Approaches and Measures to Stabilizing the Korean Peninsula

A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa®) Report

Produced in support of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Office (Joint Staff, J39)
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What is ViTTa®?
NSI’s Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) provides rapid response to critical information needs by pulsing a global network of subject matter experts (SMEs) to generate a wide range of expert insight. For this Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Strategic Outcomes on the Korean Peninsula project, ViTTa was used to address eight key questions provided by the Joint Staff project sponsors. The ViTTa team received written response submissions from 50 subject matter experts from academia, government, military, and industry. Each Korea Strategic Outcomes ViTTa report presents 1) a summary overview of the expert contributor response to the ViTTa question of focus and 2) the full corpus of expert contributor responses received for the ViTTa question of focus. Biographies for all expert contributors are also included in each report.
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ViTTa Question

Q2 Is there anything the US can do to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution that would remove both the nuclear and conventional instabilities on the peninsula?

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennet, RAND; Debra Decker, Stimson Center; Abraham Denmark, Wilson Center; Ken Gause, CNA; Dr. James Hoare, Chatham House; Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Dr. Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists; Inhyok Kwon, RAND; Group Captain (Indian Air Force ret) Ajey Lele, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; Dr. Rod Lyon, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Dr. Patrick McEachern,1 Wilson Center; Dr. John Plumb, RAND; Joshua Pollack, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; Dr. Gary Samore, Harvard University; Dr. Steve Sin, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism; Brig Gen Rob Spalding, United States Air Force; Yun Sun, Stimson Center; Dr. Miles Yu, United States Naval Academy.

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of 18 insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider whether there is anything that the US can do to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution that would remove both the nuclear and conventional instabilities on the Korean Peninsula. This summary details the various perspectives that emerge.

Can the US Empower the ROK to Negotiate a Solution?

There is disagreement amongst the contributors as to whether there is anything the US can do to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution that would remove both the nuclear and conventional instabilities on the Korean Peninsula. Many contributors do believe that the US can empower the ROK to implement measures that would remove instabilities on the peninsula. Although Ken Gause of CNA casts doubt on the likelihood of removing Pyongyang’s nuclear and conventional deterrents in the short- to medium-term, contributors who advocate this position generally assess that there are concrete and realistic actions that the US can take to unilaterally empower Seoul in pursuit of stability on the peninsula in the longer-term. Dr. Patrick McEachern of the Wilson Center, however, disagrees, arguing that the ROK lacks leverage and authority and that the US must lead the way: “the US cannot hope to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution...there is no substitute for American leadership.”

Still other contributors, however, fall somewhere between these two positions. Several of these contributors suggest that the US can empower the ROK to act as a mediator between the US and the

1 McEachern’s views expressed in this report are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the US government or Department of State.

2 See contributions from Denmark; Kulacki; Plumb; Samore; and Sin.
DPRK, enabling the ROK to engage in “shuttle diplomacy” in pursuit of solutions that could remove instabilities on the peninsula. Some advocate for a stronger role for Seoul overall, arguing that the US should encourage the ROK to take the lead on negotiating a formal end to war with Pyongyang. Several others are a bit more particular, arguing that the US should lead negotiations related to denuclearization while the ROK should lead conventional détente efforts. Ultimately, the contributors offer several different approaches that may enable the US to empower the ROK to negotiate solutions that would remove instability on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting different mechanisms for resolving the peninsula’s distinct nuclear and conventional dilemmas.

### Denuclearization Measures

Several contributors suggest that removing nuclear threats on the peninsula may be more straightforward than removing conventional instabilities. Dr. Bruce Bennet of RAND and Dr. Jeffrey Knopf of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies echo this assertion, contending that simply holding the DPRK to the Panmunjom Declaration will go a long way toward eliminating nuclear instabilities. Dr. Gary Samore of Harvard University and Brig Gen Rob Spalding of the United States Air Force advocate for a more aggressive approach, arguing that the US should maintain its extended nuclear deterrence regime with Seoul. McEachern suggests that the ROK recognizes the US as the more appropriate actor to lead denuclearization negotiations, and that President Moon “has prioritized communication” with Washington to ensure robust correspondence. On the other hand, Yun Sun of the Stimson Center believes that the US should facilitate the ROK to “push for a nuclear-free, permanently neutral peninsula,” by allowing the ROK to take the lead on some aspect of denuclearization negotiations. Along these lines, Debra Decker of the Stimson Center proposes that the US utilize track 1.5 diplomacy to express an openness to denuclearization negotiations with the ROK, and suggests that Seoul assist Pyongyang in finishing the KEDO nuclear plants to make discussions with the US more attractive.

### Conventional Measures

The path to removing conventional instabilities appears to be more complicated and nuanced than denuclearization measures, according to the contributors, and requires significant commitments from the US, ROK, and DPRK. To this end, however, the US may be able to empower the ROK on a number of confidence building measures with the DPRK. While Dr. Miles Yu of the United States Naval Academy argues that the US must never yield its military presence on the Korean Peninsula, other contributors contend that a gradual and reciprocal de-escalation and repositioning of US forces may help to remove conventional instabilities. These contributors identify several potential approaches for overcoming some of the conventional instabilities stemming from the presence of US forces on the peninsula, including:

- Creating a DMZ Peace Zone.
- Establishing a leader-level hotline.

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3 See contributions from Decker and Pollack.
4 See contributions from Kwon and Samore.
5 See contributions from Denmark; Hoare; Lele; and Lyon. This is also contrary to the views of Denmark, Hoare, Lele, and Lyon, who maintain that Washington should be leading denuclearization initiatives.
6 See contributions from Knopf and Hoare.
7 See contributions from Denmark; Plumb; and Pollack.
8 See contributions from Kwon and Pollack.
9 See contributions from Lyon and McEachern.
• Considering limits on conventional forces.\textsuperscript{11}
• Engaging in negotiations on the reduction of artillery.\textsuperscript{12}
• Considering the elimination of elements of ROK missile program activities in exchange for significant reductions in and limitations on the DPRK missile arsenal.\textsuperscript{13}
• Expanding the suspension of loudspeaker broadcasts.\textsuperscript{14}
• Establishing inter-Korean agreements of conduct in the West Sea.\textsuperscript{15}

**General Measures**

Contributors also highlight several more general approaches to empowering the ROK to negotiate solutions that would abolish instabilities indistinct from conventional and nuclear measures. First, Dr. Steve Sin of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism argues that the ROK must feel that it is leading the discussion and that future policies must “look, taste, smell, and feel Korean,” even if such policies run counter to US interests.\textsuperscript{16} In this vein, Dr. John Plumb of RAND suggests that transferring the operational control of Combined Forces Command to the ROK may better empower Seoul to negotiate. Yu, however, warns against ceding such authority to potentially “trigger happy” South Korean leaders. Second, Dr. Gregory Kulacki of the Union of Concerned Scientists highlights the importance of communication, arguing that “the source of all instability is lack of communication and the misunderstanding that results from it.” He suggests, therefore, that “the US should encourage greater ROK communication with the DPRK by engaging in greater communication itself.” Third, several contributors suggest that the US offer a cautious stream of economic benefits both unilaterally and through the ROK to Pyongyang in return for verifiable limits and to increase confidence in negotiations.\textsuperscript{17} Lastly, Plumb recommends that the US apply pressure on Seoul to cease reunification rhetoric, contending that it is overtly “unrealistic and unhelpfully aggressive militaristic” and that a message of “brotherhood and harmony” is much more productive.

\textsuperscript{11} See contribution from Lyon. Lyon suggests that “there’s precedent from the agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe for focusing on a set of limits that increase transparency, provide for the destruction of obsolete equipment in excess of agreed limits, constrain forward-deployed armour, limit the size of exercises, and improve crisis management arrangements.”

\textsuperscript{12} See contribution from Lele.

\textsuperscript{13} See contribution from Plumb.

\textsuperscript{14} See contribution from McEachern.

\textsuperscript{15} See contribution from McEachern.

\textsuperscript{16} For an explanation of why this is important, and how South Korean sentiment affects both past and current ROK strategy, see Sin’s contribution.

\textsuperscript{17} See contributions from Knopf; Kwon; McEachern; and Samore.
The ROK has both of these issues included in its April 27 declaration with North Korea. The question is really more about whether North Korea will honor the declarations that it has made. The United States can help the ROK get to a positive outcome in several ways:

1. North Korea is claiming that it has already been denuclearizing. It has disabled two sites associated with the North Korean nuclear weapon and ballistic missile test programs. But late in 2017 Kim said that his nuclear and missile development efforts were completed, and thus test facilities are no longer important. This helps explain why Kim Jong-un was prepared to sacrifice these.

2. In reality, since the beginning of 2018, North Korea has surrendered no nuclear weapons but it has probably built 5-9 new nuclear weapons. Kim has thus not frozen his nuclear program and he is certainly not denuclearizing; instead, he is nuclearizing. The United States can help the ROK in achieving North Korean denuclearization by clearly demonstrating that the North Korean words are not matched by its actions, and in fact are exactly opposite its actions. In the most simple terms, this can be done by showing the presumed North Korean inventory of nuclear weapons over time, and how that inventory has significantly grown in recent years.

3. Kim Jong-un views his nuclear weapons as a key asset of North Korea and the ultimate guarantee of regime survival. The US/ROK needs to convince him otherwise, telling Kim that his nuclear weapons will likely be the cause of his regime’s destruction if they are not abandoned. The U.S. should regularly reiterate the conclusion of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: “Our deterrence strategy for North Korea makes clear that any North Korean nuclear attack against the United States or its allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime. There is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive.” The United States should be increasing its surveillance of Kim Jong-un and periodically telling him where he is physically located to convince him that this is not an idle threat.

4. If it has not already, the United States should brief ROK President Moon on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty signed in 1990. It reduced the two sides in Europe to common ceilings of conventional forces. North Korea made a similar proposal in the early 1990s to reduce both sides in Korea to a common ceiling of 300,000 military personnel. So North Korea has accepted the concept of equal ceilings before, but 300,000 is too low—the initial ceiling should be about 600,000 military personnel. The United States should explain to President Moon why the common ceilings approach is the proper one, but also explain the challenges of verification. In particular, in the North Korean 2008 census, the North shows different population figures that suggested that the North had just over 700,000 personnel in its military in contrast to the ROK Defense White Paper which in 2008 said that the North Korean military had over 1,190,000 active duty military personnel. So to get any kind of reasonable arms control proposal, the US/ROK will need to develop a plan for verification of the North Korean information.

5. The US/ROK should tell North Korea that its intense hostility towards the United States, and its indoctrination of its people that the US is their eternal enemy, in particular, will not allow a peace agreement on the Korean Peninsula anytime soon. The US should work with the ROK to develop a proposal on how North Korea needs to change its indoctrination of its people as a condition for concluding a peace agreement, one that will “build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula” as called for in the June 12 Singapore Agreement.

6. North Korea will not meet its commitments for reducing its military threats unless the US/ROK establish consequences for North Korea failing to do so. To date, the major consequences have been economic sanctions, but those are largely exhausted and outside US/ROK control. Instead, the US/ROK should begin to develop information operations consequences such as regularly talking about North Korean human rights violations, about which we already know that Kim Jong-un is exceptionally sensitive.
Debra Decker
Senior Advisor, Managing Across Boundaries Initiative (Stimson Center)
21 May 2018

The US can use track 1.5 to communicate to the ROK that it might be interested in engaging on broader nuclear nonproliferation issues and being open to having the DPRK, with China’s support, suggest this. This would allow the DPRK to develop a new identity, which it appears to be wanting. [Think of Kazakhstan as an example, which took great pride in its mediating role in the nuclear realm – giving up the nuclear weapons based there, supporting a Central Asian nuclear weapon free zone, housing a fuel bank, and supporting the cleanup of radioactive fallout from testing there.] Also, the DPRK with a commitment to denuclearization can look to further economic development along the Chinese model of authoritarian control with economic openness and universities (like the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, which Kim Jong-un’s father had wanted developed after seeing a similar university in China).

To sweeten the discussions for the DPRK, the ROK can help the DPRK finish the KEDO nuclear power plants (without foreign support that managed to delay development last time). These plants would need to be under safeguards.

On a parallel diplomatic track, the US can discuss with the Russians, in the context of their co-chairing the Global Initiative Against Nuclear Terrorism, the dangers of nuclear terrorism and the fears surrounding possible DPRK selling of “excess” nuclear material. The discussion could be about whether the North Koreans could be motivated to change their behavior if the US and Russia engaged in a broader nuclear dialogue on nuclear arms control. This would benefit the US and Russia, as in addition to a global nuclear arms dialogue, the Russians and the US could demonstrate their commitment by including in their own discussions: the extension of New START; a dialing down of investments in nuclear modernization (which would allow both countries to invest more in infrastructure and other domestic priorities to allow them to better compete with China); a discussion of the INF violations each side alleges; and consideration of confidence-building measures.

Abraham Denmark
Director, Asia Program (Wilson Center)
6 June 2018

Conceptually, it is possible to envision a scenario in which the ROK and DPRK could negotiate agreements to address conventional instability challenges on the Korean peninsula. While these agreements would certainly not provide a solution that removes instabilities, they have the potential to improve stability and predictability. However, on the nuclear side, the ROK is not in a position to conduct such negotiations.

Conventionally, the primary source of instability lies in North Korea’s historic use of asymmetric attacks against South Korea in the form of terrorist attacks against ROK interests, special forces attacks, conventional military strikes on South Korean military assets and civilian populations, incidents in the DMZ, and cyberattacks. The United States could potentially empower the ROK to negotiate a series of confidence building measures, and even eventually the reciprocal repositioning of military units, so long as deterrence and the ability to defend the ROK can be maintained. Yet the ROK and U.S. militaries would need to work in close coordination to ensure that negotiations between North and South stay within the bounds of what is acceptable to the United States.

Nuclear instabilities, however, are a far more complex issue. Since the ROK does not possess nuclear assets, it has no ability to credibly negotiate with the DPRK on those issues. So long as the United States maintains extended deterrence for the ROK, the status and use of nuclear assets will be an issue for the United States to discuss. Thus, the ROK may be able to gain insight into how the DPRK thinks about its own nuclear assets and how they would like to enhance nuclear stability on the Korean Peninsula, and pass those insights on to the United States to inform any dialogue that may occur between Washington and Pyongyang.

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18 The possibility of such agreements were mentioned in the Panmunjeom Declaration signed by Kim Jong Un and Moon Jae-in in April 2018.
Ken Gause
Director, International Affairs Group, Center for Strategic Studies (CNA)
4 June 2018

It is hard to envision North Korea giving up both its nuclear and conventional deterrent. For this to happen, there will need to be a considerable period of time for confidence building measures on both sides. Following Iraq and Libya, the regime in Pyongyang needs to have some kind of deterrent. Otherwise, the paranoia within the leadership could lead to serious stability issues inside the regime. Therefore, NK’s deterrent in many ways ensures stability on the peninsula. The absence of such a deterrent for the foreseeable future could be destabilizing.

Dr. James Hoare
Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme (Chatham House)
4 June 2018

Since the ROK does not control any nuclear weapons, it seems unlikely that the DPRK would ever see it as being able to negotiate realistically on this issue. That is why they insist that they want to talk to the US – it has the nuclear weapons even if they are not present on the peninsula. Conventional weapons are different – but the issue is of course complicated by the presence of US forces in the ROK. It seems unlikely that the ROK or Japan would like to see the end of that presence while the DPRK is seen as hostile to both.

Dr. Jeffrey Knopf
Professor (Middlebury Institute of International Studies)
13 June 2018

The ROK is important. The apparent lack of consultation by President Trump before making key decisions is damaging to the alliance relationship. It will be important for the US to coordinate with the ROK government and consult with them on a path forward.

That said, the US is the key negotiating partner for the DPRK. There will also be bilateral DPRK-ROK talks, but by themselves these can’t resolve the problems on the Korean peninsula. Only if the US is also involved directly in talks is progress possible.

To remove nuclear instabilities is straightforward. The DPRK has to come back into compliance with the original joint declaration committing the two Koreas to a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. If there are no nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of either Korea, the situation should be stable at the nuclear level.

To remove potential sources of conventional instability will be much harder. The DPRK does not seem willing to fully abandon the dream of reunifying the Korean peninsula from the North down. It also seems unlikely to completely give up its habit of provocative behavior.

The best hope here is a process of strategic dialogue designed to create rules of the road and establish confidence-building measures. But in a process in which the North gives up its nuclear weapons, it may be even more reluctant to also constrain its conventional capabilities. If there is a peace treaty ending the state of war and other security guarantees, and if there is a stream of economic benefits that could be taken away if the North misbehaves, it is possible they will feel constrained to avoid provocative behavior. But this will likely still require a deeper process of engagement that gives them a sense of status and being accepted as a legitimate power. This would probably require overlooking the DPRK’s terrible human rights record, and I don’t see this as likely.
Dr. Gregory Kulacki
China Project Manager (Union of Concerned Scientists)
22 May 2018

The source of all instability is lack of communication and the misunderstanding that results from it. The US should encourage greater ROK communication with the DPRK by engaging in greater communication itself. This should include communication on educational, cultural, economic and political subjects, including human rights, as well as military matters. Mechanisms for communication should be institutionalized and gradually expanded. US-China relations from 1972-79, in the period prior to normalization of relations, may provide useful examples of the kinds of channels that can be opened and the kinds of activities that can be conducted through those channels.

Inhyok Kwon
Assistant Policy Researcher (RAND)
31 May 2018

If it was the first goal of the United States to bring North Korea into the denuclearization talks, it would be a second goal to have North Korea complete the negotiations to give up its nuclear weapons completely. The U.S. and North Korea are in a tug-of-war over the process of denuclearization, and the negotiations between the two countries are likely to involve disagreement over when to lift sanctions and give rewards during the denuclearization process.

The recent US decision to cancel the summit with North Korea and Pyongyang’s subsequent unprecedented response show that the situation is favorable to the U.S. and that it can put more pressure on North Korea to lead negotiations in a favorable direction. However, if the negotiations break down, all the efforts of the United States may be in vain, so it is necessary to consider the limitations of U.S. pressure on North Korea for the final goal of denuclearization of North Korea.

If so, in what circumstances could North Korea be derailed from the negotiation process for denuclearization? The answer seems to be found in the recent concerns expressed by North Korea over the security of the regime. If these concerns are not resolved and the risks that the North Koreans need to bear increase, it’s possible that North Korea will break away from the negotiations.

Of course, breaking away may be unpalatable for Kim Jong-Un, who has publicly declared a goal of denuclearization and economic development of his country. Ending negotiations would mean continued sanctions which North Korea is unlikely to be able to endure. Still, these concerns of the North Korean regime need to be considered, as they may interfere with US pressure on North Korea.

Considering the dynamics between the U.S. and D.P.R.K, the South Korean government has several options. The ROK can be a bridge to support the denuclearization negotiations by identifying the elements which may interfere with a complete denuclearization and by offering appropriate carrots. If the United States continues to maintain its hardline policy and South Korea presents some carrots, the negotiations are more likely to succeed than without any carrots at all. The U.S. administration may be unwilling to offer carrots of their own to avoid looking weak in the eyes of the U.S. public.

In order to offer any carrots in negotiation, the ROK government needs some power to mitigate the threats which concern the D.P.R.K. What can be considered is the right to decide when to sign a peace treaty. Of course, the decision is partly up to the United States, who also remains at war with the North. However, if South Korea can arbitrate with a certain degree of authority over the formal end of the war and peace negotiations, then South Korea can play a leading role in the negotiation process. Moreover, if China participates in the declaration of the end of the war and in the peace treaty negotiations, it will stabilize the North Korean regime by signaling that any potential coup would not be able to lean on China without denuclearization.

In a similar vein, economic support for North Korea can be considered. Of course, this should be limited to the extent that it does not damage the overall pressure on North Korea. For example, Moon Jae-in has a blueprint for economic development in the East Sea, the West Sea, and the DMZ after improved inter-Korean relations. The creation of a DMZ peace zone will not directly contribute to North Korea’s economic development, but it will have many additional benefits due to the relocation of its conventional forces and its symbolic meaning.
Group Captain (Indian Air Force ret) Ajey Lele
Senior Fellow (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses)
21 May 2018

Ensure the beginning of Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and expand its scope. Impart relevant training to North Koreans who are expected to work there. Involving ROK as a standalone state for removal of nuclear instabilities may not be a good idea. In conventional realm, as a test case, ROK could be asked to begin negotiations on reduction of artillery. Also, ROK could be pushed to open a dialog on Peace Treaty.

Dr. Rod Lyon
Senior Fellow – International Strategy, Australian Strategic Policy Institute
28 May 2018

- ROK doesn’t have much leverage on the North Korean nuclear issue:
  - Giving it leverage means, at a minimum, strengthening its nuclear latency
  - True, some of that’s been occurring anyway, with ROK ballistic missile capabilities
  - But there are limits how far Washington would want to go down that track
    - At least, there are limits if the US remains keen on extending nuclear deterrence and assurance to its allies in Northeast Asia in order to reduce the incentives for indigenous proliferation
- Seoul’s better placed to negotiate on conventional instabilities, though might want to define those as ‘forward-deployed armour’ in order to bear down on its principal strategic vulnerability
  - The vulnerability of Seoul to North Korean artillery strikes across the DMZ
- There’s precedent from the agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe for focusing on a set of limits that increase transparency, provide for the destruction of obsolete equipment in excess of agreed limits, constrain forward-deployed armour, limit the size of exercises, and improve crisis management arrangements.
  - Some of those measures might translate to the Korean peninsula, and might plausibly be the basis for providing credible ‘security assurances’ to Pyongyang
    - But would they be agreeable to North Korea?

Dr. Patrick McEachern
Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow (Wilson Center)
22 May 2018

No. The two Koreas have made repeated references to denuclearization commitments ranging from the 1992 Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration. However, the DPRK has refused consistently to negotiate the nuclear issue with the ROK, and the major diplomatic efforts to pursue denuclearization have involved Washington and Pyongyang. The ROK plays an important role, and close coordination with Seoul is fundamental to any effective U.S. engagement with Pyongyang. But the United States cannot hope to empower the ROK to negotiate a solution. There is no substitute for American leadership.

Pyongyang certainly has objectives it seeks from Seoul, including humanitarian and economic assistance. But North Korea articulates the path to the major political-military and economic benefits as running through Washington. North Korea thinks it can deter the South Korean military alone, but it fears the superior conventional and nuclear forces of the United States. South Korea can provide North Korea aid, but the United States holds the keys to loosening economic sanctions with global effect. Consequently, past South Korea efforts to force North Korea to negotiate the nuclear issue in an inter-Korean context, most notably during the Lee Myung-bak administration (2008-2013), met North Korean stonewalling. What South Korea can offer is simply insufficient to sway North Korea on the nuclear issue.

19 McEachern’s views expressed in this report are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the US government or Department of State.
The current South Korean Moon Jae-in administration understands American involvement is central to North Korean denuclearization. Seoul made sure the inter-Korean summit took place before the U.S.-DPRK summit, and one of the major objectives of the inter-Korean summit was setting the stage for President Trump’s meeting with Kim Jong Un. President Moon knows he cannot solve the nuclear issue alone, and his administration has prioritized communication with its American ally. South Korea’s foreign minister, national security advisor, and president visited Washington separately between the inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK summits to ensure robust communication and coordination.

Inter-Korean dialogue can address some conventional military instabilities on and around the peninsula. These are generally less high profile than the nuclear discussions but still important in their own right. The establishment of a leader-level hotline between the two Koreas notes the value of real-time communication to deescalate possible accidents or military skirmishes. Inter-Korean agreements on conduct in the West Sea can likewise reduce the risk of unwanted conflict or escalation. Confidence building measures in the DMZ such as suspending loudspeaker broadcasts, which both sides implemented after the Panmunjom Declaration, could potentially be expanded to other areas of more militarily useful requests. If inter-Korean engagement continues apace, Seoul may want to consider raising North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons programs as ambitious areas that could reduce the North Korean WMD threat on the peninsula.

Dr. John Plumb
Senior Engineer (RAND)
4 June 2018

US should pressure ROK to eliminate the “reunification” message and goal on both the domestic and military sides, which is laden with unrealistic and unhelpfully aggressive militaristic overtones, and instead adopt a suitable message along the lines of “harmony” or “brotherhood.”

While not simple to do, US could finally transfer OPCON of Combined Forces Command to ROK in order to better empower the ROK to negotiate a solution.

While the US/ROK have just recently agreed to remove limitations on the ROK missile program, the US should support ROK consideration of trading elements of its nascent new missile program for significant reductions in and limitations on the DPRK missile arsenal.

ROK could also offer a slow ramp-down of military posture on each side, with each side taking specific visible steps on a set schedule to reduce tensions over time. Such a schedule should treat North and South Korea as equals in such a ramp-down. The US should empower the ROK in this regard. This would not include a withdrawal of US forces from the peninsula.

Joshua Pollack
Editor, The Nonproliferation Review (Middlebury Institute of International Studies)
Senior Research Associate (Middlebury Institute of International Studies)
15 May 2018

The ROK is increasingly positioned as a mediator between the US and DPRK; it is unclear that it can be empowered to negotiate on behalf of the United States—except perhaps in the form of “shuttle diplomacy,” carrying messages back and forth between the two sides.

However, South Korea may find itself subject to demands from North Korea that it accept limits on its own missile program if the North is to accept any on its own, e.g., no flight-testing.

Furthermore, realizing the Panmunjom Declaration’s promised transformation of the DMZ into a “peace zone” may also require pullbacks of forces on both sides. While there is an obvious limit to any such process—the proximity of the Greater Seoul Metro Area to the DMZ—U.S. Army positions north of Seoul might be considered negotiable.
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Dr. Gary Samore
Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government (Harvard University)
2 June 2018

Yes – Any agreement to contain North Korea’s nuclear and conventional threats will require substantial economic assistance and cooperation to North Korea. The US can empower the ROK to provide such economic benefits in exchange for verifiable limits on North Korea’s nuclear and conventional capabilities. In addition, the ROK will be party to any formal agreement to end the Korean War and establish a “peace regime” on the Korean Peninsula, while continuing to maintain the US-ROK security alliance.

Dr. Steve Sin
Director, Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division
(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism)
31 May 2018

There are two ways to approach this question. One is to approach the question from the perspective of options that are more readily available to the US (what I consider to be a status quo approach). The other is to approach the question from the perspective of what the US could – or perhaps should – do (a more radical approach). I will focus on the second approach to this question.

From this perspective, I offer that if the US truly has an intention of empowering the ROK so that the ROK can negotiate a solution with the DPRK that would result in the removal of both the nuclear and conventional instabilities on the peninsula, the ideal approach would be for the US to support the ROK’s indigenous DPRK engagement policies – no matter how impractical they may seem to the US, or how contrarian they may be to the US interests – while simultaneously providing “top cover” for the ROK against any external pressures, especially from Japan, China, and Russia. Of course, what I have offered here assumes that the ROK needs to be empowered by the US for it to be able to negotiate with the DPRK effectively, and most importantly, that the ROK would welcome “being empowered” by the US.

Given my two assumptions hold, and if the US were to attempt something like this, it is paramount that the ROK feels that it is the one leading the discussion at hand and that the US will steadfastly support and abide by the ROK’s lead. In other words, to be successful, whatever policies are developed and implemented, from the ROK’s perspective, they must look, taste, smell, and feel Korean and the Americans will go along for the “ride”, good, bad, or indifferent.

There are, of course, several challenges for the US in what I have presented here. First and foremost is the complicated feelings South Koreans have about the US. South Koreans’ view of the US is extremely complicated. In a 2002 Gallup Korea poll, 44.5-percent of South Koreans perceived the Korean War as a proxy war between the US and the Soviet Union while 33.2-percent believed it was due to North Korea invading South Korea, meaning the US is viewed both as a power that infringed upon South Korea’s sovereignty and brought about a war between the Korean people and as a savior of South Korea from a fiery battlefield. The US is also simultaneously viewed as a faithful ally who stood by and protected South Korea as South Korea contended against the threat from the DPRK and achieved economic growth and mature democracy; and a chauvinistic power that supported military dictatorships. The anti-US movements and occupation of U.S. Cultural Center in the 80s reflect these views. South Korea’s economic growth and societal advancement brought about changes in the South Koreans’ views about the US. Today, South Koreans perceive themselves as societally and economically equal to the US, and the only reason they still rely on the US is because of the North Korean threat. Although the South Koreans believe the US is an extremely important friend, this belief does not automatically translate into how favorable the South Koreans view the US. These emotional and conscious changes serve as the bases for the strong South Korean demands for changes in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the ROK-US 123 agreement. It is precisely the same emotion and consciousness that resulted in large-scale protests

20 Gallup Korea, “If North Korea Develops Nuclear Weapons, It is to be Aimed at Other Countries...64%,” Chosun Ilbo, http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/newsContent.asp?seqNo=515&pos94&search=&searchKeyword=&selectYear=.
during the 2008 KOR-US FTA negotiations. To put it simply, South Koreans want to sit across the negotiating table from the US as equals on all fronts, especially when it comes to North Korea and national defense.\textsuperscript{23}

Very closely related to the challenge discussed above is the South Koreans’ perception of trustworthiness of the US commitment to the stability of the Korean Peninsula. Over the past six decades, the US has sent clear messages to the South Koreans that the US will use the ROK-US mutual defense commitment as leverage against the ROK and shirk its responsibility whenever convenient. In fact, the primary reason the ROK pursued development of an indigenous nuclear weapons program in 1970s was because it was not able to trust the US commitment to the Korean Peninsula. In an interview, Kim Jong-pil, the Prime Minister of ROK under President Park Chung-hee, recalled a conversation he had with President Park in 1970 where Park told him:

\begin{quote}
We do not know when the Americans will leave, so let’s develop nuclear weapons. Even if we end up not being able to fully develop it because the Americans interfere with us, we should still develop the technology where we can complete the development at any time.\textsuperscript{24}
\end{quote}

Under these circumstances, convincing the ROK that the US is willing to truly empower the ROK so that the ROK can pursue negotiations with the DPRK in a way the ROK sees fit because the US has the ROK’s best interest in mind will be difficult at best.

Aside from these challenges, for this strategy to be truly successful, the US is most likely going to have to forego its own immediate interests in the region and take a chance that it will receive some form of long term benefit from the stability of the Korean Peninsula. Unfortunately, this is a high-risk gamble without any guarantee that the outcome will be favorable – or at least not harmful – to the US interests. This uncertainty will most likely prevent the US from truly engaging with the ROK and other states in the region in innovative and meaningful ways to resolve the instability on the Korean Peninsula, and the region by extension.

\textbf{Brig Gen Rob Spalding}

Special Assistant to the United States Air Force Vice Chief of Staff (United States Air Force)

15 May 2018

If the US were to voluntarily leave the peninsula, ROK would be forced to come to a solution. They now have the conventional superiority to defend themselves. American security guarantees in the event of use of nuclear weapons by DPRK would be sufficient to deter DPRK from action. The only thing left would be to let improved economic and social ties facilitate reunification.

\textbf{Yun Sun}

Co-Director, East Asia Program (Stimson Center)
Director, China Program (Stimson Center)

29 May 2018

The US can agree to allow for ROK to push for a nuclear-free, permanently neutral peninsula.


Dr. Miles Yu
Professor (United States Naval Academy)
6 June 2018

Yes. First of all, to never yield on America’s military presence in the ROK as it has been, and will be, the ultimate guarantee of decades’ peace in the Peninsula. Second, to dramatically enhance interoperability among the three key allies: ROK, the US, AND Japan. Third, further Koreanization [unleash the ROK?] without transferring the wartime command authority to the ROK as unwisely and dangerously contemplated in the previous administration because this might lead to the US being dragged into an unnecessary conflict as an insurance policy by some trigger happy ROK leaders or generals.
Subject Matter Expert Biographies

Dr. Bruce Bennett
Senior International/Defense Researcher (RAND)
25 May 2018

Bruce W. Bennett is a senior international/defense researcher at the RAND Corporation who works primarily on research topics such as strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation within the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center and the RAND Arroyo Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. Bennett’s work applies war gaming, risk management, deterrence-based strategy, competitive strategies, and military simulation and analysis. He specializes in “asymmetric threats” such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and how to counter those threats with new strategies, operational concepts, and technologies. He is an expert in Northeast Asian military issues, having visited the region more than 110 times and written much about Korean security issues. He has also done work on the Persian/Arab Gulf region. His Northeast Asian research has addressed issues such as future ROK military force requirements, the Korean military balance, counters to North Korean chemical and biological weapon threats in Korea and Japan, dealing with a North Korean collapse, potential Chinese intervention in Korean contingencies, changes in the Northeast Asia security environment, and deterrence of nuclear threats (including strengthening the U.S. nuclear umbrella). He has worked with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S. Forces Korea and Japan, the U.S. Pacific Command and Central Command, the ROK and Japanese militaries, and the ROK National Assembly. Bennett received his B.S. in economics from the California Institute of Technology and his Ph.D. in policy analysis from the Pardee RAND Graduate School.

Debra Decker
Senior Advisor, Managing Across Boundaries Initiative (Stimson Center)
21 May 2018

Debra Decker is a Senior Advisor at the Managing Across Boundaries initiative. She has more than 20 years of experience developing policies and managing processes in the private and public sectors and is a subject matter expert in the field of risk management. Decker is also president of Decker Advisors, LLC, a firm she recently established to focus on framing complex national security problems in innovative ways and engaging stakeholders to develop efficient solutions. Prior to this, Decker was with Booz Allen Hamilton. She has advised the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security on strategy and risk and has specialized in the threats stemming from weapons of mass destruction and in the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure. As a researcher, Decker was an associate of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Her research has been featured at the World Economic Forum and to Congress. She is a member of the Society for Risk Analysis, the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the 2013 ASIS Technical Advisory Committee for developing a national risk assessment standard. She currently serves on the boards of the Washington Foreign Law Society and of TexProtects, which works against child abuse and neglect in Texas. Decker holds an MBA from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, an MPA from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and a B.A. from American University.
Abraham Denmark  
Director, Asia Program (Wilson Center)  
6 June 2018

Abraham M. Denmark is Director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he also holds a joint appointment as a Senior Fellow in the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States. He previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia.

Ken Gause  
Director, International Affairs Group, Center for Strategic Studies (CNA)  
4 June 2018

Ken Gause is the director of the International Affairs Group, a part of CNA’s Center for Strategic Studies. He is CNA’s senior foreign leadership analyst and has spent the last 20 years developing methodologies for examining leadership dynamics of hard-target, authoritarian regimes. In particular, he is an internationally respected expert on North Korea who has written three books on North Korean leadership. His latest book is "North Korean House of Cards: Leadership Dynamics Under Kim Jong-un." Leadership and opposing force (OPFOR) analysis are core areas of expertise within CNA Strategic Studies and Gause has personally directed studies on the North Korean, Iranian and Russian leadership and decision-making. His work on foreign leadership dates back to the early 1980s with his work on the Soviet Union for the U.S. government. Over the last three decades, he has devised analytical techniques used to understand adversary decision-making. These techniques span a five-tier set of methodologies that range from biographical analysis to studies on how to impact and shape an authoritarian or totalitarian regime’s actions. These studies include a range of approaches from sophisticated game design to proprietary analysis based on a “virtual network” of researchers around the world dedicated to providing analysis on regimes of interest, their leadership, and how they make decisions. Gause has also published numerous articles on leadership structures for such publications as Jane’s Intelligence Review, Jane’s Defense Weekly, and the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. He has a B.A. from Vanderbilt in Russian and Political Science and an M.A. from The George Washington University in Soviet and East European Affairs.

Dr. James Hoare  
Associate Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme (Chatham House)  
4 June 2018

Since retiring from HM Diplomatic Service in 2003 - where his last post was establishing the British Embassy in North Korea – Dr. Hoare has pursued a second career as a broadcaster, writer and occasional teacher on East Asia. Much of his work concerns North Korea but he also has expertise on China and Japan. He has published several books, some with his wife, Susan Pares, also a former diplomat. He is a graduate of Queen Mary University of London (BA 1964) and the School of Oriental and African Studies (PhD 1971).
Dr. Jeffrey Knopf
Professor (Middlebury Institute of International Studies)
13 June 2018

Jeffrey W. Knopf is a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies (MIIS) in Monterey, California, where he serves as the chair of the M.A. program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies. He is also a senior research associate with the Institute’s James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Dr. Knopf received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University. Prior to joining the MIIS faculty, he taught at the University of Southern California, the University of California-Santa Cruz, and the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Knopf is the co-editor of a forthcoming volume on Behavioral Economics and Nuclear Weapons. He is also the editor of International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation (University of Georgia Press, 2016) and Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation (Stanford University Press, 2012) and the author of Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on U.S. Arms Control Policy (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

Dr. Gregory Kulacki
China Project Manager (Union of Concerned Scientists)
22 May 2018

Gregory Kulacki is an expert on cross-cultural communication between the United States and China. Since joining UCS in 2002, he has promoted dialogue between experts from both countries on nuclear arms control and space security and has consulted with Chinese and U.S. governmental and non-governmental organizations, including the U.S. House China Working Group, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the U.S. National Academies, NASA, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Over the last decade, Kulacki has been cited by a number of U.S. and Chinese news organizations, including the Christian Science Monitor, Nature, New York Times, NPR, Washington Post, and Washington Times. Dr. Kulacki, who is fluent in Mandarin Chinese, has lived and worked in China for more than 20 years. Prior to joining UCS, he served as an associate professor of government at Green Mountain College, director of external studies at Pitzer College, and director of academic programs in China for the Council on International Educational Exchange. Dr. Kulacki earned a doctorate degree in political theory and a master’s degree in international relations from the University of Maryland in College Park. He also completed graduate certificates in Chinese economic history and international politics at Fudan University in Shanghai.

Inhyok Kwon
Assistant Policy Researcher (RAND)
31 May 2018

Inhyok Kwon is an assistant policy researcher at RAND and a Ph.D. student at Pardee RAND Graduate School. He has an M.A. in international relations from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and a B.Eng. in industrial engineering from the Republic of Korea (ROK) Air Force Academy. Kwon is a former logistics officer in the ROK Air Force. Prior to joining Pardee RAND, he studied political, security, and economic issues affecting the Korean Peninsula and ROK’s foreign policy relations. His research interests include national security strategy, U.S.-ROK deterrence strategy and defense posture against North Korea, and counterinsurgency and stability operations.
Group Captain (Indian Air Force ret) Ajey Lele
Senior Fellow (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses)
21 May 2018

Group Captain (ret) Ajey Lele is Senior Fellow in the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and heads its Centre on Strategic Technologies. He started his professional career as an officer in the Indian Air Force in 1987 and took early retirement from the service to pursue his academic interests. He has a Masters degree in Physics from Pune University, and Masters and MPhil degrees in Defence and Strategic Studies from Madras University. He has done his doctorate from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. His specific areas of research include issues related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Space Security and Strategic Technologies. He has contributed articles to various national and international journals, websites and newspapers. He has authored six books and has also been an editor for six books. He is a recipient of K. Subrahmanyam Award (2013) which is conferred for outstanding contribution in the area of strategic and security studies.

Dr. Rod Lyon
Senior Fellow – International Strategy, Australian Strategic Policy Institute
28 May 2018

Dr. Rod Lyon is a Senior Fellow - International Strategy. Rod was most recently a Senior Analyst with ASPI. He has previously lectured in International Relations at the University of Queensland where he taught courses on conflict, international security, and civil-military relations. His research interests focus on a range of problems associated with global security, nuclear strategy and Australian security. He previously worked in the Strategic Analysis Branch of the Office of National Assessments between 1985 and 1996. As a Fulbright scholar in 2004, he was a visiting research fellow at Georgetown University in Washington DC, researching a project on the future of security partnerships in the post-September 11 environment. He was appointed to the National Consultative Committee on International Security Issues in April 2005.

Dr. Patrick McEachern
Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow (Wilson Center)
22 May 2018

Patrick McEachern is a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in residence at the Wilson Center from September 2017-August 2018. He most recently served as the Deputy Chief of the Foreign Policy and Bilateral Affairs Unit at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. He previously served as a political officer in Seoul, an analyst in the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s Northeast Asia Division, a Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholar, and a consular and political-military affairs officer in Bratislava, Slovakia. Patrick speaks Korean and Slovak and holds a PhD from Louisiana State University. He is the author of Inside the Red Box: North Korea’s Post-totalitarian Politics (Columbia University Press, 2010) and co-author with Jaclyn McEachern of North Korea, Iran, and the Challenge to International Order (Routledge, 2017). He recently completed another book entitled North Korea: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, under contract) and is currently writing a new book with John Delury entitled Survivor: North Korea from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Un.
Dr. John Plumb
Senior Engineer (RAND)
4 June 2018

Dr. John Plumb has served in national security roles for over 20 years at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. He has served at the White House, the Pentagon, and the Senate in senior defense staff roles with a focus on missile defense, nuclear weapons, and deterrence. His past positions include Director, Defense Policy and Strategy on the National Security Council staff – where he worked to counter North Korea’s emerging nuclear capability; Principal Director for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy at the Pentagon – where he helped drive successful missile defense negotiations with NATO and with Japan; and as a Military Legislative Assistant in the Senate. Dr. Plumb also has over 20 years active and reserve service as a US Navy Submarine Officer. A Captain in the Navy Reserve, he currently serves as the Commanding Officer of 80 personnel responsible for the Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection certification of US warships. He holds a Ph.D. in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Colorado and an undergraduate degree in Physics from the University of Notre Dame. He currently works as a Senior Engineer at RAND.

Joshua Pollack
Editor, The Nonproliferation Review (Middlebury Institute of International Studies)
Senior Research Associate (Middlebury Institute of International Studies)
15 May 2018

Joshua H. Pollack is the Editor of the The Nonproliferation Review and a Senior Research Associate, and is recognized as a leading expert on nuclear and missile proliferation, focusing on Northeast Asia. Before joining MIIS in April 2016, Pollack served as a consultant to the US government, specializing in issues related to weapons of mass destruction, including proliferation, arms control, and deterrence. As a defense policy analyst at DFI International, Science Applications International Corporation, and Constellation West, his clients included the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) of US Strategic Command. In 2015, he was named an Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute. He also serves as a Research Scientist at CNA, a nonprofit research institution in Arlington, VA. Pollack has contributed to ArmsControlWonk.com, 38North.org, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. His research has appeared in the The Nonproliferation Review in 2011 and 2015.

Dr. Gary Samore
Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government (Harvard University)
2 June 2018

Gary Samore is Executive Director for Research at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. In December 2015, Dr. Samore was appointed as a member of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) under Secretary Ernest Moniz and served until January 2017. He is also a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and member of the advisory board for United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), a non-profit organization that seeks to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. He served for four years as President Obama’s White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including as U.S. Sherpa for the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC and the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, Korea. From 2006 to 2009, Dr. Samore was Vice President for Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
(CFR) in New York, where he held the Maurice R. Greenberg chair and directed the David Rockefeller Studies Program. Before joining CFR, Dr. Samore was vice president for global security and sustainability at the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation in Chicago, and from 2001 to 2005, he was Director of Studies and Senior Fellow for Nonproliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. At IISS, he produced three “strategic dossiers” on Iran (2005), North Korea (2004), and Iraq (2002), which are considered authoritative and exemplary assessments of nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile programs in those countries. Dr. Samore was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export controls during the Clinton Administration. Before the National Security Council, Dr. Samore worked on nonproliferation issues at the State Department. In 1995, he received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service for his role in negotiating the 1994 North Korea nuclear agreement. Prior to the State Department, he worked at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Rand Corporation. Dr. Samore was a National Science Foundation Fellow at Harvard University, where he received his MA and PhD in government in 1984. While at Harvard, he was a pre-doctoral fellow at what was then the Harvard Center for Science and International Affairs, later to become the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

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Dr. Steve Sin

Director, Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division
(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism)
31 May 2018

Dr. Steve S. Sin, Ph.D., is the Director of the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division (UWT) of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), headquartered at the University of Maryland, where he manages large research projects, explores new avenues for research, and establishes collaborative research relationships. Dr. Sin specializes in a broad range of international security, terrorism, and homeland security challenges. His expertise includes radiological and nuclear (RN) terrorism; illicit trafficking of RN materials; terrorist use of cyber domain; emerging technology; emergency preparedness and management; intelligence/counterintelligence operations, analysis, and exploitation; Northeast Asia regional security; and counter-terrorism training, exercise, and curriculum development. His expertise in Northeast Asia regional security is focused on North Korea, including its nuclear program; cyber capabilities; intelligence apparatus; regime survival; and leadership. His additional regional expertise includes South Korean nuclear program and infrastructure; North-South Korea relations; and Korea-Japan-China trilateral relations. Prior to joining START, Dr. Sin was the Senior Research Associate and Section Chief at the National Center for Security & Preparedness (NCSP), a strategic partner with the New York State Division of Homeland Security & Emergency Services (DHSES), headquartered at the State University of New York at Albany (University at Albany). At the NCSP, Dr. Sin directed the organization’s Homeland Security and Terrorism Research Program; led the development, coordination, and delivery of multiple counter-terrorism and emergency response training and exercise programs; and provided direct policy support to New York state homeland security leadership. Dr. Sin’s extensive experience also includes a career as a U.S. Army Officer specializing in counterintelligence, counter-terrorism, and political-military affairs in the Asia-Pacific Theater of Operations. His assignments in the Army included a five-year posting at the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) and the United States Forces Korea (USFK), where he served first as the CFC/USFK Chief of Counterintelligence and Counter-terrorism Analysis Branch and then the CFC/USFK Chief of Open Source Intelligence Branch. While in these positions, Dr. Sin led his teams in the collection and analyses efforts of information relevant to North Korean nuclear development, testing, and long-range missile testing to provide the Command, the ROK decision-makers, and the United States decision-makers accurate and actionable intelligence.
Brig Gen Rob Spalding
Special Assistant to the United States Air Force Vice Chief of Staff (United States Air Force)
15 May 2018

Brig Gen Robert S. Spalding III assumed the duties of Special Assistant to the U.S. Air Force vice chief of staff in February 2018. General Spalding received his commission through Fresno State University’s Reserve Officer Training Corps program in 1991. He earned his doctorate in economics and mathematics from the University of Missouri at Kansas City in 2007. The general attended undergraduate pilot training in 1993, and was subsequently assigned as a B-52 Stratofortress co-pilot in the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota. He subsequently transitioned to the B-2 Spirit at Whiteman AFB, Missouri. In 2001, he was selected as one of three Air Force Olmsted Scholars, and was a distinguished graduate of Mandarin Chinese language training at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. Afterward, the general attended Tongji University in Shanghai as a graduate research student. He then returned to Whiteman AFB as a B-2 evaluator pilot and assistant director of operations for the 393rd Bomb Squadron. The general was then assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Prisoner of War Missing Personnel Office as the military assistant for the deputy assistant secretary of defense. During the Iraq surge in 2007, General Spalding deployed to Baghdad and directed the Personal Security Coordination Center. After a stint at the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, he was reassigned to the B-2 at Whiteman AFB. While at Whiteman AFB, he was the chief of safety, operations group commander and vice wing commander. He was then selected as a Military Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York. General Spalding then served as the chief China strategist for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, Arlington, Va. Prior to his current assignment he served at the White House as the Senior Director for Strategic Planning at the National Security Council, Washington, D.C. General Spalding speaks Chinese-Mandarin and Spanish.

Yun Sun
Co-Director, East Asia Program (Stimson Center)
Director, China Program (Stimson Center)
29 May 2018

Yun Sun is co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. Her expertise is in Chinese foreign policy, U.S.-China relations and China’s relations with neighboring countries and authoritarian regimes. From 2011 to early 2014, she was a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, jointly appointed by the Foreign Policy Program and the Global Development Program, where she focused on Chinese national security decision-making processes and China-Africa relations. From 2008 to 2011, Yun was the China Analyst for the International Crisis Group based in Beijing, specializing on China’s foreign policy towards conflict countries and the developing world. Prior to ICG, she worked on U.S.-Asia relations in Washington, DC for five years. Yun earned her master’s degree in international policy and practice from George Washington University, as well as an MA in Asia Pacific studies and a BA in international relations from Foreign Affairs College in Beijing.

Dr. Miles Yu
Professor (United States Naval Academy)
6 June 2018

Miles Maochun Yu is a professor of East Asia and military and naval history at the United States Naval Academy (USNA). He is the author of numerous scholarly articles on military and intelligence history and newspaper columns; his books include OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War.
Author Biographies

Weston Aviles  
Analyst

Weston Aviles is an Analyst at NSI, Inc. He studied criminology and political science at Arizona State University (BS) with minors in Middle Eastern history and economics, and certificates in political thought and leadership, international studies and religion and conflict. Weston then studied Government at the InterDisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Israel graduate school with a focus in counter-terrorism and security studies (MA). His graduate studies focused on Arab Spring dynamics, international security in the MENA region and radical Islam. Weston is an alumnus of the University of Virginia’s Semester at Sea program and has participated in several academic programs in Israel to study terrorism and counter-terrorism. Weston continues a research focus on Middle Eastern politics and conflict studies.

George Popp  
Senior Analyst

George Popp is a Senior Analyst at NSI, Inc. where he conducts research and analysis on a broad range of multidisciplinary analysis projects that focus on understanding the political, economic, and social dynamics of emerging conflict situations and environments throughout the world. The bulk of George’s work has been in support of NSI’s government initiatives, particularly leading and contributing to human behavior analytics efforts completed for the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) program on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in support of direct requests from US Combatant Commanders to the Department of Defense. George has also supported NSI’s commercial initiatives, conducting business intelligence analyses for clients in the video game industry. George started with NSI as an Intern, and has risen through the ranks since. He was honored to be promoted to Senior Analyst in 2017. George’s degree is in Economics from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.