



Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) of Stability Pathways in Afghanistan



Phase I Insights
20 July 2018

SMA Speaker Series Event

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Directive: Reorient to South Asia



“CENTCOM’s objective in Afghanistan is to **get all parties focused on reconciliation** and the cessation of violence...

Key to reconciliation is **getting Pakistan aligned** and supporting the approach...

The end goal in Afghanistan is a **government that is representative of all parties** with security handled competently by Afghan security forces.”



TRADOC G-27 Modeling & Simulation Branch

ATHENA SIMULATION



Athena Stability Modeling

TRADOC G-27 Modeling & Simulations



Objective: TRADOC G27 used the Athena Simulation to model the three potential Afghan governmental constructs –Centralized, Enhanced Local Governance and Decentralized (Regional)—in order to assess the political and social outcomes of each.

Methods : We used the Athena Simulation: a decision support tool designed to increase decision-makers' understanding of the effects of PMESII-PT variables on operations in a given area over time. It was developed by NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in conjunction with the US Army TRADOC G-27 Models and Simulations Branch.

Findings:



- 1. A shift to enhanced local governance did not result in any increase in the geographic area that GIRoA controlled.**
- 2. A decentralized (regional centric) form of government improved GIRoA control in some areas but opens these areas to regional leader and QST control if the regional leaders withdraw their support from GIRoA.**
- 3. While much of Afghanistan's territory is not controlled by GIRoA, the QST can only control large amounts of territory under very specific conditions.**
- 4. A truce may be a necessary step towards any negotiated settlement between GIRoA and QST but by itself a truce did not result in any increased GIRoA control.**

Way Ahead: We are postured to modify the Athena build that we used for the initial phase of this project to 1) model the pathways that the SMA identified during Phase I and 2) respond to CENTCOM guidance.



Athena Stability Modeling

TRADOC G-27 Modeling & Simulations




Legend

GIROA Control	■
QST Control	■
Uncontrolled	■

A truce may be a necessary step towards any negotiated settlement between GIROA and QST but by itself a truce did not result in any increased GIROA control from either baseline or Enhanced Local Governance (left). But combining a truce with a partial (2/3) QST demobilization facilitated substantial improvements in GIROA control (right).



Implementing Regional Governance



- GIRoA Control
- Regional Contr
- Uncontrolled
- QST Control

A decentralized (regional centric) form of government improved GIRoA control in some areas (left) but opens these areas to regional leader and QST control if the regional leaders withdraw their support from GIRoA (right).




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PATHWAYS ANALYSIS

Pathways Model and Process

Model assessment enables determination of trajectory for AFG and identification of I&W for improvement or decline



Pathways Examined

Fragmentation: break-up into separate, independent political units

- **Divorce**—intentional and mutually-negotiated division of territory
- **Conflict**—limited violence to all-out war
- **Dissolution**—central gov't authority increasingly devolves to the provinces until they are functionally independent

Muddling: chronic weakness of the state, without major deviation

- **Muddling Up**—slow improvement, acknowledge importance of markers
- **Muddling Along**—neither decline nor positive growth, so not necessarily "good"
- **Muddling Down**—slow decline, do not acknowledge importance of markers

Happily Ever After: strong unified state and economy

** General Fragmentation & Muddling pathways derived from empirical analyses and theoretical work and tested against historical case studies as part of prior Pathways effort

Which pathway is Afghanistan currently on?

- Primarily *Muddling Along*, with downward pressure due to slow economic decline
- Near-absence of drivers and numerous barriers to Muddling Up suggest that transition to that path would be difficult
- Only major buffers to a Muddling Down path are:
 - informal (gray) economy
 - perceived external threat (US and Pakistan)

Governance Dimension		Down	Along	Up
T1	Strength of national gov't sovereignty	Red	Yellow	
	Institutional capacity		Yellow	
T2	Strength of rule of law		Yellow	
	Internal revenue generation	Red		
	Separation of power			Green
	Provision of services		Yellow	
	Civic engagement / political efficacy	Red	Yellow	
T3	Human and civil rights	Red		
	National identity		Yellow	
	Corruption and patronage		Yellow	

Economic Dimension		Down	Along	Up
T1	Transportation infrastructure	Red		
	Unemployment rate	Red		
	Skilled labor force	Red		
T2	Water	Red		
	Economic growth	Red	Yellow	
	Economic diversity		Yellow	
	Foreign investment & trade		Yellow	
	Financial infrastructure		Yellow	
	Reliance on foreign aid / loans		Yellow	
	Corruption		Yellow	


Social Dimension		Down	Along	Up
T1	Social mobility		Yellow	
	Inter-group tolerance / integration	Red		
T2	Social cleavages		Yellow	
	Popular support for political violence		Yellow	
	Basic needs satisfaction	Red		
T3	Equality of access to services		Yellow	
	Physical safety		Yellow	

T1: Significant in all cases T2: Appears in majority of cases T3: Indicated by some cases


Where is Afghanistan headed?

What are I&Ws for improvement or decline?

Muddling Path



Fragmentation Path



**Gray text = not yet observed



Oklahoma State University

STRATEGIC MEDIA MONITORING



Oklahoma State University- Strategic Media Monitoring



● Methodology

- Examined Chinese and Russian news media coverage related to security and stability in Afghanistan from May 2018 to June 2018. Analyzed for the following:
 - Frequency of coverage
 - Strategic narratives and narrative themes
 - Mentions of stability, indications toward grand bargain, potential actions.
- Cross-reference of Afghanistan coverage to other items in Russian and Chinese news media. In order to detail the following:
 - Presented national interest and urgency related to Afghanistan.
 - Links to other items on the news agenda.
 - Consistency of narrative use.

● Main Findings

- Lack of firmly established strategic narratives and the infrequency of coverage.
- Notion of a grand bargain between the United States and either Russia or China appears a difficult proposition.



Oklahoma State University- Strategic Media Monitoring



Russian news media portrayals of Afghanistan

- Concerns over the continued instability and terrorist infighting within Afghanistan allowing for a springboard of terrorists proliferating into other areas (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) leading to destabilization and further regional conflicts.
- Stability in Afghanistan involving dialogue with the Taliban, peaceful process of cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization through investment, and the protection of Collective Security Treaty Organization controlled areas.
- The instability of Afghanistan a result of actions by the United States and its heavy military presence in the region, as well as ambiguous and uncooperative operations undertaken by NATO forces

Chinese news media portrayals of Afghanistan

- Afghanistan suffers from constant instability at the hands of the Taliban.
- Military engagement in Afghanistan serves a cautionary tale for any country attempting military involvement there.
- Afghanistan has significant historical and cultural value as part of the historical Silk Road trade routes, both of which can be important for Chinese interests today.
- China's primary engagement with Afghanistan is through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization whereby its members are engaging in discussions to support and or include Afghan security and stability as part of the SCO's regional multilateral architecture.

Points of Possible Cooperation-

Appeals to Chinese interests in One-Belt, One-Road initiatives, US regional support of SCO initiatives in Afghanistan, US support of cooperative dialogue with Taliban toward stability, US supporting cooperative efforts rather than attempting to lead them.



Oklahoma State University- Strategic Media Monitoring



Directions for Phase II

- Expand data harvesting to include regional actors (ISIS, Pakistan, India, Taliban, etc....) mentioned in relation to Afghanistan in Russian and Chinese news media.
- Evaluate Chinese conversations related to trade war and potential impacts on desire for US cooperation/support of Belt and Road Initiatives and similar ventures.
- Include summaries of Indian and Iranian news media conversations on Afghanistan.
- Include narrative tracing analysis within Chinese and Russian news media data related to Afghanistan.

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VIRTUAL THINK TANK (VITTA®)

POC: Sarah Canna, scanna@nsiteam.com



Afghanistan Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa®)



Objective

Implement Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) methodology to reach out to a global network of subject matter experts (SMEs) from across academia, industry, and government to elicit responses to the project's key research questions.

SME Outreach

33 written submissions received

Status

Coded and used the material from the responses in the Pathways & IRC analysis
Wrapped up the *outreach phase* and transitioning to *analysis phase* of ViTTa process
Responses will be complete by mid-August

Expected Deliverables

Robust corpus of expert insights and responses
Individual ViTTa reports (1 report for each question) containing summary response to the question and all SME responses for the question



ViTTa[®] Expert Contributors




1. Sher Jan Ahmadzai, University of Nebraska, Omaha
2. John Arquilla, Naval Postgraduate School
3. Thomas Barfield, Boston University
4. Lee Barnard (J5 Security Cooperation – Central Asia)
5. Mark Baucom, J5
6. Sarah Chayes, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
7. Dean Cheng, Heritage Foundation
8. Claudio Cioffi, GMU
9. Patricia DeGennaro, TRADOC G2
10. James Farwell, Independent
11. Vanda Felbab-Brown, Brookings Institution
12. Shaun Gregory, Durham University
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14. Vern Liebl, USMC Univ., Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning
15. William Hardy, Army TRADOC Global Cultural Knowledge Network
16. John Hill, HQ ACC/IA (POLAD)
17. Karl Kaltenthaler, University of Akron & Case Western Reserve University
18. Eero Keravuori, J5 Combined Strategic Analysis Group
19. Feroz Khan, Naval Postgraduate School
20. Barnett Koven, University of Maryland
21. Gina Ligon, University of Nebraska, Omaha
22. Erinn McQuagge, Northrup Grumman, SOCOM
23. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University
24. Albert Mitchum, ACC/IA (POLAD)
25. Hamdullah Mohib, US Embassy of Afghanistan
26. Afshon Ostovar, Naval Postgraduate School
27. Pauletta Otis, Marine Corps' Extended Study Program
28. Raffaello Pantucci, Royal United Services Institute
29. Timothy Riesen, Madison Springfield International
30. Linda Robinson, RAND
31. Leif Rosenberger, former CENTCOM Economic Advisor and CSAG member
32. Hy Rothstein, Naval Postgraduate School
33. Aslan Sayyar, J5 Security Cooperation – Afghanistan
34. Ron Storer, J5
35. Christopher Twomey, Naval Postgraduate School
36. Johnny Walsh, US Institute of Peace
37. Fazel Rabi Wardak, Asia Foundation
38. Craig Whiteside, Naval Postgraduate School
39. Alec Worsnop, University of Maryland
40. David Young, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)



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INTEREST, RESOLVE, CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

IRC Summary




Interest, Resolve, Capability

Stability Outcome: Negotiated political settlement




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
China




US




Russia




India




Pakistan



NUG



Taliban





Take Aways



- Athena analysis has shown that GIRoA structural reorganization will not improve GIRoA control substantially. The only Afghan future that we have assessed so far that produces GIRoA control over the majority of the people, and area of Afghanistan, is a truce combined with demobilization of a majority of QST fighters.
- The stability pathway analysis suggests that Afghanistan is on a fragile muddling pathway. There are several indicators suggesting the situation could get worse and very few indicators suggesting things could get better.
- The ability of the USG to prevent a downward slide is limited. In terms of facilitating a negotiated settlement, China may be the only actor with the relative capability to bring all stakeholders to the table, but it lacks the resolve to do so.
- Russian and Chinese media both present low-levels of resolve toward Afghanistan; Russian interests are related to terrorism proliferation and advocating for political dialogue with the Taliban. Chinese interests are related to regional engagement through SCO and potential expansions of BRI.




BACKUP



Way Ahead

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PATHWAYS ANALYSIS

Muddling Path Afghanistan

Governance Dimension

Muddling Down (MD)

Muddling Along (MA)

Muddling Up (MU)

Antecedent Condition

Some functioning central or state leadership

Markers

Uneven and insufficient internal revenue generation [T1]

Cont'd contestation of national sovereignty [T1]

Civilian, military, and judicial roles well-established and respected [T2]

Government system seen as illegitimate by large groups [T1]

Weak, ineffective governing institutions [T1]

Chronic abuse of civil and human rights [T2]

Weak and biased justice system [T2]

Poor and/or uneven provision of government services [T2]

Civic engagement opportunities; some improvement in representation of women and minorities [T2]

Weak national identity and/or competing sub-national identities [T3]

Politics heavily influenced by official corruption and patronage networks [T3]

GOVERNANCE BLUF

- Markers suggest Afg on MA path
- BUT barriers to MU suggest improvement unlikely
- Presence of perceived external threat provides some buffer to MD

Drivers

Events or conditions that weaken or destabilize the government

Some movement toward political liberalization

Buffers

Perceived external threat strengthening national identity

Barriers

Well-established patronage networks

Long-standing racial/ethnic/social disputes

Government perceived as ineffective and/or unrepresentative

Where is Afghanistan now?

What might move Afg to another path?

Muddling Path Afghanistan

Economic Dimension

Muddling Down (MD)

Muddling Along (MA)

Muddling Up (MU)

Antecedent Condition

Functioning licit or illicit econ

Markers

Insufficient skilled/educated workers to support economic growth and development [T1]

Insufficient skilled/educated workers to support economic growth and development [T1]

Insufficient and poorly developed & maintained transportation infrastructure [T1]

Growth is negative & insufficient for population growth [T2]

Chronically high and rising unemployment [T1]

Commodity-based economy [T2]

Poorly developed/ maintained water and irrigation infrastructure [T2]

Limited foreign investment and limited exports [T2]

Growth is negative & insufficient for population growth [T2]

Weak/ineffective financial system, institutions, and regulation [T2]

Major reliance on foreign aid/loans [T2]

Significant corruption [T3]

Drivers

Events or conditions that weaken or destabilize the economic system

Buffers

Some alternative sources of public services

Gray economy

Barriers

Incompetent or ineffective economic management

Government perceived as ineffective and/or unrepresentative

ECONOMIC BLUF

- Overall, markers suggest slow economic decline
- All critical markers (T1) are MD and no markers are coded MU
- Additionally, barriers to MU are present, as are drivers to MD, including poor security situation and likelihood of reduced foreign aid
- Only buffers to continued decline are the gray economy and alternative sources of public services

Where is Afghanistan now?

What might move Afg to another path?

Muddling Path Afghanistan

Social Dimension

Muddling Down (MD)

Muddling Along (MA)

Muddling Up (MU)

Antecedent Condition

A degree of social tolerance short of prolonged civil violence or war

Markers

High degrees of intolerance and division between social/ethnic groups [T2]

Highly structured and entrenched social divisions limit mobility [T1]

Large groups with basic needs unmet [T2]

Social cleavages exist, ethnic minorities, & women are marginalized / discriminated against [T2]

No significant public support for out-group focused extremism and violence [T2]

Perceived unequal access to public goods and services [T2]

Violent political action, terrorism present, but trend not increasing [T3]

SOCIAL BLUF

- Dominant trajectory is flat (MA)
- Additionally, significant barriers to MU suggest improvement unlikely
- Attempts by gov't to address institutionalized discrimination and perceived presence of external threats provide some buffer to MD

Drivers

Events or conditions that perpetuate social conflict, intolerance, and violence

Buffers

Perceived presence of external threat

Some institutionalized discrimination addressed

Barriers

Well-established patronage networks

Long-standing racial/ethnic/social disputes

Perceived inequality between groups

Institutionalized discrimination

Where is Afghanistan now?

What might move Afg to another path?

Fragmentation Path Afghanistan

	Divorce	Conflict	Dissolution
Where is Afg now?	Antecedent Conditions		
	Presence of dispute among geographically-associated social, ethnic, or economic groups		
	Call for autonomy		
	Common Path Markers		
	Perceived inequitable redistribution of wealth based on social or ethnic group		
	Publicly expressed conflict among elites		
	Public protest		
	Gov't failure to address dispute sincerely and equitably		
	Contested national sovereignty		
	Gov't opposition to and/or repression of discontents		
What might move Afg to another path?	Violence and expansion of adherence to the cause		
	Catalyzing Events		
	Sudden onset of social identity crisis	Major event or condition exacerbating nature of dispute	Major event or condition catalyzing expression of conflict w/in elites or public
	Subpath Markers		
	International intervention to maintain stability	National sovereignty contested violently	Devolution of national govt authority through institutional means
	National sovereignty contested through institutional means	International intervention/ sponsorship in support of pro-autonomy group	Elite support for dissolution
	Common Path Buffers		
	Presence of perceived external threat spurring sense of national identity		
	Presence of strong, charismatic nationalist leader		
	Population feels treated equitably		
Decreasing political salience of social cleavages			
Government willing to address grievances while able to maintain central decision authority			
Perceived legitimate governing body			
Self-sufficient economic success and competent management			

FRAGMENTATION BLUF

- Majority of common path markers present, but missing critical antecedent condition: call for autonomy
- Also, no catalyzing events



University of Nebraska, Omaha

AFFAK VEO LEADERSHIP STUDY



University of Nebraska at Omaha – AFPAK VEO Threats



- Focused on emerging threats from Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) in the Afghanistan and Pakistan (AFPAK) region using organizational resource comparison framework:
 1. Human Capital and Leadership Capabilities.
 2. Organizational Targeting Patterns over the past 10 years.
 3. Prioritization of AFPAK VEOs' capacity for innovation.
- AFPAK VEOs of Interest (Study Inclusion Criteria):
 1. While the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) indicates that over 100 groups have committed attacks in this region over the past ten years, 31 of them have committed more than 5 attacks and will be used as the primary sample of interest for this effort.
 2. Groups with sufficient secondary sources about leadership, personnel, and organizational structure will be included in the present effort from these 31 active groups.
 3. Subject matter experts will review final sample for relevance and threat level.
- How our findings will contribute to the present effort:
 1. Comparison of the decision styles of AFPAK leaders will help prioritize which VEOs pose the greatest short and long-term threat to regional stability.
 2. We will identify influence mechanisms for high profile VEO leaders in the AFPAK region, to be used in red-teaming and forecasting potential reconciliation scenarios.



George Mason University


TIMED INFLUENCE NET MODEL



Timed Influence Net Model: AFG Pathway Analysis



- The Timed Influence Net Model starts with possible end-states and examines influence factors that could contribute or undermine attainment of the end-states of interest—in this case political reconciliation in Afghanistan, prevention of extremist safe havens, and a stable security situation in Afghanistan
- In building the model, we are exploring possible intermediate states that would be likely to occur on a path towards political reconciliation and examining their impact on the other two objectives
- Influence factors are still being researched, but will include:
 - Sources of Taliban economic support
 - Taliban security support (Pakistan)
 - Public support (GIROA and QST)
 - Perceived AFG social and economic well-being
 - QST perception of participation in governance
 - Regional leader acceptance of governance structures
 - China, Russia, India, and Iran political and economic influences



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SMA PEER REVIEW TEAM



Peer Review Team



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- Ms. Patricia DeGennaro, TRADOC G-2
- Dr. Christine Fair, Georgetown University
- Mr. John Hill, HQ ACC/IA (POLAD)
- Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler, University of Akron & Case Western Reserve University
- Mr. Vern Liebl, USMC University, Center for Advanced Operational & Cultural Learning
- Dr. Gina Ligon, University of Nebraska, Omaha
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