EURASIA STRATEGIC RISK

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Project Report for
“The Re-awakened Bear: Emerging Threats and Opportunities in Eurasia”

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Abstract

The GMU Eurasia Strategic Risk project examined future political, security, societal and economic trends as they apply to the decision calculus of key Eurasian regional actors. Timed Influence Net (TIN) models were used to identify potential sources of strategic risk for the United States by focusing on actions and behaviors that would be considered adverse by the United States, NATO, and other U.S. partner nations. The goal was to provide planners with a tool that can be used to inform their discussions with military and non-military staffs from both the United States and its partners on potential Eurasia strategies. Among the key observations: When the adverse behaviors the United States seeks to influence are not related to a perceived existential threat to a NATO member, classical deterrence cost-benefit calculations lose importance. However, Russia’s perceived cost-benefit calculations of not acting, and its perception of the decision calculus of the United States and its partners remain important considerations. For this reason, the study concludes that NATO’s Article V will continue to serve as an effective deterrent to actions which the Alliance believes constitute an existential threat to a member country, but is less likely to deter attacks that do not jeopardize a member state’s existence because the political cost of restraint for Russia outweighs the potential cost of a likely NATO response.
1. Introduction

The US and its NATO partners have recognized the need to develop new strategies to address the resurgent Eurasia challenge to peace and security in the region. The GMU Eurasia Strategic Risk project seeks to map future political, security, societal and economic trends as they apply to the decision calculus of key regional actors using a Timed Influence Net (TIN) model (Fig. 1) to identify potential sources of strategic risk for the United States in Eurasia and potential leverage points when dealing with Russia in a “global context.” The payoff is a tool to support operational and engagement planning by EUCOM, STRATCOM and their components.

![Figure 1. Timed Influence Net Strategic Risk Model Overview](image)

The project found it necessary to distinguish between "old NATO" countries and "new NATO" countries. This has been identified as an issue for EUCOM because the attitudes and interests of the two groups differ substantially. The project also examined relationships between Russia, Russia's allies, Russia’s "Near Abroad" non-allies, and other countries in EUCOM's area of responsibility.

The purpose of this modeling and analysis project was to identify areas of strategic risk in the EUCOM region over the next two decades; examine future political, security, societal, and economic trends; identify where US strategic interests are in cooperation or conflict with Russian and other interests worldwide (in particular, with respect to territory associated with the Former Soviet Union), and identify drivers of conflict and
convergence to allow the US to leverage opportunities when dealing with Russia in a “global context.” This led to a detailed review of Russian interests in the Arctic region which is detailed in a separate report.

The project used inputs from a group of experts to outline areas of strategic risks and conflicting interests as well as potential opportunities for encouraging cooperation between the United States and European and other regional actors. A major goal of the project was to provide planners with a tool that can be used to inform their discussions on potential Eurasia strategies. The tool relates potential influencing inputs to effects on USG strategic risk in Eurasia and provides operators a means to visually depict the influences on strategic risk in the AOR using conditional probabilities. Factors under USG control can be varied to gain insights on opportunities to influence escalation when regional stability is disturbed.

One of the key areas affecting Russian international and domestic behaviors appears to be Moscow’s perspectives regarding foreign population groups which include ethnic Russians as well as other ethnic groups who speak the Russian language. A recent CNA report [1] refers to these groups as “compatriots,” and notes that the Russian government defines the term in broad terms, which includes their families or other connections to the Russian Federation. The Russian National Security Strategy makes their protection and support a foreign policy priority, providing Putin and other senior leaders a foundation for their actions, which is particularly useful as a means to affect the strategic decision calculus of its own population.

Four questions were employed as an initial scoping mechanism; however, the scope was adjusted to support a specific request from the sponsor to examine a potential Moldova-Transnistria crisis scenario.

1. What will influence NATO’s Article V to serve as an effective deterrent?
2. Can the US and NATO influence Russia’s view of its strategic deterrence posture?
3. What de-escalation considerations could motivate Russian actions to reduce US strategic risk in the EUCOM AOR?
4. Can USEUCOM reduce potential strategic risk in its AOR through its focus on theater engagement and security cooperation?

The analysis effort was based on gaining an understanding of the Decision Calculus used by Russia and other relevant international actors relative to actions and behaviors that would be considered adverse by the United States, NATO, and other U.S. partner nations. This decision calculus approach is described in Section 2. A key assumption is that the EUCOM commander and other relevant actors would employ the concept of “Unified Action” to influence the decision calculus of key actors.

1 A. H. Levis and R. J. Elder, “Russia and the Arctic,” System Architectures Laboratory, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, October 2015.
In order to address these issues, a number of activities, listed below, were conducted and are described in Sections 3 and 4.

1. Proposed a decision calculus construct for use in assessing strategic risk (Section 2).

2. Developed a catalogue of shaping and engagement activities for steady-state use and a catalogue of possible actions for use in response to regional disturbances. (See Annex A)

3. Developed a workflow process for operational planner use (Section 3).

4. Developed Timed Influence Net (TIN) models and conducted computational experiments for two scenarios to serve as examples for use by EUCOM and other planners. (Section 4)

5. Applied the Decision Calculus Framework at an operational planning workshop with EUCOM augmentation unit planners. The framework was used to assess strategic risks in preparation for the unit’s participation in a crisis simulation. (Section 5)

6. Collected findings and observations (Section 6) and offer insights and conclusions (Section 7).
2. Decision Calculus Construct

In the past, operational planning has focused primarily on developing concepts to defeat a potential adversary militarily. However, such an approach does not always satisfy political requirements. An alternative approach to influence the decision calculus of key regional actors was developed based on the Deterrence Operations Joint Ops Concept (DO-JOC). The concept which underlies this approach was named the Decision Calculus Construct (Fig. 2).

Figure 2. Decision Calculus Construct

Figure 2 depicts a balance between two activities: Adverse Action and Restraint (from taking Adverse Action). The study assumes that a Commander’s intent is to shift the balance towards Restraint (from Adverse Actions) on the part of all the regional actors. The five influence vectors reflect the perceptions of the actor performing the decision calculus.

On the Adverse Action side of the balance are two opposing influences — Benefit of Action and Cost of Action. This is the traditional understanding of deterrence which stressed impose cost (in response to an action) and deny benefit of action as a means of deterring adverse behaviors. On the Restraint side of the balance are two influences - cost of restraint and benefit of restraint (not conducting the adverse activity). A potential perceived cost of restraint is that a government will lose power or face domestically, with partners or with competitors. Potential benefits could come from the international community or regional actors in the form of economic, political, or social advantages derived from the exercise of restraint.

The fifth, and perhaps most overlooked influence vector, is the Regional Actor’s perception of the competitor’s decision calculus. The Regional Actor’s perception can tilt the balance toward Action (such as to gain advantage by acting first), or toward Restraint (when the competitor’s likely proactive course of action is less onerous as the likely response course of action).

The DO-JOC posits that an actor must make cost-benefit decisions to either conduct an adverse action or exercise restraint. The central idea of the DO-JOC is to decisively influence the adversary’s decision-making calculus in order to prevent hostile actions against US vital interests. This is the objective of joint operations designed to achieve deterrence. For purposes of this study, the central idea is to influence actor behaviors to
support US strategic geopolitical interests. The specific behaviors examined during this study were Russian incursions into neighboring countries due to escalation of tensions between those countries’ governments and populations sympathetic to Russia, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to Russian clients, and strategic miscalculation leading to nuclear weapon use.

Understanding how these factors are interrelated is critically important to determining how best to influence the decision-making calculus of adversaries. Success is not solely a function of whether adversaries perceive the costs of a given course of action (COA) as outweighing the benefits. Rather, adversaries weigh the perceived benefits and costs of a given course of action in the context of their perceived consequences of restraint or inaction. For example, deterrence can fail even when adversaries perceive the costs of acting as outweighing the benefits of acting if they believe the costs of inaction are even greater.

Joint military operations and activities traditionally contribute to the objective of deterrence by affecting the adversary’s decision calculus elements in three ways: Deny benefits, impose costs, and encourage restraint. However, military capabilities can also enable other US and partner instruments of power to be more effective. This is called “Unified Action” of which “Whole of Government” operations are a subset. Direct military means include force projection, active and passive defenses, global strike (nuclear, conventional, and non-kinetic), and strategic communication, i.e., the alignment of actions with intended message. This is often confused with communication strategy. Enabling means include global situational awareness (ISR), command and control (C2), forward presence, security cooperation and military integration and interoperability, and assessment, metrics, and experimentation. Additionally, military planners can be of great assistance to other parts of government by helping them analyze the mission, develop and assess courses of action, and model effects of actions.

The perceived benefits and costs of a given Course of Action (COA) to either conduct an adverse behavior (relative to another actor’s perception) or to exercise restraint have two essential elements that influence adversary decision-making. First, each benefit and cost has some relative value to the adversary, (i.e., how much does he perceive he will gain by reaping a given benefit or how much does he perceive he will lose by incurring a particular cost). Second, each benefit and cost has a relative probability estimate associated with it in the mind of the adversary; i.e., how likely does he believe it is that he will reap a given benefit or incur a particular cost by acting or not acting.

One additional factor profoundly influences an adversary’s decision calculus: his risk-taking propensity. An adversary’s risk-taking propensity affects the relationship between values and probabilities of benefits and costs when in the process of reaching a decision. Risk-averse adversaries will see very low probability but severe costs as a powerful deterrent, while risk acceptant adversaries will discount costs in their pursuit of significant gains.
Finally, an actor’s decision calculus may be influenced by his perception of the other actors’ decision calculus and the time he believes is available to reach a decision. It is important to note that perceptions are more important to an actor’s decision calculus than the actual facts underlying these perceptions. Therefore, the conceptual model assumes that stability increases when the actors assess that each other’s decision calculus will favor restraint over adverse action.

3. Technical Approach

The Decision Calculus Construct was used as a framework to examine the influences on the decision calculus of Eurasia actors and explore opportunities to:

(a) Increase steady-state stability,
(b) Dampen the impact of disturbances on regional stability, and
(c) Posture for rapid restoral of stability once disturbed.

The graphic (Fig. 3) below provides examples of possible sources of risk, and the resulting effects that the USG and its partners would likely want to influence.

![Figure 3. Example Sources of Risk and Potential Effects](image)

A workflow (see Table 1) was developed to assist operational planners as they worked to apply the decision calculus construct to either develop strategies to reduce the strategic, long-term risk of behaviors (effects) adverse to US interests or to develop response plans for potential disturbances to stability in the region.
Strategic Risk Analysis Workflow

- Identify Actor-Adverse Behavior (USG Risk) to be modeled
- Identify Actor Objectives (relative to potential adverse behavior)
- Identify potential alternative action(s) (favorable to US) to support actor objective(s)
- Analyze actor perception of need to act based on perceived US decision calculus (e.g. US/partner threat, US restraint likelihood)
- Analyze perceived Cost/Benefit of adverse behavior (e.g. US response, achieve objective, deny perceived US action)
- Analyze perceived Cost/Benefit of not doing adverse behavior (e.g. domestic/opposition opinion, client state impacts, economy/trade benefits, international perception of actor)
- Analyze perceived Cost/Benefit of alternative behavior(s)
- Analyze perceived Cost/Benefit of not doing alternative behavior(s)
- Analyze conditional probabilities of adverse actions versus alternative actions (Consider impact of alternate action cost/benefit on cost/benefit of not conducting adverse behavior)
- Identify key decision-maker(s) influencers
- Identify USG and partner actions that can be used to shape the perspective of key influencers and decisionmakers
- Using the insights gained through the decision calculus analysis, construct an effects-based Timed Influence Net (TIN) model connecting potential key actor behaviors (adverse to US interests) to possible causes (disturbances)
- Add to the TIN model candidate USG and partner actions which could favorably influence the impact of the disturbances on the key actor behavior
- Assign conditional probabilities and (where appropriate) time delays to the cause-effect relationships depicted graphically in the TIN model
- Conduct computational experiments varying model inputs to gain insights for use by COCOM and COCOM component planning staffs

Table 1. Strategic Risk (Decision Calculus) Analysis Workflow
The object is to provide a framework for planners to examine an actor’s decision calculus from the actor’s perspective, particularly with respect to cost-benefit elements that are different from those that would influence national security decisions in the United States. A critical first step is to examine the actor’s objectives relative to the potential adverse behavior. If alternative actor actions (behaviors) can be identified that support the actor’s objectives but are more favorable to US interests, one of these alternatives may offer a potential avenue to successfully influence the actor’s decision calculus toward a more favorable behavior. The next step is challenging: It is important to analyze the actor’s perception of the need to act based on the actor’s perception of the USG’s decision calculus. Does the actor see a need for preemptive action to counter a perceived threat from the US or a US partner? How does the actor perceive the USG’s likelihood to exercise restraint in the face of domestic pressure for action that the target actor would find unfavorable? This assessment is difficult because this perception is often different from the reality which USG and partner planners will understand very well. On the other hand, identifying the discrepancies between the actor’s perception and fact provide a useful foundation for designing the USG plan to favorably influence the actor’s decision calculus. It can also highlight areas for collaboration with partners whose own actions may be causing undesirable effects on the actor’s perception of the need for action.

Armed with these insights, the planner now begins the process of analyzing the target actor’s perceptions of the costs and benefits of executing the adverse behavior, not performing the adverse behavior, and if alternative behaviors have been identified, the same cost-benefit analyses of acting and not acting. The cost-benefit of conducting an action considers the potential US and allied response as well as the ability of USG and partner efforts to deny the actor effective benefit expected from the action. This is similar to approach applied to strategic nuclear deterrence. The cost-benefit analysis for exercising restraint (not executing the adverse behavior) considers the response of the target actor’s population, governing structures (particularly opposition leaders), the impact on relationships (diplomatic, economic, trade, military) with friends, and the perception of the target actor internationally.

The planner now identifies pathways to influence the key decisionmakers involved in the decision calculus using the insights garnered from the cost-benefit analyses. Typical sources of internal influence include leaders of the military, political (Communist) party, business (oligarchs), security services, opposition groups, religious groups, entertainment and sports, as well as the generally accepted core beliefs of the population. External sources of influence include client and former client states, potential clients and partners (in process of being courted), trade partners, diaspora populations, international perception of US and partner objectives, commitment, and force postures, and the international assessment of the target actor’s credibility diplomatically and economically.

Recalling that the planners started with effects (behaviors) that the USG considers to be adverse or a source of potential risk to US interests and worked back to identify sources of influence that could lead to this effect, the planners now identify potential USG activities that would influence the decision favorably, both steady-state shaping and
engagement, as well as potential response actions to regional stability disturbances. Categorical lists of potential shaping, engagement, and response activities are used to stimulate the planners’ imagination. The lists used are provided in the Annex.

The planners now can use traditional planning tools to develop and assess courses of action (COAs). The information compiled through the decision calculus workflow process can also be used to construct a Timed Influence Net model which enables the planners to graphically represent their analysis, assign conditional probabilities to the cause-effect relationships depicted throughout the model, and where appropriate, factor in the time required for a given cause to have its desired effect. The Timed Influence Net (TIN) model was developed using the GMU/SAL tool Pythia [2 – 11], which has been used for many years for academic research.

A TIN model example is depicted below (Fig. 4). With this, planners could conduct computational experiments to evaluate and compare their proposed courses of action.
4. Strategic Risk Computational Experiments

One of the areas of interest to EUCOM is Russia’s propensity to proliferate ballistic missile (BM) technology to a client state, such as Syria. A look at this decision calculus was modeled and several computational experiments were run with results depicted in the graphs in figure 5 below. Since the desired behavior was to NOT proliferate ballistic missile technology, the model examined the factors that would contribute to Russia’s decision not to proliferate. Looking at the chart, the model suggests that even with no new actions from the US or its partners, and assuming no disturbances to in the international climate that would argue for proliferation, Russia would not be inclined to proliferate to a client like Syria. The chart examines the influence of promoting counter-proliferation in international bodies with the line changes at time zero. Additional influencers are added at subsequent time intervals: Message intent to deploy Counter-Ballistic Missile forces in response to proliferation is reflected at time 1, threaten additional economic sanctions at time 2, and message potential impact (threat) to Russia and partners if the Russian client loses control of the ballistic missile technology to non-state actors is at time 3. Additional experiments were conducted to identify possible disturbances that would change the decision calculus dynamics, but no influencers of any consequence were found.

![Probability Profile for 0-Promote C-Prolif/1-Msg C-BM Deploy/2](image)

- **Time 0:**
  - Promote counter-proliferation

- **Time 1:**
  - Threaten Counter-Ballistic Missile force deployment

- **Time 2:**
  - Threaten economic sanctions

- **Time 3:**
  - Message likelihood and impact of Ballistic Missile technology loss of control

**Figure 5. Proliferate Ballistic Missile Technology Decision Calculus**
The next model was prepared for possible application in the ICONS crisis simulation, and so modeled Russian Decision Calculus to invade a former client state. Both Latvia and Lithuania were modeled; the figure below (Fig. 6) reflects the Latvia model. Under the current conditions, the computation of the Russian decision calculus for either country does not appear to favor a Russian decision to occupy either country.

![Probability Profile for 1-Hostile/2-Dependent/3-Facility](image)

**Figure 6. Latvia Occupation Decision Calculus**

To gain insights that might be useful to EUCOM planners, additional experiments were conducted to modify the existing conditions applicable to the Baltic countries; results of these experiments are reflected in Fig. 7.
Figure 7. Unfavorable Invasion Decision Calculus Conditions

- Time 0:
  - FSU State does NOT protect RUS ethnic population
  - No US/European forces forward deployed to show commitment
  - No Political-Economic alternatives to military action available to RUS

- Time 1:
  - Former Client State politically and socially hostile to RUS

- Time 2:
  - Potential Invadee dependent on RUS for P-M-E support

- Time 3:
  - RUS requires access to military facility in area

- Time 4:
  - Destabilizing event threatens RUS vital interests
5. Decision Calculus Operational Application

The 217 Air Operations Group with the Michigan Air National Guard, a planning unit which serves as an augmentation unit to the EUCOM air component (US Air Forces Europe), conducted two Operational Planning Team (OPT) events to learn the decision calculus framework and prepare for a crisis simulation conducted by UMD START ICONS. In preparing, the unit applied the decision calculus to their traditional planning methodologies, working with three primary actors: Russia, a modern state (formerly part of the Soviet Union), and an autonomous territorial unit within the modern state with close ties to Russia. Their approach was to examine opportunities to affect the decision calculus of an autonomous territorial unit that is currently incentivized to strengthen its relationship with Russia at the expense of its relationship with the modern state.

The 217 AOG used a decision tree analysis with estimated probabilities and payoffs in order to determine potential levers to persuade a particular choice. Although they recognized the potential significance of cultural ties among the key actors, they limited their analysis to economic benefits to simplify the framework. Two OPT’s were conducted: One focused on finding approaches to reduce the benefits of maintaining or enhancing a strong relationship between Russia and the autonomous territorial unit; the second OPT focused on approaches to incentivize a stronger relationship between the modern state and the autonomous territorial unit. They assumed that the autonomous territory would find an alignment with Russia to offer significantly greater economic benefit compared to a close alignment with the modern state. Therefore, their objective was to reduce or eliminate the territory’s benefit from alignment with Russia and increase the perceived benefit of aligning with the modern state.

The 217 AOG first applied a traditional DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic) approach to each of the options using the table of potential shaping and engagement activities (Annex A) to stimulate ideas. They then applied the Decision Calculus framework to determine potential levers the United States and its partners could employ, and assessed the cost of implementation and likelihood of success. This analysis was later used to inform their participation in an ICONS-led crisis simulation involving Transnistria and Moldova. This is detailed in a separate report produced by the University of Maryland ICONS, “EUCOM Crisis Simulation by ICONS Project.”

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2 EUCOM Crisis Simulation by ICONS Project, 27 Jan 2016, at hyperlink: EUCOM Crisis Simulation by ICONS Project.
6. Observations

When the adverse behaviors the United States seeks to influence do not involve a perceived existential threat (such as a nuclear attack), classical deterrence cost-benefit of action calculations are of less importance than the (a) perceived cost-benefit of not acting, and (b) Russia’s perception of the decision calculus of the United States and its partners. In particular, the cost of Russian (and other actor) restraint can be difficult for United States planners to understand because the influences are “foreign” to our way of thinking.

The United States should expect that when regional stability is disturbed, Russia will assess the United States decision calculus incorrectly since the Russian government is likely to apply “mirror imaging” when assessing domestic pressures for the United States government to act in response to the situation, particularly if it involves perceived Russian aggression.

United States and partner actions that reduce potential pressure on the Russian government to protect Russian critical interests in its “near abroad” area, to include treatment of ethnic Russians and access to key Russian defense facilities, can significantly reduce the risk of a crisis escalating out of control. The problem is that these actions may be unpopular with United States and partner populations.

United States actions to maintain or restore stability following a regional disturbance can eliminate the need for aggressive (and potentially escalatory) United States and partner actions to influence the Russian decision calculus by threatening punishment or deny the Russians the benefit of the actions under consideration.

The 217 AOG staff, acting as surrogates for the EUCOM planning staff, had no difficulty applying the decision calculus framework and integrating it with their traditional planning methodologies. Adapting the decision calculus framework to be used within the traditional military planning framework (rather than in parallel) will make its use more efficient and potentially more effective as well.

One of the challenges is that military planners typically identify available (or potentially available) military forces as one of the first steps in the planning process; in this construct, planners were encouraged to employ partner (such as coalition and government agency) capabilities outside their control. This requires the commander to develop mechanisms to achieve unity of effort for capabilities for which unity of command is not practical.

One critical assumption required to apply the decision calculus approach to unity of effort planning is a clear determination of United States and partner objectives, particularly the specific behaviors to be deterred. The strategic objectives were clearly defined for the experiments conducted during this study; in the real world, planners must often deal with implied political, bureaucratic, and tactical objectives that may be in conflict with the true strategic objective(s).

Shaping and engagement activities have traditionally been used to influence perceptions of the United States and to set the conditions for the effectiveness of response activities.
For the scenarios examined during this study, the shaping and engagement activities involving actors other than Russia were of particular importance because of their influence on third-party responses to regional disturbances involving Russia, and the fact that changing longstanding Russian core beliefs will be extremely difficult to achieve.

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

NATO’s Article V will continue to serve as an effective deterrent to actions which the Alliance believes constitute an existential threat to a member country, but is less likely to deter attacks that do not jeopardize a member state’s existence: the political cost of restraint outweighs the potential cost of a likely NATO response. However, NATO can favorably influence Russia’s decision calculus for adverse behaviors that do not constitute existential threats by focusing on (1) reducing the cost (and increasing the benefit) of exercising restraint, and (2) altering Russia’s perception of the US/NATO decision calculus so that it does not assess that it must act to preempt US and NATO actions during periods of instability.

The US and NATO can influence Russia’s view of its strategic deterrence posture by using all the levers influencing the Russian strategic posture decision calculus: Increase perceived cost of action (punishment), reduce perception that Russia will benefit from the action, reduce perceived cost of restraint, increase perceived benefit of restraint, and positively influence the Russian perception of United States and NATO objectives in a crisis.

Since the Russian narrative implies that the West will exploit every opportunity to reduce Russian power and status, the United States should avoid behaviors and discourage partner actions that support the anti-Russian narrative. De-escalation of a potential crisis becomes increasingly difficult once the Russian leadership rallies the Russian electorate and their partners outside Russia; therefore, where possible, the United States should focus on Russia’s perceived costs and benefits of exercising restraint when assessing ways to motivate Russian actions to reduce US strategic risk in the EUCOM AOR.

Although the study did not conduct experimentation on the potential for theater engagement and security cooperation to reduce potential strategic risk in the EUCOM AOR, it seems clear that it will be extremely difficult to alter Russian core beliefs regarding the motives of the United States and NATO with respect to its power and international prestige. The United States is capable of influencing the attitudes and behaviors of other regional actors, to include former Russian clients, through its shaping and engagement activities. These attitudes and behaviors become important when regional stability is disturbed and responses to the disturbance are implemented. It is important for all pertinent parties to avoid activities reinforcing the Russian narrative that believes the United States and its allies will exploit every opportunity to diminish Russian power and status.
8. References


Annex A: Decision Calculus Framework Handout

Annex A-1: Potential Influencers on Decision Calculus

Internal:
- Military leaders
- Voting population
- Communist Party leaders
- Business leaders
- KGB leaders
- Intel leaders
- Opposition leaders
- Socio-religious leaders
- Core Russian Beliefs

External:
- Client states
- Former Clients
- Potential Clients
- Major trade partners
- China
- Russian Diaspora perceptions
- Perception of US/Partner objectives
- Perception of US/Partner commitment
- Assessment of US/Partner Force Postures
- International assessment of Russian economy
Annex A-2: Potential USG and Partner Influencing Actions (Categories)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shaping Activities</th>
<th>Deter &amp; Engage Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Assist US Citizens located abroad (promote US civilian involvement)</td>
<td>• Military Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strengthen regional relations</td>
<td>• Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Enhance Mutual Understanding</td>
<td>• Deterrence (Competitors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strengthen Democratic Systems</td>
<td>• Assurance (Partners)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Enhance U.S. regional Influence</td>
<td>• Regional Presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inform International Public Opinion</td>
<td>• Global Force Projection demonstrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strengthen security institutions of coalition partners</td>
<td>• Regional military exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strengthen Terrorism Prevention &amp; Response capabilities</td>
<td>• Freedom of Navigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gain/sustain access required to bring U.S. capabilities to bear in the region</td>
<td>• Global Information Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support regional economic growth and development</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Encourage policies favoring open markets and free trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Assist international disaster relief operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Improve the quality and availability of formal education</td>
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Annex A-3: Potential Disturbance Response Activities (Categories)

- Diplomatic Response Actions
- Armed Group Demobilization and Transformation Activities
- Military Security and Regional Stability Actions
- WMD Deterrence and Control Activities
- Internal Political Transition & Democratization Activities
- Humanitarian Assistance Activities
- Refugee Activities
- Counter-Terrorism Activities
- Demining and Unexploded Ordinance Removal Activities
- Contagious Disease Prevention Activities
- Infrastructure Restoration Activities
- Consequence Management Activities
- Public Security and Civil Order Activities
- Border Control Activities
- Civil Administration Restoration Activities
- Public Diplomacy and Education Activities
- Rule of Law Activities
- Counter-Corruption Activities
- Economic Rehabilitation Activities
- Employment Generation and Business Development Activities
- Civil Society and Community Rebuilding Activities
- Human Rights Abuses and War Crimes Activities
- National Reconciliation Activities