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Discourse Indicators of Gray Zone Activity

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Executive Summary

The increasing use of emotive themes and rhetorical devices (that amplify a message's emotional effect) provide indicators of gray zone activities in speeches made by Chinese, Philippine, and Vietnamese government officials during peak times of conflict in the South China Sea from 2002 to 2016. The leading indicators and warnings for the Chinese, Philippine, and Vietnamese governments are presented separately, as well as findings regarding how their use of language reflects predominant national concerns.

Indicators & Warnings (I&W)

The 16-year period examined was divided into six-month periods, and measures of theme use were correlated with the frequency of gray zone activity initiated by each actor in the subsequent period. This enabled identification of indicators and warnings approximately six months in advance of gray zone actions.

- The specific themes that indicated Chinese gray zone activity included *Conspiracy*, *Self-defense, Equality and Rights*, *Gray Zone Activities*, and *Domestic Development*.
- *Criminal/Illegal*, *Borders/Territory*, *Crime*, *Oil/Gas*, *Materiel*, *Protests*, *Friendship*, and *China* were the primary indicators for the Philippine gray zone activity.
- *Aggressor/Aggression*, *Legitimacy*, *Economy and Trade*, *UN*, and *Lexicalization* indicated Vietnamese gray activity.

Predominant Concerns of Regional Actors

The themes that occur statistically more often for each actor provide an indicator of what issues are most important for that actor.

- Chinese, Philippine, and Vietnamese governments share a mutual concern for their borders, their territories, and their own nation's prosperity.
- China also outwardly reveals their preoccupations with peace, stability, sovereignty, cooperation, and the South China Sea.
- The Philippines, like the Chinese, also display a strong concern about the South China Sea, cooperation, China, and sovereignty and also have a strong interest in conflict, equality and rights, their economy and trade, and formal agreements.
- Vietnam, like the Philippines, is predominately concerned with conflict as well as peace, like the Chinese, and security.

Use of Emotional Language

The use of emotional language (themes that evoke emotion such as *Pride*, or rhetorical devices such as *Sarcasm*) indicates the importance of an issue for an actor.

- The Vietnamese used over twice as much moderate to extremely negative language as the Chinese did when discussing South China Sea matters and the countries involved. This may

indicate that they feel most threatened by Chinese actions in the South China Sea. There were no statistically discernable differences between the Chinese and Philippine leaders.

Introduction

People both knowingly and unknowingly signal their values and intentions through the way they use language (Beeman, 2001; El-Badawy, Comerford, & Welby, 2015; Fairclough, 2001; Rahimi & Sahragard, 2006; van Dijk, 2005). Thematic analysis focuses on themes people employ that reveal what matters to them (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012; Ryan & Bernard, 2003), while discourse analysis focuses on the linguistic tools people use to deploy and emphasize these themes (Farnell & Graham, 1998; Schiffrin, 2003; van Dijk, 2005). The approach used in this study combines both thematic analysis and discourse analysis to identify what issues matter most to a speaker and to what degree. Because people are often unaware of the extent to which they signal their values and intentions, identification of key themes can provide early indicators and warnings (I&W) in advance of political action. The authors have employed this approach in studies of both state (Fenstermacher, Kuznar, & Yager, 2012; Kuznar, 2013, 2014, 2016b; Kuznar, Popp, & Peterson, 2016; Kuznar, Suedfeld, Morrison, &

Spitaletta, 2014; Kuznar & Yager, 2013, 2016; Kuznar, Yager, Clair, & Stephenson, 2012) and non-state (Kuznar, 2016a; Kuznar & Hunt, 2015; Kuznar & Moon, 2014; Kuznar & Yager, 2012) actors.

This study is based on the analysis of key leader speeches and statements from China, Philippines, and Vietnam spanning the period from 2002 to the first half of 2016. The corpus was composed of 45 speeches (China: 24, Philippines: 9, Vietnam: 12) in which regional leaders discussed South China Sea disputes.

The primary results of this study are detailed after a brief description of some key methodological terms. Supporting information is found in the following appendices:

- Appendix: Key Dates and Events
- Appendix: Narrative of Historical Events

- Appendix: Source Data
- Appendix: Gray Zone Code System

Methodological Terms

Codebook Typology

The codebook is a taxonomy of themes and rhetorical devices that represent topics mentioned, persons, places, things, ideas, and ways of using language that amplify the sentiment associated with the themes. The following terms describe the higher-level categories of the codebook taxonomy.[1]

- **Theme** – something that can be nominalized (named); can be a person, place, thing, idea, or emotion

- **Emotive Theme** – themes that convey emotion (sentiment); their mere mention evokes an emotive response

- **Rhetorical Device –** a way of using language to amplify or dampen sentiment
    - Includes repetition, sarcasm, intensifiers (very, huge), lexicalization (special word choice), pejoratives (trash talk), use of kin terms, etc.

The Primary Categories of the taxonomy include:

- **Polities** – countries, formal organizations, regions, and sub-state groups
- **Cultural Emotive Values** – themes that evoke emotions in audiences
    - **Negative Extreme Emotive** – a cultural theme that tends to evoke an extremely negative response
    - **Negative Normal Emotive** - a cultural theme that tends to evoke a negative response that is not extremely negative
    - **Positive Extreme Emotive** - a cultural theme that tends to evoke an extremely positive response
    - **Positive Negative Emotive** - a cultural theme that tends to evoke a positive response that is not extremely positive
- **Political Factors**
    - **Positive Cohesive Concerns** – political concerns that tend to lead to notions of cooperation
    - **Disruptive Security Concerns** – political concerns that tend to lead to conflict
    - **Other Security Concerns**
- **Rhetorical Devices** – ways of using language that amplify or dampen the sentiment associated with a theme

These codes were applied to 8136 segments of text, providing the basic structured database upon which the analyses in this report are based.

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[1] As a convention, actual themes and rhetorical devices will be capitalized and italicized throughout the text in order to differentiate them from more generic uses of the terms. When appropriate, footnotes defining themes will be given.

Who is Analyzed?

Statements and speeches from the following key leaders in China, Philippines, and Vietnam were analyzed.

Table 1. Chinese Speakers Analyzed in South China Sea Case Study

Group	Speaker(s)	Position(s)
Chinese Government	Kong Quan	Minister of Foreign Affairs
	Wu Hongbo	Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines
	Liu Jianchao	Chief Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Zhang Qiyue	Spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry
	Qin Gang	Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Li Jinjun	Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines
	Wen Jiabao	Premier
	Wang Yi	Chinese Ambassador to Japan, Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, Minister of Foreign Affairs
	Jiang Yu	Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Ma Zhaoxu	Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Liu Xiaoming	Chinese Ambassador to North Korea
	Hong Lei	Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Tong Xiaoling	Ambassador of China to ASEAN
	Yang Jiechi	Foreign Minister
	Liu Weimin	Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Hua Chunying	Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Xi Jinping	President
	Liu Zhenmin	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
	Yang Yujun	Defense Ministry Spokesman
	Geng Yansheng	Defense Ministry Spokesperson
	Qu Zhe	Chinese Ambassador to Estonia
	Fan Changlong	Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission
	Sun Jianguo	Deputy Chief of Staff
	Lu Kang	Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
	Tian Xuejun	Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Zhang Ping	Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission

Table 2. Philippine and Vietnamese Leaders Analyzed in South China Sea Case Study

Group	Speaker(s)	Position(s)
Philippine Government	Benigno Aquino III	President
	Albert del Rosario	Secretary of Foreign Affairs
	Raul Hernandez	Philippine Ambassador to South Korea
	Edwin Lacierda	Presidential Spokesperson
	Official Department of Foreign Affairs Statements	Department of Foreign Affairs
Vietnamese Government	Le Dung	Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
	Nguyen Minh Triet	President
	Nguyen Tan Dung	Prime Minister
	Pham Gia Khiem	Minister of Foreign Affairs
	Nguyen Phuong Nga	Ambassador of Vietnam to the UN
	Nguyen Duy Chien	Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
	Truong Tan Sang	President
	Tran Duy Hai	Deputy Chairman of the National Boundary Committee for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Nguyen Quoc Thap	PetroVietnam Deputy Director General
	Pham Binh Minh	Minister of Foreign Affairs
	Nguyen Xuan Phuc	Prime Minister
	Tran Dai Quang	President

Key Metric: Density

The key metric for measuring themes is **Density**: the number of times a theme occurred in a document or speech, divided by the number of words in that document. This provides a normalized measure of how often a theme is used that can be compared across documents and between authors, groups, etc. Comparison of densities between themes also places a theme in a broader context, guarding against bias in judging the relative importance of themes. The underlying assumption is that the more densely a theme is used, the more important it is to the author, and potentially, to an audience.

Theme densities were calculated for each document, and the variations of these densities through time were used to identify trends and possible indicators and warnings (I&W). Only those trends that were statistically significant at the .05 level or less are reported.

Metrics for Sentiment and the Use of Emotional Language

The use of rhetorical devices and emotionally charged themes are ways to interject emotive appeal into an argument. When done unwittingly, this is an indicator that the speaker is in a more emotive state, as opposed to a more rational, deliberative state. Therefore, the ability to detect departures from a rational state of mind can provide clues that the speaker's decision calculus is departing from the deliberative, cost/benefit calculus which is at the heart of traditional deterrence theory (USSTRATCOM, 2006).

In order to measure the use of more emotive language, themes were classified as Extreme Negative Emotive, Negative Emotive, Extreme Positive Emotive, Positive Emotive, and Rhetorical Devices and were coded (Appendix: Gray Zone Code System). Each of these categories was tallied for each document and subsequently normalized as densities. In addition to these categories, the Extreme Negative and Negative Emotive themes were summed as were the Extreme Positive and Positive Emotive themes. This provides nine measures of the use of emotive language against which different actors or speakers can be compared.

The mean densities of these measures were compared between all actors in order to gauge whether or not differences in rhetorical style indicate different levels of emotionality in their language.

Temporal Units and Analyzing I&W

The sheer quantity of both statements and gray zone actions in the South China Sea presents a challenge for analysis. There are no signature gray zone events before and after which one can assess language use. Instead, there is a constant level of activity that erupts into gray zone actions with varied frequencies. We divided the time span into six-month periods. The frequency of gray zone activities ranged from none to ten in any one period, although there has been a steady increase over time (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Gray Zone Event Frequencies in the South China Sea 2002 – 2016

The region's leaders also make frequent statements regarding disputes in the South China Sea, providing analysts with an abundance of material that can be analyzed for indicators and warnings. There were enough speeches throughout the time period to allow for aggregation of our discourse metrics within each time period. This permitted a time series analysis between previous six-month time periods and the overall frequency of gray zone activities in the subsequent time period. The underlying assumption is that an indicator will increase in the period before the action takes place. Depending on exactly when a speech was delivered and when gray zone activities peaked, an indicator or warning could take place anywhere from about a month up to a year in advance, with a median of six months.

Themes that correlate with lagged gray zone event frequencies are clearly advance indicators. However, a stronger test of the strength of these signals is whether or not they uniquely correlate with gray zone event frequencies. In other words, if a theme correlates only in the previous period and not during or after the period, then it would serve as a particularly strong indicator, and given its unique correlation with events in a subsequent period, would be more easily detected. Therefore, the analysis will compare theme densities lagged with the subsequent time period with those during the period when the gray zone events occurred in order to identify the strongest indicators and warnings.

Finally, in most cases, there is fairly reliable information on who initiated, or was the aggressor, in a gray zone event for this case study (Appendix: Narrative of Historical Events). Therefore, the frequency of gray zone events used for the analysis is the frequency of events in which the group under analysis was the actual aggressor.

Leading Indicators of Gray Zone Activity: South China Sea Case Study

Statistically significant trends in the occurrence of themes and rhetorical devices identified leading discursive indicators of gray zone activity.

Leading Indicators of Gray Zone Activity: China

Chinese leaders exhibited indicators and warnings with five themes and two rhetorical devices (Table 3). In all cases, the unlagged correlations were small and statistically insignificant when compared to the 6 month lagged correlations. Therefore, the themes and rhetorical devices identified as indicators and warnings present particularly strong signals that should be easily detected.

Table 3. Leading Indicators of Gray Zone Activity: China

Code	Statistics	6 Month Lag	Not Lagged
Conspiracy	R	0.639	0.011
	sig.	0.001	0.959
Self-Defense	R	0.435	0.040
	sig.	0.034	0.849
Equality and Rights	R	0.397	0.291
	sig.	0.055	0.157
Gray Zone Activities	R	0.418	-0.120
	sig.	0.042	0.568
Domestic Development	R	0.511	-0.007
	sig.	0.011	0.974
Rhetorical Question	R	0.648	-0.034
	sig.	0.001	0.871
Sarcasm/Irony	R	0.503	-0.059
	sig.	0.012	0.781

The actual density of a theme (ex. *Equality and Rights*) and the degree to which it increases before increases in gray zone activities is depicted in Figure 2. While the correlation is not perfect, in six of the periods (before first half of 2004, 2006, 2009, 2012 and last half of 2012, 2014), there are notable peaks in the density with which this theme occurs six months in advance of the peak in gray zone activities. Graphs depicting the lead-time for all Chinese indicators are found in Appendix: Graphical Representation of Chinese Indicators & Warnings.

**Figure 2. Mean Density of Equality and Rights Theme and Frequency of Gray Zone Events Initiated by China.
(Note the peaks in theme use before first half of 2004, 2006, 2009, 2012 and last half of 2012, 2014)**

The specific themes that indicated Chinese gray zone activity included *Conspiracy*, *Self-Defense, Equality and Rights*, *Gray Zone Activities*, and *Domestic Development*.

Conspiracy

The Chinese frequently accuse foreign powers of conspiring against them, and these accusations increase before China engages in gray zone activities. A potential reason for this trend could be that the Chinese become more defensive and on-edge when they are aware of a controversial action that they are about to initiate.

Conspiracy Example:

> "The US spy plane flew close to the airspace of China's Hainan Island for espionage." (Yang Yujun, 26 May 2016)

Self-Defense

The Chinese increase their assertion of their right to carry out actions or defend themselves before engaging in gray zone activities. This could be because the Chinese are aware that other countries may try to retaliate against them after their gray action or, alternatively, if the gray action can be argued as an act of self-defense, the Chinese may want to emphasize the idea of self-defense prior to the event.

Self-Defense Example:

> "What I want to point out is that China sticks to the path of peaceful development and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature." (Hong Lei, 10 June 2011)

Equality and Rights

The Chinese increase the assertion of their rights to defend themselves before a gray zone activity. The Chinese may choose to emphasize their equality among other Asian countries and their argued rights before initiating a gray activity to defend themselves against foreign nations' accusations.

Equality and Rights Example:

> "Oil and gas exploration activities by any country or company in the waters under China's jurisdiction without permission of the Chinese Government constitutes violation of China's sovereignty, rights and interests, and thus are illegal and invalid." (Jiang Yu, 25 March 2011)

Gray Zone Activities

The Chinese increasingly mention *Gray Zone Activities* themselves before executing a gray zone activity.

Gray Zone Activities Example:

> "China has made solemn representations with the Philippine side over its warships and petrol boats' harassment of Chinese fishing boats and fishermen in waters off the Huangyan Island. The Philippine side's so-called "law-enforcement" in the waters off the Huangyang Island is a violation of China's sovereignty. It goes against the two countries' consensus to maintain peace and stability of the South China Sea and not to complicate or magnify the situation. Competent Chinese authorities have sent ships on official duty to relevant waters. Currently, Chinese fishermen and fishing boats are safe." (Liu Weimin, 11 April 2012)

Domestic Development

The Chinese discuss their *Domestic Development* and their need for it, especially with regards to economic development, before engaging in a gray zone activity. This is also an indicator that economic motives may underlie or at least be conjoined with larger political and strategic motives that the Chinese have for expanding in the Pacific.

Domestic Development Example:

"Its development is uneven, as many areas remain backward. For China to be fully developed, it will take the unremitting efforts of several generations, or even a dozen generations of the Chinese people. China thus needs a durable and peaceful international environment that enables it to concentrate on economic development." (Wen Jiabao, 12 December 2005)

In addition to the five themes that indicated gray zone activity, the Chinese increased their use of two rhetorical devices before increasing taking part in gray zone activities.

Rhetorical Question

The Chinese increased their use of posing *Rhetorical Questions* in a strategy to present their arguments and to justify actions they were going to take in the future.

Rhetorical Question Example:

"If peaceful development is the path toward prosperity, then why should China change course and take a riskier approach once it gets stronger?" (Qin Gang, 29 September 2011)

Sarcasm/Irony

The Chinese also increased their use of *Sarcasm* in advance of increasing their level of gray zone activity. This use of sarcasm indicates their frustrations and sort of passive-aggressive anger towards the current state of South China Sea relations; however, they don't want to express the feeling of blatant anger, so they may implement sarcasm instead.

Sarcasm/Irony Example:

"Moreover, as for witnesses approved by the Arbitral Tribunal, one witness once mentioned in his writings that "at least 12 ocean terrains can be classified as islands in Nansha Qundao, so 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone can be claimed". However, when stood as the witness in the Arbitral Tribunal, he withdrew his previous view and said that "none of them are islands". What an expert!" (Liu Zhenmin, 13 July 2016)

Leading Indicators of Gray Zone Activity: Philippines

Philippine leaders exhibited indicators and warnings in advance of their own gray zone activities with eight themes and in three metrics of emotional language (Table 4). In all cases, the unlagged correlations were small and statistically insignificant when compared to the 6 month lagged correlations. Therefore, the themes and rhetorical devices identified as indicators and warnings present particularly strong signals that should be easily detected.

Table 4. Leading Indicators of Gray Zone Activity: Philippines

Code	Statistics	6 Month Lag	Not Lagged
Criminal/Illegal	r	0.833	0.194
	sig.	0.005	0.616
Borders/Territory	r	0.645	-0.059
	sig.	0.060	0.881
Crime	r	0.809	0.156
	sig.	0.008	0.688
Oil/Gas	r	0.869	0.273
	sig.	0.002	0.478
Materiel	r	0.783	0.135
	sig.	0.013	0.729
Protests	r	0.803	0.144
	sig.	0.009	0.711
Friendship	r	0.762	0.551
	sig.	0.017	0.124
China	r	0.735	0.131
	sig.	0.024	0.737
Extremely Positive Themes	r	0.832	-0.130
	sig.	0.005	0.738
Positive Themes	r	0.719	-0.286
	sig.	0.029	0.456
Net Emotional Language	r	0.752	-0.147
	sig.	0.019	0.706

The specific themes that indicated Philippine gray zone activity included *Criminal/Illegal*, *Borders/Territory*, *Crime*, *Oil/Gas*, *Materiel*, *Protests*, *Friendship*, and *China*.

Criminal/Illegal

Philippine government officials increasingly mention other countries' criminal and/or illegal activities before engaging in their own gray zone activities. Their reasoning behind mentioning other countries'

activities in the South China Sea and referring to them as "criminal" and/or "illegal" is likely to defend their questionable actions and mark other actors as the real aggressors.

Criminal/Illegal Example:

> "Noting that the two countries have active judicial and law-enforcement exchanges and cooperation through existing bilateral agreements, the two leaders agreed to fulfill the legal procedures to expedite the entry into force of the Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China Concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, and begin negotiations at an early date for a bilateral agreement on Transfer of Sentenced Persons. They reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation in combating transnational crimes, including drug trafficking and trafficking in persons." (Benigno Aquino, 4 March 2011)

Borders/Territory

The Philippine government frequently discusses border and territory issues prior to the occurrence of a gray zone activity that will most likely relate to borders/territory once again.

Borders/Territory Example:

> "However, I must emphasize that I have taken an oath to defend the Constitution and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The extent of our territory and maritime zones are clearly defined by Philippine laws and international law, specifically the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." (Benigno Aquino, 13 June 2012)

Crime

The Philippine government will also discuss other countries' crimes prior to the occurrence of a gray zone activity, which can be explained by the same reasoning as the *Criminal/Illegal* theme.

Crime Example:

> "They reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation in combating transnational crimes, including drug trafficking and trafficking in persons." (Benigno Aquino, 1 September 2011)

Oil/Gas

Philippine government officials often discuss oil and/or gas before a gray zone event occurs. This may be due to the fact that one of the underlying causes of many South China Sea conflicts is oil/gas control. Thus, the Philippine government may speak about oil and/or gas before becoming involved in further gray conflict.

Oil/Gas Example:

"The Chinese were allegedly claiming that the oil explorers from the Department of Energy were inside Chinese territory, according to Lt. Gen. Juancho Sabban, chief of the Armed Forces' Western Mindanao Command." (Benigno Aquino, 4 March 2011)

Materiel

The Philippine government frequently mentions various types of materiel, often military, before partaking in a gray activity.

Materiel Example:

"'The Coast Guard ship will ensure that our rights are protected by making sure that this survey ship was granted authority by our government to finish its job,' Aquino said." (Benigno Aquino, 4 March 2011)

Protests

Philippine government officials often protest China's involvement in their internal affairs prior to conducting gray zone actions, which they could justify as acts of self-defense or reactions to this interference of internal matters.

Protests Example:

"President Benigno Aquino III himself told reporters in Bacolod City that, "The (Chinese) ambassador is still in Beijing and we handed them a protest on the incident.'" (Benigno Aquino, 4 March 2011)

Friendship

The Philippine government frequently discusses their friendship with China amid gray zone activities. This may be the Philippine government's attempt to calm tensions with China before conflict erupts.

Friendship Example:

"Now, where do I see the relationship going again, my main premise is this: when you have continually improving living standards, then the whole populace will be geared towards even further increasing standards of living and the only way to be able to achieve that is really through trade, cross-cultural pollination, the interaction and if we are able again to make the relationship more mature where we become not just friends but bosom friends or very old friends." (Benigno Aquino, 26 August 2011)

China

The Philippine government frequently mentions China prior to participating in gray zone events involving China in the South China Sea.

China Example:

"With the guidance of such a framework and through the facilitation of ASEAN, the Philippines calls on the claimant states in the South China Sea, including China, to meet and discuss these claims and define the undisputed and the disputed areas for the purpose of establishing a Joint Cooperation Area." (Albert del Rosario, 15 November 2011)

Leading Indicators of Gray Zone Activity: Vietnam

Vietnamese leaders exhibited indicators and warnings with four themes and one rhetorical device (Table 5). In all cases, the unlagged correlations were small and statistically insignificant when compared to the six-month lagged correlations. Therefore, the themes and rhetorical devices identified as indicators and warnings present particularly strong signals that should be easily detected.

Table 5. Leading Indicators of Gray Zone Activity: Vietnam

Code	Statistics	6 Month Lag	Not Lagged
Aggressor/Aggression	r	0.998	-0.144
	sig.	0.000	0.655
Legitimacy	r	0.889	-0.328
	sig.	0.000	0.299
Economy and Trade	r	0.770	-0.375
	sig.	0.006	0.230
UN	r	0.900	-0.272
	sig.	0.000	0.392
Lexicalization	r	0.825	-0.110
	sig.	0.002	0.734

The specific themes that indicated Vietnamese gray zone activity included *Aggressor/Aggression*, *Legitimacy*, *Economy and Trade*, *UN*, and *Lexicalization*.

Aggressor/Aggression

The Vietnamese government frequently discusses other countries' (particularly China's) aggression towards Vietnam in the midst of gray zone conflict. This trend is likely because Vietnam desires to portray China as the sole aggressor in the conflict.

Aggressor/Aggression Example:

> "However, the response from China has been an increase of force and acts of intimidation and violation, and repeated slanders to blame on Viet Nam." (Nguyen Tan Dung, 21 May 2014)

Legitimacy

Vietnamese government officials frequently discuss matters of legitimacy before acting in the gray zone to justify and reemphasize the validity of their actions.

Legitimacy Example:

"I wish to underscore that Viet Nam will resolutely defend its sovereignty and legitimate interest because territorial sovereignty, including sovereignty on its maritime zones and islands is sacred." (Nguyen Tan Dung, 21 May 2014)

Economy and Trade

The Vietnamese government often discusses economics and/or trade activities before partaking in gray zone activities since the South China Sea encompasses various trade routes that are crucial to Asian countries' economic success.

Economics and Trade Example:

"Vietnam is also very proud of significant progress that has been made in its bilateral relations with other Asian and European members who are now strategic and leading partners of Viet Nam in the economic, trade, investment, development cooperation, educational and training areas." (Nguyen Tan Dung, 25 May 2009)

UN

The Vietnamese government frequently mentions the UN and UN jurisdiction, especially the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, before acting in the gray zone. Vietnam often uses this jurisdiction to justify their ownership to territory and exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea.

UN Example:

"China's nine-dash line in the East Sea, aka 'Bull tongue-shaped line', is completely legally groundless and is in contrary to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to which China is a party." (Nguyen Duy Chien, 28 May 2011)

Lexicalization

Vietnamese government officials often are very particular about their word choice, especially during times of frequent gray zone events.

Lexicalization Example:

"We are never the first to use military means and would never **unilaterally** start a military **confrontation** unless we are **forced** to take self-defense actions." (Nguyen Tan Dung, 21 May 2014) [key word choices emphasized]

Predominant Concerns of Regional Actors

The primary goal of this research is to identify leading indicators of adversarial intent with respect to gray zone activity and, therefore, the diachronic analyses presented in the previous sections are the primary focus of this report. However, it is also useful to understand what issues a particular actor prioritizes and which uses of language that actor relies on the most in order to persuade an audience.

In this section, those themes and rhetorical devices that were used more often *for that particular actor* statistically significantly at a ≤ 0.10 level are compared.

Predominant Concerns: China

The predominant concerns expressed by Chinese officials included *Peace*, *Stability*, *Borders and Territory*, *Sovereignty*, *Cooperation*, *China*, and the *South China Sea*.

Although the Chinese frequently engage in questionable activities, Chinese government officials always reiterate how dedicated they are to maintaining "peace and stability" in the South China Sea. The Chinese may be choosing to reemphasize this theme because they want other nations to believe in the legitimacy of their actions. If other nations believe that China is striving to maintain peace and stability in the area, then they are less likely to think that China's activities in the South China Sea are aggressive in nature.

Chinese government officials also discuss matters of borders and territories during press conferences and speeches. This is apparent because China is concerned about acquiring various islands, territories, and economic zones within the South China Sea as well as protecting their "legitimate" sovereignty over these areas. China is always concerned about maintaining their sovereignty over certain areas in the South China Sea to maintain their influence in the area and to further prove their strength.

Similar to China's continued emphasis of peace and stability, China also reemphasizes their desire for continued cooperation in the South China Sea. Chinese government officials always make a point to say that they want to work with other countries to pursue cooperation in the South China Sea and care about settling matters while working in conjunction with other countries rather than just doing what they want. However, as is evident by the amount of gray activities that China engages in, it looks like cooperation may not be as important as them achieving their sovereignty goals. Overall, China's primary concern appears to be China itself.

Finally, one of China's most predominant concerns is the South China Sea. China cares about the South China Sea so much because it contains vital trade routes as well as islands and other territories that China seeks to control. Since the ownership of these waters and the territories within are disputed, China believes that it can seize these assets to strengthen their nation.

The Chinese also used intensifiers more than other rhetorical devices in order to emphasize their points.

Table 6. Predominant Concerns of China. 1= theme statistically more often used at a less than or equal to 0.05 level.

	Group		
Code	China	Philippines	Vietnam
Conflict	0	1	1
Equality_Rights	0	1	0
Peace	1	0	1
Stability	1	0	0
Borders_Territory	1	1	1
Sovereignty	1	1	0
Security	0	0	1
Cooperation	1	1	0
Economy_and_Trade	0	1	0
Formal_Agreement	0	1	0
China	1	1	0
Philippines	0	1	0
South_China_Sea	1	1	0
Vietnam	0	0	1
Intensifier	1	1	1

Predominant Concerns: Philippines

The predominant concerns expressed by Philippine officials included *Conflict*, *Equality and Rights*, *Borders and Territory*, *Sovereignty*, *Cooperation*, *Economy and Trade*, *Formal Agreement*, *China*, *Philippines*, and the *South China Sea*.

Philippine government officials are especially concerned with conflicts, particularly South China Sea disputes. The Philippine government cares about its involvement in this conflict and must stay alert to new developments initiated by China and other Asian nations.

The Philippines is also concerned about matters of equality and rights because they want to be assured equal treatment in the South China Sea region and to have their maritime rights protected, including their rights to ownership of property in the South China Sea and to maintain their exclusive economic zones.

Similarly to the Chinese government, the Philippine government is focused on borders and territories as well as sovereignty. Again, the Philippines is concerned about protecting their sovereignty over their proclaimed borders, territories, and areas of economic control. However, at the same time, the government expresses its desire to cooperate with other countries involved in the South China Sea conflict to draft mutual agreements and ease tensions. The government hopes to create a lasting formal agreement that will outline all territorial ownership in the South China Sea and will resolutely solve

border and territorial disputes. Government officials also prioritize upholding existing formal agreements and laws, especially the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which they believe validates their sovereignty over various areas in the South China Sea.

Furthermore, the Philippines is concerned with maintaining their economic freedom in the South China Sea as well as their right to exclusive economic zones within the sea. They are further interested in ensuring that their economy and trade relations do not suffer as a result of the conflict.

Ultimately, the Philippine government is predominately concerned about its own prosperity, its rocky relationship with China, and the South China Sea, which is an area of valuable significance to the Philippines as it is for China.

Philippine government officials also used intensifiers more than other rhetorical devices in order to emphasize their points.

Table 7. Predominant Concerns of Philippines. 1= theme statistically more often used at a less than or equal to 0.05 level.

	Group		
Code	China	Philippines	Vietnam
Conflict	0	1	1
Equality_Rights	0	1	0
Peace	1	0	1
Stability	1	0	0
Borders_Territory	1	1	1
Sovereignty	1	1	0
Security	0	0	1
Cooperation	1	1	0
Economy_and_Trade	0	1	0
Formal_Agreement	0	1	0
China	1	1	0
Philippines	0	1	0
South_China_Sea	1	1	0
Vietnam	0	0	1
Intensifier	1	1	1

Predominant Concerns: Vietnam

The predominant concerns expressed by Vietnamese officials included *Conflict*, *Peace*, *Borders and Territory*, *Security*, and *Vietnam*.

The Vietnamese government is most likely concerned with conflict, peace, and borders and territory for the same reasons as the Chinese and Philippine governments.

In addition, security is a predominant concern for the Vietnamese government. Vietnam wants to be assured that their borders and territories both on the mainland and on the South China sea are safe, especially during these times of conflict.

However, ultimately, Vietnam is concerned about its own wellbeing above all other countries and territories.

The Vietnamese used intensifiers more than other rhetorical devices in order to emphasize their points, as did the Chinese and the Philippines.

Table 8. Predominant Concerns of Vietnam. 1= theme statistically more often used at a less than or equal to 0.05 level.

	Group		
Code	China	Philippines	Vietnam
Conflict	0	1	1
Equality_Rights	0	1	0
Peace	1	0	1
Stability	1	0	0
Borders_Territory	1	1	1
Sovereignty	1	1	0
Security	0	0	1
Cooperation	1	1	0
Economy_and_Trade	0	1	0
Formal_Agreement	0	1	0
China	1	1	0
Philippines	0	1	0
South_China_Sea	1	1	0
Vietnam	0	0	1
Intensifier	1	1	1

Use of Emotional Language

There were statistical differences in the use of emotional language only between China and Vietnam. The Vietnamese used much more negative language than the Chinese. The Vietnamese used negative languages (both moderately and extremely negative) over twice as much as the Chinese did. These differences were very strong and statistically significant.

Emotional language correlates with the importance of an issue to an actor and so, it provides a measure of sentiment or affect that the actor has on that issue (Fenstermacher et al., 2012; Kuznar & Hunt, 2015). Purely rational (including unemotional) decision-making is the foundation of U.S. government established deterrence theory (USSTRATCOM, 2006), and departures from this (in this case increasingly emotional decision calculus) indicate that more emotion-based heuristics ((Astorino-Courtois, 1998; Bowles, 2001; Boyd & Richerson, 2001; Gigerenzer, 2000; Heuer, 1999)) may influence what the Vietnamese value and how they would protect it.

Table 9. Use of Emotional Language

Emotive Language Metric	China Mean	Vietnam Mean	Mean Difference	t	df (Unequal Var)	Sig (2-tailed)
Negative Language	0.00477	0.01163	-0.00685	-2.223	25.199	0.035
Negative + Extremely Negative Language	0.00726	0.01499	-0.00773	-2.172	27.068	0.039

Overall, the Chinese were much more restrained in their use of emotional language. Chinese government officials seem to have rehearsed responses to questions related to the South China Sea conflict. Speakers would repeat the same responses, including how their position on the South China Sea is "clear and consistent," how they are constantly working towards "peace and stability," how they want to "enhance mutual trust" with other nations, and how they desire to increase cooperation, especially over South China Sea matters. However, their actions appear to have contradicted these claims on various occasions in recent history.

The Vietnamese, however, were less temperate in their word choice. Government officials would directly challenge the Chinese for their involvement in gray zone activities and express their disapproval of their actions. Unlike the Chinese, the Vietnamese did not have any rehearsed responses to questions or phrases that they would repeat whenever discussing a particular issue.

The Vietnamese emphasis, relative to the Chinese, on negative emotion in their discussions concerning South China Sea matters may indicate that they would be more sensitive to losses (fear losing). Moderate levels of fear lead to risk minimizing strategies (such as submitting to higher authorities like the UN), although once the consequences of loss supersede any gains from success, decision makers typically embrace risky strategies (Kuznar, 2002, 2007). Their relatively much higher level of emotionality may indicate that they would depart from the traditional predictions of rational choice and deterrence theory.

Conclusions

Analysis of key themes and uses of language (rhetorical devices) can provide indicators and warnings (I&W) of gray zone activity, reveal the most important concerns of actors, and provide insights into emotional factors that can influence their decision calculus. In the case of the South China Sea conflict, linguistic indicators would have indicated to analysts that China was planning on initiating a series of gray zone events within the next few months. This insight would have enabled analysts to forewarn US and allied officials of potential gray zone actions and to allow them to prepare for Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.

Thematic analysis, in which the density of themes and rhetorical devices are normed against measures of speech length, provide objective metrics that track the potential importance of issues to speakers (and potentially their audiences) and their actual level of emotionality, which impacts decision-making. These measures discipline our own subjective readings of others' discourse in which we are likely to over- or under-estimate the importance of what people express.

Indicators & Warnings (I&W)

Various themes indicated actors' gray zone activity in the South China Sea; however, this analysis did not find a mutual indicator among all three actors.

The specific themes that indicated Chinese gray zone activity included *Conspiracy*, *Self-defense, Equality and Rights*, *Gray Zone Activities*, and *Domestic Development*.

On the other hand, *Criminal/Illegal*, *Borders/Territory*, *Crime*, *Oil/Gas*, *Materiel*, *Protests*, *Friendship*, and *China* were the primary indicators for the Philippines, and *Aggressor/Aggression*, *Legitimacy*, *Economy and Trade*, *UN*, and *Lexicalization* indicated Vietnamese gray activity.

Predominant Concerns of Regional Actors

After assessing the predominant concerns of China, the Philippines, and Vietnam individually, it appears as though the three actors share a mutual concern for their borders, their territories, and their own nation's prosperity.

China also outwardly reveals their preoccupations with peace, stability, sovereignty, cooperation, and the South China Sea. The Philippines, like the Chinese, also display a strong concern about the South China Sea, cooperation, China, and sovereignty and also have a strong interest in conflict, equality and rights, their economy and trade, and formal agreements. Vietnam, like the Philippines, is predominately concerned with conflict as well as peace, like the Chinese, and security.

Emotional Language and Decision Calculus of Regional Actors

There were statistical differences in the use of emotional language only between China and Vietnam. The Vietnamese used over twice as much moderate and extremely negative language as the Chinese did when discussing South China Sea matters and the countries involved. The differences were consequently very strong and statistically significant. The much higher level of emotionality of the Vietnamese relative

to the Chinese may indicate that they would depart from the traditional predictions of rational choice and deterrence theory and take unexpected chances.

Appendix: Graphical Representation of Chinese Indicators & Warnings

Graph 1. This graph indicates the mentions of conspiracy with relation to time periods and the frequency of gray zone actions by China. In particular, the frequent Chinese accusations of conspiracy may indicate that a large volume of gray zone actions may be coming in the near future.

Graph 2. The above graph displays the potential relationship between discourse related to self-defense and the number of gray zone actions over time. Notice how significant peaks of mentions of self-defense will occur immediately before or during a time of many Chinese gray zone actions.

Graph 3. This graph illustrates the potential relationship between mentions of equality and rights with the frequency of gray zone actions initiated by China. Based on this graph, it appears that often times, when equality and/or rights are mentioned, a large amount of gray zone events will occur around the time of the frequent mentioning or within the next few months. There may also be a statistically significant correlation between the number of gray zone events that occur within a month and the number of mentions of equality and/or rights.

Graph 4. This graph displays the amount of times the Chinese mentioned other "gray" zone activities in comparison to the number of Chinese gray zone actions that had occurred at the time. It appears as though during times of frequent discussion of gray zone activities and events, China is more likely to engage in further gray zone activities.

Graph 5. The above graph displays the potential relationship between Chinese mentions of domestic development and gray zone actions during various time periods. According to the above graph, it appears that frequent discussion of domestic development may indicate the incoming prevalence of a series of gray zone events.

Graph 6. This graph displays the amount of times the Chinese posed rhetorical questions during press conferences, speeches, etc. in comparison to the number of gray zone actions during various time periods. Based on the above graph, China frequently posed rhetorical questions either a few months prior to or during a six-month time period with several gray zone actions.

Graph 7. This graph displays the potential relationship between the Chinese use of sarcasm and/or irony as a rhetorical device and the volume of gray zone actions during a six-month time period. Based on the evidence from the above graph, Chinese officials used sarcasm and/or irony either a few months prior to or during a six-month time frame with several gray zone actions.

Appendix: Key Dates and Events

The following table (10) lists key dates and events in the South China Sea case study. A full narrative of events is found in Appendix: Narrative of Historical Events.

Table 10. Key Dates and Events in South China Sea Case Study

Event	Date	Aggressor
Japan detects Chinese sub sailing through Osumi Strait between Japan's Kyushu and Tanegashima islands in East China Sea	12-Nov-03	China
Japanese vessel uses water canon on Chinese fishermen in waters near Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in East China Sea	15-Jan-04	China & Japan
Chinese Navy intimidates Japanese survey ship in East China Sea by performing maneuvers close by	1-Jun-04	China
Chinese sub spends 2 hours submerged in Japanese waters in the East China Sea, eventually slipping between the Liyako and Ishigaki islands before returning to Chinese waters	11-Nov-04	China
Taiwan starts building 1,200 meter runway at Itu Aba Island in the South China Sea	1-May-05	Taiwan
Chinese vessels spotted off Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in East China Sea, remain for 9-hours	1-Sep-05	China
Chinese vessels near Chunxiao gas field point gun at Japanese plane in East China Sea	1-Sep-05	China
Chinese sub stalks USS Kitty Hawk	26-Oct-06	China
Chinese fishing vessel turns spotlight on USNS Victorious in Yellow Sea	4-Mar-09	China
A Chinese maritime surveillance aircraft flies over the USNS Victorious a dozen times, while a Chinese frigate sails within 100 yards of the USNS Impeccable after an aircraft also flew over that vessel	5-Mar-09	China
A Chinese ship warns the USNS Impeccable by radio that it is conducting illegal operations and has to leave the area	7-Mar-09	China
Chinese vessels harass USNS Impeccable	8-Mar-09	China

Malaysia and Vietnam submit UN claims, renewing friction over maritime sovereignty in South China Sea	1-May-09	Malaysia & Vietnam
China claims sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and adjacent waters	1-May-09	China
Chinese sub collides with USNS John S. McCain	11-Jun-09	China
Chinese and Indonesian military vessels seize fishing boats	May–Jul-10	China & Indonesia
Indonesian patrol confronts escorted Chinese fishing boats	23-Jun-10	Indonesia
Chinese fishing boat rams Japanese coast guard vessel near the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in East China Sea	7-Sep-10	China
Clash between Chinese fishing trawler and South Korean coast guard off South Korea's west coast kills two	18-Dec-10	South Korea
Chinese warship allegedly fires warning shots at Philippine vessel	25-Feb-11	China
Two Chinese patrol boats aggressively approach and reportedly threaten to ram, a survey ship conducting seismic testing near Reed Bank	2-Mar-11	China
The Philippines increases military patrols following an incident with two Chinese boats	2-Mar-11	China
Philippine President warns visiting Chinese Defense Minister of a possible arms race in the region if tensions worsened over disputes in the South China Sea	1-May-11	Philippines
China reportedly unloads building materials near Likas and Patag islands on the contested Iroquois Reef-Amy Douglas Bank claimed by the Philippines	21-24-May-11	China
Chinese vessel severs Vietnamese vessel's exploration cables	26-May-11	China
The Philippines summons a Chinese envoy to express mounting concerns over naval incursions in its claimed territory	1-Jun-11	China
Chinese vessel disables Vietnamese vessel's exploration cables	9-Jun-11	China
Vietnam announces live ammunition drills	10-Jun-11	Vietnam

Chinese soldiers oust Vietnamese fisherman	5-Jul-11	China
The Philippine government begins referring to the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea in all official communications	1-Oct-11	Philippines
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also refers to the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea	1-Oct-11	US
Philippine vessel rams Chinese fishing boat in disputed waters near Reed Bank	18-Oct-11	Philippines
China objects to presence of oil exploration vessels in disputed waters near Reed Bank	28-Feb-12	China
Taiwan reaffirms South China Sea sovereignty claims	13-Mar-12	Taiwan
China detains Vietnamese fisherman near the Paracel Islands	23-Mar-12	China
Philippines and China engage in naval standoff at Scarborough Shoal. Two month standoff ensues	10-Apr-12	Philippines & China
Vietnam passes a maritime law asserting its jurisdiction over the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands	1-Jun-12	Vietnam
China launches first aircraft carrier	25-Sep-12	China
Hainan province police gain authority to search and board territory-violating vessels	28-Nov-12	China
Philippines initiates UN arbitration case over Chinese claims of sovereignty to the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal	22-Jan-13	Philippines
China says it has started allowing tourists to visit Woody Island in the Paracels	1-Apr-13	China
Japan offers military aid to allies in the East China Sea and South China Sea	1-May-13	Japan
Malaysia suggests that it might work with China over Chinese South China Sea claims	1-Aug-13	Malaysia
Chinese oil company moves an oil exploration rig near Triton Island in the Paracels	2-May-14 – 15-July-14	China
Chinese fighter jet harasses US surveillance aircraft	1-Aug-14	China

Satellite images suggest China is building an island at Fiery Cross Reef in Spratlys	1-Nov-14	China
Satellite imagery shows China building significant presence in the Spratlys	1-Feb-15	China
A US surveillance plane flies over disputed territories in the South China Sea	20-May-15	US
China completes a 3,125 meter runway on the newly created Fiery Cross reef	1-Sep-15	China
US Navy patrol sails within twelve nautical miles of Chinese-built islands in disputed waters in the South China Sea	26-Oct-15	US
Two US B-52 bombers fly around the Spratly Islands near Chinese-built artificial islands	8-Nov-15	US
Two US B-52 bombers get within 12 nautical miles of China's man-made islands in the South China Sea	10-Dec-15	US
China says it has conducted a civilian test flight to Fiery Cross Reef	2-Jan-16	China
China says it has conducted a second test flights to Fiery Cross Reef	6-Jan-16	China
Chinese media report that China has finished construction on a second 10,000-ton China Coast Guard cutter destined for patrols in the South China Sea	11-Jan-16	China
The guided-missile destroyer Curtis Wilbur sails within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island, claimed by China and two other states in the South China Sea	30-Jan-16	US
New satellite images show what appear to be construction of Chinese helicopter landing sites at Duncan Island in the Paracel chain	13-Feb-16	China
China deploys missiles on Woody Island	14-Feb-16	China
A Taiwanese naval ship accidentally fires a supersonic missile in the direction of China during training exercise, hitting a Taiwanese fishing boat and killing the captain and injuring 3 others	1-Jul-16	Taiwan
Hague court strikes down Beijing's South China Sea claims	12-Jul-16	Hague Court

Appendix: Narrative of Historical Events

Narrative

Chinese Vessels Infringe on Japanese Waters in the East China Sea

Territorial claims in the East China Sea have historically been a point of contention between China and Japan, with territorial disputes and intrusions on behalf of both sides surfacing from time to time since the 1970s. In fact, some of the disputes have roots in the 19th century. Both China and Japan are clearly interested in protecting, and seemingly more and more in potentially growing, their territorial waters in the region, and it appears that both sides are increasingly taking more zealous action to do so.[2]

However, tensions and disputes over territorial waters in this region are not limited to the East China Sea, and Chinese maritime disputes start arising with almost every state with maritime territorial claims in the region. Maritime confrontations between China and its regional neighbors start becoming

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[2] http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26257#.V3PQ61dpBTY

increasingly present in the waters of the South China Sea (particularly around the disputed Spratly islands), the waters around the Korean Peninsula, and the Sea of Okhotsk as well.[3]

The unrest and disputes over territory in the East China Sea between China and Japan seems to start flowing into the South China Sea in the mid-2000s, with China remaining a constant in much of the maritime conflict.

In late 2003 and through 2004, a number of instances arise in which Chinese maritime vessels infringe on Japanese waters in the East China Sea.

On 12 November 2003, a Japanese self-defense aircraft spots a Chinese attack submarine near Japanese waters in the East China Sea. The Chinese submarine heads west on the surface of international waters 25-miles east of Satamisaki and continues sailing through the Osumi Strait between Japan's Kyushu and Tanegashima islands.[4] Interestingly, the Chinese submarine is sailing west, which indicates that it is on its return trip from an unknown mission. The submarine also deliberately decides to float to the surface, therefore increasing its likelihood of detection.[5] This decision by China to apparently deliberately choose to sail its submarine on the surface of waters so close to Japanese territory while also on a return trip from completely unknown whereabouts seems to represent a clear act of provocation and bravado on behalf of the Chinese towards the Japanese over the long-disputed territorial rights of the East China Sea.

On 15 January 2004, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces (JMSDF) fire water cannons at Chinese fishing vessels in waters near the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, leaving one Chinese citizen injured. The Chinese fishing vessels approach to within 10 miles of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands before turning back.[6] This incident, in which Japanese forces use water cannons against Chinese fisherman, highlights the tension surrounding the China-Japan dispute over varying territorial claims in the East China Sea.

Chinese provocation continues when, in June 2004, a PLA Navy vessel performs maneuvers close to a Japanese survey ship in the East China Sea—a move that can be interpreted as an attempt by the Chinese to intimidate Japan.[7] Furthermore, on 11 November 2004, a Chinese submarine spends two hours submerged in Japanese territorial waters in the East China Sea near Taiwan. The Chinese submarine enters the Pacific Ocean region of Japan's territorial waters about 400 kilometers southwest of Okinawa island and then passes between the Miyako and Ishigaki islands and into the East China Sea before returning back to China.[8] While the incursion occurs on the fringe of Japanese territorial waters, it nonetheless seems to represent an attempt by China to stoke the already high tensions surrounding territorial claims in the East China Sea between China and Japan.

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[3] http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26257#.V3PQ61dpBTY
[4] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline; http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EK25Ad01.html
[5] http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EK25Ad01.html
[6] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline;
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26257#.V3PQ61dpBTY
[7] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline
[8] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline; http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FK17Dh01.html

Chinese provocation in the East China Sea continues into 2005. In September 2005, two Chinese Marine surveillance vessels (the 1,100-ton "Haijian" 46" and the 1,700-ton "Haijian 51") are spotted sailing about 6-kilometers southeast of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese-claimed territorial waters. The two vessels remain in Japanese-claimed territorial waters for roughly nine hours.[9] This is yet another illustration of China pushing the boundaries in its dispute with Japan over territorial water claims in the East China Sea.

In an example of clearly increasing Chinese provocation and aggression in the East China Sea, in September 2005 five Chinese naval vessels, including a guided missile destroyer, circle around the contested Chunxiao gas field.[10] One of the Chinese vessels goes so far as to point its gun at a Japanese surveillance aircraft above.[11] This incident not only highlights the value China places on the contested Chunxiao gas field and its resources but also illustrates how significant tensions have become between China and Japan regarding their respective territorial claims in the East China Sea.

After the incident at the Chunxiao gas field, China follows its aggressive actions with an aggressive announcement in which it reveals a new Chinese "reserve vessel squadron" in the East China Sea. China claims that the reserve vessel squadron provides it with the capability to fight during wars with a force equipped to eliminate obstacles at sea.[12]

In response to the Chinese provocation, Japan, which has witnessed steadily increasing Chinese aggression towards Japanese territorial water claims in the East China Sea, officially identifies China as a threat. For the first time, the Japanese Self Defense Forces' "Security and Guarding Plan" identifies China as a threat and suggests serval threat scenarios, including a brigade size invasion of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea.[13]

Taiwan Starts Building an Airstrip in the South China Sea

In May 2005, Taiwan begins building a 1,200-meter runway on Itu Aba island in the South China Sea. Itu Aba island is the largest naturally occurring island in the disputed Spratly islands, and it is the only island in the South China Sea that Taiwan controls.[14] The effort to build an airstrip on an island in the South China Sea represents a tactical move on behalf of Taiwan, and it sends a strong signal regarding Taiwan's interests in and commitment to protecting its territorial claims in the heavily disputed waters of the South China Sea.

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[9] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline

[10] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline; http://www.stratad.net/downloads/PacNet%2047.pdf

[11] http://www.stratad.net/downloads/PacNet%2047.pdf

[12] http://www.stratad.net/downloads/PacNet%2047.pdf

[13] http://www.stratad.net/downloads/PacNet%2047.pdf

[14] http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/

Chinese Submarine Harasses US Aircraft Carrier in the East China Sea

On 26 October 2006, Chinese aggression and provocation continues in the East China Sea, but this time, it is directed at the US when a PLA Navy submarine stalks the United States' USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier in the East China Sea.[15] China's willingness to stalk a US military aircraft carrier seems to highlight how important maritime territorial sovereignty interests are to China and how serious the Chinese are in ensuring those interests.

The USNS Impeccable Incident in the South China Sea

In another example of Chinese aggression toward a US vessel, on 4 March 2009, a Chinese Bureau of Fisheries vessel shines a high-powered spotlight on the USNS Victorious, an unarmed surveillance ship sailing in international waters in the Yellow Sea, forcing the ship to come to a halt.[16] In continuing with aggressive actions targeted at the USNS Victorious, the next day, on 5 March 2009, a Chinese maritime surveillance aircraft flies over the USNS Victorious a dozen times.[17]

Building on its aggression and provocation toward the USNS Victorious, China doubles down and targets another US vessel, but this time in the South China Sea.

5 March 2009 turns out to be a busy day for Chinese aggression over international waters, as China also targets the USNS Impeccable in the South China Sea. The USNS Impeccable, an unarmed oceanographic surveillance vessel conducting routine surveillance operations in international waters, is first targeted by a Chinese aircraft fly over and then later targeted when a Chinese frigate sails within 100 yards of the US vessel.[18] A few days later, on 7 March 2009, a Chinese ship radios to the USNS Impeccable warning the US ship that it is conducting illegal operations and must leave the area.[19]

The next day, on 8 March 2009, five Chinese vessels (a Naval intelligence-gathering ship, a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries Patrol vessel, a state oceanographic administration patrol vessel, and two small trawlers) surround and harass the USNS Impeccable as it is conducting routine operations in international waters, approximately 75-miles south of Hainan island in the South China Sea.[20] Despite attempts from the unarmed USNS Impeccable to radio-request a safe path to leave the area, the Chinese ships maneuver in front of the vessel and drop wood in its path, forcing the USNS Impeccable to

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[15] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline

[16] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline; http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499;
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY

[17] http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY

[18] http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY;
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7933171.stm

[19] http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY

[20] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline; http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7933171.stm;
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY

make an emergency stop.[21] Once the USNS Impeccable is stopped, the Chinese ships attempt to grab the sonar array being towed behind the ship.[22]

These incidents of Chinese aggression and provocation directed at the USNS Victorious and USNS Impeccable portray targeted aggressive tactics over multiple days by the Chinese toward US vessels operating in what is considered international waters; however, these are also waters that the Chinese appear to believe are within China's maritime territorial sovereignty claims. The level of aggression and provocation directed at unarmed US vessels also seemingly underlines China's seriousness regarding its maritime territorial claims.

The US formally condemns the Chinese aggression toward the USNS Impeccable, claiming China violated international law on respecting other users of the sea.[23] China, on the other hand, does not deny the details of the incident with the USNS Impeccable, but it instead characterizes the US surveillance activities as fundamentally improper and arrogant.[24]

South China Sea Territorial Sovereignty Claims to the UN

Tensions over maritime sovereignty in the South China Sea only continue to rise when, in May 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam file a submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in which the two countries request that their continental shelves be extended beyond the standard two-hundred nautical miles from their coastlines.[25] By extending their continental shelves, the two countries can claim the economic rights to larger areas of the South China Sea, including the rights to any energy resources discovered.[26]

As to be expected, China objects the Malaysian and Vietnamese submission, which it views as a challenge to its territorial claims in the South China Sea. China claims that the Malaysian and Vietnamese submission seriously infringes on China's indisputable sovereignty over islands and territory in the South China Sea.[27]

Following the lead of Malaysia and Vietnam, China files its own territorial sovereignty submission to the UN in May 2009. In its submission, China claims sovereignty over all of the islands in the South China Sea and adjacent waters. Furthermore, the Chinese submission includes the "nine-dash line" map, in which China uses nine-dashed lines to mark out and claim territorial waters that extend hundreds of miles to

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[21] http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY;
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7933171.stm
[22] http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY
[23] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7933171.stm
[24] http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34923&no_cache=1#.V3RUvldpBTY
[25] http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345; http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499
[26] http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499
[27] http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345;
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/

the south and east of its island province of Hainan. Unsurprisingly, Malaysia and Vietnam object the Chinese submissions.[28]

Chinese Submarine Harasses Another US Vessel

On 11 June 2009, a PLA Navy submarine follows the USS John S. McCain in the South China Sea near Subic Bay off the coast of the Philippines. In addition to stalking the US vessel, the PLA submarine is also suspected of colliding with and damaging the ship's sonar equipment.[29] The incident is another example of Chinese aggression and provocation toward US vessels operating in what are considered international waters but are also waters that the Chinese appear to believe are within China's maritime territorial sovereignty claims.

Aggression from Chinese Fishing Vessels

Between May and July 2010, Chinese and Indonesian military vessels seize control of fishing vessels from each other's countries that are suspected of illegally fishing in the South China Sea. Notably, during several of the confrontations, Indonesian naval vessels encounter armed Chinese fishing vessels, including a heavily armed Chinese fishing management vessel.[30]

The encounters with armed Chinese fishing vessels is particularly interesting, as the use of armed fisherman as proxies for pushing the boundaries of maritime territorial disputes could potentially represent a clever tactic on behalf of the Chinese.

On 23 June 2010, the Indonesian Navy confronts ten Chinese fishing vessels operating without permission approximately 65-miles northwest of the Natuna islands in Indonesia's exclusive economic zone, and the confrontation eventually leads to the Indonesian Navy vessels temporarily seizing a Chinese fishing vessel. The confrontation escalates when a heavily armed Chinese fishery management vessel points a large-caliber machine gun at the Indonesian Navy vessel and threatens to fire, which quickly forces the Indonesian Navy vessels to free the seized Chinese fishing vessel.[31]

In an incident with Japan near the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, on 7 September 2010 a Chinese fishing vessel rams a Japanese Coast Guard vessel after it attempts to interdict the Chinese fishing vessel. The aggressive act prompts Japan to arrest the Chinese crew, which then triggers China to enforce an unofficial embargo against Japan and also arrest four Japanese businessmen in China. The Chinese fisherman are later released following two weeks of escalating tension between China and Japan.[32] This incident highlights the tensions surrounding the maritime territorial dispute between China

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[28] http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/
[29] http://edition.cnn.com/2009/US/06/12/china.submarine/index.html; http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499; http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline
[30] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline
[31] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline; http://www.weeklystandard.com/article/489430
[32] http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345; http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline

and Japan in the East China Sea and sparks debate about Japan's ability to defend its interests in the face of China's rise.[33]

In another incident, this time off of South Korea's west coast, on 18 December 2010, a Chinese fishing vessel clashes with a South Korean Coast Guard vessel, leaving two Chinese fisherman dead. The skirmish ignites as the South Korean Coast Guard attempts to prevent the Chinese fishing vessels from illegally fishing in South Korea's maritime territory off of its west coast.[34] While this incident does not occur in the South China Sea or East China Sea, it does highlight significant tensions over maritime territorial claims and assumed rights in all of China's surrounding waters, including the Yellow Sea, as demonstrated by this incident.

Interestingly, these incidents indicate a willingness on behalf of China to use fishing vessels as a proxy for pushing aggression and Chinese maritime territorial interests in the waters surrounding the country.

Tensions Increase Between China and the Philippines

Instances of aggression and increased tension between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea start cropping up in 2011.

Chinese aggression around the disputed Spratly islands in the South China Sea is on display when, on 25 February 2011, a Chinese warship fires warning shots at Philippine fishing vessels after ordering the fisherman to leave the waters near Jackson Atoll in the Spratly islands, 140-nautical miles from the Palawan island and Philippine territory.[35]

On 2 March 2011, Chinese aggression towards the Philippines continues when two Chinese patrol boats aggressively approach and reportedly threaten to ram[36] a survey ship conducting seismic testing near Reed Bank, which is located in waters to the west of the Philippines' Palawan island and within the Philippines-declared exclusive economic zone (EEZ).[37] "The incident underscores China's continued willingness to apply limited coercion in disputes with Southeast Asian countries over maritime resources such energy resources and fisheries."[38]

With tensions clearly rising between China and the Philippines over maritime territorial sovereignty concerns in the waters surrounding Philippines-claimed territory, the Philippines hardens its stance towards China following the Reed Bank incident. This hardened stance includes strengthening the

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[33] http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345
[34] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline
[35] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline; http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499; http://news.abs-cbn.com/-depth/06/02/11/china-fired-Philippine-fishermen-jackson-atoll
[36] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline
[37] http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37902#.V3XmK1dpBTY; http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline
[38] http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37902#.V3XmK1dpBTY

presence of Philippine armed forces in the disputed Spratly islands and launching formal objections to China's territorial sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.[39]

Two months later, in May 2011, Philippine President Benigno Aquino III warns visiting Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie of the possibility of an arms race in the region if tensions continue to increase over disputes in the South China Sea.[40] The warning underlines the seriousness of the Philippines' concerns regarding its maritime territorial sovereignty, and the continued Chinese infringement on that sovereignty, in the South China Sea.

Seemingly undeterred by the Philippine threats, between 21-24 May 2011, Chinese marine surveillance vessels and PLA Navy vessels unload building materials in the South China Sea near Likas and Patag islands on the contested Amy Douglas Bank, territory claimed by the Philippines.[41]

Clearly frustrated and amidst continuously increasing China-Philippine tensions, on 1 June 2011, the Philippines summon a Chinese envoy to express its mounting concern over Chinese maritime incursions into Philippine-claimed waters and territories in the South China Sea. The Philippines cite at least five incursions over the past year by Chinese vessels near the Spratly islands and Amy Douglas Bank, territories off the coast of Palawan island and Philippine territory.[42]

Tensions Increase Between China and Vietnam

With tensions already high between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, instances of aggression and increased tension between China and Vietnam begin arising in mid-2011.

On 26 May 2011, Vietnam accuses a Chinese marine surveillance vessel of severing the exploration cables of a Vietnamese-chartered seismic vessel as it is conducting a seismic survey along the continental shelf in waters off Vietnam.[43] Later, on 9 June 2011, a Chinese fishing vessel ensnares itself in the exploration cables of a Vietnamese survey vessel, disabling the Vietnamese vessel in the water. The incident occurs about 1,000-kilometers off China's Hainan island and within Vietnam's 200-nautical mile continental shelf in which Vietnam has territorial sovereignty rights.[44] Vietnam publicly objects the two incidents of Chinese aggression and territorial dispute, claiming the Chinese are using systematic acts of aggression to dispute undisputed territory as a means of attempting to materialize China's "nine-dash line" claim over South China Sea waters, a claim that is unacceptable to Vietnam.[45]

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[39] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline;
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37902#.V3XmK1dpbTY
[40] http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499
[41] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline
[42] http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345
[43] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline
[44] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline; http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns110610145220#tr5qmcP0xVB6
[45] http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/ns110610145220#tr5qmcP0xVB6

The next day, on 10 June 2011, Vietnam announces that it will conduct two nine-hour live ammunition drills.[46] Vietnam's announcement, which comes following Chinese incursions and acts of aggression towards Vietnam and in waters that Vietnam claims as its own, represents a provocative response that illuminates Vietnam's underlying frustrations with the Chinese in the South China Sea.

Chinese aggression continues when, on 5 July 2011, armed Chinese soldiers chase down a Vietnamese fishing vessel and eventually board the Vietnamese vessel, where the Chinese soldiers proceed to beat a Vietnamese fisherman and threaten others before expelling the Vietnamese ship from the waters. The incident takes place in waters near the disputed Paracel islands in the South China Sea[47] and is just another example of Chinese aggression in the waters of the South China Sea.

The Philippines Renames the South China Sea

With tensions and Chinese aggression steadily increasing in the South China Sea, the Philippines responds provocatively in a political sense when, in October 2011, the Philippine government begins referring to the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea in all official Philippine communications. Interestingly, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton also refers to the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea in a joint US-Philippines press conference in November 2011.[48] The move by the Philippine government clearly underlines its frustration with China and its aggressive nature in the South China Sea.

An Incident of Philippine Aggression Toward the Chinese in the South China Sea

The Philippines takes on the role of the aggressor in the South China Sea when, on 18 October 2011, a Philippine Naval vessel rams a small Chinese fishing vessel in disputed waters near Reed Bank.[49] While the Philippines quickly apologizes to China for the incident, which it claims to be an accident, the incident is a notable example of a role reversal in which the Philippines plays the aggressor in an incident with China. To this point, most of the maritime aggression between China and the Philippines in the waters of the South China Sea has been initiated by China.

China Objects to Oil Exploration Near Reed Bank

On 28 February 2012, China publicly expresses its objection and disapproval of energy exploration in disputed waters near Reed Bank in the South China Sea.[50] The Philippines, however, claims that it has sovereign rights to exploit resources in Reed Bank because the territory falls in waters within a 200-nautical mile Philippine exclusive economic zone.[51] China and the Philippines had a number of incidents and disputes in waters surrounding the Reed Bank in 2011, and this public objection over resource

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[46] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline

[47] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline; http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499; http://globalnation.inquirer.net/5887/vietnam-chinese-soldiers-attack-fishermen

[48] http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345

[49] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline

[50] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline

[51] http://www.eurasiareview.com/09032012-china-philippines-dispute-in-south-china-sea-does-beijing-have-legitimate-claim-analysis/

exploitation might provide some insight into the factors driving China's aggression over territorial claims surrounding Reed bank.

Taiwan Claims Sovereignty Over South China Sea

With uncertainty surrounding maritime territorial sovereignty claims and rights in the South China Sea continuing to increase, on 13 March 2012, Taiwan claims sovereignty over the entire South China Sea.[52] Taiwan's sovereignty claim further complicates what is already a complicated sovereignty situation in the South China Sea.

China Detains Vietnamese Fisherman

On 23 March 2012, China detains 21 Vietnamese fishermen near the Paracel islands in the South China Sea and demands $11,000 for the release of the fishermen.[53] The Paracel islands are controlled by China's military but are also claimed by Vietnam as sovereign territory,[54] and this incident certainly highlights the tensions that exist over territorial rights in the South China Sea.

Standoff at Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea

On 10 April 2012, a naval standoff begins between China and the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. The standoff begins when a Philippine surveillance aircraft spots Chinese fishing vessels at Scarborough Shoal, territory claimed by both China and the Philippines. In response, the Philippine Navy then deploys its largest warship to the area, in what can certainly be interpreted as a provocative response from the Philippine side. The Philippines claim the Chinese fisherman are exploiting the resources of Philippine-claimed maritime territory in the South China Sea. The aggressive response from the Philippine side prompts response from China, which then sends surveillance ships to the Scarborough Shoal to warn the Philippine Navy to leave the area. A two-month standoff between the maritime forces from China and the Philippines ensues. Eventually, on 18 June 2012, amidst anticipation of the looming typhoon season, the Philippine vessels leave the Scarborough Shoal area, and the Chinese fishing vessels depart shortly thereafter.[55]

The tit-for-tat responses from the Philippines and China in this incident, and particularly the Philippine decision to send such a strong message by deploying its largest warship to respond to Chinese fishing vessels believed to be simply exploiting resources in Philippine-claimed waters, shows how tense the situation in the South China Sea has become. Furthermore, the two-month standoff that results from this initial incident illustrates how quickly disputes over territorial claims and rights can escalate in this maritime region.

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[52] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline; http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499

[53] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/asia/china-vietnamese-fishermen-detained.html?_r=0; http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline

[54] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/asia/china-vietnamese-fishermen-detained.html?_r=0

[55] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline; http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499

Vietnam Passes Maritime Law on Disputed Territory in the South China Sea

In June 2012, Vietnam announces its passing of a maritime law that asserts Vietnamese jurisdiction over the disputed Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea. As part of the new law, Vietnam demands notification from any foreign naval vessels passing through the area.[56] This new Vietnamese maritime law is seemingly an attempt by Vietnam to increase its control over disputed territories in which it believes to be within Vietnam's territorial sovereignty.

Not surprisingly, China strongly objects Vietnam's announcement. Following the Vietnamese announcement, China makes its own announcement in which it claims that China has established a city named Sansha on the Paracel islands that will administer the territories and waters surrounding the Paracel islands, Spratly islands, and Macclesfield Bank.[57] The Chinese announcement is a clear act of provocation, and seems to be an attempt by the Chinese to emphasize that China is in fact control of these important, and largely disputed, territories in the South China Sea.

China Launches its First Aircraft Carrier

On 25 September 2012, China puts its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, into service. China notes that the Liaoning aircraft carrier will help protect Chinese national sovereignty.[58] The deployment of its first aircraft carrier is a large advancement for China and something that will certainly help the Chinese in protecting their maritime territorial sovereignty interests in the South China Sea.

New Chinese Search and Seizure Regulations

On 28 November 2012, China announces new regulations that provide police in its Hainan Province the authority to board and search vessels deemed to be violating Chinese territorial waters. Furthermore, the new regulations will allow the Hainan police to take over foreign vessels and their communication assets if they are deemed to be in violation of Chinese territorial maritime rights and claims. The new regulations are to be put into action starting on 1 January 2013.[59] The announcement of these new, and clearly provocative, regulations underscores China's willingness to utilize aggressive tactics in order to ensure its territorial claims and rights in the South China Sea.

As to be expected, China's neighbors in the South China Sea react negatively to the provocative Chinese announcement.[60]

The Philippines Files a UN Case Over Chinese Sovereignty Claims in the South China Sea

On 22 January 2013, the Philippines files an international arbitration case under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to seek a ruling on the Philippines' right to exploit South China Sea waters

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[56] http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345
[57] http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345
[58] http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345
[59] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline
[60] http://www.cnas.org/flashpoints/timeline

within its 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone[61] and to also dispute Chinese sovereignty claims over the Spratly islands and Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea.[62] This is a notable move from the Philippines, as the case marks the first time a country has brought a claim against China under UNCLOS regarding the issue.[63] Not surprisingly, China refuses to participate in the case.[64]

The move by the Philippines comes after what turns out to be a notable year of China-Philippine aggression and dispute in the South China Sea in 2012. Shortly after, China initiates its new regulations allowing Hainan Province police to search and seize vessels in waters that China claims territorial rights over.

Chinese Tourism on Woody Island in South China Sea

In April 2013, China announces that it has started allowing tourists to visit Woody island in the Paracels in the South China Sea as part of a cruise experience.[65]

While the move is not violent or overly aggressive, it does seem to personify a tactical action within the Chinese strategy for the ongoing South China Sea regional maritime confrontation. China is bringing Chinese tourists to disputed territories in the South China Sea, which makes the territory feel and appear to be an extension of Chinese land and therefore within Chinese sovereignty. This seems to be a clever tactic in shifting the territory dispute more in the favor of the side of China.

Japan Offers Military Aid

For the first time since World War II, in May 2013, Japan offers military aid to some of its regional allies that have maritime disputes with China. The move is viewed as a Japanese bid to bolster its Southeast Asia regional alliances vis-à-vis China in the East China Sea and South China Sea.[66] Of particular interest to South China Sea observers, as part of the move, Japan announces that it will provide patrol boats to the Philippines to help boost the country's ability to counter China's growing maritime presence in the South China Sea.[67]

The move is a significant step for Japa, and seems to provide some insight into Japan's strategy for competing with Chinese maritime efforts in the region.

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[61] http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/
[62] http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345
[63] http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345
[64] http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/; http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345
[65] http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/
[66] http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345
[67] http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345

Malaysia Suggests It Might Work with China Over South China Sea Claims

In August 2013, Malaysia claims that it might work with China over Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea and ignore other regional claimants. Furthermore, Malaysian Defense Minister Hishamuddin Hussein states that Malaysia has no problem with China patrolling the South China Sea.[68]

This seems to be an interesting development in the battle for territorial control in the South China Sea. To this point, it seems as though most of the incidents and announcements from other regional actors have been directed against China and not towards working with China, as is the case in this announcement from Malaysia.

Oil Rig Standoff Near Triton Island in the South China Sea

A dispute and resulting standoff between China and Vietnam sparks when, on 2 May 2014, a Chinese oil company, CNPC, moves an oil exploration rig near the Triton island in the Paracels in the South China Sea. Other Chinese vessels surround the oil rig, and interfere with and prevent Vietnamese vessels from approaching. A China-Vietnam standoff ensues. The standoff eventually ends after about two-months when, on 15 July 2014, China moves the oil rig.[69]

The standoff between China and Vietnam around the placement of a Chinese oil rig in waters near the Triton island in the South China Sea highlights the sensitivity around territorial claims and resource rights in the largely disputed, resource-rich waters and territories of the South China Sea.

Chinese Aggression in the Airspace Domain

In August 2014, a US surveillance aircraft is harassed by a Chinese fighter jet over territorial waters claimed by China. Following the incident, the Chinese Navy calls on Chinese fighter jets to fly even closer to US surveillance aircraft over Chinese-claimed waters.[70]

The Chinese aggression, which has now clearly spread into the airspace domain, illustrates the lengths to which China is willing to go across all domains to protect its interests regarding maritime territorial rights and claims.

China Builds Man-Made Islands in the Spratlys in the South China Sea

In a clear and clever move to strengthen Chinese territorial claims and increase the reach of Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea, China starts efforts to build man-made island chains in the Spratlys in the South China Sea.

In November 2014, satellite images start to suggest that China is building an island, which appears to be large enough for an airstrip, at Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys in the South China Sea.[71] A few months

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[68] http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499
[69] http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/
[70] http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499
[71] http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/

later, in February 2015, satellite images suggest that China is not just building one artificial island in the Spratlys, but instead building a much more significant presence. The satellite images go on to show that China is reclaiming land and apparently building airstrips at five sites in the Spratlys, an aggressive move that is described as a methodical and well-panned strategy to create a chain of air-and-sea-capable Chinese fortresses.[72]

Chinese provocation over the Spratlys continues when, on 20 May 2015, a US surveillance plane with CNN crew members flying over the South China Sea is warned eight times by the Chinese Navy and is repeatedly told to quickly leave the area.[73] The incident highlights Chinese interests in protecting the secrecy around its territorial claims and the work being done to develop man-made islands in the Spratlys. The incident also highlights the types of steps China is willing to take, even in the airspace domain, to protect Chinese interests.

In a major development for the Chinese, China completes construction of a 1.93-mile runway on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys in September 2015.[74]

The completion of the runway on Fiery Cross Reef is a significant milestone in China's attempts to expand its regional territorial control and reach in the South China Sea. With one runway completed on a man-made island, one would expect China to continue similar building efforts on other islands throughout the South China Sea.

The US Tests Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea

With the announcement of China successfully completing an airstrip on man-made islands in the Spratlys in the South China Sea, the US responds by initiating efforts to test and push the boundaries of freedom of navigation in the waters of the South China Sea.

On 26 October 2015, a US Navy warship, the USS Lassen, sails within 12-nautical miles of China's man-made islands on the Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys.[75] Following the incident, the US claims that it will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permits and whenever its operational needs require.[76] China, on the other hand, strongly opposes the incident, calling it a serious provocation and abuse of freedom of navigation.[77]

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[72] http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/
[73] http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html;
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/
[74] http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html;
http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499
[75] http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/; http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345; http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html; http://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-timeline-history-chinese-us-involvement-contested-region-2158499
[76] http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html
[77] http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html; http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345

In another incident, this time in the airspace domain, on 8 November 2015, two US B-52 bombers fly around the Spratlys near the Chinese-built artificial islands.[78] In a similar incident, on 10 December 2015, two US B-52 bombers fly within 12-nautical miles of the Chinese man-made islands in the Spratlys in the South China Sea.[79] Both incidents illustrate examples of the US pushing the territorial boundaries in the South China Sea through actions in which the Chinese are very familiar with taking themselves.

Chinese Test Flights to Fiery Cross Reef Airstrip

After announcing the completion of an airstrip on the artificial Chinese island on the Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys in the South China Sea, Chinese provocation continues when it announces that it is going to start making test flights on its new airstrip.

On 2 January 2016, China conducts its first civilian test flight to the Fiery Cross Reef airstrip. A few days later, on 6 January 2016, China conducts its second round of civilian test flights to the airstrip.[80]

Vietnam, not surprisingly, strongly objects the Chinese actions regarding its new airstrip.[81]

The completed airstrip and ability to fly to and from the artificial island on the Fiery Cross Reef is a significant development for the Chinese and one that would seemingly help to ensure China's interests in safeguarding and expanding its territorial sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. The test flights clearly illustrate the strategic value that the airstrip and man-made island provides to the Chinese in what now represents a Chinese outpost in the middle of largely disputed territorial waters in the South China Sea.

Chinese "Monster" Ship

Chinese provocation and bravado continues when, on 11 January 2016, it announces that it has finished construction on a 10,000-ton Coast Guard cutter to be used for patrols in the South China Sea. The large size of the new vessel results in it being called "the monster" by Chinese media.[82]

The announcement of the new, massive vessel is a seemingly provocative move by the Chinese to assert its dominance over its regional waters.

The US Continues to Test Freedom of Navigation

In continuing with its efforts from late 2015 to push freedom of navigation boundaries in the South China Sea, on 30 January 2016, a US guided-missile destroyer warship, the USS Curtis Wilbur, sails within 12-nautical miles of the disputed Triton island in the South China Sea.[83] Notably, the Triton island

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[78] http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html
[79] http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html
[80] http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html; http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/
[81] http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html; http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/
[82] http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html
[83] http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html

L e a d i n g D i s c u r s i v e I n d i c a t o r s o f G r a y Z o n e A c t i v i t y :
S o u t h C h i n a S e a C a s e S t u d y

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territory is claimed by China, as well as two other states (Taiwan and Vietnam). China, as expected, condemns the incident, claiming the US actions are intentionally provocative, irresponsible, and extremely dangerous.[84]

Satellite Images Suggest More Chinese Construction in the South China Sea

China's construction of artificial islands and military infrastructure in the South China Sea appears to be an innovative, tactical strategy for ensuring and expanding Chinese maritime territorial sovereignty claims and overall Chinese military strength in the regional waters. Given this, it is reasonable to expect China to continue with its artificial island construction efforts in the South China Sea.

This is confirmed when, on 13 February 2016, satellite imagery shows what appears to be Chinese construction on Duncan island in the Paracel islands in the South China Sea. The satellite imagery appears to display construction of helicopter landing sites,[85] which would illustrate another move as part of the Chinese strategy to expand its influence, capability, and control further out into the South China Sea.

China Deploys Missiles to Paracel Islands in South China Sea

In what represents another move to expand Chinese military, and overall, influence and control further out into the South China Sea, on 14 February 2014, China deploys surface-to-air missiles on Woody island in the Paracel islands in the South China Sea.[86]

The move to deploy surface-to-air missiles on disputed territory in disputed South China Sea waters is a clearly provocative act of aggression on behalf of the Chinese in their attempts to ensure Chinese territorial interests in the South China Sea.

While China claims that the installation of the missiles is its right for defense on its sovereign territory, the US warns that the missile deployment might signal a militarization of the South China Sea maritime disputes.[87]

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[84] http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html
[85] http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html
[86] http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345; http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-timeline-20160217-htmlstory.html; http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/
[87] http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345

Appendix: Source Data

Table 11. Chinese Government Speeches Analyzed in South China Sea Case Study

Document_Name	Date	Period	Word Count
2002.08.06_China_Chinese Government 02	8/6/02	1	1451
2004.02.25_China_Kong Quan 02	2/25/04	3	186
2004.04.07_China_Kong Quan 01	4/7/04	3	23
2004.04.19_China_Wu Hongbo	4/19/04	3	1045
2004.04.20_China_Kong Quan 05	4/20/04	3	45
2004.05.20_China_Liu Jianchao 02	5/20/04	3	527
2004.10.22_China_Zhang Qiyue 01	10/22/04	4	448
2004.11.24_China_Zhang Qiyue 03	11/24/04	4	680
2005.03.11_China_Kong Quan 07	3/11/05	5	426
2005.03.16_China_Liu Jianchao 03	3/16/05	5	928
2005.07.21_China_Wu Hongbo 04	7/21/05	6	1130
2005.10.11_China_Wu Hongbo 05	10/11/05	6	698
2005.12.12_China_Wen Jiabao 02	12/12/05	6	1847
2005.12.16_China_Li Jinjun 01	12/16/05	6	600
2006.09.15_China_Qin Gang 03	9/15/06	8	1101
2006.11.17_China_Jiang Yu 01	11/17/06	8	656
2007.04.01_China_Wen Jiabao 01	4/1/07	9	52
2007.12.11_China_Qin Gang 05	12/11/07	10	132
2008.01.25_China_Jiang Yu 03	1/25/08	11	365
2008.02.05_China_Liu Jianchao 02	2/5/08	11	638
2008.05.25_China_Qin Gang 06	5/25/08	11	319
2008.07.29_China_Liu Jianchao 04	7/29/08	12	29
2009.02.03_China_Jiang Yu 04	2/3/09	13	80
2009.03.11_China_Ma Zhaoxu 01	3/11/09	13	625
2009.03.17_China_Qin Gang 08	3/17/09	13	143
2009.03.25_China_Liu Jianchao 05	3/25/09	13	708
2009.04.28_China_Liu Jianchao 06	4/28/09	13	2508
2009.06.25_China_Qin Gang 11	6/25/09	13	217
2010.06.03_China_Liu Jianchao 08	6/3/10	15	149
2010.10.14_China_Ma Zhaoxu 06	10/14/10	16	377
2011.01.26_China_Hong Lei 03	1/26/11	17	57
2011.03.25_China_Jiang Yu 11	3/25/11	17	282
2011.05.31_China_Jiang Yu 13	5/31/11	17	44
2011.06.07_China_Hong Lei 08	6/7/11	17	165

2011.06.10_China_Hong Lei 11	6/10/11	17	127
2011.06.22_China_Hong Lei 14	6/22/11	18	154
2011.07.12_China_Hong Lei 17	7/12/11	18	36
2011.07.24_China_Yang Jiechi 03	7/24/11	18	1265
2011.09.07_China_He Yafei 01	9/7/11	18	792
2011.09.19_China_Hong Lei 18	9/19/11	18	423
2011.09.29_China_Qin Gang 12	9/29/11	18	1300
2011.10.27_China_Liu Xiaoming 03	10/27/11	18	2189
2011.11.22_China_Liu Weimin 02	11/22/11	18	660
2012.02.13_China_Liu Weimin 05	2/13/12	19	306
2012.03.06_China_Fu Ying 02	3/6/12	19	770
2012.04.05_China_Hong Lei 24	4/5/12	19	148
2012.04.11_China_Liu Weimin 07	4/11/12	19	295
2012.04.23_China_Liu Weimin 09	4/23/12	19	64
2012.05.14_China_Hong Lei 25	5/14/12	19	127
2012.06.04_China_Liu Weimin 12	6/4/12	19	559
2012.07.03_China_Liu Weimin 13	7/3/12	20	186
2012.09.03_China_Hong Lei 29	9/3/12	20	824
2012.09.13_China_Hong Lei 30	9/13/12	20	182
2012.11.29_China_Hong Lei 32	11/29/12	20	303
2012.12.24_China_Hua Chunying 02	12/24/12	20	301
2013.01.07_China_Hong Lei 35	1/7/13	21	68
2013.02.05_China_Liu Xiaoming 04	2/5/13	21	1537
2013.04.02_China_Hong Lei 39	4/2/13	21	285
2013.05.10_China_Hua Chunying 05	5/10/13	21	244
2013.06.06_China_Hong Lei 41	6/6/13	21	639
2013.12.11_China_Wang Yi 14	12/11/13	22	1521
2014.05.21_China_Xi Jinping 03	5/21/14	23	2426
2014.07.15_China_Hong Lei 02	7/15/14	24	236
2015.03.08_China_Wang Yi 04	3/8/15	25	144
2015.03.26_China_Geng Yansheng 01	3/26/15	25	1606
2015.04.13_China_Qu Zhe 01	4/13/15	25	1856
2015.05.16_China_Fan Changlong 02	5/16/15	25	197
2015.05.31_China_Sun Jianguo 01	5/31/15	25	296
2015.07.24_China_Lu Kang 01	7/24/15	26	233
2015.10.17_China_Liu Zhenmin 06	10/17/15	26	2752
2015.10.29_China_Yang Yujun 01	10/29/15	26	894

2016.02.26_China_Wang Yi 11	2/26/16	27	4452
2016.04.22_China_Wang Yi 01	4/22/16	27	93
2016.05.26_China_Yang Yujun 02	5/26/16	27	619
2016.06.02_China_Tian Xuejun 01	6/2/16	27	920
2016.06.18_China_Zhang Ping 01	6/18/16	27	986
2016.07.01_China_Wang Yi 03	7/1/16	28	2747
2016.07.12_China_Wang Yi 02	7/12/16	28	1187
2016.07.13_China_Liu Zhenmin 02	7/13/16	28	1120
2016.07.28_China_Yang Yujun 03	7/28/16	28	2616

Table 12. Philippine Government Speeches Analyzed in South China Sea Case Study

Document_Name	Date	Period	Word Count
2011.03.04_Phillippines_Benigno Aquino_03b	3/4/11	17	243
2011.08.26_Phillippines_Benigno Aquino_04b	8/26/11	18	1535
2011.09.01_Phillippines_Benigno Aquino_11	9/1/11	18	962
2011.11.15_Phillippines_Albert del Rosario_05	11/15/11	18	796
2012.06.13_Phillippines_Benigno Aquino_08b	6/13/12	19	1215
2012.09.06_Phillippines_Department of Foreign Affairs_02	9/6/12	20	261
2013.01.18_Phillippines_Raul Hernandez_01b	1/18/13	21	142
2013.06.12_Phillippines_Benigno Aquino_07b	6/12/13	21	1002
2013.10.09_Philippines_Benigno S Aquino III 02	10/9/13	22	944
2014.02.25_Phillippines_Raul Hernandez_02b	2/25/14	23	229
2014.03.30_Phillippines_Albert del Rosario_08	3/30/14	23	602
2014.06.27_Philippines_Edwin Lacierda 01	6/27/14	23	196
2015.06.05_Phillippines_Benigno Aquino_09b	6/5/15	25	1791
2016.02.29_Phillippines_Albert del Rosario_04	2/29/16	27	129
2016.05.30_Phillippines_Department of Foreign Affairs_01	5/30/16	27	168

Table 13. Vietnamese Government Speeches Analyzed in South China Sea Case Study

Document_Name	Date	Period	Word Count
2004.04.07_ Vietnam_Le Dung 01a	4/7/04	3	31
2009.03.19_Vietnam_Nguyen Minh Triet_02 and Nguyen Tan Dung_03	4/28/09	13	164
2009.04.23_Vietnam_Nguyen Tan Dung_04	4/23/09	13	1411
2009.05.25_Vietnam_Nguyen Tan Dung_02	5/25/09	13	1002
2009.12.29_Vietnam_Nguyen Phuong Nga_02	12/29/09	14	51
2011.05.28_Vietnam_Nguyen Duy Chien_01	5/28/11	17	75
2011.12.22_Vietnam_Nguyen Tan Dung_07	12/22/11	18	685
2013.05.31_Vietnam_Nguyen Tan Dung_10	5/31/13	21	258
2013.07.25_Vietnam_Truong Tan Sang_01	7/25/13	22	249
2013.10.13_Vietnam_Nguyen Tan Dung_09	10/13/13	22	583
2014.05.11_Vietnam_Nguyen Tan Dung_17	5/11/14	23	117
2014.05.21_Vietnam_Nguyen Tan Dung_11	5/21/14	23	597
2014.05.22_Vietnam_Nguyen Tan Dung_12	5/22/14	23	41
2014.05.22_Vietnam_Nguyen Tan Dung_19	5/22/14	23	660
2014.06.05_Vietnam_Tran Duy Hai_01	6/5/14	23	660
2014.06.16_Vietnam_Nguyen Quoc Thap_01	6/16/14	23	1058
2014.06.16_Vietnam_Tran Duy Hai_02	6/16/14	23	2284
2014.06.18_Vietnam_Nguyen Tan Dung_13	6/18/14	23	93
2014.09.24_Vietnam_Pham Binh Minh_04	9/24/14	24	764
2015.06.05_Vietnam_Truong Tan Sang_08	6/5/15	25	745
2016.02.26_Vietnam_Pham Binh Minh_01	2/26/16	27	242
2016.05.26_Vietnam_Nguyen Xuan Phuc_03	5/26/16	27	22
2016.06.14_Vietnam_Pham Binh Minh_06	6/14/16	27	276
2016.08.24_Vietnam_Tran Dai Quang_01	8/24/16	28	73

Appendix: Gray Zone Code System

Code System
Agreements
G20
Minsk_Agreements
Polities_Regions_Organizations
Abkhazia
Afghanistan
Arctic_Far_North
Armenia
ASEAN
Asia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Balkans
Baltics
Belarus
Brazil
BRICS
Britain_UK
Bulgaria
Caucasus
Central Asia
Chechnya
China
Crimea
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Czech_Republic
Donbass
Donetsk
E_Ukraine
Estonia
EU
Europe
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
Hungary

India
Iran
Iraq
ISAF
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Kalingrad
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latin_America
Latvia
Lebanon
Libya
Lithuania
Luhansk
Malaysia
MENA
Moldova
Mongolia
Nagorno_Karabakh
NATO
North Korea
OSCE
Philippines
Poland
Romania
Russia
Russian_America_[Alaska]
Siberia_Far_East
Slovakia
South China Sea
South Korea
South_Ossetia
Soviet_Union
Spain
Sweden
Syria
Tajikistan
Taiwan
Thailand
Transnistria
Turkey
Ukraine
UN

US		
Vietnam		
Western_World		
Yugoslavia		
Denmark		
Guam		
Norway		
Portugal		
Switzerland		
Cultural_Emotive_Values		
	Negative_Extreme_Emotive	
		Aggressor_Aggression
		Conspiracy
		Danger
		Enemy
		Humiliation
		Injustice
		Manichean_Evil
		Shame
		Threaten
		Threatened
		Victimization
		Xenophobia
	Negative_Normal_Emotive	
		Anti-Western
		Competition
		Conflict
		Corruption
		Criminal_Illegal
		Denial
		Extreme_Radical
		Failure
		Grievance
		Imperialism
		Isolation
		Lying
		Outrage
		Weakness
		Women_Innocents
	Positive_Extreme_Emotive	
		Dignity
		Duty_Obligation
		Heroism
		Homeland
		Honor

		Independence
		Justice
		National_Identity
		Overcoming
		Preparedness
		Pride
		Protect
		Religion
		Resilience
		Sacrifice
		Self-defense
		Strength
		Superiority
		Victory
	Positive_Normal_Emotive	
		Confidence
		Courage
		Democratic
		Equality_Rights
		Hope
		Legitimacy
		Peace
		Progress
		Respect
		Stability
		Success
		Tolerance
		Trust
		Unity
Events		
	CharlieHebdo	
	Cold War	
	Color_Revolutions	
	G20	
	Maidan_Square	
	MH17	
	WWII	
Individuals		
	Obama	
	Poroshenko	
	Putin	
	Stalin	
Political_Factors		
	Positive_Cohesive_Concerns	
		Allies

	Cooperation	
	Domestic Development	
	Economy_and_Trade	
	Foregin Aid_Investment	
	Foreign Aid	
	Formal Agreement	
	Friendship	
	Governance	
	Humanitarian_Aid	
	Political_Process	
	Political_Reform	
	Support	
	Domestic_Development	
	Foreign_Aid_Investment	
Disruptive Security Concerns		
	Annexation	
	Atrocity	
	Borders_Territory	
	Conflict	
		Gray_Zone_Activities
		Rebellion_Resistance
		Terrorism
		War
	Coup	
	Crime	
	Cyber_Attacks	
	Economic_Problems	
	Economic_Sanctions	
	Energy	
		Nuclear_Energy
		Oil_Gas_Other
	Extremism	
	Violation_International	
	Island Building	
	Media_Propaganda	
	Military	
		Materiel
		Miilitary_Operations
		Occupation_Invasion
		Troops_Fighters
			Regular_Troops
			Irregular_Fighters
		Weapons_Nuclear
	Nationalism	
	NATO_Expansion	

		Nazism
		Prisoners
		Protests
		Refugees
		Separatism
		Sovereignty
	Other_Security_Concerns	
		Article5
		Ceasefire
		Civilians
		Infrastructure
		Novorossiya
		Oligarchs_Elites
		Reunification
		Russian_Minorities
		Security
Rhetorical_Devices		
	Accusation	
	Counterargument_Comparison	
	Dehumanization	
	Ethos_Credibility	
	Example	
	Figurative_Language	
	Graphic_Violence	
	Grouping	
	History	
	Hyperbole	
	If_Statements	
	Intensifiers	
	Intimacy	
	Kinship	
	Lexicalization	
	List	
	Logos	
	Magnitude	
	Misinformation	
	Other_Outgroup	
	Pathos	
	Pejorative	
	Poetry	
	Quote	
	Repetition	
	Rhetorical_Question	
	Sarcasm_Irony	
	Title	

Us_Ingroup	
Veiled_Threat	

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