

The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters

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Question and Answer

Question:

What kind of nuclear posture does the United States need to protect itself and its allies?

Answer:

The United States needs a robust nuclear posture, with capabilities designed to limit damage in the event of nuclear war. It has always pursued meaningful strategic superiority over rivals and desired a nuclear arsenal "second to none."

Outline

- 1) Conventional Wisdom: Second-Strike theory
- 2) The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy
- 3) The Advantages of Nuclear Advantages
- 4) The Disadvantages of Nuclear Advantages?
- 5) Conclusions

1) Conventional Wisdom: Second-Strike Theory

- The Logic of Second-Strike Theory
 - Second-Strike Capabilities
 - Mutually-Assured Destruction (MAD)
 - Brinkmanship and the balance of stakes
- This leads to a puzzle:
 - Why has the United States always retained a robust nuclear posture?
- Two possible answers:
 - 1) US nuclear strategy is illogical (Jervis, Glaser, etc.)
 - 2) We need a better theory

2) The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy

What is unique about American Nuclear Strategy?

- Counterforce Targeting
 - Legal and ethical motivations
 - Damage limitation
 - Force requirements
- Extended Deterrence
 - Washington extends its nuclear umbrella to over thirty formal treaty allies in Europe and Asia.

2) The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: The Superiority-Brinkmanship Synthesis Theory





In a game of chicken, we might expect the smaller car to swerve first even if a crash is devastating to both.

3) The Advantages of Nuclear Advantages

Hypothesis 1: In the event of a nuclear war, nuclear superior states suffer less damage.

Nuclear Exchange Simulation Results



Russia First-Strike on the United States



China Second-Strike on the United States

3) The Advantages of Nuclear Advantages

Hypothesis 2: Nuclear superior states are more likely to get their way in high-stakes nuclear crises.

Table 3. Cross	Tabulations	of Nuclear Crisi	s Outcomes, 19	45-2001
		Outcome		
		Win	Loss	Total
Superiority	Yes	14 (54%)	12 (46%)	26 (100%)
	No	4 (15%)	22 (85%)	26 (100%)
	Total	18 (35%)	34 (65%)	52 (100%)
	$X^2 = 8.49$	97 (p=0.004)		

The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962



Sino-Soviet Border War, 1969



1973 Arab Israeli War



1999 Kargil War



The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962



3) The Advantages of Nuclear Advantages

Hypothesis 3: Nuclear superior states are less likely to be targeted with military threats in the first place.

List of Compellent Threats by Nuclear-Armed States, 1945-2001

Country	Threats against Nuclear Superior	Threats against Nuclear Inferior
	States	States
United States	0	17
Soviet Union	0	7
Great Britain	0	9
France	0	3
China	0	3
Israel	0	3
South Africa	0	6
India	0	1
Pakistan	0	0
Total	0	49

4) The Disadvantages of Nuclear Advantages? Strategic Stability

The Claim: Nuclear superiority undermines strategic stability and increases the risk of nuclear war.

- The United States still has a 2nd Strike capability.
- The enemy can always back down.
- The evidence doesn't support this view.

4) The Disadvantages of Nuclear Advantages? Arms Races

The Claim: The pursuit of nuclear superiority provokes costly and unnecessary arms races

- States often unable or unwilling to match US developments.
- The United States has always maintained meaningful superiority over rivals.
- States design nuclear postures for many other reasons.
- Sometimes arms races are necessary.

4) The Disadvantages of Nuclear Advantages? Nonproliferation

The Claim: If the United States pursues nuclear superiority, nonnuclear states will build nuclear weapons.

- States build nuclear weapons for other reasons.
- A strong U.S. nuclear arsenal is an important force for stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.
- Quantitate and qualitative evidence supports my view.

4) The Disadvantages of Nuclear Advantages? The Defense Budget

The Claim: The United States cannot afford a robust nuclear posture.

- Ashton Carter, Obama's Secretary of Defense, "nuclear weapons don't actually cost that much."
- U.S. nuclear modernization costs 5-7% of the defense budget.

3) Conclusions

Implications for international relations theory:

- A new theory of nuclear deterrence: superioritybrinkmanship synthesis theory.
- Second-strike theory is not wrong, but it is incomplete.

Implications for U.S. foreign policy:

- U.S. leaders are not illogical.
- The US could scale back commitments. If not, then...
- The US should maintain a robust nuclear posture.

Thank You