist the growing media inside Pakistan play a more useful role in informing the public about key issues and answers. Engaging with and educating civil society and media in this direction would act as a multiplier for the US efforts to assist Pakistan.
  - The United States needs to have a clearer and longer-term Pakistan Strategy and not see it as a spin-off or subset of our Afghanistan or India strategies. Once the Pakistanis understand this to be the case, they will feel more respected and comfortable in taking us at our word. While it may be tempting to follow a "feel good" policy of isolating or containing Pakistan, those approaches confuse our friends within the country and weaken their position while achieving little by way of influence in what still remains a critically important country in a tough neighborhood. History has taught us that crises will continue to erupt in the arc of instability that extends from Turkey to Indonesia. Who knows when we may need to have Pakistan on our side again?
  - We should eschew the short-term fix and over-reliance on the military channel to solve problems as they arise. This undermines the civilians in Pakistan. Bypassing the Minister of Defence and even the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for

---

<sup>7</sup> Bharat Karnad "Rethinking Indian Policies towards Pakistan" Security Wise, a blog by Bharat Karnad. May 2, 2012. <https://bharatkarnad.com/2012/05/02/rethinking-indian-policies-towards-pakistan-2/>, and Bharat Karnad "Rethinking Pakistan," *Asian Age*, March 31, 2011. <http://archive.asianage.com/columnists/rethinking-pakistan-898>.

example, in favor of the Chief of Army Staff only makes the latter stronger than his titular bosses.

- Ask the Pakistanis to help identify for us ways we can work with them to improve nuclear safety and prevention of leakage of nuclear materials and weapons into the hands of unsavory groups and work with them to further strengthen safeguards. This approach is better than offering unsolicited advice.
- Use the Chinese approach of closed-door pressure tactics rather than public harangues to convey demands for change of behavior or explanation for missed targets or broken promises. We have provided more aid without strings and more grant aid to Pakistan than China, yet the Chinese are perceived in the Pakistan government and the public as being a better friend of Pakistan than the United States. One reason is that they lower the boom quietly and privately, while we resort to public criticism that provokes perverse behavior from our counterparts inside Pakistan.
- The United States need not always be the lead agency for change in Pakistan. Use of key NATO allies, especially the British, the Germans, and the Turks could help us achieve our goals. This bank-shot approach might sometimes be preferred, since the Pakistanis listen on some issues more to the British and the Germans and Turks. The NATO office in Islamabad populated by the Turks has been one of the best-kept secrets in Pakistan! A growing number of senior military officers in today's Pakistan army have been trained in Germany and Britain. The Australians also could help Pakistan think through the institutional changes needed to assess the structure to support the work of the newly minted National Security Committee. (I provided the new National Security advisor with a journal article that listed the steps the Australians took to reframe their national assessment networks.)

Many of these ideas have been offered before in different fora, including the published works by me for the Atlantic Council over 2008-2014 and in my book *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its army, and the wars within* (Oxford 2008) that I am now updating. Some of the budgetary ideas were also shared with General James Mattis in his project on the future of CENTCOM shortly before he left his post as commander CENTCOM.

## Determinants of the Foreign Policy Behaviors of Pakistan

Thomas F. Lynch III

NDU, Institute of National Strategic Studies (INSS), Center for Strategic Research (CSR)

Pakistan's foreign policy and security behaviors are the function of three major factors. In late 2016, these factors remain firmly embedded in the narrative framework agreed to [be] safeguarded by Pakistan's security and defense leadership – principally its military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Agency, which answers to the military. Absent foundational changes in these three factors, there will be no change in Pakistani behavior. The U.S. and its Coalition partners in Afghanistan cannot directly change these factors. However, they can deny Pakistan and its proxies dominant influence in Afghanistan while at the same time reducing the risks of

“Reconsidering a Pakistani security framework firmly rooted in the need for proxy jihad would require a radical reformulation of the intellectual basis for Pakistan itself. This will require fundamentally new national leadership – leadership of a character not now present in Pakistan.”



escalating proxy war in Afghanistan between Pakistan and India.

Three major factors drive Pakistan foreign policy and security behaviors. First, Pakistan's security leadership views India as an enduring and existential threat. This belief is dogmatic, and resistant to countervailing evidence. It impels Pakistan to an anti-status quo foreign policy and a security approach that "blames India first" and seeks to agitate and provoke India into intemperate responses. Second, Pakistan security elites believe themselves to be at an enormous asymmetric military disadvantage with India, one that they must offset with a robust nuclear weapons arsenal and with use of militant proxy forces. They empower and encourage militant proxy groups imbued with the spirit of jihad, leveraging these proxy groups to keep India off balance with targeted insurgency operations in nearby locations like the disputed area of Jammu-Kashmir and the country of Afghanistan. They also inspire and resource these jihadist groups to acts of terror inside India and in locations where Indian interests appear to be advancing, especially Afghanistan. A strategy of "jihad beneath a nuclear umbrella" – or no peace, no war - allows Pakistan persistently to challenge the status quo while staying short of another dangerous, direct military clash with India. Third, Pakistan's militant strategy is necessitated by its state-building logic – which is cherished and perpetuated by Pakistan's military and intelligence elites, but shared across the civilian political spectrum. By definition, Pakistan is an oppositional state, created to counter India. As long as it remains so defined, it will cling to a proxy militant strategy in pursuit of its core national purpose.<sup>8</sup>

U.S. and other western governments have attempted a full range of policy options in failed efforts to alter Pakistan's security framework. Pakistan has been welcomed as a U.S. ally in the Global War on Terror and afforded preferential military equipment, training and operational arrangements in an effort to alter its security choices. The Pakistani framework did not change. Pakistan has been given preferential international loans, global debt relief and an enormous amount of direct economic aid, including a U.S. government \$1.5 billion per year for 5 years deal known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill in an effort to encourage a change to Pakistan's security narrative. Pakistan's framework has not changed. The U.S. and its western partners have also sanctioned, embargoed and isolated Pakistan from the international community in reaction to its covert nuclear arms programs. When sanctioned, Pakistan turned to the support and comfort of states like China, North Korea and Iran – states that do not challenge Pakistan's security framework at all. Its framework did not change; and, its leverage of jihadist proxies expanded and its nuclear weapons arsenal grew. Reconsidering a Pakistani security framework firmly rooted in the need for proxy jihad would require a radical reformulation of the intellectual basis for Pakistan itself. This will require fundamentally new national leadership – leadership of a character not now present in Pakistan.

---

<sup>8</sup> The themes in this paragraph are advanced in various forms and fashions in the following scholarly works: Thomas F. Lynch III, "War and Pakistan: Ongoing Conflict, Imminent Risks and the "One Big Thing," in Thomas Mahnkhen, ed. *Learning From History* (Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 2017- *Forthcoming*); Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army and the Wars Within* (London: Oxford University Press, 2008); Aparna Pande, *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India* (New York: Routledge, 2011); Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), Stephen P. Cohen, *Shooting for a Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2013); T.V. Paul, *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); C. Christine Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army Way of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); S. Paul Kapur, *Jihad as Grand Strategy: Islamist Militancy, National Security and the Pakistan State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017); and Stephen Tankel, *Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Tayyibah* (London: Hurst Publishers, 2011).

Given these three dominant security factors and their complex interaction, Pakistan must be expected to pursue proxy-led jihad (with the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqanis, Gulbiddin Hekmatyar's group and others) in Afghanistan against what it views to be U.S. and Coalition abetted Indian interests in there. U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan can frustrate Pakistan proxy aims to wrest control of Afghanistan from its leadership in Kabul. Our forces can continue to strike at proxy militant leadership in Afghanistan and in targeted cross-border operations. Each of these activities, over time, will raise the cost to Pakistan's proxy militant strategy in Afghanistan; and, may eventually assist in the rise of new leadership voices in Pakistan questioning the strategy's worth.

Simultaneously, U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan can work to build the stamina and resilience of Afghan national forces against proxy militant operations. It also can demonstrate that Afghan leadership will be durable and persistent without the requirement for direct Indian security assistance. This too can slowly erode the Pakistani security narrative of nefarious Indian influence in Afghanistan. Finally, the U.S. and its Coalition partners can maintain frank – and even blunt – open dialogue with Pakistan military and civilian leaders about the unfortunate and inevitably unsuccessful pursuit of its aims through a proxy war strategy in Afghanistan or across wider South Asia. Coupled with limited but important U.S. and western-states civilian engagement and connective projects with the people of Pakistan, a persistent and capable U.S. and Coalition partnership in Afghanistan can set the conditions for the rise of a fundamentally new national leadership in Pakistan. Only then can the factors that undergird Pakistan's six-decade-old proxy militant strategy be redressed.<sup>9</sup>

## Comments on Behavior Change in Pakistan

Raffaello Pantucci

Director of International Security Studies, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

It is very difficult to influence Pakistani behaviour, but considering the massive influx of Chinese investment of late and the degree to which Islamabad has expressed a view that CPEC offers all the answers to Pakistan's problems, it is clear that Chinese investment is a point of influence on the country. Were Beijing to abruptly change tack, this could change Pakistani behaviour. Having said this, it is highly unlikely that China would change position abruptly, but it is clear that Chinese influence does have leverage over Pakistan. The US and allies are already engaging with Beijing in Afghanistan (and to some degree in Pakistan), focusing these efforts to an even greater degree could start to help shift more entrenched Pakistani views (though this requires Beijing's continued support and willingness to see its problems as coincidental to US and allies ones, something that may become complicated by the broader US-China relationship). Hugging Beijing closer within this particular context may be a way longer term to influence Pakistani behaviour.

---

<sup>9</sup> These paragraph themes are developed more fully in Thomas F. Lynch III, *The 80 Percent Solution: The Strategic Defeat of bin Laden's al-Qaeda and Implications for South Asian Security*, National Security Studies Program Policy Paper, *New America Foundation*, February 2012; Thomas F. Lynch III, "After ISIS: Fully Reappraising U.S. Policy in Afghanistan," *The Washington Quarterly*, 38:2, 119-144 (July 2015); and, Thomas F. Lynch III, "South Asia and Evolving Major U.S. Security Interests," in Richard D. Hooker, Jr. ed., *Strategic Assessment 2017* (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, January 2017-Forthcoming).

Use Pakistani connections in the Middle East (on both sides of the Sunni-Shia divide) to give the country a greater sense of importance as well as provide a different conduit into difficult

“Hugging Beijing closer within this particular context may be a way longer term to influence Pakistani behaviour.”

relationships. Iran and Saudi Arabia have complicated and deep relationships with Pakistan, and maintain regular engagements. Playing up this role for Islamabad and suggesting Islamabad offers a useful conduit to better understand and engage with both sides in the Saudi-Iran clash will not only offer a new way to engage with this complicated clash (between Iran and Saudi), but also offer a way of enhancing Pakistani sense of prestige

which may in turn produce benefits on broader US and allied concerns within the country.

## Comments on Behavior Changes in Pakistan

Hassan Abbas

National Defense University

Pakistani military and intelligence staunchly believes in the conspiracy theory that the US plan to target Pakistan's nuclear arsenal at some stage. Despite strong US-Pakistan cooperation in the realm of nuclear security measures, the concern lingers on. It is less intense than before (based on my interactions with leading Pakistani military and intelligence officers). Any event/statement/action that will in any way strengthen their view will change Pakistan's behavior for the worse. Secondly, Pakistan is increasingly leaning towards China in regards to regional politics for quite a while but its power centers are more aligned with the US primarily due to the military aid component. Pakistanis love US made military hardware and they often express that Chinese equipment is no match to that of the US. Any negative slide in the US-Pakistan military to military relationship can make Pakistan more insecure. Pakistani perception about increased Indian role in Afghanistan is yet another critical issue but in that case Pakistan has played all its cards (by continuing to equip and arm Afghan Taliban/Haqqani group). The rise of Northern Alliance players in Kabul in 2002 for Pakistan was the red line and they never reviewed their Pro-Afghan Taliban stance since then.

## Potential Internal and External Factors of Pakistani Behavioral Change

MAJ Shane Aguero

US Army

shane.aguero@mail.mil

There are several factors that have the possibility of causing behavioral change within Pakistan. I have broken them down into four internal (military coup, economic collapse, new national leadership, and a massively effective terrorist attack) and four external factors (increased Saudi/Iranian hostilities, Indian aggression, Russian rapprochement and Chinese benefaction). In the short term, none of these are likely, although the probability of an external factor occurring increases over time. Several of these have limited lead time before

occurring (military coup, massively effective terrorist attack, Indian aggression), and four of them have little chance of the US navigating a path towards increased influence (massively effective terrorist attack, Indian aggression, Russian rapprochement and Chinese benefaction).

#### Internal factors

Internal factors that have the potential to cause behavior change within Pakistan include military coup, economic collapse, new national leadership, and a massively effective terrorist attack. A military coup is a low probability, high impact event due to the low threat to the military posed by PM Nawaz Sharif, and the politically low key Chief of Army Staff Raheel Sharif. If this were to occur, it would most likely be orchestrated by the ISI and have the tacit approval of COAS Sharif since he would be the one to be placed into national leadership. If this were to occur there would be little warning, and would most likely cause little long term instability in the country, since the military is still seen as being the most effective and least corrupt organization in the country. The most negative effect for the United States would be the short-term interruption of US support and aid similar due to the situation in Egypt in 2013. Due to the long term interaction of the US and Pakistani militaries, there would be little difficulty in resuming working relationships between the two countries on issues of mutual benefit.

“If PM Sharif were to be replaced by a PPP candidate, relations with the US would cool significantly, as the party has often opted to increase relations with China, Russia and Iran ... by a PTI candidate ...relations with the US would most likely become hostile ... ”

Economic collapse of Pakistan without a concomitant regional disaster, military conflict with India or China (regarding the Gilgit-Baltistan, Jammu and Kashmir) or a widespread economic downturn is highly unlikely, and the economic devastation would be foreseen well ahead of time by regional economic actors. If this were to occur, the US is well positioned to assist in providing humanitarian and economic relief on a large scale. Depending on the length of time aid is required, and how such aid is delivered (preferably through the Pakistani military with acknowledged US involvement, but minimal US visibility) an event such as this with a large US relief package could assist in strengthening relations with both the government and the populace over the long term.

A political regime change (as opposed to a military coup) is a moderate probability, especially with the renewed allegations of corruption brought on by the release of the Panama Papers. Although there is a call for PM Sharif to resign by his opponents, there is little support for this in the populace since the other two political parties are also widely seen as being corrupt. If PM Sharif were to leave office, but replaced by someone in his party (PML-N), there would be little change with regard to the US relations with Pakistan.

If PM Sharif were to be replaced by a PPP candidate, relations with the US would cool significantly, as the party has often opted to increase relations with China, Russia and Iran instead of the West. This would be difficult to counteract post-election unless the US made a concerted effort to support the PPP aligned PM whenever appropriate, although due to many of the policies the PPP supports, this would be difficult. Economic assistance would be the only easily accepted tool, and that would be only grudgingly accepted and fail to provide long term influence.

If PM Sharif were to be replaced by a PTI candidate, most likely Imran Khan, relations with the US would most likely become hostile as many of the PTI policies would bring it in conflict with US policies. If that occurs, the US would be best served by approaching the new PM as a blank slate as they have no national leadership experience. By placing all aspects of US-Pakistan relations on the table, it would allow the US to build a new relationship with Pakistan minus many of the previous missteps and some of the mistrust. The most effective influence the US could achieve with a blank state approach to a PTI PM would be continued relations with the Pakistani military, increased economic trade and a willing partner in the CT fight throughout Central Asia. The US should be wary of PTI aggression over Kashmir and/or a military coup in the event of a PTI victory.

A massively effective terrorist attack has a distinct possibility of causing a behavior change within Pakistan. This terrorist attack would not be effective due to the number of casualties, but rather the target of the attack. If Pakistani terrorists were able to cause a significant number of foreign casualties similar to the Islamabad Marriott Hotel bombing in 2008, it would cause a significant domestic uproar as more foreign investments leave and tourism declines even further, weakening the economy. Alternately, an effective terrorist attack against a foreign target may possibly goad the victimized state to attempt a retributive military action, in an attack similar to the 2008 Mumbai attacks. However, another distinct possibility is that an effective terrorist attack occurs against a nuclear facility, which would cause the country to go into immediate lockdown and possibly cause India or other concerned states to attempt intervention. This response would lead to armed conflict between Pakistan, the terrorist groups and the foreign intervention forces. The long term US response to an incident such as this could be to push for nuclear disarmament, increased global CT efforts, and increased regional cooperation, all of which are unlikely.

#### **External factors**

The external factors that have the potential to cause behavior change within Pakistan are an increase in Saudi/Iranian hostilities, Indian aggression, Russian rapprochement and Chinese benefaction. An increase in Saudi/Iranian hostilities would place Pakistan in a difficult position, as Pakistan is a very close ally with Saudi Arabia, and a very close economic partner with Iran and is seen in positive light by a majority of Pakistanis. If the Saudi/Iranian hostilities were to increase to the point where Pakistan was forced to choose between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it would most likely choose Saudi Arabia, although the level of that support would be highly variable and be weighed against the long term issue of being sandwiched between a hostile Iran, the existential threat of India, an unstable Afghanistan, a vast "occupied area" in Jammu, Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, and a relatively unfriendly China beyond that. In the case where Pakistan must become a belligerent in the Saudi/Iranian conflict, the US should expect Pakistani support for Saudi Arabia. Pakistan would be far more willing to support Saudi Arabia as part of a broad international effort as opposed to working bi-laterally against Iranian interests.

Indian aggression against Pakistan, either as a response, or as pre-emptive Cold Start offensive, would be devastating for Pakistan. The Pakistani response would most likely include massive terrorist actions across India, nuclear weapons and a very long low level insurgent conflict regardless of the military outcome. The US can best use its' influence to prevent this conflict from occurring, but if that fails, the potential for interminable conflict throughout the region leaves no positive options for US policy other than diplomatic channels and humanitarian assistance during the conflict and economic aid post-conflict.

Russian rapprochement with Pakistan is a new phenomenon due to the relatively close ties of Pakistan with the West and the support of the anti-Russian mujahedeen in the 1980's. The freedom that having positive relations with Russia provides Pakistan cannot be overstated, however. Having Russia as a patron to counteract India, China and the US allows Pakistan to more fully engage in regional issues from an independent position as opposed to having to follow a more stringent foreign policy dictated by having only one patron. The convergence of Pakistan and Russia on issues closely parallels that of Pakistan and China, although without the territorial issues that China and Pakistan have. This has led to an increase in military equipment purchases from Russia and joint exercises, increasing Pakistani military capability further. This is seen as a direct counter to increased India-US ties and warmer India-China relations. The US influence in the Pakistani military will wane over the long term if this trend continues.

Chinese benefaction would cause a significant Pakistani behavior change as China is already Pakistan's leading trading partner. If China determined that it was in China's best interest to support Pakistan's territorial claims, the regional stability would shift overnight as Pakistan would have finally achieved a lasting victory over India, which could embolden Pakistan or goad India into overt military action. China is careful to maintain the balance of power in Central Asia, but if China (and Russia) decide to punish India for their closer ties to the West, Pakistan would be a very valuable ally or cat's paw.

The US would be hard pressed to respond in an effective manner to a Chinese benefaction and/or Russian rapprochement in a timely manner, although there would be sufficient lead time before any significant actions were able to be made. The most effective US strategy would be to attempt to limit Russian and Chinese influence in Pakistan on issues the US requires Pakistani support for, such as nuclear security, CT and CN. The good news is that these are issues where the US finds itself in agreement with all the concerned parties including China, Russia and Iran.

In conclusion, behavior changes in Pakistan could either be internal (military coup, economic collapse, new national leadership, and a massively effective terrorist attack) or external (increase in Saudi/Iranian hostilities, Indian aggression, Russian rapprochement and Chinese benefaction), and with limited US capacity to influence prior to the event. Of these four (military coup, economic collapse, new national leadership, increase in Saudi/Iranian hostilities) offer the US the opportunity for increased influence in Pakistan, and the other four (massively effective terrorist attack, Indian aggression, Russian rapprochement and Chinese benefaction) have a generally negative effect on US influence.

## **Pakistan's Asymmetric Advantage in Strategic Information & Influence Control is Progressing to New Thresholds**

Dr. Shalini Venturelli  
American University

In parallel investigations I am currently conducting on four conflict and instability zones covering the regions of MENA, South & Southwest Asia, Russia-Eastern Europe and the China-East Asia, I identified a set of underlying patterns in key drivers of low-to-high intensity conflict inflation that involve differential capability of strategic actors to potentiate



multiple signaling pathways in order to modify, influence and control the perceptions and behaviors of adversaries, media organizations and population groups. The research demonstrates that the Pakistani state is a far more capable strategic actor in critical areas of asymmetric information warfare and in disinformation and influence control than is its much larger regional adversary, India. The Pakistan military is the epicenter of this capability which, directly and through its client networks of jihadi militias, civilian sanctuaries and indigenous media channels continues to excel in shaping the domestic perception environment within the country. Crucially, however PAKMIL is increasingly proficient in projecting asymmetric control of the perceptual and behavioral response environment across the border in India, including among India's diverse population groups and Indian civilian and military decision-makers. The mere threat of escalation by PAKMIL and its client networks has thus far restrained Indian decision-makers fearful of Indian public opinion opposed to their military's involvement in spiraling and costly wars. Indian Decision-makers are also anxious to avoid provoking too far an adversary they believe to be manipulated by a powerful but irrational circle of military and ideological leaders who seem eager to obtain a disproportionate reaction from the Indian military. Among top ranks in the Indian Army and Ministry of Defence, a deep belief in the willingness of their PAKMIL counterparts to take hostilities to the nuclear brink is widely and deeply held. Moreover, scant media and public support in India for pushing Pakistan's military leaders beyond current levels of low-intensity border skirmishes, continues to rein-in the scope of tactical and strategic options available to the Indian military. In contrast, the Pakistani public perception—other than among a professional minority—is daily controlled and channeled by the military's direct and indirect, multi-tiered information campaigns to keep India at a strategic information disadvantage in vulnerable territories like Kashmir with majority Muslim composition, and among unstable Muslim-Hindu population groups in urban zones prone to sectarian unrest. The net result is that strategic information signaling by PAKMIL and its clients effectively shapes and dominates the perceptions of leaders, population groups, and media channels across both sides of the border. Despite possessing a far larger sector of media and military power, India's civilian-military organizations and leaders are unable to compete with their rival's capability in the influence domain.

- Even as India's military forces conduct operations in response to cross-border Jihadist network infiltration in Kashmir, intervene in that Himalayan state for security and population control, and plan and conduct strikes against terrorist camps in Pakistan-held territory, they are obliged to plead public support through painstaking discourses of rationalization and lengthy explanation. Although venturing into new practices of open public announcements of operations, India's defense organizations are doing so without any assurances of the kind of enduring and stable support from their own media or populations comparable to that enjoyed by their rival military organizations within Pakistan.
- Nor do Indian defense forces have any experience, capability or even intention to influence Pakistan's domestic opinion environment. They have in essence ceded the region's strategic and asymmetric information domain to PAKMIL.
- Thus while the Indian armed forces are in process of shifting to a new military doctrine with new sets of assumptions regarding the use of pre-emptive operations to prevent and deter terrorist attacks launched from Pakistani territory, nevertheless the influential narrative on the latest outbreak of hostilities over Kashmir will be crafted for the entire region of actors by PAKMIL's information operations. This includes narratives of absolutist threats to 'destroy' India which is vital to securing public legitimacy, unity and cohesion for PAKMIL from across

multiple indigenous sectors, as well as signaling the US and regional neighbors of its determination to escalate if India does not back down and continue to grant implicit freedom of maneuver to PAKMIL's proxy jihadist militias.

- Most singular of all capabilities in the information domain, is PAKMIL's current success in narrating border violations and hostilities by its historical enemy India suggesting the imperative of a greater war. These are powerful narratives intended to influence perceptions of reality in the Indian media and general public and thus serve as an effective deterrent and limitation on India's armed forces.
- Indian leaders and security organizations have not yet learned the art and science of asymmetric information warfare, and Pakistan's dominance of this critical capability will continue to shape the evolution of the region's security and (in)stability.

#### **How can US influence these factors?**

The US currently is unable to match the asymmetric strategic information capabilities demonstrated by a number of strategic actors ranging from terror networks to peer competitor states such as Russia, Iran and China. This does not mean, however, that it does not have a role to play in helping to stabilize an increasingly volatile information and perceptual environment of conflict in South Asia. So long as PAKMIL control this space of operations, conditions will continue to escalate. The US can use its experience of information and influence operations over the past decade fighting the Taliban and stabilizing Afghanistan to support the Indian military's development of capabilities for stabilizing this domain. Without this capability, the spiral of escalating tension and graduated hostility will generate an autonomous dynamic past the indeterminate tipping point from which neither side can voluntarily withdraw.

- Our extensive research in the field in the region shows how the complex signaling system of asymmetric information dominance works, its control mechanisms, and vulnerabilities. This knowledge should be applied to rapidly advance US capabilities, to deploy them for upgrading the information capabilities of our partners in India, leading to stabilization of the cross-border information environment in both countries
- Investing in this strategy will pay multiple order dividends in the long run, not only in South Asia and MENA but also in other regions subjected to instability by continuing asymmetric information domination by peer competitors such as Russia.

## **Comments on Behavior Changes in Pakistan**

Dr. C. Christine Fair  
Georgetown University

In this memo, I first address the policy problem confronting the United States and its partners. Second, I identify the Pakistan army as the center of gravity. Third, I address specific actions the United States and its partners can undertake to influence the army's cost-benefit calculus of its preferred courses of action.

## The Problem

I argue here and elsewhere that the object of influence is not “Pakistan;” rather the Pakistan army.<sup>10</sup> The Pakistan army controls all levers of power that influence Pakistan’s foreign and security policies as well as key domestic policies that inform the same. The civilians have very little role in setting these policies.

The Pakistan Army has several enduring strategic goals:

1. Resist Indian hegemony in South Asia and beyond
2. Cultivate “strategic depth” in Afghanistan both to vitiate any Afghan ill-will towards Pakistan and to deny India any space from which it can destabilize Pakistan from Afghan territory
3. Secure that portion of Kashmir currently administered by India

To secure these goals, Pakistan has two tools:

1. A menagerie of Islamist (as well as non-Islamist) militant groups acting as proxies
2. An ever-expanding nuclear arsenal which includes battlefield nuclear weapons

Pakistan relies upon proxies because they are inexpensive, able to subvert even the best defenses in India and Afghanistan, offer plausible deniability of state involvement, and generally limit the involvement of Pakistani security forces in direct engagement. (Pakistan’s military and intelligence personnel of course train, equip, and otherwise enable the operations of these groups and collaborate in planning high-profile attacks. In some cases, retired personnel fulfill these roles and may even join a militant group.)

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal confers three principle advantages:

1. It raises the cost of Indian punishment in response to Pakistan-backed terror
2. It ensures international involvement following a Pakistan-sponsored terror attack or incursion by Pakistani forces (e.g. Kargil War of 1999) to pressure India to not escalate
3. In conjunction with the veritable zoo of militant groups, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal coerces the international community to engage Pakistan by exploiting the twin fears of Pakistan’s collapse should aid be withdrawn and of terrorists acquiring nuclear materials, weapons or know-how.

Pakistan has successfully used terrorism under its nuclear umbrella with impunity because it works to achieve Pakistan’s agenda of highlighting the “conflict” between Pakistan and India and inevitably provokes calls for dialogue to resolve “outstanding differences.” At the same time, Pakistan has incurred few costs that it believes to be disproportionate to the benefits it derives from this course of action. Even the sustained blowback of erstwhile proxies since 2004 has not persuaded Pakistan to cease using “jihadis” as tools of foreign policy.

“The only way to motivate change is by developing a coercive campaign that diminishes the advantages of Pakistan’s use of militants under its nuclear umbrella while also increasing the costs of doing so.”

## Motivating Change: The Army is The Center of Gravity

---

<sup>10</sup> C. Christine Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War* (New York: Oxford University Press).

Pakistan's army is fighting a battle it cannot win conventionally and it is unwilling to revise the three core goals enumerated above. The only way to motivate change is by developing a coercive campaign that diminishes the advantages of Pakistan's use of militants under its nuclear umbrella while also increasing the costs of doing so.

The United States has been reticent to undertake a serious revision of policy because of the belief that US assistance and presence in the country can position Washington to stave off state collapse and/or prevent further nuclear proliferation. Unfortunately, Pakistan has used American assistance to further develop the very assets—nuclear weapons and terrorists—that disquiet Americans the most. Americans have generally been unable to appreciate the resilience of the Pakistani state and the low likelihood of any such failure. The United States will not likely be able to undertake any meaningful coercive policy if it continues to believe that its resources and those of its allies and multilateral organizations are staving off an otherwise likely collapse of the state. The below recommendations assume that state collapse is very unlikely even though this fear is commonly articulated by US officials. This assumption is premised upon the author's detailed studies of this country since 1993.

If the United States seeks to change Pakistani behavior, it must change the cost-benefit calculus of the Pakistan army. To the extent possible, policies should aim to influence the army's equities rather than the entire country.

*It should be acknowledged that any significant deviation from the status quo is unlikely given the prevailing lack of political will in key parts of the US government which continues to nurse the fantasy that Pakistan may be more cooperative with the right mix of allurements.*

### **Courses of Action**

Washington first must cease incentivizing Pakistan to continue producing "good jihadi assets" while fighting "terrorists of the Pakistani state." Pakistan is engaging in simple asset banking. As long as Pakistan has terrorists to kill, the United States will pay exorbitant amounts to Pakistan to do so. The army knows that the United States would be less concerned about Pakistan were it not for these groups. Instead of continuing to incentivize the security establishment to groom more terrorists, the United States should incentive them to abandon Islamist terrorists as tools of foreign policy. How does Washington do this?

As a preliminary matter, it should cease providing CSF funds.<sup>11</sup> Pakistan should not be paid to do what sovereign states are supposed to do. Washington should also cease supplying Pakistan with strategic weapon systems.

Instead, the United States should be willing to provide a narrow set of platforms which have proven utility in counterterror and counter-insurgency operations. None of these platforms should have significant value in fighting India. The United States should also offer Pakistan military training in these areas, as well other areas that fit squarely within the rubric of domestic security (i.e. natural disaster relief). The United States should remain willing to provide police training and counterinsurgency training to Pakistan's security forces and other forms of assistance to Pakistan's shambolic justice system should Pakistan permit the

---

<sup>11</sup> The latest legislation no longer uses this term. I use it here because this term has widest recognizably.

United States to do so and should the United States be able to provide meaningful assistance to these organizations.

A key part of this change of incentive, Washington should state clearly that it will declare Pakistan to be a state sponsor of terror if specific actions are not immediately undertaken. Such a declaration will impose sweeping and devastating sanctions against Pakistan's army in particular because it will curtail security assistance. To pre-empt such an outcome, the United States should provide a time-line of concrete steps that Pakistan must take against the various militant groups it now supports. The first such step is ceasing active support for these groups, constricting their space for operations and recruitment; ultimately, Washington should demand the elimination of the remnants.

Even if Pakistan were willing to do so, this will be long-term project akin to any disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program. Pakistan has trained tens of thousands of militants, if not more. However, there should be no economic support to Pakistan for these efforts as long as it continues to actively raise, nurture, support and deploy so-called jihadis for state goals.

Simultaneously, the Washington should expand effort to target specific individuals who provide material support to terrorist groups and individuals. This means international prosecution, designations under UNSC Resolution 1267, Department of Treasury designation and seizure of accounts, and visa denials. In some cases, it should also include JSCOC targeting or other means to eliminate high-value personnel. Washington should work with its allies to ensure that its partners follow suit as well as those countries that traditionally protect Pakistan (i.e. China). Should China not cooperate, it will literally be China's problem. The United States should be less concerned about "lost access and influence" in Pakistan than about coercing Pakistan to abandon the most dangerous policies that it currently pursues with American subsidies.

The United States can, in some measure, curb Pakistan's appetite for terrorist misadventures by depriving it of the principle benefit it derives: international attention to its pet cause, Kashmir. Recent administration statements that reiterate support for India and Pakistan to achieve "peaceful resolution of outstanding issues, including Kashmir" reward Pakistan for its malfeasance while treating India as an equal party to the crime. India is, in fact, a victim of Pakistani terrorism. This language gratuitously rewards Pakistan for its use of terrorism in Kashmir.

It is also historically ill-informed and dangerously misguided. Despite Pakistan's vocal assertions that it has legitimate claims to Kashmir, the facts bely Pakistan's narrative. First, the Indian Independence Act of 1947 did not allocate Kashmir to Pakistan; rather allowed the princely state to select the dominion of its choice. Second, Pakistan started the first war of Kashmir by dispatching militants who enjoyed various levels of state support in an effort to seize Kashmir by force, despite having signed a standstill agreement which bound it to not undertake a military invasion. As a consequence of Pakistan's invasion, the Maharaja of Kashmir Hari Singh signed an instrument of accession to India in exchange for military assistance. Thus, all of Kashmir, including that portion currently administered by Pakistan and that portion "ceded" to China in 1963, are lawful parts of India. When the United States acknowledges Kashmir as a disputed area, it either demonstrates an enormous historical ignorance of the issues or evidences an effort to placate Pakistan at the costs of facts, law

and history. Worse yet, it rewards Pakistan for its continued use of terrorism in Kashmir and elsewhere in India.

Consistent with historical facts, the United States should refuse to interject any mention of Kashmir in its various statements with and about Pakistan. Equally, it should abjure making any statements encouraging India to engage with Pakistan on the subject. Pakistan craves such language because it legitimizes Pakistan's contention that it is seeking peace from India, which obstructs its efforts. While it would be preferable if the United States adopted strong language placing the onus on the conflict firmly upon Pakistan, a middle ground may simply be omitting such language altogether. The Pakistanis are very sensitive to such omissions and will understand the intent that such an omission conveys. Such signaling would also advance U.S. interests in discouraging Pakistani terrorism in some measure by depriving Pakistan of this much sought-after benefit.

When Pakistan-based terrorist organizations attack India, the United States should abandon its usual practice of encouraging India publicly to observe restraint and offering the usual bromidic calls for the both sides to continue dialogue. Such language imposes a false equivalence on India, the victim, and Pakistan, the victimizer. Most importantly, such language rewards Pakistan for using terrorism, and one of the reasons why Pakistan does so is to continue focusing international attention upon the area and incentivizing the international community to continue identifying Kashmir as "the most dangerous place on earth." Instead, the United States should consider encouraging Pakistan publicly to take action against the militant groups in question and to cooperate with Indian and international law enforcement agencies to bring the terrorists to justice. This is a far cry from what the United States should do to punish Pakistan for continuing to use Islamist terrorism as a tool of foreign policy, but it may be something that the current or next administration would consider.

Finally, the United States inter-agency should have a serious conversation about its official position on the Kashmir "dispute." I would encourage the inter-agency to officially adopt support for converting the Line of Control into the international boundary. After all, such a conversion requires India to forego its claims on Pakistan-administered Kashmir while allowing Pakistan to retain that which it currently controls without legal sanction.



## Author Biographies



### **Major Shane Aguero**

Major Shane Aguero is a counter-terrorism strategic intelligence officer with the DIA. He has previously been the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) officer in charge, and prior to that he was the US Army Central (US ARCENT) intelligence fusion desk chief for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. Major Aguero also has over five years of deployed combat experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq working at all levels from infantry squad to Combined Joint Task Force, with experience conducting joint, special and combined operations.

Major Aguero has a Master of Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University, an MBA from Webster University and a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from St. Edwards University.



### **Raffaello Pantucci**

Raffaello Pantucci's research focuses on counter-terrorism as well as China's relations with its Western neighbours. Prior to coming to RUSI, Raffaello lived for over three years in Shanghai, where he was a visiting scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS). Before that he worked in London at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington. He has also held positions at the European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) and is an associate fellow at the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) at King's College, London. He is the author of *We Love Death As You Love Life: Britain's Suburban Terrorists* (London: Hurst, April 2015/US: Oxford

University Press, forthcoming), described by The Financial Times as 'the most articulate and carefully researched account of Britain's 'suburban terrorists' to date.' He is currently completing a writing project looking at Chinese interests in Central Asia. His journal articles have appeared in *Survival*, *The National Interest*, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, and *RUSI Journal* amongst others, and his journalistic writing has appeared in the *New York Times*, *Financial Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Sunday Times*, *CNN*, *Guardian*, *Foreign Policy*, *South China Morning Post*, and more.



### **Hassan Abbas**

Hassan Abbas is Professor of International Security Studies and Chair of the Department of Regional and Analytical Studies at National Defense University's College of International Security Affairs (CISA). He is also currently a Senior Advisor at Asia Society. He remained a Senior Advisor at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (2009-2011), after having been a Research Fellow at the Center from 2005-2009. He was the Distinguished Quaid-i-Azam Chair Professor at Columbia University before joining CISA and has previously held fellowships at Harvard Law School and Asia Society in New York.

He regularly appears as an analyst on media including CNN, ABC, BBC, C-Span, Al Jazeera and GEO TV (Pakistan). His opinion pieces and research articles have been published in various leading international newspapers and academic publications. His latest book titled *The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier* (Yale University Press, 2014) was profiled on *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart* in August 2014. Abbas' earlier well acclaimed book *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror* (M E Sharpe, 2004) remains on bestseller lists in Pakistan and India. He also runs WATANDOST, a blog on Pakistan and its neighbors' related affairs. His other publications include an Asia Society report titled *Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform* (2012) and *Pakistan 2020: A Vision for Building a Better Future* (Asia Society, 2011).



### **Shuja Nawaz**

Shuja Nawaz, a native of Pakistan, is currently a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council's South Asia Center. Most recently, he was the Center's first director. He is a political and strategic analyst. Mr. Nawaz writes for leading newspapers and websites and speaks on current topics before civic groups, at think tanks, and on radio and television worldwide. He has worked with RAND, the United States Institute of Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and other leading think tanks on projects dealing with Pakistan and the Middle East. He has also advised or briefed senior government and military officials and parliamentarians in the United States, Europe, and Pakistan.

Mr. Nawaz was educated at Gordon College, Rawalpindi, where he obtained a BA in

Economics and English Literature and the Graduate School of Journalism of Columbia University in New York. He was a newscaster and news and current affairs producer for Pakistan Television from 1967 to 1972 and covered the western front of the 1971 war between Pakistan and India. He has worked for the *New York Times*, the World Health Organization, and has headed three separate divisions at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He was also a director at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna from 1999 to 2001, while on leave from the IMF. Mr. Nawaz was the managing editor and then Editor of *Finance & Development*, the multilingual quarterly of the IMF and the World Bank. He served on the editorial advisory board of the World Bank Research Observer.

He is the author of *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within* (Oxford University Press 2008). He is also the principal author of *FATA: A Most Dangerous Place* (CSIS, Washington DC January 2009), *Pakistan in the Danger Zone: A Tenuous US-Pakistan Relationship* (Atlantic Council 2010), *Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army's Experience with Counterinsurgency* (Atlantic Council 2011), and *India-Pakistan: The Opportunity Cost of Conflict* (Atlantic Council 2014).



**Dr. Shalini Venturelli**

Dr. Shalini Venturelli is Associate Professor of International Communication and International Relations, in the School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC. She conducts international sociocultural field research and multidisciplinary complex qualitative analysis on the information environment of conflict, culture and international security, analysis & forecasting of strategic threat systems and outcomes. She investigates strategic competitors, regional stability systems, high-complexity asymmetric conflict environments, ideology & influence projection, strategic communication, sociocultural drivers of violent networks, analysis of global social media networks, evolutionary analysis of extremist networks, and assessments of governance, security and stabilization in volatile world regions.

Current research projects include:

- Design and application of evolutionary model of information dynamics to identify and predict unstable human ecosystems in trans-regional environments.
- Identify critical drivers of human ecosystem volatility across diverse security and information and orders with the aim advancing capabilities in detection, deterrence and information engagement.
- Control systems mechanisms of asymmetric information and influence capabilities of geopolitical power actors Russia, China, Iran and their non-state proxies across transregional land and maritime domains in Euro-Asia, East Asia and MENA.
- Evolutionary capabilities and strategic impacts of violent terrorist networks, including ISIL, within and across regions.
- For her front-line research efforts in support of U.S. forces in Southwest Asia and the Middle East with field investigation and analysis of the strategic information environment and sociocultural drivers of conflict, Prof. Venturelli was awarded the U.S. Army Commander's Medal for Civilian Service, and the Secretary of Defense Medal for the Global War on Terrorism.

Dr. Venturelli has multidisciplinary expertise, and is multilingual. She is the author of many

studies and publications on information and communication environments and information networks, the global communication and knowledge revolution, and culture, media and international security. Professor Venturelli received a Ph.D. from the University of Colorado at Boulder in International Communication & International Relations, an M.A. from the University of Chicago in Interdisciplinary Social Science, and a B.S. from Illinois State University in Economics.



**Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois**

Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois is Executive Vice President at NSI, Inc. She has also served as co-chair of a National Academy of Sciences study on Strategic Deterrence Military Capabilities in the 21st Century, and as a primary author on a study of the Defense and Protection of US Space Assets. Dr. Astorino-Courtois has served as technical lead on a variety of rapid turn-around, Joint Staff-directed Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) projects in support of US forces and Combatant Commands. These include assessments of key drivers of political, economic and social instability and areas of resilience in South Asia; development of a methodology for conducting provincial assessments for the ISAF Joint Command; production of a "rich contextual understanding" (RCU) to supplement intelligence reporting for the ISAF J2 and Commander; and projects for USSTRATCOM on deterrence assessment methods.

Previously, Dr. Astorino-Courtois was a Senior Analyst at SAIC (2004-2007) where she served as a STRATCOM liaison to U.S. and international academic and business communities. Prior to SAIC, Dr. Astorino-Courtois was a tenured Associate Professor of International Relations at Texas A&M University in College Station, TX (1994-2003) where her research focused on Middle East politics and the cognitive aspects of foreign policy decision making. She has received a number of academic grants and awards and has published articles in multiple peer-reviewed journals. She has also taught at Creighton University and as a visiting instructor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Dr. Astorino-Courtois earned her Ph.D. in International Relations and MA in and Research Methods from New York University. Her BA is in political science from Boston College. Finally, Dr. Astorino-Courtois also has the distinction of having been awarded both a US Navy Meritorious Service Award and a US Army Commander's Award.

**Dr. Tom Lynch**

Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III is a Distinguished Research Fellow for South Asia, the Near East and countering radical Islam in the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) at the Institute of National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, D.C. He researches, writes, lectures and organizes workshops and conferences for Department of Defense customers on the topics of Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and the Subcontinent, the Gulf Arab States, and the past & future trajectory of radical Islam. Dr. Lynch joined NDU in July 2010



after a 28 year career in the active duty U.S. Army, serving in a variety of command and staff positions as an armor/cavalry officer and as a senior level politico-military analyst. Dr. Lynch was a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff & Deputy Director of the Chairman's Advisory & Initiatives Group; Commander of the U.S. Army War Theater Support Group in Doha, Qatar; Director of the Advisory Group for the Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM); and Military Special Assistant to the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. He spent 42 of 44 months from 2004-07 on assignment in the Middle East and South Asia supporting OPERATIONS ENDURING & IRAQI FREEDOM.

Dr. Lynch has published widely on the politics and security of South Asia, the Near East and radical Islam including articles in *Orbis*, *The American Interest*, and *Joint Forces Quarterly*; book chapters in publications by NDU Press, Oxford University Press and Johns Hopkins University Press; and feature monographs with the New America Foundation, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, and NDU Press. He is also regular multi-media analyst and commentator on national & international programs with FOX News television, Al Jazeera International television (Qatar), Alhurra television, Express-24/7 television (Pakistan), Chinese Central television (CCTV)-English, Voice of America radio & television, and FOX News radio.

Dr. Lynch is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the International Studies Association and the Arms Control Association. A former CFR-International Affairs Fellow, Dr. Lynch also has been a fellow at the Brookings Institution, the Atlantic Council of the United States and the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. Dr. Lynch holds a B.S. from the United States Military Academy; and a Masters in Public Administration (MPA) along with a M.A., and Ph.D. in International Relations from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs at Princeton University.



### **Christine Fair**

C. Christine Fair obtained her PhD from the University of Chicago, Department of South Asian Languages and Civilizations in 2004 and an MA from the Harris School of Public Policy in 1997. Prior to joining the Security Studies Program (SSP) within Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, she served as a senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation, a political officer to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, and as a senior research associate in USIP's Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. Her research focuses upon

political and military affairs in South Asia. She has authored, co-authored and co-edited several books including *Cops as Counterinsurgents: Policing Insurgencies* edited with Sumit Ganguly (forthcoming 2013, OUP) *Cuisines of the Axis of Evil and Other Irritating States* (Lyons Press, 2008); *Treading Softly on Sacred Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations on Sacred Space* edited with Sumit Ganguly (OUP, 2008); *The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan* (USIP, 2008), *Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance* (USIP, 2006); among others and has written numerous peer-reviewed articles covering a range of security issues in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India,

Pakistan, Iran, and Sri Lanka. Her forthcoming book (OUP, 2013) is on the strategic culture of the Pakistan army. She is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, Women in International Security, and the American Institute of Pakistan Studies. She serves on the editorial board of *Current History*, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, *Asia Policy*, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, and *India Review*. She is also a senior fellow with the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Her publications are available at [www.christinefair.net](http://www.christinefair.net)