TRUCKS, KNIVES, BOMBS, WHATEVER

GW
Program on
Extremism

EXPLORING PRO-ISLAMIC STATE INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIAL ON TELEGRAM

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
Key Questions



- How do English-speaking online supporters of the Islamic State share instructional material on Telegram, and what types of material are frequently disseminated?
- What can dissemination of instructional material explain about the broader use of Telegram by IS supporters?
- What is the impact of online instructional material on terrorist learning and attack planning?

- <u>98 channels</u>, collected as part of Program on Extremism's "Telegram Tracker" project
- December—June 2017
 - 98.7 members/channel
 - 7,560 photos, 536 videos, 300 audio
 messages, 8,243 files, and 689 URL links
- Three major categories
 - Explosives construction
 - "Low-tech" attacks
 - Operational and cyber security

The Data




Category 1: Explosives



- information and step-by-step instructions to synthesize explosive material, improvised explosive devices, and instructions for carrying out an attack using explosive devices
- Approximately half (46%) of surveyed channels contained some form of explosives-making instruction
- "Lone Mujahid"
- Reposting of non-IS explosives manuals
 - Jihadi sources
 - Other sources

Category 2: Low Tech Attacks



- information and guidance about conducting attacks that do not require explosive devices (knife attacks, vehicular assaults and rammings, arsons, train derailments, etc.)
- "Just Terror Tactics" + crowdsourced instructions
 - Operational playbooks
- Recent months: poisons

Category 3: Operational and Cyber Security



- information about avoiding detection while implementing a plot and reducing the risk of apprehension; instructions to avoid monitoring of online activity, including the installation of privacymaximizing applications and services (virtual private networks, anonymous browsers, 'self-destruct' features, encrypted messaging and e-mail services, etc.)
- 70% of channels posted information on OPSEC or cybersecurity
- Cybersecurity
 - application download links for avoiding detection online (VPNs, anonymous browsers, etc.)
 - Instructions for creating multiple accounts on mainstream social media

Observation 1: Everything Goes





- English-language, pro-Islamic State Telegram channel administrators post a wide array of instructional material from inside and outside the jihadi movement.
 - Dearth of officially-released IS instructional material in English
 - Surplus of material released by other groups (AQAP)
 - English-speaking jihadist attack planners: a la carte approaches to the broader movement

#2: Filesharing, Filesharing, Filesharing



- Telegram has changed the landscape of jihadist instructional material distribution by developing a platform that combines extensive file-sharing capabilities in multiple file formats with lax regulation.
 - Critical factor in jihadist use of the platform more broadly
 - Expansion in size/type of media
 - Laissez-faire regulation and the "clearinghouse" factor

#3: Impact, Techne, and Metis



- Should we be worried about attackplanning instructional material on Telegram?
 - Yes, with caveats
 - Access to instructions ≠ successful plot
 - Techne/metis
 - TATP/Akayed Ullah
- OPSEC/cybersecurity manuals- important concern
 - Easily accessible and implementable
 - Impede law enforcement/intelligence collection
 - Make efforts against ISIS elsewhere online difficult

Thank you!

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