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### Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) of Stability Pathways in Afghanistan





Phase I Insights 20 July 2018

SMA Speaker Series Event

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"CENTCOM's objective in Afghanistan is to get all parties focused on reconciliation and the cessation of violence...

Key to reconciliation is **getting Pakistan aligned** and supporting the approach...

The end goal in Afghanistan is a **government that is representative of all parties** with security handled competently by Afghan security forces."



# TRADOC G-27 Modeling & Simulation Branch **ATHENA SIMULATION**

**3** POC: James Krakar, james.n.krakar.ctr@mail.mil





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### **Athena Stability Modeling** TRADOC G-27 Modeling & Simulations




**Objective:** TRADOC G27 used the Athena Simulation to model the three potential Afghan governmental constructs –Centralized, Enhanced Local Governance and Decentralized (Regional)—in order to assess the political and social outcomes of each.

**Methods :** We used the Athena Simulation: a decision support tool designed to increase decision-makers' understanding of the effects of PMESII-PT variables on operations in a given area over time. It was developed by NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in conjunction with the US Army TRADOC G-27 Models and Simulations Branch.

#### Findings:


- 1. A shift to enhanced local governance did not result in any increase in the geographic area that GIRoA controlled.
- 2. A decentralized (regional centric) form of government improved GIRoA control in some areas but opens these areas to regional leader and QST control if the regional leaders withdraw their support from GIRoA.
- 3. While much of Afghanistan's territory is not controlled by GIRoA, the QST can only control large amounts of territory under very specific conditions.
- 4. A truce may be a necessary step towards any negotiated settlement between GIRoA and QST but by itself a truce did not result in any increased GIRoA control.

**Way Ahead:** We are postured to modify the Athena build that we used for the initial phase of this project to 1) model the pathways that the SMA identified during Phase I and 2) respond to CENTCOM guidance.





A truce may be a necessary step towards any negotiated settlement between GIRoA and QST but by itself a truce did not result in any increased GIRoA control from either baseline or Enhanced Local Governance (left). But combining a truce with a partial (2/3) QST demobilization facilitated substantial improvements in GIRoA control (right).





A decentralized (regional centric) form of government improved GIRoA control in some areas (left) but opens these areas to regional leader and QST control if the regional leaders withdraw their support from GIRoA (right).

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# NSI, Inc. **PATHWAYS ANALYSIS**


7 POC: Dr. Sabrina Pagano, spagano@nsiteam.com



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### Pathways Model and Process

Model assessment enables determination of trajectory for AFG and identification of I&W for improvement or decline



\*\* General Fragmentation & Muddling pathways derived from empirical analyses and theoretical work and tested against historical case studies as part of prior Pathways effort

# Which pathway is Afghanistan currently on?

- Primarily Muddling Along, with downward pressure due to slow economic decline
- Near-absence of drivers and numerous barriers to Muddling Up suggest that transition to that path would be difficult
- Only major buffers to a Muddling Down path are:
  - o informal (gray) economy
  - perceived external threat (US and Pakistan)

Down Along	d D	L MOD	Along Up	Down Up
Governance Dimension		Economic Dimension		Social Dimension
Strength of national gov't sovereignty		Transportation infrastructure		T1 Social mobility
Institutional capacity	Т	1 Unemployment rate		
Strength of rule of law		Skilled labor force		Inter-group tolerance / integration
Internal revenue generation		Water		Social cleavages
Separation of power		Economic growth		T2 Popular support for political violence
Provision of services		Economic diversity		Basic needs satisfaction
Civic engagement / political efficacy	'	Foreign investment & trade		Equality of access to services
Human and civil rights		Financial infrastructure		
National identity		Reliance on foreign aid / loans		13 Physical safety
Corruption and patronage	т	3 Corruption		

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# What are I&Ws for improvement or decline?

Buffers to MD	Muddling Dov	vn		Muddling Up
Gray Economy Some alternative sources of public services Perceived external threat	Well-establish Long-standing racial/ethnic/so Gov't perceived as ine Destabilizing Incompetent / in Events/conditions perpetuate social Continued percepti	ed patronage networks continue S ocial disputes increase in salience S effective and/or unrepresentative S economic conditions and events E effective economic management G	ome movement toward ome attempts to addre trengthening governing conomic success & com	ss institutionalized discrimination
		rong, charismatic, divisive leader		
Antecedent Conditions Disputes among geo-associated social, ethnic, or economic groups Call for autonomy	Catalyzing Events Sudden onset of social identity crisis (Divorce) Major event or condition exacerbating nature of dispute (Conflict) Major event/condition catalyzing expression of conflict w/in elites or public (Dissolution)	Common & Subpath Frag Perceived inequitable redistribution of Publicly expressed conflict among elite Public protest Gov't failure to address dispute sincere Contested national sovereignty Gov't opposition to and/or repression of Violence and expansion of adherence to International intervention to maintain a Nat'l sovereignty contested thru institut National sovereignty contested thru institut Int'l intervention/ sponsorship in suppor group (Conflict) Devolution of nat'l govt authority thru	wealth s ely and equitably of discontents o the cause stability (Divorce) ational means (Divorce) by (Conflict) ort of pro-autonomy	Buffers Perceived external threat incr nat'l identity Strong, charismatic nationalist leader Population feels treated equitably Decreasing salience of social cleavages Gov't willing to address grievances while able to maintain central decision authority Perceived legitimate governing body Self-sufficient economic success and competent management
**Gray text = not yet observed		(Dissolution) Elite support for dissolution (Dissolutio		1 0

Fragmentation Path



Oklahoma State University

## STRATEGIC MEDIA MONITORING

**11** POC: Dr. Skye Cooley, skye.c.cooley@gmail.com





#### Methodology

- Examined Chinese and Russian news media coverage related to security and stability in Afghanistan from May 2018 to June 2018. Analyzed for the following:
  - Frequency of coverage
  - Strategic narratives and narrative themes
  - Mentions of stability, indications toward grand bargain, potential actions.
- Cross-reference of Afghanistan coverage to other items in Russian and Chinese news media. In order to detail the following:
  - Presented national interest and urgency related to Afghanistan.
  - Links to other items on the news agenda.
  - Consistency of narrative use.

### • Main Findings

- Lack of firmly established strategic narratives and the infrequency of coverage.
- Notion of a grand bargain between the United States and either Russia or China appears a difficult proposition.





#### Russian news media portrayals of Afghanistan

- Concerns over the continued instability and terrorist infighting within Afghanistan allowing for a springboard of terrorists proliferating into other areas (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) leading to destabilization and further regional conflicts.
- Stability in Afghanistan involving dialogue with the Taliban, peaceful process of cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization through investment, and the protection of Collective Security Treaty Organization controlled areas.
- The instability of Afghanistan a result of actions by the United States and its heavy military presence in the region, as well as ambiguous and uncooperative operations undertaken by NATO forces

#### **Points of Possible Cooperation-**

#### Chinese news media portrayals of Afghanistan

- Afghanistan suffers from constant instability at the hands of the Taliban.
- Military engagement in Afghanistan serves a cautionary tale for any country attempting military involvement there.
- Afghanistan has significant historical and cultural value as part of the historical Silk Road trade routes, both of which can be important for Chinese interests today.
- China's primary engagement with Afghanistan is through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization whereby its members are engaging in discussions to support and or include Afghan security and stability as part of the SCO's regional multilateral architecture.

Appeals to Chinese interests in One-Belt, One-Road initiatives, US regional support of SCO initiatives in Afghanistan, US support of cooperative dialogue with Taliban toward stability, US supporting cooperative efforts rather than attempting to lead them.





#### **Directions for Phase II**

- Expand data harvesting to include regional actors (ISIS, Pakistan, India, Taliban, etc....) mentioned in relation to Afghanistan in Russian and Chinese news media.
- Evaluate Chinese conversations related to trade war and potential impacts on desire for US cooperation/support of Belt and Road Initiatives and similar ventures.
- Include summaries of Indian and Iranian news media conversations on Afghanistan.
- Include narrative tracing analysis within Chinese and Russian news media data related to Afghanistan.

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### VIRTUAL THINK TANK (VITTA®)

POC: Sarah Canna, scanna@nsiteam.com





#### Objective

Implement Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) methodology to reach out to a global network of subject matter experts (SMEs) from across academia, industry, and government to elicit responses to the project's key research questions.

#### SME Outreach

33 written submissions received

#### Status

Coded and used the material from the responses in the Pathways & IRC analysis Wrapped up the *outreach phase* and transitioning to *analysis phase* of ViTTa process Responses will be complete by mid-August

#### **Expected Deliverables**

Robust corpus of expert insights and responses

Individual ViTTa reports (1 report for each question) containing summary response to the question and all SME responses for the question UNCLASSIFIED



### ViTTa<sup>®</sup> Expert Contributors



- 1. Sher Jan Ahmadzai, University of Nebraska, Omaha
- 2. John Arquilla, Naval Postgraduate School
- 3. Thomas Barfield, Boston University
- 4. Lee Barnard (J5 Security Cooperation Central Asia
- 5. Mark Baucom, J5
- 6. Sarah Chayes, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- 7. Dean Cheng, Heritage Foundation
- 8. Claudio Cioffi, GMU
- 9. Patricia DeGennaro, TRADOC G2
- 10. James Farwell, Independent
- 11. Vanda Felbab-Brown, Brookings Institution
- 12. Shaun Gregory, Durham University
- 13. Nicole Laster, Army TRADOC Global Cultural Knowledge Network
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- 16. John Hill, HQ ACC/IA (POLAD)
- 17. Karl Kaltenthaler, University of Akron & Case Western Reserve University
- 18. Eero Keravuori, J5 Combined Strategic Analysis Group
- 19. Feroz Khan, Naval Postgraduate School
- 20. Barnett Koven, University of Maryland

- Gina Ligon, University of Nebraska, Omaha
- 22. Erinn McQuagge, Northrup Grumman, SOCOM
- 23. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University
- 24. Albert Mitchum, ACC/IA (POLAD)
- 25. Hamdullah Mohib, US Embassy of Afghanistan
- 26. Afshon Ostovar, Naval Postgraduate School
- 27. Pauletta Otis, Marine Corps' Extended Study Program
- 28. Raffaello Pantucci, Royal United Services Institute
- <sup>29.</sup> Timothy Riesen, Madison Springfield International
- 30. Linda Robinson, RAND
- 31. Leif Rosenberger, former CENTCOM Economic Advisor and CSAG member
- 32. Hy Rothstein, Naval Postgraduate School
- 33. Aslan Sayyar, J5 Security Cooperation Afghanistan
- 34. Ron Storer, J5
- 35. Christopher Twomey, Naval Postgraduate School
- 36. Johnny Walsh, US Institute of Peace
- 37. Fazel Rabi Wardak, Asia Foundation
- 38. Craig Whiteside, Naval Postgraduate School
- 39. Alec Worsnop, University of Maryland
- 40. David Young, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)






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### INTEREST, RESOLVE, CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

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
- Athena analysis has shown that GIRoA structural reorganization will not improve GIRoA control substantially. The only Afghan future that we have assessed so far that produces GIRoA control over the majority of the people, and area of Afghanistan, is a truce combined with demobilization of a majority of QST fighters.
- The stability pathway analysis suggests that Afghanistan is on a fragile muddling pathway. There are several indicators suggesting the situation could get worse and very few indicators suggesting things could get better.
- The ability of the USG to prevent a downward slide is limited. In terms of facilitating a negotiated settlement, China may be the only actor with the relative capability to bring all stakeholders to the table, but it lacks the resolve to do so.
- Russian and Chinese media both present low-levels of resolve toward Afghanistan; Russian interests are related to terrorism proliferation and advocating for political dialogue with the Taliban. Chinese interests are related to regional engagement through SCO and potential expansions of BRI.















# NSI, Inc. **PATHWAYS ANALYSIS**

23 POC: Dr. Sabrina Pagano, spagano@nsiteam.com



## Muddling Path Afghanistan

#### Governance Dimension

Muddling Down (MD)	Muddling Along (MA)	Muddling Up (MU)
	Antecedent Condition	
	Some functioning central or state leadership	
	Markers	
Uneven and insufficient internal revenue generation [T1]	Cont'd contestation of national sovereignty [T1]	Civilian, military, and judicial roles well-established and respected [T2]
Government system seen as illegitimate by large groups [T1]	Weak, ineffective governing institutions [T1]	
Chronic abuse of civil and human rights [T2]	Weak and biased justice system [T2]	GOVERNANCE BLUF
	Poor and/or uneven provision of government services [T2]	<ul> <li>Markers suggest Afg on MA path</li> <li>BUT barriers to MU suggest improvement</li> </ul>
	Civic engagement opportunities; some improvement in representation of women and minorities [T2]	<ul> <li>unlikely</li> <li>Presence of perceived external threat provides some buffer to MD</li> </ul>
	Weak national identity and/or competing sub-national identities [T3]	
	Politics heavily influenced by official corruption and patronage networks [T3]	
	Drivers	
Events or conditions that weaken or destabilize the government		Some movement toward political liberalization
Buffers		Barriers
Perceived external threat strengthening national identity		Well-established patronage networks
		Long-standing racial/ethnic/social disputes
		Government perceived as ineffective and/or unrepresentative

## Muddling Path Afghanistan

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#### **Economic Dimension**

Muddling Down (MD)	Muddling Along (MA)	Muddling Up (MU)
	Antecedent Condition	
	Functioning licit or illicit econ	
	Markers	
Insufficient skilled/educated workers to support economic growth and development [T1]	Insufficient skilled/educated workers to support economic growth and development [T1]	ECONOMIC BLUF
Insufficient and poorly developed & maintained transportation infrastructure [T1]	Growth is negative & insufficient for population growth [T2]	<ul> <li>Overall, markers suggest slow economic decline</li> <li>All critical markers (T1) are MD and no markers are</li> </ul>
Chronically high and rising unemployment [T1]	Commodity-based economy [T2]	<ul><li>coded MU</li><li>Additionally, barriers to MU are present, as are drivers</li></ul>
Poorly developed/ maintained water and irrigation infrastructure [T2]	Limited foreign investment and limited exports [T2]	<ul> <li>to MD, including poor security situation and likelihood</li> <li>of reduced foreign aid</li> <li>Only buffers to continued decline are the gray</li> </ul>
Growth is negative & insufficient for population growth [T2]	Weak/ineffective financial system, institutions, and regulation [T2]	economy and alternative sources of public services
	Major reliance on foreign aid/loans [T2]	
	Significant corruption [T3]	
	Drivers	
Events or conditions that weaken or destabilize the economic system		
Buffers		Barriers
Some alternative sources of public services		Incompetent or ineffective economic management
Gray economy		Government perceived as ineffective and/or unrepresentative

### Muddling Path Afghanistan Social Dimension

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	Social Dimension	
Muddling Down (MD)	Muddling Along (MA)	Muddling Up (MU)
	Antecedent Condition	
A d	egree of social tolerance short of prolonged civil violence or war	
	Markers	
High degrees of intolerance and division between social/ethnic groups [T2]	Highly structured and entrenched social divisions limit mobility [T1]	SOCIAL BLUF
Large groups with basic needs unmet [T2]	Social cleavages exist, ethnic minorities, & women are marginalized / discriminated against [T2]	<ul> <li>Dominant trajectory is flat (MA)</li> <li>Additionally, significant barriers to MU suggest</li> </ul>
	No significant public support for out-group focused extremism and violence [T2]	<ul> <li>improvement unlikely</li> <li>Attempts by gov't to address institutionalized discrimination and perceived presence of</li> </ul>
	Perceived unequal access to public goods and services [T2]	external threats provide some buffer to MD
	Violent political action, terrorism present, but trend not increasing [T3]	
	Drivers	
Events or conditions that perpetuate social conflict, intolerance, and violence		
Buffers		Barriers
Perceived presence of external threat		Well-established patronage networks
Some institutionalized discrimination addressed		Long-standing racial/ethnic/social disputes
		Perceived inequality between groups
		Institutionalized discrimination

### Fragmentation Path Afghanistan

Divorce	Conflict	Dissolution		
Antecedent Conditions				
Presence of dispute among geographically-associated social, ethnic, or economic groups				
	Call for autonomy Common Path Markers	FRAGMENTATION BLUF		
Densein	Majority of common path markers			
Perceive	present, but missing critical			
Publicly expressed conflict among elites     present, but missing       Public protest     antecedent condition				
	Gov't failure to address dispute sincerely and equitably	autonomy		
	Contested national sovereignty	Also, no catalyzing events		
Gov't opposition to and/or repression of discontents				
Violence and expansion of adherence to the cause				
	Catalyzing Events			
Sudden onset of social identity crisis	Major event or condition exacerbating nature of dispute	Major event or condition catalyzing expression of conflict w/in elites or public		
Subpath Markers				
International intervention to maintain stability	National sovereignty contested violently	Devolution of national govt authority through institutional means		
National sovereignty contested through institutional means	International intervention/ sponsorship in support of pro- autonomy group	Elite support for dissolution		
Common Path Buffers				
Presence of perceived external threat spurring sense of national identity				
Presence of strong, charismatic nationalist leader				
	Population feels treated equitably			
	Decreasing political salience of social cleavages			
Government	villing to address grievances while able to maintain central decision aut	hority		
Perceived legitimate governing body				
	Self-sufficient economic success and competent management			



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### AFPAK VEO LEADERSHIP STUDY

**28** POC: Dr. Gina Ligon, gligon@unomaha.edu

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- Focused on emerging threats from Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) in the Afghanistan and Pakistan (AFPAK) region using organizational resource comparison framework:
  - 1. Human Capital and Leadership Capabilities.
  - 2. Organizational Targeting Patterns over the past 10 years.
  - 3. Prioritization of AFPAK VEOs' capacity for innovation.
- AFPAK VEOs of Interest (Study Inclusion Criteria):
  - 1. While the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) indicates that over 100 groups have committed attacks in this region over the past ten years, 31 of them have committed more than 5 attacks and will be used as the primary sample of interest for this effort.
  - 2. Groups with sufficient secondary sources about leadership, personnel, and organizational structure will be included in the present effort from these 31 active groups.
  - 3. Subject matter experts will review final sample for relevance and threat level.
- How our findings will contribute to the present effort:
  - 1. Comparison of the decision styles of AFPAK leaders will help prioritize which VEOs pose the greatest short and long-term threat to regional stability.
  - 2. We will identify influence mechanisms for high profile VEO leaders in the AFPAK region, to be used in red-teaming and forecasting potential reconciliation scenarios.



George Mason University

## TIMED INFLUENCE NET MODEL


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- The Timed Influence Net Model starts with possible end-states and examines influence factors that could contribute or undermine attainment of the end-states of interest—in this case political reconciliation in Afghanistan, prevention of extremist safe havens, and a stable security situation in Afghanistan
- In building the model, we are exploring possible intermediate states that would be likely to occur on a path towards political reconciliation and examining their impact on the other two objectives
- Influence factors are still being researched, but will include:
  - Sources of Taliban economic support
  - Taliban security support (Pakistan)
  - Public support (GIRoA and QST)
  - Perceived AFG social and economic well-being
  - QST perception of participation in governance
  - Regional leader acceptance of governance structures
  - China, Russia, India, and Iran political and economic influences



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### SMA PEER REVIEW TEAM





- Mr. Sher Jan Ahmadzai, University of Nebraska, Omaha
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- Dr. Christine Fair, Georgetown University
- Mr. John Hill, HQ ACC/IA (POLAD)
- Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler, University of Akron & Case Western Reserve University
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