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**Biography:**

Ariel Petrovics is a PhD candidate at the University of California, Davis and a researcher at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Center for Global Security Research. Her research examines the effectiveness of foreign policy strategies with specific application to national security and nuclear proliferation. Her work uses cross-national quantitative analysis and original data as well as critical case studies to address current security questions, including the effectiveness of nuclear deproliferation policies, engagement with renegade regimes, and the consequences of economic sanctions. After graduating with honors from Bucknell University, Ariel worked with American Enterprise Institute’s Foreign and Defense Policy Department under Dr. Frederick Kagan, and as a contributing author and project manager of AEI’s IranTracker and Critical Threats Project. Her work has been published in the Critical Threats Project and Berkeley’s Policy Matters Journal, and has appeared at multiple conferences including the ISA Annual Convention, WPSA, MPSA, and forthcoming at APSA. Beyond her policy interest, Ariel is also a five-time National Team athlete, representing the USA at World Cups, Pan-Am Games, and World Championships.

**Dissertation Abstract:**

The international community has worked for decades to combat the spread of nuclear weapons, but new proliferators continue to emerge despite these efforts. While scientific research has helped explained when and why states seek the bomb, little work has yet explored how to reverse this process once it has already begun. This project therefore asks: under what conditions will foreign policies most effectively encourage nuclear reversal in proliferating states? I suggest that positive inducements reduce the security-motivated demand for a nuclear weapon, and thereby more effective than coercive strategies at encouraging deproliferation. Policy effectiveness, however, is also mediated by the existing relationship between target and sending states, so that inducements from nuclear-armed rivals are more effective than similar policies from non-nuclear allies. To test these hypotheses, I develop testable definition of policy effectiveness and employ a mixed method research design through cross-national quantitative analysis and within-case process tracing in Iran and North Korea. I find that cooperative inducements encourage nuclear reversal more effectively than the traditional coercive strategies, leading to nuclear reversal more often, more rapidly, and with a lower risk of perverse proliferation.