6 January 2017

Question (LR 5): *Given the generational nature of the threats we face, what changes in organization, legislation, authorities, resources, infrastructure, education, and other areas should the USG make to become as agile, resilient, survivable, sustainable, technologically and intellectually dominant as required to protect our constitutional system and prevail in any conflict from the present until 2050?*

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Executive Summary

The contributors to question LR 5 diverge widely on their recommendations for ensuring that the USG prevails in future conflicts, while also preserving the US constitutional system. The divergence is attributable to the breadth of the question, as well as the diversity of the contributors' backgrounds.

The most common areas for improvement that arose from the contributions are:

- Refinement of the USG and military strategy making processes
- Emphasis on strategic communication to multiple audiences and through multiple channels
- Improvement of civilian and military operations prior to and during conflict
- Enhancement of capabilities for understanding varied operational environments
- Creation of new authorities and organizations to deal with fluid events as they develop
- Development of resource channels and education opportunities that empower decentralized action

The contributors' recommendations are arranged in this report based on the original question's categories of inquiry, which were: changes in organization, legislation, authorities, resources, infrastructure, and education; with the addition of two categories, risk calculation and strategy formation.

Due to the broad scope of the question, multiple contributors also encourage further exploration of the topics through deliberate networking and research in order to develop additional solutions.

The Projected Future Operational Environment

Among the contributors there is a general expectation that future military operations will increase in complexity, with a commiserate increase in requirements for information on the environment. Among the risks seen are the impacts of climate change, which as one contributor states, "will present more, more frequent, and more severe instances for the US to respond (or NOT)."[1] "These events will include humanitarian responses to severe weather events, as well as global crisis and conflicts…spawned by the effects of this change and variability."[2]

The assumed result by commentators is that the Joint Force will increasingly be required to engage globally. One concern raised with the expansion of DoDs requirements is that a, "corresponding 'militarization' of foreign policy through the dominance of the military instrument of national power to address increasingly complex issues/problems/challenges, supplants the other departments/agencies constitutional and legal (i.e. FAA) roles and responsibilities."[3]

One contributor assumed that the creation of additional requirements is also likely to accompany an increase in the force being used to fill, "'non-traditional' roles due to our capacity and capabilities."[4] Another contributor believed that, "the increasing number of countries, cultures, and languages of

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[1] John Collison
[2] John Collison
[3] John Collison
[4] John Collison

interest," in which DoD will be employed, will require the force to "focus on producing agile cultural generalists rather than stable long-term specialists.[5]

Another contributor stated that the Joint Force will face resource limitations that impact its capacity to respond to events.[6] This limitation was assumed to be partially offset by an increase in the US's utilization of coalitions to achieve its desired end states for a range of different contingency scenarios.[7]

One planning model was recommended in order to address these new challenges. The model states that future planning and engagement may be more fruitful if it is divided into Short, Medium, and Long-Term challenges. Short-term challenges consist of those that can be addressed between 2017 and 2021 under the current POM. Medium-term challenges consist of those between 2022 and 2030, which can be extrapolated based on current and newly identified trends. Long-term challenges are those between 2030 and 2050, which cannot be extrapolated based on current trends.[8] This model was not incorporated into the current report, but may be useful as a stepping off point for future inquiries.

Contributors Recommendations

The contributors made several recommendations for improving the force's ability to address the various aspects of Question LR 5.

Organization

One group of contributors asserted that increases in the complexity of problem sets, as well as greater demand for specialized subject matter expertise, can be partially mitigated by the creation of, "Standing Civilian-military teams or increased civilian-military teaming."[9] Among the examples provided by the contributor was, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Afghan & Iraq); USSOF 'teamed' with FBI for sensitive site exploitation efforts; USSOF 'teamed' with USAID development representatives to assess local vulnerabilities and development (Afghanistan/Iraq); Conventional Force and Reserve elements 'teamed' with FBI and ISCTAP elements to support building partner law enforcement capabilities; and Conventional Force and Reserve elements 'teamed' with USDA elements to build agricultural capabilities in Afghanistan."[10]

Two other contributor strongly cautioned however that the future civilian-military teams must not be created from previous templates, without incorporating lessons learned from their past performance. Critiques on some of the above listed examples can be obtained through the Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense University.[11]

Legislation

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[5] DeCamp, et. al.
[6] John Collison
[7] Nathan White
[8] John Collison
[9] John Collison
[10] John Collison
[11] Nathan White

One contributors stated that, "alignment of DoD and DoS regional boundaries," will also, "support agility and sustainability in 'competition', crisis, and conflict."[12] Their recommendation was, "aligning DoS Bureaus and desk areas of responsibility and GCC AORs to facilitate better opportunities to coordinate, align, synchronize and integrate programs, initiatives, activities, actions and operations in support of US interests, and discrete foreign policy objectives."[13]

The contributor went on to argue that interdepartmental conflicts may also be offset by the creation of, "Civilian-led JIATF (i.e. USAMB, POTUS Special Representative, other; ISO 'competition short of armed conflict') in order to support agility in engagement options." In the contributors own words, the recommendation has not been, "fully analyzed and developed in terms of providing civilian leaders with traditional 'command authority' over military assets to address complex, multi-agency, and essentially non-military challenges, issues or threats over an extended period of time approximating an 'integrated campaign' effort."[14]

Authorities

One contributor's recommendation is to develop, "a shared DoS and DoD authority to proactively build resilience and resistance with threatened partners." Their assertion is that such an authority will enable the, "integration of instruments of national power earlier and more proactively." [15] Once implemented, the authority would, "support broader USG engagement with partners to build resilience and resistance capabilities and capacity to overt or clandestine threats from another state actor, proxy, or non-state actor," as well as "identify opportunities, threats and challenges early."[16]

Resources

The resource issues identified by contributors focused on the impact that centrally controlled resource distributions strategies have on developing agile organizations. One author contended that a, "deliberate efforts need to be made to empower leaders and soldiers in edge organizations that can obtain the most rapid feedback from the operating environment." [17] It was also recommended that senior leaders ensure junior leaders have access to the resources and time necessary to pursue self-initiated projects.[18]

The same contributor stated that, "improvements in collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence on sub-national and low-collection priority areas prior to conflict," needs to take place.[19] They also stated that based on current capabilities, new tradecraft must be developed that, "enable rapid in-depth understanding of populations, mobilization, and other human factors, using advanced analytic and data analysis methods."[20]

Infrastructure

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[12] John Collison
[13] John Collison
[14] John Collison
[15] John Collison
[16] John Collison
[17] Robert Holliday
[18] Robert Holliday
[19] Robert Holliday
[20] Robert Holliday

One contributor argued that new organizational infrastructures must be developed with two goals in mind. First, "ensuring that whole-of-government and coalition participation supports a strategy as opposed to institutional equities and advancement within functional stovepipes," and second, "managing continuity of effort over time."[21]

Another group of contributors recommended creating opportunities and incentives that are structured for specialists to, "develop and build long-term relationships with people in power, people coming into power, people who influence them, and people who may be able to advise and support the development of recommendations and Courses of Action (e.g., foreign partners, members of NGOs, etc.)."[22] The contributor believe that these specialists should be developed to augment the current generalist mentality within DoD.

Education

One group of contributors stated that, "Defeating ISIL's effective use of terrorism, media messaging, and inspiration and cooptation of lone wolf attacks, requires using modular means of national power – influence operations across diplomatic, economic, and social settings." [23] Their recommended solution was the creation of "integrated, overlapping interagency working groups focused on core challenges and tasks in the Gray Zone."[24]

Another contributor recommended an alternate solution to terrorism messaging. Their assertion was that, "more nuanced audience analysis of different segments of target populations is necessary to determine how best to create and disseminate counter-messages to these different segments." [25] This approach would allow for messaging to, "children in at-risk populations," with the assumption that, "CENTCOM may have more success in stemming violent radicalization among that age group, thereby mitigating the possibility of ISIL-type ideologies from taking root in the young."[26]

Finally one contributor recommended that, "training and encouragement within the Joint Force to establish social networks prior to identification of tasks or missions, along with opportunities to mobilize social networks to achieve self-directed results," will be important to developing a more agile force.[27]

Other (Strategy)

One contributor recommended, "Improvements in the communication of strategic intent from principle level decision makers, to the Joint Force and interagency as a whole, in order to better empower subordinate organizations to plan and act in support of national objectives."[28]

Another contributor made specific recommendations on achieving that end state, stating the Joint Force needs to, "properly conceptualizing the nature of strategy," "articulating a theory of change to guide

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[21] Nathan White
[22] DeCamp, et. al.
[23] After ISIL Conference
[24] After ISIL Conference
[25] Kurt Braddock
[26] Kurt Braddock
[27] Robert Holliday
[28] Robert Holliday

strategy execution," "developing a campaign specific strategy management office," "clearly articulated goals and strategy that are agreed upon and understood by coalition partners."[29]

A final contributor stated that improving US strategy formation and communication needed to include: "increased coordination of mission specific pre-conflict authorities and authority requirements between the COCOMs, SECDEF, and the NSC; including identification, analysis, definition, and preparation for action along multiple contingencies."[30]

Other (Risk)

One contributor asserted that the Joint Force should, "realign its risk tolerances (balance of likelihood of failure, cost of failure, and benefits of success), in order to provide opportunities for breakthrough successes, at the cost more numerous failures."[31] The recommended approach was based on lessons learned in leadership from Silicon Valley. A group of contributors also recommended that, "anti-fragile" approaches can be used as alternative approaches to leadership, in order to encourage situation in which and people, "can more easily make small errors without failing."[32]

Comments from Contributors

Dr. Kurt Braddock, Penn State University

Here, audience analysis is critical. In reading the materials related to US counter-messaging efforts against ISIL, it seems as though those perceived to be at risk for violent radicalization by ISIL are thought of as a monolithic group. This is hardly the case. As in Western cultures, children and adults tend to be persuaded by different types of messages. More nuanced audience analysis of different segments of target populations is necessary to determine how best to create and disseminate counter-messages to these different segments. With a more nuanced approach to counter-radicalization for children in at-risk populations, CENTCOM may have more success in stemming violent radicalization among that age group, thereby mitigating the possibility of ISIL-type ideologies from taking root in the young.

Views expressed herein do NOT reflect positions of HQ USSOCOM, USSOCOM-FMD, or FMD-J9. They are the opinions of the author.

John Collison, USSOCOM

COMMENT: This question is wildly broad. I would suggest there are 'armies' of 'futurists and think-tanks', public and private, that are more qualified (and have produced a lot of forecasts/predictions) to address the totality of this question. 'Thoughts' below simply start to 'scratch the surface' to provide some initial input and spur thought.

PURPOSE: Protect our constitutional system (*?*) / Prevail in any conflict

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[29] Nathan White
[30] Robert Holliday
[31] Robert Holliday
[32] After ISIL Conference

COMMENT: Is part of DoD's underlying purpose to 'design' the force specifically to 'protect our constitutional system' OR is our underlying purpose to 'design' the force to 'support and defend' the constitution? I would think that 'protect our constitutional system' is NOT a principle concern for design/development of the force. The elements below are more focused on broader 'prevail in any conflict' rational, and more specifically targeted towards a foundation of a broader understanding of 'competition' including the spectrum of crisis/conflict to better prevent or mitigate ahead of having to 'prevail'.

TIME HORIZON: now-2050 - suggest this analysis can be broken down as follows;

Now-2021(thru the POM) - essentially operating with 'what we have' and against the '5 challenges (i.e. '4+1') with minor ability the change absent significant event or

2022-2030 (implications of identified/new trends)

2030-2050 ('Fantasyland' – not sure we can 'foresee' this far)

ASSUMPTIONS/Reason for Assumption:

1. *'5 challenges' will exist thru 2021* as the principle threats/challenges to US vital interests globally, transregionally, and regionally / this assumption contextualizes CENTCOM's focus for these underlying categories

2. *DoD will continue to be used in 'non-traditional' roles due to our capacity and capabilities* – in the short term (thru 2021) this is a 'trend' due to limited USG resources, domestic political division and use of 'executive orders', and increased variety of threats/challenges to our national interests globally / this assumption contextualizes the application of Joint Force elements in roles that, by definition, should be the responsibility of other elements of national power. This assumption represents a current/future challenge to the Joint Force/GCCs in terms of OPTEMPO, constrained resourcing, and Joint Force synchronization with other USG departments/agencies. The risk is continued (and increased) use of the Joint Force in these roles, and the corresponding 'militarization' of foreign policy through the dominance of the military instrument of national power to address increasingly complex issues/problems/challenges, supplants the other departments/agencies constitutional and legal (i.e. FAA) roles and responsibilities.

3. *Continued climate change (long-term 2030-50), and climate variability (now-2030), will present more, more frequent, and more severe instances for the US to respond (or NOT) w/the Joint Force to severe weather events globally AND to crisis/conflicts (i.e. radicalization/extremism, revolution/insurgency, resource competition, etc.) spawned by the effects of this change/variability (i.e. droughts, desertification, floods, mass migrations, etc.).*

Agile   Resilient   Survivable   Sustainable   Technology Dominant   Intellectually Dominant

<u>Organization</u>

Standing Civilian-military teams / increased civilian-military teaming – supports agility in functional requirements; and intellectual dominance WRT issues/problems. This 'idea' is specifically ISO identifying / mitigating vulnerabilities (broader than those that are directly military/security related) impacting security/defense of the US, partners and allies.

Some anecdotal examples of previous, recent, initiatives include - Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Afghan & Iraq); USSOF 'teamed' with FBI for sensitive site exploitation efforts; USSOF 'teamed' with USAID development representatives to assess local vulnerabilities and development (Afghanistan/Iraq); Conventional Force/Reserve elements 'teamed' with FBI/ISCTAP elements to support building partner law enforcement capabilities; and Conventional Force/Reserve elements 'teamed' with USDA elements to build agricultural capabilities in Afghanistan.

While none of these are fully representative of what this effort MIGHT be in future, it is a previous area of focus in both the QDR(10?), and captured in CJCSI 3210.06 (IW/2010 p.A-3).

Greater analysis is necessary as to what the specific benefits where standing and/or ad hoc civilian-military teams and teaming would be most appropriate.

Civilian-led JIATF (i.e. USAMB, POTUS Special Representative, other; ISO 'competition short of armed conflict') – supports agility in engagement options; and intellectual dominance in planning, coordination and engagement across a broad range of 'competition short of armed conflict'. This, again, isn't new, but has not been fully analyzed and developed in terms of providing civilian leaders with traditional 'command authority' over military assets to address complex, multi-agency, and essentially non-military challenges, issues or threats over an extended period of time approximating an 'integrated campaign' effort.

Legislation

Align DoD and DoS regional boundaries – supports agility and sustainability in 'competition' and crisis/conflict. While 'simplistic' this specifically recommends aligning DoS Bureaus/desk areas of responsibility and GCC AORs to facilitate better opportunities to coordinate, align, synchronize and integrate programs, initiatives, activities, actions and operations ISO US interests and discrete foreign policy objectives. It can also enable the more efficient sharing of critical information by synchronizing the alignment areas of responsibility and prevent having to go through multiple bureaucracies to get or share discrete elements of information. This supports routine foreign affairs and engagement, as well as coordination in 'competition short of war' as well as for crisis (natural and man-made) and conflict.

Authorities

A shared DoS/DoD authority to proactively build resilience and resistance with threatened partners – supports agility of action; sustainability (and coherence) of efforts; and intellectual dominance through integration of instruments of national power earlier and more proactively. This entails development of an 'authority' – operational and fiscal – to support broader USG engagement with partners to build resilience and resistance capabilities and capacity to overt or clandestine threats from another state actor, proxy, or non-state actor. This MAY ENTAIL refinement, rewriting, recalibration of the FAA61 (as amended) to translate to the contemporary and future operating environment, and technologies available, to destabilize states and regions.

Shared DoS/DoD because BOTH are necessary to holistically enable and/or build a partner's resilience capabilities as the foundation for resistance capabilities.

Potentially inclusive of political, security, and civil elements within partner nations.

Transregional preparation of the environment authority - to identify the opportunities for, and threats to, US vital interests – supports agility for leadership & resilience for the force through earlier identification of opportunities, threats and challenges for GCCs/DoD (as well as other responsible USG departments/agencies) to develop and provide options to policy makers. This may entail a more proactive authority for GCCs to employ DoD assets, potentially in conjunction with other USG elements and/or private entities, to determine opportunities where the Joint Force might support other instruments of national power to advance a sub-regional/regional/transregional interest, and/or where these interests may be threatened by state or non-state actors.

Seeks to provide GCC authorities within the TCP (and 'phase 0') to better understand, develop options, and prepare for opportunities and challenges in an increasingly fluid operating environment.

Expands the 'concept' of PE to include 'seeking constructive opportunities' to advance US interests beyond simply potential kinetic, military, operations.

Robert Holliday, NDU

Methods

The following response is based upon the integration of three ongoing lines of research. The first line is an analysis of intelligence production in support of operations in Libya, Syria, and Mali from 2011 through 2013.[33] The second line of research is a pending study on the national security decision making process for Syria between 2011 and 2015.[34] The third line of research is drawn from a cross-functional seminar at the University of California Berkeley, focused on improving innovation in defense.[35] Together they map multiple channels for improving defense capabilities over the coming decades.

Results

Improving the United States Government's agility, resilience, survivability, sustainability, technological and intellectual dominance through 2050 will require efforts along two separate and equally important channels. The first channel will employ centralized approaches to make incremental improvements in the existing defense bureaucracy. The second channel will take place in defined areas of innovation that are protected from the defense bureaucracy, to the degree it enables breakthrough solutions to be pursued and reached. Leveraging both channels simultaneously, and to maximum effect, will be the greatest leadership challenge facing the Joint Force over the coming decades.

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[33] Robert Holliday, "Lessons Learned in Sociocultural Analysis from Libya, Mali, and Syria: 2011-2013" (pending JWICS report, Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 2016). Please contact the author if an early draft is required.

[34] Bernard Carreau et al., "The United States National Security Decision Making and Policy Process for the Syria Conflict" (JWICS working paper, Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, last updated September 23, 2016).

[35] Robert Holliday, John Goodwin, and Chris Hyde, "Empowering the Edge: Lessons Learned in Leadership from Silicon Valley" (working paper, Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, last updated September 23, 2016).

Liner Development

Based upon ongoing research in the Center for Complex Operation (CCO), some opportunities for incremental improvements using centralized approaches include: improvements in collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence on sub-national and low-collection priority areas prior to conflict; development of tradecraft and capabilities that enable rapid in-depth understanding of populations, mobilization, and other human factors, using advanced analytic and data analysis methods; improvements in the communication of strategic intent from principle level decision makers, to the Joint Force and interagency as a whole, in order to better empower subordinate organizations to plan and act in support of national objectives; increased coordination of mission specific pre-conflict authorities and authority requirements between the COCOMs, SECDEF, and the NSC, including identification, analysis, definition, and preparation for action along multiple contingencies; and numerous other changes that will lead to measured improvements, without requiring broad organizational change.

Breakthrough Innovation

Based on a pending article, improvements using defined areas of innovation to achieve breakthrough successes will require broader changes in order to allow them to organically form in an otherwise institutionally inhospitable organizational ecosystems. The issues that must be addressed for long term innovation and breakthrough success within the Joint Force include: realignment of risk tolerances (balance of likelihood of failure, cost of failure, and benefits of success) to provide opportunities for breakthrough successes, at the cost more numerous failures; training and encouragement within the Joint Force to establish social networks prior to identification of tasks or missions, along with opportunities to mobilize social networks to achieve self-directed results; empowerment of Leaders and Soldiers in edge organizations, that have the most rapid feedback mechanisms from the operating environment, including allocation of resources and time necessary to pursue self-initiated projects; and creation of defined Innovation Incubators that are protected from external Command influence, in order to enable them to explore alternate norms that will increase their effectiveness over time.

Nathan White, NDU

Submission #1: Learning From Iraq and Afghanistan: Four Lessons for Building More Effective Coalitions

An academic article, published in May 2016 in the *Journal on Baltic Security*, as part of a special edition featuring papers from the 2015 International Lessons Learned Conference in Estonia, addresses this issue through presenting research on lessons from OIF and OEF for future coalitions.[36] The article identifies four interrelated lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan that can be utilized to inform more effective coalition development and employment.

Methods:

The research for this article consisted of an analysis of primary-source and secondary-source interview data from interviews with policymakers, civilian and military leaders, analysts, and operators, both in

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[36]White, Nathan; Learning From Iraq and Afghanistan: Four Lessons for Building More Effective Coalitions, Journal on Baltic Security Vol 2, Issue 1, 2016; Baltic Defence College p.197-221
http://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/JOBS/JOBS.02.1.pdf

and out of theater. It also included a review of pertinent literature and original government documents. A trend analysis was conducted of both explicit and implicit observations regarding coalitions to identify the most critical lessons. The four lessons discussed in the paper are the results of this analysis.

Results:

Post-9/11 operations by U.S. led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan did not achieve their intended outcomes. Despite many tactical and operational successes by brave military and civilian personnel, today the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its affiliates control large areas of Iraq and Syria, and the Taliban insurgency rages on in Afghanistan. Both of these outcomes are surprising given the cost in blood and treasure for coalition members. Much of the lessons learned debate from the two wars centers around how operations were planned and executed, what went well and what did not, and how things could have been improved. In some cases, coalition partners are working to take stock of this analysis and adapt accordingly. Many efforts are underway by military and civilian organizations to place lessons in the context of the current security environment, so as to ensure learning, and ultimately, improved outcomes in future engagements. However, less attention is paid to lessons for successful coalitions.

Given that the U.S. and its allies will most certainly form coalitions in the future for a range of different contingency scenarios, these lessons are particularly important. For contingency operations, coalitions play three important roles: geopolitical legitimacy of the mission; shared cost and responsibility, and most importantly, the effective design and execution of campaigns. Although all three are important, this article is primarily concerned with the third component. This article identifies four interrelated lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan that can be utilized to inform more effective coalition development and employment. It contends that effective coalitions require clearly articulated goals and strategy that are agreed upon and understood by coalition partners – lessons one and two. It also identifies a requirement for a strategy coordination element, even when unity of command is absent – lesson three. Additionally, the importance of recognizing the capabilities and limitations of partners is discussed – lesson four. Ultimately, the article provides an analysis of key lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan that if heeded, will lead to improved outcomes for future coalitions.

Submission #2: Organizing for War: Overcoming Barriers to Whole-of-Government Strategy in the ISIL Campaign

An academic paper, published in *Small Wars Journal* and republished in the edited volume *Global Radical Islamist Insurgency: A Small Wars Journal Anthology* covering key lessons from the past 15 years of war for the C-ISIL campaign.[37] *The research demonstrates that the many* unsatisfactory outcomes were caused less by the shortcomings of U.S. civilian and military personnel, government

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[37] White, Nathan; Organizing for War: Overcoming Barriers to Whole-of-Government Strategy in the ISIL Campaign; Small Wars Journal December 2014
http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/Articles/White_Organizing-for-War-Overcoming-Barriers-to-Whole-of-Government-Strategy-in-the-ISIL-Campaign-2014-12-28.pdf
Re-published in Global Radical Islamist Insurgency: Al Qaeda and Islamic State Network Focus: A Small Wars Journal Anthology, edited by David Dilegge and Robert Bunker; February 2016 p.596-616.

agencies, or Presidential administrations as is often claimed. Instead, they are more the result of deeply rooted systemic barriers to good strategy within the U.S. national security system that will likely prevent a favorable outcome in the C-ISIL campaign if left unresolved. The paper makes recommendations for how these institutional deficiencies can be overcome to increase the likelihood of success in countering ISIL.

Methods:

The research for this article consisted of an analysis of primary-source and secondary-source interview data from interviews with policymakers, civilian and military leaders, analysts, and operators, both in and out of theater. It also included a review of pertinent literature and original government documents. A trend analysis was conducted of both explicit and implicit information on lessons from the past 15 years of war to identify the most critical lessons and make informed recommendations for the C-ISIL campaign. The lessons and recommendations discussed in the paper are the results of this analysis.

Results:

As operations continues in Iraq and Syria, many are calling for a more comprehensive strategy to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the long-term. If these calls are heeded, the result will be yet another attempt at an interagency, coalition effort by the United States Government that seeks to integrate a wide array of capabilities to achieve policy objectives, albeit with limited numbers of American boots on the ground.   Yet, in recent overseas missions, the U.S. regularly struggled to coordinate the various tools of state power to achieve desired strategic end-states. Post-9/11, civilian and military personnel achieved many tactical and operational gains in several places, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen, and Somalia. But many pitfalls prevented these impressive, often heroic, efforts from leading to strategic success.

Today's national security leaders must understand that these unsatisfactory outcomes were caused less by the shortcomings of U.S. civilian and military personnel, government agencies, or Presidential administrations as is often claimed. Instead, they are more the result of deeply rooted systemic barriers to good strategy within the U.S. national security system that will likely prevent a favorable outcome in future campaigns if left unresolved.

Referencing lessons from the past thirteen years of war, this paper argues that in order to prevail against ISIL, leaders, planners, and operators need to overcome three mutually reinforcing institutional deficiencies that plagued the United States in past missions: First, a failure to properly conceptualize the nature of strategy in war; Second, a national security system that is poorly structured for whole-of-government campaign strategy management; and finally, a resulting inability of U.S. Government agencies to coordinate in the field for strategic impact. Recommendations for improved effectiveness include: Properly conceptualizing the nature of strategy; Placing lines of effort in proper context; Developing a campaign specific strategy management office; Properly structuring, empowering, and resourcing the strategy management team; Ensuring that whole-of-government and coalition participation supports a strategy as opposed to institutional equities and advancement within functional stovepipes; Articulating a theory of change to guide strategy execution; Developing a shared understanding of the operational environment and nature of the conflict; and Managing continuity of effort over time.

MITRE-RAND Joint Effort

FINDINGS

Our findings include the following:

A move towards agile cultural generalists rather than stable long-term specialists.

As discussed by DeCamp et. al in a joint MITRE-RAND report on *Linking Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture Capabilities to Military Readiness* (2012), the increasing number of countries, cultures, and languages of interest and the desire by DOD for the agility to easily reconfigure resources has led to a focus on producing agile cultural generalists rather than stable long-term specialists. These generalists, moving rapidly between different cultures and languages with sequential assignments, have little time, ability, opportunity, or incentive to develop long-term relationships with the people in power, the people coming to power, the people who influence them, or the people who may be able to help (e.g., foreign partners, members of NGOs). The problem is further aggravated by the lack of translators and interpreters with sufficient skills to persuade and to understand nuance (i.e., Defense Language Proficiency Test score 4 or above), and financial cutbacks to language and culture training.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Develop career specialists rather than or in addition to generalists. Have part of that specialty focus on the culture, regional expertise, and languages/dialects of problem areas. Structure opportunities and incentives for these specialists to develop and build long-term relationships with people in power, people coming into power, people who influence them, and people who may be able to advise and support the development of recommendations and Courses of Action (e.g., foreign partners, members of NGOs, etc.)

Spencer Meredith, NDU

EXSUM: USASOC-LUCAS Symposium

"After ISIL: Stability and Spillover"

One-day conference is to help the Special Operation Forces (SOF) community's strategic planning and forward posturing by accessing academic expertise.

Key Takeaways:

- Identities factor heavily into radicalization processes, but they also form the basis for US interests and actions. This common role for identities gives analytical traction and supports strategic communication against ISIL so as to draw away its would-be supporters in the wider community of interest. Emphasizing identities brings into focus the role of beliefs that are both exploitable and rigid, but not always consistent. Narrative messaging in the region of conflict, as well as within post-conflict zones in the Balkans, shows the combination of superior advertising and idea re-branding by ISIL and others to address these recruitment and retention challenges. Messages are intended to sway identities towards anti-status quo views, while also empowering behavior beyond feelings of

victimhood. This relies on <u>"touchstones" that have personal appeal to the individual</u> (images of protective fathers on the battlefield, as much as popular video game scenes). They also offer <u>space for membership and meaning in the "in-group"</u>. Both processes allow people to anchor into otherwise disparate events and connect with messages interpreting them.

- <u>Support for "more democracy" may not be the answer to this problem</u> as debates about the role of external influence vs. internal responsibilities crossed the regional conversations. At stake is the role of local grievances, and if their legitimacy extends beyond perceived failure of democratic governance to meet political aspirations, or if something fundamentally divides societies from the Western liberal ideal. The possibility of unmet expectations, rather than any specific catalyzing events, needs further analysis.

- Comparisons to the Cold War drew in more than international relations between the United States and Russia, extending into the use of influence operations to counter ISIL narratives. At its core, the discussion centered on essential methodological questions of comparing cases across time, geography, culture and history. Assumptions of an inherent, universal appeal to US values of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" were countered by arguments that those ideals may exist broadly, but get interpreted and acted upon so differently in different contexts as to make comparisons non-actionable. Bosnia served as an excellent case to test the debate, with <u>some panelists concluding that foreign support ran counter to local values and expectations, leading to a return of hostilities and openings for ISIL recruitment</u>. <u>Others remained optimistic that increased Western support would encourage the discontented to keep building democracy and pursue non-violent conflict resolution with ethnic "outsiders"</u>.

- Underlying much of the discussions was a central theme about the role of the United States in these areas of concern, but also more fundamentally in terms of US self-identity. "<u>With a more negotiable US role on the table", the symposium exposed many of the underlying assumptions about US power projection and the motivations behind it</u>. The event did not pursue those avenues fully given the intended focus on ISIL, but instead allowed for the topic to serve as an open door for further conversations. This is one of the core tenets of the USASOC-LUCAS initiative.

Recommendations from the Symposium:

- <u>Clear US strategic goals</u> are needed because lasting grievances are being formed in Iraq and Syria, in large part due to the weaknesses of government – destroyed infrastructure and economies are as damaging to Internally Displaced Persons returning to their lives, as are the failures of political reconciliation through one-sided governance.

- <u>Adaptability with the capabilities and mechanisms of US foreign policy</u> must be the hallmark for dealing with anti-status quo, violent extremist ideologies and organizations. This counters "legacy industry" thinking, where past successes become a disadvantage vis-à-vis nimble start-ups. The latter are "anti-fragile" and can more easily make small errors without failing.

- <u>Further analysis is needed to address the increasing likelihood of "marginalized, concealable identities"</u> that rely on freedom of movement across borders (both physical and cyber) to instigate "politics of division" in new areas.

- Defeating ISIL's effective use of terrorism, media messaging, and inspiration and cooptation of lone wolf attacks, requires using modular means of national power – influence operations across diplomatic, economic, and social settings. This requires <u>integrated, overlapping interagency working groups focused on core challenges and tasks in the Gray Zone</u>.

Contributor Biographies

Dr. Kurt Braddock, Penn State

Dr. Kurt Braddock is a post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Communication Arts and Sciences at Penn State University where he teaches courses in group communication, disaster communication, and terrorism. His research focuses on how terrorist groups use different types of communication to recruit and radicalize target audiences, particularly on the Internet. He has also begun to explore how to use communication and psychology theory to produce strategic messaging guidelines for countering violent extremism in the field. Dr. Braddock's work has been published in Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, and other peer-reviewed journals. He has also co-edited (with Dr. John Horgan) a volume of seminal terrorism research called Terrorism Studies: A Reader.

John Bornmann

John Bornmann completed his Ph.D. at George Washington University in Human Sciences and Cultural Anthropology in 2009, focusing on how privates at Army Basic Training transition their identity from civilian to soldier. At MITRE John has worked on a number of military and non-military projects focused on improving training and awareness of critical thinking by servicemembers, intelligence analysts, and other government employees. Dr. Bornmann is an expert in qualitative data collection and analysis techniques, including focus groups, interviews, and open-ended survey administration, and has taught four courses at the MITRE Institute on designing, conducting, and analyzing qualitative and mixed methods research.

John Collison, USSOCOM

John Collison is a Special Applications Group (SAG) contractor supporting the USSOCOM Directorate of Force Management & Development (FMD), J9 Concept Development and Integration (CD&I). A Strategic Planning and Integration Analyst supporting FMD-J9, Mr. Collison's duties include support to Joint and SOF Concept development, analysis, and assessment, and SOF capabilities development. He previously supported the Headquarters' Security Force Assistance (SFA) office where he addressed DoD SFA policy and process development, and SOF integration of SFA concepts and doctrine.

Mr. Collison retired as a Lieutenant-Colonel in July 2012 after 26 years of active duty service in the Army Civil Affairs and Infantry branches. He served at HQs USSOCOM, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, the United States Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs Command, and in various Infantry assignments from Infantry Platoon Leader to Infantry Battalion Executive Officer, to include a tour on the Army Staff, prior to transitioning to the Civil Affairs branch. In Civil Affairs he served at the Detachment, Company and Brigade levels as a Company Commander and Brigade Operations Officer. Mr. Collison is a 1985 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point and was commissioned an Infantry Officer.

Mr. Collison's overseas assignments and deployments include; Alaska, Cambodia, Egypt, Honduras, Bosnia and Iraq.

Barry Costa, MITRE

Barry Costa has led critical, fast paced projects for the Intelligence Community, USCENTCOM, USLANTCOM, USSOCOM, the Joint Staff, ASD RE, and others. He has had a broadly diverse career in pioneering digital imaging technologies and immersive visualization systems; human social culture behavior analysis and modeling; operationally focused technical analyses; tagging, tracking, and locating; and radar modeling. Mr. Costa is the Director of Technology Transfer for The MITRE Corporation and is responsible for the development and execution of the corporation's licensing strategy and the promotion to industry of MITRE's technology as well as the development and implementation of licensing and commercialization strategies consistent with the company's public interest and FFRDC missions.

Previously, he was Director of MITRE's Corporate Initiative on Smart Power, the Investment Area Leader for MITRE's Measuring and Guiding Engagement research portfolio, and the systems engineer for the Department of Defense ASD RE Human Social Culture Behavior (HSCB) modeling program and led MITRE projects in the Human Geography and Smart Power domains. His most recent technical focus was on the research and transition of natural language processing and sociocultural understanding and modeling capabilities with an emphasis toward the development and transition of such systems for operational support.

Mr. Costa previously led the USSOCOM SOJICC and similar projects where he focused on the on the development of operational data mining, visualization, and language translation systems used in direct support of the warfighter. These systems are in research, development, and/or use today supporting COCOM missions and have been briefed and demonstrated at the highest levels of the intelligence community and DOD.

In addition, he led MITRE's support to the Joint Staff Deputy Director for Global Operations (DDGO), the OSD Rapid Response Technology Office (RRTO), the USSOCOM PSYOP Global Reach ACTD, and the USCENTCOM Map-Human Terrain (Map-HT) JCTD. Prior to that, Mr. Costa supported the fledgling USSOCOM sensor program and was the system engineer on both the Integrated Survey Program (ISP) and the Special Operations Tactical Video System (SOTVS). Mr. Costa was a pioneer in the field of digital cameras and digital video technologies and began developing and integrating those systems as early as 1994. Mr. Costa was also the systems engineer of the Mission Familiarization Virtual Reality Program (MFVRP) a high fidelity pseudo-3D ground mission rehearsal system developed in the mid-1990's.

Mr. Costa was the MITRE project leader for United States Central Command. He was responsible for a wide range of data communication and data processing activities that supported USCENTCOM before, during, and after Desert Storm.

Mr. Costa was also at the MITRE site in Ramstein, Germany where he developed the communications architecture for the United States Air Force in Europe and at MITRE's Norfolk. site where he led USLANTCOM's network planning and implementation team. Prior to that he participated in the development of the Joint Stars Radar Evaluation Activity where he modeled optimization techniques for Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) radars.

Prior to MITRE, Mr. Costa served on active duty with the US Navy where he specialized in radar missile fire control systems.

Dr. Jennifer DeCamp, MITRE

Dr. Jennifer DeCamp is an internationally recognized expert in assessing the quality and effectiveness of human and machine translation and in implementing new processes and technologies to better achieve mission objectives. She has been honored by General Barbara Fast as a *Language Hero* for her efforts in this area and has received extensive awards from SOCOM and other organizations for her seminars and support.

As the project lead for a joint MITRE-RAND effort to assess DOD's ability to measure mission readiness and mission effectiveness in the areas of language, regional expertise, and culture (LREC), Dr. DeCamp and her team produced findings and recommendations for shaping DOD's requirements and training processes (see: ***Linking Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture Capabilities to Military Readiness*** and ***An Assessment of the Ability of the U.S. Department of Defense and the Services to Measure and Track Language and Culture Training and Capabilities Among General Purpose Forces****.)* She conducted further work for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (P&R) Defense Language and National Security Organization (DLNSEO) and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), reviewing the extent to which current training and other personnel data could be used to reliably support decisions regarding training and readiness.

Dr. DeCamp has served on many advisory panels, including the Executive Advisory Panel for Adaptive Learning Systems for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture for DLNSEO and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (R&E) Human Performance, Training, and BioSystems Directorate. In addition, she provides input to R&E's Reliance 21 Human Systems Community of Interest on the technologies and impact of foreign language distance learning. She has supported DOD Senior Language Authorities in developing metrics, assessments, roadmaps, and strategic plans, and in integrating technology and new work processes. She has supported overseas organizations, including U.S. Forces Korea and multiple overseas missions. In addition, she has worked with Document Exploitation (DOCEX) and Document and Media Exploitation and with ontologies and terminologies to leverage linguistic and cultural information.

Dr. DeCamp leads efforts in multiple professional organizations and standards organizations to improve translation and interpreting. She is the Chair of the American Translators and Interpreters Association (ATA) Standards Committee, a member of the Executive Advisory Board of ASTM's Language Services Committee, and a technical expert appointed by the American National Institute of Standards (ANSI) to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Technical Committee (TC) 37 on Terminology and Other Language and Content Resources. She is also a member of the Translation and Interpreting Summit Advisory Council. She has led and/or participated in the development of standards to provide better guidelines and evaluation in these areas.

Dr. DeCamp has worked as a professional translator and interpreter in Arabic, Chinese, and French, and has taught university courses at the undergraduate and graduate levels in translation, interpreting, localization, and global user interface design, including at the American University in Washington D.C. Her doctorate is in Applied Linguistics and her master's degree is in instructional technology for foreign language teaching, both from the University of Texas at Austin.

Robert Holliday, NDU

Robert Holliday is currently conducting research on intelligence, innovation, and the national security decision making process for the USG campaigns in Syria and Iraq for the Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense University. For the past eight years he has worked at the forefront of the United States military's effort to understand foreign societies and cultures. He previously conducted operational research in combat zones, and designed and implemented training for soldiers and senior leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom. He crafted the foundational research doctrine for a program which became the largest single programmatic expenditure on social science in the history of the United States military. He has contributed to Joint Doctrine, NATO Doctrine, and Joint Capabilities Developments on subjects including: Counter Insurgency, the Human Domain, and Human Aspects of the Military Operations. Mr. Holliday is a Military Intelligence Company Commander in the Army Reserve, and holds a Master's Degree in Defense Policy Studies from George Washington University.

Sarah O. Meadows, Senior Sociologist; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School

Sarah O. Meadows, Ph.D., is a Senior Sociologist at the RAND Corporation. Her research focuses on family well-being, including both civilian and military families; family structure and health; readiness and resilience; and, manpower and personnel issues related to diversity. Dr. Meadows recently co-lead the Deployment Life Study (DLS), a longitudinal study of service members and their families over the course of the deployment cycle. Other recent work includes an examination of military family resilience sponsored by the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury (DCoE), as well a study for the Army, focusing on ways in which the effectiveness of the Ready and Resilient (R2) Portfolio of Programs could be assessed. Dr. Meadows is currently co-leading the 2015 DoD Health Related Behavior Survey (HRBS) of active duty service members.

Prior to joining RAND in 2008, Dr. Meadows was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Bendheim-Thoman Center for Research on Child Wellbeing at Princeton University. She received her Doctorate and Master of Arts degrees in Sociology from Duke University, and her Bachelor of Arts in Psychology and Sociology from the University of Virginia.

Dr. Spencer B. Meredith III, Ph.D., NDU
College of International Security Affairs

Dr. Spencer B. Meredith III, PhD, is an Associate Professor in the Joint Special Operations Master of Arts program for the College of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University. After completing his doctorate in Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia in 2003, he served as a Fulbright Scholar in the Caucasus in 2007 working on conflict resolution, and has focused on related issues in Eastern Ukraine for several years. He has also served as a subject matter expert for several DOS public diplomacy programs in South and East Asia dealing with the role of religion and democracy in US foreign policy.

His areas of expertise include democratization and conflict resolution in Russian, Eastern European and Middle Eastern politics. Most recently, he has been working with USASOC on several projects related to

comprehensive deterrence, narratives and resistance typologies, and non-violent UW in the Gray Zone. His publications include research on democratic development and international nuclear safety agreements (*Nuclear Energy and International Cooperation: Closing the World's Most Dangerous Reactors*), as well as articles in scholarly journals ranging from *Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, to *Central European Political Science Review*. He has also published in professional journals related to UW, SOF more broadly, and the future operating environment, with articles in *InterAgency Journal*, *Special Warfare*, *Foreign Policy Journal*, and the peer-reviewed *Special Operations Journal*. He is currently participating in SOCOM SMAs on Intellectual Motivators of Insurgency and a Russian ICONS simulation.

Mark Overton

Mark Overton has spent more than twenty years in the language teaching, technology, testing, and program administration / management field, including serving as the Command Language Program Manager for the West Coast Navy SEAL Teams (NSWG-1).

Mr. Overton currently serves as the Academic Director / Deputy Program Manager for the Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron, Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. He previously served as the Training Manager and Senior Language Expert for General Dynamics Information Technology, where he was responsible for managing all aspects of the National Language Service Corp's training program. He conducted orientation programs for volunteer members selected to become temporary federal government employees in order to support government and DoD linguist assignment requirements. In addition, he managed the Defense Language Institute – Washington office language training contract.

In prior work at MITRE Corporation, Mr. Overton reviewed military training, induction, and other personnel data to provide recommendations for how to better assess language and culture readiness and effectiveness. He also supported the Language Technology Resource Center and other language technology programs.

Mr. Overton has also worked at Voxtec, where he was esponsible for content development, translations, and revisions for one-way, handheld machine translation systems for DOD personnel operating in foreign language environments. He researched and adapted DOD CENTCOM and AFRICOM language content from the Defense Language Institute's (DLI's) Language Survival Kits for Voxtec's translation systems.

For more than eight years, Mr. Overton served as a Command Language Program Manager for Naval Special Warfare Group ONE. In this position, he was responsible for the education and provision of high intensity foreign language training for more than 700 Navy SEALs and Navy intelligence linguists in wartime while managing an annual budget ranging from $500K to $1 million and functioning as a certified Contracting Officer Representative (COR) on behalf of the Command. He directed and

contracted a wide array of educational institutions, consultants, and in-house programs that included on-site classes and tutoring, foreign immersion programs, university and DOD courses, distance learning technology, distribution of foreign language software, and Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) and Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) administration and record keeping. He also coordinated and managed foreign language consultants located worldwide and on-site.

Nathan White, NDU

Nathan White is a Department of Defense Civilian Research Fellow with the Center for Complex Operations at National Defense University. He conducts research projects and advises U.S. Government agencies on lessons from various U.S. contingency operations, with a focus on strategy, interagency coordination, intelligence, and conflict assessment. Nathan has participated in numerous in-theater assessments of ongoing post-9/11 operations within the CENTCOM AOR, to include serving on the CJTF-OIR Commander's initial 30 day assessment team in Sept/Oct 2015. He has authored several publications on lessons from the past fifteen years of war and has also worked with various U.S. Government organizations to integrate lessons into policy, concepts, doctrine, training, and education. Nathan's current research focuses on improving strategic effectiveness of U.S. Special Operations Forces, and lessons from the U.S. strategic decision-making and planning processes for the crisis in Syria. Prior to joining NDU, Nathan served as a Department of the Army Civilian where he deployed to Iraq's Basra province. Nathan is in the War Studies PhD program at King's College London. His dissertation project analyzes U.S. Government institutional constraints on improving intelligence capabilities for irregular warfare and stabilization missions. He also earned a Master's degree in Intelligence and International Security from King's and is a graduate of UC San Diego.

Kayla M. Williams, MA

Kayla M. Williams serves as primary advisor to the Secretary on Department policies, programs, and legislation that affect women Veterans. In addition, she oversees the Center's activities, which include monitoring and coordinating VA's administration of health care, benefits services, and programs for women Veterans; serving as an advocate for cultural transformation (both within VA and in the general public) in recognizing the service and contributions of women Veterans and Service members; and raising awareness of the responsibility to treat women Veterans with dignity and respect. As Director of the Center for Women Veterans, Ms. Williams is the Designated Federal Official for the VA Advisory Committee on Women Veterans, manages the VA's Women Veterans Program, leads the White House Council on Women and Girls Women Veterans Working Group, and serves as an ex officio member of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services.

Prior to coming to VA, Ms. Williams spent eight years at the RAND Corporation conducting research and analysis on numerous topics, including the effectiveness of efforts to support wounded warriors and transitioning service members; sexual harassment and assault in the military; psychological and cognitive injuries, their consequences, and services to assist recovery; and Veterans' education benefits. She also assisted in strategic management of the military health portfolio, including aligning with Congressional intent, identifying research needs, filling gaps in core competencies, business

development, and ensuring regulatory and oversight compliance.

She spent five years enlisted in the U.S. Army as a voice intercept operator and Arabic linguist, which included a year-long Operation Iraqi Freedom deployment while serving in the 101st Airborne Division. As commander's interpreter during combat operations, Ms. Williams helped infantry companies succeed in conducting numerous quick reaction force (QRF) missions and combat security patrols by interacting with Iraqi civilians and police.

Ms. Williams graduated *cum laude* with a Bachelor of Arts in English Literature from Bowling Green State University and earned a Masters of Arts in International Relations from American University. She is a member of the VA Survey of Experiences of Returning Veterans (SERV) Study Advisory Board and the Army Education Advisory Committee, a Truman National Security Project Fellow, a former member of VA Advisory Committee on Women Veterans, a 2013 White House Woman Veteran Champion of Change, and a 2015 Lincoln Award recipient. Ms. Williams is also the author of <u>Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in the U.S. Army</u>, a memoir about her deployment to Iraq, and <u>Plenty of Time When We Get Home: Love and Recovery in the Aftermath of War</u>, about her family's journey from war trauma to healing, both published by W. W. Norton. She has given lectures and participated in numerous panel discussions and print, radio, and television interviews about Veterans, wounded warriors, caregivers, and women in combat.