## DEFINING A STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN FOR WORKING WITH PARTNERS TO COUNTER AND DELEGITIMIZE VIOLENT EXTREMISM

A Strategic Multilayer Assessment Project

19-20 May 2010

Prepared for: US Department of State RAND Corporation JS/J-3/DDGO STRATCOM/GISC OSD/DDRE/RRTO

Prepared by: Ashley Arana, Tessa Baker, & Sarah Canna NSI, Inc. (301) 466-2265 <u>scanna@nsiteam.com</u> This report represents the views and opinions of the workshop participants. The report does not represent official administration policy or position.

## CONTENTS

Strategic Communications Workshop: Areas of Panelist Agreement & Divergence	5
Executive Summary	8
Introduction (Dr. Hriar Cabayan & Mr. Todd Leventhal)	13
Opening Comments (Pradeep Ramamurthy)	14
Session 1: Trajectories of Terrorism	
Dr. Dipak Gupta (San Diego State)	15
Tom Rieger (Gallup)	17
Dr. John Horgan (Penn State University)	19
Dr. Sherifa Zuhur (Institute of Middle Eastern, Islamic and Strategic Studies)	21
Dr. Angela Trethewey (Arizona State University)	24
Dr. Frank Furedi (University of Kent)	26
Unattributed Speaker (USG)	27
Danny Campos (USSOCOM)	28
An All-of-Government Approach to Countering Violent Extermism: The Value of Interagency Planning (Dan Sutherland, Shaarik Zafar, & An Unattributed Speaker)	20
Session 2: What Constitutes "Delegitimization"?	
Mehdi Khalaji (Washington Institute for Near East Policy)	
Dr. Benjamin Nickels (START, University of Maryland)	
Dr. Eric Larson (RAND Corporation)	
Dr. Tawfik Hamid (Potomac Institute)	
Dr. Karl DeRouen (University of Alabama)	
Dr. Cheryl Benard (a consultant for RAND Corporation)	
Dr. Walid Phares (National Defense University)	
Dr. Latéfa Belarouci (Consultant)	
Dr. Paul Davis (RAND Corporation)	
Session 3: Strategic Campaigns to Diminish and Deflate Radical Islamist Threats	
CAPT Wayne Porter (OCJCS)	
Farah Pandith (Department of State)	
Dr. Qamar-ul Huda (USIP)	
Ziad Alahdad (Former Director of Operations at the World Bank)	
Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi (WORDE)	
Unattributed Speaker (USG)	
Dr. Bill McEwen (Gallup)	49

Dr. Gregory Michaelidis (Department of Homeland Security)	50
Scott Carpenter (Washington Institute for Near East Policy)	50
Session 4: Day One Wrap-up	51
Radicalization	53
The Gensis of Terrorism in Algeria (Dr. Latéfa Belarouci)	53
From Afghanistan to Mexico: Explaining Radical Behavior? (Alexis Everington)	54
Radicalization and the Battle of Values (Dr. Frank Furedi)	58
The Turn to Political Violence (Dr. Marc Sageman)	62
Stories, Identities, and Conflict: The Narrative of Political Violence (LtCol Bill Casebeer)	65
Influence & Deterrence	70
Extremist Narratives and Influence (Dr. Angela Trethewey)	70
Mega Trends of Terror: Explaining the Path of Global Spread of Ideas (Dr. Dipak Gupta)	73
Deradicalization & Counter-Radicalization	76
Assessing the Effectiveness of Deradicalization Programs (Dr. John Horgan)	76
A Strategic Plan to Defeat Radical Islam (Dr. Tawfik Hamid)	80
Muslim Democrats as a Counter-Strategy to the Jihadist Radicalization (Dr. Walid Phares)	84
Wrap Up (Dr. Paul Davis)	87
Appendix A: Agenda	90
Appendix B: Participants	93
Appendix C: Acronyms	95

## STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS WORKSHOP: AREAS OF PANELIST AGREEMENT & DIVERGENCE

Rather than a typical executive summary, this section highlights the major points of agreement and difference among panelists attending the "Defining a Strategic Campaign for Working with Partners to Counter and Delegitimize Violent Extremism" Workshop, 19-20 May 2010 at Gallup World Headquarters in Washington, DC.

#### Shaping Discourse

Engage the Muslim world to address concerns using appropriate language and jargon, and as partners rather than adversaries.

Most foreign policy actions communicate something about America to the world and are, thus, strategic communications. The impact of such actions are a function of the substance of policy actions themselves; the messages they send to various audiences; how they are orchestrated and explained; and message reinforcement, i.e., the degree to which the USG appears to do what it says it will do.

A successful strategic communications campaign to address violent Islamist extremism must therefore involve both actions and words. It requires the United States Government to credibly engage the Muslim world. Panelists noted that this can and should be accomplished by forging strategic alliances with governments of Muslim populations, Muslim leaders, academics, and the private sector. Caution must be taken: the credibility of government, leaders, academics, etc. can be eroded by affiliation with the United States. In the end, the United States and its allies will benefit from a broader and more diverse set of mainstream Muslim voices and citizen messengers -- even when they criticize the West. However, others expressed doubt in the ability of the United States to identify and successfully work with credible, mainstream Muslim voices. Additionally, some participants noted that the United States is not as effective as some of our adversaries in communicating with target populations nor can the United States react fast enough to compete with local communications.

Panelists disagreed as to whether a US-led strategic communication strategy could be at all effective in reducing Islamist-based political violence. Regardless, most agreed that the United States is in no position to define terminology or to direct or shape discussions about religion and the "proper" interpretation of Islam with Muslim communities. This type of discourse must come from within the communities themselves. Panelists also generally agreed that it is unadvisable to view the concepts of "violence" and "justice" from a purely Western perspective. Consequently, the US needs to be very cautious and humble about the role of strategic communication.

Developing a national strategic campaign plan is important for coordinating a whole-of-government approach and for synchronizing efforts among the departments of our government, and with our allies, Muslim organizations, and NGOs. As a first step, the US should clearly communicate its values and what it stands for. Many panelists believed that the US would be more successful in engaging the Muslim world if it advocated its own principles and values rather than focusing on those it opposes. Consider that Al Qaeda's reputation and standing in the Muslim world have been damaged more by complicity in the deaths of innocent Muslims than by anything the United States has or could have done. It is important to communicate that the United States has broader interests in the region than countering terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.

#### Vocabulary: Extreme Islamist vs. Jihadist

## Using the lexicon of violent extremism and Jihad may have deleterious effects on the US mission and objectives.

There was a good deal of discussion – and disagreement – over the proper term to use in describing the adversary in this conflict (e.g., Islamists, Jihadis, radical Islamists, violent radical extremists, etc.). Panelists did agree that the ways in which the United States uses vocabulary and themes is critical to the success of its strategic communication efforts, but disagreed over the details of the language to be used. A number argued that in the Muslim world an "*extreme Islamist*" is understood to be a person who is an orthodox Muslim – not a bad thing at all. Similarly, there was disagreement over whether using the term "*jihadist*" as a derogatory term was appropriate or not. In fact, some argued, labeling violent extremists "jihadists" validated their cause and corroborated the message that they are legitimate defenders of Islam. Others countered that because *jihad* is a religiously legitimate term, the US has no reasonable basis for deciding whether violent extremists are legitimate or not. That is a role for the Muslim community.

#### "The Enemy"

It is important to employ multi-perspective, tailored approach to counter-terror strategic communications.

Workshop participants agreed that it is folly to speak of violent Islamist extremism as a monolithic movement. The problem must be evaluated from a multi-method or a systems perspective that can accommodate multiple levels of analysis (e.g., individuals, groups, regions, etc.) to identify possible leverage points. Ultimately, the success of counter terrorist campaigns will rest on the silent majority of Muslims – that is, the mainstream voices, not necessarily those who seem "moderate" by Westerns standards -- to rise up and challenge violent extremism.

#### Causes of Violent Extremism

Violent extremism cannot be reduced to one singular or simple cause; rather it is connected to a number of interconnected issues and dissatisfactions.

Panelists rejected longstanding notions that violent Islamist extremism is caused solely by psychological deficiencies, poverty, region, tribe, discrimination, internet or other media, concern over the Israel-Palestine conflict, or simply Islam itself. Indeed, while religion is an important component of both the development of violent extremism and successful efforts to counter it, it was argued that the West tends to overemphasize religion in this case. Rather, religion is only one component of a multi-dimensional problem that will require a multifaceted approach. That said, others believed that Salafi-style teachings of Islam are themselves a profound threat because they are ubiquitous and teach intolerance and hatred.

Many panelists saw the emergence of violent extremism among Muslims as founded in a general sense of disorientation and cultural confusion. In this sense, violent extremism may be seen to arise

from a countercultural movement that rejects materialism and modernity as eroding cultural identity. Some suggested that among young adults, being countercultural has always been "cool." The most accessible means of expressing youthful angst among Muslims is radicalization. Some argued that violent Islamist extremism is just another wave of history, which will fade in time. Others argue that violent Islamist extremism is born of legitimate grievances and will not subside until the grievances are addressed.

#### Deradicalization vs. Disengagement from Violent Radical Acts

## The difficulties of pursuing deradicalization and delegitimization are many; the first of which is whether either is an appropriate goal.

One participant stated that delegitimizing violence in the name of Islam is a very complicated process that would require application of a new mode of interpretation of existing text and teachings - a new Quranic hermeneutics. That is, it would require delegitimizing the underlying paradigms of Islamic thinking and belief that are the foundation of orthodox belief and violent extremism alike.

Moreover, disengagement from radicalization is not the same thing as deradicalization. One of the foundations of US political ideology is that people are free to hold all manner of radical views, as long as, in the pursuit of those views, individuals do not negatively impact or impede the rights of others. Most panelists agreed that, in and of itself, radicalization does not always lead to violent extremism. It is more appropriately considered an important risk factor. It was suggested that *disengagement from violence* was a much more feasible objective than either *deradicalization* or *delegitimization* of violent extremism. Extremists become legitimized if they can cite a theological basis for their activities. If the objective is to delegitimize them, one needs to work with mainstream elements of society and religious leaders.

However, getting people to disengage from violence only scratches the surface of extremism. The public must believe that violent extremists are not doing the right thing. However, getting the message "right" will not change entrenched views. Therefore, a variety of intervention methods is required. An example of one such intervention would be supporting outlets where Muslims could vent their anger. Currently, the main avenues of frustration are extremist websites, mosques, and organizations.

#### Global vs. Targeted Approach to Deradicalization

#### It is import to focus on local issues in pursuing deradicalization.

It is often said that all politics are local and that a local grievance will trump a national or international issue every time. Research indicates that historically the balance of terrorism has been locally spawned and grown. Some panelists argued, therefore, that the US government must concentrate its messages and other resources "where things are happening," i.e., on the local level. Additional panelists cautioned, however, that while counter-radicalization efforts certainly benefit from targeted, local efforts, there must be a strategic plan as well that coordinates efforts across the government and guarantees that the US's messages are consistent and "a single voice." Most agreed that it was possible for the United States to maintain a strategic global message – for example, one based on defining and highlighting US beliefs and values -- while still fashioning targeted, local efforts to thwart radicalization and encourage disengagement.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Dr. Hriar Cabayan, OSD, welcomed the participants on behalf of the Department of Defense (DoD), the State Department (DoS), and the RAND Corporation to the *Defining a Strategic Campaign for Working with Partners to Counter and Delegitimize Violent Extremism* workshop held from 19-20 May 2010 at Gallup World Headquarters in Washington, DC. The workshop focused on strategic communications and violent extremism and was designed to inform decision makers and was not intended as a forum for policy discussion. The workshop emerged from an SMA- and AFRL-sponsored white paper entitled *Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-radicalization and Disengagement.*<sup>1</sup> As the white paper was being written, it came to Dr. Cabayan's attention that Dr. Paul Davis at the RAND Corporation was writing an integrative literature review on the subject.<sup>2</sup> The RAND report was entitled *Simple Models to Explore Deterrence and More General Influence in the War with Al-Qaeda*. Building on that, CAPT Wayne Porter wrote a paper on the strategic campaign to counter and delegitimize violent extremism, which resulted in the genesis of this workshop.

The workshop was organized as a series of panel discussions and individual discussion sessions. This executive summary is organized by session for ease of reading and use.

#### **Opening Remarks: Pradeep Ramamurthy**

Pradeep Ramamurthy, Senior Director for Global Engagement on the White House's National Security Council (NSC), began the conference with a discussion of how the current Administration defines countering violent extremisms (CVE) and strategic communications. He then provided an overview of key communication and engagement goals and objectives, highlighting that CVE was one of the Administration's many priorities. Mr. Ramamurthy then provided an outline of critical elements of strategic communications that should stay in participants' minds for the duration of the conference; noting (1) the importance of coordinating words and actions that involves an all-of-government approach; (2) the need to do a better job of coordinating multiple messaging efforts across agencies; and, (3) listening and engaging with target communities on topics of mutual interest, not just terrorism. He sought to emphasize that the conference served as an invaluable launching point for government introspection and the injection of new ideas from outside experts.

#### Session 1: Trajectories of Terrorism

Dr. Laurie Fenstermacher, AFRL, and Dr. Paul Davis, RAND Corporation, moderated the first session of the day on the causes and trajectories of terrorism from perceived socio-economic and political grievances to recruitment and mobilization. The participants, who included representatives from government, industry, and academia, spoke on a variety of related issues including the dynamics and tactics of violent non-state actor (VNSA) communications and decision-making, the role and importance of ideology, and the key causes of popular support for terrorism and insurgencies. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Laurie Fenstermacher, Larry Kuznar, Tom Rieger, & Anne Speckhard (Eds). (2010). *Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-radicalization and Disengagement.* Washington, DC: Strategic Multilayer Assessment and Air Force Research Lab.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin (Eds). (2009). *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together* (Santa Monica, California: RAND).

panelists reinforced the need for tailored strategies for individuals based on their motivation (e.g., ideology, self-interest, fear) or based on other factors (e.g., Type 1 or 2 radicals, fence sitters)such as the need to focus on "pull" factors (recruiting, compelling narratives/messages) versus "push" factors and the need to understand ideology and associated terms. Also asserted was the need to target strategies towards the function of ideology (e.g., naturalization, obscuration, universalization and structuring) with culturally and generationally sensitive strategies, which are not based on inappropriate generalizations of past strategies, groups, or movements. Finally, the panel stated that some models need to be changed if they are to be truly useful in understanding terrorism (e.g., rational actor models may need to include altruism). This first panel (taken together with the reference materials) provided a snapshot of the current understanding of terrorism from the perspective of social science. As the first session of the conference, the panel discussion served to provide a common understanding and foundation for the remainder of the workshop.

## Working Lunch: An All-of-Government Approach to Countering Violent Extremism: The Value of Interagency Planning

Two representatives of the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) and another representative of the USG outlined the key components of an All-of-Government approach to countering extremism. The NCTC coordinates the efforts of various agencies like the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI on issues of counterterrorism; consequently, they have significant experience in the domestic context. The critical element of the NCTC approach is the importance of "going local" or structuring interventions and responses within the context of a given community, thereby recognizing the inherently local nature of the radicalization process. The NCTC representatives noted the critical importance of getting outside the Beltway and implementing micro-strategies. An unattributed speaker then spoke about the importance of understanding the language that the United States uses to deal with violent extremists and the danger of using the language and the narrative of violent extremism because it only perpetuates their message to the rest of the world. The USG needs to do a better job of communicating its objectives and working with communities to develop solutions to deal with extremist violence. Partnerships with communities have been important tools in helping to address issues of violence, such as gangs, and can be a valuable resource to address the issue of extremist violence. Ensuring that US actions and words are synchronized, and not in contradiction to each other, is critical. As a federal government, the United States must work hard to better understand the complexity of extremist violence by working with state and local authorities, academics, and communities.

#### Session 2: Whether Violent Islamists Groups Can, in Fact, be Delegitimized?

The panelists of Session 2 were somewhat divided on whether delegitimizing extremists should be approached from a religious perspective or if efforts should be focused on eliminating or minimizing contributing factors. Some participants emphasized the importance of making use of the religious jargon and institutions (like Fatwas) to marginalize the leaders and participants in violent extremists in the eyes of their broader religious communities; indeed, one panelist recommended changing the underlying Quranic hermeneutics to recognize the historical nature of the Quran. Other panelists were wary of labeling extremism as a religious problem, because radicalization and extremism are not new developments in the Middle East; it existed during the nationalist campaigns of the 1960s much as it does today. Almost universally, panelists acknowledged that the West needs to do a better job of selling its own message of what it is that it stands for and what it tries to do in the international community.

#### Session 3: Strategic Campaign to Diminish Radical Islamist Threats

Session 3, moderated by CAPT Wayne Porter and Special Representative to Muslim Communities Farah Pandith, focused on several features of an effective campaign to combat radicalization. However, there was major contention regarding the degree to which the United States should focus on its own views and reputation versus focusing on supporting other groups or focusing on strategic communication in terms of other countries. Nonetheless, the session reached consensus on several major points including supporting historical traditions and customs of indigenous Muslim cultures and closing the say/do gap to increase consistency. This consistency will lead to credibility, which is critical in conjunction with whether the message is compelling and whether it connects with the audience. It was also considered important to align government, private sector, and Muslim leaders to forge strategic alliances. This empowerment of many voices creates competition for radicals attempting to monopolize communications to these populations and allows the United States to partner with and support potential leaders. Such an empowerment strategy also allows the United States to implement a wide variety of approaches and employ diagnostic measures to recalibrate over time. Ultimately, whether it is by telling the story of modernity, shining a light on outreach efforts, or just assisting those around the world who are countering extremists for their own reason, the approach must be sustainable and global in nature.

#### **RADICALIZATION:**

#### Belarouci: The Genesis of Terrorism in Algeria

Dr. Latéfa Belarouci, a consultant, offered a historical overview of the development of fundamentalism and extremism in the Algerian context, noting that it was not a recent development, but instead grew out of the colonial experience. When the French colonized Algeria, they robbed the Arab populations of their identities, engaging in ethnic politics that equated the darker skinned, Arabic speaking Arabs as something different from the paler skinned Berbers and the French themselves. This destruction of collective identity and the subsequent marginalization of native politics created an environment fertile for Muslim extremism. After the accession to independence, the first constitution enshrined the special place of Islam and Arabic in the Algerian psyche and the 1994 amnesty gave terrorists reprieve, though not necessarily to their victims. Fundamentally, Dr. Belarouci's presentation illustrated the importance of understanding the historical context when confronting terror and extremism.

#### **Everington: From Afghanistan to Mexico**

Alexis Everington of SCL made a presentation outlining recurrent themes relevant to radicalization that had arisen from projects SCL had conducted around the world. Key themes for consideration in strategic communications included: mobilizing fence sitters; identifying the correct target population; managing perceptions of common enemies; engaging in local infospheres effectively; controlling the event and the subsequent message; making use of credible messengers; and understanding the importance of perceived imbalance. Everington noted that these themes are shared but are important to different degrees. Strategic communication must acknowledge, understand, and use these themes and their levels of importance, in the fight against radicalization.

#### Frank Furedi: Radicalization and the Battle of Values

Dr. Furedi of the University of Kent, UK offered findings from his research and his experience as an observer of events in Europe. He concluded by attempting to refute six key myths including: that radicalization is predicated in an ideology; that radicalized individuals suffer from some psychological deficiency; that extremism is driven by poverty or discrimination; that the internet is a key mobilizer or cause of extremism; that oppressive acts abroad (i.e., Israel and Palestine) motivates extremism; and finally, the notion that extremism is directly related to Islam.

#### Sageman: The Turn to Political Violence

Dr. Sageman of the Foreign Policy Research Institute elaborated upon his view of the transition process to radicalization and then extremism. He detailed the stages of engagement with radicalism from disenchantment and the development of a sense of community with counter-cultural forces to further involvement and sometimes violent extremism. He noted that it was very rare for someone to be caught up in a counter-cultural milieu and then end up undertaking terrorist actions; however, he noted that much of this transition occurs at a very local, micro level - not through the internet or other media.

#### **Casebeer: Stories, Identities, and Conflict**

Dr. (LtCol.)Casebeer's presentation illustrated the power of narratives to motivate action and to provide an internally resonant message and rationale for action. He detailed the common structure of narratives and how they engage cognitive structures and impact reasoning, critical thinking, and morality. Fundamentally, he concluded that stories help mediate the divide between the initial stimulus to act and the ultimate action, if it ever reaches that point.

#### **INFLUENCE/DETERRENCE**

#### **Trethewey: Identifying Terrorist Narrative and Counter-Narratives**

Dr. Trethewey of Arizona State University offered a background on narratives throughout history and their uses in today's context. In terms of the narratives themselves, and why they are critical to understand, humans have acted as narrators throughout history. Historically narratives have helped to answer three questions:

- How do people connect new information to existing knowledge?
- How do people justify the resulting actions we take?
- How do people make sense of everyday life?

Understanding narratives provides a shorthand introduction into cultural comprehension. The critical components of narrative systems are stories, story form, archetypes, and master narratives. Narratives do not provide a full history or full understanding, but perhaps they provide a shorthand understanding that can prevent or reduce the possibility of making strategic communication gaffes. Additionally, it may suggest something about how to amplify the voices that are doing some interesting narrative work. However, it was agreed upon that the United States needs to be careful in invoking narratives of ridicule, but explore how those narratives work in contested populations. Ultimately, the environment has a lot to do with how a radical message resonates with a population. The master narrative then is always grounded in cultural, social, historical, and religious assumptions and radical extremists take up and appropriate those narratives for their own ends.

The role of the US government should be to better understand those narrative strategies and work toward more effective, equally-culturally grounded counter narratives.

#### Gupta: Mega Trends of Terror: Explaining the Path of Global Spread of Ideas

Dr. Gupta of San Diego State University presented the reasons why messages spread within societies. He began with the messengers, arguing that there are three main actors who are present and extraordinarily important to the spread of ideas. The first actor is the connector. The connectors are the social networkers with connections to many people and with the necessary social skills to connect people to other people or ideas. Then there is the maven or "the accumulator of knowledge." This actor is a theoretician. The third critical actor is the salesman. Dr. Gupta noted that these individuals are present in many of the social and religious movements around the world. He then concluded that the environment or context must be ripe. Lastly, the message itself must stick to the receivers, or those who are necessary to support a movement. Dr. Gupta discussed three factors that cause a message to stick: simplicity, a compelling storyline, and the idea of impending doom should the audience not act. Ultimately, any individual within an audience who is captivated by the message will seek out the opportunity.

#### **DERADICALIZATION AND COUNTER-RADICALIZATION**

#### Horgan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Deradicalization Programs

Dr. Horgan of Penn State University emphasized the importance of distinguishing between deradicalization and disengagement in terms of violent extremists. In his research, Dr. Horgan has interviewed over 100 respondents—only one had said that he had no other choice but to join a radical group. He outlined key push factors for disengagement including disillusionment with the goals of the group and the group's leadership. He also outlined the key objectives of deradicalization programs while highlighting the problems faced by deradicalization programs in Saudi Arabia.

#### Hamid: A Strategic Plan to Defeat Radical Islam

Dr. Hamid of the Potomac Institute emphasized the importance of confronting radicalization on its own territory using the metaphor of disease - not only must one treat the symptoms of the disease (terrorism), but one also has to treat the disease itself (the radical ideology). His key recommendations were related to preventing the formation of passive terrorists (on the fence) and interrupting the transition of the latter to active ones. These recommendations included making use of Fatwas denouncing terrorism; exploiting rumors to denigrate the heroic image of radicals; and instilling a sense of defeat in the mind of the radicals. Fundamentally, he emphasized the importance of understanding the underlying cultural paradigms that underpin these social movements. Additionally, based upon his personal experiences with and observations of radical Islamic groups over the last 25 years, he considered radical religious ideology to be the most crucial component of both the development of radicalization and any successful interventions against it.

#### **Phares: Muslim Democrats**

Dr. Phares, National Defense University, argued that there was irrefutable evidence that extremists were motivated by a similar and comprehensible ideology—that of global jihadism with two main threads: Salafism and Khomenism. Despite this jihadist underpinning, observers, and others in the

West must be careful to distinguish between the three main threads of jihadism in usage: Jihad in theology, in history, and in modern times, which represents the current movement.

#### Davis: Day Two Wrap Up

Dr. Paul Davis of the RAND Corporation synthesized many of the ideas that had been discussed over the two-day workshop. He noted that throughout the workshop there had been consensus as well as debate. One of the points that participants have agreed upon is that it is folly to speak about "terrorists" as a monolith. It is critical to take a systems perspective where the individual components are differentiated, providing a number of leverage points for counterterrorism. Another striking debate that has taken place over the two-day workshop involved the relative emphasis that should be placed on the ideological end or religious aspects of the problem. Those who take the broadest view see the troubles the world is going through as another wave that will resolve itself in its own time. However, that sanguine view assumes that countervailing forces will eventually succeed. Conference participants are part of such countervailing forces. Dr. Davis also highlighted discussion over whether the United States should focus on its own values and stories or on focusing strategic messages about critical issues such as interpretations of Islam. Most conference attendees, he said, were skeptical about the latter. He also discussed lessons learned from the Cold War about the value of truthfulness and credibility in strategic communications, as distinct from baser forms of propaganda. Overall, Dr. Davis pointed out that many of the points that appeared to be in conflict at the conference are not necessarily so when it is realized that the United States can maintain one focus at the strategic level and allow those who are closer to the action to focus on the tactical, contextual, level.

## INTRODUCTION (DR. HRIAR CABAYAN & MR. TODD LEVENTHAL)

Dr. Hriar Cabayan, OSD, welcomed the participants on behalf of the Department of Defense (DoD), the State Department, and RAND Corporation to the *Defining a Strategic Campaign For Working with Partners to Counter and Delegitimize Violent Extremism* workshop held from 19-20 May 2010 at Gallup World Headquarters in Washington, DC. Dr. Cabayan thanked Tom Rieger and Gallup for hosting the workshop. Dr. Cabayan particularly extended a welcome to those who traveled to the workshop from abroad as well as representatives from the many government agencies in attendance including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the National Security Council (NSC), and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC).

The workshop focused on strategic communications and violent extremism. The workshop was designed to inform the decision maker and was not intended as a forum for policy. The workshop emerged from two bodies of past work that established a baseline of knowledge: an SMA- and AFRL-sponsored white paper entitled *Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-radicalization and Disengagement<sup>3</sup> and a RAND monograph reviewing* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Laurie Fenstermacher, Larry Kuznar, Tom Rieger, & Anne Speckhard (Eds). (2010). *Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-radicalization and Disengagement.* Washington, DC: Strategic Multilayer Assessment and Air Force Research Lab.

relevant social science literature integratively.<sup>4</sup> Building on that, CAPT Wayne Porter wrote a paper on the strategic campaign to counter and delegitimize violent extremism, which resulted in the genesis of this workshop.

Session One provided selective "snapshots" of issues and analysis relating to an understanding of terrorism including root causes, key factors, and dynamics. It, and the reference documents, also provided a theoretical and scientific foundation for the rest of the workshop. The working lunch addressed the whole of government approach to countering violent extremism. Session Two focused on two main issues: whether violent Islamists groups can in fact be widely "delegitimized" and whether they can be deterred and otherwise influenced from pursuing violent strategies. Session Three focused on a strategic campaign to diminish and deflate radical Islamist threats. On the second day, there were a series of speakers focused on radicalization, influence/deterrence, and deradicalization and counter-radicalization.

Todd Leventhal, Senior Policy and Planning Officer in the Bureau of International Information Programs at the Department of State, thanked Dr. Cabayan for inviting the Department of State to cosponsor the workshop. The Department of State had several representatives present from the Counterterrorism Office, the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) team, Global Strategic Engagement Center as well as the Special Representative to Muslim Communities. Todd Leventhal stated that there is a weekly Interagency Strategic Communication Network meeting, which he chairs, where guests from inside and outside of the government are invited to share information and ideas on strategic communication. The meeting has a listserv of 800 people from DoD, Department of State, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and Broadcast Board of Governors (BBG) among others.

## OPENING COMMENTS (PRADEEP RAMAMURTHY)

Pradeep Ramamurthy, Senior Director for Global Engagement on the White House's National Security Council (NSC), began the conference with a discussion of how the current Administration defines countering violent extremisms (CVE) and strategic communications. He then provided an overview of key communication and engagement goals and objectives, highlighting that CVE was one of the Administration's many priorities. Mr. Ramamurthy then provided an outline of critical elements of strategic communications that should stay in participants' minds for the duration of the conference; noting (1) the importance of coordinating words and actions that involves an all-of-government approach; (2) the need to do a better job of coordinating multiple messaging efforts across agencies; and, (3) listening and engaging with target communities on topics of mutual interest, not just terrorism. He sought to emphasize that the conference served as an invaluable launching point for government introspection and the injection of new ideas from outside experts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin (eds.). *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together*, RAND, 2009.

### SESSION 1: TRAJECTORIES OF TERRORISM

The first session, *Trajectories of Terrorism*, was moderated by Dr. Laurie Fenstermacher (AFRL) and Dr. Paul Davis (RAND). The panel addressed trajectories of terrorism from socio-economic and political grievance to recruitment and mobilization as well as the root causes of terrorism. Participants spoke about the dynamics and tactics of VNSA decision-making, the role of ideology, the importance, and reasons for popular support of terrorism and insurgencies, and counterterrorism and de-radicalization/disengagement solutions.

Panelists included:

- Dr. Laurie Fenstermacher (AFRL Moderator)
- Dr. Paul Davis (RAND Moderator)
- Mr. Danny Campos (SOCOM)
- Dr. Sherifa Zuhur (IMEISS)
- Mr. Tom Rieger (Gallup)
- Dr. John Horgan (PSU)
- Dr. Dipak Gupta (San Diego State)
- Unattributed Speaker (USG)
- Dr. Angela Trethewey (ASU)
- Dr. Frank Furedi (University of Kent)

The first panel provided a snapshot of the current baseline understanding of terrorism: root causes, key factors, and dynamics and relationships from social science. It also served to provide a theoretical and scientific foundation for the rest of the workshop. Additionally, this session helped enable a common understanding and foundation for the remainder of the workshop.

Dr. Paul Davis stated that over the last two years, there has been a pulling together of knowledge of social science issues that should and do affect the phenomena of terrorism and counterterrorism. We now have a strong base that we can talk about because there is a shared understanding. He stated that the panel was strong as many have run their own research studies and have been in the counterterrorism field for some time. He was struck by how much progress has been made in the last few years going from an atmosphere where many people thought they knew what the cause and solution was. Now, the conventional wisdom is that issues like terrorism have many causal factors over time and space. There is no magic bullet. Workshop participants and the USG have to be constantly aware of these multiple factors and how they change. There is much more nuance now than there was just several years ago.

Dr. Fenstermacher introduced the panelists and asked each one to speak for ten minutes.

#### DR. DIPAK GUPTA (SAN DIEGO STATE)

Dr. Dipak Gupta, San Diego State University, thanked the moderators for inviting him to speak. He stated that he was struck by how much the counterterrorism community has learned in the past decade about terrorism when the community's knowledge of the whole phenomena was meager a few years ago. It was not addressed on an academic level at all previously. Prior to 9/11, there were few universities offering courses specifically on terrorism. Going back a few decades, there was

hardly much academic discourse in the social sciences on social conflict, particularly in political science. There was some social movement literature, but the study of terrorism, where a small subnational group attempts to take on larger society, was practically non-existent. The community has learned quite a bit.

Dr. Gupta stated that his research was a synthesis of economic rationalization with group rationality. What he argued was contrary to the ideas of rational human beings in an economic sense. When one tries to maximize his own welfare, he also strives to further the wellbeing of the group in which he claims membership. Therefore, everyone has a dual personality. Group identity does not come with birth; it is something that is promoted. It is promoted through external agents – such as political entrepreneurs. Political entrepreneurs take existing grievances and complaints and turn them into threats. It is not enough for one to feel aggrieved or peasants would always be in revolt. It is when these political entrepreneurs use religion, mythology, or history to create a collective identity that the threat is created. The identity is particularly successful when it says not only what the group's identity is, but clearly explains who the enemies are. It is only when the enemies are identified that political action is seen.

Dr. Gupta explained that because of the above argument, grievances do not tend to be coordinated strongly with political violence. The reason is that these measures of social injustice, which cause deprivation, are not necessary factors for political violence. The necessary factor is provided by political entrepreneurs who can frame the issue so that when anyone participates in political action, they are motivated by ideology. Mercenaries are also involved for reasons of loot, rape, and power. Captive participants just do not want to be on the wrong side of the battle.

Dr. Gupta stated that to develop policy options, one has to isolate ideology, self-interest, and captive participants. Captive participants need security so they do not have to worry about groups. Mercenaries are people who could be won over with civil society programs. He stated that after the earthquake in Pakistan, President Bush was more popular than Bin Laden due to disaster relief efforts. These people are not committed to ideology, but interested in personal welfare. The ideological factors can be overcome by developing a counter-ideology. That is a more intractable problem, but they are not totally intractable because we have had success in the past.

Alia Ayub, Chenaar Group, stated that Dr. Gupta raised the concept of development insecurity. She stated that in her research, she spoke to a former mujahideen fighter in Peshawar. He said that he did not join the Taliban for the salary, but it was a matter of honor – protecting women and children. If joining the Taliban is a matter of honor, not economics, what other channels of counter-radicalism can be explored? Dr. Gupta responded that counter-radicalization is a matter of security. The current political system is not sufficient to protect his women and children. If that security can be provided, then he would not have to be part of the Taliban. Social science provides perspectives on this.

Dr. Gupta stated that one day he spoke to an Afghan cab driver who stated that there is no such thing as the Taliban in Afghanistan. He had been a mujahideen fighter. He said that the people carrying out suicide attacks are outsiders who may even be supported by the United States. He said that Afghans would never commit suicide attacks. Dr. Gupta stated that Afghans have had so little political discourse that it has become implicitly conspiracy-driven. Therefore, when coalition forces take action, it will be a lot more effective when the events are effectively communicated.

Alexis Everington, SCL, asked whether there was a problem of group membership being transient. For example, would an Afghan first identify himself as a Pashtun, then a Muslim? One person can be a member of a group at one time and a member of another group at the same or different time depending on circumstance. If that is the case, how should coalition forces build strategies? Dr. Gupta replied that that one strategy was to develop a counterculture. There is a lot of work on group identity including by Marc Sageman of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and John Horgan of Penn State University. There is a human urge to belong and take part in a larger cause.

LtCol Bill Casebeer, JFCOM, stated that in Dr. Gupta's opening remarks, he noted that there have not been courses in terrorism before 9/11. LtCol Casebeer noted there have been studies of violent social movements, and that we should not forget the work done in counterinsurgency studies after the Vietnam War. LtCol Casebeer then asked about rational actor theory, which is a model of social behavior. He asked if there is still room for rational actor explanations of human behavior in light of the importance of group identity, or should researchers dispense with rational actors? Dr. Gupta responded that the rational actor model has been extremely useful in many areas including conflict studies. He proposed expanding it. He said the choice between what is good for me and what is good for the group is a tradeoff. This happens all the time – for example, picking a stock based on its greenness. In life, each individual must allocate its most precious resource (time) in competing pursuits and when one does, one makes different choices. Therefore, terrorism is a matter of ideology for many people. In the mind of terrorists – they are altruist. They are acting for the greater good of the community. This is what motivates them. Researchers cannot model that using a pure rational choice framework.

Ziad Alahdad asked Dr. Gupta to speak more about the relationship between social deprivation and terrorism. Dr. Gupta responded that researchers have found that poverty on a cross national basis is weakly correlated with instances of violence. There are many poor countries and they do not see a rise in terrorism. There are people brought up in the lap of luxury and they take part in terrorism. How does one reconcile the two? He stated that one answer is that there are political grievances all over the world, but violence takes place when someone take grievance and creates and "us and them" framework. When these political entrepreneurs come in and reference Islamic history, they resonate with a group and connect the dots. The stickiness takes place because they connect the dots. Then it becomes a matter of opportunity.

### TOM RIEGER (GALLUP)

Tom Rieger, Gallup, spoke about moving counter-radicalization further to the left. He recommended that researchers and government officials focus more on the factors that cause radicalization – or the swamps where things start to grow and bloom. Dr. Davis' paper<sup>5</sup> speaks about a need for greater validation, rigor, and prediction in this field. That is what Gallup has tried to do. Tom Rieger's work emerged out of research into what destabilizes organizations. There are things organizations do to themselves to inhibit success. While at times there were simply unintended consequences of bad decisions, Gallup found that there are often groups within an organization that work to further their own agendas even at the expense of the larger organization. These theories were transferred to radical organizations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Davis, P. (2010). Simple models to explore deterrence and more general influence in the war with al-Qaeda. *RAND Corporation and Pardee RAND Graduate School*. Washington, DC.

Gallup first defined Type I radicals. Radicalism is defined here not necessarily as VNSAs, but people who think it is a good idea to use violence against civilians. Type Is tend to be highly intolerant or elitist. They lack confidence in government institutions and may have experienced past hardships. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been shown to be very susceptible.

Tom Rieger cited a well-known quote that there is a saying that a lot of people use statistics the way a drunk uses a lamppost – for support instead of illumination. In other words, is there learning beyond the initial hypotheses that led to the identification of the Type I radicals? In looking at the residuals, Gallup found a second type of radicals. Type IIs feel that they are victims, often due to the intolerance of others. Looking at the data overall, deprivation is a weak indicator of radicalization, but for the type II, it is a strong predictor. Type IIs tend to be downscale, slightly younger, and ideology seeking. They are usually drawn to a nationalist ideology. It is a mistake to assume that radicalism is an Islamic phenomenon as ideology can be nationalist, economic, or ethnic in nature.

Type IIs are strongly leader seeking. Type IIs are also very accepting of violence.

A third group identified is the "high potentials." High potentials are almost, but not quite, at the levels required for classification as a radical. For a strategic communication conference, it is the high potentials that are the most interesting. They are the ones who have not made up their mind, but are close. They are the easiest to move.

Tom Rieger stated that an important finding was that once three percent of a population had been radicalized, there is a much higher probability of terrorist activity happening. In countries where less than three percent of the population had been radicalized, there were less than three incidents of terrorism per year on average. Those above three percent had an average of 971 events, much higher than levels observed for areas with lower levels of radicalization. These findings help when also looking at it on a per capita basis (approximately 50 incidents versus 0.8). Gallup also looked at classified data and the model validated as well.

The key lesson is that it is a mistake to talk about radicals as one group. There are two distinct types of radicals: types Is and IIs. There are probably more than that, but only two have been validated so far. That implies that as officials are developing a strategic communications campaign, they need to formulate one for each group. They also need to understand which group is causing the problem. The two types of radicals have different sources of influence in terms of media and content. Type Is use more media sources and more inflammatory sources. Type IIs are more influenced by informal sources. The messages that would resonate with each group are different and the triggers are different.

Tom Rieger stated that all politics are local; local issues trump everything including national issues. Type Is levels tend to fluctuate during high profile national activities – like a highly charged national election. They tend to grow and then may somewhat fall off. Type IIs tend to be stable over time. Nationalist themes are just as compelling as religious themes. They are often somewhat intermingled. Urban areas are susceptible to both types of radicals. However, it is the high potentials that you battle with to win hearts and minds. The good news is that with effective action and communication, it is possible to reduce levels of radicalization.

#### DR. JOHN HORGAN (PENN STATE UNIVERSITY)

Dr. John Horgan, Penn State University, stated that there is substantial promise to social science approaches to counter-radicalization. Social science is critical in inserting both rigor and evaluation potential into understanding counter-radicalization. Social science also helps focus and prioritize interventions. The goal can be to prevent or displace initial radicalization, disrupt people already engaged in terrorism as well as facilitate disengagement and maybe (in some cases) promote deradicalization. Social science can also help develop risk assessment. This is one glaring area where researchers have not made as much progress as they would like. Risk assessment relates to a series of issues including decisions about where and how to move people back into society.

Dr. Horgan just finished a study for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assessing the effectiveness of deradicalization programs. He found that deradicalization programs are effective, but not for the reasons commonly stated. He and his team provided a framework for assessing dynamic deradicalization programs.

Dr. Horgan stated that there are important distinctions in the core terminology. It is important to distinguish between radicalization and violent radicalization. One does not lead to the other, but is a risk factor for engaging in violent extremism. Disengagement from violent activity is not the same as deradicalization. One does not have to deradicalize to make people stop participating in terrorism. Similarly, counter-radicalization is not the same as deradicalization. The first recommendation from the DHS study was a suggestion that 'deradicalization' programs be considered 'risk reduction' initiatives since deradicalization at the cognitive level is rarely a component of what works in reducing and controlling terrorist behavior.

Dr. Horgan stated that terrorism is complex. It is important to consider involvement as a dynamic, non-linear process and realize that researchers have moved away from understanding involvement in terms of root cause-type explanations. There are multiple pathways in and out of terrorism even for members of the same small network. Not everyone has the same level or degree of involvement. Furthermore, the process changes people. People change as a result of engaging in terrorism and being part of a terrorist network. What researchers ought to be looking for is evidence-based means of prioritizing their efforts. It makes sense to want to focus on big issues (e.g., the 'push' factors) that may be root causes because these seem to offer plausible intervention points, but it is important to look more than ever at the 'pull' factors – the movement-specific lures that are used to groom radicals into violent activity. The push factors tend to be very resistant to change. It is more practically manageable to affect and influence the pull factors.

Dr. Horgan stated that the United States has not done a good job at identifying former repentant terrorists who can talk about the negative implications of experiences as a terrorist. Penn State is doing work on interviewing former terrorists. They talk about the fantasy that drove the grooming process and their search to become involved and how that differed from reality. That is the first step in the radicalization process that helps distinguish the radical from the violent activist. One of the most significant risk factors for involvement is an overwhelming positive sense of the perceived rewards awaiting recruits. Once someone is involved, how is involvement sustained? How do people disengage? The significant distinction is that there are a number of options available for intervention. Effective risk assessment will help inform where and how the appropriate interventions may take effect.

There are numerous examples of dissent. It can play a big role in preventing initial involvement. Dr. Horgan stated that he initially created a model based on the three stages. He once argued that the stages should be distinct. Since collecting more empirical data, he has since revised that initial model and now believes that for the individual terrorist, the stages are more closely linked than he previously thought. Looking ahead, he stressed the need to develop a clearer role for microanalysis in the study of terrorism. He stated that the community has been obsessed with a terrorism profile. The community should have left that behind 20 years ago. Profiles provide no clear practical utility in countering violent extremism. What Dr. Horgan is particularly interested in is a clearer understanding of the individual perspective in the study of terrorism. In particular, there needs to be a greater understanding of disengagement and risk assessment frameworks. It is something that will inform the sentencing of convicted terrorists and whether people can be released. There is practically no research on recidivism. There needs to be a systematic approach to counter radicalization research. Dr. Horgan and his team at Penn State are currently developing a risk assessment framework to inform decisions about initial sentencing as well as possible release and re-integration.

#### **Discussion**:

Michael Gallagher, EUCOM, asked whether there is any ability to determine the cultural context of radicalization or whether type Is or IIs vary based on cultural setting as opposed to geography. Tom Rieger responded that the answer is that radicalization varies based on human nature. When he looked at the correlates to those factors, he saw specific events and cultures coming into play. In Afghanistan, while the role of the tribe was a factor. The local conditions were much more important. In different countries, there may be different issues. The degree of tolerance or elitism is wrapped up in culture.

Michael Gallagher stated that there are different levels of knowledge on the ground. If one wanted to do a specific tailored narrative, one would have to know a lot about what was going on. Is that always necessary or can you use universals – for example, women trying to protect children from being recruited. John Horgan responded that the issue is how does one know they are affected? He said that what is troubling is that there are two parallel discussions. One can do whatever they want but unless an evaluation framework has been built in, any effort to counter violent extremism is merely guesswork.

Michael Gallagher asked how John Horgan is getting those measures. John Horgan responded that it depends on what jurisdiction one is looking at. One can draw on different kinds of data that will help build that picture. Dr. Horgan stated that he is extremely skeptical about the use of survey data as an attempt to draw reliable inferences about the risk of violent extremism. There are creative ways of getting different kinds of data. It is not hard to get people who have been disengaged to talk, but it has to be done safely and rigorously.

Michael Gallagher stated that it is important to figure out themes, but target groups are never able to measure them. Is that where we are? Dr. Horgan responded that unless the understanding of the violent radicalization process is clear, you cannot have a rigorous understanding of what is being measured and how change is evaluated. It must be always be evidence based, not based on what one thinks is right.

Michael Gallagher asked whether deradicalization is feeding or countering radicalization. Is it a reasonable approach? Dr. Horgan responded that there are many people trying to answer this, but

their approaches vary significantly. One interesting model of how it has worked is in the United Kingdom with different groups. Former IRA members who have spoken out about what life was like had a price put on their heads for doing so. There are countless examples of that and increasing examples of former members from Al Qaeda and affiliate movements. In particular, Dr. Horgan mentioned the Active Change Foundation being run from London by Hanif Qadir. There has not been a systemic approach to collecting this data. There have been naïve, dangerous approaches with the expectation that the radical would hold up a mirror, but there are often other kinds of agendas. Dr. Horgan said that there is no shortage of celebrity ex-terrorists, but stressed that it is important to engage the right ones who engage more in de-glamorizing and de-mythologizing the lifestyle rather than proselytizing against one interpretation of Islam.

Jeff Martini, RAND, asked Tom Rieger to speak about the characteristics of the high potentials. Tom Rieger said that demographically, they tend to mirror the Type I and II groups, but have not yet embraced violence. There are no distinct demographics. It is a fuzzy group and one that is situation dependent.

One participant from the Department of State noted that the criteria Tom Rieger gave for type I – dissatisfaction with government – is rather broad. Tom Rieger responded that what we are looking for are extremists – people who embrace violence. The percent of radical varies by country. The average level for Central Asia is three percent. The highest rates are in some parts of Afghanistan at 20 percent.

# DR. SHERIFA ZUHUR (INSTITUTE OF MIDDLE EASTERN, ISLAMIC AND STRATEGIC STUDIES)

Dr. Sherifa Zuhur has been involved in primary research on Islamist movements since the 1980s. Previously a faculty member at MIT, UC Berkeley and American University in Cairo, she most recently was Research Professor of Islamic and Regional Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College and is currently the Director of the Institute of Middle Eastern, Islamic and Regional Studies. Her publications on the subject of violent extremism include Ideological and Motivational Factors in the Defusing of Radical Islamist Violence (2010); Precision in the Global War on Terror: Inciting Muslims through the War of Ideas (2008); Hamas and Israel: Strategic Interaction in Group-Based Politics, A Hundred Osamas and The Future of Counterinsurgency (2006); and Saudi Arabia: Islamism, Political Reform and the Global War on Terror (2005) Islamic Rulings on Warfare (2004). Dr. Zuhur began by cautioning the conference framers not to confuse deradicalization, or the "delegitimizing" effort with the more limited, ongoing process of defusing violence by radical Islamist actors. She explained that a basic difference exists in that the recantation process in Egypt was undertaken by the Gama'at Islamiyya, and later Islamic Jihad of its own volition. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group also produced its own important recantation document in September of 2009, but in this case, the defeated and imprisoned group members were a smaller entity than the mass movement in Egypt. These two instances differ from the government-crafted Saudi Counseling (re-education) program offered to some members of the al-Qa'ida fi Jazirat al-Arabiyya, as well as other prison-based programs (in Jordan, Iraq and now being established in Yemen). The latter take place in a coercive context. The re-education process in Saudi Arabia appears very positive and is a showpiece for the government; post-release follow-up will be necessary. In Egypt and Libya, the groups mentioned have provided an ideological basis for the relinquishing of violence instead of continuing their struggle with the government and state

security. (However, since the Egyptian revolution of 2011, the Gama'at Islamiyya leadership have emerged from prison and formed a political party, while the LIFG became involved in the struggle against Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi, effectively canceling out many of the groups claims of quiescence in the face of authoritarianism.) In Saudi Arabia, al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula has not yet been defeated. She mentioned that most of the actual works of recantation have not been translated, although the principles of Saudi recantation have been described and a work in Arabic (al-Awa, 2006) describes the process by which the Egyptian recantation was formulated. The actual arguments based on Islamic doctrine are not very adequately understood in the West because the nuances of that doctrine are usually glossed over or misunderstood. The different treatments of the same issues – jihad, takfir, fitna, moderation, treatment of non-Muslims, and da'wa -- extant in the different re-education or recantation models can be usefully contrasted and compared. They are important to policy and should not be dismissed. Dr. Zuhur explained that much of her research methodology has depended on interviews with the members of the Islamist groups studied, analysis of their texts and statements, and interviews with local experts and officials, when possible.

She noted that in the case of Saudi radicals, the prison-based program has collected data since 2004 some of which has not been shared with the public. The analysis of this data, or of jihadi self-written information (as in efforts by T. Hegghammer) has not shown whether tribe or region were actually important elements in the extremists' profiles, as is believed to be the case by Saudi observers, probably because it would be difficult for an outsider to know that affiliation based on personal names or jihadi noms de guerre.

Dr. Zuhur stated that there is a good deal of value in the so-called deradicalization programs, primarily as they show that violence may be relinquished within a Muslim framework. However, these programs do not "de-radicalize" individuals to agree with US foreign policy or even to become pro-American. The doctrinal reasoning for jihad in these programs considers it *fard kifaya*, only a collective duty in Saudi Arabia or Libya, but legitimate as an individual duty (*fard al-`ayn*) in places under non-Muslim military conquest, i.e., Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine, possibly even Pakistan. The simplistic argument given in the West – that only the "greater jihad" (the struggle to be a good Muslim) is licit as opposed to war-fighting jihad – is not the reasoning given in the Saudi prison program or the deradicalization movements.

Dr. Zuhur noted that it seemed that some of the work in terrorism studies based on psychology and other fields seemed to stress universalist principles and that a strong role of culture in the discourse of "radicals" was discounted. For instance, in a previously mentioned typology of potential radicals, based on "anger," it seemed to her that there are immense differences in the ways in which anger is expressed in respective cultures. Similarly, Western ideas of recantation and redemption are very different. A final caveat is that academics, based on the research of the 1990s and early 2000s, had thought radicals, like moderate Islamists, might engage in legitimate political action instead of radical opposition. However, radicals often lack that avenue and cannot replace what they consider wrongful leadership in their countries. In Saudi Arabia, this applies to the royal family – an entire class of society. In Libya, this applied to Qaddhafi's regime. Therefore, it is significant that the Saudi re-education program does not address the issue of political leadership, and the LIFG was silent (in 2009) on the matter of their previous opposition to the Qaddhafi government.

Dr. Zuhur stated that the recantation literature and Saudi prison program covers the wrongful uses of takfir – meaning considering someone to not be a Muslim and therefore worthy of killing. In the Libyan document, this task is accomplished by providing a very a broad definition of a Muslim. As in the inclusive definition of the Muslim Brotherhood, a Muslim is anyone who calls themselves a Muslim or who is a child of a Muslim. People who follow the requirements (prayer, covering) are also considered Muslim.

Dr. Zuhur stated that in Islam, jihad is both lawful and required, but it has many rules and limitations referred to as fiqh al-jihad (jurisprudence of jihad). The radicals think they are following the rules, but they are not. For example, they have not followed the rules that require them to be debt-free or to obtain their parents' permission (since parents may be dependents). In each program, a situation of occupation, as in Afghanistan, or Iraq, or Palestine provides a license for war-fighting jihad. A key point in the philosophy of all groups is *hakmiyya* – the sovereignty of God. This principle means that the sole just and licit law is God's law – not secular law. Since this principle, *hakmiyya* is accepted by mainstream Islam, we must understand that the alternative to radicalism is not secularism. Yet, solutions promoted by some of the participating organizations in this conference, promoted the idea of secularizing Muslims during the George W. Bush presidency as an alternative to radicalism.

Dr. Zuhur stated that each program or recantation deals with the need to moderate radicals' attitudes towards non-Muslims. Some of their negative orientation is due to interpretation of texts based on historical events, but also on widespread pre-existing ignorance about Jews and Christians. There is dismay and anger about policies they are associated with – mainly with regard to Israel and the war on Islam. However, the Libyan document takes a slightly different tack in stating that it is wrong to apply punishments that fit Muslims to non-Muslims. In other words, the killing of non-Muslims with a punishment befitting an apostate is a legal misconstruction. It is not correct Islamically to expect non-Muslims to observe Muslim law and then enact severe punishments for not complying. Those severe punishments are reserved for Muslims. The document also says that it is permissible to have a lengthy truce with Jews and Christians. This is the same rationale by which Hamas observed a sustained *hudna* (a truce) from 2004.

Dr. Zuhur then discussed another key principle in recantation – the call for moderation in Islam, this idea of moderation is not at all what Americans call "moderate," but rather expresses the notion of a "middle path," the *wasatiyya* that is inherent in Islam. The principle of moderation was advocated by the Prophet Muhammad, who constrained some of his more ardent followers from being too strict and expecting too much from their peers. Along these lines, in Saudi Arabia, there have been some efforts to constrain the *mutawa'in*, whose policing efforts tend to oppose the principle of moderation. The Libyan Correcting document addresses this issue by explaining that the *hisba*, the "commanding of the good and forbidding of the evil" is considered a very important means, but only a means to an end – a society living under Islamic law. The LIFG document states that the *hisba* can be carried to an extreme where people are spying on one another's adherence to Islam, and this defeats the methodology of moderation.

Dr. Zuhur stated that another justification for moderation is called *maslaha*, which means supporting the common good, a principle that may be found in most legal systems. In Islam, it is an adjunct principle (known as *istislah*) to the major *usul al-fiqh* (roots of jurisprudence). The jihadists may argue that governments generally claim to uphold the common good through their suppression of political dissidence, for instance. However, the LIFG's Correcting document contains

a chapter on maslaha as a source of reformulating these extremists' philosophy. They utilized the definition of maslaha as given by al-Ghazali, the theologian, that it should protect and preserve the shari'ah (Islamic law), wealth, religion, inheritance. Thus, if jihad is deleterious to the wealth, or religion, or inheritance of the *ummah*, the Muslim community, it must be reconsidered. However, instead of engaging in jihad, in such cases, the mujahidin should shift their activities to *da'wah*, active communications on behalf of their cause, but shift away from violence. To re-iterate, the sources of extremist violence that are to be found in doctrine – are all addressed in these approaches to jihad, moderation, non-Muslims, takfir, and maslaha, but the recantation or reeducation efforts do not call for anyone to cease being pious, or lessen their conviction in *hakmiyya*, or the need for Islamic law. To understand jihadist strategic communications that have diminished violence, it is necessary to fully explore their discourse and efforts in self-moderation.

#### DR. ANGELA TRETHEWEY (ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY)

Dr. Angela Trethewey, Arizona State University, spoke about ideology from a strategic communication perspective. The traditional notions of ideology often treat it as a fixed idea in people's heads – an image of society and attendant set of behaviors. A communication perspective on ideology treats it as an unexamined set of assumptions about how things should work that circulates through social discourse in stories and narratives. Ideology is a meaning making and a meaning-creating process. Dr. Trethewey stated that approached from a communication perspective, one can perturb those meaning-making systems by intervening in social discourses. She talked about how ideology functions communicatively. There are four functions. For a fuller account of ideologies functions, please see the Consortium for Strategic Communication's <u>white</u> paper on the topic.

Dr. Trethewey stated that the first function is naturalization. Ideology works to position socially constructed meanings as real, fixed, and "objective." That is how ideology does its work. Gender is a human construct and it is treated as if it was real. Violent extremists do the same work in their communication. If one looks at the Said Qutb's *Milestones*, we can see how particular meanings for the "*new* Jahiliyya" become naturalized. When the present state is naturalized as back to the future, it legitimizes violence as an appropriate response. Some possible countermeasures are local conversations, alternative narratives, and stories. In response to naturalization, one might emphasize the complicated and constructed nature of meanings. The notion of jihad has been naturalized as violence, but that has not always been the case. Jihad of a new age focused on ideas, media, and communication. There are historical notions and meanings to jihad. Abdul Khan is historically and culturally relevant. He stated that the jihad of the pen is more powerful than the sword. It is important to amplify those voices.

Dr. Trethewey stated that the second function is obscuring. Ideological systems are laden with contradictions. Ideology works best when it can smooth over contradictions. One notion in the United States is "one person, one vote." However, this rule does not apply in the work place. Why is it that this rule is applied to elections, but not at work? That contradiction is obscured. Violent extremists use that to counter-contradictions in their own system. Look at the killing of innocent Muslims. Violent extremists increasingly have to account for contradictions. When that happens, we know we have hit an ideological nerve we can push.

Dr. Trethewey stated that the third function is universalizing or representing the interests of those in power as the interests of all. Violent extremists frame martyrdom as a universal benefit, a

strategy that serves all Muslims and thus forwards their ideologies. Extremists construct martyrdom as productive and valued not only by a would-be suicide bomber, but also by entire families and communities. A living martyr is represented as something good for the individual and community. A strategy for countering this is to point to the self-interestedness of the key leaders that shows that, often, violent extremists are forwarding the leaders' agendas. The population becomes increasingly disenchanted when extremist leaders are viewed being narrowly self-interested rather than interested in the community.

Dr. Trethewey stated that the fourth function is that ideology works best when one can create rules of the game that others are willing to play along with. If one can structure the rules of the game, he or she can forward his or her ideological goals. That is why the Taliban is adamant in denouncing democracy. What they are doing in their discourse is shaping democracy as a religion. If they are successful, it makes it difficult for strategic communications to work. When democracy is denounced as a religion, sharia law becomes the only alternative and extremist ideology is produced and reproduced in everyday practice. Dr. Trethewey stated that the strategy for countering ideological structuring is to breach the structure. This seems like an impossible task, but it can be done. This happened in Colombia with the FARC. The FARC used to have a legitimate standing and the public supported them. Then there was a botched series of hostage exchanges, and there was a social movement that delegitimized their negotiating position.

The United States is not without its own ideological assumptions. It would do well to recognize its own ideological meanings and to remember when its strategic messages do not match practices, extremists point out the contradictions.

#### Discussion:

Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi, WORDE, stated that Dr. Zuhur's analysis was brilliant. From the US policy perspective, the scenario she left us with is depressing. Jihad is not here [Saudi Arabia or Libya], but in Iraq and Afghanistan. If this is the approach, how does that bring the Muslim community forward? Does it represent a set of shared values with the West and if so, is it useful to promote this methodology?

Dr. Zuhur responded that the issue is not that we have shared values with former extremists – we may share some, but not all of their values. Rather, the issue is that we should see that former extremists, especially those who voluntarily shift their tactics are perhaps the most credible persuasive figures to nonviolence in their own movement. The Egyptian movement was a mass movement, running to tens of thousands, and not just a handful of radicals. It was very challenging for the movement's leaders to convince second through fourth-level cadres to cease violent attacks on government and security forces. It could only be done with theological arguments. It is not necessarily a solution for the US, but it is a solution Muslim majority governments have understood. She recognized that there are some problems, just as Dr. Mirahmadi had noted, in the fact that these groups call for violence where the United States is acting (according to them) as an occupying force. However, the point is that the current US approach of military tactics plus development strategies, is still not changing the core opinions of those in the community of violent fighters. Furthermore, the US is not in a position to reshape religious ideology with all of its historical aspects.

LtCol Casebeer asked what role the environment plays in psychology with regard to Dr. Trethewey's four functions. Psychology is influenced by so many things. He asked Dr. Trethewey if her group examined what the US can do about the environment to address or influence these four

functions. Dr. Trethewey responded that in a cultural environment, many things contribute to a larger discursive field in which one operates. Ideology does not get implanted into one's brain, it comes from repetitive conversations. One's understanding is that the more one focuses on getting the answer right, the less successful one will be. Therefore, if one has a particular worldview, everything will be interpreted in terms of one's worldview. Getting the message right will not change one's mind. There needs to be a variety of intervention methods involving a number of narratives. Intervention matters. However, the US has to know what the environment is and what narratives would resonate. The environment matters greatly in entering a conversation knowledgeably.

Ziad Alahdad stated that the four functions outlined by Dr. Trethewey are very interesting. They apply across many cultures. In some of these cultures, contradictions and nuances exist. Therefore, the third point - representing the interests of those in power as the interests of all – is the one where it would seem that all those opposing terrorism including the United States could have the most influence. He asked which function would be the most effective. Dr. Trethewey replied that more empirical work needs to be done to answer that question. ASU is collecting extremist narratives from Southeast Asia. The team is looking for counter narratives in those cultures and identifying the most effective ones. There are no analogies to draw from yet. In many ways, the contradictions represent the wedges where the US can focus.

Dr. Davis, RAND, stated that research on narratives is underway. The narrative of revolution is one thing; killing innocent people is another. He stated that there is a lot of discussion in the Muslim world that killing other Muslims is not okay. Is this a feasible narrative to exploit? Dr. Zuhur stated that in nearly every interview session she has held in the region, that question is turned on its head. Her interlocutors asked, "How does the US rationalize the number of civilians killed in Iraq and Afghanistan?" Therefore, it becomes a conversation about who is the biggest offender of human rights and that is not a productive line of discussion. The question is – are there necessary victims, casualties as in nearly all military operations, or is the use of jihad, and martyrdom operations actually poor tactical planning? One can have an important strategic debate about this. Premature lines of operation may do more harm than good. It (discussion of civilian casualties) is a double-edged sword and not a good argument for those crafting STRATCOM strategic communications." They need to stay away from this topic until they are ready to have an honest discussion (not in English) about why America is doing things that harm ordinary people as in drone attacks or other operations.

### DR. FRANK FUREDI (UNIVERSITY OF KENT)

Dr. Frank Furedi, University of Kent, stated that his research is focused on Europe. After 9/11, a group of graduate students did a project in north England and talked to Muslim kids. They asked the kids one question and they got very different answers across geographic space compared to non-Muslim kids. Similarly, sociologists who studied the race riots in the United States found distinct pools of knowledge were developed in the black and white communities. The same thing happened after Katrina when the displaced black people had a different experience than displaced white people. Polls do not reveal this divide. There is a spiral of silence where people tell pollsters what the pollsters want to hear. In addition, the language pollers use is different from the language used by the people being polled.

Dr. Furedi stated that researchers know a lot more about terrorism and radicalization that forces them to be specific. He agreed that researchers have learned a lot in the last ten years, but have learned not to generalize too much. After 9/11, there were series of briefs about extremist groups and people began to look for general themes. That does not work. Terrorism is not something researchers can reproduce and narrowly generalize from. There is homegrown terrorism in the European context. There are important developments occurring that need to be understood. Homegrown radicalization is critically important because it is focused on the young. In terms of communication, the most critical community is the young. They do not listen to elders anyway, particularly when they are extremists.

Dr. Furedi asked what kinds of evidence can researchers rely on. Researchers may know what the facts are, but how do they interpret them? What he concluded from this in Europe is that what is happening is the typical generational dynamics that occur in every society has somehow been entwined with radicalization themes. There is often a problem of double alienation. The youth in Europe are alienated from their immigrant parents (who they see as Uncle Toms) who they are rebelling against and they are repelled by Western society. It is different in the United States because the method of immigrant integration is much more robust.

Dr. Furedi stated that this powerful sense of double alienation is made more difficult because the alienation is supported and reinforced by countercultural trends. It is really cool to be anti-American in Europe. Countercultural flows mean that there is a positive system of support for these sentiments. It is not something where one can close the door.

Dr. Furedi stated that in Europe, young people aged 19-20 are encouraged to pilgrimage somewhere back home. That is where they run into trouble. This is one of the most important things to understand, engage, and help prevent. It is not very different to what European Jews did when they went to Palestine for a few years and come back home and ended up doing things they did not anticipate. It is becoming evident that drivers of radicalization have little to do with the Middle East. They do provide the cultural resources that these kids can draw on.

Dr Furedi drew attention to research on social networking effort. Six years ago, radicalism was not embodied in pop culture, but now it is. It starts with rap music, artistic innovations, and video. They are phenomenally popular with non-Muslim kids. The question was to determine how to minimize the appeal of radical violence. One way to think about it has to do with the younger generation. It is a youth problem and that calls for a range of instruments that are generation specific.

#### UNATTRIBUTED SPEAKER (USG)

An unattributed speaker from a US agency sought to convey a practitioner's insight into violent extremism in the United States and how it compares to what has been seen in the past. The speaker indicated many in the US media have highlighted the recent number of violent extremist disruptions that have been made public. He noted the USG is trying to assess whether these recent developments indicate that violent extremism is on the rise, and if so, what factors are driving this phenomenon in the United States.

The speaker stated that accepting the hypothesis that violent extremism is indeed on the rise in the United States—which the speaker indicated is hard to assess empirically—the speaker indicated

there could be several potential explanations. One might be an increased ability for violent extremists in the US to travel overseas and engage militant networks.

The speaker noted that another hypothesis might be an increased level of anger towards various US and Western foreign policies. While such grievances are not new, they continue to resonate with violent extremists in the United States. Although difficult to measure, a growing sense of cultural alienation and identity crisis may also support the hypothesis that violent extremism is on the rise. The expanded role of the Internet as a platform for extremist propaganda and as a social networking hub for like-minded violent extremists may also have some impact. Similarly, the speaker noted the increased availability of English-language propaganda, often communicated by American extremist ideologues, as another potential factor.

Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi stated that in the early 1990s, Americans were going to Chechnya, Albania, etc. to fight and returned home. Is the pool of former radicals feeding the current threat? Are they connected? How big is the problem? The speaker responded that the USG was not focused on criminalizing travel to engage in extremist or militant group activity in foreign conflict zones then to the same degree as now, which limits the ability to study the American foreign fighter phenomenon from a comparative historical perspective.

Alexis Everington, SCL, stated that in some countries, violent extremists would be immediately imprisoned or executed if they returned home after participating in violence. To what degree is the US applying too much carrot and not enough stick? The speaker responded that part of the problem is that there are ideologues. The most prominent American ideologues are not even in the US. The people who receive propaganda material are protected under the first amendment. Unless it crosses the line to the promotion of violence, there is little the USG can do.

Alia Ayub stated that the concept of pilgrimage is important. The USG does not want to stop people from traveling to these countries. What the USG wants to do is prevent the masses from becoming radicalized. Angry Muslims in the United States do not have a good outlet for venting their anger except for on radical sites. What programs is the USG undertaking to encourage positive venues for venting? The speaker said he could not give a good answer to the question as his particular agency does not participate in deradicalization programs. In terms of foreign travel, the USG is not trying to criminalize travel to Muslim countries.

Dr. John Hanley, ODNI, asked the speaker and the panel whether the USG <u>should</u> focus on radicalization as a whole or on countering Muslim radicalization. The speaker responded the USG is trying to manage responses to all forms of violent extremism, whether the origins are purely domestic or have international connections that manifest in the United States.

### DANNY CAMPOS (USSOCOM)

Danny Campos, USSOCOM, spoke about USSOCOM/J239, formerly the SOCOM Support Team – Texas, commonly referred to as the S2T2 team in San Antonio. For those that are familiar with Functional Commands, the J represents a Joint effort and the 239 is a combination of J23, Intelligence Support to Operations, and J39, Information Operations. In this case, his team is tasked with conducting Intel Support to Info Ops. His team provides specialized IO to special operations forces (SOF), theater special operations commands (TSOC), and geographic combatant commands (GCC) directly supporting operations against terrorist networks.

#### **Discussion**:

Dr. Gupta stated that Dr. Furedi studied Islamic youth and found that culture does matter. In that respect, he asked whether Dr. Furedi found similar results in Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, or the Maghreb because he believes that there is a substantial difference in participation rate of type II radicals when it comes to taking part in terrorism. Dr. Furedi responded that he has not done ethnographic studies. His work is based on northern England. However, he agreed that there is a big difference in involvement in radical behavior and expression of radical views. In France, there is a common youth culture developing that goes beyond their ethnic background. What is seen in Europe is that the wider youth culture influences middle class educated students who do not live in ghettos but experience the youth culture. It is supported by social networks, music industry, and is very attractive dimension of young Muslim experience.

Alia Ayub stated that she had done research on the Pakistani diaspora in the United Kingdom. She also looked at Bengali, Indian, and Somali communities to look at root causes of radicalization. She stated that in a broad sense, it comes down to immigration patterns – when their forefathers came to the UK and if they were accepted. When you talk to Pakistani-British communities, they vividly remember Pakistani "bashing." Their grandparents tell them that they will never be truly British. In terms of finding effective communicators, one has to find them in each community.

Dr. Furedi stated that the groups all have different trajectories. In the examples mentioned by Alia Ayub, the British Somali is a new immigrant and the dynamics are more apparent. What is seen is a mutation of gang-related activities that have been transformed and recycled. He warned against confusing various immigrant groups.

## AN ALL-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTERMISM: THE VALUE OF INTERAGENCY PLANNING (DAN SUTHERLAND, SHAARIK ZAFAR, & AN UNATTRIBUTED SPEAKER)

Samuel Rhem, SMA, introduced the working lunch participants. Both Dan Sutherland and Shaarik Zafar come from the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC).

Dan Sutherland of NCTC stated that the directives of the NCTC have to deal with all levels of power, so the NCTC talked about the whole of government approach. Both Dan Sutherland and Shaarik Zafar are civil rights lawyers by training, which is very telling of the all-of-government approach. Dan Sutherland stated that the topic of this conference was defining a strategic campaign and he thought it would be best to start off with the quote from President Eisenhower, "one of my predecessors is said to observe in making his decisions he had to operate like a football quarterback; he couldn't call the next play before seeing the last play out, which may be the way to run a football game, but it isn't how to run a government." Both he and Shaarik Zafar wanted to leave the group with two words "go local" and discuss micro-strategies.

Dan Sutherland stated that it was great to see Dr. Marc Sageman in the back. He joked that he may have purchased more of his books than anyone else on the planet, but Dr. Sageman's book *Leaderless Jihad* is a great book. He noted in his book that almost half of the people arrested in France for Islamist terrorism in the 1990s had grown up together in a single city in Algeria. Most of the people responsible for the Madrid bombings came from one town in Morocco. The other day someone handed Dan Sutherland an article from Newsweek, which is a couple of years old, and the article has pictures of faces. This article was about people who became suicide bombers in Iraq and it identified all of these faces and concluded that a disproportionate number of these bombers came from the same town in Libya. The point is that researchers and practitioners can begin to recognize that this is about specific hotspots, particular neighborhoods. Sometimes researchers can narrow it down to a five or ten block radius and this makes sense when you think about it—because radicalization evolves for a whole host of reasons, but it evolves with a particular radical contact and proximity. One of the things the NCTC has been thinking about is taking these ideas of hotspots and thinking about the policy and programming implications of those hotspots. If practitioners could know that there were twelve communities that were creating radicals, intervention could change the game—because intervention could be targeted to these specific areas. Additionally, these towns could be used as predictive exemplars of where similar problems might arise.

Dan Sutherland stated that the NCTC has entered into a project with the Department of State called "Counter-Rad." The two agencies will work with specific embassies to counteract radicalism in specific areas. In some places, radicalization might be due to economic dislocation—so the project might rebuild an industry in that place. It may be a security and training issue; police officers do not know how to handle terrorism. Maybe it is educational; maybe in some places there are shortfalls and program staff can do educational intervention. It could be infrastructure—sewers and electricity shortages can be a breeding ground for government disillusionment. So, "counterrad" is a way to develop micro-strategies to try to deal with particular hotspots—taking all of this theory and applying it. So, the objective of this brief talk is the importance of "go[ing] local" when considering these issues.

Shaarik Zafar of NCTC followed Dan Sutherland by noting his understanding that most of the folks at the conference have an international portfolio, but he wanted to provide the group with a few domestic examples. Several months ago, Zafar was at a conference in London with several Muslim-American activists, one of whom said, "We are trying to create passion for moderation." The bad guys are very excited and very organized and because of that there is a lot of energy, the rest of the people who are going about their ordinary lives do not have the same passion. But creating passion for moderation is not an easy thing to do.

Shaarik Zafar stated that the second event was held in early in February. During the meeting, John Brennan gave a talk at NYU and he did a really good job of dividing the roles of government and communities. The job of the government is to enforce the law and protect the country. In terms of countering violent ideologies, that has to be done by communities—the US government needs the help of Muslim communities. The US government has little legitimacy to counter a narrative, particularly one that cloaks itself in religion.

Shaarik Zafar asked rhetorically, "But, what do you do to create passion for moderation? What if we had a conversation with the American people about the dangers of extremism?" The NCTC is thinking about showing videos of extremists themselves and having a very frank conversation about these clips—not blaming Muslim populations - because they are part of the solution, not part of the problem. Shaarik Zafar did this at a very modest level in Houston. Afterwards, the community in Houston developed an anti-extremist curriculum in programs associated with the local mosques. It has to be local. A presentation that could be given in Minneapolis is probably different from what is best presented in Cleveland, but the reality is that many of the kids who have left for Al-Shabab have been killed.

A lot of times when Americans talk about the Department of Education or Health and Human Services, they are talking about agencies that are just doing good government. The NCTC thinks that some of these simple good governance programs can prevent radicalization and prevent alienation, which may be something specific to Somali communities. One thing that is known is that Al-Shabab is targeting Americans and they have a plan to do so. If they have a plan, the USG should have a plan to counteract it. It has to be local. The USG can have the best plan sitting on the shelf in an undisclosed location in Virginia, but it will not do anything unless it is brought to a community. So, the NCTC is talking about focusing on several communities.

The job of the NCTC is to coordinate efforts by the DHS, FBI and others. There is a lot that the NCTC does to help coordinate, but what the organization has recognized is that if they do not get outside of Washington, DC, if the NCTC does not get out into the field, if the government and the NCTC do not implement micro-strategies, the government will never get it right.

Alexis Everington of SCL noted that someone had previously discussed the impact of the Internet. He wanted to know how the Internet impacts the NCTC's "go local" strategy. Shaarik Zafar replied that an Al-Shabab Internet video might have more efficacy in Minneapolis and Columbus than it does in Houston. People all live in communities, the Internet plays an important role, but it does not mean that people are not getting radicalized in their communities through peer to peer contact.

Samuel Rhem of the SMA office then introduced the unattributed speaker (USG).

The unattributed speaker stated that his experience taught him that as one moves up in an organization, you begin spending more time in policy than on-the-street action, but it is important to remember that policy is not some academic discussion; it is the fusion of thought and action and operationalizing things and making them effective. Agencies want policy to be informed by and surrounded by evidence. When the speaker first came to work in DC, a colleague of his asked for stories that could be used to sell a program to Congress—in contrast to his colleague, the unattributed speaker wanted data. The colleague reminded him that in illiterate societies, story-telling is very effective; some people view Washington as an illiterate society. While his colleague was right, he still wanted to substantiate the story with data to make it more powerful.

The unattributed speaker stated that there are still unsubstantiated policy positions in policycircles. But things are often copied in government that may not be right, which is something that needs to be challenged. The important thing is to realize how the government frames complex problems in effective ways. The unattributed speaker has spent a lot of time in the United Kingdom talking with policy-makers in the UK about how they are confronting these problems. He also had the opportunity to go to Belfast, North Ireland to talk to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) about their community policing efforts. The predecessor to the PSNI, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, was probably hated more than the British military forces. Given the view that certain parts of society had about the police, it was important for the PSNI to establish trust and work closely with the communities to address issue of violence. It was impressive to see how open theses officers were about the experiences that they had and the obstacles that they still had to overcome to build partnerships with the community. They acknowledged that the police play a critical role in how people respond to action—police can actually make things worse. One of the most important things that the government can do is "do no harm." The unattributed speaker wanted to present some ideas, which are not official views of the USG but are intended to make the group of researchers and practitioners think.

First, the unattributed speaker stated that strategic communications require a communications objective. A common objective has been to delegitimize radicalization and win over the hearts and minds of Muslims. This is a curious assumption, because it is presupposes that there is a monolithic Muslim consciousness. The critical way to delegitimize radicals is first and foremost not to legitimize them by using that the language that they choose to use. We must think more critically about the language that we use when discussion violent extremism. People in the West often refer to these radicals as 'jihadists,' which is precisely what they want to be called. Jihad is a religiously legitimate term that is acceptable to a billion Muslims. When media and government officials refer to Al Qaeda as a Jihadist movement, they only help to promote the extremists' propaganda - that this is a legitimate holy war against infidels.

Second, he stated that what representatives of the West and the United States say and what they do must be synchronized. When our actions do not mirror our words we undermine our credibility and provide an opening for our enemies. If the government is going to strategically communicate, the government better know what it is talking about and be consistent with its words and actions.

Third, he stated that rather than trying to push for 'moderate' voices, the US should push for 'mainstream' Muslim voices. On a political spectrum, moderate can mean centrist and non-extreme views. To many Muslims, it means more secular, which is inherently/potentially offensive. One thing that the UK does very effectively is evaluate how their message is received. As a result, one of the things that they have noticed about their use of the word 'extremism,' is the while they are using it in a negative context some communities have interpreted this as a positive by being "extremely Muslim." Rather than delegitimizing extremists the use of this language potentially has reinforced some extremist in certain communities. Understanding the impact of communications is extremely important.

Fourth, he pointed out that if the objective is winning over hearts and minds—US policies must not alienate the people it is trying to win over. If the government is trying to counter the assertion that the US and its allies are fighting a war against Islam, it must recognize the power and the impact of this assertion because it is viewed as an attack on the identity of Muslims around the world. In order for such efforts to work, the US government cannot alienate the Muslim world. If counter-productive language continues to be used and the West continues to view these communities as suspect, the US government is never going to be able to achieve that strategic objective.

He highlighted that when asked how they would like to be viewed and treated, American Muslims say they want to be viewed and treated like Americans. American Muslims do not want to be viewed as suspect or second class citizens. You have to treat American Muslims as partners, not as suspects. Many American Muslim communities recognize the problem with extremist violence and wanted to work with the government to address this issue. While some communities may be in denial, the USG needs to work better to articulate the threat and the dangers that extremist violence plays in these communities. The US Government and researchers must understand that there are *individuals* in communities that have engaged in acts of terrorism, but not entire communities. Muslim communities feel that they have to stand up and say that any attack is wrong. But the bigger question is why there is an assumption that Muslim communities and their leaders would think it is right?

Fifth, he stated that strategic objectives are liable to change and they may need to be targeted to specific entities and threats. Al Qaeda has a specific message that it uses to promote its cause, Al Shabaab has another, Hizbollah has another—there is no singular message that counters all

terrorist groups. The USG must tailor its approaches and responses to extremist violence to each group's purpose, goal, and objective. If the assumption is that there is only one approach, there will never be a truly effective strategy.

In summary, the unattributed speaker concluded that the USG is trying to learn as much as possible, not only within the federal and local government and with academics, but within communities themselves. The community has to be part of the solution and if the government wants to build those partnerships, communities need to rely on the US as a government and the government needs to rely upon them for their help in addressing this complex phenomenon.

#### Discussion:

Dr. Dipak Gupta of San Diego State University offered the first question, noting that as the unattributed speaker was talking, Dr. Gupta was thinking of when he himself came to this country. At that time, the problem was black radicalization. In 1968, the Carter Commission talked about a race war and the parallels are amazing. The black leadership, people like Dr. King, never legitimized violence. This country depended more on counterintelligence than on military intervention. And third, the integration of the police force was critical. Another critical turning point was the passage of the Civil Rights Act, which treated people equally under the law. And this brought down the violence and radicalization.

The unattributed speaker (USG) agreed that the US government should learn from past experiences. But, Dr. Gupta's comment just emphasized the point that the United States has dealt with many issues of violence in the past and to this day—from gang violence to domestic violence to sexual assaults. The way that authorities have always overcome these acts of violence was not merely as a law enforcement effort but also by reaching out to communities to address these problems. The USG should be looking at other successful models.

Brooke Stearns Lawson of USAID noted that one of the critiques of USG efforts is that they are not evidence based. She asked whether there were any lessons that can be drawn from gang experiences. The unattributed speaker replied that there are some lessons that can be learned. He prefaced his statement by saying that many have probably studied what causes crime. On this question, there are thousands and thousands of data points. Yet, despite this abundance of data, there is no true answer to the question of what causes crime.

In terms of terrorism, there is a very small population. The unattributed speaker sought to emphasize that it is going to be very difficult to figure this out. In terms of gangs, particularly where it relates to youth violence, those experiences are very helpful—social deprivation might be applicable, for instance. Much homegrown terrorism has been among highly educated people, which may have something to do with political and ideological radicalization, which has little to do with social deprivation theory. These organizations are recruiting via the Internet and in person, which is precisely what gangs do—they glamorize their organizations. That is important to recognize and understand.

Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi of WORDE asked whether the NCTC and DHS are describing different approaches to the problem. The unattributed speaker responded that he did not want to speak on the NCTC's behalf, but he recognized the localization of these problems and issues. The point is that agencies should put their resources somewhere where things are happening. If there are problems

occurring at a local level, it makes sense to address a problem there. Organizations should try to address the problem where it is occurring.

Dr. Tawfik Hamid of the Potomac Institute asked whether it was better to believe in our imaginations that jihad is peaceful than addressing jihad as a violent effort as defined in several mainstream Islamic books and as the word is actually predominantly used in the Arab media and culture. The unattributed speaker asserted that he does not think that the government should be involved in deciding whether Jihad is peaceful or not; that is a theological question. The government should address the violence. Additionally, the USG should not be using terms that are trying to legitimize al Qaeda as the legitimate warriors of Islam.

Dr. Latéfa Belarouci added that the unattributed speaker had said to delegitimize, one cannot legitimate the actors. She referred to her own experience as an Algerian and the fact that the Algerian government said they were fighting terrorism, but instead gave the terrorists amnesty. The unattributed speaker responded that strategic communications are just one thing that the government needs to be doing in order to address this problem; it obviously cannot solve all the problems of the world. Different terrorists do things for different reasons. Policymakers and others often use the words "violent extremism." By this, do they mean extreme violence or excessive extremism, because there are organizations that have relatively moderate objectives? Terrorist organizations that have an objective that is not that objectionable can potentially evolve out of their tactic, like the IRA. Al Qaeda, however, probably cannot because their objectives are cosmic and often mythological and cannot be negotiated with. It is really important to appreciate the different objectives of these organizations.

## SESSION 2: WHAT CONSTITUTES "DELEGITIMIZATION"?

Samuel Rhem, SMA, introduced the members of the second panel group on the question(s), What constitutes "delegitimization"? Which actors can spearhead such an effort? Do traditional notions of deterrence apply in this area? Does the answer change depending on the type of violence to be deterred and the target?"

Members of the panel included:

- Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (Moderator, NSI)
- Dr. Karl DeRouen (University of Alabama)
- Dr. Tawfik Hamid (Potomac Institute)
- Dr. Walid Phares (National Defense University)
- Mr. Mehdi Khalaji (Washington Institute for Near East Policy)
- Dr. Benjamin Nickels (START, University of Maryland)
- Dr. Eric Larson (RAND)
- Dr. Paul Davis (RAND)
- Dr. Cheryl Benard (Consultant, RAND)
- Dr. Latéfa Belarouci (Consultant)

Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois began the session by noting that there had already been a lot of interesting ideas thrown around during the first session and working lunch. She added that Session 2 would be organized and run in a different manner than the first session. The panel discussion was

conducted as a discussion among the panelists with audience participation. She began the discussion by asking everyone to introduce themselves and offer a discussion point, but she asked that each panelist limit themselves to a minute or two. After allowing everyone to introduce themselves, she would then return to some questions that she had previously sent to the participants to guide the discussion.

MEHDI KHALAJI (WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY) stated that he is working on Iran and politics of Shiite groups in Middle East. He has written extensively on new current in Islamic thought.

DR. BENJAMIN NICKELS (START, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND) introduced himself by noting that he had conducted research on the Algerian war, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Muslims in Europe.

DR. ERIC LARSON (RAND CORPORATION) stated that for the last four years, he has been studying al Qaeda's *salafi-jihadi* ideology, strategy, strategic messaging, and propaganda distribution systems.

DR. TAWFIK HAMID (POTOMAC INSTITUTE) stated that he started fighting radical Islam 25 years ago. He would like to see a holistic approach to combat radical Islam and secondly, he would like to change the current process of thinking in the USG that fails to grasp the crucial role that radical Islamic ideology plays in motivating and sustaining jihadist groups and individuals.

DR. KARL DEROUEN (UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA) stated that he is not an expert on extremism. His research is largely on civil wars and conflict management. He suggested looking at extremism through the mechanism of negotiated settlements. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has been discussing a negotiated process with the Taliban, which begs the question of how to look at the issue from a bigger picture approach—looking at Algeria and Egypt and deradicalization in those countries as possible case studies.

DR. CHERYL BENARD (A CONSULTANT FOR RAND CORPORATION) stated that her interest in this area goes back to the 1960s when she studied at the American University of Beirut and subsequently lived in many parts of the Middle East. Her Muslim friends range from people who are extremely pious to some of the most secular; in addition to the academic side, that range has been very helpful to her understanding of the Muslim world. She joined the RAND Corporation in 2002 and pioneered a new strategy for countering extremism by identifying and supporting those elements and individuals who share our goals. Her process started out with producers of creative media, because when RAND originally launched this effort, there was some pushback as to whether progressive and moderate forces even existed in the Middle East to any noteworthy extent, and if they did, whether they had any influence or audience. By focusing on media activists, this could easily be demonstrated on the basis of their products and their viewership or readership. Later, she also developed a deradicalization curriculum for young detainees in Iraq in the context of a school that was being stood up for them. Based on the recognition that upon release, these young people would again be exposed to radical messages, this curriculum refrained from "countermessaging" and instead focused on imparting some critical thinking skills and an ability to recognize propaganda. This approach sought to build on the natural skepticism of adolescence to make them recognize recruitment efforts, evaluate the goals of the extremists, and consider consequences and alternatives. A big piece of this was the so-called "re-direct" piece, in which the

youths were respected in their dissenting and oppositional stance but encouraged to consider nonviolent, constructive forms of social activism.

DR. WALID PHARES (NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY) warned that the expert community dealing with the radicalization and counter-radicalization measures has not yet found significant answers to the issue of narratives although the United States is in the ninth year of the confrontation. The terms now used to address the challenge or define the parties to the conflict are obsolete in the sense that they are time and space neutral. Terms such as "extremists," "radicals," lone wolves, violent individuals, etc. do not actually identify the ideological and strategic motivations of the terrorists or the groups engaged in the terror activities. These terms used by the expert community are "descriptive" and are not "identifiers" of the phenomenon. Dr. Phares made a distinction between the strategic discourse to be adopted by US National Security, the US legal system and the American public on the one hand and the strategic narrative to be used in communicating overseas messages on the other. Dr. Phares also proposed a distinction between delegitimization, de-radicalization, and de-indoctrination. These are three different but connected levels of engagement.

In expanding on "de-legitimization," Dr Phares argued that the "legitimacy" granted to Jihadists is by perception. The "indoctrinated" individual or group believe in the representation power of the Jihadist movement because of a previous acceptance of the "cause" of the Jihadists. In his findings he can see clearly that the "Jihadist narrative" matches the nodes created by indoctrination. Hence the latter is what produces legitimacy. In his conclusion, Phares underlined that at the foundation of de-radicalization is de-indoctrination.

DR. LATÉFA BELAROUCI (CONSULTANT) noted that she was a psychologist from Algeria, living in France. She has worked with victims of terrorism in Algeria—working in a community where there was a massacre. She then went to France to learn what was going on in Algeria, to be objective, and to undertake further research. She studied families of victims and families of terrorists. She was surprised to find in her research that the families of terrorists were in better mental health than the victims. In Algeria, there was a law that gave terrorists amnesty and granted them total impunity. Terrorists became heroes to their family and communities—they can rebuild themselves with ideology. In Algerian society, there is a cleavage—on one hand there are the 'them' (the family of terrorists) and the 'others' (those that do not agree with the Islamist ideology). She believes that Algeria is a sitting volcano. The society is divided.

DR. PAUL DAVIS (RAND CORPORATION) noted that his job on this panel was a little different that the other panelists. He was first introduced to the topic of terrorism in 2002 when RAND was asked to conduct a study into whether deterrence could play any role in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). RAND's studies took a system perspective—looking at all the various parts of the terrorist system. At RAND, he is an integrator; therefore, he does a lot of listening. With that in mind, he sought to put out some definitional guidelines.

1) If there is a discussion of public support for terrorism, it would be nice to divide the discussion into those that are more passive, those that support terrorist organizations but do not engage in it themselves, and those that would help the authorities and are actively opposed.

2) Another distinction is something that he drew from the metaphor of disease. If one gets sick and recovers, is one then immune or is it possible to relapse into the same illness? Can

more effort be made to work with those who are disengaging so that they will subsequently be "immune?" There are periods when humans are vulnerable to disease—is that a useful concept or distinction to keep in mind? Can groups be inoculated against disease—that is, can preemptive intervention head off radicalization by at-risk groups?

3) Should we not distinguish between violence and indiscriminate violence? Is there potential resonance to understanding that there will be violence and dissatisfaction (e.g., legitimate rebellion), but is indiscriminate violence against civilians not something that can be universally recognized as against the rules? There are rules of war; so also, should there not also be rules of non-war that can be lived by despite all else?

Dr. Astorino-Courtois began the panel discussion by reminding the group that the primary topic was the application of strategic communications to this issue of diminishing the threat posed by violent extremism. This panel was asked to delve deeply into this issue of delegitimization. So, the panel approached extremism from that direction. Then the panel switched directions and looked at extremists in terms of deterrence. Participants have heard earlier this morning a number of different approaches to delegitimization and deradicalization. They heard that it is important to consider how to denaturalize or reframe concepts that are being used—for example, switching Jihad into something that is non-violent. Another thing that the group heard was about

Discussion Topics	r. a
	Ь
• Counter-terrorism strategy: Can violent extremist ideologies be widely "delegitimized" (i.e. across multiple audiences)?	d c
What does it mean to "delegitimize" violent radical Islam? Should the target be the legitimate use of violent tactics, or the legitimacy of the ideology itself?	b
Is it possible? Advisable? Which actors might accomplish this?	р
Is this the most effective strategy for inhibiting terror attacks made in the name of Islam?	v
What is the risk if "delegitimaztion" efforts fail/back-fire?	n
•Counter-terrorist strategy: Can radical Islamists ("active terrorists") can be deterred or	S
otherwise influenced from pursuing violent strategies?	С
Do traditional notions of deterrence apply?	S
Does the answer change depending on the type of violence to be deterred and/or the target of that violence?	v
	n
• How do counter-terrorist and counter-terrorism strategies fit together/overlap?	а
•What is the spectrum of influence activities relevant to each (e.g., denying	v
targets/success through strategic communications and re-framing)?	i
	14

#### **Discussion topics for Session 2**

reinterpreting ideas ather than context: nd finally, Dr. Astorino-Courtois encouraged liscussion about hanging violent ehaviors or olitically motivated iolence into other nodes of expression. he offered these omments because he is not certain vhich one was the nost critical. She sked whether iolent extremist deologies could be widely delegitimized.

Dr. Benard responded that it is

important to first clarify what one means by the term delegitimization. She has found that it consists of five component parts: delegitimizing the leaders, the members, the arguments and the message, the means and methods, and the outcomes. She offered further thoughts on these five constituent parts:

- 1) **Leaders:** Researchers and those in the West have not spent much time delegitimizing the leaders; instead, the West's efforts have been more kinetic, trying to kill them. Indeed, the West has oftentimes inadvertently glamorized the terrorist leaders, depicting them as very evil but also very powerful. Instead, they should be deglamorized, shown to be corrupt, hypocritical, etc.
- 2) **Participants:** There are many possible techniques to delegitimize participants including publicizing the stories of those who have become dissatisfied with the movement, feel they were exploited, or that their Arab leaders had racist attitudes toward non-Arab Muslims etc. One can create doubt in the minds of followers. For example, individuals are told that they have been selected for a suicide bombing as a special honor, while in fact it is because they are seen as the most expendable member of the group. There are studies on the group dynamics within terrorist cells that point to many opportunities to sow doubt and discord.
- 3) **Message:** Deconstruct the radical message. This has been a major focus of efforts and a lot has been accomplished here, from theologically based work to analysis of websites and extremist videos and more.
- 4) **Means and Methods:** By contrast, this is a constituent part that has not been exploited effectively despite many opportunities. Their brutality and reckless disregard for the lives of ordinary people are a major vulnerability. An Afghan TV station broadcasted interviews with relatives of village people who had been killed in a Taliban suicide bombing. That material was so effective and, if posted on the internet, would instantly dispel the message that pious Muslims all over the world admire the extremists.
- 5) **The Outcomes:** In this category, one would have to raise the question as to whether the terrorist actions are achieving the desired effect. Are they leading their societies towards better lives? By disentangling the grievances, which may be widely shared, from the violent means, one can make the case that terrorist violence is not working, that sectarian conflict is making things worse for everyone, etc. The Iraqi population largely came to this conclusion on its own, but in other locations, it will be good to emphasize the message.

In addition to the constituent parts, it is important to consider the five most significant obstacles to delegitimization:

- 1) Fear and intimidation;
- 2) Lack of avenues. Some people may oppose the extremist actions, but have no way to reach out to the authorities with information;
- 3) Misinformation;
- 4) Overlap of goals; some may form partnerships of convenience with violent extremists; here, the agendas need to be disentangled and non-violent groups discouraged from supporting the terrorists.
- 5) In some cases the grievances may actually resonate, so one must put forward credible solutions and alternative paths of action for people who want to change their political and economic circumstances.

Dr. Astorino-Courtois noted that Dr. Benard's statement begged the question whether delegitimization is in fact a good sell.

Dr. Karl DeRouen stated that violent extremist ideologies could be delegitimized. John Mueller uses the example of slavery, which was ended despite those who would have said three centuries ago that it would be impossible. He agreed with Dr. Benard that the West needs to concentrate on the leaders. Looking at Afghanistan, ISAF is not trying to talk about or to the leaders directly. Mullah Omar is in hiding, key leaders have been killed in drone attacks, others have been arrested—so ISAF is not talking to the leaders. So, maybe there are two approaches: 1) talking directly to the leaders with credibility and in turn have the leaders convince their followers to deradicalize; and 2) the government and third parties such as ISAF can give inducements to the leaders so their leadership positions become enhanced. This is the basic model Omar Ashour uses in his book to explain deradicalization in Egypt and Algeria. The USG can learn from these cases and apply this model in Afghanistan.

Dr. Tawfik Hamid noted that delegitimization is possible. But in order to achieve these ends, it is important to use the language that is understood by the target audiences (Muslims). It is possible to make use of the Shura principle in Islam, by saying that Muslims have not chosen radical leaders (such as Bin Laden) in any particular way that follows the Shura. The language of hell and paradise works well in their minds. Delegitimization can only occur if you delegitimize terrorists in ways that are compelling to the Muslim populations. It is critical to use appropriate religious terminology with these populations. Dr. Hamid mentioned that he will address later on in the session the actors who can delegitimize these radicals.

Dr. Eric Larson added that what is crucial here is not lumping terrorist groups together, but understanding each group's influence objectives, target audiences, and messages and exploiting the specific vulnerabilities of each group. Al-Qa'ida (AQ) has done a very good job of market segmentation in understanding the beliefs of their target audiences and addressing different messages to different target audiences. AQ also betrays its own vulnerabilities, however. For example, Al-Zawahiri held a question-and-answer session in which he responded to questions about al-Qa'ida's use of violence against fellow Muslims in six or seven different ways that were contradictory-an indication that AQ felt itself vulnerable to attack on this issue. In terms of messaging to participants in al-Qa'ida terrorism, the objective should be eroding morale-they have been pushed out of Afghanistan and they have lost nearly everything in Iraq—this is an organization that is largely in decline. In terms of messaging to the broader Muslim world, al-Qa'ida offers no positive objective or vision, only violence, largely against innocents. They seek to take over uncontrolled territories by means of violence, but after that they have no real plan. At the end of the day, lumping disparate extremist groups – al-Qa'ida, HAMAS, Hizballah, etc. – under the term "CVE" is not at all meaningful or helpful in identifying each group's unique vulnerabilities and developing effective strategies to exploit them; one needs to focus on specific groups whose ideologies one is trying to counter, and tailor USG strategy and tactics to attack their ideology and narrative, their leadership, their organization and networks, and the appeal of their messages and program. The USG is not going to be able to do very much itself, but can provide indirect support to individuals and institutions that are likely to have much greater influence in discrediting the extremist discourse.

Dr. Benjamin Nickels stated that the idea of 'delegitimizing' violent extremism runs the risk of implying that violent extremism already enjoys wide-spread legitimacy, and of applying a concept traditionally attributed to states (i.e., political legitimacy over a specific territory and population) to non-state actors. Dr. Nickels warned that such assumptions may lead researchers astray. For example, one of the key things about AQIM is that it is not bound to the territory and population of Algeria but has been expanding into other areas, into the Sahel. We may be wise to take a step back and look at the terms 'legitimacy' and 'delegitimization' in and of themselves.

Dr. Astorino-Courtois noted that Dr. Larson was arguing that AQ is on a good road to delegitimizing itself and what Dr. Nickels has added that there is not a wide acceptance of this behavior and of these ideas. If that is the case, she asked what the point of the panel was. She asked whether the panel should have been talking about diminishing politically motivated violence.

Mehdi Khalaji noted that he thought Islamic extremism and violent extremism have been delegitimized in places like Iran. Iranians have shown that they are unhappy with violent Islam. But, he added one more point about the violence itself—what is often called violence is not in fact violence to many in the Islamic world. The amputation of robbers' hands is not violence in Saudi Arabia, it is the law. As Rene Girard, the French anthropologist demonstrated, the sacred is related to the violence; and especially in the Middle Eastern religion, there is nothing sacred without violence. If one wants to work on destroying the notion of violence, one has to work on changing the nature of what is sacred, which is not an easy job. It is not advisable to define violent ideology only from the Western point of view. Violence in an Islamic context is different; killing civilians is not necessarily prohibited by Muslim jurisprudence—particularly the property, lives, and wives of non-Muslims. According to Islamic jurisprudence, if you kill a Muslim, you should be killed; but if you kill a non-Muslim, there is no punishment in Islamic jurisprudence for this. Delegitimizing violence is a very complicated process, it means applying new hermeneutics on extant religious texts. He did not think that just citing Quranic verses or using religious jargon is sufficient; instead it requires delegitimizing the Islamic paradigm of thinking—that is something necessary and radical. The only scholars and intellectuals who can delegitimize the Islamic radicalism are those who use historical and philosophical methodologies for understanding the Islamic texts and through using new methodology they deconstruct the texts. Usually Muslim and non-Muslim scholars in the west can do this job much better than those who live in Muslim countries under various kinds of pressures and restrictions.

Dr. Walid Phares responded that this same paragraph could apply anywhere else. The problem of the destination is descriptive—when someone is classified as extremist, there is a concomitant failure to identify their goals. When these things are discussed by experts, it is imperative to have a strategic discourse that can be understood. There are words that cannot be used—things that insult the religion. When one talks about jihad, there is a religious sense of jihad, the historical, and the modern movement. If in the Arab discourse these terms are being used, who are those in the West to determine what term is used? It is not the place of scholars and others in the West to impede on an ongoing debate that is already occurring in the Arab world. With regard to the initial problem, delegitimizing what is the question. There is a public and organizations undertaking violence—the objective is the desire to have the public believe that these violent extremists are not doing the right things. The critical question is to ask how the public sees these things as legitimate. There are a set of ideologies that have to be identified—their own narratives, not operating in the abstract. It is not just a floating ideology or theology; it is an organized movement that is indoctrinated. People do not become jihadis overnight because their parents are getting divorced—it is a lifelong process.

Dr. Astorino-Courtois identified two strains of conversation in the panel discussion thus far. She wanted to allow Dr. Benard to respond and then the panel would return to the issue raised by Mehdi about the sacred.

Dr. Benard replied that in every society, there are always radical and potentially violent factions. Delegitimization is achieved when these are marginalized to the point where mainstream society does not support them and can absorb the damage they do. Timothy McVeigh did significant harm

but his abilities, and those of similar marginal movements, are limited by the fact that society does not view them as legitimate, which in turn diminishes their ability to operate, recruit, etc. She noted that she thought the panel was off on a tangent when it focused on theology. She asked the group to recall that a few decades ago, violent extremism in the Middle East occurred under the headline of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism. She did not think that the problem was principally about Islam; it was about discontent. The method had to be to enable and encourage people to address their problems in socially constructive ways, and the ultimate goal should be that the countries and societies at large had to have the resiliency to manage their own fringe groups that posed threats.

Dr. Tawfik Hamid commented on why these groups are legitimate to these populations. He shared his own story of radicalization. It started when he read a verse in the Quran that said, "Kill the infidels, wherever you find them" and a radical friend told him that it was their duty to prepare for this. On the contrary, a Sufi scholar (who follows a mystical form of Islam) was peaceful; however, he could not give a theological basis to refute the radical interpretations of this verse. Extremists become legitimized mainly because not only can they offer a theological basis to support their radical views, but they also look more religious than others, e.g., they wear beards and dress like the founder of Islam, Mohamed (as described in some Islamic books). These factors helped them became legitimate. If the objective is to delegitimize them, one needs to work with the moderate elements of the society, and one has to work with Mullahs who can say that the terrorists are being infidels themselves by issuing strong fatwas against them. The mullahs are the ones that can delegitimize these groups along with the secular Arab governments; but ultimately, the Mullahs should be the ones leading these efforts publically.

Dr. Latéfa Belarouci added that it is possible to use the same language about religion. Delegitimization efforts can make use of religion to answer to the extremists. She stated that she believes in justice—it is critical to emphasize that if you kill someone, you have to pay. If there is no justice, people feel insecure and there is revenge. The animals are better, because when they kill, it is only to eat and to survive, but when people kill it is for other reasons. The real question is really about civilization and that fundamentalism is an ideological and cultural war. What is the message that is transmitted to today's children? How do we learn to live together and to tolerate differences?

Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois wanted to reach out to the audience and get their input.

Dr. Frank Furedi noted that legitimacy from a sociological point of view is not just political; there is also a moral authority element to legitimacy, which begs the question of how to combat it using propaganda and communications techniques. Governments have often used these techniques to assert their own authority. The EU governments are good at telling Muslims how to be good Muslims, but they are not very good at saying what it means to be a good European. Gordon Brown learned that there was no easy way to figure out how to create and characterize a group identity.

Mehdi Khalaji added that in order to understand Islam, it is not necessary to be a Muslim. Living a tradition and understanding a tradition are two very different things. Western universities are producing a much higher standard of Islamic studies which is much, much better than what Islamic seminaries are producing. In the Islamic world, Muslims are living in a world of darkness. Policymakers in the West do not want to say to Muslims how to be a Muslim, but the West can achieve its goals by spreading the knowledge and let them know that a traditional view of Islam has expired. In order to understand the Quran as a text, it is important to understand the underlying linguistics, a human science—Ayatollahs are using medieval linguistics. It is important to tell the Islamic world that entrée into the modern world requires that they understand their religious texts

in a modern way. The antidote to radical Islamic is not a traditional reading of Islam, but a historical reading of Islam. This type of studying Islam has already been done to some extent by many Muslim and non-Muslim scholars like Mohammad Arkoun in France and Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid in Egypt.

The unattributed speaker noted that it is not possible to delegitimize something unless it is assumed that it is already legitimate, but this is an assumption that is often imposed upon the Muslim world by the West. So much of this is focused on religion as a key factor that motivates terrorism, but that is a problematic assumption to make, because if the sole focus is religion, there is a significant loss of power including the issues of legitimacy and identity.

Dr. Walid Phares registered his disagreement with the unattributed speaker's statement that if the West overemphasizes religion, it is only looking at one component of the problem. Religion is a dimension that is critically important. Some in the West think that if the West addresses one dimension to the end, victory will happen. But Dr. Phares stated that this was a multi-dimensional problem that requires a multifaceted approach. He noted that others in the group had compared the Irish conflict to a global war—something that everyone ought to be careful of. He suggested that members in the West determine where the threat is localized. The government ought to determine what radicalization is. There is energy and a movement and a set of ideas and ideologies that motivate this radicalism—people need to know what those ideas are. The West should not be afraid to enter a discussion of a problem that has already been discussed within the Muslim community. Those in the West cannot counter something without knowing what it is countering.

Dr. Hamid added that the problem needed to be analyzed in a scientific manner, if external factors such as poverty and lack of education produced different responses in people who follow different types of faiths, then religion has to be considered in the equation. If religious factors are ignored and only other contributing factors (like poverty) are considered, the West will lose this war. Dr. Hamid mentioned that if such external factors were the true cause of the problem of terrorism, then why do they predominantly affect young Muslims rather than young Christians or Hindus who live under the same socio-economic and political circumstances?

Dr. Astorino-Courtois concluded the panel discussion at this point, encouraging members of the audience with additional questions to follow up with the panelists during the course of the conference. She also observed that the panel talked about many things because the issue is so complicated. This is a unique thing that the government is trying to do—which is influencing someone else's world view. It is important to not conflate the objective (what is the problem that the West is trying to address) with the tactics used to address that objective. As the panel concludes, she asked each panelist to tell the group two things: 1) what is the big threat in as few words as possible—why is the panel here?; 2) list a couple of things that the Session 2 panel can impart to Session 3; 3)—identify the type of campaign that ought to be designed to combat the big threat.

Dr. Davis noted that as a practical matter, the unique feature of the threat is the potential international appeal and the potential universalist argument. There will continue to be breakouts and many people will be radicalized.

Dr. Phares concluded that the threat is the production of terrorists or violent people and instigation of violence that threatens the US and its allies. To counter that threat, the West needs to identify two things. First, the West needs to understand the set of ideas and concepts that are used by an

organized network to radicalize and encourage violence and; 2) the West needs to know how the network(s) operate. The campaign should include theology, military, diplomacy, economics, etc.

Dr. Benard felt that the main threat is overextension, as the West tries to solve too many problems in too many places, combined with a loss of its own self-confidence and resiliency. It was not going to be possible to fix the economies, education systems, unemployment problems, etc. of the entire Middle East. What was more important was to keep sight of the West's own values. Iran she noted, is the country whose population is the most pro-American in the entire Islamic world, because their experience with an Islamic government had left them with an appreciation for the cultural and political freedom the United States stands for. It would be much better for the West to focus on what it stands for, instead of trying to explain Islam to Islamic countries. Versus the extremists, that would be a fruitless effort anyway. Groups such as the Taliban are not interested in what moderates think about Islam because they consider themselves to be the real and true believers.

Dr. DeRouen noted that the threat is the reputational costs to violent extremists seeing value in their tactics. The campaign should be targeted to leaders, talking about rational choice deterrence and having respected leaders go to the communities and convincing them to give up violence.

Dr. Hamid noted that the threat is the failure to define the real underlying cause of the problem. What should be done is to consider adopting a proper psychological warfare and to use education to provide young Muslims an alternative interpretation of the Quran than those that are provided by the radicals.

Dr. Larson added that AQ is in decline right now, but he was worried about the violent social movement and the potential for succession by a new set of leaders that could make better use of that ideological package. For the next panel, he would urge participants to rely on enabling Muslims to carry the water on discrediting extremist ideology and staying out of the way since the US lacks any credibility whatsoever on definitions of what it means to be a good Muslim. It will be Muslim opinion leaders, clerics, and rock stars that will and should lead the charge. The West should not try to do too much with its own hands because the West does not understand the problem.

Dr. Nickels added that while there are many threats out there, the focus of this panel, at least at the outset, was the facet of Islamist ideology which can drive violent extremism. As for advice to the next panel, there should not be too much focus on ideology and any eventual 'delegitimization' campaign by the USG should beware of the Midas Touch regarding moderate Muslim voices and organizations – the Midas Touch in the original sense of the myth, as a curse, where touching something turns it into beautiful gold but also makes it no longer of use for its purpose.

Mehdi Khalaji concluded that the threat is terrorism. The wrong solution is to empower extremists against extremists, which is what the United States and other Muslim countries have done before. The West should be very careful of the implication of its policies in Islamic countries and their impacts on nascent democratization. The US government and progressive governments should encourage civil society to get involved in this issue to help Islamic civil society. Nascent democratic movements in Muslim countries are disconnected and marginalized—they have no media platform —the Western civil society can empower these groups and help them to help themselves and enhance their voice.

## SESSION 3: STRATEGIC CAMPAIGNS TO DIMINISH AND DEFLATE RADICAL ISLAMIST THREATS

CAPT Wayne Porter, OCJCS, and Farah Pandith, DOS, moderated the third panel: Strategic Campaign to Diminish and Deflate Radical Islamist Threats. The panel topics centered on three lines of persuasion: the US public / Government, the private / commercial sector, and International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations. It demonstrated collaboration across the three sectors: to empower mainstream Muslim thought leaders, academics, and activists who can affect the intra Muslim discourse in order to deter and delegitimize violent Islamist messages.

Panelists included:

- CAPT Wayne Porter (OCJCS)
- Ms. Farah Pandith (DOS)
- Dr. Qamar-ul Huda (USIP)
- Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi (WORDE)
- Dr. Ralph Wellborn (NDU)
- Mr. Scott Carpenter (Washington Institute)
- Dr. Bill McEwen (Gallup)
- Unattributed Speaker (USG)
- Mr. Ziad Alahdad, (Former Director of Operations, World Bank)
- Dr. Emily Goldman (CENTCOM)
- Dr. Gregory Michaelidis (DHS)

**CAPT WAYNE PORTER (OCJCS)** began the panel discussion with a couple of points. There has been a lot of talk about strategic communication throughout day one; however, this was not the stated purpose of the workshop. Much of strategic communication is about what is done rather than what is said. It is important to remember that the purpose of the workshop was to evaluate a proposed way ahead against the global threat of the perversion of Islam. The concern lies in the fact that this version of Islam propagates virally and is manifested through individuals, movements, organizations, and sovereign states. The focus is not on ETA and the Basque movement nor should the focus be specifically placed on AQ. This is because when AQ are defeated, the problem will not necessarily go away, and the more that the focus is placed on AQ, the more that the group is empowered. With this in mind, the main focus may be the practicality of partnering with Muslim communities across the globe in order to challenge the ideologically perversion. Then the US can hold up their side and identify the underlying grievances.

FARAH PANDITH (DEPARTMENT OF STATE) then added a frame to spark the conversation. Two weeks after the Cairo speech, Secretary Clinton requested that the State Department engage on a people-to-people level so the US could understand what goes on at the grassroots level. This also allows for the United States to interface with localized communities and build dialogue and trust. This partnership is very broad and means a lot as it gives the United States insight to what is going on around the world. It is important to keep in mind that there is no monolith of what Muslims are experiencing around the world. It is critical that the United States

understand the nuance. This is a global approach and it is critical based on who is being engaged. Currently, 45% of the world's population is under the age of 30; this is a much higher percentage in Muslim communities. This is important to understand as the United States looks at a long-term effort to engage and open up dialogue. If the younger generation is not understood, then the United States will be missing a lot. Throughout the conversations that Ms. Pandith has had with young people, the number one issue that has been brought up is a policy issue; the next issue is a desire to defeat the violent ideology that is coming into their community. No matter who the group is made up of, the issue of preventing foreign ideologies from penetrating is brought up. Overall, it is necessary to understand the credible voice in a given community. Afterwards, it is possible to form an intellectual partnership and work organically with credible sources to push back against violent extremism. It is also important to note that most of the time the US flag is not flying high over these efforts. In these cases it takes commitment for a long term working relationship rather than money. The final point that Ms. Pandith made was about being Muslim and modern. It is more prevalent to find "how to be a Muslim" online than there are sources speaking about the diversity of being Muslim. An important question may also be why Muslim youth are going online to ask questions about being Muslim instead of asking questions in the home.

CAPT Porter added that what is being suggested when talking about campaigning involving the Muslim community is transparent and involves public and private partnership.

DR. QAMAR-UL HUDA (USIP) addressed engaging with the military and defining strategy. He informed the group that USIP held a round table focused on how to create experts on religion. Currently, there is not a single course taught to Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) about religion, about the importance of religious actors, and how to engage with religious communities around the globe. However, when the groups broke out into sessions, the fact that DoD had been engaged with religious actors for 20-25 years became clear. These conversations indicated how much is going on across the government but little is known to various departments, and there is a dire need for interagency sharing of information on religious engagement.

Dr. Huda stressed that overall, it is critical to find strategies and campaigns to deflate threats from radical actors and it is even more important to ensure that our models of deflation are strategically designed for eradication of radicalism. He explained his background in thinking and understanding practicing fundamentalism in Islamic communities. His work deals with extremists in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Overall, he proposed a strategic outlook focused on religious actors who know the language of radicalism and who can work with students who have drifted. He stated that there is not a need for a reformed theological curriculum, but rather Islamic educators (for madrasas) are very much interested in expanding their curricula to include peace building, conflict resolution, peace studies, mediation, world history, management, accounting, comparative religion, and other courses that will make the next generation of students competitive with students around the world. This may not be a place for government to intervene; however, the USG needs to support efforts that expands, develops, and fosters a culture of peace within these Islamic seminaries. It does not violate the Establishment clause because it is specifically targeting educational programs to broaden the scope of learning. In addition, any strategic campaign to counteract the rise of radicalization overseas and domestically must focus on citizen messengers.

Dr. Huda suggested the implementation of more strategic projects and action plans that allow the United States to identify citizen messengers or thought leaders. Therefore, part of the strategic plan would be to discuss violence, peacekeeping, state violence, gangs, drugs, and criminals. Citizen messengers have the respect of the larger community and their opinions are able to influence large segments of their particular community. Examples of citizen messengers are talk show hosts within Muslim communities, artists, actors, and filmmakers as potential leaders may be useful. In April 2010, an Al-Jazeera television show hosted for three weeks a poetry contest. It was a type of "Arab Idol" but focused on poetry recitation and the imagination of poetry. This is the perfect forum where heroes are elevated or where villains are re-imagined as heroes. Other messengers may be sports figures or religious representatives. Religious representatives are often women who are involved through clinics, schools, and through the provision of other social services.

Additionally, it is important that these leaders create their own message. In terms of Muslims in the US political representatives, youth groups, and Muslims in the public face are all important potential messengers. Lastly, it is important to factor in the problem of spoilers in designing a campaign against radicalization. Spoilers inherently take opposing positions, not because it serves their argument but they have the intellectual habit of being contrarian. Spoilers may or may not be interested in this project but their involvement is critical. We saw how spoilers finally joined United Kingdom's efforts in creating a counter-radicalization program in 2008. I might add, for example, the inclusion of academics will be extremely challenging. Speaking generally, academics-specifically Middle Eastern and Islamic studies specialists-are fiercely independent, extremely biased against USG, and DoD in particular, and tend to avoid any national program which involves counter-radicalization. However, they are untapped resource, but academics need to be a focused group.

CAPT Porter added that one other area to think about when the conversation turns to citizen messengers are the kids/youth. They are vocal and social and yet American Muslims are grossly under-represented in advertising. Muslims in other nations would benefit from seeing how well integrated American Muslims are through mainstream advertising (Coca Cola, iPod, cosmetics, etc.).

ZIAD ALAHDAD (FORMER DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS AT THE WORLD BANK) brought up four main points. The first of which was that he felt that there are two distinct threats. The first threat is an ideological core of extremists. The way to counter them is with an ideological effort that drowns out their messages. One example of this would be bringing the recent fatwa to the media. This fatwa of Tahir Qadri systematically negates the doctrine of those who justify terrorism on a religious basis as totally contrary to the tenets of the very religion they profess to follow. The second group is similar to Gallup's "fence sitters" who verge on converting to extremism. This group is deprived of socio-economic benefits and feel deprived of a political voice. Ultimately, they are the breeding ground and the recruiting base for violent extremism as exclusion creates conflict and a safe haven. For this group, socio-economic development would be good where NGOS/development finance institutions can play a role.

The second point Mr. Alahdad brought up was that the development paradigm is largely understated as there is a conflict between the political horizon and the development horizon. The former calls for rapid action as it cannot afford the luxury of a generation change. Conversely, the development horizon is long term and spans several electoral cycles. Terrorism focuses policies on immediate actions. The development paradigm therefore is given lip service and is placed on the back burner. This is evident in the disconnect between development promises and actions.

Mr. Alahdad's third point was that, globally, there is an immense deficit of effort and resources for development. As an illustration, take the Millennium Development Goals for 2015, which address extreme poverty, primary education, gender equality, environmental sustainability, and building global partnerships for development. The World Bank works in each of these areas and although the estimates are difficult because they overlap, the deficits appear to range between 40 and 70 billion dollars a year. This translates into a huge shortfall between now and 2015. As a result, progress in attaining most targets is lagging.

The last point that Mr. Alahdad made was that special times require special treatment and thinking outside of the box. The modern development paradigm supports international financial moderate organizations that work with NGOs. He pointed out that this may be the time to take a fresh approach to counterterrorism by perhaps partnering with NGOs who provide social services and also profess moderation in religion. He pointed out that in Pakistan, for example, there are many welfare organizations where capacity building efforts will counter the messages by extremist organizations that are already well funded. Mr. Alahdad concluded his remarks by stating that a security response is not enough and neither is development work. The real world solution lies in between these responses. It is critical that the development paradigm is introduced into the policy framework.

CAPT Porter added that there is a viral spreading of malign networks via the hateful ideologies of radicalism and violent Islamists. The US should seek ways to intercede with benign networks that will satisfy the common requirements of individuals, movements, organizations in a less harmful, more hopeful way.

DR. HEDIEH MIRAHMADI (WORDE) explained that to be truly global, a strategic campaign requires a synchronicity of ideals. Since there are a lot of reasons why this is difficult, Dr. Mirahmadi focused on whether it is necessary to define such a campaign. This can then be used as a platform for international support.

Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi stated that there is a significant amount of research that indicates that the trajectory to radical Islam is made up of a number of complex variables. Within the workshop, a number of these variables have been brought up including culture, ideology, political grievances, economics, and social discontent. These variables are all relevant for a comprehensive campaign. Dr. Mirahmadi focused on the ideological component which should be made up of a public and a private campaign. The public campaign includes an effort to support the cultural traditions in Muslim countries. Currently, there is a cultural genocide due to radical Islam, so if the United States supports cultural preservation, including the restoration of landmarks, it would demonstrate respect for the culture and traditions of others. Privately, it is important to forge strategic allegiances. This includes an alliance with Muslim leaders who have the ability to generate a popular social movement. More specifically, this can be done through traditional leaders who abhor extremists redefining Islam, or through leaders who have new ideas. Support can come in the form of providing media outlets or leadership training.

Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi stated that questions to consider include how should a message be shaped to gain buy in from mainstream traditional Islam? Is a unified campaign possible? Will the government define the campaign and agree? And will the private sector agree with the government's definition? If both government and private sector agree on the campaign message will the silent majority of Muslims rise up to the challenge radicalism since it requires their action? The global campaign would require a long time and would require regular tests of effectiveness and recalibration. This effort may also include implementing conflicting approaches as long as the effectiveness of each approach can be measured.

CAPT Porter added that while people tend to focus on the government's role addressing grievances that feed into a radical narrative, the private sector is often better placed to have a more influential role in effecting positive change.

UNATTRIBUTED SPEAKER (USG) then spoke about public diplomacy. He believes there is a need for what he called a new "origin myth" for revolutionary Islamism. In many people's minds, violent revolutionary Islamism is viewed in either a "good versus evil" or an Islamic framework. Both present problems. The "good vs. evil" framework can make violent revolutionary Islamists seem romantic or heroic to those who are hostile to the West. On the other hand, viewing the tiny group of violent revolutionary Islamists as representative of Islam is likely to exacerbate intercultural tensions. Thus, there is a need for a new "origin myth" to explains the phenomenon of violent revolutionary Islamism.

The USG speaker suggested that violent revolutionary Islamism should be viewed as an unfortunate, dysfunctional byproduct of the inevitable process of modernity. Throughout modern history, there have been numerous violent extremist ideologies. Communism, fascism, Nazism, Ba'athism, the aggressive Japanese militarism of the 1930s, and the Jacobinism of the French Revolution were all destructive, modern "isms." Such movements arise during the difficult transition to modernity, as has been pointed out by Michael Mazarr in his 2007 book *Unmodern Men in the Modern World: Radical Islam, Terrorism, and the War on Modernity*.

"Throw-back" anti-modernisms like revolutionary Islamism invoke a mythical, idealized past for inspiration. "Leap-ahead" ultra-modernisms, like communism, seek to eradicate the past and create a new, perfect world. Both are dysfunctional reactions to the challenge of adapting to modernity.

Shifting the framework from Islam to modernity would allow us to discuss violent revolutionary Islamism as an example of the pitfalls involved in making the difficult transition to modernity, one of the unfortunate "growing pains of a shrinking world." This would move the focus from the mythic to the mundane, casting violent revolutionary Islamism as a dysfunctional failure to adapt rather than as something that could be viewed as romantic or heroic. The framework of modernity is also useful because it is highly relevant to other important public diplomacy, issues, including climate change, democracy, and human rights.

CAPT Porter replied that something to consider is that it is not modernity per se as it applies to the Middle East; rather it is the fear of a loss of a true identity. Bear in mind that Bin Laden's father made money with a construction company in Saudi Arabia and that he resented and rebelled against that. Muslim architects are building huge structures in Dubai, UAE, etc. If Muslims could orient to a new identity, based on their unique contributions in a modern world, this could be very positive. Therefore, focusing on modernity is a double edged sword that must be carefully considered.

DR. BILL MCEWEN (GALLUP) mentioned that he had encountered a number of issues that bear mentioning as the group considered the development of campaigns. Clarity with regard to the objective is critical since, as Lewis Carol said, "if you don't know where you are going, any road will get you there." Despite years in advertising, a successful campaign is not just about communication-it is about behavior. He pointed out that there are two aspects to emphasize. The first is authenticity and the second is alignment. There is a need for both. Alignment becomes a real issue because as the public and private sectors are considered, there is a multiplicity of messages directed through multiple channels at multiple audiences. Oftentimes, the resulting takeaway by an audience is confusion resultant from mixed messages and skepticism resultant from messages that are not backed up by behavior. The aspect of these messages that Mr. McEwen was asked to address was the companies that communicate to the rest of the world about what the US believes in.

It is important to look at what message the world gets in terms of what the US stands for. One question is if it is possible to get alignment amongst various marketing organizations. They have a very different agenda, as typically the idea of all working together does not resonate with them. And thus one question is will they work together. The answer is yes but only if it can be demonstrated that it is clearly aligned with their business interests. If a proper view, coordinated, consistent message sells, they will get behind it. For example, Business for Diplomatic Action is an organization working with companies such as Coca-Cola, American Airlines, McDonald's, and other major businesses to see what they can do to enhance cooperation and understanding, through their behaviors and not just through advertising under the assumption that the longest journey begins with short steps.

One lesson is that if the goal is to be effective, attention must first be gained. A message that is not heard has no potential for impact. But for any campaign, there are three fundamentals. The first fundamental, credibility, has been addressed within the workshop. Without credibility there can be no positive result. Credibility comes from who is saying it as well as what is said. The key question that will be asked, often by a very skeptical audience, is how believable is it? The second fundamental is whether it is compelling. So not only is it believable, but is it meaningful, clear and relevant? It needs to be clear. The third component is whether it connects. Does it personally resonate with the audience? The importance of emotional connection is incredible. Decisions are based on emotional reactions and feelings, not just rational considerations. And thus, if there is going to be a campaign, it has to be noticed, credible, compelling, and it has to resonate. This requires personalization. This may best be achieved by starting with a cadre of people and expand out using available mechanisms. Rather than starting broadly, which is what was traditionally done in decades past. The approach must consist of an authenticity of what is being said that fits with what is being done and aligns with all the players.

CAPT Porter added that it is important to not lose sight of why this is being done. America's interests of security and prosperity are inseparable. It is impossible to have one without the other. The short term gain is not the goal; it is sustainable security and prosperity. That can only be gained

through credible influence and strength morally, economically, and militarily. America needs to be consistent and close the "say/do" gap in order to develop the credibility to achieve sustainability.

DR. GREGORY MICHAELIDIS (DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY) addressed the domestic challenges of communicating about the phenomenon and the means to reach people. He began by discussing the key documents that give DHS their framework. The founding legislation established DHS to have a coordinating role with groups in the private sector, general public, and government. In February, DHS came out with its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). This supports what the USG speaker spoke about earlier in terms of a putting out a positive vision of what the United States would like to promote, in terms of safety, security, and an environment in which Americans can thrive.

One challenge is that there is no "tabula rasa." Communication has been ongoing for quite some time and so the world is not waiting for a report to land on the desk to see how the United States is talking about communication and what it stands for. Another challenge is the false dichotomy that the terrorist need to be right one time and the government must be right 100% of the time. This sets up the notion that failure is based upon a single terrorist attack. The next challenge that Dr. Michaelidis presented to the group was the revolution in media consumption. The old model was a reliance on the evening news or morning paper, but now the methods are immediate and mobile. The current challenge associated with this is attempting to deliver messages to multiple audiences about complex topics in ways that are easily boiled down. In other words, the USG needs simplicity beyond the complexity.

SCOTT CARPENTER (WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY) spoke about creating a strategic campaign to counter violent extremism. His comments have not been approved for public release and are not included in this report.

#### Discussion:

Craig Charney, Charney Research, addressed the USG speaker's point on modernization. He added that perhaps post-modernization should be considered as well, specifically the Arab modernity industrialization, communication, and uniformization. Mr. Charney stated that he thought there was an important implication for campaign strategy as all these identities co-exist. The USG speaker responded that he was thinking as a communicator to keep things simple and encompass a multitude of concepts. He was trying to identify a simple concept that would make a good frame.

Brad Baylor, JFCOM, followed up by asking the panel what the focus of a US campaign strategy would be. He asked whether the focus of the effort would be on the de-legitimization of radical violent extremism or if it would be the idea of building capacity or would it be both. Overall, how would the panel describe the focus in terms of promoting opportunity of which this de-radicalization would be a subset or equivalent level of effort? Ms. Pandith replied that the US Government does not have the credibility to jump into a society and say what they should or should not do. The purpose of what the United States is trying to do is to move the space where it is not credible to a space where the United States can support someone who is. These voices or entities can delegitimize or create alternatives to what is being played the loudest. However, a challenge being confronted is how to find the credible people who can create alternatives. Previously, someone mentioned tapping into artists, poets, athletes, and other social leaders; however, the

right mechanisms to use these people have not been identified. Often they will not want to work with the United States but the US can make their voices known.

Ziad Alahdad added that if one accepted that there were two groups, the ideologically driven core group and the others who are the socially and economically excluded, one would need both initiatives. This means the USG needs to both de-legitimize the ideology to address the first group and to build capacity through long term development to address the second group and prevent it from becoming a breeding ground for recruits.

The unattributed speaker went back to the USG speaker's point on modernity. The modernity frame is important; however, that frame may be feeding into the belief that the West is trying to change religion. One thing that may be worth focusing on is how the United States looks at crime and separates crime from ideology. For example, in the United States, it is not possible to arrest or prosecute based on thinking. The line is drawn, however, at violence or action. If we focus on "violence," then it is not about ideology. Hedieh Mirahmadi added that there is a danger in not addressing ideology. The unattributed speaker responded that the group is speaking as if the next step from extremist is to violent extremist. If that is the case, then ideology is relevant.

Farah Pandith added that what is happening to this generation in Western Europe, and around the world, is not just a move toward violence. Rather this move is in many ways an expression that they should not celebrate diversity and if they are different, then they should separate themselves from the group.

John Hanley, ODNI, asked the group when the United States has done enough. CAPT Porter replied that the United States must stop focusing on near term ends. In actuality, "enough" can never be attained since sustainability requires an infinite series of actions. However, it is important to demonstrate what the United States stands for and close the say/do gap.

Ziad Alahdad added that he had brought up the Millennium Development Goals earlier to give a sense of the magnitude of the international development effort needed. To counter terrorism, there have been and continue to be short-term actions but there are no short-term solutions. As far as long-term development actions are concerned, these go well beyond what is needed for countering terrorism alone. The overall process of development is a continuous process and, given the extent of the deficit, and the very concept of development, one cannot think in terms of an end to the process

Dr. Michaelidis added that in terms of resilience, the head of FEMA talks about the American people not as being victims but assets. They are often the first responders, so the combination of resilience and heightened sense of readiness are important traits.

Bill McEwen added that asking when the efforts are enough is much like asking when Coke should end its marketing efforts.

John Hanley added that it is important to think about at what level it will no longer be sustainable.

### SESSION 4: DAY ONE WRAP-UP

The moderators of sessions one through three concluded the day with a wrap up session. The moderators were:

- Dr. Laurie Fenstermacher (AFRL);
- Dr. Paul Davis (RAND);
- Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI); and
- CAPT Wayne Porter (OCJCS).

The current baseline understanding that session one panel members identified were presented by Dr. Fenstermacher. The panel identified a need to have tailored strategies for individuals who are motivated by ideology, self-interest, and those motivated by fear. These three groups are similar to type one radicals, type two radicals, and fence-sitters. Energies should focus on type ones and fence sitters. Additionally, any action that the US takes should be evaluated with rigor and be based on evidence. These actions should focus on "pull factors" or those which are context specific rather than "push" factors. Furthermore, former terrorists or extremists who have disengaged may be useful messengers.

The group also identified the need to understand the ideology and terms associated with it. These include the "do" terms such as truce and Da'wa and the "don't" terms which include secularism and public goods. The target strategies that were talked about in regards to the function of ideology included:

- a) Created narratives/naturalization;
- b) Contradictions/obscuring;
- c) Interests of leaders vs. collective/universalizing;
- d) Rules of game/structuring.

Targeting should be done with generationally sensitive strategies; for example, the youth culture. It is important though that one does not generalize and base current strategies on past terrorist groups or violent movement without understanding or considering differences. To understand terrorists, it is critical to realize that they see themselves as good guys. Perhaps a rational actor model can work if it is generalized to include collective utility.

The outcome from session two entitled, "Delegitimizing Violent Extremists/Islamists," was filled with both consensus that delegitimization is possible; however, there were a number of different opinions on whether this is either the best approach or a feasible approach.

One question that was addressed was what the real threat that should be addressed was. Panelists disagreed on the threat to be addressed by any strategic communication campaign. Perceived threats included: United States or Western misunderstanding of the real situation in the Muslim world, terrorism, social discontent, the production in Muslim society of violent extremists, and politically-motivated violent behavior.

A second question that was addressed was what tactics of strategic communication should be used to address the threat. There was disagreement about the relevance, advisability, and likely effectiveness of using Muslim religious terms and concepts as a means of addressing violent Islam extremism.

Session three entitled, "Strategic Campaign to Diminish Radical Islamist Threats," included a number of points that panelists found important in determining a campaign. These points included supporting historical traditions and customs of indigenous Muslim cultures and closing the say/do

gap to increase consistency. This consistency will lead to credibility, which is critical in conjunction with whether the message is compelling and whether it connects with the audience. It was also considered important to align government, private sector, and Muslim leaders to forge strategic alliances. This empowerment of many voices gives the radicalize competition and allows the US to partner with and support potential leaders. It also allows the US to implement a wide variety of approaches and employ diagnostic measures to recalibrate over time. Ultimately, whether it is by telling the story of modernity, shining a light on the outreach effort, or just assisting those around the world who are countering extremists for their own reason, the approach must be sustainable and global in nature.

## RADICALIZATION

Dr. Laurie Fenstermacher of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) began the first session of Day 2 of the conference by welcoming the participants. She introduced Dr. Latéfa Belarouci, an Algerian psychologist with experience researching terrorists and their victims.

#### THE GENSIS OF TERRORISM IN ALGERIA (DR. LATÉFA BELAROUCI)

Dr. Latéfa Belarouci, an Algerian psychologist currently residing in France, presented a briefing on the genesis of terrorism in Algeria. She began her presentation by introducing her objective, seeking to speak about her own experience with terrorism in her native Algeria. In order to understand the current situation in Algeria, it is critical to understand the history of the country. Islam and fundamentalism did not start in Algeria with the 1980s, but instead started much earlier, in colonization and the accession to independence.

Dr. Belarouci noted the significance of the French colonial era insofar as the native/indigenous population was designated as "other. The violence of colonization is inherent to its mutilation of identity through domination, expropriation, and exploitation of resources and people. The denial of otherness through the use of vocabulary that designates the other as belonging to a race defined as inferior to Europeans, the denial of access to education and religious discrimination: Muslims were considered as prisoners of obscurantism and the extermination of Arab considered as savages. This second-class status was associated with a denial of resources and religious discrimination. In this marginalizing milieu, Islam provided a unifying cause and means to resist colonizers. To face the loosing of their roots and being excluded, Islam provided an identity and culture that constituted a factor of resistance and self-assertion.

Dr. Belarouci noted that when a population cannot practice their culture, the one thing that cannot be destroyed is religion. Following the casting off of colonial rule, the independence struggle and the first government incorporated Islam as the religion in the Algerian constitution, with Arabic becoming the official language.

After independence, facing a socialist orientation of the country that was perceived as anti-Islamic, certain religious personalities gradually slid towards political Islamism. And in order to mobilize the greatest number of supporters, an enemy was needed; this enemy became the communists and French speakers. Radicals started to kill French speakers.

Radicals started being violent towards their own; starting with Algerian women and girls – largely those who worked, studied, etc. Then students swelled the ranks of radicalization. Political Islamism developed within the universities.

Dr. Belarouci indicated that the violence of terrorism against civilian and members of security services, intellectuals, and the economic infrastructure and public institution became a civil war in Algeria. In 1995, the government enacted a law to give amnesty all the terrorists. This amnesty is now a problem because they use the amnesty law to protect the terrorists. There is a major cleavage dividing Algerian society – the terrorists versus everyone else. The terrorists are considered by their family and their community as heroes.

Dr. Belarouci concluded by noting her objective, which was to say that in order to understand what is happening in the country and fundamentalist terrorism – it is critical to return to the history of the country. The colonization and other factors: economic, social, political and particularly ideologues who use violence and the denial of otherness contribute in the growth of terrorism.

# FROM AFGHANISTAN TO MEXICO: EXPLAINING RADICAL BEHAVIOR? (ALEXIS EVERINGTON)

Alexis Everington of SCL presented a briefing on his research findings on radicalization and how some shared themes are found to varying degrees in all of these findings. In the approach used behind the data collected, he noted that in the field, members of violent organizations tend to embellish. Second, they are often harder to find. These were two of the practical reasons for why the approach focused on the immediate population around radicalized members of society, rather than radicalized individuals themselves. The approach could be best summarized as most important is understanding how to exert pressure on the group whose behavior needs to change by understanding their environment.

Using case studies, Alexis Everington elaborated upon the key themes. The first of which was the fact that there are often too many fence sitters in the population in which radical behavior can flourish. In behavioral terms this is called a relatively low propensity for change. His Mexico case study illustrated how fence sitters relate to the growing power of drug cartels. A number of factors have contributed to the fence sitting problem. For example, people are afraid to speak out; they perceive the current government as too corrupt and they lack a deep understanding of the situation. These various motivations need to be kept in mind when creating any communication campaign.

A second theme is the erroneous identification of the enemy. The danger of erroneous identification of the enemy is that other groups and individuals are caught up in a drag net and labeled/segmented improperly. In FATA, Everington indicated that he did not believe that the correct group has been identified yet. This is due to a lack of knowledge that groups such as the Taliban consist of many different groups, some of which are far less of a threat than others. The nature of some of the more dangerous groups is also misunderstood. For example, a strong sectarian streak can be seen in the TTP—illustrating the importance of sectarian input into the radical Taliban movement. Until we segment the audience in the right way, we will not understand how to use precision communication strategies and products to root out the real enemies. A third theme is the notion of a common enemy. The perception of a common enemy can exist on several levels. For example, the existence of Hizbollah is justified to many Lebanese as a means to repel the Israeli threat. However, Hizbollah itself is a common enemy to the vast majority of Lebanese March 14<sup>th</sup> Christians - for example, 90.7 percent believe that Hizbollah should not keep its armaments. Diverse attitudes can occur in a small area. It is important to remember to not get too caught up in geography – look at attitudinal behaviors.

In another case-study, Alexis Everington found that in AJK, opposition to India is a stronger motivation than Anti-Western sentiment. There is much less local support for terrorism against the West. However, locals do want to protect themselves and defend themselves from India. It is more likely that the US is opposed primarily through the perception that it supports India, rather than out of opposition to western values. The USG needs to be aware of these subtleties. For example, a recurrent theme in Afghanistan is a distrust of GIRoA due to issues such as corruption. It was President Reagan who said "The nine most terrifying words in the English language are—I am from the government and I am here to help." Accordingly, the negative perception of USG alignment with the Afghan government should be acknowledged.

In terms of recommendations vis-à-vis common enemies, Alexis Everington illustrated the potential efficacy of emphasizing the opportunity cost versus expenditure on nuclear programs in Iran. Iranians are hurting because of a lack of expenditure on public goods and welfare needs. Currently, the Iranian President has succeeded in depicting the West as a common enemy. USG needs to break this perception and focus on showing how this binary is not the case.

The next theme is failed engagement in the local infosphere. Thus far, the United States and Western elements have tended to fail in attempts to effectively engage in the infosphere and communicate to target communities directly within the AFPAK region. Simple reliance on NGOs is also not the answer – for example, the NGO response to the earthquake in Kashmir was perceived as inadequate in contrast to the LeT. The United States and Western countries are not as good as the enemy at communicating with target populations. As well as better face-to-face communication, one potential workaround is using the internet in areas where connectivity is possible. New technology can be used to engage populations directly, even in the AFPAK region.

Alexis Everington added that one of the critical approaches to successful communication is the focus on creating an event and controlling the subsequent communications, rather than simple dissemination of communications. The key example of this is 9/11. Our enemies did not need to create articles or adverts – the event itself created a huge wave of communication. Stage a political leader to sit in jirga and make sure journalists will be there. Use diaspora communities to spread and focus the message because they represent an important flow of communication and influence that the UK has not taken advantage of yet. They have much more credibility than the government. Strategies such as these need closer attention.

The issue of credibility led to another theme – the importance of source credibility. However, this theme requires careful treatment as credibility flows two ways. Elders lose credibility when they openly work with West. Likewise, it might be possible to undermine the credibility of enemy figures. The degree to which Gordon Brown was slammed in newspapers because he said the lady in the crowd was a bigot is a perfect illustration of the power of this technique. There is great power in this theme.

A final theme presented was the perception of imbalance, as illustrated in Yemen. Alexis Everington noted that it is the perceived imbalance of a factor and not the level of the factor itself, which causes the problem. In Yemen, issues such as southern/northern imbalances and poverty inequality are exploited by radical groups to gain support. In terms of Afghanistan and Pakistan, support for the Taliban is strongly linked to their perceived efficiency and justice—after Taliban regained control, matters were solved in days that had lingered for years in a way that was free of corruption. Redressing imbalance should be seen as key role for NGOs.

Alexis went on to provide some insight into the personal factors contributing to radicalization, which had been uncovered during the research. He also stated his belief that it is not possible to put a stone wall up to surround and contain radicalization. For example, the USG must distract and divert interests to other areas that provide excitement and adventure.

Location	Fence- Sitting	Wrong Enemy	Common Enemy	Not in infosphere	Lack of credible sources	Imbalanc
FATA						
Afghanistan						
KSA						
Egypt						
Jordan						
Yemen						
Mexico						

Alexis Everington then concluded his talk by arguing that the key to developing counter-messaging radicalization to lies in acknowledging that themes such as the presented, ones occur to varying degrees the in countries studied. One has to look at inputs and these themes and deal with them based on their perceived severity.

Alexis ended by posing a number of questions that he felt needed to be answered as part of the dialogue. For example, he noted that there was a lack of focus on behavior rather than attitude. Likewise, he questioned whether USG has adequate infrastructure to implement the recommendations that come out of so much work. He did not believe that under current conditions, it was possible to compete with Taliban's decision-making loop. Until it is recognized that communication must take its place as a capability with the provision of adequate infrastructure, the USG and others cannot react fast enough. He then opened the floor for questions and discussion.

#### Discussion:

Dr. John Horgan of Penn State University sought to take issue with some of Alexis Everington's points. Dr. Horgan disagreed with Alexis Everington's defense of not interviewing militants because they are self-serving. They are self-serving but no more so than anyone's account would be self-

serving. He also disagreed that the militants do not want to be found. First hand research with militants themselves has never been stronger. It takes a long time to get to them, but this methodological failing needs to be corrected.

Alexis Everington responded that it is not that engagement is a bad thing, but that within budgetary and time constraints doing field research on just radicalized members of society is too difficult.

Dr. Paul Davis of the RAND Corporation noted that there is a difference between broad strategic communications and more pointed communications in a context. He asked Mr. Everington whether he had any experience on whether strategic communication SWAT teams would be useful. He added that such a team could see problems building up in a neighborhood. The government could put team on the issues to give people alternative frames to help tap down the problem before it explodes.

Alexis Everington responded that he thought it would be difficult to expect armed forces to fight the war, do peacekeeping, and do strategic communications. Strategic communications are a gap in capability that has to be addressed. In terms of research, going down to the local level and having local researchers go in an explore themes or question is a good idea – for example, the exchange of videos is popular in tribal areas. A researcher might show a video comparing quality of life, which is different in other areas compared to tribal areas that can be inflammatory or can get people to ask question about why it is the case. Alexis Everington believes that in FATA, people respond to logical argument. Pashtuns love discussion. He stated that researchers and others are being too quick to assume that it is possible to impose without having these discussions.

Dr. Sherifa Zuhur stated that she was very taken aback by the very large number of false statements presented by SCL, likely to be challenged by other country experts. She noted that the speaker had not explained the SCL's methodology, but it sounded as though SCL was working with notions thought to be attractive ideas to US/UK policymakers and then going out and speaking to people about them, which is a methodologically unsound process. Or SCL has poorly described their data points in short form, as in the claim that "Syrians believed Iranians were infiltrating" - which is a nonsensical statement, was it meant to pertain to Alawis? Or to Iranians who visit Syria as pilgrims, or the SCL's view of Syria's foreign policy? The claim that the Lebanese Armed Forces should expand, presumably to disarm Hizbullah counters the LAF's understanding of its own mission, and presents an enormous sectarian problem. The slide pertaining to Yemen had exaggerated the threat of AQ, and had not clearly summarized the more lethal conflict with the Houthi rebellion, or, that local Yemeni are concerned with democratization in their country, but view AQ as a very tiny and rather inconsequential threat. She questioned SCL's data on internet use – in Saudi Arabia, internet use is not more than 15%, and that in the entire region, still only between 10 and 15% - so how can 10% of Saudis use Facebook? She stated that other statistics were delivered without explaining the size of the sample, or how the quotations were collected. For instance, in Egypt, it sounded as if the statistics were based on other data, referring to Egyptian dislike for al-Qa'ida, but it was not clear which extremists 87% supposedly decried – attacks by AQ, in the Sinai, in Iraq, or where? She said she had never heard anything quite like the combination of unclear data described in such a confident tone. Perhaps it was too challenging to combine information on the entire world.

Alexis Everington responded that he can address most of Dr. Zuhur's comments. The Saudi statistic was 10% of internet users and not the Saudi population. He noted that Dr. Zuhur brought up a valid point that the expectation is high to summarize the whole problem in 20 minutes. There will be

oversimplification. He clarified that the way in which SCL operates is that there are never any preconceptions – he gets all of his information from what the people are saying. Whatever they say (and not what we think) is what should be considered – ultimately perception is reality. He observed that it is very possible to bring out statistics that conflict with other statistics, but that all he can do is provide data on his specific research projects.

Dr. Eric Larson, RAND Corporation, was interested in commenting about viral processes through spreading messages: insights into processes, analyses for being successful in tribal societies, etc. He noted that the strategic communications area is prone to embracing "silver bullets" that create unrealistic expectations about what can be accomplished and he is skeptical about US ability to execute viral messaging campaigns in tribal societies.

Alexis Everington responded that Dr. Larson was asking about the degree to which action in one area can be seen popping up in another area. SCL has not undertaken such measurement for any client and so he could not comment on this process. There are people here who have worked on those issues and they can answer the question better. Alexis stated that he believed that formal communication does have its position, but so does informal. In a tribal society, the informal is more effective than formal.

### RADICALIZATION AND THE BATTLE OF VALUES (DR. FRANK FUREDI)

Dr. Frank Furedi from the University of Kent in the United Kingdom began his discussion by noting that there were other aspects and dimensions of the issue that could be looked at. One thing that hit him as interesting is the tension between two statements during earlier discussions: on the one hand speakers say the leaders of violent extremisms are discrediting themselves; that these leaders use contradictory messages and have lost a degree of legitimacy or authority as a result. There is some truth in that. At the same time, there are leaders who have to some extent compromised their sacred authority.

Dr. Furedi stated that there is a palpable process where many sentiments, values, and cultural attributes are associated with the political outlook of violent extremists. Indeed, this political outlook is stronger today than it was in 2001, especially in Europe. Right now, in Europe, the influence of these movements is more palpable and real than it was is 2000 or 20 years ago. One way this could be understood is to understand that the forces of enlightenment Europe and the West have a problem defining themselves. It is not a linguistic problem, but it is a more essential issue of knowing what the West is talking about. Certainly, this is a movement as was discussed yesterday. It also has a powerful cultural dynamic, which is an important development of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Dr. Furedi stated that something not touched upon in earlier discussions, which is essential in the European context, is that extremism and terror are a lifestyle. Throughout the West, the advertising industry spends millions on constructing lifestyles, but the West fails to recognize that extremism is a lifestyle in a different form. There are similar patterns and yet there are differences. There was a painful discussion about talking about extremism as an Islamist movement or not. Dr. Furedi himself has no problem using the word Islam. However, it is possible to talk about this phenomenon without using a particular vocabulary. In a sense, it is possible to conceptualize what is going on without using the "I" word. The main point that is often missed is that extremism draws on resources in Europe – not resources from the Middle East.

When the USG speaker talked about anti-modernization movements, it was immediately dismissed, but in many respects, the anti-modern movement is a crucial component of understanding these issues. By understanding the structure that underpins the imagination of the young people involved in this, it is possible to get a better understanding of the larger issue.

Dr. Furedi was involved in an EU project titled 'Changing perception of Security and Interventions.' As part of this work, the Dutch partners looked at responses of different communities in terms of their security and insecurity in Amsterdam. People coming from immigrant communities, by and large, differed from the broader population at large. This research argued that there is a lot of overlap and highly segmented reactions to fundamental problems. Within communities there are shared knowledge and attitudes. There are also shared cultural attitudes and resources. They come up regularly time and again in jihadist propaganda. Jihadist videos make use of arguments that draw upon issues and questions that those in the West are ambivalent about. They draw divisions over every day experiences, which those in the Western mainstream are not concerned about.

Dr. Furedi stated that after the London bombing in July 2005, videos surfaced that talked about banks and global recession and American banks. This content was not a million miles away from what ordinary people in Europe are thinking about on a daily basis. Western concern regarding the degradation of women is recast in some jihadist videos as a form of Islamic feminist discourse where wearing a certain type of clothes is considered liberating.

Dr. Furedi stated that extremist videos also draw on powerful anti-consumption and antimaterialist ideals that are promoted in Western popular culture. Is it any surprise that Bin Laden talked about environmental problems from the West? These are all issues about which observers in the West are generally ambivalent. Contemporary western culture is itself ambivalent about the benefits of modernity. And anti-western communication from extremist sources amplifies this through a radical quasi-religious message.

Dr. Furedi stated that in European society, there is a politically very palpable distrust of authority. Europeans do not trust what politicians tell them or what the media says. One thing that popular culture does is continually communicate to Europeans that they must never trust what they hear. It is not possible to see a Hollywood film where the CIA is not hiding something. The message is that the government cannot be trusted. That is called conspiracy theory – the story behind the story. In this world of mistrust, it is not possible to have good or positive stories – Israeli doctors in Haiti mutated into Israeli monsters stealing organs to ship them back to Israel.

Dr. Furedi stated that ambivalence provides fertile terrain on which countercultural movements can thrive. Dr. Furedi noted that he used the term 'countercultural' – yet there is no culture to counter. These forces are a very powerful movement in all European states. These are the values that are institutionalized and the values through which radical extremists sentiments are confirmed and even celebrated. It is not countercultural – it is really mainstream. Instead of launching a formal campaign, it is critical that policymakers in the West secure the home front to deal with ambivalence. Such an effort requires an earnest discussion of what this means for the West in the future, rather than pretending that these things are not important. It is not about getting radicals and extremists to change their minds, but instead to address the question of what the West thinks of itself in the first instance.

Dr. Furedi returned to previous elements of the conference discussion. He questioned a few concepts that were raised. Some are not particularly useful. He questioned whether the utility that

the term 'process of radicalization' helped capture real developments. It is often presented as a causal chain of events – but it does not work that way. Just seeing a video does not mean that a youth will become a terrorist. This simple conceptualization of a linear process does not take into account what sociologists call 'identity work'. A lot of young people do not have to be recruited when they are looking for something actively. They are looking actively. It is critically important to understand in a proper way this process; it is fundamentally an issue of estrangement from society, generational development and estrangement. Use this estrangement frame is critical to make sense of this.

Dr. Furedi wanted to draw attention to six myths. Like all myths, these notions contain some truth, but are fundamentally flawed:

- 1. The identification of radicalization ideology. The current era is a non-ideological age the ideologies that undergird extremism are conspicuous by their feebleness. They are not ideologies. These are cobbled together ideas. These extremist ideologies are not identified with theology if the connection is drawn between these feeble ideologies and theologies, one imposes a coherence, which it does not have and it causes trouble. By doing this, the West helps them in their identity work inadvertently;
- Another myth is the notion that those who are drawn toward radicalization suffer from some psychological deficiency. Instead, these individuals are often people with idealism, sense of responsibility, etc. It is not appropriate, therefore, to use a psychological defense model – which is often used in Europe. People who are vulnerable to terrorism is not a correct way to think of it. It assumes a sense of powerlessness;
- 3. The notion that extremism in the European context is driven by poverty or discrimination is faulty. It is true that discrimination and poverty do exist in Europe, but these are not drivers of extremism;
- 4. Another myth is the idea that the Internet is a trap which seduces people into it. There is some kind of grooming going on. Someone mentioned yesterday that the Christmas Day bomber went on the Internet to find out why parents did not eat halal meat. He was taking the initiative rather than other way around.
- 5. Extremism is also not due to oppressive acts abroad. (Israel/Palestine conflict). If Israel disappeared tomorrow, nothing would change. Israel and other "Great Satans" are not causally related to extremism, they are just part of the rhetoric.
- 6. Additionally, it is a myth to conclude that extremism is directly related to Islam it has more to do with general sense of disorientation and cultural confusion. If an individual is angry, s/he does not need a reason why.

Dr. Furedi noted that the less the West and its governments do, the better the outcome. It is important not to do too much, but it is critical that what is done is effective. Having concluded his remarks, Dr. Furedi opened the floor to questions from the audience.

#### Discussion:

Dr. John Horgan of Penn State University stated that he disagreed with one of Dr. Furedi's main points, noting that he had unfairly characterized what is meant by a process perspective, by which Dr. Horgan explained that his (Horgan's) meaning of process referred to a series of steps that are in some way interconnected, but not necessarily causal or deterministic. Dr. Horgan noted that Dr. Furedi had largely characterized all process as causal. This is not always the case, which is why researchers use a process framework to get away from this. Dr. Furedi stated that he agreed with Dr. Horgan that it is not necessary to have a non-causal process that teaches us. He clarified what he was talking about earlier, stating that it was a mechanistic process cobbled together.

Tom Rieger of Gallup wanted to identify relationships between identity work and ideology. Type IIs are ideology seeking and tend to be younger, but when Gallup looks at ideology, it is not just Islam – it is often economic, revenue sharing (Peru), and nationalism. Tom Rieger wanted to know what role ideology plays in social identification.

Dr. Furedi responded that the extremists are seeking something that is often called ideology, but what they really are looking for is meaning. This search for meaning can take on many different forms. This search is also not necessarily ideologically drive – what some call ideology, Dr. Furedi calls lifestyle. It is not a trivial category, but it is one of the most distinct developments in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. People take lifestyle very seriously. There are arguments about vegetarianism – a vegetarian is making a moral statement about themselves. People are looking for meaning. Once you do that, you look for other kinds of meaning.

Dr. Eric Larson of the RAND Corporation noted that on the question of ideology, one reaches different conclusions based upon the approach, whether one looks from the top-down or from the bottom-up. From a top-down perspective, *al-Qa'ida* has an ideological program. They have a diagnosis of the Muslim world's current condition and a prescription (armed struggle) about what to do about it. Their ideology, discourse, and apologetics are grounded in *salafi-jihadi* theological and jurisprudential texts and reasoning, which they use to create an ideological community of fellow travelers. They have a set of networks and other organizational structures (e.g., al-Sahab Media Production Institute, al-Fajr Media Center) to promote their ideology, gain new adherents, and generate funding. Dr. Larson thinks that the important point is that from the vantage point of the group, there is a rational quality in leadership (political entrepreneurship) in which they seek to build the movement by attracting new adherents while retaining the allegiance of existing cadres. From a top-down perspective, ideology does matter, although from a bottom-up perspective the role of ideology in gaining new adherents is less certain. Connecting these top-down and bottom-up perspectives is a tough problem, and as important as it is, the USG has not been particularly successful in understanding this.

Dr. Furedi noted his agreement, except for a matter of vocabulary. What Dr. Larson and others call ideology –is really a master narrative that leaders put together as way of making sense of self and creating unity. A master narrative helps to maintain the leading discourse. Ideology is not just ideas, but captures that imagination of people and self.

Dr. Larson responded that there is a master narrative in Al-Qaeda's discourse and propaganda, but there is more that goes beyond narrative. It is a statement about the Muslim world, a detailed set of theological elements, linked together. Dr. Larson fully appreciates narratives and frames, etc., but there is something more going on here than simply a master narrative.

Dr. Furedi again noted his agreement, but indicated that the crucial thing was that there must be a moment in which these ideas become more than an elite sentiment, but capture the mood and directs behavior in a way that is internalized by a large segment of society—this internalization has not been effectively counteracted as far as Dr. Furedi was aware. Young kids do not read those books, they read what they want to find. That is the difference. Comparable narratives work themselves out.

Dr. Angela Trethewey of Arizona State University stated that she agrees with Dr. Furedi on the notion of identity work, as well as agreeing with Dr. Furedi on ideology – ideology does not work as a set of beliefs, but is instead on how a set of ideas has power. In a post-modern condition, ideology and its development is ongoing, complex and increasingly entrepreneurial. Individuals are always trying to become better whether they are radical or not , which begs the question if there is no end game, where is the lever for intervention in identity work?

Dr. Furedi replied that it was a good question. He indicated that he might be one sided or too pessimistic, but he thinks that when one undertakes identity work, one is in danger of making the problem far worse than it is; almost 99% of time it will blow up in one's face. The good news is the identity work is provisional. Because it is provisional, type IIs can fall in love and decide that they are still the same person, but would rather chill out for the next ten years and call it quits. The good news is that radicalization exhausts itself quite regularly. Governments need to learn that. In England, Dr. Furedi believes that the previous government inadvertently risked legitimating the extremists by paying too much attention to them. He recommended that it is far better to positively affirm what democratic culture is all about, why it should be defended and learn to make democracy a passionate issue for people in society.

#### THE TURN TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE (DR. MARC SAGEMAN)

Dr. Marc Sageman of Sageman Consulting began his talk by offering the outlines of what political violence is. He uses the term "political violence" because that is the crucial subject of this discussion and his research. Dr. Sageman liked the fact that Dr. Furedi had preceded him because Dr. Furedi's research and discussion preempts some of what Dr. Sageman was planning to say.

Dr. Sageman indicated his dislike for the term 'radicalization.' When he works with the government they frequently ask him the same question – they say that there are hundreds who talk the talk, but not all that many that make bombs. The USG is interested in those that make the bombs. Currently, the field is overly cognitive right now – hence the concern with ideology. If there were a strong pool of ideas, it would be possible to find robots to fulfill them. Ideologies did not fly into World Trade Center – people did. The task at hand is understanding these people.

Dr. Sageman viewed these issues from the perspective of political violence. The main concern was about specificity. If millions make the same noise, few become terrorists. They talk about it, but idle talk is part of youth. It is not possible or advisable to outlaw youth. Yet, that is essentially what people want to do. The battle will be lost if youth is outlawed by whatever means. In order to drive home the point about the low base rate of terrorism—Dr Sageman conducted a comprehensive survey of global neo-jihadis. While he agreed with some earlier speakers that this is not jihad – he chose to use the term because if he fails to do so, people will not understand what he is talking about.

Up to December 2008, there were more than 60 terrorist plots with approximately 420 individuals in the West populated by 700 million people — thus providing a base rate of 3 per 100 million per year. Such a low base rate would produce a massive number of false positives. If we had an instrument that was 99.5% accurate in finding terrorists (100% sensitive and 99% specific), it would be necessary to arrest 300,000 people for the one true terrorist, which raises the question how to distinguish the terrorists from the population at large. In 2009, this base rate predicted 21 new terrorists. There were five or six plots with 14-23 people. This is support for this model.

Observers in the West can see and test it and everyone in the West must brace themselves for a few more attacks.

Answering the question of specificity, Dr. Sageman elaborated upon his methodology. From the 60 terrorist plots, he tried to derive a thick description from trial transcripts. Then it is an iterative process. Dr. Sageman always seeks out disconfirming evidence to modify the prevailing model. After 10-15 trials and plots, it is possible to develop a model using inductive reasoning.

Dr. Sageman quickly realized that the Western view of violence must be contextualized; it emerges out of a specific political context. Dr. Sageman called it a protest counterculture, but realized that the majority of the population has counter-cultural beliefs. They are all different countercultures.

Dr. Sageman viewed the evolution to political violence as a two-step process. First, an individual joins a protest counterculture, a relatively low risk/low cost involvement, and from that, the individual turns to violence, which is high risk and high cost. It is pretty much a standard model in mobilization within the context of social movement theory. The Western fear of terrorism is very overblown. Dr. Sageman is concerned with the transition from violent extremism, which is mostly talk and still legal in a liberal democracy, to extremist violence, which of course is criminal behavior. The West has trouble eradicating extremism for it is still legal and protected by freedom of speech, no matter repellant. However, violent extremism is not totally benign because extremist violence that has crossed the line into illegality emerges from it. Unfortunately, there is no clear delineation between the two, but they cannot be lumped together. Looking at terrorist participation, if one reviews the plots, there are distinctions because not all terrorists are equally responsible.

Dr. Sageman noted that Tom Rieger's (Gallup) idea of type I and type II radicals is intriguing. He divides terrorists from an analytical perspective. Core terrorists are those that initiate and drive plots – if they are removed from the conspiracy, the plot ends. Beyond the core are lots of folks tagging along. The guys who tag along are replaceable. It is just chance that they are there. Outside of the conspiracy itself there are those people in the periphery, who may have a high potential of moving into the more criminal categories.

Dr. Sageman offered further elaboration on what he meant by protest counterculture; it means rejecting society. He viewed them as a discursive community trying to make sense of life through discourse online and offline –though it is moving online, which is less visible physically. They use available models of society, which are supported by lifestyle, including the way they dress, which is important. The social movement in question is defined by a counterculture, which rejects society and political activism. They are politically active. Discredited ideas provide a space for new ideas that can make sense of the world to emerge. The movement results from changes and interstices in society. Throughout history there have been similar large societal changes that gave rise to protest countercultures that degenerated into violence. In the era of rapid industrialization, the move from rural to urban areas fostered anarchism. The migration has led to our present wave of terror.

Dr. Sageman wanted to highlight some points made on day one – namely, why radicalization occurs in clusters around the world. These social blobs are created through intense efforts of some individual – a political entrepreneur. The necessary condition is the entrepreneurs. Individuals are invited by friends and family to go to a demonstration, to get more involved, to become politically active, and proselytize. The characteristic of the blob are fluid– the blob is diffuse, not clearly

defined, people go in and out based on the issues of the day. Most people flirt with the blob. Within the blob, there is a diversity of people and the blob itself is internally very fluid with many different leaders/heads. Indeed, there are a lot of internal rivalries.

Terrorists emerge from this blob because of emotional drivers. The blob is a political entity. Emerging terrorists have a sense of moral outrage regarding some local or national issue. People can be angry about anything; it is moral outrage – mostly blood. Terrorists get disillusioned by the inefficacy of the blob and reject its relative pacificism and non-violent tactics. They feel it is their personal duty to go beyond. They leave the mosque. If the grievance is local, the anger stays local, with its potential for domestic violence. Core terrorists have a high level of centrality in the blob. A small active core emerges, which is where some inspirational leaders come in. These fabulists articulate the sense of disaffection with the blob and exalt the glories of fighters. People who go to some of these meetings overcome their state of pluralistic ignorance by realizing that they reject the blob. Even if the fabulists are exposed as fake, it does not matter, the damage has been done. Potential core members have met each other, they know what they each believe, and they encourage each other to go further along the path of violence. It is the start of a plot. These splinter bunches of guys may link up with formal terrorist groups that can result in serious attacks. This dynamic can also happen online.

This is an era of transition for large swaths of the population. Many people are leaving their families and countries of origin. A key element that distinguishes people who turn to violence from those that do not, is a lack of structure and routine activities in everyday life. These are students who do not go to class. Down time and leisure facilitates the generation of violent ideas. Additionally, if individuals marry within the blob, the turn to violence is only accelerated. If a marriage occurs between a member of the blob and an individual who is not a member, it is very likely that the member will ultimately leave the blob because one cannot fight your spouse and jihad at the same time, the spouse will always win.

Within the blob, individuals start thinking of themselves as soldiers who are protecting the community – this justifies violence and killing people. This is a key threshold. Individuals who want training and attempt to go to camp are not being brainwashed at the camp, they are already politically there. Then these individuals brag about the experience when they come back. The active core is two to four people. These plots do not have many leaders, just two to four people egging each other on. To expand the plot, the core members can tap into the blob for people they think are reliable. Those guys are honored to be selected to be part of plot and join the plot. At the end of a plot, the final conspirators hang out all the time. So radicalization can take just 15 seconds – just asking for help, but the counterculture made it possible.

Radicals think of themselves as special – they are their community's vanguard. So they separate themselves from the blob. The plot involves a gradual increase in suspicious activity. The most important one is getting the means of destruction and then personal preparation. This process is full of obstacles, which is why the acts are so rare. It is hard to acquire weapons. Of the hundred people who talk about doing something – maybe two people reach the end point. Most drop out of frustration. This is where the many cases of entrapment come in. Authorities hear the guys that want to do things. They then make it easy for them to carry out their plots by removing the natural obstacles in their path that make most plotters simply give up out of frustration. This is entrapment. Those arrested would probably not have carried out their plots. Most people do not carry out their New Year's resolutions as well.

The turn to political violence is not deterministic. They are all volunteers from the bottom up: it is not a top down process of mobilization. Regardless, this is the little model that Dr. Sageman sought to present. The guys who make the bomb cannot give a coherent answer why.

#### Discussion:

Curtis Johnson noted that the SNL's data showed social pressure still does not reduce radicalization. Even people who decide enough is enough and leave the blob are still affected by group pressure. Johnson asked whether Dr. Sageman saw any opportunities to divert angst.

Dr. Sageman noted that this is the turn to violence in the name of global neo-jihadi terrorism. He would caution people from generalizing for one phenomenon to another. In terms of low numbers of terrorists, Dr. Sageman is skeptical about the effectiveness of information operations. The United States has always been bad at this. The USG succeeded in 1917, but it backfired. Then, the President appointed a propaganda czar. That is why the United States does not have national TV, or radio, because people do not trust government. The United States' communications and those of the West more broadly are by means of movie stars. He mused that the USG speaker must have to face that every day. If one reviews the portrayal of the United States in Saudi Arabia, it is usually Christian evangelists on Sunday morning who are shown. These 'televangelists' say rather offensive things about Islam. When the government tuned in on the Cairo speech, people did not listen that much because it was about Obama, not the government. This type of ideology is fading. It is possible to survive by entering the fray, but young Muslims will turn to other ideologies that are cooler than jihad. There is an internal dynamic that can be postponed. Nonetheless, the less the USG and other Western governments do, the better the solution—there are significant limitations to government intervention, because intervention may only prolongs the problem.

Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, IMEISS, accepted Dr. Sageman's model as it operates in the West. She asked whether Dr. Sageman could speculate on other situations, as in the Middle East, where there may be a base of several thousand "radicals"– or a society divided. She asked whether from his discipline he could say something about such situations or even in the Western cases where, as earlier stated, some radicalization took place by Westerners of Muslim descent traveling to their countries of origin.

Dr. Sageman did not think that the West has as much influence in those countries as the West would like to think. He is pessimistic about Afghanistan. Afghans have developed their own way of dealing with each other and are milking the West. He does not believe that the West can do much about Afghanistan; Pakistan is a little different. No one has ever been able to control the Pashtun because, in the past, armies were just passing through. In those countries, their problems are often local. Dr. Belarouci's Algerian presentation did not talk about the role of the Algerian government after 1962 – they lost the confidence of the people. They made things worse. The role of the government is mostly negative. They control their country, the West does not. The West must go there with eyes wide open, conscious of the West's limitations. To succeed, the West must show a model of what can be done, say what the West is, and what its ideals are and lead by example. That is the most that can be done. They key is to make as few mistakes as possible. The bad guys are making plenty. Let the bad guys discredit themselves.


## STORIES, IDENTITIES, AND CONFLICT: THE NARRATIVE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE (LTCOL BILL CASEBEER)

LtCol Casebeer of JFCOM presented a PowerPoint presentation entitled "Stories, Identities, and Conflict: The Narrative Dimensions of Political Violence." He began his discussion by illustrating the fundamental conundrum for many radicals or for those engaged in political violence; using a case study from Mali, he noted an individual's decision to decide to support the Alliance for Democratic Change (a peaceful response to political disaffection) or choose to support the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), now known as AQ in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb. This decision will be influenced by stories and narratives he hears from people he trusts. If one were to redress political violence, then one needs to have a more robust understanding of the role stories play in political violence and more importantly, have qualitative and quantitative tools to help us analyze stories.

The critical question is how to evaluate the efficacy of storytelling.

LtCol Casebeer noted the importance of heading off the organization's outcome – noting that his diagram is two years out of date. He indicated that the diagram had been brought up to date by Dr. Davis's volume at RAND (For revisions, see page 11 of the handbook). Second, this diagram has room for both structure and agency. Even though it is a process looking diagram, some of the content is hidden below the surface. Third, this is a model, not a set of law-like relationships. He noted that there is determinism in any system or it is impossible to do forecasting, but it is not possible to get an absolute systematization of the social world of the kind you find in physics, like F=MA. It is only possible to build models of a moderately generalizable nature that can be used in some circumstances and not in others.

Start with inputs. The conversion processes that act upon inputs results in outputs. Then the organizations take reinforcing actions to make sure they continue to exist – even addressing the inputs the government should be addressing. For instance, Hizbollah often provides social services.



Stories play a critical role in this process: shaping inputs to produce frames that act upon individuals to create membership, reinforcing identity cleavages, and shaping culture of an organization that are being stood up to make it more likely to persist.

As organizations stand up they will have to do things in gestation that they will not have to do in maturity. Production can mean provision of social services. They help to tell the story of the dehumanization of the out group.

LtCol Casebeer noted that it is difficult to find a single theory of stories because there is an entire movement in English departments rejecting the notion that there are in fact parts of a story. The cognitive science side of the house is just now maturing enough to address the cognitive side of story. The nineteenth=century German writer Gustav Freytag asserted that most stories have a beginning, middle, and end. The beginning lays out the framework for the story. Freytag's conceptualization is meant to provide the theoretical foundation for a generic story, but it helps to structure the analysis of the moving parts of a story and explain why they are politically efficacious.

Stories can motivate people to join movement because they structure reasoning, cue heuristics and biases, modulate choice behavior, and change inferences. Stories can also affect memory and recall as well as shaping identity. Greene, et al. concluded that it is easy to change the way people rationalize about killing people. Two famous case studies in moral judgment demonstrate this; one is the trolley problem –there is a trolley barreling down the track – the trolley will strike five children. But there is a lever – if one pushes it over, it will divert to different track and the trolley would strike one child. Most audiences around 80% make the latter choice. Similarly, there is the footbridge problem. Once again there is a trolley barreling down a track with five children in its path, this time, however, there is a child playing on a footbridge that were he/she to fall in the path of the trolley would halt its progress and prevent the crash further down the tracks that would kill five. Usually 1 % would do it. Yet, it is really difficult to draw distinction between the two cases, which begs the question of why there is such a dramatically different reaction. In neurobiological terms – in the first case-- the words that were used to describe the scenario activated working memory, and a prediction of consequence. The words that were used to describe the second case tend to activate what others would think and emotions related to sociability.

LtCol Casebeer sought to illustrate a simple evaluation model for stories. There are three ways to influence how a story impacts a person: ethos (the credibility of the source), logos (the logic and consistency of the story), and pathos (appropriate appeals to emotion). Based upon the ethos, thick social connections drawn from identity may make a story more persuasive. If an individual is of the same group identity, he/she might overlook inconsistencies based on an identity related connection. It is possible to operationalize this simple ELP mode and make evaluations.

LtCol Casebeer offered two case studies, that of Peru and the Masai in Tanzania. In Peru, President Toledo response to student protests was to have police fire on students, which killed two people. Within six hours, the student organization had stood up the narrative, framing the event and channeling energy that encouraged mobilization and student radicalization.

When LtCol. Casebeer was in Tanzania, his interpreter interviewed some local Masai leaders involved in violent response to encroachment of government on grazing grounds especially in tourism areas. The Masai have pastoral and warrior lineage that they emphasize. Some people spoke about changes made in social structures. A rite of passage—a circumcision ceremony involving young males--was coming to forefront again to help mobilize the society against territorial encroachment.

At the ceremony there were a lot of items consistent with the Freytag structure. Phases of stories and narratives that reinforce the shared history of the Masai emphasize the warrior aspect rather than the pastoral herder aspect.

In addition, the native societies of the Polynesian Islands produce artifacts that tell stories with similar narrative arcs. The artifacts contained in LtCol. Casebeer's presentation illustrates overfishing in Polynesia. They are essentially story boards. Hung on entranceways of long huts where important decisions are made. Some have Freytag triangle structure. One tells story of what happens when you overfish. The conclusion is that if the tribes overharvest, the community cannot do well next season and families die.


While traveling in Mali, LtCol Casebeer encountered a billboard outside the main mosque in Bamako –a mural of an image of Mohammad al Dura and his father attempting to protect him from Israeli soldiers. Mohammed was killed by Israeli defense forces. It is a powerful symbol that provokes a resonant narrative that deals with events thousands of miles away from the Middle East. The connection between the Palestinian cause and Mali seems thin, but people want implicate a sense of connection. Additionally, during the same trip in Mali, LtCol. Casebeer encountered credentialing for public services like wells by the Saudis. In a small village, there was a well beneath message that says "this well was a gift from Islamic Republic of Saudi Arabia to the Islamic people of Mali" in three languages—thus the Saudis were taking credit for social services and the provision on infrastructure all within a context of shaping Islamic identity.

LtCol Casebeer then showed a clip from Hezbollah TV, which constructed a narrative calling for action, using images of the unjust establishment of Israel, Muslims resisting violently to occupation, with the resolution – respond violently and push Israel into the sea which mirrors the Freytag structure.

LtCol Casebeer outlined counter-narrative strategies, which include:

- 1) Target audience characteristics are critical;
- 2) Darwinian competitiveness counts;
- 3) Aristotle is better than nothing;
- 4) There are two important story sets: the ones our adversary is telling, and the ones being told implicitly and explicitly by us;
- 5) Tactical success may require overriding strategic story considerations;
- 6) Stories with firewalls are better than stories without defenses;
- 7) Adaptability and flexibility are important;
- 8) Listening is a critical start;
- 9) Authenticity is king.

The critical component of countering narratives is the importance of shaping the environment such that credible people can tell a counter-narrative that reduces the threat of the prevailing narrative that is aiding in radicalization. LtCol Casebeer recommended an article he and Russell produced, which outlines strategic insights into this process.





In his research. LtCol Casebeer has produced an At-Risk Group Identity (ARGI) Index. As of part it his research group constructed a group identity ID index (GI). The X axis involves delineating whether а population is at risk for recruitment. There are three factors: 1) lack of political opportunity (INV (PO)), assessment of mobilized resources (TTPs, expertise,

ungoverned spaces) (MR), and frame resonance (FR) – if one can tell a story that resonates with population rather than no story. These stories are often justice related. The Y axis diagrams the salience of group identification, made up of a heterogeneity measure and a group identification measure. The regions or nation-states most at risk for a violent social movement appear in the upper right quadrant of the diagram.

Curtis Johnson of SNL noted that participants in the conference panels have spent a lot of time talking about how words can lead to actions. There is another kind of narrative – an explanation narrative—these narratives fill the void of providing an explanation for doing something. These are much more frequent than motivational narratives. They are recursive – there is a huge gap between attitudes and behaviors. For instance, if a married man is having an affair and someone confronts him in an attempt to convince him that his narrative is wrong, the unfaithful man will only come up with another narrative so he can continue his affair. In this instance, the individual is not motivated by story but appetite.

LtCol Casebeer indicated that there is a need for more research on how narratives, counternarratives, and the environment interact. There has been some initial neurobiological research, particularly into limbic and mid-brain structures (hypothalamus) – certain forms of stories reach out and touch certain portions of the brain responsible for action, namely the dopamine system. Certain kinds of stories tweak the dopamine system in a way similar to taking a hit of cocaine.

Curtis Johnson followed up by noting that it is possible to tell which words lead to actions, because it is possible to see the signatures of ones that end in actions and ones that do not.

Anne McGee, a consultant, asked LtCol. Casebeer about the Iraq data point in his scatter plot. She wanted to know what time interval that data point represented for Iraq. LtCol Casebeer replied that the index was just notional because no exhaustive case study was done. Empirical validation was

not the initial intention. Anne McGee followed up by asking where history fits into the model. To which LtCol Casebeer responded that history has to become active in the model – history is important because it figures into the processes for reading in high order superstructures in the brain. The process by which it became concrete comes in through socialization processes through schools, religion, etc. There is going to be higher order n-dimensional state space in the brain that is somehow tweaked by inputs. It is important to deconstruct that systematically – there are some tools that use techniques from systems engineering to deconstruct complex systems that can assist with this process.

### INFLUENCE & DETERRENCE

#### EXTREMIST NARRATIVES AND INFLUENCE (DR. ANGELA TRETHEWEY)

Dr. Angela Trethewey, Arizona State University, discussed identifying terrorist narratives and counter narratives by embedding story analysts in expeditionary units. Currently, narrative analysts are being imbedded in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Northern Africa. This is in hopes of contributing towards a traction model that indicates the kind of stories in a given area that are gaining traction. Currently the group is in the phase of testing the database and traction model.

Task one for this ongoing effort is constructing a narrative database. The general approach employed is to collect texts, analyze the ideology via stories, archetypes, story forms, and master narratives, and look for similarities across texts, regions, and sources. The collection component is mainly an effort to collect stories from extremists through extremist blogs and other sources. Ultimately, the hope is to find patterns across the regions in terms of content, form, and spread. There are two research approaches the first is based on humanities in which fragments of narratives are invoked. The second approach is scientific utilizing text analysis.

In terms of the narratives themselves and why they are critical to understand, humans have acted as narrators throughout history. Historically narratives have helped to answer three questions:

- How do people connect new information to existing knowledge?
- How do people justify the resulting actions we take?
- How do people make sense of everyday life?

A narrative is a system consisting of stories, archetypes, and story forms. This system can result in the creation of a master narrative such as the "American" narrative. In regards to the American narrative stories include ideas such as the landing at Plymouth Rock, Revolutionary War, Civil War, frontier expansion, and the Great Depression. Archetypes throughout these narratives include Pilgrims, Minutemen, rebels, and pioneers. The story forms refer to progress, quests, and the idea of rags-to-riches.

Dr. Trethewey continued by explaining that a story is a sequence of related events that are situated in the past and recounted for ideological and rhetorical purposes. Stories are composed of elements such as actors, events, times, and other entities. The term "story" is often used in the colloquial sense to refer to a variety of texts including news articles, family stories, online postings and blogs. Archetypes are standard characters that one might expect to find in a story. They unlock motives and operate as shorthand terms for situations. Examples of archetypes include the hero, villain, crusader, and tyrant. An archetype also invokes an overarching narrative that binds the story form to a larger historical and political context; ultimately this may be expressed or invoked in narrative fragments. Relevant archetypes that have been identified include the martyr, woman warrior, warrior/knight, child, sage, fool, artist, evil genius, devil, tyrant, hero, father, trickster, imposter, crusader, colonizer, barbarian invader, Messiah or Savior, infidel, deity, prophet, villain, and oath breaker. A story form is a recognizable pattern of relationships between characters, settings, and events. An example would be a conflict with God. Story forms guide the comprehension process, provide a cognitive framework for understanding and provide a set of expectations for the pieces of story as they unfold. They also make a new story seem familiar. Examples of an extremist story form include conflict with God, noble sacrifice, vengeance, rivalry of superior and inferior, daring enterprise, and revolt. Part of the revolt story form can allude to invasion, deliverance, ruse, or a miraculous victory.

All of these inputs can contribute to the creation of a master narrative. A master narrative is a coherent system of stories that have a shared desire to resolve an archetypal conflict. These narratives create expectations for what is likely to happen and what the audience is expected to do about it. The narratives are ultimately deeply embedded into a particular society or culture. Master narratives begin as a story and become linked or associated with other stories. This process continues until the system of stories support a common theme built upon archetypes and a common story form. Master narratives that have been identified include: The Pharaoh, The New Jahiliyya, The Battle of Badr, The Hypocrites, The Battle of Khaybar, The Battle of Karbala, The Mahdi , The Crusaders (Colonizers), The Tatars, Shaytan's Handiwork, 1924, Al-Nakba , 72 Virgins, and Musaylimah.

Dr. Trethewey next went into the master narrative of The Tatar. In the 13th c. the Mongol hordes conquered the eastern Islamic world causing mass destruction. In 1258, Hulagu Khan destroyed Baghdad and executed the Caliph and his heirs, ending the Abbasid Caliphate. In time, Mongol rulers converted to Islam, but still maintained customary Mongol law called the *Yasa* as they ruled over the Muslims. Muslim scholar Ahmed ibn Taymiyyah lived during the Mongols' rule and denounced them as infidels. He called on Muslims to wage Jihad against the "Muslim" Mongols because they ruled by Yasa rather than Shari'ah law. Ibn Taymiyyah is prominent in Jihadist ideology and is referenced in almost all radical Salafi literature. Contemporary Islamist rhetoric makes extensive use of the Tatar narrative.

Dr. Trethewey added that not all stories are master narratives; however, these stories are still rhetorically useful even if they are not deeply embedded. The approach that the team has taken then has been to collect and code stories and their elements. Currently, 185 stories from extremists in Middle East, 150 stories from extremists in Southeast Asia, and 90 stories from extremists in North Africa have been collected and coded

In terms of progress on the traction model the overall goal is to model message spread factors. The method being employed is a review of theoretical and empirical explanatory studies, a review of empirical-descriptive studies, and incorporation of multiple parameters into an agent-based simulation. The application of the model should identify socio-cultural conditions for message spread and identify a parsimonious set for operators. There have been 37 parameters identified that relate to diffusion. These parameters were then broken down into four categories: Agent Based (credibility), Community Based (openness or closeness), medium based (relevance), and message based (decay rates for interpersonal or mass communication).

One of the parameters that has been identified and used is transmediation. It is the official and unofficial spread of terrorist-related stories across mediated platforms. It has implications for extremist strategic communication and counter-terrorism efforts. An example of transmediation was the case of Noordin Top. Noordin Top was a Malaysian-born, Jemaah Islamiyah leader who was responsible for numerous attacks including the 2009 Jakarta bombings. He was killed on September 17, 2009 by Indonesian forces. After his death accusations of sodomy and bisexuality emerged. At a press conference a police spokesman stated that his autopsy results, which were announced, had to be kept secret. Implications for counterterrorism include the importance of rumors. Narratives are socially constructed across media and by audiences. The story of Noordin Top demonstrates the potential for the appropriation of meaning.

The importance of looking and understanding narratives provides a shorthand introduction into a marginal form of cultural comprehension. It does not provide a full history or full understanding but perhaps there is enough of an understanding gained to not make tremendous gaffs. Additionally, it may suggest something about how to amplify the voices that are doing some interesting narrative work. One thing that is being explored through the project is how humiliation/ridicule may work in terms of countering extremist discourse. The questions associated with this are focused on what points are vulnerable for humiliation where others who may be using it may provide an opportunity for the United States to amplify. However, it is important to note that it may not be ideal for the United States to engage directly with humiliation. Ultimately the project hopes to provide system tools that allow for individuals to think about countering strategies based on the analogies invoked by narratives.

#### Discussion:

Dr. Furedi asked if Dr. Trethewey knew of any narratives that allude to conspiracies. Dr. Trethewey replied that she did not know of any but that she has done work with narratives that deal with rumors, which contain conspiratorial angles, and other narratives that invoke the idea of an imposter.

Dr. Furedi followed up by asking if Dr. Trethewey had an example that is any more distinct in terms of the area and time of focus. Dr. Trethewey replied that the colonizer narrative is most pervasive and that it is historical in a number of ways and places but equally relevant now.

Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, IMEISS, commented that Indonesian government propaganda invoking homosexuality had previously been utilized against Anwar Ibrahim and it is not a successful narrative. It may be important to note that ridicule and humor are very culture specific. Dr. Trethewey replied that the government should never be the instigator of ridicule. However, what may be interesting is what can be learned from how others are using satire and humor.

Dr. Davis asked if there are good examples throughout the world of places where children grow up and fully learn the narratives within their society. This may allow them to understand one another even if they associate more with one group than another. Dr. Trethewey replied that the narratives are usually taught in history rather than as an explicit curriculum.

### MEGA TRENDS OF TERROR: EXPLAINING THE PATH OF GLOBAL SPREAD OF IDEAS (DR. DIPAK GUPTA)

Dr. Dipak Gupta, San Diego State University, began his talk on mega trends of terror to explain the path of the global spread of ideas. One of the things he believes that has happened over the last decade is that a common ground has been developed in regards to talking about terrorism. Ten-to-fifteen years ago, no one spoke about terrorism and there was no fundamental basis for discussion. Progress towards a common understanding of the issue has been exemplified throughout this meeting as, even if there have been disagreements over details, there have not been huge controversies over the ideas of terrorism.


Dr. Gupta then transitioned into discussing human nature, as it has bearing on the evolution of terrorism and the spread of ideas. Human beings have two identities: the individual and the collective. The individual identity is typically stable while the collective identity changes constantly. Each person is ultimately a self-maximizing individual; however, the only branch of the social sciences that makes a significant assumption about human nature is economics. Economics equates self-interested maximization with rationality. Many factors have gone into this understanding of the internalization of the value of self-utilization. The resultant question then is how a person gets to be there; perhaps it is due to a confluence of work including Adam Smith and a misreading of Darwin's evolution.

Darwin observed the idea of inclusive fitness. For example, there are two groups and one focuses on self-utility by trying to be the fittest in the group and the second group believes in counterfactual entities and has a number of norms. When asking which of these two groups would win in an evolutionary battle it would be group two. Darwin called it inclusive fitness. When people subsume their own individual identities for the welfare of the group, the group gets stronger. There is some contradiction here. In the animal world, if an animal is the alpha he still sacrifices his self for the group when a predator approaches. Group identity is deeply ingrained and often individuals are unaware of it until an event such as 9/11 occurs. Another example is that of Heaven's Gate. The group believed there was an alien spaceship that was coming and they were going to go to the spaceship. The most amazing part of the story though is that many of the young men in their 20s and 30s had been surgically castrated. How or why does an individual do that?

Given these observations on human nature, it is possible to look at terrorism from a broad perspective; this is something that Professor David Rutherford has done. He argued that the beginning of modern terrorism was in the 1880s, which coincides with the invention of dynamite. Over the course of history there have been four successive waves of terrorism. The first was in the 1880s and lasted for about 40 years, it was the anarchist movement. The Western world was shaken up by it (the Decembrists and then the Bolshevists being a prime example). The second was after the First World War. The third resulted from the dissipation of anti-colonialism in the 1950s after most former colonies gained independence. This led to a movement in the 60s of a new leftist movement when the concern was focused on nationalism and socialism. The latest wave started in the 1990s with religious fundamentalism, Islamic fundamentalism being one of these religious movements. There was a Sikh movement in India and the Christian identity movement in Atlanta and Oklahoma. By looking at terrorism through that lens, there is a way to explain mega trends that permeate the world from time to time.

These ideas are not absolutely original. It starts with the work of journalist Malcolm Gladwell. He argued that there are three main actors who are present in the spread of ideas. The first actor is the connector. The connectors are those who know a lot of people and their social skills are such that they connect people to other people or ideas. Then there is the maven or "the accumulator of knowledge." This actor is a theoretician. They are important because they identify the parameter of group memberships including who is weak and who is not. Then there is the salesman. Looking at all social and religious movements, there is a noticeable presence of these three types of individuals. For example, Osama Bin Laden had ready access to places in Saudi Arabia where he knew people at the top and had credibility established from his family. He could then take the work of the maven and could talk about identities. Finally there were salesmen, or the people who brought in others.

A question that may emerge is why or how are these leaders born? Are they historical accidents? Fortunately, economist William Donald has tried to explain it through the idea of society's incentive structure producing certain individualities that can give meaning to existing grievances.



### An Integrated Model of Diffusion of Ideas

In the current situation within the Arab/Islamic world, because of the political system, the only political discourse they can engage in is based on religion. As a result, these actors have emerged in these countries rather than in other areas where there are large Muslim populations - such as India or Bangladesh. Ultimately, the environment has a lot to do with how a radical message resonates with a population. The society produces these entrepreneurs. The master narrative then depends on the context and the mavens and connectors are responsible for the connection.

As a result of this work, the emerging question is why do certain messages resonate? There are three factors that cause a message to stick: the first is simplicity. LtCol William Casebeer spoke about the climax, and it is accurate that the narrative must have a compelling storyline. And,

importantly, the narrative must impart a story of impending doom, because, as others have brought up, individuals do not necessarily attribute the same weight to costs and benefits in a cost/benefit analysis. Often, in a person's perception far greater weight is attributed to the prospect of los, which is biologically rational. A species that does not fear outcomes will die out. Therefore, the message must have these elements to stick. Individuals who are seekers and who are looking for an identity look at these simple, compelling, and impending doom messages and join a group. Again, there are the ideologues, the mercenaries, and the captive participants. These are the processes by which ideas spread. However, there is one more step involved that is creating opportunities. For instance, if the desired goal is AQ or Islamic radicalization, an individual would go to Pakistan, which for decades has promoted these groups as a part of outsourcing their foreign policy. Those who are motivated will find their way to places like Pakistan, Afghanistan, or Yemen because these are places where inspiration meets opportunity. This is the main process by which ideas spread and people join groups through friendship, kinship, and existence of outlets such as these.

### **Discussion**:

Dr. Eric Larson, RAND Corporation, added that there is substantial theoretical and empirical support for viewing individuals as "cognitive misers" with "bounded rationality" who seek to minimize the costs of acquiring the information they need to understand political issues.<sup>6</sup> Most individuals rely upon opinion leaders that are personally known to them, or scan a crowd of faces in mass media to identify individuals who they think take the right position, and take their cues from these individuals. People vary in their level of political sophistication and attention to politics, but most have limited interest and understanding of political issues. The substantial empirical support for this model is generalizable and relates well to previous topics of conversation in the conference about the role of opinion leaders and leader cues. Dr Gupta replied that diffusion is a topic that was written about in the 1950s and 1960s and somehow that research has died down. There is a lot of talk about the large weight of international terrorism; however, few try to explain why it comes at a certain point in time. For instance, oftentimes an elite group of political entrepreneurs promote certain ideas based on a platform. Later these groups and views are looked upon as spontaneous; however, there have been promoters working on them over time. Malcolm Gladwell wrote about connectors who spoke to a lot of people; however, that is no longer necessary with the use of airtime, print, media, etc. An example that is current is the Tea Party movement. The master narrative is of "losing America;" the Tea Party followers then internalize these messages in their own ways. But the message is simple, compelling, and there is a high cost of not doing something about it.

Curtis Johnson, SNL, noted that an important point to keep in mind is that people make dozens of decisions a day. These people end up following others in a rational way due to the number of decisions they are required to make daily. However, the person they choose to follow may not be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Perhaps the best theoretical treatment of this is Anthony Downs' *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, New York: Harper, 1957. In addition, a number of political scientists, social psychologists, and other scholars of American public opinion have sought to understand the diffusion of mass attitudes and have come to roughly comparable conclusions about the role of leadership cues and individual-level political sophistication and ideological or political predispositions in influencing awareness and acceptance of messages. See for example, W. Russell Neuman, *The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986, John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, and Samuel L. Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

the right person to follow. A lot of what is important in reality is the meta-message, or the buzz, surrounding the message. Dr Gupta added that this is why political communication is all about symbols.

Dr. Cabayan, OSD, asked Dr. Gupta if this is the narrative of these groups and others are watching and acting based on these actions resulting in constant adaptation. Therefore, it is not linear because of a constant act, adapt, and feedback loop. Within this process of predator, victim, and adaptation, the cycle can become more and more lethal. How much of this feedback loop is being studied? This question may be especially pertinent as the United States watches their narrative and they watch the US.

One participant asked how the constant adaptation can be factored into a narrative. Dr. Gupta replied that every message has its own life. There are unexpected events that take place within that lifetime, as there can be a trigger effect. The United States can kill Osama bin Laden tomorrow and then who knows how it will play out. There are uncertainties that come with every turn of events. But, it is still possible to generalize something and that is where the wave theory comes in. Waves rise and it is difficult or impossible to predict how long they last. The pattern so far has indicated that eventually the waves die out and new waves come up, this leads the United States to having to manage this rather than trying to eradicate it.

# DERADICALIZATION & COUNTER-RADICALIZATION

# ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DERADICALIZATION PROGRAMS (DR. JOHN HORGAN)

Dr. John Horgan, the Director of the International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Penn State University, began his talk by introducing himself to the conference audience. He primarily does work on the social and behavioral aspects of terrorism. His work and the work of his center is multidisciplinary in focus. The Center's work is sponsored by HSCB, DHS, FBI, and others.

Before presenting his research findings, he noted several things of concern to him after a day and a half of the conference. First, he was not convinced that the group has identified what precisely the problem was. Indeed, he noted that he thought the group had skirted around another issue. Additionally, he felt that conference attendees have not explicitly identified what should be done, let alone what actually could be done. Nevertheless, this distinction does not matter unless the West and researchers can stand by conclusion(s) with rigor and evidence. He stressed that one depressing thing about terrorism studies is that after more than five years, issues of method and rigor are still in their infancy.

Dr. Horgan clarified the key distinctions between extremists and violent extremists; and deradicalization and disengagement as opposed to counter-radicalization. He noted that the process being described was real in that it was based on empirical evidence. People do change how they think. It is important to distinguish between radicalization and disengagement with regard to terrorism. To make things more complicated and to echo something implicit to some of the panel discussions – not every radical becomes a terrorist, but also not every terrorist is radical. There is a vague nexus in the relationship between radicalization and terrorism. Violent radicalism is only one expression of radicalism.

In his research efforts, Dr. Horgan interviewed over 100 respondents; only one said he had no other choice but to join a radical group. He said that his respondents engage in a process of 'pre-involvement searching' whereby potential recruits consider different alternatives open to them. Additionally, disengagement is not the same as deradicalization—a person can disengage from one kind of activity to do something else. They can move from terrorist to subversive and not necessarily remain engaged in violent or even illegal activity.

Dr. Horgan urged caution around the use of the term de-radicalization. He said that the term has fuelled unrealistic expectations about what is possible. De-radicalization refers to a process that is much more than someone terminating their engagement in terrorism or terrorism-related activity. We can distinguish physical desistance from change on the cognitive level (which is what is usually assumed by de-radicalization). There is an assumption in these kinds of initiatives called 'derad' – if one wants to try to change behavior, the West has to change the way people think about it. The critical point to understand is the relationship between attitudes and behavior – this relationship is something that has not been understood as well as people claim, and Horgan stressed that these issues are at the heart of current disagreement about the 'right' approaches to de-radicalization.

Dr. Horgan then asked "Why study disengagement?" He noted that there are also two very interesting trends in recent years. There is an increasing visibility and availability of disengaged individuals—leaving the movement either because they have to leave or they want to leave. There has been an increased visibility of practical initiatives that are aimed at promoting disengagement. Dr. Horgan pointed out that despite being critical of features of the programs, they are borne out of creativity and innovation rarely seen in counter-terror endeavors—including the Saudi plan that has taken a lot of flak as of recently.

There are two recent studies, findings from which Dr. Horgan will make available if group participants contact him. The "Walking Away from Terrorism" study looks at the complex narratives of individuals that have disengaged from terrorist movements. The second study done for DHS has to do with assessing the effectiveness of deradicalization efforts. The measurement study is available in the current issue of Terrorism and Political Violence.

"Walking Away" was essentially a pilot study in which Dr. Horgan interviewed 29 former terrorists, including IRA members, Jemaah Islamiyyah, right-wing racists, and three "very different" AQ members. In his research efforts, Dr. Horgan purposely went across the board because the research was exploratory in nature. There were an additional 23 supporters; friends and family members that it was really helpful to talk with to provide context to the accounts given by the primary interviewees.

He joked that the picture he paints about field methodology is going to make him unpopular

PUSH FACTORS for disengagement
<ul> <li>Disillusionment with the (unattainable) goals of the group</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Disillusionment with the violent methods and who are victimized by the group</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Disillusioned with the leaders of the group</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Disillusionment with the social relations within the group</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Loss of position and status within the group</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Cannot take the pressure any more</li> </ul>
- Competing loyalties between group and family obligations

because the image he projects is rather mundane. Dr. Horgan and his fellow researchers at Penn State are beginning to talk more and more about their experiences of fieldwork. doing First hand research with disengaged and even engaged individuals can be done ethically and safely, but most importantly he says it can be done rigorously. He did have the not necessary time to

get into all of his material, but he wanted to provide a quick snapshot of the push factors for disengagement. He stated that efforts should focus on prioritizing what might be feasible. There is certainly no shortage of disillusionment among members of these movements—that disillusionment can persist despite their continued involvement in the movement.

Deradicalization has many names, but it represents the varied efforts of NGOs and governments around the world. The Saudi program is very well resourced and Dr. Horgan has had the opportunity to go there. Dr. Horgan illustrated the complexity of these programs by paraphrasing Wittgenstein who said "let the use of the word guide its meaning." The terminology used for these programs tells the world something about the purpose, objectives, and expectations associated with these very diverse and context-specific programs.

One of the first recommendations that Dr. Horgan's center made to the DHS was to stop calling these programs 'deradicalization' because in reality they rarely feature deradicalization as a necessary component for effecting behavioral change. Braddock and Horgan recommended referring to these programs as "risk reduction" efforts because this is one common element across all programs – they seek to reduce the risk of re-engagement in terrorist activity.

Dr. Horgan was asked to give a talk in Saudi Arabia about risk assessment and recidivism. He gave a talk about how to contextualize recidivism in the context of terrorism, because he is skeptical about claims of high success rates in the absence of explicit evaluation criteria.

Dr. Horgan went on to identify the "Common Objectives and Expectations" of these programmatic efforts (drawn from his collaborative work with Professor Tore Bjorgo at the Norwegian Police University College), noting that he thought that Westerners should be very careful about using externorists as opinion builders. It should be explored, but there have been cases that the opinions

that have been built have been less to counter

radicalization. but instead to espouse a particular ideology or agenda. In a lot of interesting cases, Dr. Horgan argued that there is greater promise when former repentant members hold up a mirror to life in these movements.

Moving through his presentation, Dr. Horgan then went on to ask whether these programs are

# Reduce number of active terrorists Reduce violence and victimization Changing ideological attitudes of the participants Resocialize ex-members back to a normal life Acquire intelligence, evidence and witnesses in court cases Use ex-terrorists as opinion builders Sow dissent within the terrorist milieu To reduce the dependency of repressive means and make more use of more humane means of counter-terrorism Reduce the economic and social costs of keeping a large number of terrorists in prison for a long time

To increase the legitimacy of the government

effective. He noted that it is still difficult to say because there is little or no evaluation associated with any of the efforts. That is not to say that there are not serious internal discussions on these issues. Dr. Horgan strongly disagreed with the notion that it not possible to scientifically evaluate these programs. He said that program officials may offer this as a defense against evaluating their claims for success. Dr. Horgan suggested that there are two principal elements missing from current initiatives. These are 1) clear criteria for what constitutes recidivism and 2) valid and reliable risk assessment protocols. The second point is very critical—it is a thorny issue to figure out what risk looks like with this population. Dr. Horgan said that he and his team at Penn State are working to develop a framework for risk assessment of terrorist offenders.

Dr. Horgan had to leave quickly after his presentation, so he concluded his talk and told audience members to contact him via email if he was not able to answer their questions before he had to depart. He recommended those with questions contact him at terrorism@psu.edu. Before leaving, he opened the floor to discussion.

### **Discussion**:

Dr. Frank Furedi of the University of Kent, UK noted that one of the problems that he has encountered is the policymakers that insist that it is too early to evaluate—that "we do not know yet." Dr. Horgan responded that for DHS, he and his team drew up a system for multi-attribution evaluation; it is a very dynamic framework because these programs are changing by the year. The model that his team helped build for DHS allowed for the model to be influenced by ongoing

changes. He offered to send the broader technical report (as well as the published academic article from Terrorism and Political Violence) to Dr. Furedi.

Dr. Benjamin Nickels of START, University of Maryland, agreed with Dr. Horgan's observation that disengagement is not the same thing as deradicalization. Dr. Nickels wondered whether Dr. Horgan had any examples of individuals being deradicalized without being non-violent, or where deradicalization actually increased a propensity to violence. For example, could not there be an individual who radicalized in a quest for significance and whose deradicalization then deprived him of that sense of significance, leading him to become more willing to be violent?

Dr. Horgan responded that an irony of some of the programs is that there is a very heavy religious component to deradicalize individuals that were not very religious to begin with. It is about making them pious and making them into something that they previously thought that they might get from that radical experience.

Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, IMEISS, commented that it sounded like she and Dr. Horgan had been doing exactly the same research. She noted her own discomfort with a process in which the Ministry of the Interior prefers to work with certain academics and is unwilling to share data or explain some discrepancies in the available 2004 data. It is as though she and Dr. Horgan, and others, are in a position to communicate valuable lessons learned to the world—but trying to convince the Saudis that it is important to communicate these findings is so very difficult. They are understandably cautious; after all what other country has enacted an accountability act for another nation as the US has for Saudi Arabia? She wished that there was a way to diminish their concerns so researchers could more successfully study the program.

Dr. Horgan replied that he would welcome communication from Dr. Zuhur. Dr. Horgan said that at all times during his dealings with Saudi officials involved in the program, they were open and frank about all aspects of their program. He suggested to Saudi officials that if they wanted want to have this program taken seriously, they have to talk openly about how they evaluate success.

Andrew Garfield of Glevum Associates noted that when individuals that are about to bail are detected and then incarcerated, the treatment is jeopardized. Are there any lessons between the Sageman and the Saudi experiment?

Dr. Horgan responded to Mr. Garfield's query that the program has created other problems, because it has created a "minority report" feeling to it—Dr. Horgan said that there is a view that the Saudi officials may apprehend people for things that they "might" do in the future. There is no reliable risk assessment framework for determining which radicals would benefit from early intervention. Dr. Horgan said that we are allowing metaphor to drive how one thinks about these issues (staircases, conveyor belts, and pyramids)—which he says contains a variety of assumptions about how and why people do things.

### A STRATEGIC PLAN TO DEFEAT RADICAL ISLAM (DR. TAWFIK HAMID)

Dr. Tawfik Hamid began his discussion by thanking the conference for inviting him to speak. He had three short comments about previous speakers.

(1) Concerning terrorist rehabilitation efforts - the question is why the Saudis are rehabilitating terrorists but not adulterers? This could signify a form of sympathy towards the terrorists.

(2) Nine years after 9/11, people are still discussing the role of ideology. He would like to emphasize the lack of logic in arguments that ignore the role of Islamic ideology based upon the observation that the majority of Muslims are not terrorists. He gave the following illustrative example: Most smokers do not develop lung cancer, but that does not mean that smoking is not the most important cause of lung cancer. In fact, smoking is considered the main cause of lung cancer. Similarly, the observation that most Muslims are not terrorists does not necessarily mean that the religious ideology is not the main cause of terrorism.

(3) When there is a patient that is severely bleeding, a doctor can spend a lot of time investigating the cause of the bleeding, but if he/she does not care for the ABC's first (airways, blood loss, cardiac condition) the patient would die. There needs to be a balance between academic research and active solutions to the problem of terrorism. This is an existential issue—it is not merely a matter of academic research.


He noted the importance of being very careful about dealing with the potential existential threat these people are persistent and they have the will to destroy the West. When Dr. Tawfik deals with radical Islam, it is like any disease—it is a problem with a pattern. We need to understand the pattern of the phenomenon in order to treat it. When one observes the phenomenon of radical Islam, observers will recognize a specific form of regressive religious teaching called Salafi Islam (Salafi = "predecessors" in Arabic) that encourage violence. There are certain brainwashing tactics that the radicals use, like suppression of critical thinking, and the suppression of human consciousness to the point that a radical may lose human conscience (example: halal v. haram when a person accepts certain practices such as polygamy or beating his wife just because it is 'Halal' (permissible in religion), even if it contradicts his human conscience, he gradually learns to suppress that conscience). The West has to address how radicals distort the image of the United States and how to fight this distortion. The Hejab phenomenon is both a manifestation and a perpetuating factor for Radical Islam. The previously mentioned factors result in the creation of Passive Terrorists who, on one hand, sympathize with the suicide bombers and on the other hand they are the ones that want to implement Sharia law throughout the world. There are many reasons for passive terrorism in the Arab world. An example of passive terrorism is Muslims strongly protesting the Danish Muhammad cartoons rather than Osama Bin Laden. It is critical that the West deals with this problem at several levels and addresses its different components such as: ideology, the brain washing tactics used by the radicals, improving the image of the US, the Hijab phenomenon, and the transition of passive terrorists into active ones.

Dr. Hamid is currently working on a curriculum that uses cognitive psychological techniques to teach moderate Islam. An example of his technique is that he draws a cup of water and ask whether drinking this cup of water is halal or haram—it is halal, permissible; then he shows the image of someone dying of thirst and tells the class that they can save him by giving the cup of water to him—is it now halal or haram to drink the cup of water? It is haram now, because drinking that water will result in killing a human soul. Killing an innocent human being is a major sin as described in the Quran (Verse: Whoever gives life to a human soul it is as if he gave life to all mankind). In this model, Dr. Hamid is counterbalancing the radical teachings that suppress critical thinking. He is using critical thinking, encouraging the use of human conscience, utilizing the effectiveness of images in creating human memory, and using theology to create love instead of using it to create hatred.

It is necessary to change both the available interpretations of the religious texts, which is possible, and the processes of thinking in young Muslims. There are ways to make the brain think differently about verses—if he himself had thought about things differently, he would not have joined JI and become radicalized. He gave an illustrative example on how caring for the value of the suffix "the" in the Quran could have saved him from going into the path of Radicalism. There are many different ways to fight brainwashing techniques. There are certain ways to link the United States to positive things. Memory is a connected network of related information—when an individual remembers that something it activates other related information in the brain (Spreading Activation Model). In Egypt, when Hamid was a child, they ate American chicken in red, white, and blue packaging that looked like the US flag and thought it was very good—the subconscious connection between the good taste and the US made him and his friends positive about the United States. There are several cognitive psychological techniques to link America to positive ideas and to also weaken the negative links to the US.

Things that can work to stop the transit from passive to activist terrorists:

- 1) Fatwa War—denouncing terrorism by theological means. Calling terrorism haram is inadequate because one is essentially equating terrorism to eating pork (the latter is also haram). However, when one calls terrorism apostasy, it can work in the minds of Muslim youth and deter them from becoming Jihadists. The fatwa has to use specific words and phrases in order to be effective.
- 2) Rumor War—rumors can spread quickly especially in Internet era and can be used to ruin the heroic image of the radicals;
- 3) Sense of defeat—killing terrorists does not defeat the terrorist movement because in their theology and mythology dying in an effort to kill the infidel is just and good.



There are at least five different categories of Muslims:

- 1) Cultural Muslims (outermost concentric circle, light blue) are not very religious;
- 2) Ritual Muslims (next smaller concentric circle, navy blue) focus on praying and fasting, they are not interested in changing the secular constitution;
- 3) Theological Muslims (third concentric circle, green) want to implement Sharia laws but do not use force to implement their changes yet; if they reach a certain critical mass they may pose a threat;
- 4) Radical Muslims (red circle) start using violence to implement their views on the world;
- 5) Jihadists (innermost concentric circle, yellow) actually undertake the attacks.

Based upon these cultural divisions, it is possible to target the process of radicalization at multiple levels of Muslim society with various types of interventions.

In summary, it is important to look at the pattern of the phenomenon of Radical Islam in order to treat it. He recommended the importance of mixing different techniques and understanding the synergistic effects of these techniques—there is no singular simple solution to the problem. It is the integration of several effective tactics that can bring a solution. He opened up the floor for discussion and questions from the audience.

Dr. Dipak Gupta of San Diego State University asked Dr. Hamid why he thought the Islamic community worldwide is defined by their religion. For instance, when the Oklahoma City bombing happened, there was no push to have all the Baptist ministers recant. When there is a question of Muslims, leaders always turn to the Mullahs. Which begs the question of whether there is anything in particular about the Islamic community that makes the Islamic community the unique case?

Dr. Hamid responded that the notion of "umma" (one-body for Muslims) is very strong. The feeling of the umma is a sort of ideological culture that pervades and the media plays the role in creating it as well. Muslims, based upon their upbringing and the notions of hellfire, live in fear of judgment by G-d. This makes many of them caring about involving religion in their life decision making about anything.

Dr. Hriar Cabayan noted that Islam has been around for 1400 years. Jihadism is not inevitable—this is very much a recent phenomenon. So there must be a context that Islam is finding itself in that is fairly contemporary. He recommended focusing on the factors that are not necessarily inherent to Islam.

Dr. Hamid responded that there could be some contributing factors to violence, but we should always ask: Why do these factors impact Muslims more than others? Most Muslims can be placed near the Ritual/Theological border (see the diagram above). He then emphasized the role of the literal interpretation of the Quran. He noted that it was only after the Saudis became wealthy that more stringent religious practices took hold (Petro Islam). After this stage, radical groups changed the level of jihad from a national level responsibility to an individual level responsibility. The phenomenon has become global because Jihadists and radicals have been dispersed outside of the Middle East partially via emigration – and especially today via the internet.

Dr. Eric Larson of RAND Corporation noted that Dr. Hamid had given a couple of examples of a cognitive approach to interpreting various theological doctrines more fruitfully. He wondered what sort of cognitive approach would be most effective in confronting exclusionary theological doctrines used by *salafi-jihadis* like *takfir* (declaring another Muslim to be an apostate, thereby

clearing the way for violence against them) and *al-wala' wa al-bara'* (loyalty to fellow Muslims and disavowal of non-Muslims, clearing the way for violence against the latter).

Dr. Hamid emphasized the importance of using the jargon of the religion itself. Some of these things do not exist in the Quran, which means it is possible to use the religion itself to counterbalance these [radical] things. For example, killing apostates and stoning women until death for committing adultery is not a command in the Quran.

Danny Campos of SOCOM noted that with regard to mechanisms, Dr. Hamid's presentation offered the suffocation strategy as a potential technique. There have been studies and efforts that indicate that the most effective counterterrorism efforts include the coupling or combination of proper intelligence and law enforcement. He asked Dr. Hamid to offer further elaboration on that and counterterrorism more broadly.

Dr. Hamid responded that if one wants to treat a disease, one has to treat the destructive manifestations as well. While the USG and others endeavor to prevent radicalization, it is also vital to deal with those that are already acting against the nation. The critical issue is the necessity to think more broadly, and to interrupt the radicalization process at different levels. He added that he would gladly respond to further questions via email.

### MUSLIM DEMOCRATS AS A COUNTER-STRATEGY TO THE JIHADIST RADICALIZATION (DR. WALID PHARES)

Dr. Walid Phares of the National Defense University and senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies prepared a PowerPoint presentation for the group entitled *Partnering with "Muslim Democrats": Defining a Strategic Campaign For Working With Partners to Counter and Delegitimize Violent Extremism.* 

He started his talk by stating that he is attempting to offer a strategic overview of the problem and offer some strategic approaches to the problem. He offered a review of how the USG and other Western observers and scholars have looked at the world of terrorism. On one edge, there is the irredentist/theological parameter or those that have argued that as long as "there are religious texts legitimizing violence," there will be no chance to moderate or mitigate Jihadists. In response to this claim, there are a lot of attempts by theology scholars to use theology against the use of texts. The other edge is irredentist foreign policy: some in the field have said that so long as the United States maintains this foreign policy and all that comes with it, it is impossible to mitigate the threat—according to this point of view, the USG must change its foreign policy in order to mitigate terrorism. In the center, there is the notion of mitigation with two sub-schools vying for decision-makers' attention. One that is predominant in the social sciences is clinical. The other theory says that the response is more than clinical, it is systemic. It is a systemic problem that is creating the radicalization.

The clinical strategies say basically that there are no global sets of beliefs, it is only local (an ocean of local problems). Additionally, this school of thought argues that there are no systematic counterradicalizations, that there is individual deprogramming. Terrorism, however, is not just an academic notion to study, this is an existential threat. The limitations of the clinical approach are many: they do not have an identification of the global dynamics, there is no projection of global strategies, and there is no singular counter campaign. The United States and others are working on

the red dots, those extracted from the mass of radicals. The reality, however, is different. What is really being addressed are the quasi-radicals at the edge of the radicalized mass, but few are completely out of the radical mass. It is a systematic approach to the mass indoctrination of the population that truly addresses these issues.

There is another school of thought that argues the need to counter radicalization by addressing the ideological movement. It is not just a war of ideas; it is a sophisticated effort at all levels. There are five strategic goals:

- 1) Determine the map of violent extremism;
- 2) Identify the identity of extremists;
- 3) Identify the organized forces behind the identity of violent extremists;
- 4) Detect the strategies of the organized force behind the violent extremists; and
- 5) Understand the evolution of the organized force behind the violent extremists.

In essence, this is about the ideology that is mobilized by an actual force and it is dynamic. In order to engage this approach, it is necessary to be on top of the evolution of the dynamics and techniques.

Additionally, it is important to evaluate the understanding of the threat. Heretofore, the USG and the West more broadly have not made significant advances in the past decade that indicates that there has been a failure to understand the identity of threat. The inability to define the organized forces and the strategies of those networks is problematic. This has happened due to a derailment of analysis. Analysis is not happening soundly because we are in a war of ideas—the expert community in the West has been impacted by the feedback from the forces waging the war of ideas.

The strategic definition of the threat has determined that the threat:

- 1) Has a comprehensive ideology
- 2) It moves and mutates in particular ways

Irrefutably, according to the research, all cells, narratives, literatures, etc. are connected to an ideology. Across the US, Europe, and Middle East/North Africa, these so-called "extremists" are motivated by a comprehensive ideology. All of these ideological components aim at global jihadism. This is broken into two branches: Salafism and Khomenism. There are two global networks based off of this ideological web.

Focusing on the Salafi ideological network, terrorists, and militants recruit from the same radicalized pool. Thus, the USG confronts one pool of radicalized individuals, which produce either terrorists or radicals that are not violent. The historical narrative is the easiest one to detect, a new caliphate.

The issue of jihad, which is central to this global ideology, has to be carefully articulated. There are many notions of Jihads, there is a:

- 1) Jihad in Theology;
- 2) Jihad in History—the images of jihad in history (caliphates); and

3) Jihadism in Modern times—which is of interest to the West, because it is the current movement.

Jihad is a specific movement; it is the contemporary Islamist movement advocating Jihad.

A major Islamist and Jihadist Debate took place during the 1992-93 Khartoum Conference. The point of analysis begins with the discussion of the Islamist debate on Jihad. In the Western world, there is a distinction made between violent and non-violent Jihad. In the Islamist  $\epsilon$  conceptualization, that is not the division, it is about being applied or not applied because jihadism is a comprehensive tool at the discretion of the leaders and strategists. The real reform that would attack radicalization is the rejection of the practice of Jihad in politics.

In the counter-terrorism interception, over the past seven to eight years, the West has confronted a major dilemma about where to intercept a terrorist threat on the homeland. Most of the West's diversion efforts have happened at terrorism, well after indoctrination and radicalization. The best strategy would try to prevent radicalization rather than reversing it.

Existing models include:

- 1) Regimes  $\rightarrow$  silent majority  $\rightarrow$  Muslim Civil Society
- 2) Finding what is out there beyond the Jihadists and the Islamists, which essentially means finding and empowering counter jihadists and democrats. Democrats (in the small letter sense of the word) are essential to promoting systematic change.

Muslim democrats are diverse, dispersed and uncoordinated. The Islamists and Democrats have a lot of points of conflict.

Dr. Phares offered several strategic recommendations:

- 1) Priority must be given to the dispersed and weak Muslim Democrats through partnership;
- 2) Engage the Muslim/Islamic traditional parties in a dialogue; and
- 3) Engage non-Jihadist Islamists to generate reform—encouraging debate.

The more the non-jihadis are engaged, the greater the potential to encourage them to change their societies. Upon completing his talk, Dr. Phares opened the floor up for questions.

Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois of NSI opened up the questions by thanking Dr. Phares for a wonderful presentation and one that lays out very well something for the group to discuss.

Dr. Sherifa Zuhur of IMEISS noted that she agreed with a lot more than she thought she would. But she noted the difficulty of finding Muslim democrats around the world. She noted that looking country-by-country for Muslim Democrats, there are generally no more than 3-5%. The more that they are strengthened from outside, the worse it gets. She asked Dr. Phares whether he had anything in mind about expanding the range and nature of those Muslim democrats because it is too small right now.

Dr. Phares responded that his perception of the Muslim Democrats is not just the elites. He views the elites as the tip of the iceberg - then he sees the mass behind them. When 1.5 million Iranians are walking around and protesting in Tehran in Beirut or in Darfur, it is merely the tip of the iceberg. In truth, it is not only 2%; rather it is more like 8-13%. When Muslim democrats are given

an opportunity, they will grow. However, he agreed that engaging Muslim democrats is the problem; the United States Government cannot reach out to them in a raw manner, because it is the kiss of death. One of the possibilities would be to engage Western civil society to their civil society, in the same way the United States and others encouraged civil society in South America and South Africa.

### WRAP UP (DR. PAUL DAVIS)

Dr. Paul Davis, RAND Corporation, noted that throughout the workshop there had been a good deal of consensus. Participants had agreed that it is folly to speak about "terrorists" as a monolith. It is critical to take a systems perspective, where the individual components and levels are distinguished, revealing a number of leverage points. There also exists a wide range of instruments to be used on these leverage points, in a spectrum of deterrence and influence actions. This includes dissuasion, cooptation, killing, and so on. It is important to note that the struggle is about social systems and complex adaptive systems that contain many loosely connected entities. To imagine that this is all nicely determined somehow is incorrect. Therefore, there has also been a significant amount of agreement about the necessity of approaching the problem broadly (i.e., not focusing exclusively on one issue).

Dr. Davis stated that an important lesson that arose from the disagreements was that the US needs to be very cautious, humble, and almost paranoid about the role of strategic communications. Not one panelist stated that they believed that the United States can go out and change the opinions of the world. Instead, most discussion revolved around the notion that "bottom-up" or group engagement approach would be more productive. The resulting question is *how* the United States should approach the problem from the bottom up. Potential solutions include women engaging women's groups, labor unions engaging laborers, etc. That bottom up level is a level in which a lot of progress can probably be made although not always in predictable ways. Encouraging bottom-up initiatives relinquishes control (or the illusion of control).

Dr. Davis noted that the participants believed that a "top down" strategic communication plan would be unsuccessful; however, if the national strategic communication plan includes all activities at all levels and includes encouraging activities at all levels then there is potential for success.

Dr. Davis noted that another striking debate in the workshop involved the relative emphasis that should be placed on the ideological end or religious aspects of the problem. Those who take the broadest view see the current troubles as another wave that will resolve itself in its own time. This may be valid but political leaders cannot be complacent. After all, the past resolutions came about in part because of reactions and counter movements. Those cannot be taken for granted and those doing counterterrorism work are indeed part of the countering actions. This said, al Qaeda's worst enemy is probably itself and it can be argued that the most important thing for the USG is to avoid making things worse while al Qaeda does itself in.

Dr. Davis stated that an interesting idea consistent with this, one brought up in the very first talk, was that a priority for strategic communication should consist of framing the United States' own story and living up to it. Doing so is also something that the United States will have some control over. To the extent that the United States can tell any story in a compelling manner, it should be its own.

Dr. Davis stated that an interesting historical comparison may be to the Cold War era when people were struggling with how the United States should address international Communism. Ultimately, the composite strategy that came out consisted of being very firm on defense matters and on maintaining alliances, but taking a high road on what amounted to strategic communications. Voice of America and Radio Free Europe were not about propaganda. The strategy was focused on doing what the United States does well and what its liberal-democratic allies believed in. Others would observe and would come around in time.

Dr. Davis stated that when trying to reconcile observations and sketching elements of a strategic campaign, any consensus would probably involve maintaining *tactical* flexibility, which is sensitive to context while focusing on the United States' own ideas and story at the strategic level (rather than, say, attempting to push particular interpretations of Islam). It should also be possible to work problems of misinformation without undercutting the rest of the strategy. For example, it is widely believed in the Muslim world that the United States is aggressive, kills a lot of people, and is at war with Islam. This shows that there is a disconnect between perception and reality. It should be possible to point out effectively that the US supported Moslems in the Balkans, that the United States is leaving Iraq with a freely elected government, that the US has no intention of long-term occupation in Afghanistan, and that Turkey has been a long-term US ally. It is not at all at war with Islam.

Dr. Davis had one last observation, which had been troubling him. That involved the separation of church and state. Although conference participants had indicated that they did not believe that this resonated within Islamic societies, he believed that it was important to remember that that the separation *is* an important part of America's story. Further, he observed pointedly that the Iraqi people indicated in their recent elections that they also are souring about mixing religion and state. Thus, Dr. Davis ended by being more concrete about what it *means* to tell America's story.

In response to Dr. Davis' comments, Anne McGee, a consultant, added that a key issue in communication that has been skirted around throughout the workshop is the idea of positive messages about us versus negative messages about the other side. What had been expressed at an Information Warfare Conference the previous week was a general agreement among the primarily military attendees that the US was focusing on sending positive messages about us without also devising a communication campaign emphasizing the negative aspects of our opponents, for which we have ample "ammunition." Negative communication campaigns are often the most effective, so why focus just on one side of the equation?

Dr. Larson added that he is under the strong impression that during the Cold War, in addition to the "public face" in which the United States talked about its policy views and positions and the charms and merits of democratic systems and liberal economies, there were also covert programs that were meant to build capacity to create a greater bulwark against Communism. Oftentimes, the United States supported socialists, social democrats, or other left-leaning political currents not because they were particularly attractive, but because by doing so the US could reduce the number of individuals who might otherwise support the communists. He wondered whether this approach might be adapted to be able to siphon off support for extremist Islamist currents by supporting the emergence of less extreme alternatives.

Dr. Davis agreed, but noted also that the United States usually supported democratically elected foreign leaders even when it did not like their views. This was part of the high road. Thus, it supported democracy. There were also instances in which one could quarrel about America's

record, such as in its support of some Latin American governments. Nonetheless, the high road was the norm. At the same time, the US and NATO were remarkably solid and consistent, despite numerous issues along the way—in part because the allies did not allow themselves to be too nuanced on some of the topics.

Jeff Martini, RAND, contributed that the takeaway that he noticed from the first day of the workshop was that strategic communication informs foreign policy rather than seeking to explain it.

Dr. Davis replied that he also regarded as important the point that every foreign policy action is itself a strategic communication and must be understood as such. The issue is not how the United States can spin the story (with the negative connotations of "spin"), but rather that the US must be aware of all the strategic-communications considerations as it makes and implements decisions.

Danny Campos, SOCOM, asked Dr. Davis where he saw the role of "red teaming" within the government and government policy (he was referring to Davis' paper on simple models for use in deterrence and influence). Dr. Davis said that he strongly supports such efforts to identify different perspectives and that some organizations use it routinely as a matter of doctrine. Ideally, it would be USG at the NSC level to assure that strategies were hedged against so as to be appropriate for different images of the adversary. He said that it was interesting to look back at foreign-policy crisis decisions, which have frequently been quite wrong because they were based on a "best estimate" image of the adversary, when reality was something else. It is possible for strategy to be formulated so as to be better hedged. This is precedented in some domains.

## APPENDIX A: AGENDA

### Defining a Strategic Campaign

### For Working with Partners to Counter and Delegitimize Violent Extremism – Day One 19 May 2010

Time	Торіс	POC
0730-0800	Check-in	SMA Team/Gallup
0800-0815	Welcoming Remarks	Dr. Cabayan &
		Todd Leventhal
0015 0015		
0815-0845	Opening Comments	Pradeep Ramamurthy
0845-1000	Session One: This session will focus on provide a	Dr. Fenstermacher & Dr.
	snapshot of our current baseline understanding of	Davis
	terrorism: root causes, key factors, dynamics and relationships from social science and provide a	
	theoretical and scientific foundation for the rest of	
	the workshop. This session will enable a common	
	understanding and foundation for the remainder	
	of the workshop.	
1000-1015	Break	
1015-1130	Session One Continues	Dr. Fenstermacher & Dr. Davis
1130-1230	Working Lunch - An All-of-Government Approach	Shaarik Zafar
	to Countering Violent Extremism: The Value of	
	Interagency Planning	
1230-1445	Session Two: This session will focus on two main	Dr. Astorino-Courtois
	issues: whether violent Islamists groups can in fact	
	be widely "delegitimized;" and whether they can	
	be deterred and otherwise influenced from	
1445-1500	pursuing violent strategies? Break	
1500-1700	Session Three: This session will focus on a strategic	CAPT Porter &
1500-1700	campaign to diminish and deflate radical Islamist	Ms. Pandith
	threats. Panel discussion topics will be centered	
	on three lines of persuasion	
1700-1745	Session Four: Wrap-up	Moderators

Session	Topics Discussed	Panelists
One	Trajectories of Terrorism: From Socio-Economic and Political Grievance to Recruitment to Mobilization Relationships between Root Causes and Terrorism. Dynamics and Tactics of VNSA's. Decision Making. Role of Ideology. Importance of and Reasons for Popular Support of Terrorism/Insurgencies. Counterterrorism and De- radicalization/Disengagement Solutions Moderators: Dr. Laurie Fenstermacher (AFRL) & Dr. Paul Davis (RAND)	Mr. Danny Campos (SOCOM) Dr. Sherifa Zuhur (IMEISS) Mr. Tom Rieger (Gallup) Dr. Dipak Gupta (San Diego State) Unattributed Speaker (USG) Dr. Angela Trethewey (ASU) Dr. Frank Furedi (Univ of Kent) Dr. John Horgan (PSU)
Two	What constitutes "delegitimization"? Which actors can spearhead such an effort? Do traditional notions of deterrence apply in this area? Does the answer change depending on the type of violence to be deterred and the target? <i>Moderator: Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI)</i>	Dr. Karl DeRouen (Univ of Alabama) Dr. Tawfik Hamid (Potomac Institute) Dr. Walid Phares (NDU) Mr. Mehdi Khalaji (Washington Institute) Dr. Ben Nickels (START, UofMd) Dr. Erik Larson (RAND) Dr. Paul Davis (RAND) Dr. Cheryl Benard (Consultant) Dr. Latéfa Belarouci (Consultant)
Three	<ul> <li>Panel topics will be centered on three lines of persuasion: The US public / Government. The private / commercial sector.</li> <li>International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations. Collaboration across the three sectors: to empower mainstream Muslim thought leaders, academics, and activists who can affect the intra Muslim discourse in order to deter and delegitimize violent Islamist messages.</li> <li>Moderators: CAPT Wayne Porter (OCJCS) &amp; Ms. Farah Pandith (DoS)</li> </ul>	Dr. Qamar-ul Huda (USIP) Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi (WORDE) Dr. Ralph Wellborn (NDU) Mr. Scott Carpenter (Washington Institute) Mr. Bill McEwen (Gallup) Unattributed Speaker (USG) Mr. Ziad Alahdad, (Former Director of Operations, World Bank) Dr. Emily Goldman (CENTCOM) Dr. Gregory Michaelidis (DHS)
Four	Wrap-Up	Session Moderators

### Defining a Strategic Campaign

### For Working with Partners to Counter and Delegitimize Violent Extremism – Day Two 20 May 2010

Time	Торіс	Presenter	Area
0730-0800	Check-in	SMA Team/Gallup	
0800-0815	Introductory Remarks	Dr. Laurie	
		Fenstermacher	
0815-0845	From Yemen to Mexico - what	Mr. Alexis Everington	
	causes radical behavior	_	
0845-0915	Radicalization and the battle of	Dr. Frank Furedi	
	values		Radicalization
0915-0945	Small group dynamics,	Dr. Marc Sagemen	
	radicalization and		
	deradicalization		
0945-1015	Stories, Identities, and Conflict:	LtCol Bill Casebeer	
	The Narrative Dimensions of		
	Political Violence		
1015-1045		Break	1
1045-1115	Deterrence and influence	Dr. Paul Davis	_
1115-1145	Extremist Narratives and Influence	Dr. Angela	
		Trethewey	Influence/
1145-1215	Mega Trends of Terror: Explaining	Dr. Dipak Gupta	Deterrence
	the Path of Global Spread of		
	Ideas		
1215-1300		Lunch	1
1300-1330	Assessing the effectiveness of	Dr. John Horgan	
	deradicalization programs		_
1330-1400	A Strategic Plan to Defeat Radical	Dr. Tawfik Hamid	
	Islam		
1400-1430	Muslim Democrats as a counter	Dr. Walid Phares	
	strategy to the jihadist		
	radicalization		Deradicalization &
1430-1500		Break	Counter-
1500-1530	Counter-Radicalization: Tools and	Dr. Cheryl Benard	radicalization
	Methods		
1530-1600	Wrap Up	Dr. Paul Davis	

# APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANTS

Alahdad, Ziad	Former Director of Ops World Bank.
Al-Suwaij, Zainab	American Islamic Congress
Arana, Ashley	NSI
Astorino-Courtois, Allison	NSI Changer Crown
Ayub, Alia Balaan Taasa	Chenaar Group
Baker, Tessa	NSI
Baran, Zeyno	Hudson Institute
Baylor, Brad	JFCOM Congultant
Belarouci, Latéfa Benard, Chard	Consultant Consultant
Benard, Cheryl	
Berry, Susanna	UK Embassy
Bexfield, John Biylon, Col Nicolo	DOD
Bixler, Col Nicole	SMA
Cabayan, Hriar	OSD
Campos, Danny	SOCOM
Canna, Sarah	NSI Waab Just fan Naam Faat Dalim
Carpenter, Scott	Wash. Inst for Near East Policy
Casebeer, LtCol William	JFCOM
Charney, Craig	Charney Research
Curry, Timothy	DHS
Davis, Paul	RAND
DeRouen, Karl	Univ of Alabama
Everington, Alexis	SCL
Fenstermacher, Laurie	AFRL
Fontenrose, Kirsten	Archimedes
Furedi, Frank	Univ of Kent, UK
Gallagher, Michael	EUCOM
Garfield, Andrew	Glevum Associates
Garner, COL Ron	JS J5
Gillen, Thelma	UK Joint Terrorism Analysis Center
Goodhart, Andrew	OSD Son Diago Stata
Gupta, Dipak	San Diego State
Hamid, Tawfik	Potomac Institute of Policy Studies
Hanley, John	ODNI
Hartig, Luke	OSD
Horgan, John	PSU
Huda, Qamar-ul	USIP
Johnson, Curtis	SNL
Khalaji, Mehdi	Wash. Inst for Near East Policy
Kiame, William	EUCOM
Larson, Eric	RAND
Leventhal, Todd	Department of State
Lewis, Katrina	NSC
Litten, Tiana Martini Jaff	SCL
Martini,Jeff	RAND
McCauley, Clark	Univ of Pennsylvania
McEwen, Bill	Gallup

McGee, Anne McGuire, Suzanne Michaelidis, Gregory Mirahmadi, Hedieh Nawaz, Maajid Nickels, Ben Pandith, Farah Pang, Chris Phares, Walid Porter, CAPT Wayne Pyle, Deborah Ramamurthy, Pradeep Reiling, Kirby Reynolds, Nate Rhem, Sam Rieger, Tom Roy, Robie Samanta Ryan, Col Mick Sageman, Marc Seidl, Michael Shore, Rhonda Siegel, Pascale Stearns Lawson, Brooke	Consultant SOUTHCOM DHS WORDE Quilliam Foundation START, Univ of MD DOS SCL NDU OCJCS SMA NSC USAID DOS SMA Gallup OSD Australian Army/PACC Foreign Policy Research Inst. SOLIC DOS Glevum Associates USAID CALLUP
Shore, Rhonda	DOS
0	

# APPENDIX C: ACRONYMS

AFRL	Air Force Research Laboratory
AQ	Al Qaeda
AQIM	Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb
AQN	Al-Qaeda Network
ASU	Arizona State University
BBG	Broadcast Board of Governors
CA	Civil Affairs
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CI	Counter Insurgency
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism (ists)
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
DoD	United States Department of Defense
DOJ	United States Department of Justice
DoS	United States Department of State
ЕТА	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Separatists)
EUCOM	European Command
FARC	Revolutionary Army Forces of Colombia
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOUO	For Official Use Only
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
GLASS	Gallup Leading Assessment of State Stability
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GWOT	Global War on Terror
IC	United States Intelligence Community
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
	Institute of Middle Eastern, Islamic, and Strategic
IMEISS	Studies
IO	Information Operation
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISAF	International Security and Assistance Force
ISI	Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JS	Joint Staff
LET	Lashkar-e-Tayyiba Libuan Jalamia Fighting Croun
LIFG	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
MIST	Military Information Support Teams
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ΝΑΤΟ	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCTC	National Counter-Terrorism Center
NDU	National Defense University
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
NYU	New York University
OCICS	Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
ODNI	Office of the Director for National Intelligence
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAKAF	Pakistan and Afghanistan
POLRAD	Gallup's Political Radical Survey
PSNI	Police Service of Northern Ireland
PSU	Penn State University
PSYOP	Psychological Operation
QHSR	Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
RCU	Rich Contextual Understanding
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SC	Strategic Communication
SCL	Strategic Communication Laboratory
SMA	Strategic Multilayer Assessment
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SNL	Sandia National Laboratory
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
START	Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (UMD)
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
ТТР	Tehrik Taliban Pakistan
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USIP	US Institute of Peace
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
VEO	Violent Extremist Organizations
VNSA	Violent Non-State Actor
WORDE	World Organization for Resource Development