






# Understanding Today's Asymmetric Conflicts

Prepared for SMA Speaker Series


- Motivation – broad trends and micro-data
- A model of asymmetric conflict
- Four results
  - Cellular communications
  - Development assistance
  - Military suppression
  - Civilian harm
- Strategic ‘so-what?’

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
The things we thought would help  
often did not...

And sometimes seemed to make  
things worse




Every village and valley was different

## A. Afghanistan



## B. Iraq







## A. Pakistan


## B. Philippines

Quarterly Incidents per 10,000



Quarterly Incidents per 10,000





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# Asymmetric Conflict: A Three-Sided Game




FIGURE 3.1. Asymmetric conflict modeled as a three-player game.

GEN (Ret) Victor Corpus, AFP, on his time as NPA rebel Ka  
*Eming:*

*“Without people’s support you’re dead, because it’s the support of the people that give(s) you all the intelligence that you need. They will be your eyes and ears, and that’s a big difference between a guerrilla fighter and government forces.”*

Brigadier General Joselito Kakilala, AFP, on gaining information from the population:

*“Because of your sincere interest in improving their quality of life. When you are a reliable unit that can decisively defeat the enemy, you can gain support... Right now because of text messaging the people can support you without exposing themselves....they share information by text but do not expose themselves.”*

Victor Corpus (on his time with the AFP):

*“Having been with the other side, I know that if you harmed one innocent civilian in an area, that whole area will become your enemy. For instance, in one village, you accidentally bomb and kill a child, the whole village will become your enemy. First they will get even and ambush you, so instead of neutralizing one guerrilla you create one whole village of enemies. And the more civilian casualties that get killed, the stronger and more powerful will be the resistance.”*

# Order of Play and Rebel Choice of $v^*$

- Order of play
  - Nature determines community norms, unobserved by combatants
  - Government and Rebels simultaneously choose their actions
  - Community members decide whether to share information
  - Control over territory is determined
- Rebels face an “information-sharing constraint”, community members share info. if rebels impose too many costs given:
  - Local political views
  - The benefits from government service provision
  - The collateral damage from government use of force
  - Rebels’ ability to retaliate against collaborators





# Setting $v^*$ under uncertainty in AQL



“Stop the killing of people unless they are spying, military, or police officers...if we continue using the same method, people will start fighting us in the streets....

You have to come with Dr. ‘Amir the day after tomorrow early in the morning....It is important that you and Dr. ‘Amir have to come to me as soon as possible...”

- Letter to Abu-Usamah, Ramadi cell leader from senior leader in al-Qa’ida in Iraq. Early-2006. Harmony IZ-060316-02.







Victor Corpus on his time as Ka Eming:


*“That’s why the discipline of the guerrilla is very strict, because any violation of discipline that will cause the loss of popular support will diminish your team or be the end of you, because if the people are against you, we would get ambushed left and right. But if the people love you, they will tell you the government forces are still far away and tell you to move to safety when they come closer.”*

# Select Testable Implications


- Making informing safer should decrease violence (IO 2015)
- Conditional service provision will reduce rebel violence (JPE 2011)
- Security and conditional service provision are complements (AER P&P 2013, APSR 2016\*)
- Civilian casualties reduce support for side causing harm (AJPS 2012, PSRM 2016), shift information flow (JCR 2018, WP)
- Both sides will provide services if not too costly (various)
- Economic conditions will be inconsistently correlated with violence (JCR 2010, various)

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**FIGURE 5.1.** Effect of Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) spending on combat incidents by Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) presence. Each dot represents a district of Iraq for a six-month period. CERP spending data from Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS) database. Conflict events from MNF-I SIGACT-III Database.



**FIGURE 6.2.** Marginal effect of different kinds of aid spending on violence depending on force levels.

Incident data from declassified data from Multi-National Force–Iraq SIGACT-III database. Spending from Iraq Reconstruction Management System data. Force levels from Carrie Lee, “Battalion Dataset Codebook” (working paper, Stanford University, 2011), Order of Battle Data. Dotted lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval. Rugs at the bottom of each panel show the density of observations at different Coalition force levels.




FIGURE 7.1. Total informational and preemptive tips reported for Diyala (A) and Salah-al-Din (B) provinces between June 2007 and July 2008. Source: Multi-National Corps—Iraq. Date (of containing report): 21 July 2008.



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- There is an algorithm to restoring order locally – winning the valley or the village is possible
- Small changes/policies can have big effects
- While local success does not win wars, it can pave way for strategic outcomes
  - Insurgents' incentives
  - National-level politics
  - Economic growth