

# **Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO)**



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## FOREWORD

The *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations* (JC-HAMO) focuses the future Joint Force on a critical and enduring challenge in warfare—the need to understand relevant actors’ motivations and the underpinnings of their *will*. The concept recognizes that war is fundamentally and primarily a human endeavor. Our Joint Force must inculcate in its members, the necessary mindset to excel at the human aspects of military operations. An updated approach is essential to achieve policy objectives and create enduring outcomes. Thus, the intent of JC-HAMO is to revise the manner in which the Joint Force thinks about and addresses human aspects, while strengthening the application of operational art.

The JC-HAMO recognizes the centrality of human will in war and provides a framework that integrates with the Commander’s Decision Cycle, enabling the Joint Force to *influence* a range of relevant actors. The goal of this concept is to improve understanding and effectiveness during the conduct of operations. This is accomplished by using the proposed framework to examine the behavior of actors in the environment and optimize operations based on a detailed understanding of the situation.

The JC-HAMO mindset and approach is critical to producing enduring strategic outcomes. All echelons of our force must have a foundational understanding of what drives human behavior. As each Military Service and a range of other stakeholders contributed to the evolution of this concept, the entire force must now play a role in its implementation.



PAUL J. SELVA  
General, U.S. Air Force  
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

*“It is a fundamental mistake to see the enemy as a set of targets. The enemy in war is a group of people. Some of them will have to be killed. Others will have to be captured or driven into hiding. The overwhelming majority, however, have to be persuaded.”*

Frederick Kagan  
“War and Aftermath”  
Policy Review, August 2003

*“In today's information age, we must recognize that the essential ‘key terrain’ is the will of a host nation's population...[This] permits us to gain the trust of skeptical populations, thus frustrating the enemy's efforts and suffocating their ideology.”*


Gen J. N. Mattis, USMC  
Foreword to *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications*  
2008

*“Though sociocultural analysis has come to the fore with recent counter-insurgency experience, its relevance extends far beyond these operations. Indeed, its relevance may be greater in the future security environment than in contemporary operations. America’s security environment faces a diverse set of challenges, all of which are shaped by sociocultural dynamics.”*

LtGen Michael Flynn  
Preface to *Operational Relevance of Behavioral Social Science to DOD Missions*  
March 2013

## JC-HAMO Logic

The following logic chart provides an overview of the principal ideas within key sections of the JC-HAMO.



## **Table of Contents**

1. Introduction .....	1
2. Purpose.....	3
3. Scope .....	4
4. Human Aspects and the Future Operating Environment.....	4
5. The Military Challenge.....	13
6. Central Idea .....	13
7. Capabilities Required by this Concept .....	26
8. Risks of Adopting this Concept .....	42
ANNEX A – Glossary.....	44
ANNEX B – Bibliography .....	47

## 1. Introduction

The *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations* (JC-HAMO) describes how the Joint Force will enhance operations by impacting the *will* and influencing the decision making of relevant actors in the environment, shaping their behavior, both active and passive, in a manner that is consistent with U.S. objectives.<sup>1</sup> Human aspects are the *interactions* among humans and between humans and the environment that influence decisions. To be effective at these interactions, the Joint Force must analyze and understand the social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements that influence behavior. Actors perceive these elements over time, mindful of seasons and historical events, and with people having differing notions regarding the passage of time. Relevant actors include individuals, groups, and populations whose behavior has the potential to substantially help or hinder the success of a particular campaign, operation, or tactical action. Relevant actors may include, depending on the particular situation, governments at the national and sub-national levels; state security forces, paramilitary groups, and militias; non-state armed groups; local political, tribal, religious, civil society, media, and business figures; diaspora communities; and global/regional intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.<sup>2</sup>

*The measure of strategic success is ultimately the change in relevant actor behavior, in addition to physical results on the battlefield.*

Military efforts in the recent past have produced many tactical and operational gains, but rarely achieved desired political objectives and enduring outcomes in an efficient, timely, and effective manner. The elusiveness of success, despite unmatched U.S. conventional combat capabilities, highlights that militarily defeating adversary forces, in and of itself, does not automatically achieve strategic objectives.

Recent failure to translate military gains into strategic success reflects, to some extent, the Joint Force's tendency to focus primarily on affecting the material *capabilities*—including hardware and personnel—of adversaries and friends, rather than their *will* to develop and employ those capabilities. The ability to destroy the material capabilities of adversaries and strengthen those of friends has always been, and will continue to be, critical. However, military operations are most effective when they induce or compel relevant actors to behave in a manner favorable to the United States and its partners.

The human aspects of military operations are critical considerations in traditional and irregular warfare. Thus, JC-HAMO re-focuses the Joint Force

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<sup>1</sup> The goal is for relevant actors in overseas operational environments to cooperate with U.S. operations and efforts to achieve objectives. This document does not seek to guide military interactions with U.S. citizens and civilian leaders.

<sup>2</sup> E.g., United Nations, NATO, ASEAN, etc.

on understanding relevant actor motivations and the underpinnings of their *will*, and developing and executing more effective operations based on these insights. The consideration of the human aspects of military operations is central to various forms of strategic competition and all Joint Force operations. A failure to grasp human aspects can, and often will, result in a prolonged struggle and an inability to achieve strategic goals. With insightful analysis, the Joint Force can identify opportunities for collaboration and discern weaknesses and exploit divisions among adversaries.

Enhancing the Joint Force's ability to conduct military operations, which have the required impact on the will and decision making of relevant actors, demands a detailed understanding and consideration of the human aspects of military operations. This understanding and consideration is critical during the planning, directing, monitoring, and assessing of operations. It is also vital to the provision of military advice to policymakers. To accomplish these efforts, the JC-HAMO identifies the following four imperatives that are instrumental to inculcating in the Joint Force an updated mindset and approach to operations:

- *Identify* the range of relevant actors and their associated social, cultural, political, economic, and organizational networks.
- *Evaluate* relevant actor behavior in context.
- *Anticipate* relevant actor decision making.
- *Influence* the will and decisions of relevant actors ("influence" is the act or power to produce a desired outcome on a target audience or entity.<sup>3</sup>)

These imperatives apply to all facets of the National Military Strategy and all the primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces, as outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense*. These imperatives pertain to the full range of military operations (ROMO) and the entire conflict continuum.

The JC-HAMO mindset and approach, which provides the foundation for a core competency on the human aspects of military operations throughout the Department of Defense (DoD), requires institutional change across the Joint Force.<sup>4</sup> Military leaders must understand how to work with partners and decision makers to support the development of political strategies and determine how military operations will contribute to sustainable outcomes

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<sup>3</sup> JP 3-13, *Information Operations*, 27 November 2012, I-3, incorporating Change 1, 20 November 2014, defines "influence" as "the act or power to produce a desired outcome or end on a TA (target audience)."

<sup>4</sup> The necessary mindset and approach must go beyond recent efforts to create Human Terrain Teams, Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands, Cultural Support Teams, Female Engagement Teams, Stability Operations Information Centers, Sociocultural Research and Analysis Teams, new software packages, new analytical frameworks, or the hiring of anthropologists and other social scientists for discrete missions.

consistent with U.S. interests. A renewed focus on the human aspects of military operations is necessary to:

- Develop deep understanding to enable friendly forces' decisions.
- Effectively articulate purpose, method, and desired state for each operation and campaign—and identify “human objectives” that focus on influencing relevant actors.
- Deter aggression and prevent, mitigate, contain, and win armed conflicts.
- Influence friendly, neutral, and adversary actors to build the strength of the Joint Force and its partners—and gain advantage in the operating environment.
- Provide sound advice to military and civilian leaders with regard to the size and scope of U.S. interventions and make possible, when appropriate, a small-footprint approach that will prevent the overextension of the Joint Force.
- Enable capable partners to assume the lead when and where it is fitting to do so.

A critical objective of the JC-HAMO is to improve decision making and the application of operational art and design by Joint Force members. The goal is *not* to advocate for a separate line-of-effort or a new occupational specialty dedicated to the human aspects of military operations, although access to regional specialists, social and cultural anthropologists, and other technical experts is important. Rather, the aim is to elevate the performance of the entire Joint Force. As a human aspects core competency takes hold and matures over time, it will generate a broad range of knowledge, skills, and abilities—sustained via a learning continuum—that will enable the Joint Force to improve its strategic competence and aptitude to contribute to the achievement of national policy objectives.

## **2. Purpose**

The JC-HAMO establishes a basis for enabling Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) and their staffs to understand and consider the range of relevant actors in the environment and the elements that influence their behavior. This concept identifies concept-required capabilities (CRC) and provides a framework for a capabilities based assessment (CBA) to refine requirements, determine shortfalls, and outline potential DOTMLPF-P<sup>5</sup> changes required to operationalize the concept.

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<sup>5</sup> Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.



### 3. Scope

The ideas described in this document apply to the entire Joint Force and are relevant across the ROMO, beginning with military engagement—and preparation of the environment—and progressing across the conflict continuum and the spectrum of U.S. Government (USG) activities. While the JC-HAMO has relevance for all echelons of command, the emphasis of this document is on human aspects at the operational level. The JC-HAMO implications and levels of necessary knowledge and expertise will vary by individual, unit, Service, and mission. Whereas individual knowledge requirements will generally increase with seniority, some types of necessary expertise, skill, and abilities will vary by occupational specialty and billet. While some activities described in this document are similar to Joint Force efforts today, the JC-HAMO outlines a comprehensive framework under which to consider existing and new lines of effort. This framework encompasses both lethal and nonlethal operations and activities. The goal is to develop a Joint Force that can understand human aspects and apply pertinent insights to plan, direct, monitor, and assess operations. The ideas in the concept can assist JFCs to provide advice to policy makers regarding where and how to conduct military operations.



**Figure 1: The range of military operations as depicted in JP 3-0 *Joint Operations***

### 4. Human Aspects and the Future Operating Environment

Notwithstanding the growing impact of technology, warfare in the future will remain an inherently political and human endeavor. People will continue to fight for “fear, honor, and interest” as described by the Greek historian Thucydides nearly 2,500 years ago.<sup>6</sup> To attain strategic and political objectives

<sup>6</sup> Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York: Free Press, 1996), 43, in “Continuity and Change: The

and successfully end conflicts, the Joint Force will work with partners to understand and shape relevant actor perceptions and behavior. The Joint Force must plan and execute operations that account for the impact human aspects have on operations, the achievement of operational and strategic objectives, and efforts to influence the decisions of relevant actors. A number of factors will shape the resolve and decisions of relevant actors.<sup>7</sup> Consequently, the Joint Force must strive to understand the perspective of actors, their interests, and even the role of emotion in shaping behavior.

#### **4.1 Elements that Shape Human Behavior**

Dynamics in the environment will reflect the social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements that shape human behavior. Actors often perceive these elements from a historical perspective or through a “temporal lens,” which is described later in this section.<sup>8</sup> A region’s history and the situation within which actors exist will play a critical role influencing developments. The past behavior of relevant actors may offer insights into their values, priorities, interests, grievances, relationships, and decision making processes. A region’s history can provide insight into an actor’s character, traditions, and nature—and suggest how people might behave under particular circumstances in the future.

Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of key elements shaping human decision making and behavior. The elements provide a construct through which the Joint Force should strive to understand relevant actors and their behavior. While these are not the only elements that influence actors in

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
Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking About Future War,” H.R. McMaster, *Military Review*, (March-April 2015): 6-20.

<sup>7</sup> The resolve of a belligerent can be influenced by perceptions of the relative size, discipline, skill, leadership, materiel capacity, and tradition of its fighting forces; the legitimacy and urgency of its interests and cause; the support of factions and allies at home and abroad; the favorability of the terrain and geographic conditions; the availability of material, human and technological resources; and other factors that will change from one situation to another.

<sup>8</sup> The JC-HAMO recognizes the value of various analytical frameworks, such as Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT); Counterterrorism Assessment Framework (CTAF); Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events (ASCOPE); Sociocultural Analysis (SCA), and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). The social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements that shape human decision making and behavior—and that actors perceive through a temporal lens—are highlighted in this document because they are viewed as the most important to the JC-HAMO approach. The JC-HAMO elements are informed by the concept of Sociocultural Analysis (SCA) and related human factors. The elements shaping human behavior underlie the context in which individuals, groups, and populations make decisions and behave. The elements are key to understanding actor preferences and interactions. SCA is “the analysis of adversaries and other relevant actors that integrates concepts, knowledge, and understanding of societies, populations, and other groups of people, including their activities, relationships, and perspectives across time and space at varying scales” (JP 2-0). Human factors are the “physical, cultural, psychological, and behavioral attributes of an individual or group that influence perceptions, understanding, and interactions” (JP 2-0).

the environment, they collectively provide a starting point to develop understanding. The relative importance of each element and sub-element may depend on the character of the respective actor and the particular situation in the environment. As circumstances change, the relevance of one element may shift in its significance in relation to the others.

The elements are interconnected and interact with each other in a continuous and fluid manner. Considerations regarding one element can shape how actors perceive dynamics in another. The elements play a key role in shaping the identity, norms, values, interests, and perceptions of actors in the environment.



**Figure 2. The social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements, examined through the temporal lens, provide a construct for understanding and evaluating relevant actors.**

The **social element** focuses on how a society, its institutions, and key relationships influence people. The social element is often distinguished by the competing influence of groups and institutions, each seeking to impose its own priorities and perspective. A traditional contest among soldiers and diplomats within an adversary regime, for example, may result in dissimilar policies, depending on which side imposes its views.<sup>9</sup> Religion will continue to play an important role in the environment. Religious beliefs can influence political will and motivate actors to struggle and fight—often with greater zeal than a secular ideology. Faith-based organizations and congregations can form an important social component, while religious customs and traditions often exert a powerful cultural influence.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> As an illustrative example, Social Network Theory (SNT) provides a possible framework for understanding the relative power of some actors over others and the comparative cohesion of one group over another. Social power comes in many forms, but it is often related to the volume and quality of information an actor can access—and the strength and reach of his or her connections.

<sup>10</sup> Sociologists often refer to primary and secondary social groups. In general, primary social groups are close-knit, typically small scale, include intimate relationships, and are usually long lasting. The family is often the most important primary group. Secondary groups, in contrast

The **cultural element** considers the way a society's beliefs (including religious and spiritual principles), customs, and way of life affect the manner in which people behave. The cultural element can contribute to markedly different perceptions of "fear, honor, and interest."<sup>11</sup> While there are commonalities in human nature (e.g., the desire to safeguard families and property), differences among cultures (e.g., concepts of guilt, shame, honor, and loyalty) affect human perceptions.

The **physical element** includes environmental aspects that shape the choices, outlook, values, and behavior of groups and individuals. For example, a desert people will prioritize access to water differently than those who live in a rain forest. An area's topography, climate and weather, hydrography, vegetation and soil, land use (farming, ranching, mining, etc.), population density, urbanization, physical infrastructure, and other aspects of development can be part of the physical element. Furthermore, the material capability and capacity of friendly, neutral, and adversary actors in the environment are also part of the physical element.

The **informational element** centers on the sources, availability, and uses of data. While modern communications and media accessibility have transformed many societies, others rely on more primitive and traditional sources of information or are characterized by strong central government censorship and the manipulation of news outlets. Perceptions of legitimacy and authenticity will influence an actor's decision to rely on one media source over another. Adversary and neutral actors will possess propaganda capabilities that can distort or negatively shape the perceptions and behavior of various actors, unfavorably impacting the Joint Force and its partners across the ROMO.

The **psychological element** is complex, difficult to understand and assess, and, in some instances, potentially the most important element of human decision making and behavior. This element influences how people perceive, process, and act upon information. An individual actor, for example, can have a distinct pattern of how he or she analyzes a situation, exercises judgment, and applies reasoning skills in response to perceptions and beliefs. Individual life experiences, emotions, and mental health can play a strong role in shaping behavior. The intelligence community has for many years conducted clinical analysis of key figures in the environment that can inform Joint Force actions.

The **temporal lens** allows the Joint Force to examine the above listed elements over time. It enables scrutiny of relevant actors and their interactions through the course of various events and under different circumstances. The

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to primary groups, are larger, involving formal and institutional relationships. Secondary groups perform functions; the roles of individuals are often exchangeable. Membership is generally optional in secondary groups. See: American Sociological Association, Intrososite: Introduction to Sociology, Glossary, available at:

<http://www.asanet.org/introsociology/Documents/Glossary.html>.

<sup>11</sup> As discussed earlier in this document, the Greek historian Thucydides highlighted how perceptions of fear, honor and interest help to explain actor behavior.

temporal lens provides a historical perspective that can help the warfighter identify and visualize pattern-of-life events over time. The Joint Force must evaluate how the passage of time shapes changes in the elements that influence behavior. The examination of an actor's past deeds and actions is key to developing predictive insights. Circumstances will change rapidly and relevant actor decision making will evolve over time. These dynamics require a continual assessment of the elements that shape behavior.

Thinking in terms of a temporal lens stresses the importance of change over time. It can incorporate a consideration of key dates and events—perhaps of a religious, cultural, historical, or political nature—that are significant to relevant actors and which should inform the conduct of operations and activities in the environment. For example, the planting and harvesting seasons occur annually; their importance cannot be discounted within agrarian societies. Patterns of life around activities like these may change with the passage of time. Knowledge and understanding of key dates and events with cultural or social significance can help friendly forces to predict the actions and decisions of relevant actors, while increasing the likelihood that operations will create their desired effect. A U.S. or coalition military action during a significant religious or national holiday, for instance, could create an unintended negative effect among audiences in the environment.

*Circumstances will change rapidly and relevant actor decision making will evolve over time. These dynamics require a continual assessment of the elements that shape behavior.*

Even the relative perception of time periods significantly varies between a Western cultural context and that which is often found in Eastern and other societies. Differing assessments of time may impact the cost and benefit calculus that is integral to decision making. Some actors will be willing to take a longer view of things when evaluating one course of action over another. Perceptions of time and urgency differ between social and cultural groups along with the importance placed on calendar events. Visualizing the five elements through the temporal lens emphasizes the importance of continually assessing the environment.

## **4.2 Trends in the Future Operating Environment**

The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) envisions a future operating environment that is “likely to be more unpredictable, complex, and potentially dangerous than today.”<sup>12</sup> Adversaries will chip away at U.S. technological dominance. This includes modern competitor states and increasingly capable non-state actors. Violent extremism, regional instability, transnational crime, and competition for resources will continue to be key aspects of the environment. Within this context, adversaries will persist in

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<sup>12</sup> *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, 10 September 2012, 3.

exploring creative ways to employ both basic and advanced technologies to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. The Joint Force can expect adversaries to change tactics quickly and adapt rapidly to U.S. capabilities and techniques. Furthermore, the conventions by which wars are fought are no longer as settled as they once were. Notions of who is a combatant and what constitutes a battlefield in the information age are rapidly shifting beyond previous norms.<sup>13</sup>

**The artful use of national power by state actors.** With growing frequency, state actors will continue to threaten international security by employing conventional, including anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategies and capabilities, and irregular military force to advance their interests.<sup>14</sup> These state actors will also combine subversion and other forms of coercive political action to undermine the will of their opponents, while exploiting a sophisticated grasp of human aspects and local conditions.<sup>15</sup> Countries may seek to make innovative use of their instruments of national power and employ various resources and techniques in the “gray zone” between coercive diplomacy and war.<sup>16</sup> This approach is advantageous to the aggressor, increasing ambiguity, complicating decision making, and slowing the coordination of effective U.S. and international responses.<sup>17</sup> Many adversary state actors will rally support to address perceived historical grievances or to reclaim a lost or stolen glory—from the near or distant past. The potential for miscalculation is high, which may lead to unintended hostilities.

*Operational Implications for the Joint Force:* An understanding and consideration of the perspective and interests of state actors and the populations that support them—and insight into the elements shaping their behavior—is necessary to counter adversary efforts.

**Persistent conflict and non-state violence.** Generational conflicts, focusing on issues of legitimacy, continue to recur because the underlying human concerns of previous confrontations are not resolved.<sup>18</sup> So long as the

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> “...sophisticated adversaries will use asymmetric capabilities, to include electronic and cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced air defenses, mining, and other methods, to complicate our operational calculus.” *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense*, January 2012.

<sup>15</sup> “Within states, the nexus of weak governance and widespread grievance allows extremism to take root, violent non-state actors to rise up, and conflict to overtake state structures...” *The National Security Strategy*, February 2015.

<sup>16</sup> “Actors taking a ‘gray zone’ approach seek to secure their objectives while minimizing the scope and scale of actual fighting. In this ‘gray zone,’ we are confronted with ambiguity on the nature of the conflict, the parties involved, and the validity of the legal and political claims at stake.” Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, U.S. Army, Commander, United States Special Operations Command, Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 18, 2015.

<sup>17</sup> *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, June 2015, 4.

<sup>18</sup> “...our military, in close coordination with other U.S. agencies and international organizations, assist local governments in addressing the root causes of conflict.” *The National Security Strategy*, February 2015, 8.

root causes are not addressed, these recurring conflicts will be a central feature of the environment, making distinct periods of peace or war harder to discern.

Many modern recurring conflicts will involve non-state actors as well as traditional state belligerents. Conflicts will often center on issues of identity, with one sectarian, ethnic or national group confronting another. The Arab-Israeli confrontation is one example of a recurring conflict. Some non-state actors will endure over time, exploiting grievances and developing influence with at least a portion of the population.<sup>19</sup> Non-state actors will seek to subvert local security officials and host nation government representatives, with the intent to supplant local authorities and create an operating space for group activities. Some groups—like Hezbollah and Hamas—have already developed state-like capabilities as a means of building legitimacy and influence, with the potential that other actors will follow.

*Operational Implications for the Joint Force:* Understanding and influencing the drivers of armed conflict will often be the key to countering adversary state and non-state actors.

**Changing power relationships as a result of the increasing availability of technology.** The spread of new technologies empowers people to “see more, share more, create more, and organize faster than ever before.”<sup>20</sup> This dynamic, coupled with weapons proliferation, accentuates the impact and relevancy of influencers in the environment, leading to a redistribution of power among actors and shifts in the geopolitical landscape.<sup>21</sup> These shifts, and the violence often associated with them, will occur more rapidly than in the past.

Transnational and virtual radicalization and recruitment by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) will become easier and more widespread.<sup>22</sup> Local authorities will be hard-pressed to address popular grievances before malign actors can take advantage of the situation. Many adversaries, unconstrained by democratic deliberative processes, will have greater agility than the United States and its partners to outline and communicate a responsive narrative.

*Operational Implications for the Joint Force:* Modern communications and media present the United States and its partners with challenges, but also opportunities to develop effective narratives and shape the perceptions of relevant actors—friendly, neutral, and adversary—in the environment.

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<sup>19</sup> The National Security Strategy recognizes underlying conditions that foster violent extremism, to include “poverty, inequality, and repression.” *The National Security Strategy*, February 2015, 9.

<sup>20</sup> *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, June 2015, 1.

<sup>21</sup> “...power is shifting below and beyond the nation-state. Governments once able to operate with few checks and balances are increasingly expected to be more accountable...” *The National Security Strategy*, February 2015, 4.

<sup>22</sup> “...groups are dedicated to radicalizing populations, spreading violence, and leveraging terror to impose their visions of societal organization.” *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, June 2015, 3.

**Migration and urbanization.** A majority of the global population already lives in cities, and this percentage will continue to increase.<sup>23</sup> Urbanization is the result of both high rates of natural population increase in cities and the influx of rural migrants due to increased opportunities and the perception of safety in urban areas. Long-term internally displaced persons and refugees often add to the migration flows. “Millions of people are flowing from the countryside into cities in search of work, where they are exposed to cultural differences, alienation, and disease.”<sup>24</sup> Population growth in urban areas can create or enhance the appearance of cultural, institutional or economic seams within cities. The human interpretation, and exploitation, of these seams can often be a contributing factor to instability and the potential for the growth of terrorist, criminal, insurgent, and foreign fighter networks.

Disease can readily spread among densely packed people in areas lacking appropriate hygiene or medical facilities, such as refugee camps or urban slums.<sup>25</sup> The deliberate spreading of infectious diseases by nefarious actors is a concern. Fear of disease outbreaks and subsequent scapegoating are influenced by the elements that shape human behavior. Alternatively, the concentration of resources within cities can facilitate disease treatment, enable public awareness, and have a stabilizing effect on populations. Wealth and economic interests may often concentrate in cities.

*Operational Implications for the Joint Force:* The Joint Force must understand conditions in the environment to identify and evaluate relevant actors and their motivations, and make informed operational decisions. Military personnel must engage in frequent and meaningful close contacts and dialogue with actors in the environment to continuously improve awareness and build relationships.

**Support to international, interagency, and nongovernmental partners.** The Joint Force, with increasing frequency, will support efforts led by international and interagency partners. The Joint Force must collaborate with USG partners to interpret the environment, anticipate challenges, and generate options, while continuously increasing awareness.<sup>26</sup> Non-Defense USG departments and agencies will call upon the Joint Force to participate in diverse and non-traditional activities, which may, for example, seek to address governance, developmental, or diplomatic challenges. In some instances, the

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<sup>23</sup> The urban population in 2014 accounted for 54% of the total global population, up from 34% in 1960, and continues to grow. Global Health Observatory (GHO) data, World Health Organization, accessed on 5 March 2015,

[http://www.who.int/gho/urban\\_health/situation\\_trends/urban\\_population\\_growth\\_text/en/](http://www.who.int/gho/urban_health/situation_trends/urban_population_growth_text/en/).

<sup>24</sup> *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, June 2015, 1.

<sup>25</sup> “The spread of infectious diseases constitute a growing risk...new microbes or viruses, the rise and spread of drug resistance, and the deliberate release of pathogens all represent threats ...” *The National Security Strategy*, February 2015, 13.

<sup>26</sup> “U.S. military forces work closely with international and interagency partners to generate strategic options for our Nation.” *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, June 2015, 10.



Joint Force will collaborate with nongovernmental organizations, particularly to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

*Operational Implications for the Joint Force:* The Joint Force must understand the impact military operations may have on its partners—and enable collaborative efforts to achieve shared goals and beneficial political outcomes. The sharing of classified and/or unclassified information is necessary to develop a common understanding of the situation and articulate political and military objectives.

**Constrained resources.** Projected future operational demands may exceed available Joint Force capacity and resources. An improved ability to understand and consider the human aspects of military operations will enable the Joint Force to better engage in strategy and policy discussions—helping to choose battles, and make possible, when necessary, a small-footprint approach.<sup>27</sup> In this manner, the United States can avoid the erosion of its national will and the depletion of its resources. In those instances in which vital interests are at stake, the United States must be able to marshal the necessary means for their defense.

*Operational Implications for the Joint Force:* The Joint Force must enable local partners, to the extent possible, to develop their own capabilities, commit their own resources, and employ effective strategies to confront challenges—allowing the Joint Force to selectively contribute capabilities to address gaps. Capable local partners are essential to consolidate military gains.

**Impact of environmental trends.** The trends in the environment contribute to a heightened need for a more comprehensive understanding of the human aspects of military operations. The Joint Force must strive to understand the situation and perspective of relevant actors, including the elements shaping human behavior, before it can use force, the threat of force, or other activities to assure, deter, coerce, or compel relevant actors in the environment. Insight regarding the root causes of instability and conflict, not merely awareness of symptoms, is essential. An understanding of the strategic and operational context—including knowledge of conditions and circumstances on the ground—is necessary to shape the friendly forces' campaign in support of U.S. and partner objectives and interests. This understanding enables the Joint Force to visualize, describe, direct, and assess operations effectively.

By strengthening understanding of the complex and difficult-to-predict environment and the underlying conditions that can lead to or escalate hostilities, the Joint Force and its partners can take proactive and preventive measures. These anticipatory actions are especially necessary in environments

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<sup>27</sup> “Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.” *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense*, January 2012, 3.

that may face an outbreak of violence and in which U.S. and partner interests are at stake.

## **5. The Military Challenge**

The Joint Force must avoid focusing too narrowly on the physical environment and challenges, fixating on friendly and adversary lethal capabilities, and over-relying on technology to solve problems—while failing to adequately affect the will and decision making of relevant actors.

To address the challenge, the Joint Force must ask: How will we—

- Conduct military operations that favorably affect the will and decision making of relevant actors?
- Inculcate an understanding and consideration of human aspects to enhance the design, planning, conduct, and assessment of military operations—and achieve national policy objectives?

## **6. Central Idea: A Joint Approach to Human Aspects of Military Operations**


To achieve national and military objectives, the Joint Force will develop and adopt an updated mindset and approach that fosters an understanding and consideration of the human aspects of military operations, recognizing that, even in our technological age, war is primarily a human endeavor. This mindset and approach, which provides the foundation for a core competency, will improve how the force visualizes the environment and interacts with relevant actors within the context of the situation. The Joint Force will:

- *Identify* the range of relevant actors and their associated social, cultural, political, economic, and organizational networks.
- *Evaluate* relevant actor behavior in context.
- *Anticipate* relevant actor decision making.
- *Influence* the will and decisions of relevant actors.

These four imperatives of the central idea, described in greater detail below, enable commanders and their staffs to plan, direct, monitor, and assess operations, while evaluating, through a temporal lens, the elements (social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological) that shape human behavior. Operations and activities occur on a continuous basis. As the situation, and by extension relevant actor behavior, evolves over time, so too must the Joint Force campaign. Operations and activities require analysis of, and are informed by, the elements that shape human behavior.

**Applying the Human Aspects of Military Operations Operational Framework.** Figure 3 depicts how U.S. military forces will continuously enhance their campaign, while building up U.S. and partner strength and effectiveness. The figure depicts how the four central idea imperatives (identify, evaluate, anticipate, and influence) align with the existing commander's

decision cycle.<sup>28</sup> These imperatives build on a foundational understanding of the elements shaping human behavior (depicted by the outer framework in Figure 3), which the Joint Force must develop, whenever possible, before the start of operations. The imperatives contribute to ongoing and continuous efforts to comprehend conditions and relevant actor behavior in the environment, once operations commence. The Joint Force develops an understanding of the environment as early as possible using all sources of information. As operations progress, the Joint Force continuously improves its knowledge of dynamics and conditions in the environment. Fundamentally, Joint Force members must ask the right questions and develop necessary insights to understand the complex and evolving environment in relation to desired political outcomes and objectives.




**Figure 3: The JC-HAMO Operational Framework applies the “ways and means” to operate and achieve desired “ends”**

Efforts to thoroughly understand the situation are critical. The Joint Force must grasp the context and perspective of relevant actors when contemplating

<sup>28</sup> The four actions of the commander’s decision cycle are: Monitor, Assess, Plan, and Direct. For a complete explanation see: JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, 30 July 2012, IV-15 and IV-16, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jointpub\\_operations.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm).

action. A region's history and knowledge of past dealings among relevant actors can offer valuable insights and suggest how the elements that shape human behavior have affected occurrences during earlier periods. The development of this foundational understanding is necessary to properly identify, evaluate, anticipate, and influence relevant actors in the environment.

The JC-HAMO Operational Framework functions as part of the military planning process and the Adaptive Planning and Execution system.<sup>29</sup> The framework requires continual application to improve understanding, enable operational design with greater creativity, and enhance overall effectiveness. Joint Force personnel will use their understanding of the human aspects of military operations to plan, direct, monitor, and assess operations that focus on friendly, neutral, and adversary actors in the environment. Figure 4 below again highlights how the Operational Framework imperatives align and strengthen activities as part of the commander's decision cycle. The central idea imperatives complement and depend on the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process, including sociocultural analysis (SCA).<sup>30</sup>



**Figure 4: The JC-HAMO Operational Framework and its four imperatives strengthen the conduct of activities as part of the Commander's Decision Cycle**

Insight into real or potential sources of instability and conflict is essential during military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations, to help prevent, mitigate, and/or contain armed conflict. During crisis response and major operations, the Joint Force emphasis is on winning—that is, on effectively achieving policy goals and creating beneficial outcomes and an

<sup>29</sup> Adaptive Planning and Execution system: A Department of Defense system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications and information technology, that is used by the joint planning and execution community to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. Source: JP 5-0.

<sup>30</sup> JIPOE Process: 1) define the operational environment, 2) describe the impact of the operational environment, 3) evaluate the adversary, and 4) determine adversary courses of action. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, 21 May 2014, available through JEL.

enduring desired state. The key is to identify “human objectives” that focus on influencing relevant actors. The Joint Force continuously optimizes its methods and operations to achieve military and policy goals.

Due to *their* understanding of the human aspects of military operations, a skillful enemy may seek to protract conflicts, waiting until U.S. resolve falters before undertaking decisive action and attempting to reverse friendly forces’ gains. To some extent, adversaries countered the U.S. interventions in Vietnam and Somalia with this type of strategy. In these cases, proper analysis of the human aspects by U.S. planners might have resulted in different choices and outcomes than those that transpired.

Joint Force members must think critically as they continuously improve their understanding and effectiveness. Intellectual humility is essential to understand and influence relevant actors in the environment. Individuals must be conscious of the limits of their knowledge, sensitive to their own inherent bias, and alert to the fact that one’s viewpoint and egocentrism can often function in a self-deceptive manner. Intellectual courage, empathy, integrity, and fair-mindedness are also essential traits.<sup>31</sup>

The JC-HAMO seeks to equip the Joint Force with the necessary methodologies and capabilities to be successful in identifying and evaluating relevant actors and anticipating and influencing their decisions and behavior.<sup>32</sup> Military leaders must focus operations and campaigns on achieving results that enable the accomplishment of U.S. and partner policy objectives. A key goal is for the Joint Force to visualize, describe, direct, and assess operations effectively. Before conducting operations guided by the four imperatives of the Central Idea, it is crucial that the Joint Force has a thorough understanding of the elements that shape human behavior depicted in Figure 2 and outlined in section 4 above. The following sections describe the four imperatives of the central idea that allow military leaders to maximize their effectiveness in the complex environment:

### **6.1 Identify the Range of Relevant Actors and their Associated Networks.**

Relevant actors are individuals, groups, and populations critical to the success of a given policy, strategy, campaign, operation, or tactical action. These actors may draw resources, conduct activities, and exercise influence through social, cultural, political, economic, informational, cyber, and organizational networks. To determine who is a *relevant* actor, the Joint Force must first have an understanding of its objectives to ascertain which actors will have an impact on the mission. As the campaign objectives and approach evolve over time, the Joint Force must continuously reassess the relevance of actors.

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<sup>31</sup> See: Dr. Richard Paul and Dr. Linda Elder, *The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking: Concepts and Tools*, The Foundation for Critical Thinking, 2008, 14-15.

<sup>32</sup> Truly understanding how and why people make decisions is aspirational and will be imperfect. However, the goal of anticipating potential actions and possible responses to Joint Force operations is a worthy endeavor and appropriate for this unconstrained future concept and think-piece.

Once the Joint Force understands its objectives, leaders must undertake necessary research to comprehend the general context of actors in the environment. The Joint Force collaborates with international partners and non-Defense USG departments and agencies to adequately assess the environment. Military personnel work collaboratively as part of a continuous learning process to expand understanding of the social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements that shape human behavior and which actors perceive through a temporal lens. It is important to note that the context is rarely limited to the local environment. Furthermore, Joint Force efforts will likely have effects beyond the geographic boundaries of an operation. Knowledge of past and distant events, which is often facilitated by modern communications technologies, will also provide context.

Equipped with knowledge of its objectives and the general context in the environment, the Joint Force will then undertake deliberate steps to determine the particular situation of actors in the environment. Related efforts include the conduct of all-source intelligence operations<sup>33</sup> and engagement with partners to improve knowledge of friendly, neutral, and adversary actors and their social, cultural, political, economic, informational, cyber, and organizational networks. Specific types of adversary networks may include terrorist, criminal, insurgent, foreign fighter, intelligence, and cyber networks. The Joint Force will monitor the environment and continuously reassess information on the situation and the activities of networks in the environment.

In determining who is a relevant actor, the Joint Force must consider the particular circumstances, interests, and corresponding narrative of a variety of individuals, groups, and populations, while attempting to discern the affiliations and connections among them. The Joint Force must examine the “landscape” of competing and reinforcing narratives. Knowledge of a region’s history is necessary to understand present conditions. Insight into local institutions and their processes is often needed to comprehend the roles and relationships among actors. Military personnel will seek to understand an actor’s perspective, decision making, and behavior—and consider how actions directly or indirectly affect the attainment of U.S. objectives. Military leaders must continuously reassess the relevance of actors in a changing environment.

The Joint Force has long recognized the importance of understanding the friendly and enemy order of battle, including units, functional organizations, and key leaders. The JC-HAMO approach also emphasizes a range of non-military stakeholders in the environment, including local authorities and a variety of political, religious, tribal, social media, and community figures.

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<sup>33</sup> **Intelligence operations:** (DoD) The variety of intelligence and counterintelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities within the intelligence process (JP 2-01). **Intelligence process:** (DoD) The process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users, consisting of the six interrelated intelligence operations: planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback (JP 2-01).



These individuals can facilitate or hinder the achievement of campaign goals by shaping the perceptions and behavior of other actors. Similarly, a variety of groups—such as professional and charity organizations, labor unions, social clubs, political parties, schools, religious assemblies, and neighborhood committees—can play a role generating support or opposition to friendly forces' efforts. Aided by technology, some of these stakeholders may exist far outside the geographic boundaries of an operation.

The Joint Forces seeks to develop strong relationships with local partners, while striving to build trust based on mutual understanding, respect, and shared interests. These efforts can help develop a more thorough understanding of the population and local dynamics—and reveal a range of friendly, neutral, and adversary actors. Working with local partners<sup>34</sup> during military engagement and security cooperation, the Joint Force may develop understanding of dynamics among actors in the environment. In building local partnerships, the Joint Force must understand the elements that shape human behavior to better grasp the authenticity and veracity of information developed through these contacts.

Actors may have a shifting hierarchy of allegiances that helps to explain their perspective and anticipate their behavior. This hierarchy shapes and is shaped by perceptions of identity and is key to developing influence. An individual's religion, ethnicity, gender, language, tribe, social class, caste, occupation, or geographic area of birth can play an important part in forming perceptions of his or her identity. Even in urbanized societies, the power of tribal affiliation exerts great influence. As an example, tribal allegiances in Iraq followed a distinct pattern that relates to degrees of actual or perceived kinship among groups and individuals.<sup>35</sup> In non-tribal societies, the hierarchy of allegiances may be the product of a variety of local circumstances. People with different values and perspectives may coexist in proximity with each other. However the web of influence has developed, Joint Force personnel must

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<sup>34</sup> Local partners may include a variety of stakeholders and will differ from one situation to another. Local partners may include: partner nation security forces and civilian government entities; non-Defense USG departments and agencies on the ground or otherwise in the area of operations or host country that may or may not be part of the U.S. Country Team; and non-governmental, international, and multinational organizations on the ground or otherwise present in the area of operations or host country.

<sup>35</sup> Lin Todd et al., *Iraq Tribal Study – Al-Anbar Governorate: The Albu Fahd Tribe, The Albu Mahal Tribe and the Albu Issa Tribe*, June 18, 2006, [www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/0709todd.pdf](http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/0709todd.pdf). “Iraq is a collectivist society where an individual is associated with the larger group (family, clan, and tribe) to which he or she belongs....The scarcity of food and water required families and extended clans and tribes to depend on one another for survival. Surviving in such a harsh environment often meant competing with neighboring families and tribes for the desert's limited resources. Strong group cohesion and loyalty were required for survival. This competition sometimes led to violence” (p. 2-39). “...tribal allegiances and structures (in Iraq) are often based on the changing circumstances of individual tribes and clans and fictive rather than actual lineage relationships” (p. 4-16).

continuously assess the environment and identify relevant actors who are crucial to success.

**6.2 Evaluate Relevant Actor Behavior in Context.** This imperative is about examining past actions to determine the *drivers* of relevant actor behavior. Drawing on knowledge of the elements that shape human decision making, the Joint Force will continually attempt to evaluate and understand relevant actor behavior. Critical to this endeavor is identifying and understanding the past, current, and future constraints and enablers of behavior. To effectively gauge actors in the environment, the Joint Force must first conduct a self-assessment to determine and minimize the friendly forces' biases. Leaders should avoid mirror imaging, stereotyping, and wishful thinking. Once the Joint Force accounts for the friendly forces' biases, it will examine the past decision making of relevant actors to understand their deliberative processes, key stakeholders, and weighing of costs and benefits. Key goals are to understand perceptions of fear, honor, and interests and to gain an appreciation of how behavior evolves over time in response to various stimuli, including friendly force operations and activities in the environment.

The situation in the environment is dynamic and complex. The actions of one actor can have an impact on the behavior of others, thus the importance of understanding and mapping the social networks of relevant actors. For this reason, the Joint Force engages in a recurring process to evaluate relevant actor behavior in regards to the evolving situation, while continuously considering the elements that shape decision making. Analysis must consider the interests of all relevant actors. Groups may have centralized or decentralized approaches to decision making and hierarchical or flat organizational structures. Opposing factions may exist within a group, each striving to impose its will. The Joint Force must assess the motivation, perspective, and steadfastness of a variety of actors.

The Joint Force will develop an orientation to new environments prior to intervention in an attempt to anticipate how actions might reverberate among local actors and their networks. Military leaders must advise national policymakers on the viability of, and best options for, intervention. Commanders and their staffs will draw on outside experts (anthropologists, historians, psychologists, economists, etc.) and an array of capabilities to continually improve understanding. Personnel with language, regional, and cultural expertise play a key role in efforts to evaluate contextual relevant actor behavior. The JC-HAMO approach emphasizes ongoing analysis to refine understanding and refocus operations as circumstances unfold.

Efforts to identify and evaluate relevant actors will assist friendly forces' decision making. As a picture of the situation emerges, military leaders provide policymakers with an assessment of conditions in the environment and the best options to achieve national objectives. By identifying and evaluating relevant actors with the assistance of noted experts, the Joint Force can help



the USG and its partners to carefully choose their battles and potentially, when appropriate, make possible a small-footprint approach.

**6.3 Anticipate Relevant Actor Decision Making.** The Joint Force must try to determine the range of relevant actor decision options, while assessing which actions are most probable or might have the greatest impact. Similar efforts have traditionally been central to military planning, as commanders and their staffs evaluate an enemy's most likely and dangerous courses of action (COAs). The JC-HAMO approach extends this practice to a broader range of relevant actors in the environment. Military leaders will anticipate relevant actor decision making via an unremitting learning process that examines:

- The elements that shape human behavior.
- The current environment in which relevant actors exist.
- The decisions actors have made in the past based on similar or related stimuli and circumstances.
- The actions and behavior that are the consequences of decision making.

By examining past decisions, the Joint Force and its partners can develop a better understanding of how actors might assess costs and benefits in the future—and anticipate how they will react to friendly forces' operations. Efforts to anticipate relevant actor decisions and reactions will be imperfect. Information will frequently be incomplete, imprecise, or flawed. Nevertheless, Joint Force leaders will make use of the best information available.

Once the relevant actor decision options have been determined, the Joint Force must select appropriate methods to influence future behavior, while considering second and third order effects. Joint Force leaders must be mindful of the potential impact on legitimacy from engagement with questionable or controversial actors. Outreach to one actor may jeopardize relations and the potential for collaboration with another. Additionally, military leaders should develop safeguards to prevent the inappropriate or misdirected use of combat power, which could alienate relevant actors. The Joint Force may rely on a dynamic narrative, cyber activities, electronic warfare, military and humanitarian assistance, and lethal force to influence relevant actors. Leaders must determine whether to use deception, coercion, persuasion, cooperation, avoidance or some other approach or combination of strategies to influence relevant actors. Commanders must be prepared to counter an adversary's propaganda and dismantle the means by which it is propagated. The Joint Force must plan military information support operations (MISO) that are part of the broader USG information strategy.

Military leaders must ensure that the use of military deception<sup>36</sup> does not in any way compromise the legitimacy of the friendly forces' campaign. The pursuit of tactical advantage cannot jeopardize strategic aims. The Joint Force must consider the impact of military deception on the use of other methods of influence, such as persuasion and cooperation. Planners must consider the costs and benefits of using military deception, including the effects it may have on other friendly government and non-government organization efforts. In short, the Joint Force too, must determine how to effectively utilize the elements of local and national power.

**6.4 Influence the Will and Decisions of Relevant Actors.** The goal of the Joint Force and its partners is to influence relevant actor decisions in a manner that supports national and military objectives. This will begin with advising national leadership on the viability of, and best options for, the desired strategic and operational objectives.

Commanders will direct operations and activities with the intent of influencing relevant actor decisions in the environment. Military leaders use a range of Joint Force and partner capabilities to influence each actor. The Joint Force will often seek to bolster or protect potential partners to encourage and enable support for the friendly forces' campaign; in some instances, the Joint Force will use the same approach with neutral actors to gain their backing or at least to dissuade them from assisting an adversary. The JC-HAMO approach encourages commanders and their staffs to seek out and exploit divisions and conflicts among an adversary's forces, alliances, and followers. Drawing on the best available estimates, commanders may seek to degrade and destroy the most resolute adversaries, while attempting to reconcile those who might lack conviction. In other instances, the Joint Force will seek to weaken or marginalize obstructionist actors in the environment. In each case, the Joint Force aligns words, deeds, and images to maximize its credibility and influence. Guided by an understanding of relevant actors, the Joint Force will effectively articulate the purpose, method, and desired state for operations.

*Joint Force personnel maximize their influence on actors, reminding individuals of their hopes and fears when encouraging action or caution, and of their interests when advising on strategy.*

Effective planning ensures that all lines of effort drive towards influencing actors at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Knowledge of the elements that shape human behavior—and insights into relevant actor decision-making processes and interests—will inform planning. The purpose of military operations is often to enable a political strategy that will create a

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<sup>36</sup> Military Deception: Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Also called MILDEC. Source: JP 3-13.4

desired state, achieve enduring outcomes, and bring about a cessation of hostilities. Achieving some form of reconciliation with adversary combatants and their supporters will often be necessary. Local actors will assess the legitimacy of any post-conflict settlement. Similarly, local political leaders must play a central role in mediating an end to a conflict and, in instances of internal strife, developing a new or revised governance framework.

Strategically, the United States will ultimately judge the success of a campaign in terms of how effectively it achieves national objectives. At the operational and tactical level, commanders must often assess how proposed actions can strengthen the resolve, capability, and capacity of partners; convince adversaries of the futility of their efforts; and persuade neutral parties to either support or not undermine friendly forces. The Joint Force must prioritize relevant actors and emphasize efforts that will effectively achieve national objectives. A key consideration is to drive towards an eventual cessation of hostilities and reconciliation within an acceptable desired state. At the conclusion of a crisis or major operation, the Joint Force focus returns to conflict prevention activities as part of the theater campaign plan.

The Joint Force must work with partners to develop and strengthen beneficial narratives and discredit or counter detrimental ones—such as those espoused by violent extremist organizations. This is essential to winning the contest of ideas. A key priority is to communicate clearly through words, deeds, and images. Operations and activities must be congruent with the friendly forces' information campaign. The Joint Force must understand how images and notions of identity can often function as a powerful driver of human behavior. The ability to influence relevant actors in an ideological struggle is necessary to generate support for friendly forces and deny assistance to adversaries. The Joint Force must be knowledgeable, flexible, and culturally-astute to understand and influence relevant actors. Military personnel must recognize they are operating in a competitive space. They must work with partners to counter adversary propaganda, expose an enemy's brutality, clarify friendly forces' intentions, and address popular grievances. Conflict will often center on issues of legitimacy and resolve. Efforts to isolate an adversary, physically and psychologically, are often essential.

The following sections highlight key considerations Joint Force leaders must keep in mind when seeking to influence relevant actors in the environment:

**6.4.1 Influence by applying force or the threat of force judiciously and for maximum psychological effect.** The JC-HAMO approach focuses and prioritizes the use of force or the threat of force to create desired psychological effects and influence actor behavior. By understanding relevant actors in the environment, the Joint Force can identify which military actions are more likely to have a beneficial impact and which ones might be counterproductive.

During military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations, the Joint Force trains, advises, and mentors partner nation

personnel on using force judiciously and for maximum psychological effect. Extrajudicial killings and the infliction of collateral damage, for example, can fracture alliances, alienate the local population, strengthen adversary resolve, degrade friendly forces' morale, and erode public support.

During crisis response and major operations, the Joint Force and its partners must defeat the enemy, but also make peace attractive. They must strive for military supremacy, yet also demonstrate the benefits of their cause.

The destruction of an adversary's entire military capacity is almost never feasible and doing so without political solutions may lead to a regeneration of the armed conflict by personally and ideologically motivated actors. Consequently, the Joint Force must find ways to degrade an adversary's resolve and legitimacy. The choice of what to target and when to strike must consider the desired psychological and political effect. The Joint Force and its partners must consider, for example, if their intent is to weaken, degrade, or destroy an adversary—or create some other desired effect.

Commanders must carefully weigh the political, psychological, and strategic implications in each particular situation. The 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, for example, was operationally brilliant, inflicting a severe blow on U.S. forces. The attack was also a strategic disaster, jolting the American people, from embracing isolationism before the strike, to supporting a global war to achieve the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers following the Japanese incursion in Hawaii.

#### **6.4.2 Influence by increasing legitimacy and generating friendly potential.**

Joint Force personnel must understand the societal context that shapes perceptions of friendly actions. The key is to ensure relevant individuals, groups, and populations see U.S. and partner activities as legitimate. Commanders and their staffs are mindful of both legal and popular notions of legitimacy, as they continually align words, deeds and images. When appropriate, they must show respect for, and collaborate with, esteemed individuals and institutions to increase legitimacy, while enabling partners to develop their military and non-military potential. Successful and sustainable narratives, which can generate support in the environment, must be seen as honest, sincere, and credible.

During counter-insurgency operations, a way to boost friendly forces' legitimacy in the eyes of the indigenous population is for the host nation to lead with U.S. support. Successes in Colombia and the Philippines over the last decade, for example, illustrate the importance of host-nation lead. In certain situations, a low-signature or small-footprint approach may help preserve the legitimacy of host nation governments and partners. It is harder for an adversary to portray a small U.S. military presence as an occupation, rather than a helping hand. A small-footprint approach is more likely to be acceptable to indigenous partners and preserves the legitimacy of a campaign in the eyes of the local population. The discriminate and measured use of force

will limit unintended effects, while preserving the acceptability of the U.S. military presence and operations.

By enhancing their legitimacy in the minds of the relevant actors, the Joint Force and its partners can more effectively generate friendly potential in the environment. “Potential” refers to the capability and capacity that relevant actors possess to support the friendly forces campaign. The Joint Force focuses not only on generating the combat and support potential of regular forces, but also of irregulars who can fulfill various functions across the ROMO and the conflict continuum.

During the war in Afghanistan, U.S. military forces often explained their intentions and solicited suggestions from village elders, tribal councils, and religious leaders. Support from respected individuals and groups boosted the perceived legitimacy of U.S. operations. In these and other cases, a key concern centered on protecting individuals, who collaborated with friendly forces, from adversary retaliation. With increased legitimacy, the Joint Force and its partners gained information, recruits, and other forms of support from the population, while seeking to deny resources and backing to the enemy. The inclusion of women in Female Engagement Teams, Cultural Support Teams, and other mixed teams provided an additional capability to share and obtain information from the female portion of the local population, which was previously inaccessible due to local cultural norms.

### Increasing Partner Legitimacy in El Salvador

In 1977, a fixed election in El Salvador kept the ruling military junta in power and helped to consolidate radical Marxist revolutionary organizations in a violent campaign against the perceived illegitimate government. This insurgency was met with a heavy-handed military response, in what became a protracted and bloody civil war.<sup>37</sup> However, a small contingent of U.S. advisors persuaded the regime to hold an open and free election in 1982; this election, in which nearly all adult Salvadorans participated,<sup>38</sup> provided legitimacy to the elected leaders and slowed the momentum of the leftist insurgency.

Despite continuing concerns about possible human rights abuses by the local security forces, the U.S. advisory effort in El Salvador was remarkably successful. The professional training imparted to the Salvadoran military led to ultimate success on the battlefield against the guerrillas. In spite of some military setbacks, the Salvadoran military fought back and beat the guerrillas to a standstill. When the final "final" offensive of the FMLN (*Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional*) was launched in 1989, the Salvadoran military took some hard hits, but rallied and decimated the rebels. Another round of elections, supported by the majority of the people, soon showed the world that the Communists had little public support. The FMLN was forced to seek a political solution; a military victory was no longer an option.<sup>39</sup>

Not only had U.S. advisers worked to make the Salvadoran military a more effective force, they helped ensure that its human rights record improved. Cases of abuse by the military dropped dramatically over the decade as the Salvadoran armed forces slowly recognized that crimes and other instances of misconduct only resulted in a loss of popular support. Civic action projects, information programs, and a greater respect for the citizenry paid off. On 16 January 1992, the FMLN signed peace accords with the government. In return for ending the armed struggle, the FMLN was recognized as a legitimate political party. In addition, the government agreed to enact land and judicial reforms, and to create a new, less politicized police force.<sup>40</sup> In fact, El Salvador integrated a number of former rebels and soldiers into the new National Civilian Police as part of the Chapultepec peace agreement.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Angel Rabasa et al., *From Insurgency to Stability, Volume II: Insights from Selected Case Studies*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011) 77.

<sup>38</sup> *Certification of Progress in El Salvador*, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, 1982.

<sup>39</sup> Richard W. Stewart, editor, *American Military History, Volume 2: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917 – 2008*, (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2010), 397-399, [http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/030/30-22/CMH\\_Pub\\_30-22.pdf](http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/030/30-22/CMH_Pub_30-22.pdf).

<sup>40</sup> Stewart, *American Military History, Volume 2*, 397-399.

<sup>41</sup> Mark Knight, "Security Sector Reform: Post-conflict Integration," report commissioned by the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom, August 2009, 47. [http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5064~v~Security\\_Sector\\_Reform\\_Post-Conflict\\_Integration.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5064~v~Security_Sector_Reform_Post-Conflict_Integration.pdf).

## 7. Capabilities Required by this Concept

To operate in accordance with Section 6, *Central Idea: A Joint Approach to Human Aspects of Military Operations*, the Joint Force will require the capabilities outlined in this section. These CRC align with the four Central Idea imperatives: identify, evaluate, anticipate, and influence. The JC-HAMO text for each CRC includes a description, an explanation of the desired effect, and a listing of related tasks. Following concept approval, subsequent analysis of these proposed capabilities within the various DoD development systems, such as the Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS), will provide the basis for developing capability solutions to close operational gaps.

**7.0.1 Foundational Capability: *The ability to inculcate the Joint Force with an updated mindset and approach that accounts for the human aspects of military operations.*** This capability provides the Joint Force with the intellectual underpinnings and the necessary foundational understanding required to incorporate the consideration of human aspects into the design, planning, conduct, and assessment of military operations. The levels of necessary knowledge and expertise will vary by individual, unit, Service, and mission. Skill requirements increase as an individual progresses in seniority.

**7.1 Required Capabilities to Identify the Range of Relevant Actors and Their Associated Networks.** Relevant actors are individuals, groups, and populations that are critical to the success of a given policy, strategy, campaign, operation, or tactical action. To determine who is a relevant actor, the Joint Force must ascertain which actors will have an impact on the mission. As the campaign objectives and approach evolve over time, the Joint Force must continuously reassess the relevance of actors. The following capabilities enable the first imperative of the JC-HAMO Central Idea: *Identify*.

**7.1.1 *The ability to understand the evolving operational environment through the human aspects lens.*** This capability includes the means to achieve an integrated, foundational understanding of the elements that shape human decision making and behavior. The need for this understanding will guide development of information requirements and the conduct of military operations. Desired effect: the Joint Force is able to develop a comprehensive approach to gather all relevant information and understand the operational/strategic problem and context. The Joint Force can identify and engage relevant actors, in support of USG goals and objectives.

- Determine Joint Force and partner goals and objectives, specifically as they relate to the behavior of relevant actors in the environment.
- Develop an understanding of the general and specific context of a region or area, including knowledge of key political/religious/community figures and their drivers/motivations.
- Determine and analyze sources of patronage, finance, and logistics—as well as commercial and economic relationships and inter-

dependencies—among actors in the environment; develop knowledge of illicit, resource-generating activities.

- Develop information on gender differences and social relations to identify and understand inequities among the sexes; assess the different security concerns of women, men, girls, and boys in the area of operations; women and men may not have equal access to humanitarian assistance; examine how customary conflict-resolution mechanisms affect women and men differently and how their social status may change as a result of conflict and war.
- Identify and understand power brokers, centers of influence, and local notions of legitimacy; generate information by examining social media.
- Develop information on actors in developed and under-developed areas, as well as in geographically isolated locations.
- Contend with an adversary's access denial methods and technologies.
- Draw on outside experts (cultural anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, historians, psychologists, economists, etc.) to develop an understanding of the elements that shape human behavior.

**7.1.2 The ability to determine relevant actors.** This capability includes the means to conduct activities to identify friendly, neutral and adversary individuals, groups and populations (and their supporting relationships/networks) that are critical to the success of a policy, strategy, campaign, operation or tactical action. Desired effect: the Joint Force is able to determine individuals, groups, and populations that are vulnerable to adversary influence or receptive to collaboration with the USG and its partners. The Joint Force can determine relevant actors in both the physical and virtual space.

- Identify criteria for determining the relevance of actors in the environment based on the identified social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements shaping human behavior in the environment and which actors perceive through a temporal lens.
- Examine information on actors and determine which ones meet the relevance criteria.

**7.1.3 The ability to develop intelligence on the elements shaping relevant actor decision making.** This capability includes the means to conduct a comprehensive gathering, processing/exploitation, analysis, production, dissemination, and integration of information—through a variety of means, including engagement with partners and management of sources—on the social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements that shape actors' perceptions, decisions, and behavior. Actors perceive these elements through a temporal lens and from a historical perspective. Analysts and leaders must take particular care to assess the influence of religious beliefs and organizations on relevant actors. Desired effect: the Joint Force is able to obtain actionable intelligence in a timely manner, facilitating the development of coherent plans that will enable military engagement and other efforts to influence relevant actors in the environment.



- Identify and prioritize key information requirements and sources that will provide information on elements that impact actor decisions and behaviors; the Joint Force is interested in relevant actors in the physical and virtual environments.
- Determine intelligence requirements and task intelligence assets accordingly; develop information from open sources, including social media, and classified sources.
- Develop a plan to gather information on the elements shaping human decision making and relevant individuals, groups and populations.
- Develop knowledge on the elements shaping human decision making in the operational environment.
- Develop and manage both overt and clandestine human intelligence sources, employing DoD-certified collectors at all levels, while paying particular attention to recurring challenges at the tactical unit level.
- Gather information through a variety of means, including cultivation of long-term relationships with professionals/experts/academics to obtain advanced insights and predictive analysis.
- Analyze information on the social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements that shape actors' perceptions, decisions, and behavior—and which they perceive through a temporal lens.
- Employ certified human intelligence collectors to pre-brief and debrief military members and civilian support specialists who interact with local and allied/partner organizations—using information gathered during operations to enable the friendly forces' decision making process.

## **7.2 Required Capabilities to Evaluate Contextual Relevant Actor Behavior.**

The following capabilities allow the Joint Force to examine past actions and determine the *drivers* of relevant actor behavior. Drawing on the elements that shape human decision making, the Joint Force will continually evaluate relevant actor behavior. A key goal is to understand perceptions of fear, honor and interests, while developing insights into the motives and perspective of relevant actors. Military personnel must gain an appreciation of how behavior evolves over time as a result of various stimuli, including friendly force operations and activities in the environment. As part of this pursuit, the Joint Force must seek out and dispassionately analyze the point of view of relevant actors. The Joint Force must understand an adversary's priorities and assess what they value and reject. The following capabilities enable the second imperative of the Central Idea: *Evaluate*.

**7.2.1 The ability to conduct self-assessments.** This capability includes the means to identify, assess, and account for national, institutional, cultural and individual perspectives and preconceptions, and to understand the risk that friendly forces' biases pose to mission accomplishment. Desired effect: the Joint Force is able to avoid perceptual errors, such as mirror imaging, stereotyping, and confirmation and activity biases when evaluating relevant actors to develop an accurate assessment of the situation.

- Develop situation-based criteria for self-assessment.
- Validate self-assessments to ensure the accuracy and unbiased nature of the analysis.

**7.2.2 The ability to monitor relevant actors.** This capability includes the means to maintain situational awareness of continuities and changes in the physical and virtual capabilities, composition, disposition, and strength of relevant actors (including both traditional and non-traditional adversaries and partners). Desired effect: the Joint Force is able to build upon a foundational understanding to develop a common operating picture of friendly, neutral and adversary actors from which to analyze and forecast changes, plan and execute operations, and subsequently assess influence efforts and the overall effectiveness of operations.

- Evaluate biometric information and conduct biometric enrollment.
- Utilize weapons technical intelligence and other types of all-source analysis to collect, exploit, analyze, and disseminate information about relevant actors and their capabilities.
- Conduct site exploitation activities to collect, analyze, and disseminate information about relevant actors and their capabilities.
- Track adversary and other actors' surreptitious activities, in particular efforts to engage the population in collective action.
- Confirm the identity of non-attributed forces.
- Collaborate with international partners and representatives of non-Defense USG departments/agencies to monitor relevant actors.

**7.2.3 The ability to analyze relevant actor behavior and decision making.** This capability includes the means to conduct the continuous tracking, assessment, synthesis, validation, and information sharing related to current and past actions and decision making of relevant actors, including developing an appraisal of their motivations, emotions, perceptions, and external influences. Desired effect: the Joint Force is able to determine key relationship dynamics and trends, and to characterize actors as friendly, neutral or adversary.

- Analyze and understand the landscape of narratives.
- Determine relevant actor grievances and conflicts; assess relevant actor goals and desired state.
- Identify past relevant actor decisions and patterns in assessing costs and benefits; understand relevant actor priorities and “red lines.”
- Validate findings and develop information from a variety of sources and using multiple methods, increasing assessment reliability and accuracy.

The following illustrative framework suggests a possible approach to understand and ultimately influence relevant actors.

#### **Illustrative Framework – French and Raven’s Bases of Power**

Joint Force personnel may consider the five “bases of power” (or types of power) both to understand the relation among actors and increase friendly influence on people and events. Coercive power and reward power refer to the influence an actor may have by virtue of being able to punish or reward others. Legitimate power is also known as position power and official power. It is bestowed by a higher authority. In an organization, an individual gets legitimate power because of his or her position or post, which may include control of information and resources—and the ability to reward and punish others. Expert power comes from possessing knowledge and skills. The expert has knowledge and skill that others need, but do not possess. Referent power is also called personal power, charismatic power, and the power of personality. This power comes from within each leader, and it focuses on the ability of a person to attract followers. People follow because they are influenced by the magnetic personality of the leader. The followers learn to admire their leader and may even try to copy his or her behavior.<sup>42</sup>

**7.2.4 The ability to assess changes in relevant actor perceptions and behavior in relation or response to U.S. activities.** This capability includes the means to conduct continuous monitoring and evaluation of changes in human perceptions and behavior—and determining how those changes relate to the friendly campaign’s progress and other factors within the overall environment. This capability will enable the Joint Force to determine the causal and/or spurious relationships between U.S. activities, other influences, and relevant actor behaviors. Desired effect: the Joint Force is able to link meaning to action (specifically Joint Force activities and/or external influences to discernable effects in actor decisions and behavior), enabling evaluation, adaptation, and adjustment of Joint Force activities to achieve objectives.

- Develop quantitative and qualitative measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP) to assess the impact of campaign operations and activities on human perceptions and behavior.
- Analyze the operational environment, specifically the elements that affect human decision making and behavior, and changes within them.
- Measure and evaluate the impact of Joint Force activities within the operational environment.

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<sup>42</sup> John R. P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, “The Bases of Social Power,” *Studies in Social Power*, Dorwin Cartwright, ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959), 150-167, [http://web.mit.edu/curhan/www/docs/Articles/15341\\_Readings/Power/French\\_&\\_Raven\\_Studies\\_Social\\_Power\\_ch9\\_pp150-167.pdf](http://web.mit.edu/curhan/www/docs/Articles/15341_Readings/Power/French_&_Raven_Studies_Social_Power_ch9_pp150-167.pdf). See also, <http://kalyan-city.blogspot.com/2011/08/five-bases-of-power-by-john-french-and.html> (French and Raven’s Five Bases of Power are: Coercive Power, Reward Power, Legitimate Power, Expert Power, and Referent Power or the power of charisma and personality).

- Determine and weigh the effect of adversary activities within the operational environment.
- Examine social media information to detect possible changes in relevant actor behavior.
- Assess Joint Force effectiveness in bringing about desired ends.

### **7.3 Required Capabilities to Anticipate Relevant Actor Decision Making.**

The Joint Force tries to determine the range of relevant actor decision options, while assessing which actions are most probable or might have the greatest impact. Similar efforts have traditionally been central to military planning, as commanders and their staffs evaluate an enemy's most likely and dangerous COAs. The JC-HAMO approach extends this Joint Force practice to a broader range of relevant actors in the environment. The following capabilities enable the third imperative of the Central Idea: *Anticipate*.

**7.3.1 The ability to determine relevant actor desired behavior.** This capability includes the means to ascertain what relevant actor behavior will best enable the accomplishment of friendly forces' objectives. In general, the Joint Force will seek to strengthen the resolve, commitment, and resiliency of partners; convince adversaries of the futility of their efforts and/or armed struggle; and persuade neutral parties to side with friendly forces and support U.S. goals. The Joint Force must determine what individual, group, and population behaviors would be beneficial to the accomplishment of tactical through strategic objectives. Actors may face a series of choices. Desired effect: the Joint Force is able to understand the impact of relevant actor decisions before encouraging or compelling behavior that enables friendly forces to achieve their objectives.

- Determine desirable relevant-actor actions and activities—political, economic, military/security, and informational—that would contribute to the accomplishment of tactical through strategic objectives.
- Understand the choices relevant actors face regarding who they decide to support and who they determine to oppose.
- Assess how Joint Force operations and activities will create strategic choices for relevant actors.
- Pursue collaboration with friendly actors by working collaboratively to frame problems and identify shared interests; promote partnerships based on trust and mutual understanding and respect.

**7.3.2 The ability to determine how to address the elements that influence relevant actor behavior.** This capability includes the means to build on initial insights regarding the elements that shape human decision making to develop advanced understanding. The goal is to use awareness of the elements that shape behavior to encourage or compel conduct that enables the Joint Force and its partners to achieve their objectives. Desired effect: the Joint Force develops insightful objectives, actions, and activities that draw on a detailed understanding of the elements that shape human behavior.

- Identify a range of levers and inducements to influence relevant actor behavior, based on an in-depth understanding of the social, cultural, physical, informational, and psychological elements that shape actors' behavior—and which they perceive through a temporal lens.
- Develop approaches to achieve influence, drawing on relevant actor perceptions of their priorities and interests.
- Cultivate a range of sources of information and continuously improve understanding to develop detailed influence strategies.

**7.3.3 The ability to establish relationships and partnerships with the full range of potential partners.** This capability includes the means to identify critical contacts, build trust, cultivate support, and develop long-term, sustainable relationships between and among military personnel, government civilians, and private sector persons in the environment. Desired effect: the Joint Force is able to develop access, influence, and strategic understanding of the local conditions—thus making timely integrated action possible.

- Coordinate and develop integrated campaign plans with mission partners; create a shared understanding of the environment, the operational challenge, and objectives; promote unity of effort and trust; sustain dialogue and collaboration throughout the operations process.
- Collaborate at the local/tactical level (at or below the country team level) with representatives from non-Defense USG departments and agencies.
- Cultivate support from the local populace, expatriates, and diasporas.
- Enable collaboration with friendly state and non-state actors and de-confliction with non-partners.
- Conduct negotiation and mediation to resolve differences and integrate efforts among partners.
- Enable counter-intelligence operations to prevent adversary infiltration among partner nation personnel.
- Develop and maintain personal and professional networks with potentially relevant actors in the environment—fostered during military engagement and security cooperation in theater and as part of CONUS training and education programs and activities.
- Incentivize indigenous partners to align their goals with U.S. ends.

**7.3.4 The ability to identify behavioral parameters and develop warning intelligence.** This capability includes the means to—based upon a foundational understanding of the environment, relevant actors, and the elements that shape their behavior—identify specific actions or deviations that will indicate that a desired or undesired event will occur. Similarly, the Joint Force must also have the means to identify changes in the environment that may affect the behavior of relevant actors. Military personnel must have the ability to develop a baseline of conditions in the environment from which to identify disruptions and anticipate developing crises and opportunities. The Joint Force and its partners must develop forewarning of adversary actions or intentions, imminent hostilities, insurgent strikes, attacks on U.S. or partner

interests and forces, hostile reactions to U.S. activities, terrorist attacks, and other events. Desired effect: the Joint Force is able to detect and recognize the significance of pattern-of-life/activity changes in relevant actor behavior or other alterations in the environment, and subsequently adapt plans and operations in a timely and effective manner.

- Develop an appreciation of relationships, including rivalries and alliances, and habitual patterns of actor behavior.
- Develop a shared friendly forces' understanding of a population's concerns, grievances, and vulnerabilities—and assess how notions of identity and perceptions of interests influence behavior.
- Identify pressure points, fissures, and vulnerabilities among relevant actors in the environment.

**7.3.5 The ability to forecast actions—in time, space and manner—that are the result of relevant actor decisions.** This capability includes the means to identify and describe future relevant actor decisions and associated actions. What will relevant actors do? When, where and how? This capability draws on past and current information and a deep understanding of the region/area, population, and elements shaping human decision making. Desired effect: the Joint Force is able to envision immediate operations; estimate future actions of key individuals, groups, and populations; and anticipate friendly actions for employment of operational forces after each phase of a campaign or major operation (sequels) by understanding the elements that impact decision making and behavior.

- Develop forecasting/decision-making models (understand the way actors make their decisions; model actor decision-making processes; forecast actions that result from decision making).
- Apply forecasting/decision-making models/tools.
- Identify most likely and dangerous COAs of relevant actors.

**7.3.6 The ability to incorporate insights about the human aspects of military operations into operational planning.** This capability includes the means to develop COAs, branches, and sequels that: 1) take into account the elements that shape decisions, 2) address human-specific vulnerabilities or opportunities (including anticipated actions), and 3) consider non-traditional methods to confront military challenges (e.g., non-lethal approaches to conflict resolution). Desired effect: the JFC has multiple suitable, feasible, and acceptable employment options to engage and influence relevant actors, while generating desired effects. Those options are responsive and adaptable to changes in the operating environment.

- Conduct mission analysis through the lens of the elements that shape human behavior.
- Identify objectives regarding relevant actors in the environment.
- Develop COAs that account for human-specific vulnerabilities and/or exploit opportunities.

- Develop branches and sequels that account for the anticipated actions of relevant actors, based on a fundamental understanding of the actors in the environment and the elements that shape their behavior.
- Integrate knowledge of relevant actors and the elements that shape their decision making/behavior to plan, direct, monitor, and assess operations and activities.

#### **7.4 Required Capabilities to Influence the “Will” and Decisions of**

**Relevant Actors.** The goal of the Joint Force and its partners is to influence the decisions of relevant actors in the environment in a manner that supports national and military objectives. The following capabilities enable the fourth imperative of the JC-HAMO Central Idea: *Influence*.

##### **7.4.1 The ability to maximize partner contributions and mutual support.**

This capability includes the means to identify points of concurrence between the USG and its partners regarding goals/interests and the synchronization of DoD plans among mission partners (non-Defense USG departments/agencies, the host nation, and other international partners). Desired effect: the actions of U.S. forces and partners focus on shared operational objectives that are linked to the strategic goals—mitigating the causes and symptoms of instability, correcting/neutralizing popular grievances, and/or otherwise engaging relevant actors to create desired effects.

- Draw upon partner assessments to strengthen friendly forces awareness and understanding, while enabling decision making.
- Develop integrated campaign plans with partners, which consider the elements shaping human decision making and associated behavior.
- Work with partners to determine the feasibility of coalition operations.
- Synchronize execution of plans, operations, and shaping activities to ensure that they support a compelling narrative.
- Establish and maintain relationships to maximize partner contributions and mutual support.

**7.4.2 The ability to communicate a compelling narrative.** This capability includes the means to develop and communicate a consistent, credible, and targeted/tailored narrative by the USG and its partners that influences the decisions and behavior of relevant actors. This narrative must align words, deeds, and images to present unity across a variety of partners. The Joint Force must work with partners to develop and strengthen beneficial narratives and discredit or counter detrimental ones—such as those espoused by violent extremist organizations. Desired effect: the Joint Force is able to influence individuals, groups, and populations to support U.S. objectives, oppose adversary aims, and ensure legitimate and appropriate interaction among host nation partners and the local populace.

- Determine factors that will drive the decision making and behavior of relevant actors in the manner required to achieve U.S. objectives.

- Work with partners to craft a unified, consistent narrative and disseminate and/or broadcast the friendly forces' message.
- Verify the indigenous partner's messaging is as consistent as possible with U.S. objectives.
- Empower local individuals and groups to establish and maintain ownership of their narrative.
- Use respected interlocutors and adopt locally-appropriate and culturally-relevant messaging themes.
- Maximize use of traditional and new media resources and outlets.

**7.4.3 The ability to build partner capability and capacity.** This capability includes the means to assess current/future partner requirements and develop the capabilities and capacity to meet those needs. Partners must develop the services, products, and resources to achieve shared objectives. Desired effect: the Joint Force enables sustainable solutions that increase the security, legitimacy, resilience, resolve, commitment, and capability of its partners, thus contributing to an effective and long-term friendly forces' campaign.

- Identify partner requirements, including the capability and capacity necessary to build legitimacy and ensure security.
- Share human aspects analysis, techniques, and modeling approach with partners to improve their capability and enable burden sharing.
- Conduct training and exercises with partners to develop the capabilities necessary to maintain sovereignty, improve governance, deter threats, exploit evolving technologies, and prevent subversion and sabotage.
- Advise and assist partner nation personnel on the legal and impartial discharge of their duties and implementation of oversight mechanisms (transparency); assist in developing professional investigative bodies capable of ensuring the integrity of partner nation institutions.
- Assist partner nation forces to secure the population and protect inhabitants from retaliation that may occur as a result of their collaboration with friendly forces.
- Conduct counter intelligence activities to prevent spying, intelligence gathering, and/or sabotage/infiltration by adversaries.
- Protect friendly grass-roots organizations, institutions, and security forces from infiltration and subversion.
- Assist partners with reconstruction and development projects to offer relevant actors conditional benefits for collaboration with friendly forces.
- Understand the competition for power and resources within partner nation institutions and among various groups in the environment.

**7.4.4 The ability to disrupt support to adversaries at the international, national, local, and sub-national levels.** This capability includes the means to monitor, degrade, disrupt, interdict, destroy, or eliminate an adversary's alliances and partnerships. This capability includes efforts to counter adversary activities at the local level to engage inhabitants in collective action



against the Joint Force and its partners. Desired effect: the Joint Force is able to deny support—including information, assistance, and resources—to the adversary in furtherance of campaign objectives.

- Identify the adversary cadre/underground and diaspora management apparatuses, as well as at-risk populations vulnerable to their influence and who might take part in subversion.
- Counteract the adversary's narrative themes and influence activities.
- Deprive adversaries of the means, motives, and opportunity to mount violent campaigns.
- Enable counter-radicalization programs; disrupt radicalization forums and counter adversary operatives and networks.
- Influence actors not to join an adversary's alliance.
- Work with and enable institutional representatives (i.e., school administrators, prison wardens, labor dispute negotiators, aid workers, etc.) that deal with vulnerable actors to counter VEO influence.

### **The United Kingdom (UK) Approach to Counter-radicalization**

The UK developed sophisticated counter-radicalization programs to combat extremists' efforts in Northern Ireland and Malaya, and in the post 9-11 period, the UK military has helped to export these programs to vulnerable partner nations.<sup>43,44</sup> The UK strategy combines intelligence, security, MISO, civil assistance, and specialized training for local authorities; the approach focuses on countering terrorist ideology and preventing its propagation.<sup>45</sup> To accomplish this, UK counter-radicalization efforts target specific at-risk populations and mobilization forums, such as houses of worship, refugee and displaced-persons camps, labor union assemblies, schools, professional associations, and prisons.<sup>46</sup> The Joint Force and its partners must develop similar programs to achieve shared objectives.

**7.4.5 The ability to enable reconciliation of adversary combatants and their supporters.** This capability includes the means to work with partners to: 1) persuade adversary combatants to abandon the armed struggle, 2) re-integrate previous adversaries and their supporters back into society, and 3) develop compatible relationships between and among previously adversarial groups. Desired effect: compatible relationships in the area are restored, and

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<sup>43</sup> Prevent Strategy, UK Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2011, printed in the UK by The Stationery Office Limited on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

<sup>44</sup> "Policy: Protecting the UK against terrorism," GOV.UK, last modified September 30, 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/protecting-the-uk-against-terrorism/supporting-pages/prevent>.

<sup>45</sup> Prevent Strategy, UK Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2011, printed in the UK by The Stationery Office Limited on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office

<sup>46</sup> "Policy: Protecting the UK against terrorism," GOV.UK, last modified September 30, 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/protecting-the-uk-against-terrorism/supporting-pages/prevent>.

the Joint Force has enabled partners to sustain gains even after the U.S. military scales back its presence.

- Enable the host nation and non-Defense USG departments/agencies to lead reconciliation programs.
- Provide technical and material support to reconciliation programs.
- Identify actors in the environment who are open to reconciliation opportunities and elements that would impact their decision to reconcile.
- Provide former combatants with a stake in the post-conflict environment; empower agents of reconciliation who possess legitimacy.

### **Reconciliation Efforts in Colombia**

During the counterinsurgency campaign in Colombia in 2003, the government in Bogota adopted a groundbreaking reconciliation program, while still at the height of hostilities. Reconciliation was a key line-of-effort of the Colombian campaign. This program sought to divide insurgent leaders from followers, while allowing for the compassionate treatment of individuals who may have been forced to take up arms or who otherwise wanted to abandon the military struggle. The Colombian reconciliation program included specific tracks for different individuals, offering lenient treatment for low-level operatives, stricter provisions for mid and senior level figures, and deprogramming counseling for child combatants. Reintegration of combatants into society and accountability for possible war crimes were key concerns. The Colombian reconciliation program provided medical care, psychological counselling, education, land grants, small business loans, and job training inducements to persuade enemy combatants to abandon the armed struggle. The Colombian reconciliation program demobilized over forty-thousand illegal combatants from 2003 to 2006, while enabling the prosecution of many individuals for war crimes.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Jonathan Morgenstein, "Consolidating Disarmament: Lessons from Colombia's Reintegration Program for Demobilized Paramilitaries," Special Report 217, United States Institute of Peace, November 2008, <http://www.usip.org/publications/consolidating-disarmament-lessons-colombia-s-reintegration-program-demobilized>.

## Reconciliation with Japan Following World War II

After the Japanese surrender that ended World War II, feelings of resentment and hostility among the Japanese military and general population ran high.<sup>48</sup> When it was time for an international military tribunal to indict those responsible for the war, some Allied leaders were intent on including Emperor Hirohito.<sup>49</sup> However, General MacArthur recognized the potential value of Emperor Hirohito to the reconciliation process: while he did not hold much actual power within the Japanese government, the Japanese population regarded Hirohito as a divine ruler.<sup>50</sup> The continuity associated with Hirohito remaining in his role of emperor, as well as his public support for the political and economic initiatives introduced by the allied powers, were paramount in implementing post-war reforms.<sup>51</sup>

**7.4.6 The ability to mobilize individuals, groups, and populations in the environment.** This capability requires an understanding of “collective action” and other related theories (which draw on diverse social sciences, including psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, and economics). The Joint Force must develop approaches to capitalize on “means, motives and opportunities” to mobilize relevant actors. Individuals have incentives to “free-ride” on the efforts of others in certain groups. Some actors may face retaliation from adversaries for participating in mobilization efforts. These dynamics make it hard to mobilize individuals, groups, and populations. Desired effect: the Joint Force is able to gain support—including information, sustainment, and recruits—from individuals, groups, and populations, while denying assistance to adversaries. Mobilized actors cooperate to address shared challenges; contribute to their own security, social welfare, and development needs; and work collaboratively with the Joint Force and its partners to achieve shared objectives and oppose adversary aims.

- Develop a foundational understanding of collective action and tailored approaches to motivate and mobilize actors in the environment.
- Understand and address a population's concerns and grievances.
- Provide incentives and safeguards in exchange for cooperation.
- Support efforts to organize the populace to provide volunteers, intelligence, and resources to friendly elements.
- Facilitate the responsible development of community self-defense programs with accountability and oversight mechanisms.
- Make use of physical and virtual mobilization forums, while overcoming an adversary's population control measures and cyber capabilities.

<sup>48</sup> Stewart, *American Military History, Volume 2*, 198-199.

<sup>49</sup> “Emperor Hirohito (1901 – 1989),” *BBC History, Historic Figures*, accessed January 29, 2015, [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic\\_figures/hirohito\\_emperor.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/hirohito_emperor.shtml).

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Eiji Takemae, *Allied Occupation of Japan* (London: The Continuing International Publishing Group Ltd., 2002) 236.

- Empower formal and informal governance structures to enable campaign transitions and conflict termination.

### **Mobilizing the Population in Afghanistan**

The Joint Force demonstrated its potential to mobilize the population during the conduct of Village Stability Operations (VSO) in Afghanistan. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and conventional forces enabled village self-defense using a four-phase methodology to: shape, hold, build, and expand and transition. This approach included the vetting of recruits with the local *shura* (or tribal council). Afghan personnel also underwent biometric registration before joining the Afghan Local Police and undergoing training with U.S. forces. VSO demonstrated that the Joint Force needs the ability to develop the knowledge and influence networks necessary to mobilize the population in support of shared objectives. The experience with community defense in other countries suggests that Joint Force-enabled VSO in Afghanistan could have played a more decisive role.<sup>52</sup>

### **Marine Corps Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam**

As an alternative to the largely unsuccessful “search and destroy” campaign practiced throughout much of the Vietnam War, in 1965 the Marine Corps began implementing the Combined Action Program (CAP). This approach, which placed Marine rifle squads with platoons of the South Vietnamese Popular Force for both operations and cohabitation, was introduced to protect the local population and simultaneously prevent collusion with enemy forces.<sup>53</sup> Although this method was never fully embraced by the majority of combat commanders in Vietnam,<sup>54</sup> the effort to mobilize the population did prove highly successful at building trust amongst the local inhabitants, judiciously applying force, and limiting the ability of the Vietcong to organize and influence the South Vietnamese population.

<sup>52</sup> Ty Connett and Bob Cassidy, “VSO: More Than Village Defense,” *Special Warfare Magazine*, (Jul-Sep 2011).

<sup>53</sup> Brooks R. Brewington, *Combined Action Platoons: A Strategy For Peace Enforcement*, U.S. Marine Corps, 1996, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/brewington.pdf>.

<sup>54</sup> Curtis L. Williamson, III, *The U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP): A Proposed Alternative Strategy for the Vietnam War*, U.S. Marine Corps, 2002, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/williamson.pdf>.

#### **7.4.7 The ability to utilize the influence potential of critical infrastructure and symbolic sites.**

This capability includes recognition of the importance of infrastructure and symbolic sites—as well as the means to control, protect, and, *when appropriate*, target key locations and facilities. Physical infrastructure may include roads and railroads, the electricity grid, energy facilities and pipelines, and water and waste management installations. Symbolic sites may include historical landmarks, houses of worship, pilgrimage locations, and places of political significance that connect with the identity of relevant actors. The Joint Force and its partners must communicate with key audiences regarding friendly forces’ efforts to control, protect, and/or

*The Joint Force comports with the Law of War and takes feasible precautions in conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and other protected persons or objects.*

target key physical infrastructure and symbolic sites. The Joint Force comports with the Law of War during the conduct of operations. Desired effect: the Joint Force is able to facilitate a functioning society and economy—and a transition towards a stable desired state—by enabling necessary infrastructure services and enhancing the legitimacy of the friendly forces’ campaign and local partners, demonstrating restraint and controlling/protecting critical infrastructure and symbolic sites. Alternatively, the Joint Force is able to, when appropriate, attack and/or destroy infrastructure and symbolic sites *that are deemed to be legitimate military objectives in accordance with the Law of War*.<sup>55</sup> The goal is often to demonstrate strength and military prowess—and the ineffectiveness of adversaries—thus compelling changes in behavior. The Joint Force and its partners take “feasible precautions in conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and other protected persons and objects.”<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> *The Department of Defense Law of War Manual*, June 2015, paragraph 5.7.1.2, page 205, states: “Sometimes, ‘dual-use’ is used to describe objects that are used by both the armed forces and the civilian population, such as power stations or communications facilities. However, from the legal perspective, such objects are either military objectives or they are not; there is no intermediate legal category. If an object is a military objective, it is not a civilian object and may be made the object of attack. However, it will be appropriate to consider in a proportionality analysis the harm to the civilian population resulting from the destruction of such a military objective.” Paragraph 5.7.3 states: “Military objectives, insofar as objects are concerned, include any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”

<sup>56</sup> *The Department of Defense Law of War Manual*, 204 and 237. Protected persons may include individual civilians and the civilian population; military medical and religious personnel, including military medical units; combatants placed *hors de combat* (combatants “outside the fight,” like prisoners of war and the wounded); and *parlementaires* (agents employed by commanders to go in person within the enemy lines for the purpose of communicating or negotiating openly and directly with the enemy commander). Protected objects and locations, provided they are not military objectives, may include military medical transport, facilities, and equipment; cultural property; historic monuments, museums, scientific, artistic, educational

- Recognize the importance of a functioning infrastructure and the role of technical personnel who are needed for its upkeep.
- Enable local forces to protect critical infrastructure and symbolic sites.
- During offensive operations, weigh the benefits of destroying infrastructure (possibly to deny its use to an enemy or coerce an adversary regime) versus their value to enable a transition to a desired post-conflict state.
- Understand what constitutes a permissible military objective under the Law of War and “refrain from attacks in which the expected loss of life or injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack, would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.”<sup>57</sup>
- Place an adversary’s assets at risk as part of broader efforts to deter aggression or coerce a change in behavior; shape relevant actor calculation of their short and long-term interests; strengthen friendly forces’ credibility and develop a reputation for following through on warnings and red lines as part of deterrent strategies.

### **Targeting Assets to Influence Actors during the Kosovo Campaign**

During the Kosovo campaign, the Joint Force and its partners targeted physical assets to coerce Yugoslavia (which at this point consisted of Serbia and Montenegro) to pull its troops out of Kosovo.<sup>58</sup> It is reasonable to believe that coercion works best when an adversary’s *valued* assets are placed at risk. The campaign in Yugoslavia included multiple lines-of-effort to change the regime’s behavior, including the targeting of physical assets. NATO conducted a bombing campaign from 24 March to 10 June 1999, which involved up to 1,000 aircraft operating mainly from bases in Italy and aircraft carriers stationed in the Adriatic.<sup>59</sup> NATO forces also employed Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from aircraft, ships, and submarines.<sup>60</sup> During the ten weeks of conflict, NATO aircraft flew over 38,000 combat missions.<sup>61</sup> On 10 June 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agreed to withdraw its military, police, and paramilitary forces—while accepting the establishment of an international civil and security presence.<sup>62</sup>

and cultural institutions; places of worship; undefended villages, towns, or cities; hospital and safety zones, and persons and objects within these zones; and neutralized zones, and persons and objects within neutralized zones.

<sup>57</sup> *The Department of Defense Law of War Manual*, 241.

<sup>58</sup> Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2001) 224-225.

<sup>59</sup> “The Kosovo Air Campaign: Operation Allied Force,” *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, dated: November 11, 2014, available at: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49602.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm).

<sup>60</sup> Albert Atkins, *Air War Over Kosovo: Operational and Logistical Issues of the Air Campaign*, p. 13, Nebraska: Writers Club Press, dated: 2000.

<sup>61</sup> “The Kosovo Air Campaign: Operation Allied Force,” *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, November 11, 2014, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49602.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm).

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

**7.4.8 The ability to recommend policy actions.** This capability includes an understanding of the policy and strategy development processes and the strategic environment. Joint Force personnel must present insightful recommendations and COAs, developed through the lens of human aspects. Desired effect: the JFC is able to effectively inform decision makers on the appropriate policies or options to achieve U.S. and partner goals by drawing on a detailed understanding of relevant actors in the environment.

- Refine plans and activities in response to dynamic conditions in the operating environment, specifically changes in relevant actor perceptions and behavior.
- Recommend policy options that incorporate consideration of, and account for, the elements that shape human behavior.
- Provide advice on how to integrate multiple partners.

## **8. Risks of Adopting this Concept**

The following are risks associated with developing and adopting the JC-HAMO mindset and approach to *identify* and *evaluate* relevant actors and *anticipate* and *influence* their decisions and behavior, as described in Section 6, *Central Idea: A Joint Approach to the Human Aspects of Military Operations*, and Section 7, *Capabilities Required by this Concept*.

**8.1** The Joint Force and its partners may overemphasize consideration of the human aspects of military operations during situations when their impact is not of immediate concern or cannot be fully determined, resulting in a missed opportunity for swift and effective action. The response to a developing strategic, conventional, or unconventional attack on the U.S. homeland or interests, for example, may require a rapid defense before there is time to fully evaluate the elements impacting human decision making and behavior.

**8.2** The JC-HAMO emphasis on winning support from actors in the environment, while gaining advantage over adversaries, could be misread by some Joint Force leaders as suggesting there is little need for aggressive action when the opportunity presents itself.

**8.3** The JC-HAMO's focus on operational mindset and non-materiel implications could be misread by appropriators and resource allocators to suggest there is little need for a well-equipped and technologically-advanced Joint Force capable of traditional power projection and decisive action. In fact, a robust and powerful force that can rapidly deploy around the globe to fight and win wars is necessary to optimize U.S. influence in conflict areas.

**8.4** The emphasis the JC-HAMO approach places on regional orientation and skills could lead to the establishment of unrealistic goals and wasteful programs that expend limited resources without attaining the desired levels of personnel knowledge and overall competency.

**8.5** The JC-HAMO's focus on using exercises, operations, and engagement activities on a frequent and ongoing basis to sustain local partnerships and

enhance interoperability may result in the Joint Force developing familiarity with regions where it is welcome in peace and not necessarily where it will be needed in war.

**8.6** The JC-HAMO's emphasis on building influence and legitimacy with individuals, groups, and populations could be misapplied by military leaders who do not adequately understand the responsibilities and pre-existing relationships of non-Defense USG departments and agencies. Alternatively, some partners may erroneously perceive the Joint Force is encroaching on their areas of responsibility and local relationships.

**8.7** The JC-HAMO's goal of preventing, mitigating, and/or containing conflict could prove unattainable, if operational commanders do not receive the necessary approval for timely and anticipatory actions from the Nation's civilian leaders. Without early and preemptive efforts, the Joint Force and its partners would be incapable of forestalling and lessening conflict.

**8.8** Even if the Joint Force is successful in developing strong partnerships, there is no guarantee that these associations will result in support for U.S. objectives. The strongest of partners have interests that diverge from each other from time to time.

**8.9** The JC-HAMO mindset and approach could result—when there is a lack of reliable information—in a misguided confidence that the Joint Force understands relevant actors, when in reality it does not.



## **ANNEX A – Glossary**

Unless otherwise stated, all definitions are from JP 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/DoD\\_dictionary/](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/DoD_dictionary/)

**Adaptive Planning and Execution system.** A Department of Defense system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications and information technology, that is used by the joint planning and execution community to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. (JP 5-0)

**Effect.** 1) The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. Source: JP 3-0. 2) The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. Source: JP 3-0. 3) A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 3-0)

**Human Aspects.** The interactions among humans and between humans and the environment that influence decisions. (JC-HAMO)

**Human Factors.** The physical, cultural, psychological, and behavioral attributes of an individual or group that influence perceptions, understanding, and interactions. (JP 2-0)

**Information Environment.** The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (JP 3-13)

**Information Operations.** The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. (JP3-13)

**Intelligence Operations.** The variety of intelligence and counterintelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities within the intelligence process. (JP 2-01)

**Intelligence Process.** The process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users, consisting of the six interrelated intelligence operations: planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback. (JP 2-01)

**Irregular Warfare.** A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). (JP 1)

**Military Deception.** Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. (JP 3-13.4)

**Relevant Actors.** Individuals, groups, and populations whose behavior has the potential to substantially help or hinder the success of a particular campaign, operation, or tactical action. (JC-HAMO)

**Sociocultural Analysis.** The analysis of adversaries and other relevant actors that integrates concepts, knowledge, and understanding of societies, populations, and other groups of people, including their activities, relationships, and perspectives across time and space at varying scales. (JP 2-0)

**Sociocultural Factors.** The social, cultural, and behavioral factors characterizing the relationships and activities of the population of a specific region or operational environment. (JP 2-01.3)

**Underground.** The underground is that element of the insurgent organization that conducts operations in areas normally denied to the auxiliary and the guerrilla force. The underground is a cellular organization within the insurgency that conducts covert or clandestine activities that are compartmentalized. This secrecy may be by necessity, by design, or both depending on the situation. Most underground operations are required to take place in and around population centers that are held by counterinsurgent forces. Underground members often fill leadership positions, overseeing specific functions that are carried out by the auxiliary. The underground and auxiliary—although technically separate elements—are, in reality, loosely connected elements that provide coordinated capabilities for the insurgent movement. The key distinction between them is that the underground is the element of the insurgent organization that operates in areas denied to the guerrilla force. Members of the underground often control cells used to neutralize informants and collaborators from within the insurgency and the population. (JP 3-24, page II-17)

**Weapons Technical Intelligence.** A category of intelligence and processes derived from the technical and forensic collection and exploitation of improvised explosive devices, associated components, improvised weapons, and other weapon systems. (JP 3-15.1)

#### **Acronym List:**

<b>ASCOPE</b>	Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events
<b>CBA</b>	Capabilities Based Assessment
<b>CCJO</b>	Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
<b>COA</b>	Course of Action
<b>CRC</b>	Concept Required Capabilities
<b>CTAF</b>	Counterterrorism Assessment Framework

<b>DOTMLPF-P</b>	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy
<b>HAMO</b>	Human Aspects of Military Operations
<b>ICAF</b>	Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
<b>JC-HAMO</b>	Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations
<b>JFC</b>	Joint Force Commander
<b>JIPOE</b>	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
<b>JP</b>	Joint Publication
<b>MISO</b>	Military Information Support Operations
<b>MOE</b>	Measure of Effectiveness
<b>MOP</b>	Measure of Performance
<b>PMESII-PT</b>	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Environment, and Time
<b>ROMO</b>	Range of Military Operations
<b>SCA</b>	Sociocultural Analysis
<b>SNT</b>	Social Network Theory
<b>SOF</b>	Special Operations Forces
<b>USG</b>	U.S. Government
<b>VEO</b>	Violent Extremist Organization
<b>VSO</b>	Village Stability Operations

## ANNEX B – Bibliography

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