9th Annual
Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) Conference

Jointly with DHS/S&T and in cooperation with DNI/NIC

No War / No Peace...A New Paradigm in International Relationship and a New Normal?

Joint Base Andrews
28-29 October 2015

This report represents the views and opinions of the conference participants. The report does not represent official USG policy or position.

Table of Contents

Background

Since the end of the Cold War and with the advent of the new century, new geopolitical realities have emerged that have made classical wars with national military forces pitted against each other far less likely. What we are witnessing are new categories of conflict that cannot be considered full-scale wars in the classical sense but cannot be described as "peace" either. Small-scale conflicts are complemented with intense engagement in the Information and other Spheres. These will almost certainly have great implications in the legal domains as well new forms of alliances. Multiple factors have come into play for these trends to emerge. This is a story of change versus continuity, and the conference focused on what has changed since the collapse of the USSR. As such, there are structural and intellectual challenges that prevent the United States Government (USG) from adapting and thriving is this new environment.

Such blurring of war and peace is directly related to the softening of previously considered "solid" categorical binary distinctions (state/non-state, criminal/noncriminal, licit/illicit, etc.). Much of our diplomatic, legal, and military affairs have been predicated on being to able draw clear distinctions between these categories, and many actors are realizing that blurring them provides "strategic ambiguity." Many of the issues associated with the blurring of these categories are most obvious in the cyber realm. Many of our adversaries are much better than we are at dealing with and, indeed, exploiting these fluid situations.

There are several factors contributing to the issue of "blurring of war and peace." These include changes to the

1. type of actors involved characterized by the blurring of state/non-state, licit/illicit, organized crime/militant actions, etc.;
2. intent of those actors (i.e., actors' willingness to exploit ambiguity);
3. capabilities/means that make ambiguous action more viable (e.g., cyber, media operations, the use of proxies, etc.); and
4. changes to the strategic context of international political-security dynamics, which will foster and enable such approaches.

Some of these concepts have been around for many decades like Military Operations Other Than War, but there are some fundamental differences that require very different framing and structure, and we simply have not gotten our heads around it as a nation. Government control of information is fading, which has given rise to the global citizen phenomena and globalized what were once geographically bounded, nationalist movements. Even terrorism is globalizing. We read headlines, discuss, and face things today that just did not exist 40 years ago…but our structures to cope were built 70 years ago. We are structured for regime change, to fight nations, and now, by proxy, "groups," but we have not got a clue how to defeat "movements" that

do not possess the familiar nation-state center of gravity and, increasingly, that is what we will face. This all speaks to the limits of power as the sources, derivation, and locus of power is being completely reinvented. The question is do we need a new plan to orient ourselves to face these challenges?

The intent of the conference was to examine the root causes of these new types of conflicts and their implications and provide a contextual understanding. The emphasis was predominantly on the diagnosing of the underlying causes, about orientation, and getting to a meaningful articulation of the problem. In so doing, the conference emphasized and highlighted the need for a "whole-of-government" approach to facing and coming to grips with these challenges. These include military power, diplomacy, and criminal justice, etc. The Panels ranged from those with holistic understanding of these trends to others with a regional focus.

Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are NOT within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff/J-39 DDGO and executed by ASD (EC&P).

Executive Summary

This executive summary highlights key insights derived from speaker and participant interactions. This summary is meant to be comprehensive but does not force consensus. In fact, this summary should highlight that there is a high degree of ambiguity regarding what the gray zone is, what the USG should do about it, and what key questions remain.

The gray zone seems to be a return to an older, more expansive view of how an actor pursues its interests on the international scene. Yet, it only seems "gray" or "new" to us because we have defined a black and white lens through which to see the world. Others clearly do not feel they get value from adopting a similar black and white lens and act in ways that transgress our starker worldview.

Our tendency to think about the world in terms of black and white originates from our success in constructing a world system after World War II that conformed to our values and preferences, making us perfectly adapted to that initial state-base system of global order. As each technological advance concentrated power in fewer and fewer actors, the USG established its hegemony in the international system. Then the USG created the cyber domain, and it had the opposite effect. It empowered individuals everywhere.

What is our goal in the gray zone?

Conference participants seemed to agree that the US goals with regard to the gray zone should push the USG "left of boom." The goal is to identify and mitigate threats before they erupt into militarize conflict. Staying in phase zero is victory.

Defining the gray zone

Conference participants spoke about the gray zone in a number of ways. Understanding how we talk about the gray zone will have implications for the conclusions you draw about it. The word cloud below highlights predominant words conference participants used to describe the gray zone during the conference.

Figure 1 A cloud of words used to describe the gray zone during the conference

Participants nearly all agreed that gray zone challenges take place primarily in the human domain. However, there were two schools of thought regarding the concentration of power. One school of thought felt that state power (as employed by Russia and China) are resurging in news sorts of ways in the gray zone. Both Russia and China have seen the rise of strong, autocratic leaders such as Putin and Xi. The other school of thought acknowledged that while some strongmen remain, in general, power is fragmenting as individuals are empowered. Proponents of the second school of thought argued that the problem with the concentration of power idea is that it correlates wealth concentration with power concentration, which is the exception not the norm in this environment.

Regardless, we seem to be seeing the breakdown of global institutional order, which has changed the distribution of power. This is complicated by the fact that our adversaries now have access to tools and weapons systems previously reserved for states, especially with regard to cyber, drones, and miniaturization. Furthermore, adversaries and competitors will not be constrained by artificial boundaries like the law, bureaucracy, authorities, etc. They operate seamlessly and make decisions quickly.

The gray zone has been alternatingly described as an operating environment, a type of conflict, and a strategy. Some felt it exists outside (left of) of the conflict spectrum, some felt it primarily took place in phase zero, and some felt it occurs across the full range of conflict. If you look for opportunities within the gray zone, you realize that the area right of boom is the domain of threats and military conflict, the area left of boom is the domain of opportunity. This domain includes acceptable, if not preferable, competition that we take in order to protect our national interests. The USG clearly sees the gray zone as a threatening, but we should not discount opportunities as well.

Participants offered three definitions of gray zones.
- Where we conflict with adversaries every day in an environment where we do not have the tactical, strategic, or operational edge because the adversary is employing off the shelf technology while we have to go through red tape, oversight, and rules before fielding new technology.
- Where a "micro player" is challenging a "mega player" (referring to asymmetric warfare).
- Competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors falling between the traditional wars and peace duality.
- Purposeful, aggressive, integrated, and ambiguous use of multiple types of power to achieve political, economic, and/or military objectives

Drivers of gray zone
Dr. Moises Naim described the changes as originating from three revolutions: more, mobility, and mentality revolutions. The "more" revolution refers to the fact that today we have more of everything including material goods, countries, people, services, etc., compared to even 15 years ago. And these things and ideas have increasing mobility due to globalization and technological advances. Finally, there has been a profound change in the values, expectations, aspirations, propensities,

and dislikes of people across the world, according to the World Values Survey. These things combined have a major impact on how power is employed in the world.

While technological advances are important, some participants argued that they are simply tools employed by powerful people. Tools require users with a sense of direction and motivation. That is why it is important to focus on the human aspect of the gray zone to understand the motivation of key actors as well as how these actors exploit unaddressed grievances to gain power and influence.

Challenges & Solutions

The USG faces many challenges in how it thinks about and responds to the gray zone. Challenges, as well as proposed solutions, are summarized in the table below. You will note a number of boxes where solutions remain to be identified.

Table of Challenges and Proposed Solutions

Challenge	Description	Solution
Black and white view	The USG tends to see war as black and white. Its adversaries and competitors do not share these distinctions.	The USG needs to identify opportunities, not just threats, that exist in the gray zone. Influence and soft power is key in this environment.
Size ≠ power	Size does not always equal power; speed and agility matters very much.	
Paradox of priorities	In full spectrum conflict, everything seems like a priority, but not everything can be a priority.	The USG must be prepared to operate simultaneously, but it has to figure out a way to prioritize these competing threats.
Decentralization of technology	The USG used to be the primary technological innovator. Now, not only it is not first, but the USG must confront technology that was not even born in the defense industrial base.	
Constrained fiscal environment	The USG defense budget is shrinking at a time when its adversaries need only a small fraction of that budget in order to be	

	effective.	
Responsibility ambiguous	The USG has difficulty in proving responsibility for an adversarial action or whether the actor intended it to be provocative.	We need to better understand our competitors' and adversaries' motives and intent.
Whole-of-government	To deal with complex problems, a whole-of-government approach--bringing in interagency partners, industry, academia, etc.--is needed.	We need to bring in expertise from outside the defense industrial base to push it forward to adapt, change, and adjust to achieve the desired effect.
Human dynamics	Understanding the human domain (perceptions, environment, grievances, etc.) is critical in understanding the root causes of instability and conflict as well as adversarial intent.	The USG needs to understand the human domain in a multi-dimensional, contextually driven way. It has to understand the motivations of its competitors.
USG restrictions	The USG faces many obstacles including legal, cultural, bureaucratic, and financial when operating in the gray zone.	
Whack-a-mole	Efforts to respond to provocations in the gray zone are limited because the USG is structured to look at problems from a single-country perspective; it needs a transnational/regional approach.	Develop regional methodologies, frameworks, and organizations to respond to transnational challenges. The USG needs to develop tools, techniques, and schools of thought that yield a competitive advantage
Global cooperation	Dealing with problems fueling non-traditional actors in the gray zone (climate change, inequality, etc.) requires global cooperation.	We need a new, global institutional order. Also, we need to increase partner participation by strengthening the resolve, capability, and commitment of our partners; providing neural support to actors; and

		undermining efforts that others might use to exploit vulnerable populations. We have to be willing to work with non-traditional partners.
Rose colored lenses	The USG has to keep what it wants to exist separate from what actually does exist.	We have to see the problem for what it is. This requires rigorous analysis.
Opportunities	The USG views the gray zone as inherently threatening.	There are opportunities. This is a world that is not as comfortable with monopolists, tyrants, dictators, and strong men.
Nation state paradigm weakening	The nation state paradigm seems less relevant in today's environment, but the USG is still structured to operate within this framework.	
Communication	The USG has to become better at messaging.	The USG needs to support persistent engagement.

How can the SMA community contribute to a solution?

The SMA community has always challenged the idea that there is a linear cause and effect relationship in complex social problems. It also has a deep, abiding drive to provide contextual information for the world in which the USG and DoD operates. SMA does this, in part, by modeling a holistic approach by reaching out to intra- and inter-agency entities, academia, industry, and international partners. SMA's use of social science may not provide an answer, but it helps the DoD think systematically about understanding and responding to complex problems.

Questions asked

Speakers and participants raised a number of questions that remain unresolved. They are listed here to encourage the SMA community and its partners to ask themselves how they can contribute to a solution.

1. How does the USG maintain comparative advantage in the gray zone?
2. Does the USG have a responsibility to protect private industry from cyber attacks?

3. How do we enact a whole-of-government response?
4. How do we know that the action taken was done by a particular country?
5. Do we have rigorous quantitative or qualitative analysis to support the actions we want to take?
6. What capabilities can we bring to the fight in the gray zone?
7. Are there business practices the USG should bring to bear to help us operate more effectively in the gray zone?
8. What are the real threats in the gray zone?
9. Why do we care about the gray zone?
10. Does gray zone exist across a continuum of conflict or in one particular space?
11. How do we understand the influence of the human domain on the gray zone?
12. What are the underlying causes of the gray zone environment?
13. In the foreseeable future, instability will be driven by conflicts within and across state boundaries. Every nation will have an inherent level of instability. What is an acceptable level of instability?
14. While we are focused on the problems of today, who is looking for the smoke of the next fire?
15. Approximately 98 percent of non-government organizations (NGOs) were created in the last 10 years. How do we incorporate these groups into our thinking?
16. How do criminal networks and terrorist organizations fit into gray zone threats?
17. How do we measure power?
18. How could robotics alter power (or increase grievances that would lead to instability)?
19. How do you make sure you anticipate threats instead of react to them? This question is not about obtaining data; it is about developing tools and constructs.
20. What opportunities can we identify in the gray zone?
21. Are we falling into the trap of calling any activity we do not like as belonging to the gray zone that requires a response—probably a military one? Is competition is bad?
22. We need to know who the main nodes and influencers are. Who are they connected to and what are they saying? What values do our target audience hold?

Conclusion

Participants concluded that the current state of the no peace/no war environment will not go away any time soon. We are in an environment where newly empowered actors are working to circumvent, undermine, and overwhelm status quo powers. The response involves developing smart power capabilities that rely on employing levers of hard and soft power. Understanding the human domain and the intent of actors is essential to employing smart power.

Day One Introduction (CAPT Todd Veazie, NCTC)

Captain Veazie is assigned to the National Counterterrorism Center where he leads a team producing counterterrorism net assessments. Prior to this he served as the Executive Director of Joining Forces in the Office of the First Lady at the White House. He was born in Washington D.C. and earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Marine Science from the University of South Carolina and was commissioned in 1986. After commissioning he reported to Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL training and graduated in Class 140. Veazie is a career Naval Special Warfare (NSW) SEAL officer and has served in east and west coast SEAL Teams and deployed to over fifty countries around the globe leading SEAL formations in execution of combat and peacetime special operations in Latin America, Europe, Africa, the Western Pacific and the Middle East. Command tours include SEAL Team SEVEN in San Diego, Naval Special Warfare Unit THREE in Bahrain as well as duty as Commodore, Naval Special Warfare Group FOUR in Virginia Beach.

He has served in numerous staff assignments that include personnel policy at the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments for the Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command and in the Operations Directorate (J3) on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. Decorations include the Legion of Merit (3), the Bronze Star, Defense Meritorious Service Medal (2), Meritorious Service Medal (3), and various other awards. He is also a 2003 Graduate of the National War College earning a Master's Degree in National Security Strategy.

CAPT Veazie welcomed participants on behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, DHS Science & Technology, and the National Intelligence Council to the 9th annual SMA conference. Ten years ago, CAPT Todd Veazie and Dr. Hriar Cabayan (SMA) developed the Strategic Multilayer Assessment methodology. They then started the conferences as a way to share SMA's unique form of analysis with the larger community. The fact that the conference is in its 9th year underscores the importance and contribution SMA has made to the defense community.

In looking back at SMA's humble beginnings, it is clear that participants in SMA are here because they love their country, believe in solutions, believe that things can get better, and believe that we can make it better through personal initiative and action. The SMA community challenges the idea that there is a linear cause and effect relationship in complex social problems. It also has a deep, abiding drive for providing a contextual understanding of the world in which we operate.

The theme this year of no war/no peace is absolutely appropriate. SMA is about providing decision-quality orientation to intractable problems. The panels and speakers provided us participants with an excellent opportunity to get a deep understanding of the world we face and the changes we are experiencing on the global stage.

Opening Remarks (Mr. Early Wyatt, Emerging Capability and Prototyping)

Mr. Wyatt is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Emerging Capability & Prototyping in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering. Mr. Wyatt informs acquisition policy and advances leading edge technologies through the development of advanced technology concepts, and developmental and operational prototypes. Working closely with interagency partners, academia, and industry and governmental labs, he identifies, develops and demonstrates multi-domain technologies and concepts that address high-priority DoD, Multi-Service and Combatant Command needs.

Prior to assuming his current position, Mr. Wyatt served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Rapid Fielding and was responsible for developing and fielding operational prototypes to satisfy urgent warfighting needs. Previously, Mr. Wyatt served as a Defense team Principal, Science and Technology and Unmanned Systems Subject Matter Expert for Booz Allen Hamilton, where he was responsible for providing assistance to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Tactical Technology and Strategic Technology Offices, and the Air Force Research Laboratory's Air Vehicles, Sensors, Propulsion, and Material and Manufacturing Directorates. He supported the development and demonstration of innovative concepts for advanced platforms, weapons, space systems, maritime operations, information assurance, and strategic and tactical networks for the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps.

It is the vision of the Emerging Capability & Prototyping Office to field transformational capabilities.

Operating Environment

- **Spectrum and prioritization of operational needs**
- **Expanding potential military use of technology derived outside of the defense industrial base**
- **Constrained fiscal environment**
- **Shifting from exquisite designs (near-peer focused) to a High/ Low mix, tailorable to various engagements**

The Emerging Capability & Prototyping Office has been associated with and supported the SMA effort for over five years. Mr. Wyatt invited participants to contribute to the tool sets of both the warfighters and senior decision makers. Participants need to think about how to address the environment we are operating in today as well as the environment we anticipate operating in tomorrow. The outcome of this conversation—or schools of thought—may help us determine alternative means to achieving desired effects.

The current operating environment is one in which we have to be prepared to respond to the full spectrum of conflict: conventional, irregular, and hybrid. What is more, we must be prepared to respond to the full spectrum simultaneously.

The globalization of technology has been a major factor in bringing about the no war/no peace reality. We used to enjoy being first to the dance in terms of developing and taking advantage of technological innovations. But with globalization, we cannot rest on the idea that we will always have a significant margin over potential adversaries.

An Invitation to Engage

DII Elements
Leadership development
New capabilities
Wargaming in the security environment
Emerging threats

Grey Zone Challenges
Aggression
Ambiguity
Asymmetry
New threats
Media

Decision Making

Wargaming

SMA
Complex problems
Whole government
Rigorous analysis

We also face the challenge of operating in a constrained fiscal environment. Budget cuts over recent years have reduced DoD resources by 68 billion dollars. So we must devise a means to meet our needs more affordably.

Historically, our approach toward fielding capability is to pursue high-end solutions. But given the full spectrum of conflict, a family of capabilities may be more suitable than a high-end solution.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin Dempsey, said that innovation is critical. It was mentioned 20 times in the Quadrennial Defense Review. It called for innovation not only in weapons, but in our concept of operations (CONOPS), how we work in the interagency space, and with our international partners. So what does innovation mean?
1. It is the result of budding research incorporated to give us a competitive advantage (for example, the introduction of stealth).
2. It means repurposing something from one environment to use in another (for example, the buffalo to the MRAP).
3. It also means bringing in expertise from outside the defense industrial base to push us forward to achieve the desired effect (cyber systems).

Mr. Wyatt asked the requirements community: What can you not do today? What is the desired effect you want? If we go back to that discussion on effect, it opens the door for innovation. If all you can say is that you need a tank because the adversary

has a tank, we are not opening the aperture to innovative options. But if you say you want to maneuver in the adversary's landscape and do so with the intent of achieving a particular objective, then you have opened the aperture to bring in new technologies, CONOPs, etc.

The SMA community may not typically focus on materiel, but it does push innovation. Last November, Secretary Chuck Hagel announced the defense innovation initiative. It recognizes the importance of leadership development. It seeks to help improve decision-making and emphasizes war gaming to evaluate consequences of potential actions in a holistic way. It helps us answer the question about whether the action will drive us towards stability or instability. Does it escalate or de-escalate the conflict? What decisions will be required as our competitors engage in activities that we cannot call war but is certainly aggression. The USG will be at a disadvantage if we cannot meet our competitors head on.

This is a complex problem. For example, what actions can the USG take to defend Sony from a cyber attack? Is it acceptable to do nothing? No, but we need to understand the challenge in a multi-dimensional, contextually driven way. We have to understand the motivations of our competitors. How do we get to that kind of discussion in a war game? How do we bring the interagency into the solution space? Could USAID, USIP, and the State Department contribute to the solution? Do partner nations have greater influence on a particular competitor to communicate that an action is unacceptable or to deny them something they are dependent on?

The final component that is important to emphasize is the requirement for rigorous analysis. How do we know that the action taken was done by a particular country? Can we call in subject matter experts to help us understand this? Do we have quantitative or qualitative analysis to support the actions we want to take? This is a different approach, which needs innovation. We need to conduct rigorous analysis to include war gaming before we take certain actions. Then we need to think about capabilities. They are not always materiel. What other capabilities can we bring to the fight? What business practices give us the best opportunity to do affordably?

With regard to the conference topic, gray zone conflict, it is an environment defined by intentional ambiguity. We have to understand first whether the adversary intended the action. How do we prove that? Then we have to assess the appropriate response. For example can we bring a B52 to a fight of 40 key terrorists and therefore solve the problem or do we create more challenges because we are being attacked in an asymmetric fashion?

What are the real threats? It is disconcerting the number of American college students who have an interest joining ISIL. How do we deal with that? The Department is interested in varying ways to think about this problem. Meanwhile, the Combatant Commands are thinking about more holistic threats that we may not be properly instrumented to engage.

Mr. Wyatt charged the SMA community and conference participants to engage in this problem space. What comes out of this conference will likely spur a series of conversations with Dr. Cabayan about how SMA can support the Combatant Commands struggling with these problems. SMA often supports SOCOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, etc., but we need to engage more with SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM who are also faced with these complex challenges. Do we know what we do not know about the research we have to do?

The Emerging Capability & Prototyping Office spends more time thinking about kinetic solutions than SMA, which is why conferences like this are so important. What comes out of this conference will not fall on deaf ears. We will consider all ideas and opportunities that can help us move the field forward. Let us focus on developing innovative ways to tackle problems. Also, Mr. Wyatt encouraged individuals in the SMA community to publish papers in the journals of the war colleges to get others to think about taking a different approach.

We need to introduce stability where we can and fight aggression where we must. If, in fact, we have to fight, we should be properly equipped. This is not the kind of discussion we typically have with industry. We do not have well defined requirements. This topic is important for us. Mr. Wyatt was encouraged by the attendance and particularly by the number of government participants who want to contribute to this problem set. Mr. Wyatt said he has challenged the SMA community before, and it has delivered. He asked the participants to help him do his job. We need to expand the toolset for how we confront these current and future complex challenges.

Panel 1: No War/No Peace…The New Geopolitical Landscape

Panel Members
- Mr. Dan Flynn (DNI/NIC), moderator
- Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg (CNA)
- CAPT Philip Kapusta (USSOCOM)
- Dr. Frank Hoffman (NDU)

Mr. Dan Flynn (DNI/NIC)
Dan Flynn is the Director of the Global Security Program for the National Intelligence Council's Strategic Futures Group. In this position, he is responsible for leading national-level, interagency projects to provide senior US policymakers, defense officials, and warfighters assessments of long-term and crosscutting military-security issues of strategic importance to US security interests. In this capacity, he is also responsible for leading the National Intelligence Council's strategic analytic gaming efforts to assess emerging national security issues. He has worked closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands in

support of US military strategy development and planning efforts. He has also served as an advisor to several Defense Science Board studies.

Mr. Dan Flynn introduced this panel by discussing the importance of so-called gray zone conflicts and the idea that other countries are exploiting conditions that exist between what the United States defines as war and peace. There are some things that are not new about gray zone conflict. However, focusing only on the similarities of the past underestimates the challenges that we might see in the future. There are new things in the current gray zone environment including new technologies and information tools such as social media that provide new abilities for interaction between governments and societies. Most importantly, the geo-political landscape in which gray zone conflicts take place is new. There is a common belief that we are moving toward a more multi-polar world, which other countries will take advantage of, specifically China and Russia. Russia is in long-term decline and is looking to bolster its position in the international environment. China is a rising power that is trying to find its place in the international arena and understand how it can achieve its global interests. Neither of these states wants to challenge the US directly militarily, so, as a result, they are challenging us indirectly with gray zone conflicts. The issue is that, over time, these gray zone conflicts undermine the international norms and values that we have become accustomed to and have been promoting for decades.

Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg (CNA)
Dmitry Gorenburg, Ph.D. is a senior research scientist with CNA Corporation's Strategic Studies division. His areas of expertise include security issues, military affairs, and ethnic politics in Russia, Eurasia, and Eastern Europe. He has published numerous articles on these topics in policy publications such as Current History and in academic journals such as World Politics and Post-Soviet Affairs. Gorenburg is also editor of the journals Problems of Post-Communism and Russian Politics and Law and an associate at Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. He has served as a consultant on Russian military and security issues for various agencies of the US government and on ethnic and minority issues for the European Center for Minority Issues. - See more at: https://www.cna.org/about/staff/dmitry-gorenburg#sthash.yHnpfyDX.dpuf

Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg discussed Russia's ambiguous warfare strategy and how it has developed in the past couple of years. This strategy is not new; it is something that has antecedents in the Soviet era. A lot of the ideas of today are re-packaged from the Soviet era.

The current era for Russian military leaders and thinkers really starts with the Color Revolutions and their reactions to what they think the Color Revolutions are. Russian officials have argued that the revolutions are actually a new form of warfare that has been invented by western governments seeking to replace independent national governments around the world with ones that are controlled by the west. Russians see them as a western global strategy to force foreign values upon nations that refuse to accept US objectives. Whereas the US might consider Color

14

Revolutions as an expression of grassroots peaceful opposition to authoritarian regimes, Russian officials tend to argue that they are not grassroots but instead orchestrated by the US. In their eyes, western governments are using these peaceful protests to engineer regime change around the world. They describe Color Revolutions as a new aggressive technique that has been pioneered by the US to destroy a state from within by dividing its population. If force is then used to repress the peaceful protests, external military assistance can then be used to enforce regime change. In the eyes of Russia, the advantage of this strategy is that it requires a relatively low use of resources to achieve the goals.

Russian leaders argue that these schemes have been used over the last 15 years in places like Serbia, Libya, Syria, and most recently in Ukraine. Russia's perception is that as these Color Revolutions get closer to the Russian homeland, Russia is ultimately becoming one of the main targets and the US's main goal is to overthrow Putin.

Given their perceptions of the Color Revolutions, the Russians are working to develop a new strategy and response for western actions. This response combines political, diplomatic, economic, and other non-military measures in combination with armed force. The Russians have really been arguing for an increased role of non-military means for achieving Russia's political goals. These types of actions include starting military action by using peacetime forces; contactless military action by highly maneuverable groups of forces; decreasing the military-economic potential of an enemy state by rapidly destroying critically important military and civilian infrastructure; widespread use of precision weapons, special operations forces, unmanned weapons, and paramilitary forces; simultaneous attacks on opponent's forces and sites throughout its territory; military action in all physical environments and in the information sphere; using asymmetrical and indirect tactics; and control of forces in a unified information environment.

Ultimately, this new Russian re-packaging of ambiguous warfare has three phases: 1) destabilizing the country and inspiring domestic conflict, 2) causing economic damage and state collapse, and 3) then Russia stepping in as a savior. One thing that is critical in all three stages is influencing public opinion, and information warfare is very important here.

This general model can be seen with Ukraine. Russia began by working to weaken its economy. When that was not enough, it worked to weaken the Ukrainian government. There were also numerous statements from Russia that it wanted to ensure the protection of Russians abroad. Eventually, these actions led to destabilization and conflict, which led to Russian covert military action. These Russian actions were taken to deliberately mirror how they see US actions abroad.

All of this has provided a few lessons learned for the countries that are threatened by these kinds of actions and attacks. First, it is important to maintain a credible military force for defensive purposes. Second, steps to eliminate conscription in Ukraine had a negative effect on military morale. Third, potential target states should take measures to ensure that their minority populations are well integrated into societal and political institutions.

CAPT Philip Kapusta (USSOCOM)

CAPT Phil Kapusta was born and raised in Northern Virginia. He graduated from the US Naval Academy with merit in 1992. After completing Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training with Class 186 in Coronado, California, he reported to SEAL Team TWO in Little Creek, Virginia in 1993. He served as Assistant Officer-in-Charge (AOIC) of two platoons before transferring to SEAL Team EIGHT in 1996. At SEAL Team EIGHT, CAPT Kapusta served as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of a SEAL Platoon and then as Assistant Operations Officer. Following this tour, CAPT Kapusta earned his MS degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in Leadership and Human Resource Development. From 1999-2001, he returned to the Naval Academy and was the 16th Company Officer.

From 2001 to 2003, he served at Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) in the Joint Planning Group (JPG). Following his time at SOCCENT, CAPT Kapusta served as the OIC of Naval Special Warfare Center, Detachment Little Creek (NSWCDLC) from 2003-2005. From 2005 to 2007, he attended the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. While there, he also earned an EMBA from Benedictine College. After graduating from SAMS, CAPT Kapusta served as the J5 Chief of Strategic Plans at SOCCENT from 2007-2009. CAPT Kapusta worked at the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in J-51 (Special Plans) in 2009 before being selected for command for Provincial Reconstruction Team, Ghazni, Afghanistan. He served as the CO of PRT Ghazni from 2009-2010. He is currently assigned to the USSOCOM J-5 as a strategic planner.

CAPT Kapusta explained that gray zone consists of competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors falling between the traditional war and peace duality. They are characterized by ambiguity in the nature of the conflict, the parties involved, or the relevant policy and legal frameworks. Ambiguity is an essential characteristic of gray zone conflict.

Gray Zone Characteristics

**Ambiguous
Aggressive
Perspective-dependent**

In the gray zone, security challenges are nested between war/peace duality; they are ambiguous, aggressive, and perspective-dependent. Historically, the US paradigm is high-end war, but gray zone challenges are more common. Additionally, being good at high-end war does not ensure gray zone success. The US typically shows operational/strategic rigidity in the gray zone. We have the tools to succeed, but need better intellectual, organizational, and institutional mechanisms. We must also understand that there is no single solution to gray zone conflicts; success requires true whole-of-government efforts, specialized organizations, and addressing root causes. After a century of war, it appears that traditional war is the paradigm, but gray zone conflict is the norm.

Dr. Frank Hoffman (NDU)

Frank Hoffman is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He has been at NDU since 2011. Prior to this position, he worked for over 30 years with the US Marines and the Department of the Navy. He has twice served as a senior political appointee, with tours in the Clinton and Obama Administrations. His last appointment was as Deputy Director of the Office of Program Appraisal from August 2009 to June 2011. He was appointed to the Senior Executive Service in October 2009. Before his service in the Obama Administration, Dr. Hoffman was a Research Fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) in Quantico, VA from 2001 to July 2009. While working at CETO, he led numerous Marine research studies and was a chapter author for FM 3-24, the counterinsurgency manual.

Dr. Frank Hoffman discussed countering contemporary threats based off a full spectrum of conflict in the 21st century. We are facing competition and conflict today that is different from what we have faced in the past.

The American way of war can be described as being overly problem-solving focused, apolitical, astrategic, ahistorical, culturally ignorant, technologically dependent, logistically excellent, firepower focused, large-scale, profoundly regularly, impatient, and sensitive to casualties. The American perception of war is similar to that of American sports in that both are black and white, have defined battle spaces, have set timelines, use symmetrical uniforms/equipment, separate combatants vs. spectators, have referees and rules and infractions and fouls, and have clear metrics of progress and an accepted concept of victory. The US conception that war and peace are distinctive conditions is not held by other cultures. Our adversaries in the

operating environment do not share the distinctions we make between war and peace. The distinctions for what we constitute as war is also not shared by our adversaries.

Russia adheres to a theory of protracted conflict. Protracted conflict entails a larger and longer strategic vision, indirect approach—pulsing in and out, monopoly of the initiative, deception and distraction, masterful propaganda, and attrition via proxies. Russia's behavior over the past few years portrays key elements of protracted conflict seeking to exhaust western resolve and rebalance power ratios.

In today's conflict space, there are different operating environments, different threats, and different levels of war. Gray zone conflicts are not formal wars, and little resemble traditional, "conventional" conflicts between states. They involve some aggression or use of force, but in many ways their defining characteristic is ambiguity—about the ultimate objectives, the participants, whether international treaties and norms have been violated, and the role that military forces should play in response. Gray zone conflict is distinguishable from other conflicts/wars by the low level of violence; however, there is still the threat of war.

The events leading up to what has recently taken place in Ukraine seems to fit into the gray zone conflict paradigm. Contrary to Georgian campaign, Russia employed conventional forces indirectly as a deterrent, and directly applied "green men," Spetsnaz elements, ethnic proxies led by special forces officers, and "paid volunteers." Moscow launched an extensive information campaign and focused less on cyber operations.

The Chinese are critics of the American way of war and American mentality. They are explicitly critical of the frequency bandwidth of the American military. They feel that we fail to take into consideration and have even refused to consider means that are contrary to tradition and rarely select measures of operation other than military

means. China, on the other hand, thinks in terms of hybrid combinations and warfare.

There has been an increasing recognition of hybrid warfare and gray zone conflict. However, recognizing the problem is just the first step, now we need to counter it. Countering these threats will require a sustained strategic narrative, political competition, enhanced alliance capability, cost imposing actions, theater security cooperation, reassuring friends and allies, unconventional warfare, and mitigating/deterring coercive behavior.

Ultimately, today we face a multi-polar world with rising geo-political context. There is now a spectrum of possible conflicts ranging from gray zone to irregular, to hybrid combinations, to "optimized" near peers. We do not have the luxury of focusing just on our preferred paradigm of war because our adversaries will seek seams and employ combinations. The best counter is a strategic version of combined arms, or full spectrum operations. In an age of constrained resources, the United States must be able to operate more easily in the gray area, more ably blend direct and indirect strategies to advance its interests and to counter those of threats and challengers, and more comfortably engage in competitive soft power. This is a tall order and it will require sage chefs to make the most out of the ingredients of cookery.

Discussion

What about co-option or bringing people into a system that they agree with, rather than viewing them as evil? It seems that the Russians want to play with rules that they agree with. So what about us finding non-violent rules that they can agree with?

Dr. Gorenburg noted that the US has tried to bring Russia into the system during the 1990s and 2000s. There were many flaws in how this was done, but unfortunately it seems that this ship has sailed for the current Russian leadership. Even if we wanted to bring them into the system, the Russian side simply does not trust US intentions. Russia is willing to be in the system, but it has to be a different system.

CAPT Kapusta added that we need to be more flexible and account for the entire spectrum. At the same time, we have seen instances where over time groups eventually start to somewhat conform to an acceptable solution. Hezbollah is an example of this.

Dr. Hoffman noted that the US has been offering China and Russia this for the past decade. Russia is outside the system. China is staying within the system right now and taking every single benefit it can. But it seems unlikely that they will remain in the system forever. China wants a sphere of influence with increased regional expansion.

All of the panelists spoke about a whole-of-government approach. Are there any consistent, coherent approaches to cut against agency silos?

Dr. Hoffman noted that we do not have the modalities or mechanisms to apply a whole-of-government approach. We need to shift our mindset and mechanisms.

CAPT Kapusta added that if there is this type of model, it has not been discovered yet.

Panel 2: No War/No Peace… Challenges to Homeland Security

Panel Members
- Dr. Amy Pate (UMD/START), moderator
- Dr. Richard Legault (DHS)
- Dr. Kay Mereish (DHS/I&A)
- Dr. Gina Ligon (UNO)
- Dr. Douglas Derrick (UNO)

Dr. Amy Pate (UMD/START)

Amy Pate is the Research Director at START. She earned a Ph.D. in Government and Politics (Comparative Politics and International Relations) from the University of Maryland in 2007. Prior to joining START as a researcher in 2011, Pate was research director (2007-2011) and project coordinator (2003-2005, 2006-2007) of the Minorities at Risk Project, based in the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland. Pate is a specialist in international relations and comparative politics, with particular foci on ethnic politics, democratization, political instability, terrorism, transnational organized crime, and counterinsurgency/counterterrorism. Pate earned an M.A. in Government and Politics from the University of Maryland in 2005 and her B.A. in Political Science, History, and Russian from Miami University (Ohio) in 1998.

Dr. Amy Pate welcomed and introduced the panelists. She invited the panelists to speak about challenges the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is facing as a result of globalization, the changing climate, and low-level conflict.

Dr. Richard Legault (DHS, Science and Technology Directorate)

Dr. Legault currently leads research and development efforts at the US Department of Homeland Security in Social and Behavioral Science as well as Biometrics and Identity Management. He manages a number of research and development projects in a variety of social and behavioral science domains including the DHS Portfolio for Countering Violent Extremism. Some current and past program topics include: systematic assessments of major security programs; evaluations of technology use; developing Threat Analysis Systems federal law enforcement; communication between federal disaster response entities; and Technology Acceptance and Use Research. He also provides advice and guidance on statistical and methodological matters to other

program managers at S&T and DHS Components and is the S&T Representative to the DHS Countering Violent Extremism Working Group.

Dr. Legault spoke about DHS Science and Technology Directorate and its role in countering violent extremism (CVE) and how DHS is adding value to research in this field. DHS has a robust program with some overlapping foci with DoD and endeavors to conduct evidence-based research with replicable data.

The ultimate goals are to meet the operational needs of DHS end users. DHS conducts three different types of programs: 1) evaluation and research, 2) development of internal and external capabilities (within and across department, mainly DoD, intelligence community, and Department of Justice), and 3) analytic development programs (including big data analytics) to help inform correct application of analytic programs.

The role of research integrated into CVE activities is to provide the latest insight into analysis, provide near real-time feedback on effectiveness of programs, evaluate public perceptions, and to understand motivations for being involved in violent extremism.

Examples of current programs include full scale evaluations of DHS pilot programs with START, integrating mental health into education to counter violent extremism, doing independent third party research on requirements for future work, and provide decision support tools for mental health providers and prosecutors for people in early stages of violent extremism.

Dr. Kay Mereish (DHS, Intelligence and Analysis)

Dr. Mereish is serving as Senior Level Intelligence Officer at the Analysis Division, Office of Intelligence and Analysis of DHS. She served as Deputy Director for DHS at the National Center for Medical Intelligence in Fort Detrick, Maryland. She was acting Director, WMD and Health Assessment Division, Office of Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security. She joined DHS in Feb 09 as Senior Level Medical Intelligence Officer.

As an army officer, COL Mereish served as Senior Manager at the DIA-National Media Exploitation Center. She deployed on several overseas tours in CENTCON AOR and PACOM AOR as an Army Attaché. Dr. Mereish is DoD Certified Acquisition Professional –Highest level-Level III; Defense Attaché, North Africa/Middle East and Defense Linguist DPLTIV.

Dr. Mereish noted that the DHS Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) mission is to provide intelligence analysis targeted for DHS leadership and components to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient.

In I&A, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis is DHS Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT). In general, I&A attempts to coordinate finished intelligence products with DHS intelligence enterprise and the intelligence community, and tailor products to meet DHS and homeland security requirements. State and local law enforcement are key customers of I&A products. The homeland security mission is different from other intelligence communities; it is focused on four main elements of intelligence: 1) CVE, 2) border security, 3) aviation security, and 4) cyber security. All of which combine to protect the homeland. Analysis is primarily done at the unclassified or low-level of classification in order to share findings with state and local law enforcement.

One important CVE issue is border security. I&A analytical products try to forecast future challenges to homeland security. Recent priorities and questions include the following.
1. What are the future challenges at borders, and how is DHS prepared for that forecast over the next five years?
2. What are the most important elements of information technology that can be used to manage future challenges like border security?
3. How do changes in global trade impact DHS including the traffic of goods; trade via non-traditional, virtual borders; and 3D printing, etc.?
4. How do we cover all the gaps so as to not leave the homeland insecure?
5. What are the perceptions of overseas populations of the US and how does this impact on border secure?

Overall, DHS needs to be alert to what is coming down the road as this affects how to increase operational effectiveness to secure our borders.

Dr. Gina Ligon (UNO)

Gina Ligon joined University of Nebraska at Omaha in 2012 to lead research and development for the Center for Collaboration Science, an interdisciplinary academic center devoted to examining complex issues of collaboration. Prior to joining UNO, she worked as an assistant professor at Villanova University and as a management consultant at Psychological Associates, where she partnered with public, private, and not-for-profit organizations in the pharmaceutical, retail, medical, and energy industries. She applies this experience in leadership development to examine leaders of both conventional and unconventional groups, with a particular focus on requirements to lead innovative organizations. She joined the START (Studies of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism) National Consortium in 2010 and has developed the LEADIR (Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results) study to examine the interplay of leadership and organizational structure in violent groups. She has published over 40 peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters on the issues of violent organizations, leadership, and innovation. She recently won Best Paper at the International Conference on Consumer Brand Relationships for her work on Violent Ideological Branding. She is the Principal

Investigator on grants and contracts from USSTRATCOM, DHS, and IBM Business and Government.

Dr. Ligon stated that the cyber issues raised by ISIL represent the meeting point where domestic issues that DHS is concerned about meets the counterterrorism (CT) issues the DoD is concerned about. To get to the heart of these issues, UNO has the Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LIDER) database. To develop it, UNO used a business theoretical lens to look at the organizational structure of ISIL, its leadership team, and how these factors affect ISIL actions. We look to cyber for control and recruiting.

ISIL cyber command is just as sophisticated as their overall organizational structure. At the first level, there is the Chief Information Officer (CIO) in top management team. This is a small group that organizes and allocated resources for web site, media, etc. At the second level are the middle managers. These are the individuals that use social media to distribute transient web pages to their followers. We do believe that the middle mangers have direct contact with leadership of ISIL. This middle management takes advantage of Twitter privacy settings and has a small cadre of followers without tripping Twitter's security parameters. This is the rank and file, kept at about 4,000 followers per Twitter handle, which is when Twitter tends to take them down.

Then there are the bots, including applications that are given permission to have access a person's contacts and their contacts' contacts (research from May 2014). These bots are used to send followers to transient web pages. Finally, there is the brand community, that is not employees, but "members and followers" of the brand (e.g., people that follow Starbucks and re-tweet brand messaging).

Dr. Douglas Derrick (UNO)
Dr. Douglas C. Derrick is an Assistant Professor of IT Innovation at the University of Nebraska at Omaha and received his PhD in Management Information Systems from the University of Arizona. He holds a Masters degree in Computer Science from Texas A&M University and a Masters degree in Business of Administration from San Jose State University. He is a Distinguished Graduate (top 6%) from the United States Air Force Academy. His research interests include human-agent interactions, intelligent agents, data fusion, decision support systems, and persuasive technology.

Dr. Derrick's work focuses on the intersection of technology and psychology. It addresses challenges to homeland security, as the Internet is the gray zone. Dr. Derrick and his team were charged with building a cyber profile for ISIL. ISIL is very brand-conscious. They use cyber to amplify their message. Their messaging includes: 1) recruiting, 2) dissemination of training, and 3) to secure control and financing.

ISIL is an innovator in adapting technology to their stated purpose. For example, they employ open architecture to disseminate their messaging very effectively. ISIL uses Twitter to broaden influence and footprint, by relinking to what is in the Tweet itself.

They use transient Twitter handles. Approximately 10-15% Tweets contain links to open architecture pages. A user can paste a webpage into the Tweet, which is unsearchable by webpages by Google. UNO goes out and downloads this content for analysis. So while some links go to permanent websites, others are transient pages, which are controlled by the user and not widely disseminated. Over 100,000 of these documents are on the private Internet.

UNO has psychologists coding these pages and are looking at changes in languages. There are over 50 languages in the sample but most are in Arabic followed by English. These are then coded for themes (operational, pragmatic themes, etc.).

The second focus is looking at online influence, using a sample of western students. They are trying to understand what elements in online messages are particularly influential. In this study, a proxy measure was used, a sports team, rather than an extremist group.

The early findings indicate that more pragmatic leaders are more selective and more popular. In cyber, the pragmatic leader was preferred. The untested element is that messages in a cyber medium need to be more pragmatic. Asking questions are critical, such as: What is at the end of the influence? Who or what is the receiver and how does a person interact with the medium?

Cyber-based counter messaging needs to be strong, clear, and tailored for people in that environment. Cyber is the amplifier. It is the gray zone. There are no boundaries.

Discussion

What are examples of pragmatic counter messages?

Dr. Ligon responded that her team has found that reasons for leaving the group are very different from reasons for joining. When people leave, they tend to have pragmatic reasons, while their reasoning for joining was more ideological. Once someone is in, and the reality is different that what they thought, this tends to influence their exit.

With all of the threats we are facing, are there leadership qualities [in ISIL] in this environment that we may want to replicate and adapt in our own leadership?

Dr. Ligon responded that ISIL is doing a couple of very smart things. They have a strong ideological core, which is important because all messages need to be couched in the ideology. Then there is the pragmatist portion of ISIL and the violence group

that carries out attacks and operations. The three parts all work together and as one; there is resiliency in their overall organizational structure.

Their use of marketing and ideological expertise surpasses the USG. They maintain relations with ideological leaders in the community and know how to influence people. Go to a marketing conference and see how important the brand is. There is a serious effort to get people to buy *into* the brand. It is very similar to what an ideological leader would do.

In CVE, ideology plays a big role. Ideology is the thread that holds it all together, even the pragmatic parts. We need to field test this issue and apply it.

Dr. Ligon responded that ideology does hold it all together. With the pragmatic leaders, there could be some tension but it does have to be couched in the ideology. Dr. Derrick added that we cannot treat all communities the same. Why people are motivated is far less important than what we can do about.

In CVE field, there is not much effort to contextualize violent extremism. Do you look at the context?

Dr. Legault responded that we cannot treat CVE as a broad conceptual idea. We need to address the components individually and evaluate what we can do about it. We try to answer specific question to provide actionable items.

Keynote Speaker (GEN Joseph Votel, COMUSSOCOM)

GEN Votel attended the United States Military Academy and was commissioned in 1980 as an Infantry Officer. His initial assignments were to the 3d Infantry Division in Germany where he served as a Rifle Platoon Leader, Executive Officer, Battalion Adjutant and Rifle Company Commander. Following this he served as a Small Group Tactics Instructor at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia before being assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment as a Plans / Liaison Officer where he participated in Operation JUST CAUSE. He was next posted to the 1st Ranger Battalion where he served as the Battalion Liaison Officer, Operations Officer and Executive Officer.

Following this he was assigned to HQs, Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy and the NATO Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in Sarajevo. He commanded the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (Light) at Fort Drum, New York and was subsequently selected to command the 1st Ranger Battalion at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia. Following attendance at the Army War College, GEN Votel commanded the 75th Ranger Regiment and participated in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq.

As a general officer he served in the Pentagon as the Director of the Army and Joint IED Defeat Task Force and subsequently as the Deputy Director of the Joint IED Defeat Organization established under the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He served as the Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 82d Airborne Division / CJTF-82, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan and was subsequently assigned as the Deputy Commanding General of the Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. His most recent assignment was as the Commanding General of the Joint Special Operations Command.

Operating in The Gray Zone, a SOCOM Perspective

Note from editor: Because theses remarks were provided directly by GEN Votel's staff, they remain in first person.

INTRODUCTION

First, I would like to thank Doc for inviting me to speak at the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Conference. And while I would prefer to be there in person to deliver my remarks, the tyranny of my calendar conspired against me.

I believe that these forums play a valuable role in furthering discussion across our government on the challenges that we face today. All too often, ALL of our organizations attempt to address large problems that are beyond their scope. It's easy to look at a problem, figure out your small part, then slap a "Whole-of-government" bumper sticker on the rest and call it a day.

It's much harder to accept that you cannot solve it alone and that it will require the capabilities and authorities of multiple agencies, and partners, to effectively get after the problem.

So it's good to see members from across the interagency, academia, and assorted think tanks here to share their thoughts on the environment where we find ourselves. That brings us to the title of this Conference:

"No War/No Peace...A New Paradigm in International Relations and a new Normal?"

That title definitely doesn't lend itself to a bumper sticker. But it is a question that all of our agencies are wrestling with in different ways. And it is the purpose of this gathering to examine the root causes and implications of this "new Normal". Before I begin, I want to stress that SOCOM, and DoD, are only a small part of answering this question, so the views I will provide must be considered with that in mind.

Opening

Today, our country faces a number of growing trans-regional challenges. As the Commander of SOCOM, I have the unique privilege to command the Special Operators who are meeting these threats and challenges on a daily basis. But, as you all know, we rely on the interagency to help accomplish our mission.

Globalization, social media, and proliferation of low-cost advanced technologies are creating a level of complexity, interconnectedness, and rapid change never before seen.

To achieve and maintain a comparative advantage in this environment, the Joint Force will need to conduct simultaneous operations across the conflict continuum; but especially in what we at SOCOM call the Gray Zone.

To this end, on the 9th of September, SOCOM released a white paper entitled "The Gray Zone," describing this environment. I'll use this construct to discuss how SOCOM believes that understanding and influencing "The Human Domain" is central to operating in this new environment.

Take Away

There is one major takeaway I want you to have right up front: Main thing is to keep the main thing … the main thing.

Our ability to operate in the Gray Zone is dependent on understanding and affecting the Human Domain.

I have three supporting takeaways:
　　1. We must think, plan, and operate trans-regionally
　　2. We must be effective in the messaging/counter-messaging fight.
　　3. We cannot do this alone – we must embrace our partners

The Gray Zone
In the 14 years since we entered Afghanistan and 12 since we entered Iraq; the world has dramatically changed.

Adversaries can now easily access tools that range from advanced weapons systems and cyber capabilities to improvised explosive devices, all of which provide an expanding variety of coercive options at their disposal.

Power and influence are now diffusing to a range of actors, both state and non-state, who have not traditionally wielded it. Many governments are struggling to adjust to the new realities.

This environment encompasses a wide array of actions by state and non-state actors to achieve their goals; from direct application of state power such as the Chinese construction of islands in the Pacific, to a more nuanced leveraging of the existing grievances of populations as we saw in the Ukraine.

It is in this Gray Zone, the space between normal economic competition and open warfare, where state and non-state actors seek to operate; a place where unseen

hands deliver ideas and messages; where actors collaborate, compete and collide to achieve their ends.

While some actors in the Gray Zone try to secure their objectives while minimizing the scope and scale of actual fighting, others are exploiting local grievances within populations to advance their own ends. To do this, they take advantage of existing instabilities, weak governments, and cultural seams.

This brings us to what we believe is one of the underlying causes of this environment; the unaddressed grievances of populations are creating exploitable opportunities that enables Gray Zone activity.

Today, we are living in a hyper-connected world; the spread of technology into an increasing number of cultures and societies is driving change in the strategic environment. The Cold War and its aftermath suppressed political mobilization in a variety of ways.

The removal of those constraints, coupled with technology, is creating both new challenges and new opportunities.

Within states, it is becoming much easier for aggrieved populations to network, organize, and demand change to the status quo; we have seen this in a number of locations across the world.

For the foreseeable future, instability will be driven by conflicts within and across state boundaries as much as it will be driven by conflicts between states themselves. Every nation has an inherent level of instability. In mature systems, governments can accept some instability, whether it comes from a disenfranchised population, internally displaced people, refugees, violent extremist organizations, or external malign activities.

The acceptable level of instability is different for every government involved, their neighbors, the region, and the international community.

When the level of instability reaches a tipping point, governments will act to maintain order. Or, as was the case in the Ukraine, other actors may opt to exploit the opportunity through agitation, subversion, and messaging.

Understanding and identifying the inflection points of instability is critical to addressing the situation. If we identify and illuminate a change before the situation reaches this point, we leave time to act, either directly or indirectly, to counter these often nefarious and negative actions.

The challenge our interagency community faces is the development of the tools and capabilities to identify those inflection points and the significant actors who operate

around them. We must be able to distinguish impending changes caused by internal political grievances with those inflamed by malign interests.

Just like in medicine, early detection and identification of contributing factors enables more targeted prevention. We must provide our policy makers increased options and the time and space for planning, decisions, and approvals. Today, our government, and our allied structure, faces significant challenges in doing this due to our policies, processes, organization, and priorities.

Bottom line, we must get left of the next crises, and to do that we must understand the Human Domain.

Human Domain
On the third of August, I enthusiastically signed a concept paper entitled *Operating in the Human Domain*, which explains how SOF will enhance its future operations, through better attention to detail and focus in this area.

The human domain consists of the people in the environment—including individuals, groups, and populations. Dynamics in this domain center on the perceptions, decision-making, and behavior of actors in the environment. 10

Our goal in the human domain is to influence. We gain and keep influence by strengthening the resolve, commitment, and capability of partners; earning the support of neutral actors; and undermining efforts to exploit vulnerable populations.

To understand the grievances that are driving instability, we must be able to identify who the relevant actors are, understand how they are relevant, and determine what we can do to affect them. This is where I believe that we face the greatest challenge. The demands of the human domain go well beyond a focus on counterinsurgency, MISO and social-cultural analysis—although these activities are critical to the success of our operations.

War and conflict are centered on a clash of competing interests and wills – they are fundamentally human endeavors.

Our strategy must therefore have human objectives, defined as actions taken to influence people, be they governments, military leaders or groups within a population.

Understanding the Human Domain is central to our ability to operate in the Gray Zone. Only through deeper insight into the actors in this environment and their goals are we able to successfully pursue our objectives.

To address the capabilities, capacities, and authorities we will require in this new environment, The Human Domain Concept proposes a number of planning principles. Specifically:

We must prioritize human considerations in planning and execution and find ways to influence the *"will to fight"* and decision-making of relevant actors in the environment.

We must identify, evaluate, anticipate, and influence relevant actors.
This will allow us to determine when and how to judiciously apply *lethal and non-lethal* capabilities

Finally, our activities must increase the perception of host or partner nation legitimacy and be built upon trust-based relationships.

So, what does this mean? How do we inform the planning principles for operating in the Human Domain and what are the challenges facing us? So far, I've identified what I believe the cause is – population grievances – and how I believe we understand it – The Human Domain. So what are the obstacles that we face in doing this?

For many reasons – legal, cultural, bureaucratic, financial – we don't adapt well, or quickly, to change.

TRANS Regional
Part of this challenge is the actors, and their networks, that exploit population grievances are not constrained by our artificial boundaries, our laws, or our decision-making processes.

They operate trans-regionally to achieve their objectives, moving seamlessly across our bureaucratic boundaries without apparent limitation.

While we strive for trans-regional whole-of-government efforts, counter-messaging for example, where the information environment moves faster than ever before and supporting technology evolves at an even faster pace. Our adversaries are currently using propaganda and misinformation to great effect, often with a mix of sophisticated technology and overt brutality.

This trend will not be deterred, and will only accelerate if not contested. It is a safe assumption that future adversaries will observe, learn, and adapt new strategies. Unfortunately, our trans-regional efforts to counter this, and other activities, are often stymied by our preference to look at problems regionally.
Because of this, the execution of any trans-regional plan is at the mercy of regional priorities, resulting in a significant gap between planning at the strategic level and action down to the tactical level.

This dissonance inhibits the application of interagency capabilities in a coordinated manner to include knowledge development by the intelligence community. To compound this issue, there is no current trans-regional operational layer that synchronizes the strategic plan to the tactical level.

Our adversaries exploit this deficiency, by blending traditional and irregular techniques, capabilities, and resources to achieve their objectives.

Countering their actions piecemeal, without addressing the whole, is akin to treating the symptom, not the cause.

SOCOM and DoD are working to address this with trans –regional initiatives that attempt to focus on the problem and not the geography. The Russian Strategic Initiative (RSI) and China Strategic Initiative (CSI) are good examples of this – and we have efforts for CT and CWMD as well. This is a good thing that I assess will help all of our IA partners.

This brings us to the next challenge, while we are focused on the major fires in the world--ISIL, Syria, Russia, and China--who is looking for the smoke of the next fire? How do we enable, or leverage, the collection capabilities and capacities of partner nations so that we are aware of where the next problem, or opportunity, exists?

As you know, SOCOM and the interagency are present throughout the world are able to provide some early warning to significant changes in population opinions and countries stability. But, the grievances and inflection points we discussed earlier are more easily identified by working with partners intimately familiar with the region. We need to consider closer collaboration with our partners by augmenting their cultural understanding with our network and capabilities to enable operational fusion, as we are with the French in West Africa.

In essence-we are more dependent on our international partners now, and into the future, then we have ever been in the past. We must recognize this reality and make real change in the ways we inform, interact and operate with them.

To summarize—today and into the future the blurring of the lines between peace and war, and the spread of technology and interconnectedness are redefining our operating environment - and increasing the chances we will operate in the Gray Zone.

To this end, a grasp of the human domain will provide a number of benefits. By partnering to better detect changes in populations grievances and the associated inflection points, we will be able to:
- Develop deeper understanding to enable friendly decisions.

- Effectively articulate purpose, method, and desired state for each operation and campaign to achieve "human objectives" (focused on influencing relevant actors).
- Influence friendly, neutral, and adversary actors to build strength and gain advantage in the strategic environment.
- Carefully choose our interventions, "economize enemies", and make possible, when appropriate, a small-footprint approach that will keep our military effort from being overextended.
- Prevent, mitigate, contain, and win armed conflicts.

Let me again stress my takeaway:

Our ability to operate in the Gray Zone is dependent on understanding and affecting the Human Domain. We must think, plan, and operate trans-regionally. We must be effective in the messaging/counter-messaging fight. And, we cannot do this alone – we must embrace our partners
The Gray Zone is where I believe we will operate for the foreseeable future. To operate in it effectively, we will need to understand the Human Domain.

I thank you for providing me the opportunity to discuss these issues that I believe are critical to our military forces and our ability to support our National Security Strategy.

I look forward to your questions.

Discussion

It is important not to forget that "D" in DoD stands for defense. Perhaps the best approach is to reduce the number of antagonists and think more how to do that. We need to increase the stakes so our competitors see there are rules, and if they do not follow them, they cannot win. Perhaps the DoD should focus on its traditional domain and allow the rest to naturally fall under the domain of the Department of State.

GEN Votel responded that SOCOM has 7,000 men and women deployed to 90 countries. There is a role for SOCOM to think diplomatically as it pursues its mission. He wanted to emphasize that SOCOM has to have persistent engagement, talk to people, and understand what is going on. It does not mean we have to have a big presence. It means we have to build trusting relationships. In Somalia, the USG suffered the Black Hawk Down incident, but we continued to engage and now Somalia has a president, a constitution, and a standing military force because the USG came in small numbers, engaged with local forces, did not take the lead, and let the country and region develop an African solution for an African problem.

We have a long way to go, but there is value in persistent engagement. At the height of the Cold War, we continued to talk with the Soviets. It is important to have the capacity to communicate with our adversaries or people we are in competition with.

There are certain things we can do as military professionals to take a broader approach.

Are we moving towards a gray zone environment?

GEN Votel responded that he did not think we were moving towards a gray zone environment, we are in it right now in various areas and in various ways. The future is now. On the notion of countermessaging, this is something we are really struggling with for a variety of reasons. Some are legitimate: for example, our values guide the way we act and talk. The biggest challenge we have with messaging is that we take it country by country and do not message against the core problem. There are some ways we can counteract this. We do not have a US Information Agency like we did during the Cold War and which we effectively used in South America in the past. We also have to rely more on our partners to help carry the load. It is a real challenge in the Middle East—getting countries to actively and aggressively speak against these challenges. This is preventing us from being more effective in this area.

In terms of SOF leadership development, it seems to be a balance of experience and education. What can be done to improve leadership development?

GEN Votel responded that he is a product of the traditional DoD leadership training, which is a good process. However, he did not have an opportunity to be a fellow at Harvard, and that is something the military does now. The DoD does have to carefully balance experience and education. What it has done over the last several years is to try to get out into the environment during important times in their career to broaden their experience. This has been extraordinarily helpful in giving people a different way of looking at this, but experience is also extraordinarily important. We need to have people on the ground in areas where we operate. One initiative is the Future SOF Operator program. We also spend an incredible amount of money on training. That is a huge investment, so we have to have a way to capitalize it and keep it moving forward.

You stressed a whole-of-government approach. Could you speak about that some more?

We are doing better at incorporating a whole-of-government approach. For example, we have a capable partner in the French. They have a willingness to act, but they need assistance in terms of intelligence. We can provide that to good effect. North and West Africa is not a primary combat zone, but we need to think about challenges there before they become bigger. Where we have problems is linking larger government efforts at the local level. Over the last several years, 30,000 foreign fighters have moved to the Middle East from 110 countries like Indonesia. How do we address that problem effectively? How do we bring all the components—border patrol, legislation, etc.—together? There has to be a mechanism for addressing regional problems at the regional level. We have to link

tactical missions to things happening across the government. This continues to be a challenge.

Panel 3: No War/No Peace…Challenges in Eurasia

Panel Members
- Dr. Eugene Rumer (CEIP), moderator
- Mr. Robert Nurick (Atlantic Council)
- Dr. Paul Stronski (CEIP)
- Dr. Marlene Laruelle (GWU)

Dr. Eugene Rumer (CEIP)

Eugene Rumer is a senior associate and the director of Carnegie's Russia and Eurasia Program. Rumer's research focuses on political, economic, and security trends in Russia and former Soviet states as well as on Russia's foreign policy, especially its relations with the United States, China, and the Middle East. Prior to joining Carnegie, Rumer was the national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the US National Intelligence Council from 2010 to 2014. In this role he led the intelligence community's analytic efforts and served as senior intelligence adviser to the policy community. From 2000 to 2010 Rumer was senior fellow, research director, and interim director at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, a US Department of Defense think tank supporting the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has also served on the National Security Council staff and at the State Department. During his career, Rumer has held research appointments at the RAND Corporation (including three years as RAND's representative in Moscow), the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He has taught at Georgetown University and the George Washington University and published widely.

Dr. Rumer stated that "no war and no peace" is the new normal. This is not new, and it is not something that is going away.

We are dealing now with a Russia that has regained a good amount of its capabilities, as we have seen in Georgia, Ukraine, and now Syria. It is a county with a very hard geo-political view. It defines its interests in very hard geographic logistic terms. The idea that NATO was moving towards Russia did not sit well with Russian leaders.

Ukraine is presently at a stalemate. It is in a fragile ceasefire and in a state of geopolitical war between Russia and the West. This situation is going to continue for a long time. Change in Ukraine, if it comes, will take decades.

Russia is a strategic player with very important strategic capabilities. However, it is also a country that is in a state of long-term decline. Russia now accounts for about two percent of the global GDP, and this is where it is likely to stay for the future.

Russia is stationed between two geographic geopolitical poles: China and Asia in the East and Europe and the US in the West. Russia does not measure up to these two geographical pulls and will not likely in the future. However, this does not mean that Russia will go away.

Russia still struggles with resource dependency. Since Putin took over as president of Russia, he has been talking about diversifying and modernizing the Russian economy. This has not sufficiently taken place. The big challenge for Russia going forward is in modernizing itself militarily, economically, and politically. Ultimately, Putin must figure out how to modernize Russia while also preserving the stability that Russian elites and the Russia public value so much.

Mr. Robert Nurick (Atlantic Council)

Robert Nurick is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. Prior to his appointment at the Council, Mr. Nurick was a Senior Fellow in the Washington, DC office of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, a nongovernmental organization devoted to training and policy research in non-proliferation and related international security issues. From February 2001 through August 2003, Mr. Nurick was the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, a Russia-based public policy research institution established in 1993 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In that capacity, Mr. Nurick had overall responsibility for the intellectual agenda of the Center's research staff and for day-to-day management of Center operations.

Mr. Nurick addressed three general questions: Baltic concerns (what worries them), what they want from the US and NATO, and some core issues this raises for US and NATO decision makers.

Mr. Nurick noted that, in his interactions with Baltic officials and analysts, none claimed to have predicted what Russia has done in Ukraine, but none expressed surprise. Many had seen the Georgia War as a wake-up call, and expressed a degree of resentment that some allies had been dismissive of Baltic concerns at the time. For them, given their complicated history and often-tense relations with Russia, the potential for trouble is inevitably on their minds. They also expressed concern that some discussion tends to reduce "hybrid warfare" to "soft power" issues only. Domestic vulnerabilities, they stress, are their responsibility; the problem that needs attention is the threat of Russia "hard power. Thus, they are glad that NATO has returned to a focus on Article V and conventional defense. Most official statements say that they do not see an imminent threat of direct military attack, but they are less confident of that than they would like to be. NATO is more powerful than Russia overall, but they see a serious a Russian buildup in their region, orchestrated by an unpredictable Kremlin.

The Baltic States understand that they need to beef up their own defense capabilities, both for operational reasons and because of the important political

message these initiatives—including increased defense spending—send to Washington and Brussels. They emphasize three priorities for Western defense policy: serious regional planning, serious regional exercises, and increased presence. From this perspective most Baltic officials seem generally pleased with the results of and since last year's NATO summit. The question now is, is it enough? Most would say it is not; in particular, they would like greater US and NATO force presence in and around the Baltic States.

Mr. Nurick therefore expects that the "presence" issue will be very much on the table at the NATO summit in Warsaw next summer. The Balts tend to stress four characteristics: that the presence be visible (to both Russia and their own publics), that it be militarily significant (more robust than currently agreed), that it be NATO (US forces will be critical, but other allies should be involved), and that it be sustained. Another issue is crisis management: Russian tactics are designed to blur the line between war and peace, and thus in crises may produce ambiguities of a sort that Western decision makers are not used to confronting. They thus may raise, in sharp form, the traditional dilemma of crisis management: how to hedge against things going badly wrong without taking actions that make things go wrong. Additionally, hedging actions in a serious crisis will not be cheap, and are likely to be socially disruptive. Hence, they are not steps that decision makers would want to make too late, but they are also not steps that they will want to take if they do not have to.

Dr. Paul Stronski (CEIP)
Paul Stronski is a senior associate in Carnegie's Russia and Eurasia Program, where his research focuses on the relationship between Russia and neighboring countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Until January 2015, Stronski served as a senior analyst for Russian domestic politics in the US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He was director for Russia and Central Asia on the US National Security Council Staff from 2012 to 2014, where he supported the president, the national security advisor, and other senior US officials on the development and coordination of policy toward Russia. Before that, he worked as a State Department analyst on Russia from 2011 to 2012, and on Armenia and Azerbaijan from 2007 to 2010. A former career US foreign service officer, Stronski served in Hong Kong from 2005 to 2007.

Dr. Stronski stated that Caucasus region intrinsically ties to many of the foreign policy issues the US is grappling with. There are a number of things taking place inside the Caucasus that have implications for the United States including Russia in Ukraine, the Iranian nuclear deal, rising Iranian power, the role of the Caucasus region in the Syria conflict, and China's increasing influence in the region. Clearly, instability in the Caucasus region will have implication for US policy.

Unfortunately, there is a lot of potential for instability in the region. Russia has been moving administrative boundaries in the region, which could begin driving instability. Additionally, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is an area of instability.

Violence in this conflict has been increasing to troubling levels recently. This is not a frozen conflict and has the potential to become something greater. This is particularly troubling because it could eventually put Turkey and Russia against each other in a proxy war.

The Ukraine war has had a noticeable impact on the Caucasus region. Georgia and Azerbaijan look at the US reaction to the Ukraine conflict and feel a double standard. The Georgians see a lot of talk about support for Ukraine, but they do not see all that much direct military support for Ukraine, and it reminds them of some of the problems they felt in 2008. Azerbaijanis are angry that we have a very robust sanction policy now but did not 20 years ago when it would have favored them. They are also concerned about Color Revolutions, which has caused the Azerbaijan government to tighten its squeeze on the Azerbaijan public. This has ultimately caused tension between the US and Azerbaijan. Moving forward, this could create a dangerous situation.

Armenia is stuck under Russia's thumb. It has joined the Eurasia Union, but it has not seen any benefits from joining. Trade is down from Russia and down overall since joining the Union. The economy overall has taken a hit. Lately, we have seen protests in Armenia. There seems to be an anti Russian flavor to these protests, which is stemming from concern about the reliability of Russia as a partner.

Ultimately, the Caucasus region is a region that is in flux. The regional players are re-examining their basic security assumptions.

Dr. Marlene Laruelle (George Washington University)

Marlene Laruelle works on Russia and Central Asia and explores post-Soviet political, social and cultural changes through the prism of nationhood and nationalism. She has published three single-authored monographs, and two co-authored monographs, and has edited several collective volumes. She is the editor in chief of Central Asian Affairs and a member of the executive editorial board of Demokratizatsiya. The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization. She has been the Principal Investigator of several grants on Russian nationalism and political elites, on Russia's strategies in the Arctic, and on Central Asia's domestic and foreign policies. As director of the Central Asia Program she oversees about 30 events a year, monthly publications, and works on several programs of visiting fellows from Central Asia.

Dr. Marlene Laruelle discussed central Asia. The key change to the region today is that the regional multi-vectorism has been stopped dramatically. The role of the central Asian states institutionally has been dramatically reduced with their entry into the Eurasian Economic Union. This has created a lot of anxieties amongst the central Asian states, specifically Kyrgyzstan.

The central Asian economy's dependency on China is continuing to increase. This will likely only continue to increase if the Russian and central Asian economies

continue to slow down. The US is very far behind what Russia and China have been able to do in the central Asia region.

There are several potential areas of instability in the region. First, there is no mechanism for socialization and political change. Second, it is a region of fake governance. The ability of the states to provide public services is very low and corruption is very high. This is creating negative sentiment and increased tension. Third, interstate tensions are increasing over borders, services, and resources. Fourth, the region will have to find a way to re-integrate large numbers of people who have left the region to go fight in Syria. Finally, the deteriorating security situation in northern Afghanistan will put the surrounding states in a dangerous situation. In particular, radicalization of youth population in Tajikistan is a concern.

The US needs to decide what narrative it wants to have with the central Asian states. We need to develop a clear strategy if we think the region is critical to our interests. If we decide that we only want to interact with the region economically, then we need to step back our security involvement. However, ultimately, the US needs to be prepared to see the central Asia region as a region where China and Russia will decide the future. US influence in this region is likely to be minimal in comparison to both Russia and China.

Discussion

In an ideal world, what would you most appreciate from our non-NATO allies in the region?

Mr. Nurick noted that there is a subtext to all these regional discussions. NATO membership is not on the table in Finland, but increased engagement most certainly is. The same is true of Sweden: the present government has been explicit in ruling out membership now, but officials there have been very aggressive in exploring possibilities for enhanced security cooperation, especially with the US. There is undoubtedly widespread support in principle for increased Swedish and Finnish engagement in regional security affairs, but also some constraints—some NATO members, including some Baltic officials, want to avoid blurring the line between NATO members and non-members. Working out the details of serious Swedish and Finnish participation in regional security and defense is thus one big issue. The possibility of enhanced intelligence sharing between Sweden and Finland, on the one hand, and the US and NATO on the other, is another especially sensitive one. Finally, dealing with the domestic challenges raised by so-called "hybrid warfare" will require interactions among a variety of military, police, and civilians institutions. Given their experience with "total government" approaches to security, Sweden and Finland may have useful lessons for the Baltic States.

Dr. Rumer added that there are some very robust Swedish voices that are speaking very loudly in favor of NATO membership.

Mr. Nurick added that it is being discussed, but it is not on the policy table. The government has made it clear that this is not on the agenda for this government.

Georgia has been a significant recipient of training from the US. Do you think that the capability that we have provided them has changed the shape of the calculus that Russia has towards Georgia?

Dr. Stronski stated that it has probably changed the relationship a bit. However, Russia is supporting Georgian politicians, and Georgian support for Russia amongst the Georgians seems to be increasing. Russia is definitely watching what the US does and trying to figure out ways to respond.

What about the growing nexus between organize crime, government intelligence services, and big business, and how this impacts the security complex and dynamics of the region.

Dr. Laruelle noted that there is a real connection between high-level political figures and criminal groups and transnational groups in the central Asia region. In Central Asia, narco-trafficking is funding many of the states. Transnational networks are bringing drugs from Afghanistan through central Asia and into Russia and then into Europe. This is something that is very difficult to fight because it is embedded into the structure and has been for a long time.

Russia appears to be fairly opportunistic. Do you see any triggering events that could embolden Russia for a more aggressive action?

Dr. Rumer agreed that Russia is very opportunistic. Syria is an example where they could come in at a fairly low cost because an opportunity presented itself. Russia took advantage of this opportunity. While Russia actions tend to be fairly consistent, it is not clear whether their actions are part of a deliberate, well thought out strategy. What is clear though is that Russia will exploit opportunities where there is the right balance between resources and opportunities.

Dr. Stronski added that there are a lot of unknowns and potential flashpoints that we should be concerned about. There are a number of factors that could trigger Russia.

Dr. Laruelle noted that the Arctic is another area of interest for Russia. Russia has submitted claims to the UN to take control of some of the Arctic shelf.

Mr. Nurick added that he would worry less about a pre-planned invasion of the Baltic States than about the potential for provocative Russian activities along their borders to produce interactions that get out of hand. These activities can result in accidents, or otherwise produce interactions that are hard to control. Domestic pressures on Putin could conceivably be relevant here: if a serious crisis were to

build along the Russian-Baltic border, is it possible that Putin would find it very difficult to back down?

What potential is there for the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict exacerbating tensions between Russia and Turkey?

Dr. Stronski stated that Russians tend to think that what happened in Ukraine will not impact other things that Russia is doing. Right now there is a lot of covert assistance going on in preparation for if this were to break out. Interestingly, Russia is a security provider for Armenia but also arming Azerbaijan at the same time, so it unclear what exactly Russia is doing.

Panel 4: No War/No Peace and the New Sources of Power… What is it and who Wields it?

Panel Members:
- CAPT Todd Veazie (NCTC), moderator
- Dr. Amy Zalman (World Future Society)
- Dr. Raymond Buettner (NPS)
- Dr. Ian McCullough (JHU/APL)

CAPT Todd Veazie (NCTC)

CAPT Veazie introduced the Panel Four speakers. This panel dealt with our changing understanding of the sources, nature, application and measures of power in the gray zone. It asked what the shifting nature of power in the international system is. GEN Votel alluded to this change from the industrial to the information age, which begins to provide context of the gray zone. Donella Meadow's Leverage Points paper[1] explores how leverage points used in the past no longer work. Approximately 90 percent of non-government organizations (NGOs) in existence today were created in the last 10 years. How do we incorporate these groups into our thinking? How do criminal networks and terrorist organizations fit in? What are the shifting frameworks of transnational government? What is the role of technology in power?

Dr. Amy Zalman (World Future Society)

Amy Zalman is the CEO and President of the World Future Society, the world's first and largest membership organization for futurists, the advancement of foresight, and advocacy on behalf of future-critical issues. Appointed in July 2014, she is the third leader of the organization since its founding in 1966. As CEO, Dr. Zalman will develop and implement a transformational strategy to maintain the Society's original mission as a neutral clearinghouse for the exchange of ideas about the future, while advancing

---

[1] http://www.donellameadows.org/wp-content/userfiles/Leverage_Points.pdf

its pre-eminence as a global network of people, resources, information, and activities that advance the world's best ideas for creating desirable futures.

From 2012-2014, Dr. Zalman was the Department of Defense Chair of Information Integration and professor of security strategy at the National War College in Washington DC. Previously, from 2007 – 2012, she worked at Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC, now Leidos), a Washington DC area science and technology firm, where she developed new market strategies and basic research projects in the government strategic communications sector.

Dr. Zalman stated that the optic of power can seem abstract as a topic of discussion, but the end result is that power is not an abstract topic. If the USG does not get a handle on the ways in which power has changed and make the appropriate adjustments, we will have a difficult time going forward being powerful and working with new definitions of power.

Political scientists define power in two ways: 1) ability to get things done and 2) the ability to dominate and control others. In a world that is social, with multiple actors, these two definitions may not be that different. Power matters at the moment of potential conflict (demonstration of deterrence) or at point of winning conflict. And how do we measure power? Arms? Wealth? Natural resources? Which tend to be a part of armed conflict? Economic and other forms of power tend to be leverages of soft power.

The context of power has changed in three ways: 1) conflict has become more destructive, 2) we see democracy as the primary legitimate organizing framework for governance and power (in past 50-100 years), and 3) the information revolution has upended power relationships in significant ways.

In the early 1990s, a shift in power was noted by Joseph Nye. He coined the term "soft power," which largely meant communicative power. He also coined the term "hard power," by which he meant the power to coerce—violence. Yet the context has changed and these two frameworks no longer adequately explain how different actors generate or wield influence. The context has changed so radically that we need new ways to categorize power.

Dr. Raymond Buettner (NPS)
Dr. Buettner is a native of Virginia. He enlisted in the United States Navy in 1981 and served 10 years as Naval Nuclear Propulsion Plant Operator while earning his Associate's and Bachelor's degrees. Upon completion of Aviation Officer Candidate School Buettner was commissioned an Ensign. He holds a Master of Science in Systems Engineering degree from the Naval Postgraduate School and a Doctorate in Civil and Environmental Engineering from Stanford University. Following his commissioning, Buettner earned designation as a Naval Flight Officer. His next tour of duty was at Tinker AFB Oklahoma as a Mission Commander-Evaluator for Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron THREE. Following his tour as a student at the Naval

Postgraduate School, Buettner served as Assistant Navigator on USS HARRY S TRUMAN (CVN-75). He returned to NPS as a military faculty member and retired from active duty after nearly 23 years of service. From 2003 to 2005, Buettner served on the civilian faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and was the Information Operations Chair. He established himself as one of the nation's foremost experts in the area of influence modeling and in this capacity he was engaged at the direct support of national authorities during the EP-3 collision incident and the post-9/11 response. He also served as the Deputy Director of the Cebrowski Institute for Information Innovation and Superiority. Dr. Buettner then began a 3-year period of leave without pay during which he served as founder and Chief Technology Officer for Secure Cognition, Inc. applying technology licensed from the NSA in the commercial sector. Dr. Buettner returned to NPS in 2008 and has specialized in systems engineering applications, information operations, and field experimentation. He served as the Deputy Director of the Department of Defense's Information Operations Center for Excellence where he focused on graduate education and cyber issues. He was the NPS's first Director, Field Experimentation from 2009 to 2012. He is the Director and Principal Investigator for multiple research projects with budgets exceeding $6 million dollars annually, including the Secretary of the Navy's Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research (CRUSER) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsored Joint Interagency Field Experimentation (JIFX) projects. He teaches courses for curricula in the Information Sciences Department and the Cyber Academic Group. Research focuses are currently the design of collaborative learning environments and human-machine teaming.

Technological determinism is a term used by a group of historians that look at the influence of technology on society. In determinism, technology is on a continuum. Soft technological determinism drives societal change a little bit and hard technological determinism drives societal change a great deal. There is no reason to believe technology and its influence are static over time. Traditionally, technology has been limited in its impact by the lack of agency on the part of technology. True agency may be possible in the future as autonomous and robotic systems achieve intelligence and may become social agents. So, how will social or political power change as robotics come into play?

Recent evidence suggest that, in declared combat zones, military officers will feel free to let loose robotics on human combatants in these combat zone. This, in some sense, cedes power to the robotics (e.g., old cruise control, today's self-driving cars). We are drifting into world where we are ceding more control to machines, true for both the citizen and the soldier.

If society influences technology, does technology influence society? How are people being affected by technology? Right now, robotic and autonomous systems are tools to be used by commander and troops. In the future humans may be working for machines. In the commercial sector, this is already true and the military is not far behind. In Japan, drones do 40 percent of crop dusting, much trading on Wall Street is directed by machines.

Recently, swarms of up to 50 fully autonomous UAVs were tested. Swarming implies that each individual aircraft is interacting with other aircraft and none of them are controlled by a human. Only two humans were on the ground monitoring the actions of the total swarm. Everything else was determined by the swarming system.

However, do not give machines too much credit for "thinking." The rise of the machines is not something to worry about from an existential perspective. For the foreseeable future, machines will not think (or want or need) in a manner that would cause them threaten humanity outside of mission sets designed by humans.

An issue that has not been discussed enough is that humans are being driven to keep up or evolve with these machines. "Machine-speed," the speed at which machines can move both physically and cognitively, will surpass human speed. Machines do not get tired and do not need biology breaks. It will be the humans that have to work to keep up. Humans are being driven to co-evolve in a variety of ways; pharmacologically, with external applications (exo-skeletons), and with cybernetic implants.

Pharmacological human adaptions are already used on rare occasions by the military (long range flights in single seat aircraft) and society seems to be ready to consider more widespread applications. The recent surge of exo-skeleton development fueled by the development of robotic systems as well as the prosthetic advances caused by recent wars has already led to disabled athletes that can outrun most humans. Bio-hybrids are in our future, computer chips in are already being implanted into the brain to help a person with disabilities, soon they will be installed to increase memory, etc.

Overall, what does the parallel growth of robotic systems and enhanced humans mean for society? Will soldiers seek enhancement? What will it mean to be a warrior? What will enhancements cost and will only the wealthy be able to afford them? What about professional athletes? The "haves and have nots" issue could take on new meaning. Joining the military might be the only way for the average or economically disadvantaged citizen to gain access to enhanced capabilities. There is real potential for social conflict within and between nation states.

How might robotic systems impact social power structures? Is it possible for police forces to yield to machine security forces? What could a rich dictator, or powerful industrialist, do with a robotic, 100% loyal, security force? Security robots are available for $6.25 an hour in San Francisco today. What will be the impact of such systems? Will we see police forces, militias, gangs and organized crime groups as well as military forces that are dominated by robotic systems?

Networked robotic technologies are going to change what it means to be human and the societies in which we live. Ultimately, humans and their social systems are going

to have to adapt or die. Currently we are being drawn unthinkingly into this future; we need more dialogue to address these never before faced challenges.

Dr. Ian McCulloh (JHU/APL)

Ian McCulloh is a chief scientist in the Asymmetric Operations Department of the John's Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab. His current research is focused on strategic influence in online networks and data-driven influence operations and assessment. He is the author of "Social Network Analysis with Applications" (Wiley: 2013), "Networks Over Time" (Oxford: forthcoming) and has published 38 peer-reviewed papers, primarily in the area of social network analysis. He retired as a Lieutenant Colonel from the US Army after 20 years of service in special operations, counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) forensics and targeting, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) defense.

Dr. McCulloh stated that Krackhardt's definition of power is "the ability to mobilize people or resources to achieve some end." In the gray zone context, as Clausewitz notes, "war is continuation of politics by other means" and the Merriam Webster definition of politics is "the art or science concerned with guiding or influencing government policy." Therefore, the core purpose of warfare is to influence and power is measured in the ability to influence, not the ability to destroy.

In his past research on networks, he created networks of insurgent propaganda videos in Iraq and was able to make forensic conclusions that enabled effective targeting for forward deployed units. His undergraduate students at West Point were able to find 75% of US deaths from IED attacks in Iraq in open source videos available on the public Internet. This suggests the enemy was fighting an influence campaign, where information operations were the main effort and kinetic action was a supporting effort.

Russia is another example of the supremacy of information operations. Gen. Valery Gerasimov, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia states "the role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness…" Russia has recognized the power of influence through modern media and used it to outmaneuver western forces in Ukraine.

The key to effective power and influence is understanding basic needs in the human domain. People need social acceptance. If you are central in a network, you do not feel pressure to conform. If you are peripheral, you do. A person's place in a network absolutely influences their threshold of social acceptance. Dr. McCulloh described his


Social Acceptance

- **People need social acceptance!**

"When is a tourniquet applied to a neck wound?"
- When it is a vein or artery.
- If it is spurting blood.
- Never

Correlation between centrality and social conformity was -.84.

People on the periphery are more likely to suffer PTSD, depression, have stigma to counseling.

experiments on network effects on conformity and a study investigating the onset of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in an infantry brigade throughout their combat deployment to Afghanistan. He found that social isolation was the most significant predictor of depression, PTSD, and suicide. In similar research, people have been found to develop physiological conditions that exacerbate the psychological effects of isolation.

In forming a subculture, people need acceptance. People have time/cognitive limits on their personal network size. This creates natural difference in culturally defined goals and acceptable means of attaining these goals. In his study, he found the first 5-10 weeks is important for the formation of a subculture. The subculture defines social norms and people are naturally drawn to conform to these norms in order to obtain needed acceptance. These norms differ across cultures and are important for understanding behavior.

For example, differences between the Iraqi and American concepts of life goals explain key differences in behavior. The American Dream was originally defined in the 1940s as the pursuit of wealth through hard work and education. The Iraqi Dream, as measured by McCulloh in Mosul in 2010, was the pursuit of dignity through generosity and family devotion. From the American Dream lens, the Iraqi man who has a good morning in his shop, closing up and going home to spend time with his family is seen as lazy. He is not working hard to make money. In Iraq, the man who continues to work would be seen as greedy because he deprives others of a chance to earn money and is neglecting his family. Understanding the "cultural vector" is critical for estimating future behavior and response to US actions.

A person that cannot be successful in their culturally defined idea of success has increased social strain and is more susceptible to influence as they seek alternatives. Dr. McCulloh's face-to-face research in Iraq in 2014 indicates that social strain is correlated with increased radicalization and extremism. We need to decide where we intervene at the point of social inequality, which he argued is not feasible. Do we wait until radicalization or do we try to intervene at a point of high social stress by offering viable alternatives?
As we consider more holistic influence activities, neuroscience offers emerging tools to measure the effectiveness of the campaigns and alternatives we offer indigenous populations. For example, brain activity predicts behavior change as a response to advertising campaigns more effectively than focus group responses. Neuroimaging allows someone to measure whether a person is incorporating influence actions into their mental schema or tuning out the message. If you intervene in a way that is outside of a person's cultural schema, a person finds a way to disagree. They counter-argue and become polarized in the opposite direction from that intended. So to effectively influence, you need to assess social strain and identify at risk target audiences, identify the media that those audience trust and use, measure the culturally defined worldview of that audience, evaluate what could disrupt the counter-arguing mechanism, and design an influence objective that essentially becomes the commander's intent.

Commanders that are effective at war will achieve success through influence. Kinetic operations and tactical success on the ground are temporary and only useful in their ability to shape the larger strategic message. The good commander makes his message the core purpose of his commander's intent and does not relegate this to an information operations appendix or coordinating instruction. The methods or key tasks to achieve his intent are based in data, not opinion. All actions are evaluated against their narrative impact. This is the art and science of power.

Conclusions and Implications

- Modern threats and decisive terrain at the strategic level, exist in the social/information domain…not the physical domain.
- People need social acceptance. This need drives the formation of groups as well as social (normative and informational) conformity.
- Social inequality drives social strain, making people susceptible to influence.
- People believe things they can incorporate into their world view…not necessarily facts.
- Information super-abundance has replaced information scarcity.

- Information operations and unconventional warfare must be a main effort with unity of command over kinetic forces.
- The DoD (or DoS if they become purpose driven) must develop greater capability for social and cognitive influence. Align investment w/ threat.
- Social strain is a necessary, but insufficient condition for instability and unconventional warfare.
- Understand key population segments: goals, values, entertainment. Phased approach: build audience/favor first.
- Open source data can and should drive understanding and operations

Dr. Jonathon Wilkenfeld (Maryland)

Jonathan Wilkenfeld is Professor and prior Chair of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland and Director of the ICONS simulation project. He has been an Affiliate Faculty in the UM Institute for Advanced Computer Systems. He is a specialist in foreign policy decision-making, crisis behavior, and mediation, as well as in the use of simulation in policy studies. Since 1977, Wilkenfeld has served as co-Director (with Michael Brecher) of the International Crisis Behavior Project, a cross-national study of international crises in the twentieth century. The project has served as the basis for systematic research into a range of crucial foreign-policy issues, including state motivations during times of crisis, conflict management practices, and protracted conflict trajectories.

Wilkenfeld serves as Director of the International Communication and Negotiation Simulations (ICONS) Project, which provides decision-makers with interactive training experiences in the fields of conflict behavior, negotiation, and crisis management. The development of ICONS grew out of his long-term interest in integrating technology and simulation techniques into the teaching of negotiation and international politics. Under his direction, the ICONS Project won numerous awards for innovation and excellence, including in 1994, the Distinguished Program Award presented by the Maryland Association for Higher Education for the ICONS instructional model, and in 2001 the University of Maryland Award for Innovation in Teaching with Technology. He has also won awards from the International Studies Association as a Distinguished Scholar. In 2009, Wilkenfeld was designated by the University of Maryland as a Distinguished Scholar-Teacher.

His most recent books include A Study of Crisis (1997 and 2000, with Michael Brecher); International Negotiation in a Complex World (1999, 2005, 2010, 2015 with Brigid Starkey and Mark Boyer); Mediating International Crises (2005, with Victor Asal, David Quinn, and Kathleen Young); and Myth and Reality in International Politics (2015). Wilkenfeld's current work focuses on mediation processes in intrastate conflicts and crises.

Myth and Reality in International Politics: Meeting Global Challenges through Collective Action

Dramatic Progress and Daunting Challenges

The current human condition presents us with an unparalleled opportunity to address pressing issues on a global scale. The frequency and lethality of interstate conflict is on the decline. There are dramatic improvements in agricultural production and means of distribution. There has been a significant decline in global birthrates and increases in life expectancy. The proportion of people living in extreme poverty across the globe has shown an enormous decline. Our ability to communicate freely through a wide range of easily accessible social media has increased opportunities to identify and track key challenges to the human condition by creating global communities that cross national boundaries, cultures, and languages.

Yet key long-term challenges to human security remain stubbornly in place. Unstable governments, often coupled with underperforming economies and unresolved domestic tensions, negatively impact the lives of citizens and often constitute a threat to neighboring states. In extreme cases, these conditions can become a threat to regional and even global security through the cross-border spread of violence and terrorism. Even as we have seen a dramatic decline in conflict between states in recent decades, ineffective conflict management at the local sub-national level in seemingly intractable *intrastate* conflicts has meant that conflict recurrence is on the rise with the accompanying localized human suffering. Uncoordinated global development strategies, insufficient or mismanaged funding, and corruption have resulted in uneven development and a widespread public perception that development aid is a waste of precious resources. Insufficient focus on the tensions that diversity can spawn in multiethnic societies can often lead to political, social, and economic exclusion and a rise in tensions and conflict. Our inability to deal with the impact of human activity on climate in a timely manner has meant that we leave unaddressed very clear deterioration of environmental conditions both in real time and for future generations.

Here are some myths - and the reality of how things actually work. Democracy is desirable but the transition to democracy is incredibly destabilizing (see e.g., Egypt after the Arab Spring); diversity enriches the culture and enhances the creativity of societies, but ethnic diversity can lead to repression and violence (Bosnia in the aftermath of the breakup of Yugoslavia); conflicts can be managed through agreements, but these agreements are often superficial and rarely lead to full conflict resolution (the jury is still

out on Northern Ireland).

Global Challenges to Human Security in the Twenty First Century
A challenge to global leaders. Many of the most severe threats to human security cannot be adequately addressed through the actions of single countries. Climate change, conflict, regime instability, and the consequences of ethnic diversity and underdevelopment are global phenomena, and thus the solutions must be global in nature. They require collective action that is timely and coordinated, action that can be systematically measured to assess impact and then adjusted to achieve optimal outcomes. Solutions will require a level of boldness and collaboration on the part of leaders and nations that they have only rarely exhibited in the past.

Challenges to Human Security and Assessing Progress

Conflict Resolution

Conflict has evolved over the past several decades from predominantly interstate or between nations, to one typified by intrastate or subnational conflict, often based on local religious, ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences. While this shift has been accompanied by a significant decrease in the number of fatalities associated with conflict, this positive outgrowth is more than offset by an increase in the destruction wreaked on the productive capacities of states. Yet the mechanisms that have been available to the international community to address these localized conflicts are largely left over from collective responses to interstate conflict. Their inadequacy is reflected in the persistence of intractable conflicts, and the dramatic increase in conflict recurrence. Our discussion therefore touched upon the complex sources of conflict today, and obstacles to the types of negotiated settlements that might move us from conflict management to conflict resolution. In short, we face this dilemma:

> **Sub-national conflict has now replaced interstate conflict as the dominant threat to human security today. But we have not adapted conflict resolution mechanisms and institutions to deal with this threat, and the consequence has been a surge in the recurrence of conflicts that have been managed but not resolved.**

Ethnic Diversity

While applauding the creativity and innovation that ethnic diversity brings to nations and the world, we also recognize a darker side. One in seven citizens of the globe are members of a persecuted ethnic minority. At the extreme, this discrimination and unequal treatment has spawned conflict and in some cases terrorism, spilling over borders. We argue that successful collective protection of group rights is best achieved through negotiation and mutual accommodation. This accommodation is facilitate by an evolving global doctrine for managing ethnic conflict (Gurr 2002) that includes recognition and protection of racial, ethnic, and religions minorities, promotion of democratic institutions for guaranteeing group rights, arrangements for regional autonomy within existing states,

enhancing the responsibilities and capabilities of regional and global organizations, and intervention with military sanctions and peace enforcement when all else fails. In sum:

While collectively celebrating the creativity, imagination, and invention that ethnic diversity has fostered globally and nationally, we have not come to grips with the flip-side of this phenomenon that can carry with it political, economic, social, and cultural discrimination.

Stability and Democracy

A complex relationship exists between stability and democracy. While we are unapologetic in our support for democratic regimes, we acknowledge that the process of transitioning from autocracy to a democratic form of government is likely to bring on a sustained period of instability. In this transition state, referred to as anocracy, underdeveloped national institutions and rising aspirations for participation, often in the form of early elections, can combine to produce a level of instability and even violence that is far worse than can be anticipated even under extreme authoritarian rule. In this environment, we argue that we need to be extremely mindful of the warning signs of deteriorating regimes, and possible points of intervention through collective action by the international community. Several indicators can assist in pinpointing the vulnerability of societies to regime inconsistency - regime durability, magnitude of regime change, direction of regime change, and leadership change. Policy recommendations designed to address the vulnerability experienced by states in the midst of democratic transitions should include the development of institutions that blunt or discourage factionalism when opening up political participation (Goldstone et al. 2010), strengthening political parties, approaching elections gradually, exploring caretaker governments as a transition phase, and the preservation of local democratic practices whenever possible.

Important gains have been made in the spread of democracy through the international system and the decline in the number of autocratic regimes. And yet we still face the daunting challenge of helping societies transition from autocracy to democracy while passing through a dangerously unstable period during which the societal institutions are not yet up to the task of simultaneously delivering democracy *and* stability.

Development and Inequality

Tremendous inequalities of wealth and opportunity exist among nations. Development aid began flowing first as a means of addressing the destruction of the Second World War, and then turned by the 1960s to addressing the development issues facing other regions, in particular Africa and Asia. But in a world in which nation-states themselves have not managed to deal with problems of severe inequality internally, the prospect for collective action on a global scale would seem quite remote. The consequences of ignoring or inadequately dealing with these development issues include, at the extreme, state instability, fragility, and failure, with consequences for the nations in which they occur, their immediate neighbors, and the system as a whole. Policy options that are

being captured by the Sustainable Development Goals for 2030, presented to the United Nations General Assembly in 2014, address in particular the areas of health, education, equality, poverty, agriculture, and urbanization. In sum:

> **There are many success stories that chronicle the transition of societies out of extreme poverty during the past few decades. And yet the impact of development aid is still outpaced by the regional and global economic costs resulting from instability, fragility, and state failure. And within many states, aid is still not being distributed in ways that will effectively address tremendous local disparities in wealth and the attendant instability that results.**

Climate Change

Climate change is the poster child for the opportunities and difficulties facing the international community as it seeks a collective action approach. In the face of overwhelming scientific evidence that human activity is the primary contributing factor to adverse climate change, we have seen the enormous difficulty in developing agreed measures of the impact of various types of activity on climate, and on the proper way to divide responsibility for addressing these problems going forward. One critical divide is between the developed and the developing world, when competing visions of development and sustainability have erupted into arguments that have halted progress in achieving conventions that will address these issues for the remainder of the century. It is the Tragedy of the Commons played out on a global stage, with easily identifiable negative consequences but seeming no easy way to reach agreement on sets of policies that will constitute a so-called "off-ramp." We suggest several goals and attendant strategies for achieving them, but all require some sacrifice, and in the current political climate, reaching such agreements is exceedingly difficult. In sum:

> **In climate change, Al Gore's "inconvenient truth" remains as real today as it was years ago. While little doubt remains that human behavior is a key contributor to the deterioration of our environment, the international community remains incapable of coming together in collective action programs designed to address this universal threat.**

Components of a Collective Action Plan to Address Global Challenges

Elements of a collective action approach to these seemingly insolvable challenges are the development of universally accepted measures for assessing problems and progress, the monitoring of these indicators so that we can set up better early warning systems for addressing emerging problems, the provision of targeted assistance, and in the extreme, intervention with force to address problems that are not being addressed, or cannot be addressed locally. Here are some examples.

In the area of conflict, we have called for the use of tools like the *Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger* as a measurement and monitoring mechanism. The Instability Ledger

provides an assessment of the risk of future conflict and instability covering the majority of countries in the world. Drawing on indicators from the political, economic, security, and social domains, a ratio is produced on which the countries are ranked in terms of their risk of instability. As a supplement, we have also examined the applicability of crowd sourcing as a means of monitoring conflict and crisis in real time. With the deployment of such indicators and tools, the international community is better equipped to anticipate potential trouble spots, and to act collectively on conflict through mechanisms like mediation, peacekeeping, and enforcement missions.

Our approach to the challenges of ethnic diversity is guided by the principle that disputes between communal groups and states are best settled by negotiation and mutual accommodation. This requires the active engagement of major powers, the United Nations, and regional organizations applying a mix of diplomacy, mediation, inducements, and pressure to encourage negotiated settlements of ethnic conflicts (Gurr 2000). Measures of discrimination are derived from Minorities at Risk (MAR) political and economic discrimination indicators, to provide a basis for assessing the degree to which various minorities around the world are in need of support by the international community. This then can take the form of providing assistance in the areas of democracy promotion and power sharing, regional autonomy, stability promotion programs, the promotion of membership in international and regional organizations with minority rights agendas, and at the extreme, international prevention of ethnic violence in low intensity conflicts.

In the realm of regime consistency and democracy, we have pointed up the challenge of achieving stability through consistency, while promoting democracy. We have taken the strong position that the road to stability must pass through a transition to democracy. We have noted the inherent instability of the transition process from autocracy to democracy. Hence, it is the responsibility of the international community to provide technical and financial resources for state institution building and consolidation, strengthening judicial institutions and the political party structure, and supporting pro-democracy civil society organizations. The Polity Score serves as a static indicator of regime type, an important starting point in a collective action approach to the promotion of stability and democracy. A number of other Polity-based indicators help us create measures of regime durability, the magnitude and direction of regime change, and an assessment of how leadership change can come about in positive circumstances.

Underdevelopment and the inequalities both within and between societies constitute areas where measurement has been substantial, but severe problems remain. Here we have recommended the use of both the original Human Development Index (HDI) and the Inequality-adjusted Development Index (IHDI) as a frame of reference for both social and economic development. With these measures in hand, we go on to explore a number of the Sustainable Development Goals which the United Nations General Assembly is considering for adoption for 2030, as well as a number of proposed indicators for measuring progress toward achieving those goals. Among the goals discussed are ending extreme poverty, ensuring effective learning, achieving gender equality, achieving health

and wellbeing, improving agricultural systems, and empowering inclusive, productive, and resilient cities.

Of all the issues addressed in this book, climate change may turn out to be the most extreme manifestation of failed collective action in the face of looming threat. There are a very large number of indicators of the deterioration of conditions on this planet resulting from the impact of human behavior on climate. A key measure identified here is a relatively straightforward indicator that measures concentrations of greenhouse gas concentrations in terms of parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide CO_2 concentrations. With this measure in hand, we proposed the Wigley, Richels, and Edmonds (WRE) Carbon Emissions Trajectory as a way to focus on the policy options and likely outcomes from the application of these policies at various ppm levels. Based on a sense of the desired level of ppm by the end of the century, several options were explored: Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM), a market based carbon mitigation mechanism; emission trading schemes; and Forest Carbon Partnerships to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.

Concluding Thoughts

The challenges and opportunities facing the international system today are easily recognized. They differ from those identified by previous generations only to the extent that their impact is on a grander scale – organizations with conflicting agendas and interests become societies and nations with the use of violence and war at their disposal; local pollution becomes a contributor to global warming and climate change; and poverty and income disparities becomes a flood of illegal immigration in Southern Europe and the southwestern United States. And our leaders, caught in the midst of difficult political situations and coalitions that do not allow for flexibility and long term planning, are forced to deal piecemeal with complex long term issues.

Garrett Harden wrote many decades ago: "Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the common. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all" (Hardin 1968: 1248). Our challenge is to rise above the collective tendency to regress toward undesired outcomes, to convince our leaders that we will tolerate sacrifice in pursuit of the common good, that the human spirit, which has been capable of such great imagination and creativity in the past, can act collectively to address the immense global challenges we face today.

Discussion

Will robotics contribute to inequality? Who is affected first and what does it mean? How does this effect disenfranchisement and potentially increase alienation among youth, which may develop into extremism?

Dr. Wilkenfeld replied that we are dealing with inequality within and across states, and inequality between states can lead to major issues in international system.

Dr. McCulloh added that social inequality is already here. When people experience inequality and the strain becomes too high, how do we offer alternatives that could be aligned with our own interests? People that have high strain are not necessarily the uneducated, poor, etc.—they were bored. When people start looking for alternatives, what alternatives are we giving them?

Dr. Buettner stated that there is potential for displaced workers to cause instability. The owner for the capital of the robotics will be natural targets by the displaced.

How different is this from the Industrial Revolution? Is there anything qualitatively different?

Dr. Buettner responded that the difference is in the degree of connectivity. In the industrial age, labor unions created that connectivity. But today, the degree of connectivity is increased and hyper. Also, society is more dependent on systems that are vulnerable to disruption.

Does technology drive social or vice versa. In terms of military, as this becomes more lethal, how does this affect our values?

Dr. Buettner responded that robotics can be added to all avenues, and this will have serious repercussions. We are just starting to get into this.

Dr. McCulloh stated that in the military, it is far easier to get approval to kill somebody than it is to create a YouTube video to influence.

With regard to the difference between enhanced and unenhanced people, is this going to create a society of have and have-nots?

Dr. Zalman responded that it will to the degree to which technology races ahead of market and demand, but technology is not demand driven.

With regard to inequality, is it talked about in an explicit sense?

Dr. Wilkenfeld responded that inequality and poverty are closely related. The international community has made tremendous effort in reducing extreme poverty. The biggest progress has been made in China where extreme poverty was 62% in 1990 to only 12% in 2010. This has done interesting things for China and its position in international system. Poverty and power of states and inequalities between states is something we are going to have to address. The UN is going to adopt a new agenda and we will see change by 2030.

Dr. McCulloh added that real inequality is determined by the culture. In the Army, wealth is not a factor. No one joins the military to get wealthy. People will seek out esteem however it is culturally defined. In cultural models, need to differentiate what is valuable.

If notion of achieving global equality is achieved, what is next?

Dr. Wilkenfeld responded that the goal is not necessarily global equality but less disparity. We should raise those that can be raised.

Dr. Zalman pointed out that non-traditional partnerships with big corporations, who also have an interest in minimizing disparities, should also be explored.

Dr. McCulloh added that prestige is one of six social forces—that is, being better than someone else. If there is global equality, everyone will be constructing new ways to be better than others. So there will never be equality.

Day Two Introduction: COL Chuck Eassa (JS/J39)

Colonel Charles N. Eassa was born in Kingston, Jamaica and was commissioned a Field Artillery second lieutenant in 1986 upon graduation from the Citadel at Charleston, South Carolina.

Colonel "Chuck" Eassa has served in a wide variety of positions throughout his 27-year career. His assignments included duty with: the 4th Battalion, 4th Field Artillery, 75th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; 8d Infantry Division Artillery; 6th Battalion, 29th Field Artillery, 1st Armored Division Artillery, Idar-Oberstein, Germany; Readiness Group Atlanta Field Artillery Team, 1st Army; 3rd Army, Fort MacPherson, Georgia, and Camp Doha, Kuwait; Assistant G3 and Exercise Control, Battle Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Planner and Information Operations Officer, V (US) Corps, Heidelberg, Germany, Camp Victory, Kuwait, and Baghdad, Iraq; Deputy Director, US Army Information Operations Proponent, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; J39 Information Operations Officer, US European Command, Stuttgart, Germany; Information Operations Officer, NATO's International Joint Command, Kabul, Afghanistan, US Forces-Afghanistan. He currently serves as the Joint Staff J-38 Chief of the Information Operations Directorate.

The focus of this conference is on "not war, not peace." As the Chief of Strategic Effects in J3, he sees this every day. This is a contested space called by various names: contested operations, cyber, hybrid, etc. The gray zone is where we conflict with adversaries every day in an environment where we do not have the tactical, strategic, or operational edge because the adversary is employing off the shelf technology while we have to go through red tape, oversight, and rules before fielding new technology. So we have to as ourselves, what is the art of the possible?

Speaker Introduction: Mr. Dan Flynn (DNI/NIC)

Mr. Dan Flynn introduced the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, Dr. Greg Treverton, who oversees the world of national intelligence officers and staff as they assess key strategic challenges.

Invited Speaker: Dr. Greg Treverton

Dr. Treverton entered on duty as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council on September 8, 2014. Prior to his selection, Treverton held several leadership positions at RAND Corporation, including director of the RAND Center for Global Risk and Security, director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center, and associate dean of the Pardee RAND Graduate School. His work at RAND examined terrorism, intelligence and law enforcement, as well as new forms of public–private partnership.

Treverton has served in government for the first Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, handling Europe for the National Security Council and later, as vice chair of the National Intelligence Council (1993–1995), overseeing the writing of America's National Intelligence Estimates.

His RAND publications on intelligence include: "Reorganizing US Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options" (2008), "Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis" (with C. Bryan Gabbard, 2008) and "The Next Steps in Reshaping Intelligence" (2005). Two books, "Intelligence for an Age of Terror" and "Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information," were published by Cambridge University Press in 2009 and 2001, respectively.

Treverton holds an A.B. summa cum laude from Princeton University and an M.P.P. and Ph.D. in economics and politics from Harvard University.

When Dr. Treverton was teaching at Harvard in the 1980s, Vietnam was a living memory even for graduate students. Now it is as far away as if it were the Peloponnesian Wars. The common perception among graduate students back then was that the USG policy and intelligence was absolutely clueless during the Vietnam War. But we had the benefit of taking the students through the Pentagon Papers and the intelligence assessments that were done during the war. They could not help but be struck by how good the intelligence assessments were. They were nearly spot on in every respect. The intelligence assessments were so scathing about South Vietnam that you could not imagine why anyone would want it as an ally.

Given that the intelligence assessments were so good, how can we explain what followed? Senior officials at the time, all good people, did not believe the assessments. They did not believe it could be that hard to win or that it would take three years and half a million soldiers. They thought it had to be easier than that.

Similarly, many smart people thought our efforts in Iraq and other places would be easier. They thought we would be seen as saviors. But the reality is that these kinds of conflict are as hard as it looks, if not harder. Furthermore, we are imprisoned and liberated by our language. For example, when we talk about an "Afghan government," it is easy to believe that Afghanistan has a government as we think about it in the West. But that is a fiction. It exists in some places, and it has relations with tribal leaders in some places. But it is not a government in the conventional sense.

We also talk about "moderate Islamists." Once you say it, it is easy to think it exists or that they can be identified, helped, and supported. Over and over, these kinds of distinctions get made and are propagated out. Currently, in Iraq and Syria, relations among various groups are fluid and overlapping. They trade people, resources, and territory. Local circumstances dominate. People follow those who control their area unless there is a good alternative. We have to keep what we want to exist separate from what does exist.

We have known since the beginning of time that warfare, like diplomacy, is all aimed at the same target: the two inches of gray matter in someone's head. We are trying to influence people's thinking and decision. We lose sight of this over and over again.

The verdict on drone strikes is for historians to make. They are more effective against a hierarchical organization like al Qaeda. It is not clear whether they are effective against other kinds of organizations. Ultimately, though, we have to keep in mind that it is the two inches of gray matter in people's heads that matter. That is what we tend to forget. We know it, but we do not act as if we understand that point.

In the world we face, we need clarity about whose brains we are trying to affect, which is a lot harder. This is a shapeless world. A way to think about it is that there have been three flex points in the last quarter century: the fall of the USSR, 9/11, and now. The two previous flex points came with an owner's manual of sorts. It was not entirely right, but it was not entirely wrong. After the fall of Communism, the manual said to take a vacation, you have earned it. It was not perfect, but it was not wrong. After 9/11, the manual said to get them "there," so they do not come here. Again, it was partly right, partly wrong. What is striking is that there is no owner's manual now. We are dealing with a very shapeless world.

Dr. Treverton stated that he gets a headache thinking about the Middle East. He was on the job about a week when he gave a dinner speech at a friend's board meeting. He said that throughout his career, he had avoided the Middle East. That is over. In some ways, he made the right decision—it is such a mess. It is a shapeless environment. The friends of our enemies are sometimes our friends and sometimes our enemies. It changes from place to place and day to day.

2014 has the highest rate of political instability since the 1990s. The world has seen the most deaths at hands of states since the early 1990s as well. There are more refugees now than at any time since World War II.

The Intelligence Community has identified 14 currently stable countries that will be unstable over the next several years. The particularly hard part of the shapeless world is twofold: transnational threats are still there and we have a resurgence of state power in new sorts of ways.

With regard to gray zones, it is interesting to think how successful Russia has been in its initiatives. It has convinced almost its people of something that we can hardly recognize. They have done brazen things to which they have not admitted. They effectively communicate to their populations that NATO and the West seek to encircle them.

This will be the pattern of warfare going forward. Any technology that we have, our adversaries will have as well, especially with regard to drones and miniaturization. These are features of the future conflict. Our adversaries will have these kinds of technology soon after we do.

We have seen the mixing of civilian and military or civilians and combatants in complicated ways. The 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah was an inflection point for how civilians began consciously being used as shields. We have also seen technological developments that are far more ominous. Weapons of mass destruction will continue to evolve. Perhaps there will be biological weapons targeted to a particular ethnic group or individual. Changes are coming in ways we have not apprehended.

It all comes down to the challenge of understanding which two inches of gray matter we are trying to affect.

Discussion

How do we better package intelligence to better inform policy makers? How do you translate conditions on the ground so that policy makers better understand the context they have never been part of?

Dr. Treverton stated that when he wrote a book on covert actions, he was struck by the same thing.[2] Policy makers are making honest decisions that tend to break down. Conveying fluidity is awfully difficult. It is easier now in that high-level meetings begin with an intelligence appraisal, insights from the State Department and others to provide context on what the situation on the ground looks like. The

---

[2] Covert Action: Central Intelligence Agency and the Limits of American Intervention in the Post-war World http://www.amazon.com/Covert-Action-Intelligence-American-Intervention/dp/1850430896

challenge is for the Intelligence Community to provide the best appraisals that convey this sense. It is so tempting for policy makers to fall back on comfortable analogies or distinctions. Communication technology does make this challenge easier to overcome.

You were saying that they key thing is targeting the two inches of gray matter. What advances have been made in the last 30-40 years that help us target gray matter? Where can we go in the future?

We have done better at trying to understand the culture and circumstances of a place where we are in conflict. It tends to gravitate to what we do well—kinetic combat. What we do not do well is what we shy away from. This world is rife with diplomacy, but that has not been a major feature. We have gotten better at thinking open-mindedly about how to influence and who to influence. In intelligence, we are dominated by counterterrorism, but it is deforming our overall analysis. Look at Nigeria; our analysis is really about Boko Haram. Since counterterrorism is about targeting, our analysis is doubly distorted because we focus on people, locations, and networks—not on what drives people and where they come from—or their two inches of gray matter.

What capabilities will our adversary have to target gray matter? What can the adversary bring to the table?

Dr. Treverton was struck by the Russia campaign, which is pretty traditional with a little social media. Putin censored the media. That worked well for him. But look how good ISIL is at making use of social media. They understand how to get to the gray matter of their target audience: young men. The future adversary is a combination of old fashioned and new fashioned. It is striking how successful Putin has been in sharing the narrative on Crimea in Russia. We would not even recognize the narrative. It is bound to get easier to target particular groups or individuals using communications technology.

Yesterday, we talked about regions and countries, but gray matter is individual. How do we scale that to the state or regional level?

At the country level, we seek to influence decision makers. In Russia, it is easy to know who makes decisions: Putin. It might be hard to understand what might affect his actions, but the target is clear. It is much less clear how to influence "the Arab street." It is nonsensical; what does the Arab street even mean? We need to be clear about who we are trying to affect. Sometimes that is easy to determine who that is. In other murky conflicts, it is not so clear. It was interesting that we were trying to influence Mullah Omar for two years before we realized he was dead.

As we shift to influencing individuals, how does that change the landscape of conflict in the next 20 years?

The density of forces on the battlefield has been trending down for 30 years. We are increasingly aware of hyper-empowered individuals—be they terrorists or renegade French bankers. The role of individuals is important. This will only get worse as individuals become empowered.

Panel 5: Operational Perspectives: Opportunities and Challenges (Joint Staff and the Commands)

Panel Members
- Brig Gen David Béen (OSD AT&L), moderator
- LtCol Scott McDonald (USMC)
- Captain Frank Bradley (Joint Staff)
- CAPT Philip Kapusta (USSOCOM)
- Mr. Mark Sisson (USSTRATCOM)
- Mr. Jason Werchan (USEUCOM)
- Mr. Juan Hurtado (USSOUTHCOM)
- Mr. Chris Carper (USNORTHCOM)
- Mr. Chris Hernandez (USAFRICOM)
- Mr. Jay Rouse (JS/J5)

Brig Gen David Béen (OSD AT&L)

Brig. Gen. David B. Béen is the Director of the Department of Defense Special Access Program Central Office. He is also the Director of Special Programs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. He serves as the principal staff assistant and adviser to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on all programs protected under special access controls. Additionally, the general serves as the DoD Director of Low Observables. General Béen was commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training program at Colorado State University. He earned his navigator wings at Mather AFB, California. He has been a squadron weapons officer and US Air Force Weapons School instructor, has commanded deployed combat flying units at the squadron and group level, and has commanded an operational wing. He has flown 1,200 combat hours over Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo, and has over 4,000 total flight hours, primarily in the B-1. His staff assignments include Commander-in-Chief's Military Assistant at a NATO regional headquarters, the Director of Air Force Manpower (A1M), and the Joint Staff Deputy Director for Global Operations (J39).

Brig Gen Béen moderated the panel. At its core, the US military is not a police force or humanitarian relief organization, although it does sometimes provide these services. Today, the US military finds itself consistently challenged to respond to operational situations in the gray zone. Anecdotally, in our more black and white wars, as troop strengths have gotten stronger, the net effects of the wars have

gotten greater. Will the populations of our future adversaries be as effected by our war fighting in future gray zone environments as in the black and white wars?

Information is becoming increasingly important in today's operational environment. While we still need tanks, guns, etc., we must be certain not to exclude information operations. Battlefield information is important for making operating decisions, but information is also important for controlling the public narrative. Information on the news affects Americans at home. Information can also be used to influence our adversaries, and using information to do so is something we must improve upon.

Putin is very good at controlling information and information operations. Russian information operations in Ukraine have consisted of turning off telephone and communication systems, surgically removing cell phone services, sending texts to the population for protests, and cyber attacks. Putin has also undertaken a number of messaging tactics along with his information operations. Ultimately, we must understand how we can influence our adversaries with messaging actions short of armed conflict. We are going to need to develop exquisite capabilities to effectively influence people in our new operational environments.

LtCol Scott McDonald (USMC)

LtCol McDonald was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps upon his graduation from The George Washington University with a Bachelor's in International Relations in 1995. LtCol McDonald was subsequently trained as an Armor Officer and reported to 2nd Tank Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, NC, where he served as a Platoon Commander and Company Executive Officer. In 1998 he was selected to be a China Foreign Area officer and transferred to Monterey, CA to study at the Naval Postgraduate School for a Master's Degree and the Defense Language Institute for Mandarin Chinese. Upon Completion of Language training, LtCol McDonald moved to Beijing, PRC for phase II language training at Capital Normal University and cultural immersion. In 2002 he was posted to 1st Tank Battalion, 29 Palms, CA where he served as a Headquarters Company Commander, Tank Company Commander, and Battalion Logistics Officer. During this period he deployed twice to Iraq. In 2005, LtCol McDonald reported to US Embassy Canberra, Australia as the Marine Corps Attaché. In 2008, he was transferred to Taipei to work at the American Institute in Taiwan, as the first active duty Marine Corps representative since 1979. During this time he served as the US Liaison Officer to the Taiwan 8th Army during US military support to Typhoon Morakot relief operations. Following this tour he joined the Plans Directorate at III Marine Expeditionary Force in 2011, serving first as a regional planner, and subsequently as the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans. In 2014, LtCol McDonald began his current posting as a Strategic Analyst, Strategic Initiatives Group, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. LtCol McDonald maintains an active interest in both philosophy and Chinese history. Both influenced his co-authored article, "Phase Zero: How China Exploits it, Why the United States Does Not." Naval War College Review. Vol 65, No. 3 (Spring 2012): 123-135.

LtCol Scott McDonald expressed disagreement with our current environment being "no war, no peace." Instead, he believes that others are at war with us, and we should recognize it as such. We should not refer to our current conflicts as hybrid or gray. We need to call them what they are—war. There is a need for clarity. The words that we use can change the way we interpret a situation and, ultimately, the actions we take. Using imprecise language clouds the problem and makes it more difficult to understand.

How do we define peace? How do we define war? We need to understand how we are defining both. Western liberal representative systems have difficulty with defining war. We define war as a kinetic endeavor. However, our adversaries do not describe it this way. In their eyes, several of them are actually at war with us. Because we are confusing ourselves with ambiguous words, we do not recognize this, which can ultimately blur our understanding of the international dynamics at place.

We typically focus too much on kinetics. Our adversary's understand that all aspects of national power can be used as part of war. We must recognize our adversary's actions for what they are. We must interpret their actions using this context and take our own appropriate actions in response.

Many argue that what we are seeing today is categorically different. This is not true. It is more that the last century is different. We have been focusing so much on kinetic conflict, but this no longer works.

Ultimately, we must stop hiding from the fact that our adversaries are trying to impose their will on us by using all aspects of national power while attempting to stay below the kinetic threshold. We must focus on long-term strategies rather than focus on short-term tactics. We must improve our ability to coordinate all elements of national power in the effort to shape the will of our adversaries.

Captain Frank Bradley (Joint Staff/J39)

Captain Mitchell Bradley is from Eldorado, Texas and is a 1991 graduate of the United States Naval Academy and began his career as a SEAL after Basic Underwater Demolition (BUDs/SEAL) Class 179 in 1992. Captain Bradley's SEAL Team assignments have included duty at SEAL Team FOUR, deploying twice to South America (1992-1995) and SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team TWO deploying to the European Theater. He served as an exchange officer with the Italian Incursori (Italian SEALs) in La Spezia, Italy (1997-1998), before transferring to Naval Special Warfare Development Group (NSWDG), Dam Neck, VA. Captain Bradley earned a Masters in Physics from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA where he received a provisional patent for his research in 2006. He then led JSOC's J3 Technical Operations Division until assuming command of Naval Special Warfare Tactical Development Squadron ONE in 2007. From 2009 until 2013 he served as the Director of Operations and Deputy Commander until assuming duty as Commander of NSWDG.

Captain Frank Bradley stated that J39 oversees and provides advocacy to Commanders for operations in the information environment, cyber operations, and the operationalization of technologies. These are all particularly pertinent in today's operating environment. As such, J39 sees itself involved in the conflicts going on in Syria and some no peace, no war areas. J39 looks at what deterrence will look like as we see Russian tactics evolve and China continues to grow. Additionally, we are thinking about what operations in the evolving information environment means. We are also confronted with the reality that it is a far more challenging world today than it was pre 9/11. It is far more difficult world today than in the 1980s during the Cold War. Today, we are almost entering into an environment where both those environments are active and dominant.

CAPT Philip Kapusta (USSOCOM)

CAPT Phil Kapusta was born and raised in Northern Virginia. He graduated from the US Naval Academy with merit in 1992. After completing Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training with Class 186 in Coronado, California, he reported to SEAL Team TWO in Little Creek, Virginia in 1993. He served as Assistant Officer-in-Charge (AOIC) of two platoons before transferring to SEAL Team EIGHT in 1996. At SEAL Team EIGHT, CAPT Kapusta served as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of a SEAL Platoon and then as Assistant Operations Officer. Following this tour, CAPT Kapusta earned his MS degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in Leadership and Human Resource Development. From 1999-2001, he returned to the Naval Academy and was the 16th Company Officer.

CAPT Kapusta discussed some challenges and opportunities that could arise from future gray zone operations. The days of traditional uniformed militaries are done. Our biggest challenge is organization. We tend to organize into geographic fiefdoms, which no longer make much sense in today's environment.

Another challenge we face is cyber and the growing focus on cyber and the cyber realm. New cyber technologies are evolving rapidly, becoming increasingly empowering, are unpredictable, and are shifting power away from the state. The USG is woefully behind in the cyber realm—it is essentially an unrecognized domain. Another crucial challenge is procurement. The multi-year development and acquisition model is dead. Today, modular/disposable is the new standard.

While we face a number of challenges, we are also presented with a number of opportunities in the evolving gray zone environment. These opportunities include the Virtual Lodge Act; increased potential for influence campaigns (brand and market); evolving technologies that can be capitalized upon; potential for burden sharing; nullifying the Strait of Hormuz in Yemen; and potential for cooperation between the US, China, and Russia on a geo-strategic scale.

Mr. Mark Sisson (USSTRATCOM)

Mr. Sisson is the Deputy Chief, Wargames and Exercise Branch (J553) Plans and Policy, United States Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. In this role he leads

a team of four contractor personnel responsible for researching deterrence and assurance for support of planning and policy. Mr. Sisson is a Certified Analytics Professional through INFORMS. He has twenty-three years of service in Air Force, thirteen years as an analyst. Extensive operational experience (including combat), with close to 6000 hours in B-52G/H, RC-135V/W/U, and KE-3B, and while active duty trained Royal Saudi Air Force (earning a Foreign Area Officer qualification, FAO).

Mr. Mark Sisson discussed the gray zone and gray matter. USSTRATCOM is worried about an array of issues, some of which include increasing abilities of non-state actors to threaten us here in the US and against our allies abroad, nuclear and chemical weapons and proliferation, Russia's increased action in Ukraine and Crimea, China's use of low intensity coercion to advance its agenda, North Korea, and ungoverned areas serving as incubation areas for terrorist activities that could impact the US. These things make up the gray zone for USSTRATCOM.

USSTRATCOM looks at gray matter through the lenses of assurance and deterrence. War games and academic initiatives have made it clear that a whole-of-government approach is required to address assurance and deterrence of gray matter. There are diplomatic, informational, military, economic, social, and political factors that can be combined that have synergy in the context of assurance and deterrence.

War games and academic initiatives have also identified that narratives are an important component of assurance and deterrence. These narratives are perishable, but also adjustable. It is important that we constantly adapt and adjust our narratives to ensure that they are meaningful to stakeholders. These narratives are also imperfect. Bias plays a critical role in narratives. Some adversaries may view everything you do as escalatory due to bias. Information availability and anchoring are also important factors when it comes to bias. Additionally, narratives are competitive. Therefore, it is crucial that we understand the strategic objectives of our adversaries and see how they align and do not align. Ultimately, the most important component of narratives is that they are contextual. Certain narratives that are effective in one environment may not be effective in a different environment.

Mr. Jason Werchan (USEUCOM)

Jason S. Werchan is a Strategy Program Manager for the United States European Command (USEUCOM). Jason Werchan entered Civil Service in January 2015 after retiring as a Colonel from the USAF in December 2014. In his last assignment he served as the Chief of Strategy for USEUCOM. He entered the Air Force in May of 1989 after receiving a commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corps at Texas A&M University. During his AF career, he served as an instructor and evaluator navigator in the RC-135, E-8C and T-1A aircrafts. He has also been a student and an instructor at the US Army's Command and General Staff College and was a fully qualified Joint Staff Officer. He has held multiple staff positions at the Pacific Air Forces and the Air Education and Training Command Headquarters to include Branch Chief for Strategic Plans for Education and Training and ISR Operations in the PACOM AOR. He also

served as Chief of the Education and Training Command's Future Learning Division, and as the Deputy Commander for the 479th Flying Training Group at Pensacola NAS overseeing the AF's new Combat Systems Officer (CSO) training pipeline.

Mr. Jason Werchan conceptualized the threats and opportunities for USECUOM. USEUCOM's theater strategy aligns along five lines of effort: 1) deter Russia, 2) support and enable the NATO alliance, 3) prepare and defend Israel, 4) counter transnational threats (narcotics, terrorism, etc.), and 5) enable United States global operations.

Interestingly, while deterring Russia is one of USEUCOM's strategies, USECUOM as an organization (funding, resourcing, etc.) was built around Russia being a partner, not a threat. This creates a massive resource disconnect. Breaking this paradigm is a significant challenge for USEUCOM.

How is USEUCOM dealing with this? First, USEUCOM has put in place Operation Atlantic Resolve. Following the events that took place in Crimea, USEUCOM took steps to assure its allies by putting forces in the countries that border Russia. Additionally, USEUCOM has established the European Reassurance Initiative, which is aiding USUECOM in taking steps to assure its allies and deter the threats posed by Russia. Furthermore, USUECOM has recently established the Russian Strategic Initiative. This initiative is modeled after the USPACOM China Strategic Initiative. This initiative is being undertaken because USEUCOM realized that Russia is not only a challenge for USEUCOM, but also a challenge for DoD, the USG, and the United States as a whole.

Mr. Juan Hurtado (USSOUTHCOM)

Mr. Hurtado is the Science and Technology Advisor, Headquarters United States Southern Command, Miami, Florida. He serves as the principal advisor in scientific matters and supports the Command through the formulation of materiel solutions to operational needs, demonstrations of technology in operational scenarios, coordination for rapid system development, integration of mature technical capability into field activities, and joint experimentation involving systems and concepts. In addition, Mr. Hurtado leads the Science, Technology and Experimentation Division, J7 Theater Engagement Directorate, composed of science advisors and operational managers to conduct research and development, and tactical evaluations. Mr. Hurtado became the Science and Technology Advisor in July 2002.

Mr. Hurtado noted that from his perspective as the science and technology advisor when it comes to defining war and peace, USSOUTHCOM is typically somewhere in the middle of the two. Over the last 15 years, there has been some sort of in-between activity in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Examples include actions by illegal armed groups, counter-narcotics, and transnational crime activities.

It is important to recognize that different people will define peace and war in different ways. Some people in the USSOUTHCOM AOR may define their

environment as peace even though there is significant violence going on. For instance, violence by narco-terrorists such as crime, murders and kidnappings sometimes is concentrated in rural areas and people in the country's big cities may not consider these as major conflict. In addition, people in a different AOR may define that environment, if it were taking place in their location, as internal war. The way the US defines peace and war may not strictly coincide with some of our partner's perspectives in these areas. So, we have to be flexible and take into account how our partners and local folks view the situation at hand.

Challenges for USSOUTHCOM include limited resources and capabilities. In addition, many would agree that poverty, crime, and a lack of resilience to prevent and respond to conflict are also major challenges. These challenges sometimes do not require a military solution as the only solution. Instead, they require all components of government and international partners to work together to provide a comprehensive and sustainable solution to conflict. SOUTHCOM is an organization that practices this concept. We have many partnerships in the USG Interagency and internationally to jointly work on regional problems that lie in-between peace and war.

The USSOUTHCOM theater is different from that of other COCOMs. We believe there is low probability that war would break out in the AOR. As such, we experimented with a different organization a few years ago to conduct the Command's mission. We had as major directorates Security, Stability and Prosperity. This structure tried to account for how we engage and the activities we take on in the theater. Engagement, consistent engagement is critical to maintain our partnerships. Otherwise, we may miss out on opportunities to maintain the security gains that talented people in the organization have created over the years.

Mr. Chris Carper (USNORTHCOM/NORAD)

Mr. Chris Carper noted that USNORTHCOM's mission is to conduct homeland defense, civil support, and security cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interests. In order to achieve this, USNORTHCOM is continuously working to strengthen its regional and homeland relationships.

USNORTHCOM's first priority is homeland defense. Given this, one of the challenges is that USNORTHCOM's AOR and battlefield is the homeland. Homeland defense is a no fail mission. Successful homeland defense requires looking beyond the homeland and USNORTHCOM AOR and out into the AORs of trusted partners and allies.

USNORTHCOM's second priority is to improve the speed and quality of response in support of civil authorities supplying our nation's needs. This is both a direct response and interagency support mission. USNORTHCOM is always in support.

USNORTHCOM's third priority is to strengthen its regional and global partnerships. This is done primarily through security cooperation. Stronger partners will only make USNORTHCOM stronger.

USNORTHCOM will continue to work to expand its partnerships as well. USNORTHCOM is interested in developing a better understanding for how it does security cooperation, and what that security cooperation means. USNORTHCOM is very good at providing equipment and training, but the problem is that it is not always clear whether this training and cooperation actually provides value back to US forces. The challenge is to ensure that the US is also benefiting from training and cooperation exercises. It is also important to ensure that our partners' interests are aligned with US interests. USNORTHCOM has many partners within its AOR and they all have different capabilities, needs, and capacities. Given the spectrum of partners, it is essential to consider their strengths, weaknesses, and overall interests.

Mr. Chris Hernandez (USAFRICOM)

Christopher Hernandez is U.S. Africa Command's liaison officer to State Department in Washington DC. In this capacity, he represents and advances the Command's equities with a number of regional and functional bureaus while providing the Command's perspectives during key planning efforts.

Until October 2010, he served in the Strategy, Plans and Programs Directorate (J5) staff at HQ U.S. Africa Command in Stuttgart, Germany, where he led the Command's initial efforts to develop priorities and defense sector initiatives with the military of South Sudan. As a political-military analyst covering issues in Eastern Africa, he focused on establishing new programs with the African Union and Rwanda while also supporting the development of the Command's inaugural Theater Strategy and Theater Campaign Plan.

Prior to USAFRICOM, he served eight years with HQ U.S. Army Europe focused on numerous issues related to strategy development, security cooperation planning and political-military analysis for Europe, Africa and the Middle East.

Mr. Hernandez holds degrees from the Georgia Institute of Technology and the University of Oklahoma.

Mr. Hernandez noted that when thinking about no war and no peace, it is all about perspective. While some may consider the current situation in Somalia to be asymmetric warfare in nature, our African partners participating in operations in Somalia would simply define the situation as war.

There are a number of conflicts in Africa that could be categorized under the gray zone definition. In East Africa, while there has been great political growth in Somalia; al-Shabaab still poses a significant threat, and many areas within the country remain ungoverned. In North Africa, Libya is a country at civil war and has disseminated into factional chaos in which extremist groups largely enjoy free reign. Mali's armed conflict has been taking place for years, and has expanses of large, ungoverned areas with groups that have ties to VEOs operating in the north. Boko

Haram is another USAFRICOM priority that could be categorized as a gray zone conflict.

USAFRICOM's method of addressing these conflicts is by enabling and leveraging its partners to successfully conduct missions to resolve these conflicts. Security cooperation is the primary means by which AFRICOM address these challenges but there are certainly obstacles associated in that regards. First, whole of government is inherently difficult. Commands try to pull in a variety of resources from a variety of agencies, but it is hard to bring in synchronized resources from DoD agencies, let alone from other agencies. Second, it is much easier to do tactical capacity building activities than it is to provide support at an institutional level. Lastly, persistent engagement is difficult, but it is critical in order to have a lasting, long-term impact.

Mr. Jay Rouse (JS/J5)

Jay Rouse is a senior strategist supporting the Joint Staff in the J5 Strategy Development Division. His major duties involve the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), Joint Strategy Review (JSR) Process, Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA) and conducting time-sensitive analysis of strategic issues. His strategic analysis has informed numerous major national security decisions, including significant strategy adjustments, force posture and defense modernization decisions. A 23 year Army veteran, he served in a variety of command and staff positions in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East with key strategic planning tours on the Army Staff and Joint Staff. He has been involved in the development of many major strategy documents, including multiple Quadrennial Defense Reviews, National Military Strategies, and Chairman's Risk Assessments (CRA). He is airborne, air assault, and RANGER qualified. Mr. Rouse holds a BA in Political Science from Siena College and a MPA from Canisius College, in addition to Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S Army War College. Among his professional affiliations, he is a member of the International Society for Risk Analysis (SRA), a peer reviewer for its journal and frequent speaker at SRA's national conference.

Mr. Jay Rouse noted that the J5 defines gray zone conflict as purposeful, aggressive, integrated, and ambiguous use of multiple types of power to achieve political, economic, and/or military objectives. It is important to understand that not everything is in the gray zone and not everything is a gray zone conflict. It is very important to establish parameters and define what is meant by terms like war, peace, and gray zone because ultimately these works will drive the capabilities that are used and capacities that are provided.

When examining gray zone conflicts, it is important to understand strategic objectives, offensive capabilities and desires, unity of force, economy of force, and potential for surprise. However, it is important to realize that not everything is in the gray zone. For example, ISIL is not in the gray zone. There is very little ambiguousness about what ISIL is doing.

It is important to not label everything as being in the gray zone because then the problem cannot be bounded. Black conflict is full-out, high-end warfare. White conflict would look something like what the US did to end apartheid in South Africa. Interestingly, the US response to Russian actions has really been to execute a white campaign (sanctions, economic levers, threats, etc.) in response to a gray zone conflict. Military power plays an important role as a supporting element to gray zone operations in a gray zone conflict. Hybrid warfare is a subset of gray zone conflict.

Adversaries make no distinction between peace and war—there is a continuum. We tend to categorize our thinking into categories (either peace or war) that have no relevance to our adversaries; they do not make this same distinction. Therefore, we need to change our thinking.
When looking at a gray zone conflict, first, we need to identify where opportunities exist. Second, we need to determine whether we even care about the opportunities—there might be things that we do not want to exert resources on. Third, we need to find a way to integrate intelligence collection. Fourth, we need to integrate US support operations effectively.

Gray zone conflicts need to be thought of as total conflicts where all elements of power can be capitalized upon. Today, the US has an opportunity to execute gray zone conflicts, rather than just be reactionary. A big challenge for future gray zone conflicts will be escalation and escalation control. We must be clear about red lines and clear about our interests. Most of the gray zone conflicts are not direct threats to the US, but they are threats to regional allies and partners. The United States is an incredibly strong power. Gray zone conflicts are being used by weaker powers. So, the US should not be overly concerned about gray zone actions.

Discussion
Does the senior leadership of the DoD recognize this shift in military warfare? Do they look at it as an example of a flexible and scalable force multiplier?

Mr. Sisson responded that USSTRATCOM leadership has recognized the shift. The recognition is reflected across a number of arenas. For example, USSTRATCOM is interested in stability and gray zone activities impact stability and instability. Gray zone activities are clearly making operational environments more complex.

Mr. Werchan noted that in terms of gray matter and how they apply to Russia, USEUCOM faces the constant challenge of ensuring statements and actions align with policy. Russia has been a constant challenge in this respect. USEUCOM recognizes this shift; however, in many cases it is unable to take action in response to adversary gray zone activity because of policy.

LtCol McDonald noted that the USMC is working to get better at integrating these capabilities with conventional forces for the desired effects.

Captain Bradley responded that the Joint Staff has absolutely recognized the shift. The previous Chairman wrote and issued guidance about the creation and recognition of these threats as trans-regional threats. These trans-regional threats are now a significant focus within the Joint Staff today. Additionally, there has been a creation of a trans-regional threat coordination cell to work across multiple lines of effort. Furthermore, there is work going on inside DoD for the creation of a strategy for operations in the information environment.

Should we treat hostile information operations as more than an annoyance? When should we look at it as an act of actual aggression?

Mr. Sisson noted that when an attack reaches a certain threshold, we consider it a strategic attack. USSTRATCOM conducted a tabletop exercise where it brought in experts and worked different scenarios focused around cyber attacks. The exercise found a wide distribution of ideas on whether or not certain cyber threats were considered attacks. Although, one thing that was clear was that anything that touched on national security interests was considered an attack.

LtCol McDonald noted that not all cyber attacks have strategic objectives or tactical objectives. While it is sometimes hard to deny that many of these types of attacks are warfare like actions in nature, determining the right level of response is very difficult.

Captain Bradley noted that the DoD has not clearly defined the lines yet for these types of activities. Defining where we draw these lines will be a great deal of work.

How do you see in your AORs the consequences of climate change causing stress on the countries and populations that could pose tomorrow's problems?

Mr. Hurtado responded that USSOUTHCOM has been thinking about climate change for almost a decade. Climate change is an area where the US and Brazil can work very closely together. Brazil is dealing with serious droughts because of climate change. Lack of water and other resources can have major implications on stability, so this is an important area of focus for USSOUTHCOM.

CAPT Kapusta added that we have all of the data we need. What we do not have is the analytical tools to use on the data. We do not have the mechanisms to make proper sense of all of the data. He added that climate change is considered a megatrend that will have an impact on almost everything.

Mr. Carper added noted that USNORTHCOM operates in the Arctic, which is an area immensely impacted by climate change. It is also an area that could serve as a ground for future conflicts over control. Interestingly, no US navy ships can currently operate in the Arctic. Additionally, most satellites do not fly over the

Arctic. USNORTHCOM realizes this and is examining and accounting for the future capabilities that will be needed.

LtCol McDonald noted that even if you accept the unproven and questionable claims of climate change and global warming, it is only one factor among many. It could be completely irrelevant. What matters is where the various cleavages are in society. It will be important to understand if a weather event lines up with an area where there are existing cleavages, thus further breaking society apart. If it does not exacerbate cleavages or disagreements over interests, then it may be irrelevant.

Mr. Rouse added that climate change is a global mega trend and is a key factor that will influence the future.

With continuing fiscal restraints, how do we overcome our geographic organizational challenges?

CAPT Kapusta noted that in today's environment, it would probably make more sense to organize ourselves around specific problems rather than geographic locations.

Invited Speaker: Moises Naim

Moisés Naím is a distinguished fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the chief international columnist for El País and La Repúbblica, a contributor to the Financial Times "A-List," and a contributing editor to The Atlantic. He is also the host and producer of Efecto Naím, a weekly television program on international affairs that airs throughout the Americas.

Naím was the editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy magazine for 14 years. He is the author of many scholarly articles and more than 10 books on international economics and politics. His most recent book, The End of Power (2013), a New York Times bestseller, was named by the Washington Post as one of the best books of the year and in 2015 the Financial Times picked it as one of the best books of the decade.

In 2011, Naím was awarded the Ortega y Gasset prize, the most prestigious award in Spanish journalism. The British magazine Prospect named him one of the world's leading thinkers in 2013, and in 2014 the Gottlieb Duttweiler Institute of Switzerland ranked him among the top 100 global thought leaders.

Naím has served as Venezuela's minister of trade and industry, director of Venezuela's Central Bank, and executive director of the World Bank. He is a board member of the National Endowment for Democracy and the Open Society Foundation. Naim holds MSc and PhD degrees from MIT.

Dr. Naím spoke about power. Power is no longer what it was. The definition has not changed; it is the ability of an individual or institution to get someone else to do something or stop them from doing something. What has changed is the sources and constraints of power. Power is fragmenting. The central message of Dr. Naím's talk is that power has become easier to get, harder to use, and easier to lose.

Dr. Naím used examples from the news to highlight how power has changed. For example, what do the United Kingdom, Poland, Guatemala, Tanzania, and Colombia have in common as of the weekend before the conference? They all had elections. In each election, the traditional "mega player" was successfully challenged and displaced by new power. The structures of political power in these countries are ordered by what happened last weekend. What else happened? The Vatican Synod came to a close. Why do we care about the Catholic Church when talking about power? My argument is that power applies to every institution from the church to criminal cartels, non-profit organizations, universities, political parties, banks, countries, and terrorists. Power is a currency. The Pope is a manifestation of what is going on with power. He symbolizes a less constrained form of power than the Curia that runs the Vatican. This is the first pope who is not European. It seemed improbably that he would become Pope. Once he did, he tried to dismantle the power structure and change the views of the church. But the Synod could not agree on substantial matters.

What else has been in the news recently? The Speaker of the House resigned. He could not take it anymore because he felt he did not have the power to rally, coordinate, lead, and make the members of his power base behave in a coordinated way. It is a kind of power fragmentation and disillusion of power.

Another thing in the news is Syria and Russia. Russia is flying Iranian weapons to Syria. At the same time, there is increasing concern in Russia about the possibility that Syria will be Russia's new Afghanistan. So rather than a manifestation of strength, Putin's intervention in Syria may be perceived as an expression of weakness.

Finally, Netflix is fighting with movie theater operators. Netflix just released an original movie. Instead of opening it in theaters, it allowed users to stream it online. The theater operators are furious. They are worried that if movie producers release an original movie online, movie theaters will become a legacy industry. So they said they would not show any original Netflix productions. Yesterday, three million people viewed the Netflix movie online. Now movie operators are working with Netflix.

Many of us now watch TV in a different way. We do not even know what channel we are watching, and we are watching via streaming or on demand—on a mobile device. Historically, the powerful people in the television industry were the programmers. They determined which show aired at which time. But now that people can watch shows on demand, the programmers are no longer powerful.

Two years ago, Netflix was still sending us DVDs in the mail. Now, at any given time, one-third of Internet users in the United States are streaming video. That is very new. If I had been invited a few years ago, I would not have talked about Netflix.

Another development we have not talked about is the Podemos movement in Spain. It is a political party that did not exist a few years ago and is now a political force.

His point was that changes in power are happening everywhere geographically. There is no village in Africa or megacity in China where this is not happening. Functionally, this is also happening in industry, military, government, banking, manufacturing, etc.

When Dr. Naím was writing *The End of Power*, he knew he was going against the grain. The grain was that power was concentrating. We live in an era where income and wealth are concentrated. There is a long tradition of assuming that money is power. If money is concentrated, then power is concentrated. We also have a resurgence of strongmen: Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. So there is a resurgence of strongmen and strong authoritarian leaders that seem to do whatever they want. That is an image of concentrated power. So to show that power was changing, he relied on the best possible data and social sciences.

The book is organized into two sectors. He looked at what was happening in the power sector, then looked at data. The data showed overwhelming evidence that power is e easier to get, harder to use, and easier to lose.

He used the military as an example. The three most disruptive technologies of the 21st Century so far are drones, IEDs, and cyber. What do they have in common? They are not controlled or monopolized by armed forces of nations. Of course, armed forces do have manifestations of these capabilities.

The reality is that for the first time in history, the main weapons available and used are not under exclusive control of the state or military. In fact, these weapons are available to individuals. The nightmare is when these three technologies combine. In September 2013, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel was giving a speech outdoors in Dresden, a drone was flown over the crowd and stopped right in front of her before crashing to the ground. Everyone laughed, but everyone was concerned. It turned out the drone was a publicity stunt by the Pirate Party. It was inconsequential this time.

Asymmetric warfare is about a "micro player" challenging a "mega player." He would not argue that ISIL would be able to defeat the US or the coalition, but it is surely denying the strongest military force options they would have had in the past.

There are some fascinating statistics about asymmetric war. One Harvard scholar studied armed conflict. He used the traditional measures of combatants. He defined

which side was weaker and which was stronger. He found that in all conflicts between 1800-1949, the weaker side only won 12% of the time. From 1950-1998 the weaker side won 55% of the time. So in contemporary warfare, the weaker side won more often than the stronger side.

Why is this happening? Our natural instinct has been to blame social media for the diffusal of power. He disagreed with that. It is foolish to deny the importance of social media. Social media is a tool. Tools require users with a sense of direction and motivation. These powerful tools are being used by powerful people in powerful ways.

The shields that create power for the powerful are less protected. In order to have power, you have to have something that is unique that rivals and challengers do not have. If you are in the military, the source of power is weapons and number of people. If you are a bank, the source of power is the balance sheet. If you are a politician, it is the number of followers you have. Each one of these entities have conditions that shield them from pushback.

The essence of the story is that the shields that protect the powerful are crumbling. They are no longer performing. They were never perfect; they were always cracking—showing vulnerability and weakness. There are a wide variety of forces that explain this decline in power. They are grouped into three categories: more, mobility, and mentality revolutions.

In the first category, we are in the "more" revolution. We have more of everything: people, countries, goods, services, criminals, etc. If you look at any statistic, we have more compared to 1990. Even the number of countries has increased. We have today the largest middle class ever in history. For the first time in human history, there are more people living in cities than in rural areas. This has consequences for power.

It is not just that we have more of everything, but everything moves more. That is the mobility revolution. The indicators are amazing. There is increased mobility of people, goods, information, etc. Everything is globalizing and moving more.

The mentality revolution relates to profound change in values, expectations, aspirations, propensities, and dislikes. For the last 50 years, the University of Michigan has conducted the World Values Survey. They claim to capture 85% of humanity. They ask the same questions about values. If you look at what people valued in 2000, it is like people were from a different planet. Survey responses had nothing to do with how people answered it in 2014. That has to do with how much is taken for granted. There is a loss of potency of what we do because of what we have. Saying "because I said so" does not work anymore. The survey shows that attitudes towards power and authority have changed dramatically.

The "more" revolution has helped challengers and micro powers overwhelm barriers that protect powers. Mobility helps them circumvent it and mentality helps undermine it. Put these element together and you end up with a situation where power has become easier to get, harder to use, and easier to lose.

So what? Is this good or bad? The answer is that there is plenty to welcome in these trends. This is a world that is not as comfortable with monopolists, tyrants, dictators, and strong men. This is a different world for those who want to concentrate power. But it is in some areas is worrisome. Taken to its extreme, this leads to anarchy where no one is in charge and everyone has just enough power to block others, but not enough power to impose a view. We have seen this in the US Congress where the political system is blocked because of the proliferation of actors will just enough power to say no. That, in a political system, creates difficulties and weaknesses.

So what should we do? The implications are different for the military or the Vatican. The common denominator has to do with peripheral vision. In this hypercompetitive world, you have to be obsessive at what you do. You need laser like attention and specialize. You have to become highly specialized and you have to be very good at what you do. Doing something in your specific area hampers your peripheral vision. Threats and challenges come from places you cannot anticipate. How do you make sure you anticipate threats instead of react to them? It is not about not having enough data; it is about a lack of tools and central constructs.

So, first, beware of losing peripheral vision. Beware of being too good at what you are doing because it means you are too focused and not looking elsewhere. Second, be careful to assume that size equals power. Speed and agility is as important as size and resources. Be very aware that the power you have is fleeting. Do not take it for granted.

Discussion

Communication systems have allowed dispersed entities to come together on the Internet to create competing power sources. ISIL global messaging has gotten disaffected people to come to Syria. We see this also happening in the US with the Black Lives Matter movement and the Tea Party.

Dr. Naím stated that we cannot deny the importance of the Internet and social media in amplifying entities. Of course you have to take that seriously and understand it. I think it is important to understand why it was so easy for ISIL to recruit—even students from the top of their class. Was that a function of social media? It might have played a role. But you also have to ask what is behind all of it. Be careful not to look only at technology and not at the three revolutions underneath it.

Is technology used at the service of cultural values to achieve a goal? To what degree is technology shaping culture?

People's mindset while watching videos on their cellphone will be affected. But you have to look at who is producing the video. What incentives create the demand for the video? He did not deny the importance of social media; he challenged those that only look at that. The video appeals to people with underlying forces.

You say power is more difficult to use now. Look at Putin's Russia. He has managed to bring the broadcast media, judiciary, church, billionaires, military, and organized crime on board. How do we deal with people who move against the trend?

Dr. Naím offered other examples of strongmen: Erdogan, Chavez/Maduro, Xi, etc. They are in the minority. That is not the trend in the world today. But the most important thing is, do you think Putin today is more powerful than he was 15 years ago? He is less powerful. There are sanctions, the economy is tanking, Russia is a petrol state and yet at the same time has the largest middle class in its history. If you apply the three revolutions, you have a highly unstable system. Am I saying that Putin is not powerful? No. Am I saying Putin will be more powerful in 10 years? No. The constraints on his power will increase. The constraints on things he cares about and used to take advantage of are mounting. The same is true in China and for other strong men.

Invited Speaker: Maj. Gen. Tim Fay (Director of Strategic Plans, Headquarters, USAF)

Maj. Gen. Timothy G. Fay is the Director of Strategic Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, D.C. In this role he is responsible for the development, analysis, evaluation and integration of the resource allocation plan to meet worldwide air, space, and cyber requirements. His directorate also analyses Air Force core mission areas and reviews legislative, policy, and operations as they relate to the total force to create a more unified Regular Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve. General Fay is also engaged in the Air Force Global Posture Policy, International Standardization, and Combatant Commanders Regional plan assessments.

Maj. Gen. Fay thanked Dr. Cabayan and the SMA not only for putting on a great conference, but for bringing great thinkers together and helping leaders on the battlefield. He was not surprised to see SMA mentioned in the New York Times[3] a few weeks ago. Also, he applauded the recent SOCOM white paper on the gray zone.

Maj. Gen. Fay said he was asked to speak to participants from a different perspective—giving a Service perspective. Previous speakers have talked about

---

[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/20/us/politics/new-role-for-general-after-failure-of-syria-rebel-plan.html?_r=0

definitions and characteristics of the gray zone. There has been lots of good thinking about the strategic environment that got us here and strategies to address it.

The conference has emphasized the importance of the whole-of-government approach and projecting a unity of effort front. This has not been something we have been traditionally good at. We are not going to figure that out here, but it is an important discussion.

Maj. Gen. Fay is the Director of Strategic Planning. His role is to help the Air Force resource the future. We have a 30-year resource allocation plan. When we look 30 years out, we have to identify potential adversaries and potential environments to meet warfighter needs and plan backwards.

The Services are not warfighters; they are force providers. We build a Service through its task of organize, train, and equip.
The Air Force has committed to improve its strategic planning process. So two years ago, it shifted gears because prior planning was good at filling immediate gaps, but not as effective as it could be building that longer-term plan. What we have discovered as we work to improve, is that although planning is sometimes characterized as building the future force based on the art of the possible, the reality of the planner is often bounded by the challenge if the science of limited resources.
The SOCOM white paper notes the difficulty of overcoming US bureaucracy and red tape and the difficulty posed by having strict timelines.

Maj. Gen. Fay spoke about some of the challenges first. The requirement the Air Force is planning towards the strategy directed by our nation's policy makers. The Air Force, like the rest of the DoD, is resource constrained. Sometimes in the past, the way we dealt with this resource-constrained environment was to wish it away. We kept thinking the money would come back, and sometimes built plans that were not likely to be achievable. We are no longer planning this way. We are using realistic projections to help us build an executable plan.

In addition to constraints on resources provided, the Services also must plan and manage the consumption of resources during current operations and missions. All missions consume resources and require readiness. The things we do today impact the art of the possible tomorrow. Policy and law are also major constrains. Taken together, all of these constraints manifest themselves as we look toward organizing, training and equipping a force for the gray zone environment.

To visualize the challenge of the force providers working to plan for an effective force for the gray zone, imagine a three-sided pyramid. The sides are capacity, readiness, and capability. The capacity side is simply the size or amount of the current force. The number of planes, cyber teams, predators, etc. that you have in the force today that must be organized, trained and equipped. The readiness side describes the preparation of the current force across the rage of military operations. The force can be deliberately maintained at a high level of readiness to operate

across the full spectrum of conflict or at a lower level of readiness for just specific areas with the commensurate implied risk. The capabilities side of the pyramid is the investment portfolio—acquiring new equipment, planes and technologies for the future environment.

The challenge any force provider has is finding the resources to balance all three sides of this pyramid. What experience has taught us, is that often you can have two sides of the triangle, but have to trade off that third side to resource the other two.

So why bring this up? We have to talk about strategies to fight in the gray zone when the Air Force is older than ever. It is also smaller than it has been. The active duty Air Force is almost half the size it was when Maj. Gen Fay joined. We have been challenged by the resource implications of the pace and scope of current operations for over a decade now. So what is the implication of this for the gray zone? Any good plan has to be feasible. So as we take on the gray zone intellectually, part of the discussion must come back to feasibility. Is this something the Air Force—in its current state with its current resourcing--can accomplish? This defines the science of the possible.

Right now, it would be difficult to make an extreme shift in the design of the Air Force. There was some discussion in the SOCOM white paper on type I and type II force. As was discussed, the rest of the security environment, the strategy, policy, bureaucracy and resource constraints highlight some of the challenges with making a huge, quick shift in the design of the Air Force structure for the gray zone challenges. And there is a question about whether we should, or if there are ways to leverage current and planned forces and capabilities for effective gray zone operations.

So where does that leave us as a Service force provider dealing with this new gray zone challenge in addition to our other security requirements? We can evolve the organization based on warfighter needs, leveraging the unique attributes of each force provider. Examples of opportunities within the current resourcing constraints are new tactics, techniques and procedures, new organizational constructs, and innovative applications of our training and equipment. We can lift and shift on that.

As it exists today, I do believe the Air Force is well postured to make outstanding contributions to the gray zone challenge. The innovative and agile application of speed, range, and flexible attributes are well suited for this environment. I offer some examples for your consideration of opportunities from within our current portfolio.

Our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are especially worth consideration as potential contributors to the joint warfighters. Most are already familiar with unparalleled situational awareness our Air Force provides on today's irregular warfare battlefield. Potential contributions of our ISR capabilities for the gray zone challenge speak for themselves.

Our command and control contributions also provide some great potential as does our rapid global mobility. Being able to rapidly project forces anywhere in the world is truly a unique characteristic of the US military. We do not have to be present all the time to have a deterrent effect, and that allows us to be creative with resources.

Our Global Strike capability speaks for itself. When we move from deterrence to defeat, it gives policy makers options.

A last thought for consideration, escalation control in this environment will be a significant challenge. We cannot be fully confident that we have complete understanding of the assumptions or reactions of our potential adversaries. I am not certain a careful study of the history of conflict like this demonstrates a strong correlation between escalation control technique and intent and subsequent outcomes. Red lines sometimes are not clear, and that is a collective challenge for us all in this type of conflict.

Gray zone challenges merit further study and understanding, and that is a difficult problem worth effort from the SMA community. Our nation needs creative ways to develop indicators and warnings (I&W) in this ambiguous environment. Based on this, which sensors will need modification? Which weaknesses should the Air Force be looking for in its adversaries, and how do we exploit them? We need to understand root causes of actions our adversaries take. There is room for improvement, and creative thinking by all.

Discussion

Capability gaps that the Air Force is facing are going to get worse. Given that our high-end allies are buying the Joint Strike Fighter, that gives us much more capability. How do we leverage interoperability to fill the capability gap?

Maj. Gen. Fay responded that when we plan and create strategies, how much should we include allies in this calculus? From a Service point of view, it is great to have allies with Joint Strike Fighters and C130s. There is common training and exercise opportunities there. The has a secondary effect of building relationships. There is nothing but goodness there. But the question asked is a policy one: should we depend on others when making plans? In the gray zone, it is essential to work with allies.

What are your thoughts on the employment of remote or unmanned systems in terms of cost efficiency and capability enhancer?

Maj Gen Fay discussed the need to better understand and quantify the requirement, for both gray zone and more traditional environments.

Panel 6: No War/No Peace…Challenges in the Pacific

Panel Members
- Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI), moderator
- Dr. Michael Swaine (CEIP)
- Mr. Zack Cooper (CSIS)
- Dr. William Norris (TAMU)

Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI)

Belinda Bragg is a Principal Research Scientist for NSI. She has provided core support for DoD Joint Staff and STRATCOM Strategic Multi-layer Analysis (SMA) projects for the past five years. She has worked on projects dealing with nuclear deterrence, state stability, US –China and US-Russia relations, and VEOs. Dr. Bragg has extensive experience reviewing and building social science models and frameworks. She is one of the two designers of a stability model, (the StaM) that has been used analyze stability efforts in Afghanistan, state stability in Pakistan and Nigeria, and at the city-level to explore the drivers and buffers of instability in megacities, with a case study of Dhaka. Prior to joining NSI, Dr. Bragg was a visiting lecturer in International Relations at Texas A&M University in College Station. Her research focuses on decision making, causes of conflict and political instability, and political uses of social media. Dr. Bragg earned her Ph.D. in political science from Texas A&M University, and her BA from the University of Melbourne, Australia.

Dr. Belinda Bragg moderated the panel. This panel was asked to look at the degree to which the US and the West needs to reconsider its policy and posture in the Asia Pacific in light of this new no war, no peace operational environment. The panel highlighted a 2014 SMA effort in support of USPACOM that focused on the drivers of conflict and convergence in the Asia-Pacific region in the next 5-25 years.

Dr. Michael Swaine (Carnegie)

Michael Swaine is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies. Formerly a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, Swaine is a specialist in Chinese defense and foreign policy, US-China relations, and East Asian international relations. He has authored and edited more than a dozen books and monographs and many journal articles and book chapters in these areas, directs several security-related projects with Chinese partners, and advises the US government on Asian security issues. He received his doctorate in government from Harvard University.

Dr. Michael Swaine could not attend the conference, so Dr. Bragg presented his slides in his place. As part of the 2014 SMA effort in support of USPACOM, Carnegie developed a strategic net assessment on conflict and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. The assessment provided insights into general trends, future security environments, implications and recommendations, and military-political approaches.

The strategic net assessment began by identifying general trends, both conflictual and cooperative/positive trends. Conflictual trends include domestic instability in key states: China, North Korea, Russia; arms races, military crises, and the nuclearization of the Korean peninsula; adverse changes in foreign policies toward greater assertiveness/ultra-nationalism; and a growing lack of confidence in and unity within the US-led alliance system. Cooperative/positive trends include a prioritization of peaceful economic development, economic integration and transnational and nontraditional security threats, an absence of strongly aggressive national objectives and military doctrines, some prospects for cooperation among US allies, and a low likelihood of a US-China military conflict over Taiwan.

The assessment then identified five potential security environments in the Asia-Pacific over the next 25 years (in order of likelihood). First, a status quo redux environment that consists of constrained but ongoing economic and political competition alongside continuing cooperation. Second, an Asia-Pacific Cold War environment develops that consists of deepening regional bipolarization and militarization driven by a worsening US-China strategic and economic rivalry. Third, an Asia-Pacific environment that consists of increased US-China and regional cooperation and tension reduction. Fourth, an Asian hot wars environment that consists of episodic but fairly frequent military conflict in critical hotspots, emerging against a Cold War backdrop. Fifth, a challenged region environment that consists of a region beset by social, economic, and political instability ad unrest separate from US-China competition.

The assessment then identified implications and recommendations. Implications were derived in the form of strategic risks (both primary and secondary risks) and strategic opportunities. Primary risks include a shift in national resources toward security competition, increased tests of resolve and political-military crises, a United States more embroiled in third-party disputes, and greater challenges to the unity and power of the US alliance system. Secondary risks include exclusionary political and economic arrangements, severe domestic instability and violent regime collapse in North Korea, domestic instability and nationalist forces in China, and US miscalculations or overreaction in response to a more powerful and assertive China. Strategic opportunities include common support for continued economic growth, the absence of deeply adversarial and existential disputes, continuing American strength, the possibility of a more flexible China, the possibility of more cooperation in dealing with North Korea, and the imperative to cooperate in dealing with transnational threats. The recommendations identified by the assessment are listed below.

- Clarify and prioritize primary, secondary, and tertiary US interests and policy methods in the Asia-Pacific.
- Conduct an unprecedented US-China strategic dialogue on the long-term future of the Asia-Pacific.

- Undertake a range of strategic assurances between the United States and China.
- Clarify and strengthen the US position on maritime disputes.
- Develop a coordinated force for SLOC defense, including the Chinese.
- Provide greater support for a variety of crisis management mechanisms.
- Establish a forum for the discussion of energy security issues.
- Strengthen ASEAN institutions and increase engagement with individual ASEAN states.

Finally, the assessment identified three potentially appropriate military-political approaches. First, a robust forward presence that consists of a deterrence-centered response designed to retain unambiguous allied regional primacy through either highly ambitious and forward deployment-based military concepts, such as air-sea battle, or approaches more oriented toward long-range blockades, such as offshore control. Second, a conditional offense/defense approach that consists of a primacy-oriented response that nonetheless avoids both preemptive, deep strikes against the Chinese mainland and obvious containment-type blockades and stresses both deterrence and reassurance in a more equal manner. Third, a defensive balancing approach that consists of a response that emphasizes mutual area denial, places a greater reliance on lower visibility and rear-deployed forces, and aims to establish a more genuinely balanced and cooperative power relationship with China in the western Pacific.

Mr. Zack Cooper (CSIS)

Zack Cooper is a fellow with the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on Asian security issues. Mr. Cooper is also a doctoral candidate in security studies at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School. Prior to joining CSIS, Mr. Cooper worked as a research fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He previously served on the White House staff as assistant to the deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism. He also worked as a civil servant in the Pentagon, first as a foreign affairs specialist and then as a special assistant to the principal deputy under secretary of defense for policy. Mr. Cooper received a B.A. from Stanford University and an M.P.A. from Princeton University, where he is the director of strategic education for the school's Center for International Security Studies.

Mr. Zack Cooper noted that China's rise follows historic patterns. Rising powers seek to alter the existing system. This is because the existing order does not reflect the current distribution of power. Therefore, rising powers tend to seek to expand control over their near abroad. As a result, rising powers often build blue water power projection capabilities.

China's Four Military Challenges

		Duration of Conflict	
		Short	Long
Intensity of Conflict	High	Short War (example: invasion)	Protracted War (example: blockade)
	Low	Coercion Campaign (example: "grey zones")	Long-Term Competition (example: strangulation)

China has taken many visible steps to expand its territory and capabilities by conducting man-made building and development projects on Woody Island, Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Michief Reef in the East China Sea. China is clearly taking steps to expand its power projection capabilities. While developing these man made islands will expand Chinese influence in the East China Sea and South China Sea, it will also impact China's regional and ultimately global influence.

On a spectrum of escalation that includes peacetime, gray zones, conventional war, and nuclear war, it is clear the US is no longer the dominant force in all escalation conflicts. The US remains dominant in nuclear war. However, the US is becoming increasingly contested in conventional wars, and is, more concerning, struggling when it comes to gray zone conflicts. The continued rise of China will likely only mean that this struggle will continue for the US.

Recognizing the current environment and the challenges that come with it in the Pacific, the US has a number of policy options.
- Build partner capacity in Southeast Asia.
- Increase patrols in disputed zones, including within 12 nautical miles of previously submerged features.
- Respond to Chinese coast guard using US "gray hulls."
- Fully implement CUES for regional coast guards.
- More actively support legal dispute resolution.
- Push for a binding code of conduct, even without China.
- Prepare multilateral response to South China Sea ADIZ.

Dr. William Norris (TAMU)

Will Norris was born and raised in Ohio and is currently a non-resident associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as well as a tenure-track assistant professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University where he teaches graduate-level courses in Chinese domestic politics, East Asian security, and Chinese foreign policy. During the 2014-2015 academic year, he was on research leave as a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Carnegie where he launched a new research project on the potential for a conventional US-China conflict to escalate to the nuclear

realm. Dr. Norris was also a 2010-2011 postdoctoral research associate at the Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs and a fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program, a joint program created by the two universities to foster the study of China's foreign relations. His research mainly focuses on the strategic relationship between economics and national security in an East Asian context and has a book coming out with Cornell University Press in the spring on Chinese Economic Statecraft. He did his doctoral work in the Security Studies Program in the Department of Political Science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he specialized in the confluence of economics and security with a particular focus on the role of economics in contemporary Chinese grand strategy. His broad research interests include East Asian security, business-government relations, and international relations theory—particularly the relationship between economics and national security.

Dr. Norris noted three challenges that we must be prepared for in the Pacific. First, we must think through what a Chinese economic downturn would look like. This includes understanding Chinese domestic and political instincts and gaming out the direct and indirect regional implications. Second, we must prepare for counterproductive Chinese learning from Putin's Russia. There are a number of Chinese territorial disputes that are ripe for applying "lessons learned." Third, we must take strategic advantage of the US regional as the status quo player. We may have to be flexible and reactive at the tactical level, but retain initiative at the strategic and operational level (e.g., make it diplomatically very costly for China to challenge the status quo). We must also be ready to respond to regional pleas to offset bellicose China (e.g., opportunities to strengthen alliances and partnerships).

While we must be prepared for these challenges, they do not change all of the rules. Most international relations theory still applies, the US is still the dominant regional power, what the US does has a shaping influence, and messaging and strategic effects are still relevant.

As part of the 2014 SMA effort in support of USPACOM, TAMU conducted a Chinese media analysis to identify areas of strategic risk and opportunity in the Asia-Pacific region over the next two decades.

The TAMU team provided an overview of Chinese media and developed individual reports on cultural scripts in media coverage of several key issues: China's relationships with its regional neighbors, geopolitical dimensions of the "China Dream" discourse, and a summary of Chinese discourse around "New Style Great Power Relations." The Chinese media analysis produced five key policy implications. First, leverage understanding of Chinese rhetorical frames to position USPACOM activities for maximum impact. By identifying dominant frames and themes in Chinese media, it is possible to begin to articulate US policy priorities within those frames. This will maximize chances that right messaging gets through while decreasing potential for misunderstanding. Second, do not allow counterproductive narratives to go uncontested. US policies are often portrayed in Chinese media in a

negative light (i.e., undermining new style great power relations), and this portrayal is rarely countered in US discourse. Third, there is political room for collaboration. Domestic Chinese media portrayals of some of the most prominent "guiding concepts" that have been articulated by Xi Jinping could provide entrees that can be leveraged to foster a more cooperative tone in the military-diplomatic relationship. Fourth, proceed with caution and address differences in conceptual interpretation frankly. Any engagement for cooperative purposes that seeks to leverage some of these dominant themes and concepts should be proactively defined by USG. Finally, USPACOM's efforts will need robust interagency coordination. If the US is looking to actively seek out areas for regional cooperation, the assessment found that there is rhetorical material in the Chinese media discourse that can be used to support that effort. However, a successful DoD cooperative engagement approach would be reliant on being enmeshed in a larger US interagency approach to China.

The assessment derived two key findings. First, regarding regional and international relations, Chinese media outlets tell a unitary story, though emphasize different aspects of that story. Second, the use of motifs such as "the China Dream" or "New Style of Great Power Relations" provides both opportunities and pitfalls for US-China bilateral relations. Ultimately, understanding how key ideas, event, and activities are portrayed domestically in China helps USPACOM couch its work appropriately to achieve maximum effectiveness.

Discussion

Dr. Bragg noted that in a gray conflict there is often the problem of determining when is the best time to act. You do not want to act too early or too late. This makes messaging and framing extremely important. It is critical that we frame our actions clearly and appropriately to ensure that they are received in the desired fashion. It is also important that we clearly and accurately interpret the actions of others. In order to do this, we must have a clear understanding of their interests, our interests, and how both are interpreted.

Mr. Cooper added that one way to get a better understanding of Chinese interests in today's gray zone is to actually look at what they have done. In looking at these actions and situations, it is pretty clear that the Chinese are pushing at weak points in the system. Part of the answer is going to be that we need to be clear about what we are actually wiling to stand up for and fight for and then be clear as to which areas we will step back from and let China impact and drive change in. The problem is that the US has not always been clear about letting the Chinese increase its control on the international level. Strangely, many of the core US interests are in the security realm, but we are not pushing back on Chinese security actions; however, on the other hand, in the economic realm we have pushed back strongly on Chinese actions despite seemingly an opportunity for valuable cooperation. This is where an interagency strategy would be beneficial. The lack of US interagency coordination has opened up the door for the Chinese to push quite hard.

Dr. Bragg noted that the interagency is very important in this region when looking at lines of power. A lot of the countries in the region are put in an awkward position in that they rely on the US for security but China for economic dependencies.

Dr. Norris agreed about the importance of the interagency. China has been able to capitalize on its areas of influence in the region, which has helped to further grow its influence. Another crucial issue is in understanding the future trajectory of Chinese domestic politics and how this trajectory will impact Chinese regional actions.

What are the implications of China's operating in the gray zone? China uses gray forces to enforce both its military and territorial claims. It is likely that it will use gray forces to defend military assets. Will the US be able to properly handle this? Additionally, what about Taiwan? What do the upcoming elections mean for China's operating in the gray zone?

Mr. Cooper agreed that the Chinese will likely use gray forces to defend military and territorial assets. The Chinese are currently building 10,000-ton coast guard ships. The Japanese wont have an answer for a Chinese fleet of 10,000-ton ships. The US is going to have to account for this. The Chinese have been very smart and calculating. The US Coast Guard ships to push their military disputes. This is an asymmetric technique the Chinese are using to avoid escalation. As for Taiwan, the big challenge will be whether the Chinese accepts what Taiwan wants. The US interest is to ensure that Taiwan is able to make its decisions on its own without being forced. Ultimately, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and Taiwan are all going to be important issues going forward, and we are going to have to deal with all three simultaneously.

With growth rates shifting between China and India, how do you see these two players affecting US policy and how should the US react to these trajectories?

Dr. Norris noted that it seems India has been able to overcome many of their domestic pressures. It looks like they are on a path towards continued growth. Therefore, it looks like there is a great opportunity for US-India relations going forward, something that both sides can capitalize upon. India seems to be taking a wait and see approach to how things play out in the region. It will be interesting to see how US-India relations align going forward, but India certainly presents a major strategic opportunity for the US.

What about using economic to influence China? Not just using sanctions, but taking advantage of the fact that a significant amount of China's resources are US treasury bonds.

Mr. Cooper noted that the kind of economic warfare that has been seen with Russia and Iran is not going to happen with China. China has not been animated toward the US. Additionally, China is much more integrated into the international system than

Russia and Iran, so the overall impact would likely impact the US and many other international players. Furthermore, the sanctions on Russia and Iran were supported in the international system. In this case, Europe has made it very clear that they would not support sanctions against the Chinese.

Panel 7: No War/No Peace…So it is Complex, But What Can we do About it?

Panel Members
- Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI), moderator
- Dr. Dana Eyre (SoSA), co-moderator
- Dr. Katherine Brown (United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy)
- Mr. Robert Jones (USSOCOM)

Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI)

Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois is Executive Vice President at NSI, Inc. She is also co-chair of a National Academy of Science's study on Strategic Deterrence Military Capabilities in the 21st Century. Over the past five years Dr. Astorin0-Courtois has served as technical lead on a variety of rapid turn-around, Joint Staff-directed Strategic Multi-layer Assessment projects in support of US forces and Combatant Commands. These include assessments of key drivers of political, economic and social instability and areas of resilience in South Asia for USCENTCOM, USPACOM and the intelligence community; development of a methodology for conducting provincial assessments for the ISAF Joint Command; production of a "rich contextual understanding" (RCU) to supplement intelligence reporting for the ISAF J2 and Commander; and two projects for USSTRATCOM on deterrence assessment methods.

Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois is Executive Vice President at NSI, Inc. She also co-chaired a National Academy of Science's study on Strategic Deterrence & Military Capabilities in the 21st Century, and a Congressionally-mandated study on US Space Defense and Protextion. Over the past seven years Dr. Astorino-Courtois has served as technical lead on a variety of rapid turn-around, Joint Staff-directed Strategic Multi-layer Assessment projects in support of US forces and Combatant Commands. These include developing models of key drivers of political, economic and social instability and areas of resilience in South Asia for USCENTCOM, USPACOM and the intelligence community; design and proto-typing of a Holitstic Engagement and Ranking Tool (HEART) to assist planners at USAFRICOM align planned engagement activities with Command objectives, development of a methodology for conducting provincial assessments for the ISAF Joint Command; production of a "rich contextual understanding" (RCU) to supplement intelligence reporting for the ISAF J2 and Commander; and two projects for USSTRATCOM on deterrence assessment methods.

Dr. Astorino-Courtois stated that the panel's charter was to consider broadly what the participants at the conference could do to promote and protect US national interests in a gray zone environment.

Dr. Astorino-Courtois articulated three main observations about the conference thus far: disagreement among panelists in what they meant by "gray zone," lack of discussion about what is to the "left of boom" in the gray environment, and the whole-of-government conundrum.

Definitions

First, although there seemed to be general agreement that our response to gray zone activities must be whole-of –government, Dr. Astorino-Courtois noted that she had heard the gray zone, and gray zone activities, defined first as a type of <u>conflict</u>. Note that in previous discussions, Dr. Hoffman placed the gray zone at the lower end of a conflict continuum, and Dr. Gorenburg referred to it as "ambiguous warfare." Other speakers used the term "gray zone" to refer to a theatre of operation somewhere in between peace to war. A second use of the term referred to gray zones as a set of new <u>conditions</u> within which the US military must learn to operate. For example, Mr. Jones wrote about a set of operational conditions that exist in the gray zone between war and crime that is characterized by ambiguity. Lastly, other speakers defined operations in a gray zone as a <u>strategy</u> intended by US adversaries to take advantage of our own bureaucratic and legal impediments. In particular, several speakers referred to China and Russia as having gray zone strategies. It is important to come to some common understanding as to what constitutes gray zone activity and what does not for a simple reason: How we define gray zone has implications for what we conclude should be done about it.

What is "left of boom"?

GEN Votel asked for analyses to get left of boom. The idea is to identify and mitigate threats before they erupt into military conflict. He said that staying in phase zero is victory. While there was little discussion of this, Dr. Astorino-Courtois suggested one way to look at this by asking the audience: "What is to the "left of boom"? She proposed that if we think of the area to the "right of boom" as the domain of threatened and military conflict, we might think about the operating space to left as the domain of opportunity. This domain includes acceptable, even if not preferable, competition among actors in the global system. We need to be clear about which domain we are really operating in when we study and make policy recommendations about how to respond to gray activities. Are we really seeing an operating environment rife with ambiguous activities that threaten our national security interests? Or, are we confusing conflict with acceptable competition in what we see as ambiguity activities? Perhaps there are gray threats and gray opportunities we can consider.

Whole-of-government

Dr. Astorino-Courtois' final observation was a call to action. She noted that over the years, there have been many speeches given, efforts conducted, and wringing of

hands regarding the general difficulty the US government has in applying whole-of-government approaches to national security issues. People rightly point to many reasons for this: organizational constraints, bureaucracy, technical and legal barriers, lack of guidance, limited authorities, etc. These are indeed critical and daunting challenges that are beyond the ability of any one person to change. Sometimes it seems that citing these enormous impediments makes us feel better because it allows us to shift responsibility away from ourselves.

Dr. Astorino-Courtois argued that while we all recognize that whole-of-government planning and action is hard, that does not mean we are individually off the hook. There is nothing to stop people from <u>thinking</u> in a whole-of-government manner. We who work in the DoD and interagency have a responsibility to consistently include the broadest spectra of national capabilities when we do our analyses; we can and should do our part in solving the whole-of-government conundrum by systematically considering the impact of trade, society and culture, economic consequences, political development—and even US domestic politics—when making our contributions to planning, analysis, and decision-making. We can think in a holistic way. We have to get out of our own way and just do it.

Instead of bemoaning the lack of what we see as necessary top-down changes, perhaps the problem with developing this capacity is that we have not moved on with what requires a grassroots movement that starts with all of us. Perhaps our ways of thinking about problems and solutions have to change before bureaucratic and legal changes can occur. In short, we can and should turn "whole-of-government" and "all elements of power" into a mode of thinking rather than a description of operations.

Dr. Katherine Brown (United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy)

Katherine Brown currently serves as the Executive Director of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy at the US Department of State, an office authorized by Congress to appraise and strengthen US engagement activities with foreign citizens. She previously served in the US government as an assistant to the National Security Advisor at the White House; as a communications advisor at the US Embassy in Kabul; and as a Professional Staff Member at the Committee on Foreign Affairs at the US House of Representatives. Katherine also worked throughout South Asia as a Communications Manager for The Asia Foundation and as one of the original editorial staff members for Bloomberg View, the opinion platform for Bloomberg News. She has served as an Adjunct Professor of international communications at American University and an Instructor of international politics at Columbia University, where she received her Ph.D. in Communications in 2013. Katherine completed her doctoral fieldwork in Afghanistan and Pakistan between 2010-2013, examining their emerging news media and civil societies. She is a Term Member at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Board Member of the Afghan Women's Writing Workshop.

Dr. Brown talked about civilian diplomatic perspectives in engaging foreign audiences. She agreed that the US needs to identify opportunities, not just threats,

that exist in the gray zone. The environment is ambiguous, but it provides space for relationship building and communication that we would normally ignore. The process of relationship building is long and arduous. We run the risk of taking tactical, short-term measures, something the Commission was just mandated by Congress to look at and explain what public diplomacy means in these environments. We need to take a long-term approach while meeting short-term goals in crisis situations.

Every year, the Commission produces a book[4] to outline what the State Department is doing with the 1.8 billion dollars allocated to engaging foreign audiences. The Commission also conducts research on understanding how public diplomacy and public engagement can be more effective, which increasingly involves taking a whole-of-government approach.

Dr. Brown spoke about academic grounding: where public diplomacy fits into international relations theory, the gray zone, and areas in need of attention. Public diplomacy fits into the international relations domain but is not owned by any one discipline. It is interdisciplinary, which is exciting as it has potential for collaboration across the social sciences.

Within international relations theory, liberalism says that stability emerges as we come closer into contact with one another. Meanwhile social construction theory emphasizes the importance of ideas, norms, and entities. It is important to look at norms in the social space. We need to rethink our assumptions about people.

Often the USG communicates from individual departments: State or Defense. But the international community does not recognize the tribal nature of the USG government. What they hear shapes their reality. The USG needs to communicate using actions, not just words.

Public diplomacy develops networks between governments and people, which is essential for maintaining peace. We need to know who the main nodes and who the influencers are. Who are they connected to and what are they saying? What values do our target audience hold? It used to be that the ultimate goal of public diplomacy was altruism, spreading our culture, and getting along with other nations. But that has changed in order to help pursue national security goals. It is not enough to focus on strategic communication and building relationship so messages can be more effectively heard. You have to build cultural and educational relations as well. We support whole-of-government approaches, especially when it works to debunk the myth that public diplomacy and relationship building is peripheral to state craft.

One space where public diplomacy is very effective is in broadcasting. We work to advance various foreign policy goals that can be specific to bilateral relations or

---

[4] 2015 Comprehensive Annual Report on Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting http://www.state.gov/pdcommission/reports/c68558.htm

regional issues. We work to ensure foreign publics understand the US in all of its complexity. We see a need for this in the gray space. The US is often seen through a hard power lens.

Dr. Brown gave examples of countries where public diplomacy aided in the gray space. In Vietnam in 1994, public diplomacy created conditions for normalized relations. Also, the establishment of the Fulbright award enhanced good will across the globe. Yet there remain challenges. Pakistan is the second most expensive public diplomacy mission. Anti-Americanism is in the DNA there. It is part of their education system. It is crucial to get them to see our complexity.

In Russia and China we know that education and cultural exchanges really matter to the national interest. Yet Putin has been shutting down all US public diplomacy efforts in the country. They closed 20 American programs in the last few years including student exchange program. Russia has a huge budget to challenge US public diplomacy efforts. The Commission has 4.5 million allocated to public diplomacy efforts with Russia that it does not want to lose.

On the other hand, we have a huge imbalance with China. China has over 200,000 students studying in the US and far few US students studying there. They have hundreds of institutes in the US and we have very few there. They understand that it is in their national interest to engage the American public.

So what do we recommend? We feel that while we understand that public diplomacy matters philosophically, we want to make it work better. We do not feel that information, education, and cultural tools are being strategically applied. Our work has focused on better media analysis and research, which is important, but should be scaled up. Also, we need better analytics in understanding digital media outreach. We need impact evaluations for how programs are advancing, or not. One issue is that we do not have a plan for countering Russian power. Public diplomacy can only advance foreign policy objectives. The other problem is that the State Department is risk averse. Everything has to be checked a million times. Embassies overseas are becoming increasingly isolated.

We need a whole-of-government approach. Interagency cooperation depends on leadership. I have found that interagency cooperation works well at the field level because they understand the urgency. We need to decentralize interagency efforts so we can work better and more quickly on the front lines.

Dr. Dana Eyre (SoSA)

Dr. Eyre is a sociologist specializing in the analysis, planning, coordination, and evaluation of social change and strategic communications activities. He holds a PhD in sociology from Stanford University. A former infantry and civil affairs officer, he has been a faculty member at the US Naval Postgraduate School, George Mason University, the US Military Academy, and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada. After working for the United Nations (in Kosovo) and the US Agency for International

Development (in Iraq and Washington, DC), he held a Jennings-Randolph Senior Fellowship at the United States Institute of Peace. His project experience ranges from the Balkans to Afghanistan to Papua New Guinea and he has supported peace building and counter-radicalization projects for Somalia, Pakistan, and the wider Middle East. At SOSA, he leads efforts to apply advanced analytical techniques to understanding and effective action in human domain problems.

Dr. Eyre noted, in response to the challenge posed by the title of the panel, as well as Mr. Wyatt's comments emphasizing the need for new frameworks for thinking, that the first requirement for dealing with "gray zone" conflicts was to think clearly about them. But to do this we need to step back and "think about how we think." It is not merely a matter of modifying old vocabularies, tweaking old assumptions, and thinking that minor adjustments to existing approaches will help us adapt. "Gray zone" conflict, Dr. Eyre argued, is reflective of fundamental changes in, and challenges to, the global "institutional order" that we have lived with since the mid-1950s. To deal with these challenges, we must, first and foremost, see the problem for what it is. And without broader theoretical perspectives, without new vocabularies, we cannot see, understand, or deal with the problems we face.

Dr. Eyre suggested that the old cartoon "Calvin and Hobbes" offers an insight. Calvin and Hobbes used to play a game – "Calvinball" – the only rule of which was "you can't play it the same way twice." That strikes us as absurd – after all, how can you have a game that does not have any rules about how you play it? Games, just like social life in general, are structured by sets of rules, informal and formal, implicit and explicit. Rules, formal and informal, are what make baseball baseball, and not cricket.

But even the most expansive and encompassing forms of social life—including social life at the global level—are structured by sets rules. At the global level, some are formal—the World Trade Organization, international treaties—others are informal—the belief in the concept of the nation-state, the belief that nation-states should have flags and armies, or a host of other associated beliefs. All of these beliefs, and the emotional attachments they generate, structure interaction. These sets of "constitutive rules" (so called because the rules 'constitute' the social order, the "game") are embedded in stories, explanations of why the rules are there, and identities (group labels); they structure flows of resources and networks of connections. Together, narratives, networks, interests, and identities structure social life. They provide social order, making day-to-day life reasonably predictable, and therefore livable. Sociologists call these interlocking "nests" of narratives, networks, interests, and identities, "institutions." The US Army is an institution—with a complex inter-locked set of stories, identities, resource flows, and networks that structure behavior and enact the institution. The globe has an institutionalized social order—less formal, in some

parts, than the U.S. Army and less detailed, in some ways, but nonetheless real and important. It is the social order on which US peace and prosperity depends.

Dr. Eyre noted that gray zone conflict, and the rise of "gray zone" conflict, represents a challenge to the extant global social order. Whether its Vladimir Putin, nationalist elements within China, or Daesh-inspired terrorists, practitioners of "gray zone conflict" want to challenge, and change, the established institutional global order. Putin wants a return to an older order—in which the world was divided into "spheres of influence," while Daesh seeks to establish a new global order, in which their "Caliphate" has a central place. What unites these distinct challenges is that they do not involve direct interests of the United States, in the classic sense of the term. None of the current conflicts, including those gray zone conflicts with China and other actors involves a classic, discrete national interest. Indeed, arguably, the US no longer has any such national interests—its only true national security interest is that the global order function in a way that allows Americans, and indeed the rest of the world—to go about their lives in peace and freedom, within a reasonably orderly rule-of-law governed space. We prosper, and secure, in proportion to the degree that the entire world can do business, go on vacation, live their lives, in a decent, just, and stable environment.

Observing that current conflicts come at a particular point in the history of globalization—a phenomena that has been going on at least since the Spanish doubloon served as the first truly global currency over 400 years ago—Dr. Eyre noted that the world truly is a single, integrated society, with a single industrial economy, a single communications system, and, increasingly, a single social structure. But Putin, and ISIL, object to the very nature of this system—its openness, its insistence (however imperfectly implemented) on the rights of individuals to associate, travel, do business, express their opinions, chose their governments—and its desire to have a functional system of governance for the peaceful resolution of disputes. In that sense, the problem is not our enemies; they are the symptoms of the problem. The challenge is building a functional and inclusive order in the face of new populations entering the system more fully, new technologies disrupting it, and environmental challenges.

The problem, then, the overarching set of circumstances that give rise to the very "non-traditional" and very challenging set of challenges we face, arises from the dynamics of globalization, and represents a challenge to the fundamental nature of the global social order. If the challenge is about the nature of the global order, the solution, then, must lie in the process of creating such an order.

Herbert Hoover unfortunately and unfairly marginalized in our historical memory, addressed this at the very depth of America's most critical existential

challenge—World War Two. In 1942, he wrote, "The purpose of this war, the most terrible of three centuries, is to make a lasting peace. We must first win the war. But we will not win the lasting peace unless we prepare for it…the vital question…is, by what means, what powers, what machinery, is peace to be made to prevail?"

Dr. Eyre noted that Hoover's challenge was ours. The current global order is the product of American values, aspirations, and extended effort, arguably from the founding of the Republic forward. Dr. Eyre highlighted Washington's understanding that following the institutionalized rules of "gentlemanly" behavior in the conduct of the American Revolution was key to establishing the nascent nation's reputation and place in the world. The current world order is an American world, in the best sense of the idea: democratic, in aspiration; governed by the rule of law, in many respects; and open, in large part, to the hopes and aspirations of its people. The global social order is, in large part, the product of American effort. Dr. Eyre asked, in this world, what is our national interest? He argued that it is, fundamentally, how the order functions. It is not any discrete issue or object, but the overall nature of the order. America is safe, and prospers, only to the degree that the wider world is safe, prospers, and functions in an orderly, rule-of-law governed manner. Dr. Eyre offered the example of a recent worldwide gathering of a Shia community in Houston. Over 25,000 Shia believers gathered from India, the Middle East, and South Asia in Houston to commemorate Ashura. That, he suggested, was a profound example of the sort of world that is in America's fundamental interest. Hotels in Houston and the people who came, all benefited. The challenge is understanding how we engage in this process of shaping world order.

Here, he noted, that although we obviously needed to address specific armed threats, that was not sufficient. We need continuity and sustained effort; whack-a-mole, we all understand, does not work. But we need to do more than "attack the network." We have to shift from enemy-centric thinking to system-centric thinking. It is only through shaping the system that we get out of the endless loop of instability. The challenge is crafting an asymmetric response to asymmetric challenges to the social order. How do we get ahead of the problems and shape the system? Dr. Eyre argued that the one truly asymmetric response to asymmetric conflict was producing a decent, just, functional social order. That, as hard as it is, is the one thing that the brutal, the cruel, the narrowly self-interested could not respond to.

Doing this is the underlying theory for the whole of government. Figuring this out at the field level often works because the problem is clear and immediate, and the pressures for cooperation large. The challenge is working this out at the global level, in the inter-agency so that we can lead. How to do this at he global level is not simple, but it can be done. It requires institutional change, breaking our rice bowls and overcoming "titanium cylinders of excellence." What we are doing is no longer war, or diplomacy, or development, it is, instead it "strategic social change." Everything we do should be about shaping the evolution of the system.

We need to think about the dynamics of the system in new metaphors, using new theory. We tend to think of power in Newtonian ways. We ask, "Which one person has the most power?" as if power was a thing to possess. What we are struggling with is how institutional order has changed the distribution of power. Institutions create power for some actors, reduce it for others. Stories generate flows of resources. Nation state have armies, armies need guns, for that you need a budget, etc., which develops capacity and concentration of power. Uber, in contrast, operating under the rules of the market (if you can invent it, you can sell it) disrupts economic and power structures for cab drivers and city governments. At the global level, Putin, for example, takes advantage of identity structures, networks, narratives, to control resources (extractive industry revenues) and in turns uses those to reinforce his power, his ability to tell stories, etc. He then takes advantage of weak institutional structures (e.g., in Ukraine) to cause disruption to the larger system. Understanding these systems, charting them and anticipating their dynamics, is the process of social science, and is our fundamental intelligence requirement in today's world. Social science is not going to give us a solution—a pill to take that will solve it all—but it can, Dr. Eyre argued give us the vocabulary, the theories, to see social systems, understand our current challenges, and design strategic social change efforts to address them. This is not easy, and it requires that we reflect, most importantly, on ourselves, but it is the only way to address current issues successfully and break out of the cycle of violence and instability.

Mr. Bob Jones (USSOCOM)

Robert C. Jones is a retired Army Special Forces Colonel currently serving as Strategic Advisor to the Director of Plans, Policy and Strategy for US Special Operations Command. Mr. Jones began his military career in West Germany during the Cold War and commanded an ODA in the 5th Special Forces Group, serving with the Egyptian Army during the first Gulf War. Upon leaving command, Mr. Jones returned to his home state to attend law school, and was serving as a Deputy District Attorney in Portland, Oregon on 9/11. Mobilizing soon thereafter, he went on to serve his final eight years of active service in a wide range of critical positions within the Special Operations enterprise, to include tours of service in the Philippines and Afghanistan.

The owner's manuals that Dr. Treverton spoke about did not work well when it came to conflicts like the Vietnam War. The USG is a Clausewitzian organization. We have this idea that war is war. We do not recognize the distinction between systems of government, which gets us into trouble. Samuel Huntington said America's problem is that it needs to recognize the world for what it is. We want to world to be what it used to be. In a globalized world, we have passed the point of key state power. Advances in technology have created the air, land, sea, and space domains. Each technological advance concentrates power in fewer and fewer actors until at last we reached US hegemony. Then we created the cyber domain and it had the opposite effect. It empowered individuals everywhere. Our Clausewitzian solution is that we need a hammer big enough to pound through population-based conflict.

SOCOM's Appreciation of the Strategic Environment

TRENDS → PRODUCES → GENERATES

- Climate Change
- Cyber & Information
- Economic Challenge and Fiscal Restraints
- Globalization
- Natural Resource Pressures / Demand
- Power Redistribution and Competition
- Science / Tech
- Shifting Demographics / Urbanization

Rapidly Shifting Power

States (Between)

Non-State Actors (Toward)

Populations (Toward)

Slowly Adjusting Privilege

Potential Energy*

Opportunity

State Potential Energy "E"

(Power + Interest)

SOF's Value Proposition: Ability to shift the strategic start point to the left, leveraging the maturity and adaptability of the force to create understanding, influence, and relationships to seize opportunity.

Population Potential Energy "e"

(Power + Grievance)

Kinetic Energy*

Threat

"Conflict Between"

"Gray zone" / illegal competition
Eroding deterrence
Policy friction/gaps

"Conflict Across & Among"

Trans-regional challenges
Internal instability + external exploitation
Hybrid of conflicts "between" & "within"

"Conflict Within"

Governance gaps
Instability and revolution
Populations have will & ability to resist perceived harm and illegitimate governance

Strategic Implications

People Matter

Identity-based populations are increasingly important

Popular Legitimacy is increasingly important

Potential energy = Opportunity

Influence > control

Deterrence demands new layers & greater SOF focus

Stability ≠ Stasis; it demands constant change

Friction arises from tactical solutions that are not framed by human nature, and tailored for local culture

Unaddressed political grievances will increasingly cause instability and attract internal & external exploitation

*Potential Energy: Occurs when a state's or population's power is greater than its privilege; it will seek to resolve the perceived imbalance.
**Kinetic Energy: Occurs when a state or population acts illegally or violently to seize privilege commensurate with its perceived power.

UNCLASSIFIED   J5 STRATEGY DIVISION   As of: 18 Sep 15

If our wonderful tactics and doctrine are not working, there is a reason. Maybe it is due to complexity. When Einstein's peers were trying to understand the universe, they tried to use experiments to understand it. He said stop thinking about which variables are constant. Nature is freakishly constant. Thought experiments lead to simple theories. The US military does not deal well with complexity. We take two approaches: we either are simplistic—give me an enemy and I will defeat him (which has not worked in population based conflict) or we will try to overmatch (calling for more intelligence, more ISR, more surge, etc.). It is part of the strategic culture that built the Panama Canal and put a man on the moon. We think that if we work hard enough, we can do anything. But how do we deal with complexity? Warfare is a human endeavor. There is a truism that the nature of war does not change but the character of war is infinitely different. Conflict internal to a single system is unique from political conflict between two or more systems. That is why sometimes massive losses contribute to victory while sometimes victory contributes to loss. We created a fictional government in north and south Vietnam. Their battle for independence began long before it, but we turned it into a Clausewitzian problem with a Clausewitzian solution. We were surprised when it did not work.

In conflict in an internal system, the sides compete for influence. Whether it is drone strikes or humanitarian aid, everything we do should bring some level of influence.

95

Popular legitimacy has become increasingly important in the strategic environment. The US does not full comprehend this. In the past, the US has worked to establish legal legitimacy and has largely ignored why the population might not recognize the right of the government to govern them. This is fundamentally important. This is equally true in foreign as well as domestic policy. Many populations ask what right the USG has to affect their life in the way it does. In the past, people did not matter as long as you had a deal with the government. In the current environment, people matter. Popular sovereignty means governing in a manner consistent with culture. We can tell people about democracy, but if that is not how people relate to government, then we are lost.

Ataturk was able to remove the Sultan because he had popular legitimacy. When we force change on people, we do not have legitimacy. We used to stand for self-determination. We need to return to our roots. We need to focus on justice, not the rule of law. The rule of law has pushed more people into revolution than pulled them out. What matters is how people feel about it.

Respect means a population perceives that it is being treated equally compared to other population groups. If you create a government that excludes some part of the population, it is not democracy; it is tyranny. For example, in Afghanistan, we excluded the Taliban. So they resisted and revolted against the new government.

Finally, we must provide an off ramp through empowerment. In the US, about half of the population had grievances under the Bush administration. Under Obama, half the population had grievances as well. But our population feels empowered. Even though we do not like the government, we believe in the governance system. Other people do not have this. We need to get to trust.

We have to remember that the insurgent is not the insurgency. He or she is a symptom of the insurgency.

In the current environment, there is shifting power at a time when sovereign privilege is frozen. The US is working to keep sovereign privilege stable. This is happening at a time when non-state actors (NSAs) are newly empowered. This is creating tremendous energy in states and populations, which is manifesting in conflicts between states, revolution, etc.

There are several implications. We need to recognize popular legitimacy, recognize energy within a system, and understand that influence is more important than control. Stability is not the same

as status. There will be lots of friction when we apply the wrong tactics. If we act early, there is a tremendous opportunity to influence. The better we understand shifts in power and populations, the more likely we are to be able to leverage opportunities. Who is thinking about Brazil, India, and Indonesia? That helps us get left of boom. This means that SOUTHCOM should get just as many resources as other commands in order to get in front of conflict.

Discussion

When I joined that national security community 13 years ago, we were talking about gray matter, the human domain, messaging, public diplomacy, etc. So how are we doing now?

Mr. Jones responded that next month GEN Votel will sign a strategic document that incorporates these themes into SOCOM. This will set the framework for how we approach gray zone activities and transregional campaigns. That is a huge change. So we are now starting to get traction.

Dr. Eyre responded that in the post-Vietnam era, the government said that operating in the gray zone is not its job. In the 1990s, I watched the Army learn everything it needed to operate in Afghanistan and Iraq, and they did not apply those lessons. Now there is a whole Command that says this is important. There has been grindingly slow progress, but it is progress in the right direction.

Panel 8: Question and Answer Session

Moderators: Dr. Ben Jensen (USMC & AU), Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI), Dr. Richard Lum (USPACOM), and Ms. Sarah Canna (NSI)

This panel was a discussion between the moderators and the audience. Questions were presented and answered by both participants and moderators.

What is gray zone competition, conflict, etc.? In particular, what do we do about it? What are the preferences and priorities that we need to work across different instruments of power to align in order to actually manage this? Additionally, is this new? Is there really anything new or novel to the idea of strategic competition that takes place beneath the threshold of what we traditionally associate with a forces needed in an undefined battlefield situation? Or, are there a set of fundamental trends that are changing the characteristics of our world in such a way that it is creating a set of new strategic problems that will alter how we generate forces, how we even think about a framework to engage a strategic competition, and how we think about managing gray power relationships?

A participant replied that no, this is not new. What we are talking about are human endeavors, which are framed by human nature. What we have to ask is, how is this

age-old drama unique in the current strategic environment? What is different today is the speed and the connectivity.

So, there are certain human elements of war that endure, but some of the aspects of today's environment are new, particularly speed and connectivity.

A participant stated that the speed of change is the difference today. New technologies are being created today that are disruptive to the model and changing things more rapidly than ever before.

So, the speed factor is different and interesting. How is this speed issue changing warfare? What does this mean in terms of what our competitors do?

A participant noted that beyond the speed factor, are competitors are not creating disorders, but instead they are now disrupting current social disorders. They are combining the speed component with these disruptions.

So, it is not just speed, but we also have an important inflection point and international order and network of privilege and power that is being disrupted. It is both speed and the cracking point of whether or not powers are willing to accept this international order.

A participant wondered if the only thing that is different today is the increased willingness of our adversaries to act.

This gets to another point. Should we care? Should we actually prefer that we have gray zone competition? Is there a certain acceptable domain for strategic competition? Should we embrace the competition?

A participant stated that the conjunction of modern technology and the end of the Cold War has freed up human aspiration. During the Cold War, the macro controlled everything. After the Cold War, and with growing development of technologies, the micro has more and more become able to influence the macro. Because of this, in today's environment, we have to meet the human aspirations more than in the past.

The micro idea and individualism is interesting. Additionally, it seems that we have moved from thinking about larger strategic competition to holding each other hostage. We have transitioned to this idea of counter individual targeting. Is this the trajectory that we are taking?

A participant noted that the speed component now makes us feel vulnerable because as a force we cannot respond as quickly as things are now changing. Our response systems are so slow. Ultimately, this scares us.

A participant added that this is not anything new. We used to call this grand strategy: using all instruments of state and national power to conduct influence operations. What is new is what this all means for how we use military force. There are not many instances where US military forces were confronted with the idea that they may need to conduct combat operations against law enforcement agencies or civilians. This is something that could arise in future gray zone conflicts. We need clearer guidance on these things.

A participant noted that there is a cost-benefit analysis that we need to make. What are the payoffs and risks of challenging other country, group, organization, etc. activities in the gray zone? What are we willing to challenge? What are we not willing to challenge? For example, is it even in the US strategic interest to challenge China in the South China Sea?

A participant stated that there are two different things going on today. One is great power conflict below the threshold of high-level state warfare. This is something that has gone on for centuries. What is different now, though, is the great powers are taking advantage of what is new with the 21st century. They are taking advantage of rising individualism at the micro level. People today feel more empowered. What we have today is an absence of submission by angry people. This is new. Before, they were helpless. Today, because of social media, people are not giving up what they believe in and want. They are resorting to opposition, protesting, and even self-organizing. Great powers today are exploiting this and taking advantage of it. They are reaching out to groups who are willing to take serious action.

A participant added that cyber is new today. In cyber today, we are contested every day. The difference between a national security incident and a law enforcement incident is widely debated throughout the government. We are a technologically advanced country that is dependent on cyber capabilities and conduits, so the role of the US military and USG in that realm now also has the threat. We can easily say what we would do to a destroyer that tries to shell a US city, but are unable to provide that same clarity for someone who is attacking via cyber or stealing information via cyber. The challenge that we have today is that we have to figure out all of these multiples of problems at a rate that is unprecedented, at a rate that policy cannot keep up with, and at a rate that is adapting far beyond our capabilities. It takes two years to process a theater campaign plan in DoD.

So, it is an enduring form of strategic competition whose character is changing because of variables including speed, democratization of human anger and aspiration, and the opening of the ability for the micro to challenge the macro. Looking internally at ourselves, we have a bureaucracy that is coming up short in trying to manage this problem.

A participant noted that we have talked about the military and what it can do in the gray zone. However, countries like Russia are playing by different rules. Putin has

been able to engineer societies, in Georgia for example, that he will be able to protect moving forward. What Putin has that we don't have is continuity. The US doesn't have political continuity. Do we have the political will to engage such a threat as Putin?

A participant stated that we have a post Cold War structure that inhibits us from engaging in 21st century competition. Only Americans are arrogant enough to divide the global geography into COCOMs. The message this sends everyone in the world is that Americans are arrogant. People abroad think we are only there to do things that benefit us. What we need to do is reorganize the US government to be more competitive, agile, responsive, and active in the 21st century.

We have a big bureaucracy, but is it actually more effectively at handling gray zone conflict than we give it credit? Maybe when we see a reluctance to actually engage in this new form of gray competition, it is actually a form of strategic prudence. Maybe gray zone competition isn't actually bad?

A participant added that bureaucracy isn't our hindrance. It seems that the attractive level of conflict is the status quo. The problem is with our definitions. It would be helpful to understand what US national interests are and then clearly define them.

Is Putin and China correct that the US is actually the master of gray zone conflict? Is what they are doing a response to what they think we have been doing to them for the past decade? Is the US actually better at complex strategy than we give ourselves credit for?

A participant noted that one reason for the stability/instability paradox in the Cold War is that both the US and Soviet Union bought into the idea that their system was the best fit for them. Ambiguity in gray zone conflict is used as a strategic tool to get more because you are threatening to ruin the entire system for a short-term gain. This is very dangerous. Putin is intentionally committing actions that have the potential to break the entire system in order for him to get what he wants.

A participant noted that what the US has done in Afghanistan and Iraq put the entire system at risk to get what it wants.

A participant stated that anonymity is another factor today. A lot of our enemies are actually anonymous. In cyber space, there is anonymity. Additionally, there is a new ideology at a different level—a level we haven't seen before. There is a lack of morality today. The types of violence we hear about today didn't exist in World War 1. Finally, the level of awareness has also increased across the world. People know what is going on all over the globe. A lot of what is happening today could have never happened in the past.

A participant noted that we tend to focus on conflict and friction points, but there is also a game of out cooperating going on. If you look at Africa, it is a battle between Chinese efforts to buy minerals and influence and Coca Cola. The idea of relative cooperative competition with who builds the densest networks is what seems to be taking place.

A participant added that one of the things that makes gray zone conflict different is attribution. Who did what and did they do it on purpose? If you cannot determine attribution clearly, how can you even start to think about deterrence? The key to deterrence is knowing who did something. The credibility of your threat is essential for effective deterrence.

A participant wondered what would a gray campaign would look like, other than just what we have seen from Putin. For example, if there was simultaneously a cyber attack in Japan, some kind of ground activity in Europe, and an attack on a satellite, each on their own not being that critical but together creating a significant effect. Would we be able to connect all of these and see them as a campaign or single action?

A participant noted that clearly the idea of the gray zone has emerged as the current dominant construct and model to frame everything. But, is this in fact the best model? Is this the reframing that we should end up with? Or, is this just the first attempt or is it the best attempt?

A participant responded that we should never stop developing and should never freeze some sort of concept of what is going on. It is too complex to stop developing it. It is too dynamic to have just one answer.

Conclusion

Dr. Cabayan thanked the moderators, panelists, and attendees for participating in the conference. He asked participants to think about and propose ideas for next year's conference.