



White Paper on The Key Role of Human Geography, Culture and Language in Effective Communication

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Foreword

“Information” continues to demonstrate the vital and preeminent role it plays in enabling all of our sources of national power. From a military perspective, it must be adequately utilized and capitalized on to succeed in shaping the cognitive/human domain (the ultimate goal of all military activities). Effective communications, which is an essential aspect of understanding and engaging the cognitive domain, is often made up of narratives in foreign languages that are written and spoken by individuals and groups from other cultures. If we are going to understand these narratives and the history, values, beliefs, behavior patterns and context they provide, we must examine communications from the perspective of ‘the other’.

The Joint Staff J-39 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) office provides perspectives from academic, operational, and international field contributors. Over the past 2 years, they have developed a series of white papers on narrative and communication including running a simulation to enhance our capabilities to conduct cognitive maneuver in the narrative space. This white paper brings together several approaches that take a deep look at cultural variation in communication patterns as well as the content of the communications-- the complex concepts such as morality, loyalty, and motivations-- for the purpose of more effective cross-cultural communications analysis and engagement. Because a key challenge in understanding communications is the non-US culture and non-Anglophone/multi-lingual character of that environment, the contributors present experience and expertise that deliver insight into ‘the other’ communications environment.

1. Academic authors provide a theoretic framework and research to understand the information and communication environment.
2. Operational authors provide experience and a practical way forward, integrating academic research and international field use cases.
3. International field authors provide ‘other’ perspective use cases to challenge assumptions and connect theory to ground truth.

The white paper is a compilation of contributions on this topic that have been synthesized to reflect and build off the insights of one another.

Maj Gen Charles Moore
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Executive Summary

To begin with a truism, people in different places speak different languages; they belong to different cultures. This is not in dispute, but it remains a persistent operational challenge. Understanding other cultures well enough to successfully communicate and to navigate each information environment means a profound effort in putting ourselves in other cultures' shoes—trying to understand narratives around identity, political engagement and deeply held beliefs requires looking beyond language and into the cognitive domain to gain a clearer picture of the information environment (IE).

Creating a clear picture for cognitive maneuver should not feel like charting a new frontier simply because the terrain is made up of unfamiliar cultural and linguistic objects. This white paper brings together several approaches from the academic and operational perspectives that describe cultural variation in communication patterns as well as the content of the communications-- the complex concepts such as morality, loyalty and motivations-- for the purpose of more effective cross-cultural communications analysis and engagement in the IE.

Human Geography, the study of relationships between locations, groups and individuals, provides a foundation for engaging in the cognitive domain, and in fact, in illustrating key aspects of the IE. Humans, after all, possess the cognitive aspects we want to understand. They produce the narratives, hold the beliefs and values, and are the audience targeted within the IE. Human Geography begins with location. Our origin is a significant part of who we are. Our home team that defines our allegiance. Our beliefs and behaviors which can be traced back to the history and events of that location. Perhaps it is the place we strive to protect, the site of an attack that prompts retaliation, the origin of our family name that gives us standing in the community, or the locus of our closest network with whom we share a dialect and a collective memory—our cultural narrative. If we understand culture as learned practices that set one group apart from another, part of that learning is connected to sharing a place. This is how British culture can be separate from American culture and yet still share the English language. Human Geography's emphasis on location provides a foundation to understand culture, communication and cognitive maneuver.

The white paper is divided into three (3) sections that walk through a definition of the impact of cultural variation for operations in the IE; support for planning from theory, research and the field; and going forward for all USG engagements, several authors discuss approaches that hold promise from strategy to methodology. Authors share key insights on the state of the art in cultural narrative analysis and cognitive maneuver in the IE as well as theory, research and field observation that can support continued development of applied research, policy and training in this area.

Part One unfolds from the premise that most populations that the US Government engages with are bilingual or multilingual. Dr. Loyet writes that this is a contrast with the monolingual experience of many Americans. Multilingualism is one of many cultural differences we need to take into account for effective communications and analysis across the IE. Many populations are adept at shifting between languages for different purposes. From a cognitive perspective, the bi-lingual brain works differently with perception, memory and cognition. Shifting between linguistic identities is part of their daily lives. Dr. Spitaletta, bringing insights from a series of SMA papers on bio-psycho-social communication, writes that, "Cognitive processes such as perception, judgment, and decision-making are the most vital aspect of the IE." Finally, Ms. Kompaniets illustrates cultural narrative in action through a Ukrainian language use case.

Part Two steps back to explore theories on culture and communication that can support a sound approach to developing successful narratives and planning cognitive maneuver. Prof. Ess and Ms. MacNulty map out dimensions of culture and values that serve as building blocks for most working in this field. These are fundamental to grounding further practical research, operational methods or analytic products. Dr. Ehlschlaeger is already developing operational means to put theory into practice using human geography to help navigate communications challenges. As a field case in action, Ms. Mushtaq describes on-going efforts in the Khyber Pakhtunkwa and Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan to identify and foster local forms of cultural narratives and communication that are seen to be effective for peacebuilding.

Part Three looks forward by focusing on current conflicts where communication, narrative and culture play a vital role in how we engage and how successful we are. This section brings together the operators' view from Col (Ret.) Robert Jones, applied research on narratives of elite individuals, and a field interview with Mr. Maktary on peacebuilding in Yemen that describes successful and unsuccessful initiatives to influence the situation.

Finally, most authors have read across each other's works and referenced one another in their papers. This experience has provided these expert contributors the chance to dialog on best practices, shared and conflicting viewpoints, gaps, strengths and ways forward. In this way, we are taking the chance to learn more on this topic ourselves while we contribute to the SMA white paper series.

PART ONE

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Improving Communication in a Multi-Lingual Multi-Cultural Environment

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The majority of the world is multilingual and multicultural. However, people of the US tend to live in a monolingual environment in which the mainstream culture is so dominant that it is unnecessary for native speakers of the dominant language to understand other languages and cultures of the country. As a result, people who work for the USG tend to lack experience in communicating in a multilingual multicultural environment. This lack of experience has consequences both for understanding countries in which the USG has operations and for communicating with the people of those cultures. Communication between the USG and people of other cultures can be improved through a 21st-century understanding of communication in general and of communication in multilingual, multicultural environments in particular. In addition, the USG will reap more benefits from modern language tools when it develops a better understanding of the benefits and drawbacks of these tools.

Monolingualism in the US

For all intents and purposes, the United States is a monolingual nation. Although English has never been declared the “official” language of the country (Baron 1990), it is the default language of public life, particularly of government, business, and education. Becoming a naturalized US citizen requires, among other things, passing an English test (US Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2017). According to the US Census Bureau American Community Survey 2015, 234 million out of 297 million Americans over the age of five, or 79%, speak only English at home (US Census Bureau 2015). Of the 62 million Americans who speak a language other than English at home (US Census Bureau 2015), many live in ethnic enclaves (Borjas 2011, Young Center 2017). The appearance of text or speech in public places in languages other than English, especially in schools, is often met with resistance in the US, as evidenced by the opposition to use of African American English in the Oakland, California school district in 1997 (Tse 2001, PBS 2017). Above all, the people of the United States know that their language has become the de facto global language of the 21st century, a situation that is unlikely to change soon (Montgomery, 2013).

Multilingualism worldwide

The linguistic environment of the rest of the globe is quite different. Out of 241 countries, only thirteen are considered monolingual (CIA 2017). In addition, the degree of multilingualism among nations varies. The citizens of some countries, Switzerland for example, may use a handful of languages more or less officially, whereas others, for example Papua New Guinea, may be home to one or two official languages and many more unofficial languages (CIA 2017). To understand how multilingualism impacts the work of the USG, consider the linguistic aspect of the 2014 Ebola outbreak, to which many USG personnel responded. The virus was widespread in three countries: Guinea, where 40 languages are spoken, Liberia, where 30 languages are spoken, and Sierra Leone, where 25 languages are spoken. Although some versions of English and French are spoken in all three countries, and there may be some overlap of the other languages of the three countries, it is clear that language added to the scope of the crisis.

Consequences of monolingualism

The monolingual environment of the US poorly prepares native born US citizens to operate in the multilingual multicultural world outside the borders of the US (Clyne 2005). As Tse (2001) writes, “. . . many [Americans] believe in the myth that simultaneous development of two languages will result in inferior learning of both . . .” (71) Such perceptions have consequences: according to Jones (2013) only 34% of Americans report knowing a second language well enough to hold a conversation in it, and only 20% consider it important for Americans to learn a language other than English. In addition to a low rate of second language proficiency, among Americans, the perception of language and languages is shaped by what Young (2016) refers to as “the ideology of monolingualism”:

that human beings carry only one language in their heads and that if they carry more than one, the languages remain entirely separate from one another, divided up in the brain like the division made by a national territorial border on a map. (1210)

This ideology reduces the ability of members of the USG to understand critical aspects of intercultural communication, as explained by Sutherland (this volume) and take advantage of language-dependent concepts described by other contributors to this volume, particularly human factors analysis (Spitaletta), the rhetoric of civility (DeRosa), and the intangible benefits of sharing a language (Mushtaq).

A new outlook on language in the 21st century

Kubota (2016) identifies a range of global problems for which a post-structuralist perception of language is part of the solution, including “. . . ethnic conflicts, civil wars, racism, xenophobia, and growing economic gaps both nationally and internationally” (475). These are issues which impact operations of the USG abroad. As other contributors to this volume explain, there are a number of language-dependent socio-cultural tools. For example, Mallory (this volume) describes the usefulness of narrative. The USG can make its operations more successful by adopting and promoting linguistic policies which take into consideration the fact that language use is interactive, co-constructed, context-dependent, and intentional.

Interaction and co-construction

Conventional approaches to communication tend to treat language as a transaction; in contrast, the post-modern linguistic tradition recognizes language as inseparable from interaction (Brown and Yule 1983, Van Dijk 1997). “When writing or speaking, we of course accomplish the acts of writing and speaking, but the point is that *thereby* we accomplish such acts as making assertions and accusations, replying to questions, defending ourselves, being polite, or engaging in strategies of positive self-presentation.” (Van Dijk 1997:5) A critical property of the interactional nature of language is that it is co-constructed, which means, according to Jacoby and Ochs (1995), that it is “. . . the joint creation of a form, interpretation, stance, action, activity, identity, institution, skill, ideology, emotion, or other culturally meaningful reality” (171). All spoken and written utterances are the creation of more than one person. The contributions of those involved are sometimes evident to the participants, but not always. When one person literally finishes another’s sentence, the co-construction is obvious. However, the meaning of every utterance is dependent on the knowledge of all participants (Jacoby and Ochs 1995). If, for example, someone says, “You must have some of this fruitcake,” the person addressed perceives it as an offer of cake—not a command to eat the cake (Green 1989). Knowing that language is interactional leads to analysis not only of the words others are saying or writing but also of the goals other speakers or writers are accomplishing in a particular text; it also leads speakers and writers to ask, “What goal am I accomplishing by saying or writing this?”

Context

One of the fundamental concepts of post-modern linguistics is that no spoken or written utterance can be understood without taking its context into consideration. This notion of “context” can be easily understood as the answers to the question, “Why this [speech or writing] by you to me here now?” (Andersen 1993). “Why” refers to the speaker’s purpose; “this [speech or writing]” refers to the actual words, including the language in which they’re uttered; “by you” refers to the speaker or writer; “to me” refers to the reader or listener; “here” refers to the location in which the exchange takes place, and “now” to its time. (Brown and Yule, 1983) illustrate the effect of context on meaning by contrasting two different environments for the following statement:

I do think *Adam’s* quick.

In Scenario A, Brown and Yule provide these contextual details:

Speaker: a young mother, *hearer:* her mother-in-law, *place:* park, by a duckpond, *time:* sunny afternoon in September 1962. They are watching the young mother’s two-year-old son chasing ducks and the mother-in-law has just remarked that her son, the child’s father, was rather *backward* at this age; the young mother says, “I do think *Adam’s* quick.” (36)

In Scenario B, Brown and Yule provide different contextual details:

Speaker: a student, *hearers:* a set of students, *place:* sitting round a coffee table in the refectory, *time:* evening in March 1980. John, one of the group, has just told a joke. Everyone laughs except Adam. Then Adam laughs. One of the students says, “I do think *Adam’s* quick.” (36)

As Brown and Yule explain, the two utterances have quite different meanings in spite of the fact that they are superficially identical. The speaker in Scenario A clearly uses the word “quick” to mean that her son is “not backward like his father.” The speaker in Scenario B, however, uses “quick” to mean “quick to understand the joke,” but s/he also is using it sarcastically, to suggest that Adam is, in fact, somewhat oblivious. An understanding of the many facets of a linguistic context should result in asking such questions as, “What is the context of this utterance, and how does it impact the meaning of the utterance?” This point is taken up in more detail in Ess (this volume).

Agency vs. structure

One side-effect of the “ideology of monolingualism” is that it results in the assumption that an individual speaks a particular language—the language of his/her nation—by default. From the monolingual point of view, language is part of the “structure” of the world, which Layder (1994) explains is “. . . existing social arrangements” (5). In reality, most people are not monolingual, and when they speak, it is a matter of choice, or “agency,” which Layder explains is “. . . the ability of human beings to make a difference in the world” (1994:5). The late-twentieth century “multilingual” perspective recognized the use of more than one language but did not account for the overlap of languages and cultures (Kubota 2016). Kubota contrasts this with the newer “hybrid” perspective, which is based on the notion that “. . . language users’ multiple repertoires . . . are employed in a contingent and flexible manner rather than an aggregate use of languages that are separated along structural boundaries” (476). A good illustration of the hybrid perspective is this passage from *Born a Crime*, the memoir of Trevor Noah, who grew up in South Africa and speaks seven languages:

One day as a young man, I was walking down the streets and a group of Zulu guys was walking behind me closing in on me, and I could hear them talking to one another about how they

were going to mug me. (Speaking Zulu). Let's get this white guy. You go to his left, and I'll come up behind him. I didn't know what to do. I couldn't run, so I just spun around real quick and said (speaking Zulu). Yo, guys, why don't we just mug someone together? I'm ready. Let's do it. They looked shocked for a moment, and then they started laughing. Oh, sorry, dude. We thought you were something else. We weren't trying to take anything from you. We were trying to steal from white people. Have a good day, man.

They were ready to do to me violent harm until they felt that we were part of the same tribe, and then we were cool. That and so many other smaller incidents in my life made me realize that language even more than color defines who you are to people. I became a chameleon. My color didn't change, but I could change your perception of my color. If you spoke to me in Zulu, I replied to you in Zulu. If you spoke to me in Tswana, I replied to you in Tswana. Maybe I didn't look like you, but if I spoke like you, I was you.

In addition to switching from one language to another based on context, multilinguals also engage in “code-switching,” which McSwan defines as “. . . the alternate use of two (or more) languages within the same utterance,” (323). Recognizing that language use is a choice results in consideration of why a particular speaker or writer has chosen a particular language. As Kampanietts (this volume) describes, even an action as (superficially) simple as choosing a preposition can be significant for multilingual speakers. This is a factor at both the macro or society level and the micro or personal level. It should also lead one to ask, “Do I have a choice of language? What will I be conveying by choosing a particular language in a particular utterance?”

Second language acquisition

People of the US who study second languages tend to develop a superficial proficiency (Devlin 2015) and perceive the target language as a combination of discreet elements of grammar, vocabulary, and pronunciation. In reality, language fluency requires what is now known as “communicative competence,” a phenomenon which embodies not only accuracy in grammar and pronunciation but a thorough understanding of the context of the language and its impact on communication. Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman (1999) identify three essential elements of communicative competence which must be learned: form, meaning, and use. “Form” is the structures of the target language; “meaning” is the various meanings of individual structures, and “use” is the understanding of how a structure interacts with context. Understanding of communicative competence should lead to a better assessment of the language proficiency of USG personnel and whether the proficiency level is adequate to the task at hand.

Modern language tools: benefits and drawbacks

English as a global language

English has clearly emerged as the language of wider communication (Montgomery 2013). However, English is not one global language but many languages. The Englishes spoken in different regions differ amongst each other in lexicon, syntax, morphology, phonology, and pragmatics (Filppula et al. 2013). In addition, non-native speakers of English cannot always communicate effectively with each other in English. English has been widely used by the European Parliament, but in 2016, the Secretary-General of the EU requested that members speak in their native languages because it is very difficult for translators to interpret the speech of some non-native speakers of English (TranslationServices 24).

Digital corpora

Modern social science has been transformed by the availability of searchable databases of natural spoken and written discourse, called corpora. Prior to the creation of machine-readable corpora, linguistic research was limited by the difficulty of quantification. For centuries, the most common research method of linguists was to create utterances consistent with the rules of language and compare them with utterances which violated rules of the language in order to determine what rules guide language in general. This is what Chomsky and others have referred to as a “thought experiment.” In the twentieth century, as more representative written texts became available, and as authentic speech was broadcast and recorded more and more widely, some linguists began to create analog databases, usually consisting of authentic utterances copied or transcribed onto index cards which could be sorted and counted manually. These databases were clumsy and difficult to share. Fortunately, due to the growth and spread of computers, searchable databases of many languages are now widely available, and the branch of linguistics related to their use is called “corpus linguistics”. One important corpus is the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), contains 520 million words of English collected between 1990 and 2015. In the beginning, such databases affected only the study of language directly. Linguists could test hypotheses about the form, meaning, and use of structures much more accurately. Over time, the use of corpora has spread to study of interaction in general. Once linguists identify the meaning and use of structures, social scientists can then create and test hypotheses about the use of certain structures by a target population; their conclusions can, in turn, be used to form hypotheses about populations of interest based on their written and spoken utterances. Such work, often referred to as content analysis, is exemplified by Rasheed (this volume) among other publications.

Machine translation

Vast machine corpora make possible the dream of automated translation between known languages. As Koehn (2012) explains, with a caveat, the current quality of machine translation is approaching the standard of “fully-automatic high quality machine translation”. The caveat is that quality is uneven from language to language and domain to domain. For comparison, here are machine translations from French to English and Chinese to English:

From French: We know very well that the current treaties are not enough and that in the future it will be necessary to develop a different and more effective structure for the union, a constitutional structure which clearly indicates what are the responsibilities of the member states and what are the competences of the union.

From Chinese: *London’s Daily Express* pointed out that the death of Princess Diana in 1997 Paris car accident investigation information portable computers, the former city police chief in the offices of stolen.

Comparison of the two translations shows that while the translation from French is quite fluent, the translation from Chinese breaks down in the middle and is not nearly as useful. In addition, as McNulty (this volume) explains, “It’s not just the language – it’s the phrases, the nuances, the whole cultural background, the context, the stories that we need to understand better” (28). Although machine translation is not (yet) the solution we dream of, Koehn (2012) points out that even the less-than-ideal state of machine translation provides a great deal of functionality if its drawbacks are understood. Since much machine translation is very domain-specific, the standard is closer to being met in domains which involve translation of narrow texts between languages for which there are already representative digital corpora. The Meteo system for translating weather forecasts, for example, has been in operation since 1976. For many purposes, a complete fluent translation is unnecessary; an understanding of the basic meaning of a text, possible even through google translate, is adequate. Such basic translations are more and more available due to advances in speech recognition software and smart phone technology. Indeed, putting smart phone translation technology in the hands of human interpreters, rather than replacing them completely, is a much better short-term goal.

Linguistic issues going forward

It is clear that language underpins many of the tools promoted in the rest of this volume. As described above, the USG cannot rely on the English proficiency of those it works with from other countries, and its own citizens have an inaccurate perception of language and a low rate of second language proficiency. As such, eliminating the hurdle that monolingualism represents to the USG is key to getting the most out of these ideas. There are both short-term and long-term issues to face.

In the short term, the USG should improve its consumption of translation by:

- Regularly assessing the current state of machine translation and disseminating such assessments to all USG departments which may be able to take advantage of it
- Making portable translation technology, such as smart phone translation apps, as accessible as possible to USG personnel

Nevertheless, significant improvement of the situation requires long-term investment and planning. Long-term investment should include:

- Support for developing handheld devices that can be used for translation
- Support for improving machine translation
- Support for creating the databases needed for machine translation

Second language education (both in English and in other target languages) can be improved by online education. In order to benefit from online education, the USG should invest in:

- Internet infrastructure in the US and in developing countries
- Successful non-profit online education efforts such as Khan Academy

In addition, effort must be made to eliminate the ideology of monolingualism in the US by investing in the following educational efforts:

- Partnering with US professional organizations which promote language study, including the American Council of Teachers of Foreign Languages (ACTFL), National Association of Bilingual Education (NABE), Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages (TESOL), and The American Association for Applied Linguistics
- Teaching second languages in the US with a post-structuralist approach
- Increasing the number of students who study any second language for three years or more in grades six through twelve—both common and less common languages

USG efforts to “solve” the language problem in the past often focused on increasing the numbers of students studying less commonly taught languages at all levels for whenever there was a sudden unexpected need. Although there is a need for speakers of many languages, simply increasing the number of young people studying Spanish, French, German, or Latin would help shift the ideology. Finally, there is a consistent need for accurate up-to-date information about world languages and cultures. Adequate contextual knowledge useful to USG personnel can only be developed by promoting the development of social sciences researchers in target countries. This need cannot be met by supporting language and area studies at universities in the US alone; the effort must include:

- Investment in education of specialists in the social sciences in all cultures in which the USG operates
- Support for social science departments in universities in developing countries
- Publication of research in the social sciences in all cultures (in English and other languages)

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Human Geography Analysis and How Cultures Think Differently

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What is culture?

Culture is not civilization.

Culture is not language. Language is just one (integral and expressive) part.

Do we need to agree on a definition to see its impact, to recognize cultural markers?

How can Human Geography analysis help us see and operationalize culture?

When people hear my accent, they start to form a picture of where I'm from and my cultural group. When I tell them that I am from Indiana, this picture narrows. If I further tell them some socio-cultural markers such as religion, ethnicity, socio-economic class, education, etc., they may have enough information to start to infer values or beliefs that are commonly attributed to the cultural group to which I belong.

We frequently develop assessments of sub-cultures within the US. This involves a geography, a group of people, and a set of attributes including language, religion, ethnicity, and values such as political allegiances. This is a process that other cultures practice as well. Syrians can tell you about the differences between Aleppo and the coastal regions that you can hear reflected in their music. Russians can tell you distinctions about each oblast's religion, language, and changing connections to Moscow or China.

We need tools and models that can detect cultural variation beyond American culture and help us gain 'local' perspective. To do this means creating appropriately localized models for those other cultures rather than transposing assumptions from American culture onto groups we admittedly struggle to understand. If another culture has a different concept of fairness, trust, shame, esteem, we need to know. And we won't be able to detect those differences if we build models that assume all concepts of fairness, trust, shame, esteem, etc., have no cultural variation. Our models will homogenize any data collected to fit the assumptions we built into our model and conform to American cultural expectations and concepts. An example of a frequent assumption that can lead to problems in planning and analysis is cultural variations in the concepts of time, place, and identity. Because these are so fundamental, they are often assumed to be constant or universal. When groups have a different concept of time, this affects how they plan operations, how they coordinate as partners in planning, or expectations about duration or timing. If they have a different sense of identity (individual vs. collective, for example), they may have a different idea about personal responsibility or even cause and effect.

Culture is frequently described as nebulous, even squishy, or it is lumped in with language. This section, based on experience in intercultural conflict mediation and research in cognitive linguistics, cultural communication, information science, and conflict analysis, looks at how cultures think differently. Problem solve differently. And almost have a different logic. While humans the world over have much in common, it is not the commonalities that create the misunderstandings. For this reason, the areas of difference, or even superficial (often misleading) similarities are of extreme interest and high value to understand. An example of such a similarity would be the inflated role of social media in the Green Revolution in Iran in 2009, dubbed the Twitter Revolution

emanating from unfounded parallels about Iranian culture and their online communications with US social media use (Morozov 2009).

What does it mean to say cultures think differently? (Sutherlin 2014)

	Example	take away
1	Cambridge students were asked to read and recall a Native American folktale. They struggled. They changed the sequence of events, they came up with new rationalizations for things they didn't understand, and they omitted or changed details that were unfamiliar because the narrative pattern was so different to what they were used to.	1. Narrative patterns are culturally specific, and hold meaning 2. We skip what does not fit our narrative pattern
2	Liebes and Katz (1990) asked Americans, Israelis, Arabs, Russians, and Moroccan Jews (in Israel) to watch and recall episodes of the TV series Dallas. They found considerable differences in narrative patterns, in what the groups focused on, and on how the groups interpreted the episodes.	Cultural variation in Perception and Interpretation of events
3	If bilingual Russians and Americans watch the same scene, they will interpret it differently because they do not share the same set of concepts to interpret and explain what they see. Examples include privacy, personal space, team or tolerance which may have or may not have a direct translation but a completely different meaning or conceptual basis. Therefore, perception of an event, memory and recall will be culturally different about the same witnessed event involving a 'close encounter'. (Pavlenko, 2003)	Cultural Variation in Complex Concepts
4	Costa et al. (2014) asked: "Should you sacrifice one man to save five? Whatever your answer, it should not depend on whether you were asked the question in your native language or a foreign tongue so long as you understood the problem." This study found answers did change. (Korean, English, Spanish, French, and Hebrew).	1. Cultural and linguistic variation in Moral Concepts 2. Perhaps moral decision-making?
5	In discussing conflict resolution programs with a Yemeni delegation of clerics, they asked not to use the word for Peace (in Arabic) in a program title because it had the connotation of being associated to Israel and no one would join. They chose instead, alternative dispute resolution.	Concepts and associations are cultural

The populations (audiences) we are aiming to engage within the MENA region are bilingual or multi-lingual. ISIS, for example, uses multiple languages for their own messaging campaigns. They are adept at shifting between languages for different purposes. From a cognitive perspective, the bi-lingual brain works differently—with perception, memory, and cognition. (Leonard 2010) Shifting between linguistic identities is part of their daily lives. With this cognitive activity, they also must navigate conceptual differences and differences in cultural norms (such as politeness, intensity, gender, topic framing, communications modes such as when to use face-to-face and when to use

social media and with whom.) The key element multilingualism impacts for operational purposes in narrative engagement in the IE is event framing.

When you hear hoof beats, think horses not zebras. (English event frame)

But what if you live somewhere where zebras are more common than horses?

How does another culture construct an event in their mind to retell it? This could be an event such as retelling how a bomb went off near a market or sharing a description of a group or personal history to impact an identity narrative. The examples above underscore how we cannot take for granted that all cultures will interpret details about timing, number or gender of witnesses/participants, location, or even the type of event itself in the same construct as we do. From the start, we may misinterpret the underlying concepts or framing of their narratives. We may also collect and bucket information into categories based on concepts we assert rather than concepts that are relevant to the originating culture. (Sutherlin 2013)

Beyond event framing, what about more emotionally charged narratives such as propaganda, recruiting material, or even misinformation? These are also based around culturally prescribed narrative pattern norms. The organization of the narratives and the underlying concepts—the thoughts, plans, dreams, cause and effect concepts that produce and construct the narrative—have been shaped by the culture to which the individual or group belongs. Their origin.

Human Geography's emphasis on location provides a foundation to understand culture, communication and cognitive maneuver. Combing information about groups, culturally prominent individuals, ethnicity, religion, language, social relationships, and political allegiance at a granular family-group level allows analysts and operators to visualize a network of dynamic relationships situated in geographic locations. By taking the connections and attributes and seeing them in the physical places that shape culture-- the schools, religious centers, neighborhoods, businesses, farms, hills, water resources-- we can build a model of appropriate human scale that approximates the process we perform when we make cultural assessments in the US about a Midwesterner vs. a New Yorker. However, this model uses factors and relationships defined by the culture we want to understand, rather than prescribed by our own assumptions. Using this granular model, we can investigate and evaluate localized communications in the IE; look for discrepancies such as misinformation that doesn't fit within known cultural concepts, attributes, groups, and locations; and begin to develop more successful communication, counter messaging or cognitive maneuver based on increased understanding.

A final comment to connect with other contributors across this paper, and to the main topic of successful communication. We seek a cohesive narrative strategy in the IE and believe that groups like ISIS are more successful at constructing and propagating their messages because they are more cohesive. Is that narrative cohesion due to cultural dimensions and communication patterns? Collective cultures or cultures in which offline communications persists, or online non-verbal, i.e. video or image sharing is more dominant than text-based narratives, may more readily produce more cohesive text-based narratives than in a highly atomic or individualistic society that is inundated with communications mediums that demand our attention to spin narratives in all directions all the time. Why does our variety in narrative need to be a short-coming? Is there a way to make it operationally advantageous not to arrive at a unified narrative that can be deployed toward the enemy, but rather maintain the variety that is inherently our cultural communication norm?

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Bio-Psycho-Social Applications to Cognitive Engagement: A Summary

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Introduction

The recently released Office of the Secretary of Defense- Strategic Multi-Layer Assessments (OSD-SMA) Office White Paper entitled *"Assessing and Anticipating Threats to US Security Interests: A Bio-Psycho-Social Science Approach for Understanding the Emergence of and Mitigating Violence and Terrorism"* that Giordano discusses in the succeeding section provided a scientific perspective on current operations (Giordano, 2016). That effort was succeeded by *"Bio-Psycho-Social Applications to Cognitive Engagement"*, which addressed how those scientific perspectives could be operationalized (Spitaletta, 2016). Specifically, how bio-psycho-social approaches to cognitive engagement may be put to use to collect, analyze, and/or apply information to meet a tactical, operational, or strategic end. Information Operations (IO), the "...integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries" (Joint Staff, 2006, p 118) serves as the most appropriate category of operations that may benefit from bio-psycho-social perspectives (Spitaletta, 2016). IO doctrine conceptualizes the cognitive domain as the component of the information environment (IE) that encompasses the minds and brains of those who transmit, receive, and act upon information. Cognitive processes such as perception, judgment, and decision-making are the most vital aspect of the IE. Cognition is influenced by individual and cultural beliefs, norms, vulnerabilities, motivations, emotions, experiences, morals, education, mental health, identities, and ideologies and thus requires research and analysis methods from the bio-psycho-social sciences to understand and manipulate. When, how, and most importantly why to apply that understanding to US advantage at the tactical, operational, and strategic level is the focus of this effort.

Contemporary conflict is increasingly a "protracted, bloody, and horrible" (Van Creveld, 1991 p 24), however, the vast majority of those contentions do not necessarily require the use of lethal force. Instead, nuanced understanding of the nature of conflict and the peoples engaged are required to remain competitive. Cognitive engagement entails understanding the individual nodes with the human domain as such and developing appropriate methods for interacting with them. This White Paper is meant not only to continue the dialogue between the academic and operational communities but also to explore more deeply how to apply knowledge gained through bio-psycho-social research to cognitive engagement.

Human Factors Analysis

The term "human factors" has a rather broad set of interpretation depending on the context in which the phrase is used. the Intelligence Community considers Human Factors Analysis (HFA) the evaluation of psychological attributes (motivation, thinking style, beliefs, and personality), cultural attributes (values, beliefs and norms that influence behavior), behavioral attributes (responses to context or stimuli independent of personality), as well as the *neural correlates of those attributes* In order to influence decision-making (how individuals and groups select a course of action), information-flow (how individuals and groups acquire information required to make a decision), objective reasoning (how individual and groups process information they receive), *neurobiological changes to (or away from) specific states*, and ultimately, behavior of individuals and groups in any state or organization (Spitaletta, 2016). HFA can be subdivided into three principal fulcrums of assessment; group and population analysis, social network analysis, and individual and leadership analysis. Group & Population Analysis (GPA) can include social structures, stratification, and demographics, as well as the key institutions, governance, roles, culture, atmospherics, economic

factors, and information networks. GPA should include not only formal (or official) structures and influences but also the unofficial, clandestine, and/or illicit. Social network analysis (SNA) examines groups of humans within and beyond the social context of institutions. SNA enables human factors analysts to understand the strengths and vulnerabilities of different types of networks, how networks structures affect social processes, and the various roles individuals play with networks. Individual & Leadership Analysis (ILA) examines the underlying human factors that affect how individuals manage their environment, process information, and make decisions. These factors include motivation, beliefs, thinking style, personality, and even (as many OSD-SMA White Papers have suggested) neuropsychological attributes.

Human geography is a vital component in HFA and approaches like those described by Rasheed (this volume) can complement behavioral assessment methods such as those employed by Bos and colleagues (2013) and Spitaletta (2014b, 2014c) to develop more comprehensive analyses of a target audience or individual. Individual leaders, even despots, lack unlimited agency and thus must be considered a node in a larger network and their words and deeds must be considered within a larger set of memes and narratives within the environment.

Narratives in Cognitive Engagement

Narratives have taken on an increasingly prominent role in contemporary conflict and, as such, have taken a prominent role in recent OSD-SMA White Papers (Reynolds & Lyle, 2013; DiEullis et al., 2014); Giordano; 2016). Revolutionary objectives frequently define an identity group, either explicitly or by the nature of its socio-economic or cultural framing (Crossett, 2012). Humans tend to think in stories; often linking discrete facts together in a logical sequence (sometimes to their detriment) and thus narrative analysis is a necessary component of contemporary intelligence support to MISO and/or MISO target audience analysis. Narrative analysis facilitates understanding of 1) recruitment occurring before the consolidation of formal movement organizations; 2) the conditions under which movement organizations are able to rebound from strategic setbacks; and 3) the impact of movements on institutional policymaking (Polletta, 1998). As the papers in this section highlight; understanding, visualizing, and ultimately engaging narratives are necessary components when considering cognitive engagement as a strategy. Successful movements often rely on a narrative for recruitment, legitimacy, and support that resonates with a deep cultural, ethnic, or historical myth/memory within the population (Bos et al, 2013) and thus understanding narratives (including not only what resonates by how and why) is an essential component of cognitive engagement.

Of the US finds itself either supporting or countering social movements and thus must start with the people and their stories (Seese, Vanderberg, Martin, Linera, & Lejeune, 2016). As Seese and colleagues (2016) and Mallory (2016) identify, narratives are not static symbols but evolving concepts that help individual make sense of their world. They are necessary components of societal fabric but they are often perceived idiosyncratically and thus should be studied using approaches from GPA, SNA, and ILA. Human geography provides not only a theoretical framework for understanding narratives but also as Mallory (2016) suggests a practical set of approaches for visualizing how narratives impact human behavior (Nisbett, 2004). As Mallory (this volume) identifies, narratives must be understood deeply enough that advisors understand the implications of their local actions in the regional and/or global information environment.

Cognitive Engagement in the Cyber Domain

The first interaction an individual will have with a social movement, be it nonviolent or violent, will likely be through the Internet and therefore (Spitaletta, 2013), cyberspace can be what Sun Tzu considered "*entangling ground*", terrain that can be abandoned but difficult to reoccupy. Retaking the ground is more likely if the enemy is unprepared but if potentially disastrous if preparations are strong. The operational requirements of cognitive engagement in cyberspace require advances in both intelligence and targeting; a precise fusion of existing scientific and

technical intelligence capabilities with applied neuroscience and psychological research (Spitaletta, 2014).

Bio-psycho-social approaches can enable more precise access, assessment, and targeting (Giordano, 2012a, b, 2014). Deviations from empirically based methods, for expediency or tactical necessity, have limited the effectiveness of Military Information Support Operations (MISO) (MacKay & Tatham, 2011). While existing neuroscience and technology has great potential to influence and/or deter targets in cyberspace, further research (such as that reported by Thompson (2016) as well as LaFon and Whalen (2016) will allow planners to rely upon firmly established linkages between perception and actions when developing both their intelligence requirements and the desired psychological actions (Spitaletta, 2014). O'Brien (2016), identifies what is an area where additional research is required for the US to truly address and exploit the confluence of influence operations in the human and cyber domains. Developing more robust capabilities in this area should be an increasingly priority for the US and the US Army Special Operational Command (USASOC) in particular (Spitaletta, 2016). Among those priorities should be the effectiveness of online curricula developed more to inform than influence. As Loyet (this volume) identifies, the potential for cross-cultural miscommunication can be diminished through education. This argument assumes it is the goal for multiple parties to want to avoid miscommunication and thus requires a degree of civility and/or decorum not always observed in online communities (Massanari, 2015).

Measuring, Visualizing, and Communicating Cognitive Engagement

An important part of cognitive engagement is assessing the environment before any interventions are made and assessing the effects of those interventions. Assessment focuses on determining the effectiveness of a product or series over time and is accomplished by analyzing observable behaviors related to engagement objectives. Measuring the effectiveness of influence has been a scientific and operational challenge since the US formalized the set of tactics during WWI and remains difficult despite increased attention and effort. Effective evaluation requires not only measures that are aligned with the objective, but also assurance that the measures are valid. Validity is an enduring concern when establishing evaluation criteria, particularly as intelligence constraints and lack of information can result in a tendency to assume a causal relationship due to sequential occurrence. Erroneous causal inference is but one threat to the establishment of useful MOE, there are also numerous other threats to internal validity. Those may include sampling bias, attrition, improper measurement, and/or artifact (Kazdin, 2003; Pollack, 1976; Starunskiy, 2003; Campbell, 2004). Evaluation is typically based on correlational research since an explicit causal relationship between friendly actions cannot be definitely linked to a target audience behavior due to the existence of innumerable extraneous and mediating variables (Spitaletta, 2016).

Summary

OSD-SMA provide actionable, systems orientation to complex operational/ technical challenges. They often entail input from multiple government agencies, military units, as well as industry and academia. The *"Bio-Psycho-Social Applications to Cognitive Engagement"*, attempted to operationalize cognitive engagement, the tactics of a shaping conditions and influencing behavior. Cognitive engagement is a data-driven approach to operations that requires a rich contextual understanding of the a priori conditions in a specific operating environment as well as those key individuals whom the US would like to influence (Spitaletta, 2016). Understanding and applying them is necessary for both mass communication and personalized persuasion. Cognitive engagement, while not necessary a new form type of military operation, is a data-driven approach to understand and influence key target audiences within an environment. This spans not only warfighting functions but also lines of operation and thus the inherently interdisciplinary approaches OSD-SMA often takes must translate to staff functions. This type of integration, what the Joint Staff (2013) refers to as Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups (B2C2WG) and Operational Planning Teams (OPT) must be a priority for a Commander in order to function properly much less

achieve the desired objectives. To achieve the desired behavioral change, products and series need to be developed with sufficient specificity and nuance to be understood and acted upon by the desired target audience and the topics this White Paper addressed will aid in that.

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A Preposition as a Marker of Identity: Ukraine Case

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Since Euromaidan of 2013, the choice of language seems to slowly lose its identity-distinguishing importance in communication in Ukraine. Regardless of the language one speaks (Ukrainian or Russian), usage of a preposition in a particular expression denoting position/place in regards to Ukraine is perceived as more telling about a person's political preferences and identity. While one preposition can manifest support of the independent, sovereign Ukraine, the other may signal distrust to Ukraine's state-building process. The prepositions are equally translated in foreign languages, losing the cultural code they are bearing. The author introduces their political meaning to the non-Slavic languages speaking audience.

Key words: identity, language, preposition, sovereignty, Ukraine.

A statement believed to be made by Socrates goes "Speak, so that I may see you". The words suggest that the true nature of a person is reflected in what they say and how they do it. The language a person speaks is also most informative. Not only it may indicate ethnic origin, which has a strong connection to a certain location, but express political views and manifest identity. It is particularly evident in multi-cultural and multi-lingual societies within same civilizational and linguistic group.

Throughout the centuries-long history of Ukraine as a nation, the language played a pivotal role in preserving ethnic identity of Ukrainians. With Ukrainian territories divided under the rule of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (succeeded by Poland) and the Russian Empire, Ukrainians were connected to the common heritage through the language. When united after WW2 within borders of USSR, all Ukrainians fell subject to Moscow-centralised Russification policy – instilling domination of Russian language in official correspondence, media, teaching and research. Soviet propaganda portrayed Russian as the language of intellectual activities and progress, while Ukrainian was perceived as the language of villagers, a rustic dialect of Russian (Weeks, 2004). It was through speaking Ukrainian language and enriching Ukrainian literature, Ukrainian national elite consolidated people around the idea of an independent state (Kuzio, 1998). Since gaining sovereignty in 1991, Ukraine has been restoring cultural identity alongside undertaking a comprehensive state-building process (Korostelina, 2013). Ukrainian language, being the only official language, was used as the language of informal communication at home by 36% of the population, while Russian – by 32% in early 90-s. 30% of Ukrainians reported they used both languages interchangeably at home (Vyshniak, 2009).

Fully bilingual, a large share of Ukrainians easily switches from Ukrainian to Russian (and vice versa) depending on the linguistic context. However, a person's choice of the preferred language in informal communication may be perceived as a certain manifestation of political views. Such perception is triggered by political processes, namely crises, since political mobilisation often feeds on language issues. Language becomes tightly interwoven into political identity. For years, the superficial belief suggested that Ukrainians speaking Ukrainian in everyday life favour pro-European political direction, while Russian-speaking Ukrainians support a closer cooperation with Russia. However, as Euromaidan 2013 and following it Revolution of Dignity of 2014 have exposed, the language a Ukrainian speaks does not necessarily tell about their major political preference or identity. A large number of Russian-

speaking Ukrainians, the young generation in particular, feel highly patriotic and actively supported Maidan protesters all over Ukraine (Razumkov Centre, 2016). The choice of language seems to slowly lose its identity-distinguishing importance in communication. Regardless of the language one speaks – Ukrainian or Russian – usage of a preposition in a particular word-combination is perceived as more telling about a person’s political preferences and identity.

It’s all in the Name

When people want to indicate that something is taking place in Ukraine, they need to use an English equivalent of the word-combination “in Ukraine”. It is “в Україні” (“v Ukrayini”) (in Ukrainian) or “в Украине” (“v Ukraine”) (in Russian). Despite the difference in the way “Ukraine” is pronounced in Ukrainian and Russian, the preposition is spelt and pronounced identically – “v” (“v” – in Ukrainian and Russian) – literally meaning “in”. It is the only correct use of indication of place or direction in both languages, according to official grammar rules. Yet along with grammatically correct “v” (“in”), there is a wide-spread use of preposition “na” (“na” in Ukrainian and Russian) in relation to Ukraine as place and country. The preposition “na” is equal in use to English preposition “on” when denoting position. Grammatically, it does not make any sense to say “*There have been new developments on Ukraine*” in English. Same applies to both Ukrainian and Russian. Moreover, when indicating position or direction in relation to any other country, such misuse of prepositions does not occur. Native speakers of Ukrainian and Russian confidently say “in Russia” (“v Rosiyi” – Ukr.), “in Georgia” (“v Gruziyi” – Ukr.), “in Poland” (“v Polshchi” – Ukr.) etc. Ukraine seems to be a special case of incorrect use of the preposition of position and direction. However, it is not an issue of illiteracy or grammatical exception of the rule. The misuse of the preposition in denoting of the place, position or direction regarding Ukraine has strong historic roots.

Throughout the history of Ukraine, there were two forms in use, sometimes interchangeably. In 1935, a linguist of Slavic languages, Minister of Education in the government of Ukrainian National Republic (sovereign state of Ukrainians in 1918-1921, predecessor of modern Ukraine) Ivan Ohiyenko published an article *In Ukraine, Not on Ukraine* (“v Ukraini, a ne na Ukraini” – in Ukr.). He explained that when talking about the defined, clearly outlined territory as a whole entity, or an independent state, the usage of preposition “v” (“in”) is required: “v Frantsii” (“in France”), “v Rosiyi” (“in Russia”), “v Rumunii” (“in Romania”) etc. As for the preposition “na” (“on”), it is used with geographical names in response to the question “where?” only when the territory is not clearly delineated or is not an independent entity, rather a constitutive unit of the state – “na Volyni” (“in Volyn” – correct translation, but following the analogy above – “on Volyn”), “na Bukovyni” (“in Bukovyna” or rather “on Bukovyna”) etc. According to the author, influenced by the Polish expression (which is absolutely correct in Polish) *na Ukraine*, Ukrainians got used to the incorrect usage of the preposition, “completely forgetting about its historical origins and turning a blind eye to the fact that “na” [in word-combination “na Ukrayini” – “on Ukraine”] is a painful and disdainful sign of our collective enslavement” (Ohiyenko, 2010, p. 216). The linguist traces the origins of the misuse of the preposition to the times when Ukrainian territories were under the rule of different states – Poland and the Russian Empire (Ibid, p. 219). Since the territories were parts of other states, the usage of preposition “na” (“on”) indicating a position – “na Ukrayini” (“in Ukraine” or rather “on Ukraine”) – was absolutely adequate grammar-wise. Yet even after Ukraine consolidated its modern borders as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic, usage of preposition “na” in relation to Ukraine was considered as the only correct form during the Soviet times.

In his works, Lenin exclusively used preposition “na” (“on”) regarding Ukraine:

Теперь на Украине каждая банда избирает кличку, одна свободнее другой, одна демократичнее другой, и в каждом уезде – по банде (Lenin, 1969, p. 356).

Now, in Ukraine (“na Ukraine” – Rus.), every gang chooses a nickname, each freer than

another, each more democratic than another, and there is a gang in every county.

Such usage may be partially explained by the historical perception of Ukraine merely as subject to the Russian Empire. It is also in line with the deliberate policy of Russification and processes of building a communist state, where every Soviet republic was just a part of the Union (Kuzio, 1998).

Upon gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine joined the ranks of internationally recognised sovereign states. In 1993, the government of Ukraine requested the government of the Russian Federation to accept the form “*v Ukraine*” (“in Ukraine”) as the only grammatically correct. Such recognition would serve as “linguistic confirmation of Ukraine’s status as an independent state, not a subordinate region” (Sheliazhenko, 2009). The norm was never formally approved, however it started being used in official documents and speeches by Russian officials as a sign of respect towards their Ukrainian counterparts.

It is notable, that such respect and Ukraine’s recognition as a sovereign state in the form of correct preposition usage was withdrawn a few months before the start of Euromaidan in November 2013. Former economic policy advisor to Vladimir Putin, Andrey Illarionov believes it signalled the start of the information component of the Russian operation on annexation of Crimea (Illarionov, 2015). The change in prepositions, hence in attitude, occurred within one day – 27 July 2013, when Putin visited Kyiv to commemorate the 1025th anniversary of events that brought Christianity to Kyivan Rus (predecessor of Ukraine and Russia). In the official documents and speeches till that date, Putin used the correct grammatical form “*v Ukraine*” (“in Ukraine”). Even when opening the working visit on 27 July 2013, Vladimir Putin said:

Мне приятно отметить, что мы с Вами постоянно в личном контакте находимся: и Вы приезжаете к нам с рабочими визитами, и я бываю в Украине – сегодняшняя встреча лишнее тому подтверждение (Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, 27 July 2013 b, para. 11).

I am pleased to note that we maintain a personal contact: you come to us with working visits, and I am [often] in Ukraine (“v Ukraine”) – today’s meeting is another confirmation of that.

Later that day at the conference *Orthodox-Slavic Values – The Core of Ukraine’s Civilizational Choice*, Putin referred to Ukraine using the preposition “*na*” (“on”):

К концу XIX века чугуна производилось на Украине вдвое больше, чем на Урале (Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, 27 July 2013 a, para. 6).

By the end of XIX century, there was produced twice as much cast iron in Ukraine (“na Ukraine” – equivalent to “on Ukraine”) than in the Urals.

The incorrect preposition usage in the second instance may be explained by the context as in XIX century Ukraine was not an independent state. Yet ever since that conference on 27 July 2013, in all official documents and speeches of Russian officials, the expression “*na Ukraine*” (“on Ukraine”) has fully replaced the correct “*v Ukraine*” (“in Ukraine”).

In his speech of 19 September 2013 at the meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, discussing topical political and economic affairs Putin used only “*na Ukraine*” which was sharply contrasted with the correct preposition usage – “*v*” – in relation to other states:

Если взять, допустим, объём импорта, скажем, той же Молдовы, куда идёт? К нам, в Белоруссию, на Украину и в Казахстан (Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, 19 September 2013, para. 256).

If we take, for example, the volume of imported goods of, say, Moldova, where does it go? It goes to us, in Belarus ("v Belarus"), in Ukraine ("na Ukrainu" – "on Ukraine"), and in Kazakhstan ("v Kazakhstan").

The incorrect preposition usage indicates that Ukraine's statehood and sovereignty are questioned by the Kremlin. Moreover, it feeds the propaganda machine that eagerly employs all means to portray Ukraine as a failed state and its post-revolution government as illegitimate.

In a display of political solidarity with Ukraine in the light of Russia's annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas, some opposition magazines, news channels and journalists in Russia switched to using the correct form – "v Ukraine" ("in Ukraine"). Notably, the reporters of Dozhd, Russian independent television channel, in early March 2014 manifested their support of the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine by starting to use the correct preposition in their broadcasts about Ukraine (Dozhd, 22 March 2014).

Since Euromaidan, the choice of preposition became a subject of animated discussions among Ukrainians, particularly those speaking Russian. There have been many memes in social media on crucial importance of the preposition. Most famous memes that became viral in weeks after the Revolution of Dignity reads "What's the difference between "v Ukraine" (in Ukraine) or "na Ukraine" (on Ukraine)? Well, it's like lying in the soil or on the soil" (Razumkov Centre 2016).

The preposition has turned into a marker of political identity. Everyone who makes a conscious choice to use expression "v Ukraine" in Russian (or "v Ukrayini" in Ukrainian) manifests their support of the independent, sovereign Ukraine. Whereas usage of "na Ukraine" ("na Ukrayini" in Ukrainian) either signals of distrust to Ukraine's state-building project or suggests that a person is being exposed to or prone to believe the political propaganda spread by the Kremlin.

Due to linguistic specifics, both grammatically correct and incorrect forms are equally translated into English. The meaning of the preposition is not conveyed and some valuable information is lost. It was vividly demonstrated during February 2015 summit in Minsk. The delegation of Ukraine was given for signature a text of the agreement¹ in Russian with the incorrect expression "na Ukraine" ("on Ukraine"). Signature of the agreement with the misused preposition was met with criticism by a number of Ukrainian political experts domestically. They claimed that by signing the agreement, Ukrainian delegation admitted its loss of sovereignty to a certain extent (Ukrlife.TV, 2015).

Therefore, the case of Ukraine, as a predominantly bilingual country facing a number of severe political and social challenges, suggests that even certain linguistic forms, as a preposition, can serve as certain cultural codes and be perceived as markers of identity. Moreover, their specific usage can be seen as indicators of sovereignty and / or, prospectively, success of state-building efforts.

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¹ Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements from 12 February 2015.

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PART TWO

Part two steps back to explore theories on culture and communication that can support a sound approach to developing successful narratives and planning cognitive maneuver. Prof. Ess and Ms. MacNulty map out dimensions of culture and values that serve as building blocks for most working in this field. These are fundamental to grounding further practical research, operational methods or analytic products. Dr. Ehlschlaeger is already developing operational means to put theory into practice using human geography to help navigate communications challenges. As a field case in action, Ms. Mushtaq describes on-going efforts in the Khyber Pakhtunkwa and Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan to identify and foster local forms of cultural narratives and communication that are seen to be effective for peacebuilding.

Culture, technology, communication: broad considerations

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Abstract

The emergence of the internet and then the World-Wide-Web as globally distributed media has evoked a now extensive body of research into how communication preferences, patterns, and so on mutually shape and are transformed by both *culturally-variable* factors (beginning with language itself, local traditions, norms, practices, and so on) and changing *media technologies* (beginning with orality, extending through print, broadcast media, and then multiple forms of online venues: Ess and Sudweeks 2005; Ess, forthcoming). Ultimately, knowing how best to communicate *what message* (i.e., depending on its content, its potential significance for what audience, and so on) between one or more *specific* communicants – all of whom are deeply shaped by both diverse cultural norms and communicative preferences – under *what specific context* depends on far more factors and variables than can be taken up here. For that, here I summarize four of the most basic cultural dimensions, followed by important characteristics of communication media themselves, that should be taken on board to avoid cross-cultural communication misfires. (NB: there are clear overlaps and complementarities between these observations and the “cultural-cognitive dimensions” highlighted here by Christine MacNulty.)

Five culturally-variable dimensions of communication

High context / low content vis-à-vis low context / high content cultures (Hall 1976)

Many traditional and contemporary non-Western cultures strongly prefer *high context/low content* forms of communication. Reflecting a prevailingly hierarchical, if not authoritarian social and political structures, these forms of communication stress establishing relative social rank and position first of all. Setting context can involve elaborate rituals of greetings, etc. or be as simple as polite exchanges of family background, significant acquaintances, etc. Only once this social-political *context* is established can *content* of communication be taken up. Japan is a premier example of a HC/LC society, specifically with its concept of *wakimae*, “situated discernment” (Hildebrandt 2015, 117-121) – what my Japanese students explain to me as “reading the atmosphere.” In these contexts, much of the communication is *implicit* and *nonverbal* – and thus opaque to outsiders who are not familiar with the cultural codes involved, beginning with gaze, gesture, body distance, etc. Broadly speaking, these communication styles emphasize the communication and sharing of feeling and affect, and prefer *images* over *text*.

It is often observed in contemporary media and communication studies that the explosion of visually oriented communication, i.e., *emojis*, in Japan – and then more globally – is precisely the result of especially younger people wanting to avoid the complications of sustaining appropriate but complex communication forms as required by relative social status, age, and so forth: at the same time, however, emojis – along with visual communication forms more broadly – are far more ambiguous than text, and hence more likely to lead to misunderstanding and miscommunication (Abumi 2015).

By contrast, many examples of Western cultures exercise *low context/high content* forms of communication. We spend little time in establishing a context defined by social status or rank and prefer to “come straight to the point.” Broadly speaking, these communication styles emphasize the exchange of *explicit* information, preferably stated as clearly and succinctly as possible. In some sense, the emphasis is more on the logical and the rational. (This approach to communication is

behind “communication = information” models in much of Western philosophy of information and communication.)

Power distance (Hofstede & Minkov 2010)

Roughly, in **high power distance** countries/cultures, unequal distribution of power in institutions and organizations is accepted by members of a society. By contrast, **low power distance** countries/cultures minimize the distance between the less and the more powerful. Broadly speaking, high power distance correlates with HC/LC, while low power distance correlates with LC/HC. This distinction can be seen in play within Western countries as well. In German, the distinction between formal (*Sie*) and informal/familiar (*du*) forms of address is used to articulate and sustain power distance, e.g., the formal address between a superior and subordinate, with the informal address used only for family and close friends. In more egalitarian Scandinavia, the formal address was eliminated in the 1950s and is now used only for addressing members of the royal family.

Masculine-feminine (Hofstede & Minkov 2010)

A masculine culture/communication assumes relatively clear and distinct gender roles; a feminine culture/communication blurs or largely eliminates distinctions between gender roles. Scandinavian countries are both low power distance and feminine in these terms. By contrast, starting with Germany and then especially southern Europe, and eventually Asia, we find increasing degrees of both high-power distance and strong gender role distinctions.

A person from a high-power distance/masculine culture will presume and employ important differences in communication, depending on whether s/he is addressing, e.g., a high-status male vs. a lower-status female. To make such assumptions in Scandinavia – e.g., when addressing the current (female) prime minister of Norway– would guarantee communication misfires.

Individualism-collectivism (Hofstede & Minkov 2010)

Research over the past twenty years has helped significantly refine our understanding of this distinction, especially within media and communication studies, where we focus more precisely on more *individual* and/or more *relational* understandings of selfhood and identity.

The contrast between individual / relational selfhood was most dramatically apparent in the contrasts between countries such as the U.S. which emphasizes individualism, the exclusive responsibility of the individual for his/her choices, accomplishments, etc. – and many Asian countries in which one’s sense of selfhood was all but entirely dependent upon the various familial, social, and political *relationships* that define one’s identity. More individualist forms of communication overlap with LC/HC: more relational forms of communication overlap with HC/LC (again, with Japanese *Wakimae* as a primary example). The former emphasizes communication as exchange of explicit information, with honesty or truth-telling as primary virtues: the latter emphasizes communication as community building, establishment and reinforcement of clearly defined social relationships, communities, and hierarchies (and thus with a greater emphasis on indirect and tacit forms of communication, as well as of “truth” as a preference for observations and commentary that serves to sustain rather than challenge community and established relationships).

These differences lead to classic cross-cultural misunderstandings. The Western, low power distance, and more individual-oriented norms of critical thinking and open (democratic) debate can directly conflict with high power distance and relational norms in more hierarchical societies, especially around the critical social importance of respecting and saving *face*. In a HPD/relational context, a subordinate can only support a superior’s claim or position in public, whatever his or her

actual views may be. If the superior is a LPD/individual communicator, and s/he later discovers that the subordinate in fact has important evidence, reasons, etc. to be critical of the publicly-stated claim – which, worst-case, might have led to operational decisions, policy decisions, etc. that are thereby in fact ill-informed, simply wrong, with perhaps disastrous consequences – the superior will interpret the subordinate as dishonest, untrustworthy, perhaps intentionally malicious. But this will only lead to further misunderstanding and communication misfires.

Similarly, those of us accustomed to LPD/individual direct communication often make the mistake of directly asking a question or requesting a service in the context of HPD/relational contexts. Rather than responding with a truthful but negative answer (“I don’t know,” “that can’t be done”) – thereby insulting the face of both persons – the HPD/relational indirect communicator will simply give us the response that s/he thinks we want to hear. Again, disastrous consequences may follow. To avoid such misfires, the LPD/individual communicator needs to learn the art of indirect communication. For example, by explaining that s/he has a problem that needs solving, the LPD/individual communicator in effect invites the HPD/relational communicator to offer useful information or service if s/he is capable of doing so – or remaining silent if not, thereby preserving the face and relative status of both.

Media, communication, and social organization

Equally fundamental, lastly, are the differences in communicative norms and preferences bound up with the forms of *media* technologies themselves. In particular, the Medium Theory built up by H. Innis, E. Eisenstein, M. McLuhan, W. Ong, and J. Meyerowitz foregrounds critical distinctions between *orality*, *literacy*, *literacy-print*, and the *secondary orality* of electronic communication such as facilitated by the internet and the web (Baron 2008; Ess 2014; Peters 2015).

Very broadly, *orality* is bound up with relational selves entrenched in traditional communities as hierarchical and more authoritarian. Individual and collective memory are retained and celebrated through performance of oral “texts” – sagas, poems, songs – that encode important cultural norms, events, beliefs, etc. By contrast, the rise of a more individual conception of selfhood emerges alongside the rise of *literacy*: while writing first arises as an administrative and eventually legal tool for the earliest agricultural cities and then empires, the ability to “freeze” speech into relatively permanent texts further allows for *reflection* on the self as now externalized in text (e.g., Foucault 1988). The Protestant Reformation, as insisting on the authority of the individual conscience in interpreting the Bible – increasingly accessible thanks to the printing press and rising literacy rates – thereby issues in modern Western conceptions of strongly individual selves as *freedoms* requiring democratic societies. Literacy further provides the infrastructure for logic, natural science, law, and rationality as such, and thereby characteristic Western democratic traditions of rule by law (beginning with Constitutions: e.g., Kant (1784] 1991; Hildebrandt 2015).

Several of these relationships are literally mapped in the World Values Survey (figure 1). Specifically, the most secular-rational societies – e.g., Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland – are at the same time *LC/HC* (Hall), more *individual*, *low-power distance* and *feminine* societies (Hofstede). From the standpoint of Medium Theory, it is not accidental that these countries are the ones most deeply shaped by the Protestant Reformation and the rise of *literacy-print*. By contrast, moving towards the (lower) left quadrant of the map is a move towards more *HC/LC* (Hall), more *collective*, *high-power distance*, and *masculine* societies (Hofstede). Most broadly: these are moves from egalitarian and democratic societies to non-egalitarian and more authoritarian societies.

The secondary orality of the internet and the Web, by contrast, facilitate a return of the more relational and collective, and thereby the emotive over the rational (e.g., emojis as a start). Hence there may be some correlation between the rise of social media and related networked technologies that foster and amplify the sense of self as relational, on the one hand, and the emergence and/or rise of more *collective* but thereby more hierarchical-authoritarian organizations calling for returns to

traditional values and practices, including strong *masculine* (Hofstede) definitions of gender roles, as exemplified in various nationalist and Neo-Nazi organizations, as well as extremist groups such as Daesh, and so on.

Concluding comments

It must be emphasized that these broad characterizations are only the most basic and initial considerations regarding culture, technology, and communication. A great deal of research over the past two decades has foregrounded (a) important limitations and critiques of both Hall and Hofstede coupled with (b) efforts to develop a far more extensive range of variables – e.g., the 29 variables identified by Baumgartner and Marcus (2004) or the more than 70 described by Reeder, Macfadyen, and Chase (2004). For its part, Medium Theory has been helpfully criticized by more recently emerging theories of mediatization, at least within the Scandinavian and German contexts (Hjarvard 2008). Still more recently, especially in the domains of Human-Computer-Interaction (HCI), some of the leading practitioners have argued that “culture” is only useful as a “can-opener,” as a starting point for what will become far more complex and difficult processes of analysis (e.g., Cabrero, Winschiers-Theophilus, & Abdelnour-Nocera, 2016). I would further add the obvious: however well informed we seek to be – in the end, nothing replaces our own immersion in a foreign culture and language, in part as this is the only way to begin to appropriate and understand the more tacit dimensions of both, and thereby the Other shaped by these (cf. Dianne Loyet on the “Consequences of monolingualism,”). But given these caveats, I hope the above summary is at least a useful starting point.




Figure 1: World Values Survey (<<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>>)

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Critical Cultural-Cognitive Dimensions for Understanding & Communicating

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Introduction

This paper explores five of the most critical Cultural-Cognitive Dimensions of twenty that can be found in all cultures. However, the ranges of scales on these dimensions and the way in which they manifest can be very different. Charles Ess's paper shows a map (WVS) that illustrates the extent of the differences. We started with Geert Hofstede's² dimensions also, and then added several based on our own experience. We, in the US and West, tend to be at opposite ends of the spectrum from much of the rest of the world, especially the Middle East, SW Asia and Africa. What this means for us is that in each of these areas there is the likelihood of significant misunderstanding and miscommunication over both large and small matters. Indeed, if we are to take non-kinetic operations seriously, then we should pay far more attention to these cultural differences.

Cultural-Cognitive Dimensions for Communication and Understanding

Communicating with people of other cultures can be frustrating at best and impossible at worst. We cannot expect direct translation (Google translate may be good for tourists, but not serious discussion) or interpretation of words to mean what we intend, or what they intend. It's not just the language – it's the phrases, the nuances, the whole cultural background, the context, the stories that we need to understand better.

Through experience on the ground in many countries, working with different cultures, we have identified twenty key cultural and cognitive dimensions that expose significant differences between us and other cultures. As mentioned, the original idea came from Geert Hofstede. The complete list is given at the end of the chapter

Working with colleagues and ex-patriates from the Middle East (Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt) we have put together scales of these cultural-cognitive dimensions, and have indicated the likely positions of what we might call "generic" Arabs – see the diagram overleaf. And we have also positioned a generic "US" – the middle-aged Americans who are doing much of the communicating and influencing. (And, by the way, we have used these same dimensions to assist members of the NATO C2COE understand each other better – by getting them to place themselves on the scales and describe to each other what it means.) We can identify gaps between "us" and "them" for any culture, country or group. We are not attempting to be comprehensive here; we are looking for 80% solutions, not perfection.


The scales are labeled with the appropriate dimension name, and then are labeled further *Low – High* or *Authoritarian – Empirical*, for instance, with the Arab ratings on the left, and the US ratings on the right. We have also included a rough estimate of Russia and China on the scales – both of these are for the middle class.

The Cultural-Cognitive Dimensions – greater detail.

I start with the five dimensions that I believe are either the cause of the problems, or are exacerbating the problems, between us and both adversarial and friendly cultures in the Middle East, Russia and

² Geert Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations*, McGraw-Hill, UK, 1991

China.



Values, Beliefs, and Motivations (sustenance driven to self-actualization)

This dimension is based on Maslow's theory of motivation and hierarchy of needs. Since the early 1970s, research has supported the idea that people have a set of values, beliefs, and motivations that are relatively consistent, that are culturally based, and that underpin everything they do. These values and beliefs manifest through time as attitudes and lifestyles, and in the short-term as behavior and perception. This is the first of the most critical dimensions, and we shall focus most attention on these four.

Throughout the world, people's values have been changing for centuries, moving from dependence to independence. But in the last decade or so, the rate of change has been increasing, with Western cultures embracing a very different type of values that have to do with individualism and the understanding of interdependence. Values and beliefs underpin motivations. Motivations describe WHY people do as they do – and that is something we must understand, if we are to communicate effectively or influence people away from, or towards some course of action or behavior. We cannot influence behavior at the level of behavior. Think about how well that works with kids, even when they are paddled for misbehaving. Here, the paper focuses on a values-based model that has been used in many countries around the world for more than 35 years, and that can be used to understand motivations.

On one side of the continuum are cultures that are Sustenance Driven. They are concerned with meeting their basic needs and, even when they have the things they need for survival, they tend to focus on holding on to what they have, including tradition. Most of these cultures are also collective – the needs of society take precedence over the individual. In contrast, self-actualized cultures and people – we call the Inner Directed are not focused on basic survival needs. They are driven by intrinsic goals. They place more importance on personal accomplishment (such as a career, or relationships,) on people, and on developing themselves psychologically, than they do on material

things. They are individualistic, value autonomy, and they see the world as interdependent. And between those extremes are the Outer Directed people and cultures that are focused on esteem-related values that manifest as desire for power, wealth and success.

Political Society and Rights

Closely associated with these values is the next cultural cognitive dimension – Political Society – that of Collective vs Individual rights. In general, Sustenance values are drivers for a collective society, or perhaps a magnet for it, while self-actualization is definitely more individualistic. However, the motivator/leader for Collectivism could be power (which is an esteem value – power over others) as in Communist Russia, China or N. Korea, or it could be an ideology with a leader who has some vision for the group which could be power-related or religious as in ISIS/ISIL and Iran. In highly collective societies, there is no “I” there is only “We,” except for the leader or leadership, and the “We” must be completely subservient to the Leader, or risk death or severe punishment. So in Russia, for instance, we see the only source of political power as Communism (which is also the state “religion”) and in the ME, we see Sharia as the only source of political power (which is also Life and the State.)

We mistake the governance element of Islam for the religious element, which is why we may see a much larger element of Islam as more extremely religious than is really the case. Probably more than 95% of Muslim families just want to live a quiet life with their families, and are not interested in any conflict. But, if they are called on to take up the cause (whatever it is) they have no choice. They could be shamed and ostracized at best, or killed and their families shamed at worst.

The United States is a republic which is a system in which the people choose representatives who, in turn, make policy decisions on their behalf. The Framers of the Constitution were altogether fearful of pure democracy. Everything they read and studied taught them that pure democracies "have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths." There may be some individualistic, self-actualized people who wish it were a democracy, especially since the group that is close to being self-actualized is now 50% of the population. But the main characteristic of this kind of society is that it values individual rights.

As one of my colleagues has said, the conflicts in which we are engaged, even with Daesh, are not about religion as we in the United States think about it – an individual choice of behavior separate from governance. They are about choosing a version of religion as their form of Governance,³ and we have not realized that – so we are fighting on the basis of an inaccurate assumption. It is primarily a political conflict for a version of governance to meet the needs of the people.

Approach to Power/Governance

Closely related to Political Society is the approach to Power and Governance. In fact, they are so closely related that I was originally going to have them as a single dimension, but there are some differences. This dimension extends from Centralized to Decentralized, where the governance of the Collective culture is clearly Centralized, and the governance of the Decentralized culture is much more individualistic, as in the US and even Europe.

So, in attempting to deal with adversaries or potential adversaries kinetically or through political

³ Kevin D. McCarty served as the Director for Global Outreach on the National Security Council staff under two Presidents.

warfare, on one side of the conflict are cultures that are primarily Sustenance Driven, centralized and collective (except for Daesh) and on the other side cultures that are primarily Inner Directed – pushing towards self-actualization – that are decentralized and individualistic.

Daesh is an interesting phenomenon, coming from cultures that are otherwise centralized and collective. Its leaders are predominantly Outer Directed, but the bulk of its members exhibit predominantly Sustenance Driven/Outer Directed values, and yet an Inner Directed organizational structure – that of a network. It is that network structure that makes them so effective. Many years ago, I spoke about networked structures as being rather like fishing nets. Good nets have knots at the intersections of the component lines. If the net snags a rock, it holds together because of the knots. It takes many knots/nodes to be destroyed because the net is unable to perform its job. And, if only 1 or 2 knots/nodes are destroyed, they can be repaired (replaced) very easily.

Despite the individualism of the US, its government and institutions, tend to operate in a centralized fashion. The Armed Forces, especially, are extremely hierarchical and centralized – with the exception of SOF.

If we are to think about a large, centralized organization trying to deal with a swarm of fast, agile, flexible, decentralized and networked ones – who is going to win or succeed? There are too many knots/nodes to deal with every one – and even if we tried to kill all of them, more would arise and form new ones. There has to be a better way. All these small, networked organizations need support. The leaders can't provide it. What can we do to erode that support?

Strategic Time

This dimension is about a culture's sense of history and the understanding brought about by that sense of history. It permeates every story, every perception, and every decision. It is also about the time over which they expect their actions to play out. In the United States, we have probably the shortest strategic time of anywhere on the planet, and this can be seen in our desire for everything to happen "right now." This can be a real handicap for the US in areas where we expect to see results, as many actions will take considerable time before results are seen. China likely has the longest strategic time. The Middle East is generally somewhere in the middle: radical Islam talks about the re-conquest of Europe and the re-establishment of the Caliphate on the one hand, while countries such as Iraq have a very short history of their various tribes and religious groups working as a nation.

Many of our adversaries or potential adversaries seem to have serious visions for who they are and what they want to achieve. That puts them in positions to develop their campaigns ahead of time:

China – to become the pre-eminent global superpower by 2049

Russia – to regain the land, power and status it had prior to 1917

ISIL – to establish a new Caliphate from Europe to Asia

Do we really understand what these visions mean for us and what we might do about them? We are already behind the curve, as we do not have a vision for ourselves, and so we will always be in a reactive mode. However, we may be able to create better thought-through responses if we understand motivations of the leaders and followers in both nation-state and non-nation state conflicts.

Concern about Shame⁴ (high to low)

This is included here as it is so critical to understanding the role of the Collective, and the influence the Collective has on action – especially in the Middle East. People in both the Arab Middle East and Asia are very concerned with “saving face” and not bringing shame to oneself or one’s family, although the penalties in the Middle East are more severe. In the West, the concept of shame has almost disappeared. In the US, we have debates about shaming or mocking adversaries in order to turn their fellow citizens against them – when, in fact, we may be doing the opposite of our intentions. We may be able to use shame or honor in our communications, but we need to be very careful that we do not create negative unanticipated consequences that could have longer-term strategic effects.

The Other Dimensions – in which we are generally at opposite ends from our adversaries

▪ Epistemologies	<i>Authoritarian --- Empirical</i>
▪ Ways of Thinking	<i>Holistic/Contextual ---- Linear</i>
▪ Approaches to Life	<i>Being --- Doing</i>
▪ Approaches to Understanding	<i>Feeling --- Thinking</i>
▪ Measure of Achievement	<i>Social --- Material</i>
▪ Religious Beliefs	<i>Critical --- Irrelevant</i>
▪ Concern about Honor	<i>High --- Low</i>
▪ Tactical Time	<i>Long --- Short</i>
▪ Assertiveness	<i>Maternalism --- Masculinity</i>
▪ Respect for Elders	<i>High --- Low</i>
▪ Reaction to the Foreign	<i>Closed --- Open</i>
▪ Willingness to point out Bad News	<i>Low --- High</i>
▪ Sense of Punctuality	<i>Low --- High</i>
▪ Indulgence vs Self-discipline	<i>Self-Discipline --- Indulgence</i>
▪ Perception: visual, auditory, kinesthetic	<i>AK --- V</i>

Conclusions

We speak about the need for Information Operations, PSYOP, and even the more strategic Political Warfare, yet we do not heed Napoleon’s or Dr. David Maxwell’s admonitions that Kinetic Operations could/should be in support of psychological/political operations, not the other way around⁵.

- *Napoleon: In war, the moral is to the physical as three is to one.*
- *In the 21st Century the psychological is to the kinetic as ten is to one*

Our adversaries understand this. Until we really understand these critical differences between us and them, we will never get ahead of the curve and stand a chance of winning.

⁴ Yusra Mushtaq has pointed out that concepts such as Shame, Honor and Respect for Elders are critical in the Pakistan/Pakhtun cultures, yet they are regarded as almost irrelevant in the American Culture.

⁵ Dr. David Maxwell: *Modern Unconventional Warfare*. Briefing to the USASOC Futures Forum, Jan 2017

Mapping Local Demographic Indicators to Language and Culture for Military Operations

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Abstract

When US forces enter an operational environment, they may have as much situational awareness about socio-cultural conditions as those soldiers in Afghanistan deployed to the same villages after previous units. Conversely, they may know nothing about local culture or even local dialects when traveling to ungoverned locations for the first time, for example remote villages or megacity slums. This chapter describe human geography techniques under research to map demographic conditions from census data, USG created surveys, and ground truth data. Soon these demographic condition maps, augmented by information created from social media and other open sources, will be able to provide a surprising amount of situational awareness before US forces have time to personally create accurate socio-cultural knowledge. These techniques have the potential to create operationally useful maps including themes such as where languages are spoken, the distribution of cultural characteristics, and which neighborhoods are more connected with nearby areas. These language, social group, and connectedness maps are critical for answering straightforward situational awareness questions and more complex critical operational queries during military operations, especially in urban areas.

Introduction

As a science advisor at a recent US Army wargame testing urban operation capabilities in phase zero to phase three, I observed that population-centric intelligence is considered "many times more important" than terrain- or infrastructure-centric information or even the military hardware for determining mission success. While special operations, civil affairs, and military police have always respected social-cultural information, the need for social-cultural information beyond population density for maneuver, fire, and logistics decisions and results is now becoming apparent: urban operations' plans and effects must be based on subgroups' ethnicity, economic status, living conditions, and what information is being communicated to those subgroups. There is an expectation that future soldiers, down to tactical levels, will have access to pattern of life analyses (POLA) techniques forecasting civilian actions and reactions to military events in real time.

The complexity of POLA results cannot be understood with traditional mapping techniques. The POLA statement "800 people from neighborhood XYZ will flee enemy indirect fire, leaving 500 people sheltering in place," for example, would currently be geotagged to a map location. However, the spread of fleeing refugees, their demographic characteristics, how they would flee, and how they would consider friendly and allied forces would not be accurately represented by a narrative and latitude/longitude coordinates. In this example, soldiers would need to know the civilians' social-economic status, who they communicate with, how they communicate, and connectedness with other neighborhoods to determine which people would flee, how they would flee, where they would flee, and by what path they would likely take. The current state of population representation is inadequate for either situational awareness or course of action analysis.

The largest information gaps for both the example above as well as many other operational queries include determining geographic and temporal demographic patterns implied by each facet of the impacted population, called subpopulations for the rest of this chapter. It is unlikely that all potential subpopulations can be binned and organized before specific military actions: there are just too many contingencies to predetermine. These subpopulations need to be divided by ethnicity, social status, economic status, or culture, forming geographic preferences based on multiple context-dependent

connectedness. For each subpopulation, easy queries of “where now” followed by queries of “where going,” and difficult queries of “when going” require detailed understanding of all cultures, languages used, how different subpopulations communicate amongst themselves and with other subpopulations, and how quickly information diffuses.

Demographic Mapping Issues

The complexity of many DOD operational questions requires that detailed demographic characteristics be mapped down to geographic scale sufficient to model face-to-face communications as well as the geographic scale of the physical impacts military operations have on those subpopulations. With many dense urban environments containing thousands of people within each km², using a single source of demographic information is not sufficient to provide the fidelity, completeness, and details of necessary subpopulations. For example, social media harvests without foundational census data cannot be adequately verified nor is it possible to determine which subpopulations are not confirming or denying the observed narratives. Another serious issue arises when subpopulations are arbitrarily aggregated to geographic areas, such as census tracts or local political boundaries, rather than the causal experiences affecting these subpopulations. This is formally described as the Uncertain Geographic Context Problem (UGCP, Kwan 2012). Dr. Kwan, and many others, argue that populations must be represented down to the individual to prevent various UGCP effects. The scope of this chapter cannot fully explain all the ramifications of the UGCP caused by using traditional demographic mapping techniques.

Demographic Mapping Techniques

To avoid UGCP, recent techniques combining multiple types of demographic information sources, described in Ehlschlaeger et al. (2016b), allow explicit representation of the uncertainties associated with each data stream at the geographic scales for military operations. Necessary foundational demographic information comes from census data, high resolution imagery, United States Government (most often from USAID or DOD), and commercial surveys, as well as social media. The census and survey data locates cultural and language groups to the administrative level available in open source information. Quite often, census and survey data provide measures of literacy, education levels, type of communication, frequency of communication, ways of travel, and demographic variables such as ethnicity, age, health, and other observable traits. Observations from geotagged social media, mapped infrastructure, and directly seen during military operations determine correlated cultural information at levels more precise than the census administrative levels. The geotagged social media is especially important for determining neighborhood patterns of language. It automatically matches language to specific city blocks. By analyzing multiple geotagged tweets from the same user accounts, we can measure the physical connectedness of neighborhoods. By analyzing twitter mentions we can build social networks. Both physical and social networks enhance our ability to measure information diffusion. These demographic characteristics are then simulated at the household or individual level allowing Monte Carlo Simulation to avoid overconfidence caused by techniques creating UGCP issues. All these advancements greatly enhance our ability to succeed in “The Three Block War” (Krulak 1999) by creating accurate and precise language maps, which are highly correlated with ethnic groups, cultures, and other subpopulations.

These maps of language, culture, subpopulations, and the correlated demographic variables will likely cognitively overwhelm soldiers actively engaged in tactical operations. Instead, warfighters need simulation models acknowledging multi-cultural differences and heterogeneous population effects on human action and reactions to military operations. The USG’s efforts in applying Human Dimension Understanding during tactical operations is still in basic research mode, but the DOD should be defining the simulation models desired. The following DOD milestones establish the path of providing actionable information at tactical geographic and temporal scales:

1. Each DOD organization should put together an operational framework describing their missions and directives with the types of information necessary to answer operational questions in those missions.
2. Data analysts should then study operational frameworks to identify which data layers and data streams to provide the information at geographic and temporal scales necessary to answer those questions expected from warfighters. Ehlschlaeger et al. (2016a) discusses this task using USPACOM Socio-Cultural Analysis Team's Humanitarian Crisis Framework as a case study. Analysts should pay close attention to the errors and uncertainties associated with building data models at the geographic resolutions necessary for tactical operations as well as how quickly data degrades over time.
3. Data developers should use the data gaps discovered in step (2) to explore which data collection techniques are required to fill gaps. Understanding the estimates of data and model uncertainties are critical to this step.
4. Social, environmental, and infrastructural simulation modelers should identify weaknesses in the framework design, developing models to better represent actions subpopulations are likely to take during various military activities.
5. Visualization techniques must be devised to translate simulation model results into maps useful during tactical operations that can be viewed on the communication systems expected to be available to the warfighter.
6. Warfighters would then evaluate which simulation model results needs improvement through wargame exercises, iterating through this process. During this step, critical evaluate of WHY the models need improvement will determine whether data collection techniques, data models, operational frameworks, simulation models, or visualization techniques are the casual elements of the weaknesses.

Instead of giving the warfighter dozens or hundreds of socio-cultural map layers, simulation model results must clearly show information necessary to improve situational awareness, forecasting near future changes in the population, while being aligned to specific military operations. For example, if civilians will be fleeing an adversary's shelling, the Army should be creating estimated go/slow-go/no-go maps considering where civilians will escape the attack. Since go/slow-go/no-go maps are a normal product for soldiers, the results of a "civilian fleeing" model should be incorporated seamlessly into terrain derived maps to provide a single point of reference.

Concluding Remarks

With USG adversaries increasing their use of civilians as human shields, as hostages, or as enablers in terrorist activities, we need to better understand the implications of subpopulation location and where our adversaries locate their operations. As discussed in "The Three Block War," warfighters in the 21st Century will require extensive information to successfully execute urban operations, whether they be disaster relief oriented or kinetic. This information must be easily communicated to the warfighter at the cognitive level they are accustomed too. Ergo, the DOD needs dynamic topographic maps aligned to military operations with more emphasis to themes portraying Human Dimensions. Dense urban environments contain multiple cultural groups, languages, and communication methods that if misunderstood, will lead to poor planning and decisions. In partnership with academia, DARPA, NGA, and private industry, Army Research Labs are exploring the complex interrelationships between languages, cultures, and how they communicate to better model and map the full spectrum of Pattern of Life Analysis necessary to support urban operations. As the world becomes more urban, the UGS will need to better understand the Human Dimension.

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Culture and Language towards Peace Building in Pakistan

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Introduction

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan appeared on the map of the world almost seventy years before with the division of subcontinent and end of century's old British Colonial Empire. The geostrategic location of the country draws a very colorful and distinctive picture of cultures and civilizations. It is surrounded by China, Afghanistan, India and Iran with strong influences of their subsequent rich historical heritages and civilizations. Located in Southern Asia, Pakistan was previously home to ancient Indus Valley civilization along with the symbolic influences of Arabs, Parthians, Kushans, White Huns, Greeks, Persians and Turks. It is the first Islamic country with a sharp blend of religion, civilizations, culture and language. Each of the provinces of Pakistan symbolizes cultural diversity in terms of ethnicity, culture and languages. The provincial languages are Punjabi, Pashtu, Sindhi, and Balochi while other regional languages are Kashmiri, Pothohari, Hindko, Brahui, Shina, Balti, Khowar, Dhatki, Dari, Marwari, Wakhi and Burushaski. However, Urdu is the national language with widely official use of English as well.

Aim

The present study is going to focus on the contribution of culture and language towards peace building in Pakistan with the particular focus on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). There is a strong established relationship between culture and language in KPK & FATA where Pashto language is widely spoken along with other Hindku and Dari languages. It is widely seen that there is a strong sense of association and affection amongst the Pakhtuns' (called the people of KPK&FATA) where ever they come across with each other. In Pakistan, it is a usual trend that if any one speaks in Pashto apart from KPK & FATA with any stranger Pakhtun, the sense of brotherhood and affection is established at once. The Pakhtun culture is highly dominated with the concept of brotherhood; so speaking the same language, no matter if by a stranger, builds a relationship of affection and adherence as if like knowing each other from ages. If language is a source of recognition and identity of culture, it can pave the way towards peace building by having an effective communication.

Challenges of Militancy and Terrorism

The whole world is confronted with the menace of terrorism, but Pakistan, being a frontline ally in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and also the victim, suffered tragically. Pakistan shares a long border called The Durand Line with Afghanistan, and there are so many ethnic commonalties between the people of KPK & FATA and Afghanistan. But unfortunately, the spillover effect of the violent disturbances in Afghanistan and militancy exits in FATA poses a very serious threat to the peace of KPK& FATA particularly and Pakistan at large. Militancy has badly damaged the Pakhtun culture and social values. It has displaced people, destroyed a network of Hujras (common guest houses), further weakened the thread of Pakhtunwali (non-written ethical code and traditional lifestyle or the way of the Pashtuns) and harmed the customs and traditions across KPK& FATA. The overall security situation in KPK& FATA has been highly improved after the series of military operations conducted by Pakistan Armed Forces, especially the Operation Zarb-e-Azb (2014), which has been highly lauded to reduce the militancy ratio in this specific area. However, the military operations are still going on to achieve a sustainable peace for development.

In this regard, many noncombatant peace building initiatives have been taken by the provincial and national governments along with the international contributors like the United Nations (UN) for the

sake of peace building. Keeping in view the cultural diversity of KPK & FATA with geographical proximity, history and civilization; linkages and associations of culture and language are being used as tools in the best possible effective and productive manner to draw the framework for peace building in Pakistan which faces lots of security threats and challenges. The traditional folk music, dances, foods, languages, dresses, traits invite senses of unity and harmony within a blend of cultures with this aim to bring out the beauty of Pakistan's rich diverse cultural heritage to the militancy hit areas of the country for peace building.



Pashtun Cultural Dance (Pinterest, 2017)

Culturally Based Approaches to Peace building in KPK & FATA

The diversity which lies in the Pakistani culture also possesses mechanisms from previous centuries to peacefully address the conflicts and issues through the act of talk. The philosophy of peace and non-violence of *Abdul Ghaffar Khan* (1890- 1988), a Pashtun, must be taken into account. He campaigned for the adoption of non-violent strategies and believed in using 'patience, righteousness and forgiveness as weapons to fight against any enemy' (Johansen, 1997). In addition, it is time to follow the nonviolent theory of *Khan Abdul Wali Khan* (1917-2006), a renowned Pashtu poet to spread peace, love and brotherhood (Express Tribune, 2012)

Pakhtun Wali: Code of Life (Banting, 2013)

The peace building approaches in Pakhtun culture are based on Pakhtunwali/Pashtunwali; all the structures and processes that underpin social, political and economic life in Pakhtun society revolve around it. Pakhtunwali, 'the way of the Pakhtun', is integral to Pakhtun identity (Kakar, 2005). Pashtuns

must behave respectfully to people, to animals, and to the environment around them. Pollution of the environment or its destruction is against the Pashtunwali (Wikipedia, 2017). It is considered as an 'alternative form of social organization with an advanced conflict resolution mechanism' (Johnson & Mason 2008). By adhering to Pakhtunwali, a Pakhtun possesses honor and respect; without honor, anyone won't be considered as Pakhtun and will not be having the rights, protection, or support of the Pakhtun tribe. Pakhtunwali honor-based society⁶ is governed by the concepts of chivalry or bravery, hospitality, gender boundaries (veil for woman), council (Jirga), the right of a fugitive to seek refuge and acceptance of his offer of peace, the right of revenge and bravery (Kakar, 2005; Joshua Project, 1999). There is no limit for the participation of members in the Jirga. The member must have background knowledge of the norms and customs of Pakhtuns. The decision of the Jirga must be acceptable to every one without having any hesitation or reluctance. In Pakhtun culture, respect of elders is highly important as it's a matter of life and death, and this is the very reason no one can object or go against the decision of the Jirga.

Jirga System: Traditional Assembly of Leaders

One of the most common practices in the Jirga system is a traditional circle of Pakhtun locals and elders of a community, comparable to a national parliament, gathered for dispute resolution, primarily through the process of arbitration. It is also an informal educational institution. The Jirga conducts shuttle diplomacy, negotiates ceasefires, and develops new laws according to the needs of the community. According to an expert, Dr. Ali Wardak, 'Jirga has over the centuries operated as an important mechanism of conflict resolution among the Pakhtuns, and has contributed to the maintenance of social order in the rest of the Pakhtun society both in direct and indirect ways' (2003).



Grand Jirga (Express Tribune, 2016)

But this Jirga system has been labeled as an "alternate dispute resolution" rather than recognizing that tribal "traditional dispute resolution" has a much longer history and greater credibility even than state institutions in Pakistan (3P Human Security, 2012). The famous Afghan poet and warrior Khushal Khan Khattak of sixteenth century highlighted the importance of Jirga in these verses-

⁶ These concepts of honor and shame are quite foreign to Americans, in particular. While my paper did not discuss these in any detail, we Americans tend to be at the opposite ends of the cultural-cognitive spectrum from the Pakistani/Pakhtun societies. Christine MacNulty.

Bandobust da kianat shi pa khabaro....

Uo tar salo sadaka sha sal tarzaro.....

The Universe can be managed on negotiations. One is preferable over hundreds and hundreds over thousands.

Noorani de agha zaye chi sara keeni....

Deerana salor yaran la maslahat.....

Translation: The place, where four friends (member of the jirga) meet to settle dispute as highly lucky and liable to be kissed (Pakhtun Culture & Traditions, 2009).

With the passage of time, there are many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations which are actively working for peace building as well as peacekeeping in the country and, in particular, KPK & FATA. They have the strong support of the Government of Pakistan and international organizations for initiating activities of cultural harmony in order to retain peace. There are many projects which are undertaken with the financial support of the United Nations to communicate with people of KPK & FATA in their own native language Pashto to reduce the impact of extreme continued militancy and pave the way for sustainable development. One example is "Social Practices: Promoting Peace and Cultural Cohesion through Heritage Education" (UNESCO, 2013).

Way Forward

Yes, there is a long way to go to address the issues of conflict, militancy and security in KPK & FATA of Pakistan. There is a need to engage the nonviolent or soft tools like culture and language in order to build a peaceful environment. The Pakhtuns are very much linked with their cultural heritage, tradition and values. In fact, religion and culture are closely linked with each other and an integral part of the society. The culture of Pakhtuns is highly emphasized even today and the Jirga system is an acknowledged mechanism to address any kind of animosity or related issues. For this reason, there should be a continuation and increase of cultural activities which certainly put a positive impact on the overall society. There is no doubt on this that culture and language act as instruments to join the masses together which history indicates also.

Things to Do

- There is no doubt that KPK and FATA inherits the *culture of peace* but the major responsibility lies on the shoulders of stakeholders that how they utilize the cultural values for peace and harmony.
- Unfortunately, the ration of violence is getting higher day by day; there is a need to engage people in *Jirga system* with adherence to address the issues rather than using any offensive means.
- Rapid change either in shape of any kind of development tangible or intangible won't be welcome from outsiders. For this reason, engaging the leaders should take into confidence.
- For the international community, many cultural beliefs and norms appear to be quite strange but this is a need of time to accept cultural as a mechanism or way out to meet the peace demands.
- One cannot bring change without taking the locals and their values into account.
- Security is a continuous problem of the people of KPK and FATA and everyone wants to get rid of it. Any kind of violent act will never be welcoming. Apart, there should be working line to enhance the cultural manifesto of peace and harmony.

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PART THREE

Part three looks forward by focusing on current conflicts where communication, narrative and culture play a vital role in how we engage and how successful we are. This section brings together the operators' view from Col (Ret.) Robert Jones, applied research on narratives of elite individuals, and a field interview with Mr. Maktary on peacebuilding in Yemen that describes successful and unsuccessful initiatives to influence the situation.

“All the King’s Horses and All the King’s Men” - Why the United States Policy Failed in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq (to name but a few...)

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'Why do you sit out here all alone?' said Alice, not wishing to begin an argument.

*'Why, because there's nobody with me!' cried Humpty Dumpty. 'Did you think I didn't know the answer to **that**? Ask another.'*

*'Don't you think you'd be safer down on the ground?' Alice went on, not with any idea of making another riddle, but simply in her good-natured anxiety for the queer creature. 'That wall is so **very** narrow!'*

*'What tremendously easy riddles you ask!' Humpty Dumpty growled out. 'Of course I don't think so! Why, if ever I **did** fall off — which there's no chance of — but **if** I did —' Here he pursed up his lips, and looked so solemn and grand that Alice could hardly help laughing. 'If I **did** fall,' he went on, '**the King has promised me** — ah, you may turn pale, if you like! You didn't think I was going to say that, did you? **The King has promised me — with his very own mouth — to — to —**'*

'To send all his horses and all his men,' Alice interrupted, rather unwisely.

'Now I declare that's too bad!' Humpty Dumpty cried, breaking into a sudden passion. 'You've been listening at doors — and behind trees — and down chimneys — or you couldn't have known it!'

'I haven't indeed!' Alice said very gently. 'It's in a book.'

*'Ah, well! They may write such things in a **book**,' Humpty Dumpty said in a calmer tone. 'That's what you call a History of England, that is. Now, take a good look at me! I'm one that has spoken to a King, I am: mayhap you'll never see such another: and, to show you I'm not proud, you may shake hands with me!' And he grinned almost from ear to ear, as he leant forwards (and as nearly as possible fell off the wall in doing so) and offered Alice his hand. She watched him a little anxiously as she took it. 'If he smiled much more the ends of his mouth might meet behind,' she thought: 'And then I don't know **what** would happen to his head! I'm afraid it would come off!'*

*'Yes, all his horses and all his men,' Humpty Dumpty went on. 'They'd pick me up again in a minute, **they** would (Carroll, 1871) [1]*



Introduction

The history of civilization is a chronicle marked by great powers going out into the world to locations they perceived their interests to exist, and then imposing their will onto the people in those places. This is typically done through the application of power, and often managed through a local government that was either created or adopted by the great power and willing to prioritize the interests of the great power over those of their own people in exchange for favor and protection from all challengers, both foreign and domestic. Like Humpty Dumpty, these governments were propped up on a figurative

wall of security force capacity and assistance; governmental institutions; and development of infrastructure critical to the great power's ambitions. Lastly, these Humpty Dumpty governments were given that famous guarantee. But increasingly no amount of effort seems sufficient to keep Humpty up on his wall, a trend that has paralleled the development and spread of electronic communications. Populations that are connected and informed do not yield easily to the yoke, regardless of how gently one believes they apply it, or how well one's rationale for doing so are intended. A yoke is a yoke, and it is only the perception of the wearer that matters.

Barring some sort of black swan reset event, relative power has significantly and irreversibly shifted from those who govern, to those who are governed. The effect on governance cannot be overstated. People everywhere are empowered and informed, and far less likely to tolerate conditions they may have felt unable to challenge before. We are entering a new era of governance, where even the most legitimate of governments struggle to stay in step with their rapidly evolving populations; and where the Humpty Dumpty strategy is finally, truly, obsolete. The lesson for the United States, and for governments everywhere, is that there are no feasible, acceptable and suitable solutions to impossible policies. The failure is embedded in the policy. We celebrate our tactical victories as we rationalize away our strategic defeats. We are expending influence and treasure at an unsustainable rate. The rules have changed on our watch, and it is time to craft new policies and strategies for advancing national interests in a world as it actually exists. The world our history, training and experience have prepared us to engage no longer exists. That is the bad news. But the good news is that the United States and the West are uniquely postured for success in the emerging strategic environment. While brittle governments premised in control *of* populations shatter under population-based shocks, those governments designed to be controlled *by* the people will be tested as well, but should possess the inherent resilience to take this shift in power in stride.

This short paper intends to introduce, and briefly describe, the following insights:

- A game-changing shift in power from governments to the governed is occurring
- Human nature provides fundamental frameworks for understanding human dynamics
- Political conflict between systems is "war," but political conflict within is *illegal democracy*
- The time-honored approach to securing interests abroad is rendered obsolete
- Influence-based strategies focused on populations offer a new, less controlling, approaches

The Revolutionary Impact of Shifting Power

When relative power shifts between those who are governed and those who govern, one of two things occurs. When the shift in power is toward government from the people, the effect is tyranny. But when the shift is in the other direction, the effect is revolution. Not always in the extremes of what those powerful terms imply, but by degrees and as shaped by all the facts and circumstances of each separate situation. The shift that has been trending since the mid-1800s, and accelerating since the late 1900s, is toward the people. We live in revolutionary times, and the important message for governments everywhere, is that no system is exempt from this condition, and it is a condition that is postured to continue and accelerate into the foreseeable future.

This is a central theme to the USSOCOM 2015 Strategic Appreciation. [2] This is also the central theme explored by authors such as Joshua Cooper Ramo in his acclaimed book, "The Age of the Unthinkable." [3] More importantly, we see the effects of shifting power everywhere, from BREXIT to Trump, and from Syria to Ferguson. A new age of awareness implies duties on governments to solve far away problems unconnected to any vital interest, and also exposes populations to the ugly realities of backroom jockeying for political power. Ignorance was indeed bliss, and we struggle to deal with the implications of awareness. Just as important is the impact of distributed and networked populations that form around shared identities and the competition for influence taking place to leverage and shape the energy inherent in such populations to serve the ends of a wide range of

exploitive actors. We will learn to deal with awareness in time, but must beware false duties to protect or fix what is beyond our power and outside our interests. If the US is to remain a global leader, we must learn to delegate more effectively to those regional powers whose interests are truly at stake, and learn to focus more on fostering influence, than on establishing control.

While governments agonize over the narratives employed, or the character of the actors involved, too often overlooked is their own culpability in creating the exploitable energy in the first place. We blame and target symptoms in ways that ignore and enhance the exploitable conditions fueling the problem at the same time. It is time to refocus. It is time to seek to better understand the nature of this exploitable energy. Governments that understand and own their contribution to causation, both at home and abroad, will be the winners going forward. Waging war against peace is not a winning strategy. Approaches designed to reduce control, enhance influence, and foster a handful of critical perceptions in the populations they affect are the key. But first, we must reframe the problem.

Human Nature and the Nature of Political Conflict

I am not a social scientist. I am a Green Beret, a criminal prosecutor and a strategist who focuses on population-based conflicts. That is my lens, shaped and polished by a lifetime of practice and study. These are my observations through that lens, and perhaps, like Alice, “through the looking glass” as well.[4] Ironically, perhaps the most prevalent aspect of human nature is the tendency in humans to underestimate or deny the fundamental shaping of human dynamics that is inescapably encoded in our DNA. Political conflict is a human dynamic, and as such, the nature of political conflict is shaped by the nature of man himself. While we are comfortable in looking for clues to guide our campaigns and tactics in the character and cultures of the humans our operations affect, we are reluctant to look to human nature. It is in our nature common to all that we find the fundamental strategic frameworks necessary to lend context and order to what otherwise appears an overly complex and wicked problem. In applying culture we find good tactics, *but it is in nature that we find good strategy*.

It appeals to our human egos to believe that free will makes all human dynamics chaos, but even chaos is shaped by fundamentals. This is the essence of strategy, certainly as explored by those theorists whose work stands up best to the ravages of time, such as Sun Tzu, Thucydides and Clausewitz. But these authors focused on political conflict *between* two or more systems of governance. This is the theory of war. But while we have long considered political conflict *within* a single system of governance to be a variation of war, what if it is something very different altogether? “War is war, but every insurgency is different” has become the battle cry of frustrated counterinsurgents everywhere. Argued here is that insurgency is indeed different from war, but that “insurgency is insurgency” as well (and that often we deal with a vexing blend of both).

Human nature is universal, durable and stable. So too then are the strategic fundamentals of political conflict. As such, when one studies the fundamentals of human nature in the context of political conflict, one can derive fundamental guides that lend context to complexity. This is not a simplistic exercise in reductionism. This is not turning boulders into sand, or wheat into flour. This is refining elemental metals from ore, or distilling fine bourbon from grain and clear spring water. In human nature we find the constants. Once the constants are derived, all one need do then is apply imagination to consider how infinite variables interact with constants to arrive at simple constructs necessary to prioritize and focus our efforts toward the goals we seek. This is not a new process, this is how Albert Einstein challenged traditional concepts in physics to take us beyond answers derived from hard analysis of data and “facts.” As such, I believe this Einsteinian axiom applies as well, “No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong.”[5]

In the study of population-based conflicts around the globe, across cultures and over time, there are a handful of perceptions of governance within the affected populations that continually show up in some combination. The facts are always as unique as the people themselves, but the perceptions as viewed through the distinctive lenses of these populations are remarkably consistent. There are five perceptions that are invariably in play. Important to remember is that terms like “legitimacy,” “sovereignty,” and “justice” can have many meanings, so please, focus on the definitions provided here to best understand this central concept.

Perceptions must be assessed as empathetically as possible from the perspective the population group in question. The perceptions or intentions of external parties are largely moot for purposes of stability, and can seriously skew the accuracy of one’s understanding. The goal is to get to trust. Those populations outside the circle of trust are exploitable, and those within are resilient. For trust to occur, the following must exist:

Popular Legitimacy: *Right to Govern.* Does one recognize the right of some system of governance (formal or informal; foreign or domestic) to affect their lives?

Popular Sovereignty: *Culturally Appropriate.* Does one perceive that the governance affecting their lives does so in a manner deemed as appropriate in the context of their culture?

Respect: *Equivalent Dignity.* Does one perceive themselves treated with respect equal to others who are similarly situated?


Justice: *Equity and Law.* Does one perceive the rule of law to be just as it is applied?

Empowerment: *Legal Democracy.* Does one perceive themselves to have trusted, certain, legal and effective means available to them to express their concerns and affect change when necessary within the context of their culture. This is “the off-ramp” from revolution, the pressure valve that releases population-based energy in a manner that fosters resilience in a society.

When these perceptions are generally positive there can be the trust necessary for a society to foster a degree of *natural stability*. When these perceptions are largely negative, the best one can hope for are conditions of *artificial stability*. Increasingly, governments are trending toward artificial stability, and falling into instability when those artificial systems fail. A prison is a classic example of artificial stability, but allies like Saudi Arabia and Israel, and competitors like Iran and North Korea qualify as well. The fundamental test is if the primary duty of security forces is to protect the government from some aspect of the population, or are they dedicated primarily to facilitating the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness within the context of the cultural expectations across the people as a whole. Governments find themselves managing a virtual circle of trust, and populations are either within or without based on these perceptions.

Humpty Dumpty

Throughout recorded history (and likely long before) major powers have exercised their interests abroad in some variation of a very simple formula: Go out into the world where one perceives their interests to exist, and apply power to either adopt or create in that place some system of governance that will prioritize the interests of the major power over those of the people who are native to the



affected space. Once this is accomplished, the major power then sets about protecting that government from all challengers, foreign or domestic. This is accomplished by building a “wall” of security force assistance and capacity; governmental institutions; and development projects for these governments to rest upon. This is the promise and the pursuit of *effectiveness* and *control*.

This is the “Humpty Dumpty” strategy. It is a strategy that began breaking down during the British Empire, and in the American Age is now fully obsolete. The hard fact is that in the current strategic environment so much relative power has shifted from governments to populations that one can no longer simply suppress popular backlash to these types of operations through the application of state power, regardless of form. This is not to argue that the nature of war has changed, rather this is a recognition that the nature of political conflict is far more nuanced than our doctrine and war theory have led us to believe. We must temper our belief in our own exceptionalism, and we must recognize that many of our policies and approaches for advancing US interests around the world today are infeasible in their current form.


Our belief in “American Exceptionalism” has contributed repeatedly to convincing ourselves that activities that would clearly provoke resistance insurgency against an external power, and revolutionary insurgency against the internal governments adopted or created and protected by that external power, would not happen if implemented by the United States. The United States is not exempt from the laws of human nature. Good intentions and relatively benign approaches may temper the degree and scope of the response, but it is the nature of the actions that will provoke the

nature of the response. The US is well served to recognize both the presumptive nature of resistance insurgency (a form of war) to the impact of excessive foreign policies or physical presence on a population; and equally the presumptive revolutionary insurgency (illegal democracy) response to any government overly shaped or protected by foreign power.

For the United States this has been a formula we have attempted often, but with mixed results. The widely held belief within the US government is that if one builds a foundation of governance for these client states, they will become “legitimate” and stable. This foundation, or wall, that we create to support these Humpty Dumpty

An Ancient Strategy Rendered Obsolete?

The Shift in Power Demands a New Approach – More importantly, a New Focus



regimes, has three major components. First is that of developing the security force capacity of the client state and providing them with military assistance as necessary to deal with internal and external threats. Second is the fostering of democracy and the creation of effective governmental institutions. Third is the development of necessary infrastructure to facilitate security, economic development and the delivery of governmental services. All of this is bundled as “Effectiveness” of government.

What has become increasingly evident in the post-Cold War era is that we have been too focused on “effectiveness” when what we should have been focused on all along is “goodness.” Political stability in a society is not a function of how well a government performs; rather political stability is a function of how people *feel* about the governance that affects their lives, and the lives of population groups they identify with. Our actions are our narrative, and “Winning Hearts and Minds” is best thought of as a poetic phrase for actions that serve to foster perceptions of good governance. Going forward the US must relinquish control of political outcomes and urges to “fix” governance we disapprove of. By understanding the critical identities in any given situation, and by seeking to appreciate the subjective perceptions those populations have toward the governance affecting their lives, we find the guides and the metrics to what types of actions are most likely to help bring populations that currently feel excluded into the circle of trust, and sustain within the circle of trust those who are already there. This

is a continuous dynamic, and one where a light touch and tailored actions will yield far better results, at far less cost and provocation, than those approaches we have believed necessary to create and sustain so many Humpty Dumpty regimes in the pursuit of our interests.

Conclusion

To “win” in the current strategic environment the US must stop agonizing over current threats to current approaches, and shift our focus to the design and implementation of new approaches focused on what is truly in our interest to achieve, and that is contextualized for the population-empowered environment emerging around us. We are a nation at peace, but like most nations, we too find ourselves overwhelmed by a mix of internal and external population-based challenges to outdated approaches. The US is actually better than most at this domestically, as we are well-served by a family of foundational documents that most appear to no longer remember either why they contain the elements they do, or how those elements work together as a system to sustain the stability of our nation. If we can learn to apply the principles of our internal system to our external approaches we will see an immediate reduction in the energy so many seek to exploit to our disadvantage. Unfortunately, the inclination of policy leaders seems to lean more heavily toward changing our internal approaches and protections to match more closely to what we apply so ineffectively abroad. That is the path to defeat, not victory. We must heed Benjamin Franklin’s clear warning. [6]

We must indeed become more realist in our perspective, we must adopt a greater risk tolerance for governance and cultures different than our own: and like Great Britain before us, we must transition from a system premised in control, to one focused on influence. This does not mean that we should abandon our Humpty Dumpty allies and partners, rather it means that *we must stop treating them like Humpty Dumpty*. The pursuit of effectiveness, control, and threats to the same serves too often to enable bad behavior in those we seek to help, and provokes powerful negative energy back toward ourselves. By seeking to understand identities and the populations that form around them, we can employ our influence and power to facilitate good governance, both at home and abroad. Ultimately, *American Exceptionalism* does not mean that we are exempt from the laws of human nature, what it really means is that if we understand and trust in the foundation of liberty and empowerment bequeathed to us, we are perfectly equipped to remain a resilient and powerful nation well into the future.

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<https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20070730013005AAte0D6>
5. https://todayinsci.com/E/Einstein_Albert/EinsteinAlbert-Theory-Quotations.htm
6. Franklin, Benjamin, “Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety,” Speech to the Pennsylvania Assembly, November 11, 1755.

The Foundations of Narrative: Operational Advisor's Edition

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The term “narrative” has been adopted by the defense industry in a general sense for several years now. However, the term is not well-defined, so the power of the concept is limited. Currently, narrative is understood to mean the following things:

- The message that we want to send, but in story form
- The message we want to send—no matter what form it's in
- A concept we hope our target audience will pick up and run with, adopting as their own
- The portion of an order that helps a combatant commander talk about the mission

None of these definitions are wrong, but they are partial definitions. In addition to being partial, the culture of the term's user further constrains the power of its usefulness. In order to use the full power of narrative, the user needs to know the full capabilities of narrative *and* what conditions are necessary for that full potential to be utilized. For example, an examination of the history of warfare shows that weapons are constantly advancing in design and effectiveness. However, each time weapons make a major leap into the future, strategic operations need to be redesigned so that the new weapons can be incorporated into battle planning. Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTPs) too, get revised, instructing the warfighter how to incorporate the new weapon. If these changes did not occur throughout the whole of the force, then the new weapon looks like it is not useful in and of itself, and it will be discarded. The same is true of narrative: It has the power to fill a large gap in current warfighting practices, but only if it is fully understood, funded, incorporated into operations, and then utilized properly.

For a tangible vignette, look back at the rise of the aircraft and the events of the early 1900's. Although I'm using something capable of enacting kinetic destruction as an example, think of narrative as needing the same type of incorporation as the aircraft experienced: narrative's non-kinetic nature doesn't negate the principle. In 1905, Orville and Wilbur Wright's aircraft could complete complex maneuver and stay aloft for 39 minutes. In 1909, the U.S. Army's Signal Corps purchased one aircraft.¹ However, Italy was the first nation to use aircraft for war, in the Italian-Turkish war of 1911. In the beginning, multiple nations thought of the aircraft as a platform for an observer, so it was used as a reconnaissance vehicle and the militaries of the world began attaching aircraft to their reconnaissance units. The next logical use for aircraft was dropping explosives. It was noticed that during a major offensive, there was a large amount of traffic movement behind enemy lines as supplies, men, and equipment were moved into positions; aircraft could see that, but they could also put a serious halt to the activity in ways that were never possible prior to their existence. World War I put the aircraft and its usefulness to the test and drove its development forward as each side strove for a new capability in war: air superiority.

The use of aircraft for bombing purposes drove the development of technology that made the aircraft better suited for bombing use: more powerful engines were developed, and rather than dropping an explosive from an aircraft by any means possible, aircraft began to be designed for that specific purpose. Again, the need drove the development, but only as people were willing to explore the capabilities of the aircraft and be flexible in the way they envisioned incorporating it. On the other hand, strategy that incorporated the aircraft into each battle developed more slowly, because it depended upon the trial and error of the operators, their feedback getting back to their leadership, and then leaders taking time to think about the new problem-set, and finally to put new plans in place. Theories about bombing differed by nation, with some believing it should only be used as a tactic of revenge while others used it as an offensive tool. Russian Major-General M.V. Shidlovski

with his unit of “Flying Ships” developed his strategy, unit, and equipment around exploiting the weakness of the Central Powers on the Eastern Front. Rather than attaching aircraft to another unit, he believed the weakness could be best exploited if his Flying Ship unit were self-contained, and in February 1915, his unit made their first bombing raid. In the next two years, Shidlovski’s unit made 400 bombing raids on Germany and the Baltic states, showing the value of incorporating the new capability into strategy and planning early.¹

Several years later, rather than aircraft just being observations platforms and bomb-dropping machines, it was imagined that machine guns could be mounted on them. This need arose from the experience of the aircraft and crew being vulnerable to artillery fire as they did their job. Machine guns being mounted on aircraft proved to be a problem, however, because there was no steady point to mount the weapon. The French solved this problem by mounting a gun to the front of the aircraft, and, several years after the bomber aircraft was accepted, the concept of the fighter plane was born.

The obvious reason for recounting aircraft history is to point out what had to happen to move from the time when aircraft was a buzzword of the time and the hope of the future to now, where an entire branch of the military is based on the capability: Every time the technology advanced, the strategy for using the aircraft had to be adjusted—but that adjustment impacted the rest of the force as well. For example: bombing raids knocked down enemy forces and supplies in big ways, enabling the infantry to sustain less loss as they came in after the bombing runs. However, had someone not re-strategized to direct bombers to go in first and infantry to wait, the results would have been disastrous. Less forward-thinking folks in that situation could have blamed such the loss on aircraft, as a useless new invention that only served to destroy friendly forces. Or what if new strategy hadn’t been imagined at all back then and aircraft were simply catapulted at enemy forces in various ways, like the other weapons of the time? In retrospect these are idiotic what-if’s, but narrative is suffering this very plight: having been not fully understood, having been utilized by an isolated portion of the force rather than incorporated into strategy, it has become little more than a buzzword that is disregarded as merely a word. No blame rests solely on anyone’s head for narrative’s plight, but as is common, lack of understanding played the biggest role in its seeming powerlessness. In this paper, I attempt to make the power of narrative accessible. This is only a first step, however: the next step is practical application. That practical application cannot be enacted by operators or narrative theorists alone but, like the development of the aircraft, must be driven forward by the operators’ experience and the strategists’ forward-thinking eye, working together with the weapon’s subject matter experts to see what is possible.

What it takes to effectively analyze narrative

As we analyze the TA’s narratives, if we can’t put ourselves in their shoes and see the world and the situation through their eyes, then we will fail. There is no other way to get the narrative right. One of the great stumbling blocks in this process is inherent even in the name we use for those we wish to communicate with: *Target Audience*. It is no secret that warfighters were trained to fight, and fighting requires us to see targets and everything that that can hinder the desired impact on the target. Warfighters aren’t generally trained to make friends with targets, to try and understand how and why they see the world as they do—traditionally, that has not been the job the warfighter is equipped to do. Warfighters, then, have a special difficulty in attempting to see themselves, their message, mission, and the entire situation through the TA’s eyes, because that is simply not how warfighters interact. It feels like sympathy, it doesn’t feel like war, quite frankly, and those experiences combined can give the warfighter the murky sense that they are not remaining true to their mission and target. This is not the case, however. In order to see the world through the TA’s eyes, judgment must be suspended, personal beliefs and prejudices must be suspended, even the instinct to see the TA as a threat must be suspended. Not forever laid aside, note, but temporarily

suspended. No one is asking the warfighter to adopt the TA's perspective or even to justify it, but in order for the warfighter to even have the ability to see through the TA's eyes, the TA must, for that moment in time, not be a target, but a human, with all the faculties, desires, prejudices, strengths, weaknesses, resources, and needs as the warfighters themselves. It takes a certain kind of internal fortitude to do this kind of work—and much practice. It also takes a tremendous amount of institutional support, partly for training but mostly to build the kind of organizational culture that acknowledges this kind of work as valuable and necessary to the overall mission. Successful negotiation of narrative analysis and production will not happen on a large enough scale to integrate into doctrine, strategy, and operations without this organizational buy-in.

The Nature of Narrative

Narrative cannot be divorced from context (actions, humans, history)

One of the most costly assumptions about narratives is that they are made up of only words (spoken or written). Rather, “conversations in particular, and human action in general, are enacted narratives.”² Which is to say that narrative cannot be divorced from action, or from the humans who use it; it is part of life and indeed impacts life itself. Stories are the thread that weaves together various types of human existence and “telling stories helps build social bonds and make sense of unexpected experiences.”³ In short, Narrative cannot be confined to words—spoken or written—must be understood as part of what it means to be human. Narrative is powerful in this way because it transcends culture: narrative exists in some form within every culture. We must be careful to understand that culture, however, to understand their use of narrative.

Narrative adheres to 3 rules: Rationality, fidelity, and coherence⁴

Much debate exists about what a narrative is and what it isn't. These three rules give some loose guidance on what is inside the narrative boundary, or more helpful, what conditions communication needs to meet in order to qualify as a narrative. These three rules apply to the narrative within itself—as in it must adhere to itself—and they apply as the narrative interacts with those around it—as in, it must adhere to the Target Audience's (TA's) memory to be of value.

Regardless of how rational our narrative seems to us, if written from a Western perspective, for example, it will break that rule if used in a non-Western culture. If our narrative insinuates something other than the local situation on the ground, it breaks the rationality rule. Fidelity has to do with credibility and trust. If the carrier or sender of the message, or the message itself, doesn't fit the expectations of the TA, the fidelity is broken.

Cohesive pertains to the narrative sticking together as parts of one whole, not as parts that will not come together as a whole. But again, caution must be used to see if the narrative is cohesive through the TA's eyes, and the TA is not one generic whole, but multiple, varied, complex parts that we often see as a whole. Unless we can truly see our own narratives through the eyes of the TA and know that our narratives conform to the three rules of narrative, we have neither a narrative nor a chance of our narrative being heard or taken up by the TA. “We cannot, without danger of becoming unintelligible, tell stories that break the rules of storytelling. To go beyond the rules is to engage in tales told by idiots.”⁵

Narratives are grounded in power and politics

Everyone is involved somehow in influencing or being influenced (even if not overtly and purposefully), and no one lives in a vacuum: they live amongst people with more or less ability to get things done. Politics, in the most basic sense of the word, are tied to power. The stories people tell and the stories they live as a result of the stories they tell cannot be divorced from issues of power and politics, for power and politics shape and influence the narrative. As the next point shows, the narrative also plays a role in shaping the politics and constraining or facilitating the power.

After narratives animate, they instigate

Narratives are a form and medium to carry on a way of life. They make visible the hopes, beliefs, and dreams of those who carry them. But they are not static: once a narrative has animated its carrier with its accompanying emotion, it instigates action. But recall that something is only truly a narrative that carries with it that instigative power when it adheres to the three rules of narrative when seen through the TA's eyes.

Narratives have the ability to hinder or develop personal agency

It follows, then, that as an instigator of group action, narrative has the ability to impact personal agency too. Personal agency is the ability to not just perceive a choice, but to act upon it. It categorizes the ability and the option, more than the perception. But it isn't a one-way street, as the next point shows.

Narratives are impacted by personal agency

This is important because when we analyze the TA's narrative, we need to account for their perception of their own agency: they may want to act in a way that is completely in line with the commander's intent in a certain situation, however, they may not be able to, or may not see a way that they are able to. Our analysis cannot confuse the TA's desire, motivation, and overarching narratives with the TA's lack of agency.

Narratives are impacted by chaos

People who have just experienced a traumatic event may produce narrative whose appearance is different from the narrative they would produce otherwise. This type of narrative is called a post-chaos narrative.⁶ If the first analysis of a TA is performed at this point, after the traumatic event, the analysts would not know if the resulting analysis reflects an enduring narrative or one impacted by the event. One way to begin to differentiate is if the rules of narrative are broken. Often, post-chaos narrative breaks one or more rules of storytelling. We see this in the accounts of bystanders at violent attacks or natural disasters. However, care should be taken to not confuse a post-chaos narrative with a narrative that would make sense to someone in the culture it was produced in, but doesn't make sense in another culture, i.e., the culture of the narrative analyst.

Some narratives are more permanent than others

Narrative cannot be divorced from its situation. Indeed, narrative credibility can rest, in part, on being coherent and rational in light of the situation. For an example closer to home, if the TA has just suffered a grave vehicle accident but a friend messages them some cheery message that "It's a great day, isn't it?" then the TA knows instinctively that the person sending the message either is not aware of the situation or is so insensitive that the TA will shut them out or respond with hostility. This is assuming a baseline that on a normal day, throughout the TA's lifetime, if you fed them a positive message, they'd get on board with it. In fact, any positive message normally reverberates as echoes of their own narrative because it is not only the story they tell when it is true, it is the story they tell when things are bad in order to sustain them and create a positive environment again. Notice, then, that this condition of the TA writing off the sender based on the positive message is temporary, induced by a situation around them. The sender could adjust their message, and knowing the TA's sense of humor and evidencing their own knowledge of the situation could say, "Well, at least there are 3 good tires left on the truck, right?" The message or narrative is still based in their optimism, but is changed slightly to account for the context that has momentarily shifted the TA's narrative. This strategy would be less effective after time passes however, and the TA returns to their normal upbeat self. This example from everyday life shows how important it is for the analyst to get an understanding of the long-term pattern of narrative-use by the TA, and then also recognize when a temporary narrative takes over.

Narratives are not fixed scripts but are in the process of constant re-creation and reproduction

One of the problems with current narrative creation for operations efforts is that in the process of trying to keep the message consistent, we have sacrificed the flexibility to shift the narrative to keep up with the local and international context. This is similar to the point above, but the takeaway is different. Narrative analysts and creators must be cognizant that once they do the analysis and create the narrative, it will not remain constant: like a buoy dropped in the ocean with no anchor, it will float on the current of events and experiences around it, coming to represent something it was not intended to represent. In one way, there is no way to control this movement, but in another, this aspect of narrative can be capitalized on because it can be paired with intelligence estimates to strategically look ahead to those known situations that will and can change the narrative, then the narrative analyst can continue to feed into the shifting environment. The main thing to know here is that once a narrative goes out, it will shift, and for the narrative creators to be successful they must expect that.

Narratives can be the adhesive that breathe life into a person and draw other people to them⁷

For as long as time has been recorded, people have gathered to tell stories. People gather to live stories too, and then record them or retell them, sometimes with a shift to motivate others to a certain desired action. A good narrative draws people in, and without realizing it, they get absorbed into the story—be it living it or listening to it. It follows, then, that good narratives bring in their listeners as part of the story (lived or told). Again, though, in order to accomplish this, narrative creators must know their audience and what constitutes “belonging” or what type of language and values draw the TA in.

Narratives are not constructed individually but are constructed in conjunction with narratives that others tell about us

People do not exist in a vacuum and neither do narratives. Whether or not people are conscious of it, many actions are reactions to others’ perceptions. For example, if a woman knows she is perceived to be unhealthily overweight, she may eat food that shows she is trying to lose weight when she is visible to those who hold the narrative that she is unhealthy. The narrative she might have created by herself might be “I’m not healthy and need to eat healthier.” But when she knows the stories the others tell about her, her narrative can shift to one that incorporates other’s narratives and no longer focuses on just eating to get healthy but eating so she is perceived as healthy. This seemingly slight shift is important because it impacts the TA’s sense of agency and can influence attitude as well—which both play into what narratives impact her and how they do so.

Narratives are formed from our interactions with others

Little needs to be said about the United States’ loss of credibility in the Middle East. Regardless of your position on the rightness of U.S. actions in the region, it is well-known that we don’t have the credibility to deliver any of the messages we create. This lack of credibility, however, didn’t appear by itself, rather, it is the result of the TA’s personal interactions with people who represent the U.S., and the resulting narratives told and retold as a result of those interactions. That makes every service member and their actions a spokesperson for the U.S., each acting out a message that will be picked up, grow, change, and spread. Modern technology is also considered an interaction: the president’s Tweets are seen to represent both his position of authority and his viewpoint on the world, so the 120 characters he puts out serve as virtual interaction between the U.S. and the world. Tangible, physical interactions between U.S. citizens and those of other countries are changed as a result: the interaction between the Tweets and the international readers have changed the narrative about the U.S. And in an overarching way, the ensuing interactions between U.S. citizens and others after the Tweet and how these interactions are handled further impact the narrative, confirming, denying, or complicating it.

Narrative transportation

You know that feeling you get when you are all wrapped up in a good movie or a song that takes you back to a better time? It's called narrative transportation, and refers to that state being so wrapped up in a story that you are nearly unconscious of your immediate surroundings. Narrative research shows that "narrative transportation heightens a reader's identification with the worldview of story characters, while reducing the salience of the readers own worldview and identity. A transported audience is less likely to directly counter ideas integral to the storyline of the narrative."⁷ Narrative, then, has a similar power as visuals in communication, to go around the barrier of logic and tap directly into emotion. Again, however, this aspect of narrative cannot be useful to a warfighter unless they understand the world through the TA's eyes, in order to create the effect of transporting these other humans into a reality other than their own. Going back to the section on what it takes to operate in the narrative sphere, in this situation we are essentially asking the TA to see the world as we see it (or as we chose to construct it in the narrative). Practicing that skill of attempting to see through the TA's eyes can help warfighters be more effective in creating the narrative transportation effect. The narrative that grips one audience enough to transport them is very seldom the same narrative that can transport a different audience.

Conclusion

In conclusion, make no mistake that when it comes to be proficient at analyzing and feeding communication into existing narratives, the way ahead is steep and treacherous. The cost of misstep in narrative is as damaging as the accidental drop of a bomb—but in different ways. But the cost of ignoring the need for narrative and its power to impact the long-term situation is the world is far more costly. The fight no longer is to the swift, but to the communicator, who understands that weapons send messages and the message they send can be framed ahead of time. And that those who speak first and keep speaking have the loudest voice. And that narratives exist everywhere already: we can't counter them, we can't create them, but we can fashion a narrative that ties into the existing narrative and so implement the commander's intent in a strategic way. The battle belongs to those who understand that messages themselves can be weapons—but only when the warfighter understands how the weapon works and has been trained, equipped, and supported in using it. If we find ourselves in doubt about the value of narrative to the warfighter, we need only to look beneath the events displayed in our news and even intelligence reports: somewhere prior to the action, communication happened that resonated with a TA, who found more reasons to act than not to. Did we defend U.S. interests in each situation to the best of our ability, or did we neglect the one weapon that requires us to see through the lens of the TA's eyes, not a scope or a satellite, to combat the threat? Narrative is a weapon being successfully employed against the U.S. and its interests and allies; we cannot successfully use it in return until we understand how it functions, fund it, incorporate it to our battle plans, and train for its use.

Way Ahead

As with any conceptual model, the information given here needs to be made actionable, and that is my next step—but I am a very small piece of a larger effort. I challenge those who believe in the value of narrative to come together in an effort to make academic and strategic knowledge actionable. Too many folks involved in narrative are unaware of each other, and consequently not as effective as we could be otherwise. *The Joint Concepts for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO)* published in 2015 laid the foundation on which to build doctrinal, strategic, operational, and training knowledge of narrative. Now narrative SMEs need to work with military experts to each bring their expertise to the table and develop concepts and technology that make narrative use practical on the battlefield. Academic knowledge is great, but it's no use sitting in an article, it must

morph into more useful forms. At the same time, support needs to come from the highest levels where narrative doctrine can be drafted and narrative can be fully integrated into current warfighting strategies so that it can be funded, trained on, and put to use. Every minute we wait to act is another minute we fall farther behind in the arms race for influence.

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“Rhetoric of Civility”: A Narrative Model of Conflict Analysis

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As a narrative method of conflict analysis, Solon Simmons offers the “rhetoric of civility” as a model describing how societies describe legacies of abusive power. Simmons contends, “If power [is] not aligned with the people’s will, it [will] produce reactions that often [lead] to protracted conflict.” These responses are mobilized through the “rhetoric of civility” in which conflict entrepreneurs construct narrative strategies employing characters, episodes, and plotlines anchored on the legacies of abusive power. These narratives give people a lens of abusive power through which to view their context and take action.

These legacies of power take form within the regimes ordering society – chaos, the one, the few, and the many. Sources of power within these regimes are generated through military, political, economic, and ideological means respectively. The activities where these sources of power intersect with society are *life, liberty, livelihood, and lifestyle*. The abusive forms of these regimes are subsequently characterized as anarchy, tyranny, oligarchy, and ethnocracy. Therefore, opposing these abusive regimes require principles, or virtues as Simmons describes it, to alleviate suffering – namely *security, freedom, equality, and tolerance*.

Chaos is a regime outside of civilized life. This legacy of power focuses on in-group versus out-group dynamics. When abusive, this regime takes on the form of anarchy where its characteristic villains are *barbarians*. When confronted with the violence and chaos of anarchy, *security* is the virtue necessary to alleviate suffering. To confront this legacy of power, conflict entrepreneurs employ descriptions of characters, episodes, and plots similarly articulated in philosopher Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*.

Boris Yeltsin, the former President of Russia, epitomized this legacy of abusive power in his September 1994 United National General Assembly speech. Echoing Hobbes’ natural state of war Yeltsin noted, “A veritable floodgate of regional and local conflicts, national, tribal and religious enmity and economic, social and political confrontations has been opened wide.” Again, Hobbes hopes man endeavors for peace but inevitable seeks the advantages of war, Yeltsin noted “It is a tragic paradox that in the wake of the cold war in Europe hotbeds of war have flared up there anew.”

A regime of the one organizes society around the monarch. This legacy of power are the liberties afforded a society or retained by the monarch. When abusive this regime takes on the form of tyranny, and its characteristic villains are *bureaucrats*. When confronted with state oppression and political corruption, *freedom* is the virtue necessary to alleviate suffering. To confront this legacy of power, conflict entrepreneurs employ descriptions of characters, episodes, and plots similarly articulated in philosopher John Locke’s *Second Treaty on Government*.

Hugo Chavez, the former President of Venezuela, exemplified this legacy of abusive power in his September 2006 speech to the United National General Assembly. Characterizing American democracy as Locke’s tyrannical oppression, Chavez cautioned the world that, “statements by the tyrannical president of the world was full of cynicism and hypocrisy...They want to impose upon us the democratic model they devised, the false democracy of elites.” With a Lockean plea for liberty reverberating through is speech, Chavez concluded, “We cannot allow a world dictatorship to be installed or consolidated.”

Aristocracy represents regimes of the few. This legacy of power is the control of economic outcomes in society. When abusive it takes on the form of oligarchy, and its characteristic villains are *bigwigs*. When confronted with economic exploitation and material deprivation, *equality* is the virtue necessary to alleviate suffering. To confront this legacy of power, conflict entrepreneurs employ

descriptions of characters, episodes, and plots similarly articulated in philosopher Karl Marx's *Capital*.

Pope Francis utilized this legacy of abusive power in his September 2015 speech to the United Nations General Assembly. Paralleling Marx's characterization of economic exploitation and material deprivation, Pope Francis describe a world "of exclusion and inequality," where he was forced to speak out against "economic exclusion, with its baneful consequences: human trafficking, the marketing of human organs and tissues, the sexual exploitation of boys and girls, slave labor, including prostitution, the drug and weapons trade, terrorism and international organized crime." He reminded the world to alleviate suffering, "economic activity is only effective when it is understood as a prudential activity, guided by a perennial concept of justice."

The regime of the many represents the collective polity. This legacy of power encompasses the power of the majority to control the lifestyles of the minority. When abusive it takes the form of ethnocracy, and its characteristic villains are *bigots*. When confronted with ethnocentrism, racism, sexism, or some other form of imbalance in group representation and cultural expression, *tolerance* is the virtue necessary to alleviate suffering. To confront this legacy of power, conflict entrepreneurs employ descriptions of characters, episodes, and plots similarly articulated in philosopher Franz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*.

Dr. Jadranko Prlic, the former Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, echoed the intolerance spoken about by Fanon in his September 2000 speech to the United Nations General Assembly.

The war has left too deep scars both with people and social fabrics, and the forces that manipulated national and religious feelings of the citizens and that spread the seeds of hatred and advocated violence are still strong and installed in the pails of the system from where they try, sometimes successfully, to act pursuant to their original goals.

Conflicts arise from the perceived abusive expansion of social power through military, political, economic, and ideological means. Conflict entrepreneurs, therefore, construct narratives where barbarians, bureaucrats, bigwigs, and bigots abuse regimes of power shaping life, liberty, livelihood, and lifestyle within society. In this manner, the rhetoric of civility allows conflict analysts to decode the talk of these legacies of abusive power to begin understanding how to intervene in a conflict.

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How transitive verbs might reveal individuals' personal predispositions: Al Zawahiri case study

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Scholars of the international relations and the personality studies have extensively discussed the role of the personal predisposition, or their belief systems, in the process of decision making. Perhaps one of the most prominent approaches regarding this matter is the operational code approach (Developed by Leites, 1951, 1953; modified by George, 1967, 1969) which is part of the cognitive theory. The cognitive theory reasons that the personal impact of leaders and their capability to address domestic and international pressure and threats are constrained by their cognitive capabilities. Such personal predispositions are composed of a set of images that individuals acquire over time about themselves and the world, including "organised knowledge" (Holsti, 1962, p. 245).

But what does this have to do with language? A language is a tool of communication. It is a form of power exercise that reveals individuals' motivations and perceptions. In the political psychology studies, scholars developed several content analysis methods to study the personality of individuals. Their argument is that language that individuals use can reveal their personality (Walker, 1983; Hermann, 1976, 1980; Weintraub, 1989, Winter, 1991, Walker 1983). (1953) For example, Leites studied of the ideology of Bolshevism through using a qualitative method to analyse the writing – the content of communication – of Lenin and Stalin.

Alexander George (1967, 1969) expanded the Operational code of Leites, and included individual's philosophical beliefs, the way he or she sees the world, as well as instrumental beliefs, the way he or she views himself or herself. Thus, he developed ten questions in two categories; philosophical beliefs and instrumental beliefs to explain leaders' belief systems in shaping the foreign policy of their states. These questions can be addressed though analyzing the utterances of leaders qualitatively. These questions are: (George, 1967, pp. 201-216)

The Philosophical Beliefs

1. The Nature of the Political Universe (P-1), Hostile vs. Friendly: What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponent?
2. Prospects for Realising Fundamental Values (P-2), Pessimism vs. Optimism: What are the prospects for the eventual realisation of one's fundamental values and aspirations?
3. Predictability of the Political Universe (P-3), Unpredictable vs. predictable: Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
4. Control over Historical Development (P-4), Low/High level of control: How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development?
5. The role of Chance (P-5), Low/High level: What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and historical development?

The Instrumental Beliefs

1. The direction of Strategy (I-1): Cooperative, Mixed, Conflictual. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
2. The intensity of Tactics (I-2): How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
3. Risk Orientation (I-3): Averse to Acceptant: How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
4. The Importance of Timing of Actions (I-4): Low to High Flexibility: What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interests?


5. The utility of Means (I-5): Low to High: What are the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

If everything is energy and can be measured, as Albert Einstein argued, then language is a form of energy, and it can be measured. This article discusses Walker's approach (1983) who uses quantitative content analysis to address the ten questions above. He calculates the transitive verbs that leaders use to help understand a leader's personal predisposition. He defends his approach by arguing that although the syntaxes and a sentence's structure can be useful to understand leaders' motivations and beliefs, their transitive verbs, though, expose their active behavior.

This approach calculates and analyses the transitive verbs of leaders through some specific mathematical equations (see Walker 2006), in order to "provide answers to the research questions associated with a leader's operational code" (Walker, 2006, p. 1), and because of the words limits this .not discuss them in details article does

Within the operational code approach, Holsti (1977) developed a quadrant and calls it the Operational code typology, in which he tries to answer ten questions Alexander George developed them in his modified Operational code approach (1967). The quadrant was later re-modified by Walker (1983). This technique of Operational code analysis provides a general perspective on the cognitive beliefs of leaders as it combines the philosophical beliefs and the instrumental beliefs of leaders into one diagnostic proposition. Thus, this paper will focus on the P-1, I-1, and P-4 beliefs as they are the core of the Operational code typology (see figure one)

Figure



Note:

* I-1 and P-1 indices are scaled along the vertical axis, and P-4 indices for Ego and Alter are scaled along the horizontal axis with VICS scores expressed as standard deviations from the mean for a norming group of leaders from different eras and regions.

** Reward, Deter, Punish, and Compel tactics around the midpoint of the horizontal axis are variants of reciprocity tactics in which Ego initiates either an escalatory (E) move or de-escalatory (D) move and then responds in kind when Alter escalates (E) or de-escalates (D) in response to Ego's initial move. Appear, Bluff, Exploit, and Bully tactics at the extremes of the horizontal axis are variants of unconditional conflict or cooperation tactics in which Ego initiates either an escalatory (E) move or de-escalatory (D) move and then does not reciprocate after Alter escalates (E) or de-escalates (D) in response to Ego's initial move. These tactics are associated with the six strategic propositions in TIP, as indicated by the P1 . . . P6 notations.

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Peacebuilding in Yemen

Shoqi Maktary
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Is peace possible in Yemen?⁷ *What is the perspective of peace in Yemen from a conflict ripeness view, is it to do more with internal dynamics or rather a manifestation of regional dynamics?*

Maktary: Lately and I think this was the case we've been talking about doing the great negotiation. My view was that the situation has reached a kind of ripeness and that is whether the different conflict parties has figured out that they will not be able to end this. All this will not see a way forward and then they will not be able to end the war with force and they cannot push further and they cannot hold resistance for long. The same thing from the Saudi's side.

From what we see on the ground now this conflict has not yet reached a ripeness point but the issue is when we describe the ripeness we need to describe what level we are talking about. Are we talking about ripeness within the internal parties meaning that the Houthis, the government's or ripeness at the regional level which is actually the driver of the conflict. This is one of the issues. Although you might see within the local parties at least from the Houthis's side that there is... they have reached a place where they are willing to negotiate and they are willing to provide some, what do you call it, let go some of the conditions.

To some extent, it is the same or at least some elements within the Yemeni government. At the regional level, the environment is very different and one of the factors that is actually feeding into this is the new US administrations and the open support to Saudi Arabia which actually created a further push. When we were toward the end of Obama's administration it was more pressures to the Saudis the Gulfies to he needs to cut a deal he needs to make this over.

Actually at that moment we were seeing some of the regional layers reaching that stage where they are willing to consider. The signals and the indication that's being provided by the Trump administration actually has shifted this and removed that ripeness there. Now it looks like the Gulf has a new ally in the US or a renewal of commitment of their alliance with US. As they have feelings to push further and support further their activities in Yemen. Which means that that ripeness that we have seen during the Kuwait negotiation during the violent stages of Obama administration is gone.

What is the identity dynamics in Yemen and how its shapes alliances? *What are the key identities in Yemen, is there a common identity in Yemen and what the impact of this on peacebuilding and networks of alliances at the moment?*

What we see now is that a more stronger desire to win this war, of the Sunnis and Emiratees with different agendas fighting them. The thing about looking... as I said at looking at the ripeness is that the key driver of the conflict in Yemen is not only internal issues. The Yemeni conflict has more and more become a reflection of political dynamic which is linked to Saudi Arabia internal dynamics within the cessation of the government restructuring the internal system of the kingdom. Trying to establish a situation where Salman I mean the Mohammad Salman is the next king I believe.

Also the dynamic with Iran. What is happening also in Syria is keenly linked and that it can be reflected by the Russian position which tries to have a deal where they get some like what you call

⁷ This paper is a transcript of an interview between Mr. Shoqi Maktary and Dr. Gwyneth Sutherland from 7 May 2017.

benefits that provide some points in Syria in exchange of some points in Yemen. Looking at the regional dynamic the situation still far from ripeness. Now what's going to create ripeness at this level? It is a number of things internally and externally. Externally I mean if we see a shift in the position in Syria or a breakthrough, where either the Syrian governments make an advancement of the way around. That will create a shift in the positions in Yemen.

I think if there is a success where the Syrian government is able to push harder in Syria would only intensify things in Yemen where Saudi Arabia would feel that they need to win Yemen at least. The alignments I mean and the situation of the engagements of US in other conflicts in the regions or at least we are that also will shift the pressures of the support the Americans are willing to provide to Saudi Arabia at the moment. That will also have an effect. The other lines that could impact the ripeness in Yemen is a dramatic change. This easily happens in like for example in Salam if you had a shift of alliance among the tribes that are holding this Salam.

One of this tribes tries to realign themselves with the governments or Saudi Arabia open the doors or engaged positive with the Hadi governments that's going to create a major shift. A takeover of Hudaydah could be another factor. The problem with the takeover of Hudaydah it not result in an ending of the war or a success of Saudi Arabia. On the contrary it will have the opposite effect and this is my analysis. What you will see is that first I mean taking over Hudaydah will not be a quick thing. Hudaydah is very vast, the Houthis have for a long time been preparing for something then. You see, from experience that's what's happening in Makkah it will take time.

That means there will be a total blockage of food importations in Yemen which means already we are on the knife edge of famine. Actually if you take the indicators we are already there. There is a resistance from the UN to announce it because of Saudi Arabia pressures. If that happens that means we'll start officially announcing famine in Yemen. We are already having cholera in the capital. This dynamic will put more pressure on Saudi Arabia to find agreements to stop activities in order to facilitate more humanitarian assistance to Yemen. In the long run actually it plays in the hand of the Houthis not the hands of the Saudis.

The human cost of such advancements would be huge actually on the warring side and on the public. These things like shift in power I don't presume that cannot be a breakthrough in negotiation. It is not yet I mean good progress we've put a facilitator and agreement except of the Europeans at the moment. The Americans are way on one sided. The British are somewhere there but not as... now we are seeing that and hearing that the Germans are proposing a few things. Germans play a mediator role of guarantor of China [0:09:10 inaudible] Russia. Russia as I said earlier have their own agenda where they are doing it in exchange of benefits that they put or score that they can have it in Syria. Any questions on the first point?

Sutherlin: Yes I do. One of the overarching themes of this whole paper that everyone is contributing to is about cultural differences in communication because I think there's a lot of misunderstandings. What you were just speaking about how there might be different more successful actors as mediators and why they are different. I think it's something to do a little bit with different levels of cultural understanding because there are different trusted actors there and actors with different interests. If you are able to speak a little bit as to why different international actors are more or less successful there based on their ability to understand or interact with Yemeni that would be helpful.

Respondent: This actually could be a bridge between the first point and the second point. If we talk about international mediator possibilities the key four actors like the US and we have UK, EU, Germany, Russia, China but it's... they are very quiet. I mean with the US we've seen a very strong administrative voice that is totally with Saudi Arabia. Although sometimes like the defense minister visited Saudi Arabia he was totally supporting Saudi Arabia but in the side was stating that he is to have political agreement. The senate and the congress actually was sending some positive letters that were well received by the Houthis.

They could be at the individual level could be like a peace broker. UK is as I said it's somewhere there I mean the UK traditionally has good connections with tribal leaders. Some political

actors from Saleh administration. Their relationship with the Houthis are very weak. Although traditionally the UK has a long history in Yemen at least in the south. More and more the leading player in Yemen was US. Next to US is the EU and the good thing with the EU is that they have maintained a very what do you call it balance between the Hadis' and Houthis'.

The fact that the EU is not per say a country that have let's say these interests and there was lots of strong statements, announcements. Announcements of arms by the EU and others actually make them a good player. The other fact is actually that the EU over the time and their work in Yemen they invest heavily in building relationship with tribes political parties for their engagements. I mean it's strictly that the EU and Yemen has always been or seen as a neutral broker. They do speak tribal language meaning that they have their own connections within the tribes in Yemen.

What are the impacts of changes in the power structure in Yemen? What is the power structure at the national level and local level, and how the last events shifted these structures, what is the role of tribes in the current context, and does it play a stabilizing or un-stabilizing role?

They do have their connections with leading figures in the government. They used to have a strong presence in Yemen. Their funding, their work in Yemen at the political and the social level. You have the Germans, the Germans are very well seen in Yemen as a neutral as a country that has long ties with Yemen helping Yemenis. The Germans' unique is the image or the perception that they will have about them. That is linked to years of collaborations between Yemen and Germany. Especially the Germans play a major role in what do you call it vocational training. They supported this sector very much and that goes into every different part of Yemen.

I remember this previously if you were driving and you get to a check point and normally they offer to check if you are internationals. The golden words to say, "German," and they just let you go. That image of the Germans of people working hand in hand with Yemenis, training Yemenis on skills. You wouldn't go nowhere in Yemen without finding somebody who has been touched by the German's collaborations or work in one way or another. Also they're relationship with the Houthis during the conflict when Saleh was working a war against Houthis also play a role in that. The fact that some of the Houthi families were actually taking refuge in Germany also established this positive relationship.

The Germans also could be a peace broker there plus the EU. The Russian also seen positively by the Houthis. Still it's very greatly involved with the Houthis' and their late statements that they do not fully trust the Russians. Although they would like to have the Russian as a culture waiting US role in Yemen. The Chinese do not really have that charisma or relationships to play any political role individually. They might be as a group with other countries but individually they do not have it. We do not have that strong relationship with China except all the goods in Yemen are made in China, but relation wise connection wise that doesn't exist.

Now moving from that level to the lower level or the change of the power structure in Yemen and who within this new power structure would be a peace broker. Or who could be a mediator. Normally in Yemen you have a number of figures who play this role. One is tribal sheikhs, second is religious people and mostly those seen are mortal. Most religious people are seen as mortal. Sheikhs are always seen as the center of the tribe. They always carry their interests to strike a deal. I mean this is the culture of the traditional setting.

The sheikh is the problem solver, he is the center of the tribe where the problems come through and he works solutions to it in consultation with the different parties. Actually he is the one representing the tribe in conflicts that involve members of the tribe against other tribe members. He always has this charisma, respect and negotiation skills to do it. The religious leaders on the other hand has that perception of neutrality and understanding of religion. To use that understanding to figure out solutions to conflicts. That goes in line with Sharia, that goes in line with what the Qoran says and what the prophet says.

It is like using the power of religion to defuse violence. Normally you would not see within this structure you would not see government or what do you call it? Court as peace builders.

Normally governments always seen as only interested in collecting fees or making problems to us. I mean one of the challenges that actually leads to problem or conflict resolution in Yemen is that at one point in time the 80s, 90s the government tried to dismantle tribal structure or replace tribal structure by normal court system. The problem is that, that process was never complete. First that's the court structure itself and the system is very corrupted and the process do not complete it.

Which led to a situation where actually you have a very weak judicial system. The court system. Lack of enforcements, lots of corruption. Also the process itself has weakened the tribal structure. You end up somewhere in the middle. You don't have the past and you don't have the future. Actually that's one complaint always when you see in areas such as al Jawf in Yemen which is a traditionally tribal area. Where the tribal codes are still respected, highly respected. Compare that to Marib which is an area although tribal but I mean there was lots of intervention by the governments due to the availability of oil investments.

The tribal courts are not as respected as before and in many cases that leads to more violence. While in al Jawf all the problems is solved based on according to tribal courts. What's happened is in this structure now, when Houthis take over they restructure to some extent the role of the Sheikh. They created kind of a new hierarchy where they have a kind of elite families or elite members of the families who are allied to Houthis with this claim that they are descendants of the prophet. Which traditionally used to be what you call the Sayyids in Yemen. If you go back before the revolution in September to 1962, you have two classes. One class, which is the Sayyids those are like the people whose families claims to be descendants of the prophet.

They always play the role of the mediators. The religious people with the knowledge about the religion and all that and they have the kind of the privilege of being from the... or claiming to be from the prophet line. Bloodline. Then you have another group, which is qadis or qudat those are traditionally judges. Those have the religious knowledge and have the negotiation skill but they do not have that blood heritage. It's kind of like the second line. When the revolution comes and there is kind of like descendants of the prophet, the statue has been demolished. The Sheikh stays into that and then the religious leaders stays to that. The religious leaders are other are kind of intermixed here. It goes hand in hand.

Now what you see is that these old families regain power and they are now becoming a broker in peace building. Where conflict happens you will find people there Houthis or those kind of appointed by Houthis normally from these families to be mediators and its to deal with the conflict. That goes in the position of the Sheikhs mostly. Now with the religious people that is also another issue with that. With the Houthis strong I wouldn't say shia ideology but they are stronger resistance or strong hatred against Muslim brotherhoods or anybody who has this kind of identity. Mostly those religious people are in that identity. Also the role of the religious people at least from the shafii group has become very weakened.

While the role of the religious peoples from the Zaidis schools are becoming stronger so that is another shift in the dynamic about who are the traditionally problem solvers. There was a number of attempts for example even by Search for Common Ground and other organizations to create more peace builders on the ground. People with the skills, the capacities to kind of respond to conflict with developed communities. Some of those are backed by their influential... what we... the latest approach that we have been using because we tried it and before many other organizations like to kind of create new individuals. Activists, people with let's say interaction with local NGOs, giving them trainings, capacities to be like problem solvers.

Unfortunately, that didn't work because those people lack the social sitting that enables them to be a problem solver for this. So what we shift is that we are looking for people who already have that kind of influence. They could be second in command of example, they could be sons of the Sheikh related to the Sheikh family. They could be some religious people, they could be for example people of knowledge in the capital sides. They could be the school headmaster, some teacher, they could be a business man who has like the money, influence. Based on those people the existing influence giving them more skills and giving them more status, increasing their status and making

them more what we call it seen and respected by the communities. We've seen that actually works more. Because those people hit the ground running, they are already at that level, they have some of the skills, they have the influence, they have the connections and they could make things happen. While investing in creating a new line or a new generation of peace builders is problematic.

Especially, like there was this tendency for investing heavily on youth activists who have this political charisma or social orientations, human rights perspectives. Some of them are good but the thing that we did is we're kind of trying to mix them with those groups so we give them the opportunity to create their own power structure. To link to some influential people. Individually we didn't see much of what you call it impact that they have. Within this structure one of the things we noticed is that the stronger... one of the thing is that the central level control is not there anymore. In some cases it exists but it's really weak. Now in areas where you have more localized structures for example travel structures. Or strong local governance that was functional in some extent we see less conflict in these areas.

Mostly the areas that has more centralized Sheikhs structure meaning that an area for example outside **Sanaa** where the tribe has more control, they have a more centralized figures who are in power. That means these areas see less violence or even if there is violence the ability of this community to respond to violence is very quick using their existing code of conduct something like that. Of course it also gives them an advantage if they align to Houthis. This kind of power they have is also authorized and approved by Houthi, which give them further. More and more what we observe is that where areas that have these kinds of structures actually are more stabilized than areas for example in Taaz where this tribal structure is not there. There is lots of actors, there is lots of like central figures for the same social group. We see more let's say subdivisions and the ability for those communities to respond to conflict and to have the persons to go to solve or to mediate is not high. We see more violence in these areas.

Sutherlin: Okay. I think that that's all fantastic and very valuable and interesting. I'm going to ask you to respond to your final point with just a few closing ideas so that I can get this typed up. Because I will have the whole thing transcribed and then I will try and consolidate it to the two to five page limit within this. I'm going to submit both for their consideration because I think that there will be more information here that they'll want to know about. The final point that you wrote in your outline was asking about common interest in livelihood if that was enough to build peace at the local level. If there's anything else you want to talk about that you don't feel that you've touched on already.

***Interest based peacebuilding in Yemen?** With the absence of national level view for peace can local level peacebuilding intervention be effective? Up on what can peace be built in Yemen? Is the common interest in livelihood is enough to build peace at the local level?*

Maktary: One of the things that we think is needed for peace building in Yemen is creating an environment in which a political base agreement is possible or is doable. Meaning that you have a situation where the connectors between the different elements of the community is deteriorating, is dividing. You have the interest that's bringing people together that's, livelihood, that's relationship, that trust, that experience is also diminishing. This is ongoing. Somewhere in the future we will be able to reach an agreement. Now if they have two parallel lines and the idea is that when we reach the line or the political level where there is a political agreement the community level should be suitable for such political agreement. Because you could have the most comprehensive political agreements but it has to deal with a very different reality on the ground.

Now from that point of view looking at possibilities to kind of maintain this kind of interest, unity, connections, stabilizing factors, roles... peace building roles within this situation. In the same time create a second line of connecting those different... although you could work on the community level but still there is a need to link these local levels to the political level. That is in the middle you track two activities where you bring those kind of peace builders from different peace building

experiences. It's shared on the middle, to kind of create what do you call it a net or a foundation on which political agreements can happen.

One of the thing that this need with the absence of the central government, with the absence of funding, with the absence of support there is a great need for livelihood, there is a great need for things that make people kind of collaborate again for their own good. We recreate this trust again among themselves. As I said one of the wrong definitions when we talk sectarian, there is a term that uses that there is sectarian violence in Yemen. Sectarian in its understanding that it's more religious based meaning that people fight over different lines of religion doesn't exist in Yemen. It's there, it's in the beginning but it's not yet there.

One of the things, I think I mentioned this before, when I compared between Yemen and Iraq, in order to have sectarian violence you need to have trauma, a historical trauma. That I have lived and it needs to have a history of violence. That doesn't exist in Yemen but it is in the making. What we have is sectarian-based on affiliation, affiliation means that people adapt a position that supports Houthis or that support Saleh or that supports Hadi. Those different affiliations and different views fly and that's when the violence happens. In that sense then religious is used to empower these positions.

It's not pure religious clashes and this is what I mean by that there needs to kind of maintain the community collaboration because the more and more incidents that we have, the more and more trauma we see, the more and more institutionalization of the sectarian divisions using and... playing with religions to enforce these positions. If that goes on and the conflict goes on it will become more vetted and it will not become affiliation of political positions. Or it will become more affiliation of religious beliefs that is empowered by political positions.

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Maj. Gen. Charles L. Moore, Jr. is the Deputy Director, Global Operations (J-39). He serves as the Joint Staff focal point for Cyber and Electronic Warfare operations, Information Operations, Special Technical Operations, and sensitive DOD support to government agencies. General Moore was commissioned in 1989 after graduating from the U.S. Air Force Academy. He has served as an F-16 fighter pilot, instructor pilot, weapons officer, forward air controller, and instructor at the U.S. Air Force Fighter Weapons School, Nellis AFB, Nev. His command experience includes: the 555th Fighter Squadron at Aviano Air Base Italy, the 332nd Expeditionary Operations Group at Balad AB Iraq, the 20th Fighter Wing at Shaw AFB, S.C. and the 57th Wing at Nellis AFB Nev. General Moore is a command pilot with more than 3,000 hours in the F-16 and more than 640 hours of combat time

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Mr. Jones's principle work is in the field of insurgency and related conditions that are often bundled as "irregular warfare." His perspectives on populace-based conflicts are built upon a diverse background of military operations; interagency emergency management and civilian law enforcement. Most recently Mr. Jones was a featured speaker at an Oxford University Changing Character of Warfare conference on Fragile States and also co-created and taught a pop-up course at the Stanford D. School in partnership with the Stanford Peace Innovation Lab on the role of trust in stable societies.



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Christine MacNulty has forty years of experience as a consultant in long-term strategic -planning for concepts as well as organizations, futures studies, foresight, and technology forecasting, technology assessment and related areas, as well as socio-cultural change. For the last twenty years, most of her consultancy has been conducted for the Department of Defense, including: The Joint Staff, OSD (OFT), the DON (Under Secretary, Secretariat, OPNAV N3/N5, N6, N7, CNET, NAVSEA, NAVSPECWARCOM, ONR, CNO's SSG), the USMC (HQMC - Commandant), the USCG (HQ - Commandant), the USA (SMDC), JTAMDO, (then) BMDO, USSOCOM, (then) USACOM, JFCOM J9, and other COCOMs. She has also conducted projects for NATO ACT and NATO NEC, the British Army's Force Development & Training Command, and the German BBK.

During the last thirty-five years Christine MacNulty has contributed methods and models for understanding social and cultural change. She developed the European version of SRI International's Values & Lifestyles Program, and worked with the International Research Institute on Social Change to develop their social models. In the last twelve years she has applied her knowledge of strategy, cultures and cognition to "understanding adversaries" – using that information for planning and assessing non-traditional operations, information warfare, information operations, and strategic communication. She has also used these social models for training in network-centric operations and C2.

She was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce in 1988 for her contribution to British industry. She is the coauthor of two books: *Industrial Applications of*

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Angie Mallory

Angie Mallory is a Ph.D. student in Rhetoric and Professional Communication at Iowa State University. She holds a Graduate Certificate in Terrorism Analysis from University of Maryland, received her BA in English from Montana State University, and is a research analyst with the U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group. She is co-author of a book chapter addressing mismatched communication expectations between military veterans and college Writing instructors. The chapter is entitled “Uniform Meets Rhetoric: Excellence Through Interaction.” She is also a contributing author to several SMA whitepapers and most often addresses issues relating to narrative, audio/visual content analysis, and how humans make meaning of events through communication. She served for six years in the United States Navy as an aircraft technician.

Shoqi A. Maktary

Shoqi A. Maktary is the Yemen Country Director for Search for Common Ground (SFCG). Mr. Maktary is a former Fulbright Scholar with Masters Degrees in conflict transformation and peacebuilding, and security management. Prior to joining SFCG, he was Risk Management Advisor for Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) where he advised GIZ Country Directors and Project Heads on conflict, risk and security issues through in-depth context analysis and trend developments, and provided guidance on conflict sensitive planning and safe and effective implementation of activities.

Yusra Mushtaq

Yusra Mushtaq did MPhil in Defence & Strategic Studies from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. She started her career as a Research Assistant in Institute of Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA) at National Defence University, Islamabad. She also worked as a lecturer in Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi. She taught as an Adjunct Faculty at graduate and undergraduate levels in different universities of Islamabad along being the broadcaster as well. Her majors are arms control and disarmament, defence, diplomacy, research, environmental geography, security with a deep insight on national and international politics. She also conducted different research projects with prime focus on capacity building and policy formulation at different forums.

Amjed Rasheed

Amjed Rasheed is an academic tutor and a post-doc researcher in Middle Eastern Studies at the Institute of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, Durham University. The title of his thesis (submitted) is SYRO-IRAQI RELATIONS: THE PUZZLE OF THE PERPETUAL RIVALRY. His research interest focuses on Muslim and Arab World politics, Syria, Iraq and Kurdistan in particular

Jason Spitaletta, Ph.D. (Maj, USMCR)

Jason Spitaletta is a Major in the US Marine Corps Reserve and a psychologist with primary research experience in applied, experimental, political psychology and cognitive neuroscience as well as operational experience in Psychological Operations (PSYOP)/Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and intelligence assignments in the US Marine Corps as well as Joint and Special Operations communities. He has deployed to the Western Pacific, Iraq, and Uganda. In civilian life, he is a researcher at The Johns Hopkins University-Applied Physics Laboratory as well as an adjunct faculty member at National Intelligence University. He holds a bachelors' degree in biochemistry from Franklin & Marshall College, a master's degree in human factors from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and a master's degree and Ph.D. in applied experimental psychology from Catholic University. He also holds a graduate certificate from Stanford University's Summer Institute for Political Psychology.



Dr. Gwyneth Sutherlin

Dr. Sutherlin is the Director of Human Geography and Analytics Research at Geographic Services, Inc. She provides analytic expertise in socio-cultural dynamics, geospatial technology, cognitive linguistics, and emerging conflict. She performs analysis on complex risk environments drawing from 10+ years of project and field experience. Her publications including 'digital battlefield' and 'lines in the cybersand' have emerged on the cutting edge for multilingual data modelling for security contexts. She applies Human Geography research to improving collection/analysis granularity, operational security, cyber security (software development), and geospatial communications intelligence (GEOINT and COMINT). Before completing a Ph.D. with fieldwork in East Africa, her expertise facilitating intercultural dialogue garnered UN recognition, in particular, in the MENA and Sub-Saharan regions of Africa. Dr. Sutherlin has a degree in political science from Indiana University and a doctorate in peace and conflict studies from the University of Bradford. She works in seven foreign languages.