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Achieving a Stable Regional Order in the Asia Pacific: What Does the US Need and What Should it Not Negotiate Away?

**A Korea Strategic Outcomes
Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa®)
Report**

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Authors

Dr. Belinda Bragg

George Popp

Please direct inquiries to George Popp at gpopp@nsiteam.com

What is ViTTa®?

NSI's **Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa®)** provides rapid response to critical information needs by pulsing a global network of subject matter experts (SMEs) to generate a wide range of expert insight. For this Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Strategic Outcomes on the Korean Peninsula project, ViTTa was used to address eight key questions provided by the Joint Staff project sponsors. The ViTTa team received written response submissions from 50 subject matter experts from academia, government, military, and industry. Each Korea Strategic Outcomes ViTTa report presents 1) a summary overview of the expert contributor response to the ViTTa question of focus, and 2) the full corpus of expert contributor responses received for the ViTTa question of focus. Biographies for all expert contributors are also included in each report.

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ViTTa Question

[Q6] What are the minimum regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions that are essential for achieving a stable regional order in alignment with US and ally interests? Are there any factors that are sufficient to generate such stability in the region? That is, what should not be negotiated away?

Subject Matter Expert Contributors

Dr. Bruce Bennet, RAND; **Dr. Stephen Blank**, American Foreign Policy Council; **Dr. Stephen Cimbala**, Penn State Brandywine; **Ken Gause**, CNA; **Dr. David Hunter-Chester**, Training and Doctrine Command G-2; **Dr. Jeffrey Knopf**, Middlebury Institute of International Studies; **Dr. Gregory Kulacki**, Union of Concerned Scientists; **Dr. Andrew O’Neil**, Griffith University; **Dr. John Plumb**, RAND; **Anthony Rinna**, Sino-NK; **Dr. Sheila Smith**, Council on Foreign Relations; **Brig Gen Rob Spalding**, United States Air Force; **Yun Sun**, Stimson Center; **Dr. Michael Swaine**, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; **Yuki Tatsumi**, Stimson Center; **Dr. Miles Yu**, United States Naval Academy

Summary Response

This report summarizes the input of seventeen insightful responses from the Korea Strategic Outcomes Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) expert contributors. While this summary response presents an overview of the key expert contributor insights, the summary alone cannot fully convey the fine detail of the contributor inputs provided, each of which is worth reading in its entirety. For this report, the expert contributors consider what political, economic, and social conditions are conducive to achieving a stable regional order in the Asia Pacific that is in alignment with US and US ally interests. This summary details the various conditions that emerge.

Achieving a Stable Regional Order

Nearly all of the contributors indicate, either directly or indirectly, that, if the United States’ desired regional order in the Asia Pacific is interpreted as continued US military presence and dominant US influence in the region, then it is unlikely to be stable. Such a regional order fundamentally conflicts with China’s strategic interest in becoming the dominant regional power and influencer.¹ For China, weakening US alliances, and pushing the US out of the region—politically, economically, and militarily—is essential to achieving its own regional objectives.² Contributors, therefore, generally align with the conclusion put forward by Dr. Michael Swaine of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, that US “efforts to double down on [its] predominance [in the region], with or without allied support, are likely to prove futile and excessively destabilizing.” Accordingly, a stable regional order, contributors suggest, may require achieving a unique balance between the United States’ force posture and China’s expansionist tendencies.³ It is clear, however, that the fundamental incompatibility between US and Chinese interests will make any effort to achieve a stable regional order in alignment with US and US ally interests quite challenging.

¹ See contributions from Bennett; Sun; and Swaine.

² See contribution from Spalding.

³ See contributions from Plumb; Rinna; Sun; and Swaine.

When considering specific conditions that are conducive to regional stability in the Asia Pacific, therefore, it is important to recognize that what either the US or China sees as a driver of stability, is likely to be seen by the other as a barrier to stability. The table below summarizes what contributors identify as key conditions of the regional order preferred by the US and its allies, as well as the often conflicting (red cells) nature of these US preferences to those of China and Russia.

Regional Conditions	United States' and US allies' preferred regional order	Does this conform (green) or conflict (red) with China's and Russia's preferred regional order
Non-Proliferation (including DPRK FFVD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nuclear non-proliferation (Blank). Prevent the rise of pro-nuclear forces in the region (Blank; Hunter-Chester). Incorporate non-proliferation into regional security architecture (Cimbala). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> China and Russia also oppose nuclear proliferation in the region, as both generally believe that it will make the region as a whole less stable (Blank).
US Influence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expand US and US ally leadership and engagement in the region (O'Neil). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Broader US engagement in the region fundamentally conflicts with China's strategic interest in becoming the dominant regional power and influencer (Bennett; Hunter-Chester; Spalding; Sun; Swaine).
US Alliances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Preserve US alliances with the ROK and Japan (Blank; Rinna). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong US alliances in the region impede China's push for regional influence and expansion, and may drive China to attempt to use negotiations with the DPRK as an opportunity to reduce US forces and weaken US alliances in the region (Plumb; Spalding). Russia has complained that Japan's continued relations with the US inhibits the normalization of its relations with Japan, especially in light of disputes over the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories (Rinna).
US Military Presence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Retain right to base US forces in the ROK and Japan, including strong air and naval presence around the Korean Peninsula (Plumb; Rinna). Retain right to base US conventional weapons and operate US missile defense systems in the region (Plumb). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pushing the US out of the region militarily is essential to China's regional interests (Bennett; Spalding; Sun; Swaine). China and Russia perceive continued US military presence in the region as an effort to balance out and/or thwart their own respective military capabilities (Rinna).
US Deterrence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain credible deterrents and defenses for Japan and the ROK against China and the DPRK (Blank). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Russia and China view US THAAD deployment, ostensibly against the DPRK, as targeted at their own military capabilities (Blank; Rinna).
Domestic Political Stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support domestic political stability in each of the stakeholder countries (China, DPRK, ROK, Japan, Russia) (Goto; Tatsumi). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social and regime stability in the DPRK is essential to both China's and Russia's regional interests (Tatsumi).
Economic Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promote regional economic order based on a series of robust US bilateral economic relationships to prevent domination by one country or economic bloc (Rinna). Support free and uninterrupted trade in the region (Smith; Tatsumi). Preserve US economic leadership in the region (i.e., do not compromise long-term strategic investment in Asia for short-term wins on trade) (Smith). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pushing the US out of the region economically is essential to China's regional interests (Bennett; Spalding; Sun; Swaine). Free and uninterrupted trade in the region is consistent with China's and Russia's interests (Hunter-Chester; Smith; Tatsumi; Rinna).

Of all the conditions highlighted as conducive to a stable regional order as currently envisioned by the US, only final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD) in the DPRK is identified by contributors as an essential condition that should not be negotiated away.⁴ While contributors contend that FFVD will make the region safer and more stable, they also suggest that it has implications for achieving other US objectives in the region. For example, Dr. Andrew O’Neil of Griffith University argues that settling for anything less than FFVD in the DPRK could be interpreted by US allies as a signal of declining US regional commitment and, as a consequence, undermine US deterrence credibility.⁵ This could lead US allies such as Japan or the ROK to reevaluate their own military capabilities, potentially including the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and, consequently, undermine US non-proliferation goals.⁶

The contributors, therefore, emphasize the importance of taking a gradual, multilateral approach to denuclearization that recognizes and accommodates the intermediate objectives of key regional actors. Achieving an agreement that has regional buy-in, particularly from the United States’ regional allies, contributors explain, may counter concerns regarding US disengagement.⁷ Moreover, while including China and Russia in the negotiations may increase the complexity of the negotiation process, and the potential for a breakdown in negotiations as a result, it also decreases the likelihood that the US and China, in particular, will come into direct confrontation over any negotiated outcomes.

Conclusion

The contributor response overall highlights the significant impact that competing interests and regional competition between the US and China has on stability in the Asia Pacific region. The ways in which the US and China currently perceive their regional interests seem destined to lead to a clash between the two powers if not amended. A regional order based on continued US military presence and dominant US influence fundamentally conflicts with China’s current interests in increased, if not dominant, regional political, military, and economic power. If the US fails to account for China’s interests, therefore, the actions that the US is likely to take to reinforce its vision of a stable regional order may end up decreasing stability in the Asia Pacific region over the longer-term. Additionally, if the US fails to redress the loss of confidence amongst its regional allies and partners in its economic and security commitments to the region, it is hard to see how the US would continue to exercise regional influence at all. Therefore, the most effective way for the US to balance these two considerations, the contributors suggest, appears to be by working multilaterally with regional allies as well as with China and Russia toward a stable regional order in the Asia Pacific.

⁴ In addition to FFVD, Smith considers democratic values, including the refusal to ignore human rights abuses, as a core value of US and US ally identities and, therefore, something that should not be compromised.

⁵ See also the contributions from Blank and Cimbala.

⁶ See contributions from Cimbala and O’Neil.

⁷ See contributions from Cimbala; O’Neil; and Tatsumi in particular.

Subject Matter Expert Response Submissions

Dr. Bruce Bennett

Senior International/Defense Researcher (RAND)
25 May 2018

You must be careful in describing what you mean as a stable regional order and stability in the region, especially in terms of US interests. Regional stability means that the United States will maintain strong influence in the region while China maintains a number two position. That is not at all what China wants—it wants a fundamental change in regional relationships with China the dominant party and with the other regional countries prepared to accept Chinese influence operations (they will do with China tells them to do—a new kind of regional stability). As noted above, China appears to view US and Chinese power as a zero-sum game, and one which China appears to be winning. Unless developments in the region change, there will be a new stability of Chinese dominance and dictation.

Dr. Stephen Blank

Senior Fellow for Russia (American Foreign Policy Council)
14 May 2018

The minimum regional, political, economic, and social questions for the US and its allies with regard to Korea strike me as the following:

1. Complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization (CVID) as any nuclear program makes the entire region, not just the U.S. and its allies insecure if not unsafe
2. Preservation of the U.S.-ROK alliance which is a keystone of regional security as much as it is of bilateral security, while there might be changes to the alliance it remains indispensable for overall Asian security, i.e. South Korea, Japan, power projection southwards
3. In return for which there needs to be a formal peace treaty ending the Korean War. This should contain mutual security guarantees of both Koreas by both Koreas and the other five members of the six-party process. This entails an end to all acts of belligerency, mutual recognition by all concerned of the two Korean states, an end to sanctions (whether at once or over time is a matter for discussion) and economic assistance to North Korea. This will have to go beyond private investment, which the Administration is now touting, but the details are really a matter for negotiation. As I have suggested, this could involve support for a Trans-Siberian, Trans-Korean gas line—Moscow's obsession—to bring it into the agreement, and to supplant North Korea's need for nuclear energy. On a larger scale this means economic integration of North Korea into the global economy. At the same time an end to all acts of belligerency also mandates resolution of the issue of Japanese abductees and a full accounting of their present situation, and repatriation for those who want it.
4. In other words, CVID whether over a period of time or rapidly is something that cannot be negotiated away or should not be negotiated away. The issue of timing the process by which we arrive at CVID can be solved if there is mutual good faith. But the substance cannot be eroded. The same holds true for preserving the alliance and the cessation of all acts of belligerency by all of the parties. We could also arrange for a robust peace enforcement force under UN auspices since we fought the war under those auspices to begin with. The issue of timing is negotiable as long as the negotiations are in good faith and credible on both sides.
5. This does suggest that there may have to be some revision of the THAAD deployment that is ostensibly against North Korean missiles. This might entice China and Russia to support the treaty but we do have to maintain credible deterrents and defense for Japan to keep it secure against the PRC and/or DPRK and also to prevent a recrudescence of pro-nuclear forces in either Japan or South Korea.

Dr. Stephen Cimbala

Distinguished Professor of Political Science (Penn State Brandywine)

16 May 2018

U.S. objectives include the denuclearization of North Korea, the deterrence of armed attack on South Korea or Japan, and the construction of a durable, deterrence-stable and crisis shock resistant security architecture for the Asia-Pacific region. This implies a regional security architecture in which the control of nuclear weapons spread is important, as is the diplomatic management of relations among the existing nuclear weapons states in Asia to ensure against deliberate or accidental-inadvertent nuclear first use.

The denuclearization of North Korea cannot be accomplished in a single bilateral negotiation, nor as a fait accompli growing out of a militarily imposed solution. The negotiations that may result in the denuclearization of North Korea will, of necessity, involve other regional U.S. partners and allies: including South Korea, Japan, China and Russia. This format will require consultation and collaboration among the five parties negotiating with Pyongyang as to their immediate, intermediate and longer-range objectives.

Denuclearization of North Korea will require the five negotiating partners to agree measures for continuing reassurance and stable deterrence. Reassurance starts with what North Korea wants most: a permanent end to the Korean war in the form of a peace treaty signed by the relevant powers (North and South Korea, the United States and China) and supported by the other negotiating partners (Russia and Japan) as well as the UN Security Council. The treaty should provide explicit acknowledgment of North Korea as a state member of the international community and renounce efforts at imposed regime change by outside powers. Absent such an agreement, North Korea has little or no incentive to provide concessions on military or other matters as a result of diplomatic negotiations.

Denuclearization may be defined differently by North Korea compared to its five interlocutors in the six-party framework (as above). For the United States, officials have stated the venerable formula of CVID (comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement) of North Korea's nuclear weapons and supporting infrastructure. It must be realized how ambitious this aim is. Without nuclear weapons or at least the capacity to promptly manufacture and deploy nuclear weapons, North Korea is a much less important international actor. Its leader Kim Jong-un vaulted himself into global prominence in 2017 precisely by a staccato of nuclear and missile tests and by explicit threats of nuclear attack against the United States and its regional allies. In addition, it is thought by military experts that, although the North Korean conventional military forces are large in size, they are inferior to those of South Korea in technology and in other ways. In any war between the two Koreas without the use of nuclear weapons, South Korea (presumably supported by the U.S.) would prevail.

Therefore, the first step in any multilateral negotiation with North Korea is to agree the five partners on a gradualist strategy for DPRK denuclearization. The increments of a gradualist strategy might be as follows: (1), North Korea agrees to a moratorium on all nuclear and missile testing; (2), North Korea agrees to a road map for its future production of fissile materials, with limitations on the amounts of enriched uranium and weapons grade plutonium, as verified by international inspectors; (3) North Korea agrees to limitations on the numbers and ranges of its ballistic missiles; (4), North and South Korea agree to ongoing bilateral military to military professional exchanges, including shared observers at military exercises; (5), North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and the United States agree on cooperative threat reduction measures in the Asia-Pacific theater to reduce the likelihood of any outbreak of conventional war or resort to nuclear coercion. These measures could include steps to avoid accidental or inadvertent naval engagements, air collisions, provocative military exercises, and-or declarations of hubristic no fly zones or expanded air identification zones.

In addition to the conclusion of a peace treaty ending the Korean war (as above), parallel or reciprocal moves by the Five could be as follows: (1), reduction in the frequency and intensity of U.S. – South Korean military exercises (but not their elimination); (2), economic assistance to North Korea for food aid and infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, transportation, electrification, and environmental needs; for example, in the case of transportation, China and Russia agree to finance a “Silk Road –Korean extension” high speed rail and superhighway to carry Russian and Chinese exports through North Korea to South Korea (and Korean exports in reverse); (3), an aggressive program of cultural exchanges between the two Koreas and between North Korea and free market countries, including performances by theater groups and other artists as well as lecture series, student exchanges, research collaboration between academics, and an open door for investment partnerships; (4), admission of North Korea to the international banking system without restriction along with eligibility for development loans from IMF or other international financiers; along with this, encourage U.S. and other free market economy states to establish business schools in North Korea (Wharton Pyongyang); (5), South and North Korea agree to talks on the possibility of reunification or, failing that, demilitarization of the Korean peninsula (to the extent of large scale reductions in the capabilities of their offensive conventional military forces, including long range air, artillery and missiles), supported by agreed transparency measures, possibly including regional or UN observers.

Regardless the particular schedule for implementation of these or other measures, it will also be necessary to address specifically the wider problem of nuclear weapons spread in Asia. An Asian Nonproliferation and Nuclear Threat Reduction Council (ANNTRC) should be established among states in the region, supported by the UN and including NWS and NNWS that are shareholders or stakeholders in Asian-Pacific regional stability (shareholders live in the neighborhood or deploy significant military forces there—stakeholders are others whose economies or security are directly affected by Asian-Pacific stability or lack thereof). The Asian Nonproliferation and Nuclear Threat Reduction Council would be a forum for the discussion of issues and concerns about nuclear weapons spread and, as well, a possible template for constructive conflict avoidance, resolution or containment (in the case of dangerous incidents or outbreaks of regional war with the potential for nuclear escalation). Ultimately this council might be broadened in its mandate to include non-nuclear related security and stability issues: an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia (OSCA) modeled along the lines of the present OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe).

Dr. David Hunter-Chester

Senior Research Analyst, Athena Team (Training and Doctrine Command G-2)

Senior Research Analyst (Intelligent Decisions Systems, Inc.)

4 September 2018

What are the minimum regional domestic political, economic and social conditions that are essential for achieving a stable regional order in alignment with US and ally interests? Are there any factors that are sufficient to generate such stability in the region?

- Some kind of peace agreement, and a verification regime in place to prevent further development or proliferation of nuclear weapons is workable. The U.S. will probably have to accept the DPRK retaining some warheads.

Which regional actors' interests (security, economic, domestic, influence/prestige) are consistent with regional stability favorable to with US interests? Which actors have interests that are at odds with that outcome? Which are indifferent?

- Japan's interests are the most consistent with those of the U.S. The RoK currently thinks economic development in the DPRK is the most key. China's over-riding concern is to reduce U.S. influence in the region. Russia is indifferent, most desiring to use the DPRK as a way to get around economic sanctions, and for its warm water ports.

Which regional actors have interests consistent with a complete and verifiable denuclearization of DPRK? Which actors are at odds? Which indifferent?

- The U.S. and Japan especially want CVD. China is less concerned, especially if the DPRK retaining some nuclear capability demonstrates weakness for the U.S. Russia is indifferent – only concerned with doing business with the DPRK.

Under what regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions would it be possible to reinforce a non-proliferation regime to include extra-regional sales?

- Security guarantees for the DPRK, but no diminution of U.S. military assets in the region. Further marketization and infrastructure improvement in the DPRK.

Ken Gause

Director, International Affairs Group, Center for Strategic Studies (CNA)

4 June 2018

The answer to this question depends on KJU's objective. If it is reunification under NK rule, then there is not much the US can do. Retaining the status quo is the best option. If, on the other hand, KJU's objective is regime survival, then there is room for maneuver. This means that Kim's calculus is flexible and he is willing to make concessions that benefit both the US and its allies. The US would not have to negotiate much away to secure this future. It might have to forego the hardline denuclearization and be able to live with an ambiguous situation.

Shihoko Goto

Senior Northeast Asia Associate, Asia Program (Wilson Center)

7 June 2018

From an economic perspective, East Asia remains united in ensuring continued growth across Asia. While there are cracks to the basic tenets of the so-called East Asian miracle once so lauded until about a decade ago, commitment to the region's rapid rise remains a key force that unites Japan, South Korea, China, and Taiwan. Together, they represent nearly a quarter of global GDP. To date, anxiety about North Korea has not had significant impact on the economies of the major Asian countries. Even at the height of nuclear testing and missile launches by North Korea last year, stock markets in the region remained largely unshaken. So, while worries about a potential attack or miscalculations about military strikes increased, Asian bourses remained relatively calm.

That is not to say investors have not been unnerved by tensions over North Korea. There has been a steady appreciation of currencies, especially the Japanese yen, against the US dollar, motivated by concerns about growing risks. Repatriation of investments from overseas, including the United States, back into East Asia has contributed to a weakening of the dollar. An actual physical strike on Japan or South Korea would of course have the opposite effect (i.e., there would be a sell-off of Asian assets in favor of offshoring to the United States). To date, however, wariness about North Korean tensions has not led to flight of capital from the principal economies of Asia, and investment patterns have remained unchanged as has market sentiment.

Continued stability would depend on the preservation of the status quo, or at least predictability in change, including denuclearization. Short of an actual strike, however, the biggest risk to economic upset would actually be unfettered extension of relations or even a collapse of the North Korean regime. The spillover effect of ensuring North Korean recovering will be felt mostly by South Korea and Japan. Of course, Seoul would see the biggest impact of such an outcome, not only as it will need to shoulder much of the financial as well as the social cost of reunification estimated to reach over \$1 trillion. With youth unemployment in South Korea already nearly at 10 percent, there is growing concern that overtures to the North would come at a steep price for those the younger generation in particular. The fact that President Trump is expecting China, Japan, and South Korea to be responsible for economic aid to Pyongyang will undoubtedly increase the financial burden of the three countries and likely adversely impact diplomatic relations with the United States, especially in the near-term.

A divide in economic vision for North Korea will be inevitable on three fronts, namely in providing direct financial assistance; offering investments and technological transfer; and migration. Pyongyang itself may be eyeing to follow the Chinese model of economic growth, but how and under what conditions aid and capital are offered will undoubtedly lead to a divide among Asian nations that must bear the bulk of the responsibility to enable North Korea to follow that path.

Dr. Jeffrey Knopf

Professor (Middlebury Institute of International Studies)

13 June 2018

The United States should be careful that any future deal with North Korea does not lead to a termination of US security ties to South Korea and Japan. The future might not look exactly the same as it does now, but mutual defense treaties and continued military cooperation will be important. Japan and South Korea will need to feel assurance that their security is still protected in case things go wrong. The US-China relationship is also important. If that becomes too conflictual, China might encourage North Korea to break out of a denuclearization agreement. This does not mean that the US has to be completely deferential to China. But something like a US-China trade war could have spillover effects that would undermine regional stability. In short, a continued US presence in the region should not be negotiated away. There might be a lighter footprint in the future, but complete withdrawal should not be on the table.

Dr. Gregory Kulacki

China Project Manager (Union of Concerned Scientists)

22 May 2018

We already have a reasonably stable regional order in alignment with US and allied interests. The goal should be to preserve and deepen that stability. Reducing the potential for instability caused by the DPRK is not difficult to accomplish as long as all

parties are willing to accept that the regime will be part of the regional community for the indefinite future and that it is in the best interests of all concerned to create a situation where the DPRK can evolve into a more “normal” member of that community. The more odious aspects of the regime cannot be eliminated or reformed in a short period of time, but they can be changed over the longer term, as we saw in the case of Mao’s China. The United States does not need to negotiate away anything. It should, in the interest of encouraging DPRK normalization, stop engaging in provocative behaviors meant to signal or demonstrate the resolve and capability to use force, but the means to do that, if necessary, can remain in the region without inhibiting the process of “normalization.”

Dr. Andrew O’Neil

Dean, Research (Griffith University)
Professor, Political Science (Griffith University)
31 May 2018

Put bluntly, US interests in Asia – or at least the perception of these interests by regional allies – are more fluid than at any time since the end of the Vietnam War. Since early 2017, US leadership in Asia has become increasingly dependent on the role of PACOM in particular, but also more broadly on the strength of existing military-military cooperation with individual allies. There is now an emerging deficit of US political leadership in Asia, stemming almost exclusively from the ‘America First’ agenda of the White House. Among other things, this has been evident in US withdrawal from the TPP, the increasingly transactional characterization of alliance relationships, and a lack of consistency in relation to China policy. Leadership by US institutions such as the military can probably compensate for a lack of direction in Washington, but this potential has its limits. Growing domestic preoccupations in Washington may have the effect of further narrowing the bandwidth of focused US leadership in Asia. Specifically, in relation to North Korea, should the White House settle for a commitment by Pyongyang to rollback its ICBM program, and not its broader nuclear and missile programs, allies in Asia will grow even more anxious about the potential for strategic decoupling of the US from the region. This, combined with more generic concerns over the prospects of US leadership, could have the effect of encouraging greater instability in Asia and force countries like Japan to confront unsavory choices about their own strategic capabilities, potentially including the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Dr. John Plumb

Senior Engineer (RAND)
4 June 2018

A stable regional order requires US forces in the region to balance China’s aggressive expansionist tendencies in the region. China may attempt to use any DPRK negotiations as an opportunity to reduce US conventional and missile defense forces and weaken US alliances in the region.

1. The US should not negotiate away its right to base forces in South Korea, Japan, or surrounding areas.
2. US should not negotiate away its right to operate missile defense systems in the region.
3. The US should not negotiate away its right to base conventional (non-nuclear) weapons in the region.

Anthony Rinna

Senior Editor (Sino-NK)
28 May 2018

A resolution to the Korean security crisis will inevitably raise questions of the utility of maintaining a US military presence in Korea (as well as Japan). The United States should, under all circumstances maintain a military presence on the Korean Peninsula sufficient to balance out China and Russia’s respective military capabilities in Northeast Asia beyond the context of the Korean security crisis. It is especially critical for the United States to maintain a strong air force and naval presence in and around the Korean Peninsula. This also goes for US missile defense capabilities.

The Chinese and Russian governments have expressed fears of having, in the case of a reunified Korean Peninsula, a country with a long-term US troop presence directly on its borders. Beijing and Moscow have also repeatedly expressed their

apprehensions about the US's deployment of missile defense systems such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in the Republic of Korea. China and Russia's misgivings are certainly understandable from a collective psychological point of view: they are countries with a permanent, sovereign geographic presence in the vicinity of Korea, whereas the United States is an external foreign power projecting influence in Northeast Asia. Where Beijing and Moscow's outspokenness, particularly in the case of THAAD constitutes attempts to pressure the United States to change its policies, from a technical standpoint, China and Russia are perfectly capable of projecting power against the US and its regional allies.

In addition to the maintenance of US hard-power capabilities, the US must also ensure a regional commercial order that ensures the US's adversaries in the region cannot wage economic warfare against regional allies. The need for this was most readily apparent in 2017 when China took (unofficial and undeclared, but very real) economic measures to punish South Korea for agreeing to host THAAD. The best regional economic order to serve the interests of the US and its allies is one with a series of robust bilateral economic relationships, but one that is not vulnerable to domination by one country or economic bloc. This could include US allies such as Japan and South Korea developing trade relationships with American adversaries such as Russia. The reason for this is because due to the economic underdevelopment of the Russian Far East, Russia is interested in garnering investment from wealth East Asian countries. Where China curbed trade with South Korea in 2017 in response to THAAD, Russia continued to develop trade relations with South Korea. Of course, Japan and South Korea should also strive to strengthen their economic ties with other American partners in the Indo-Pacific.

As China and Russia will most likely take a resolution of the Korea crisis as an opportunity to push for the ejection of US forces from the region, Washington must be continuously wary of Chinese and Russian attempts to split the US's alliances. In particular, the US must be on guard against Russian moves to split the Japan-US alliance. Moscow and Tokyo have been taking steps to normalize their relationship in light of their outstanding dispute over the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories. Russia has complained of Japan's continued closeness to the US as being a factor inhibiting the normalization of relations. The ongoing Japan-Russia territorial dispute may explain why Russia has complained more directly to Japan about Tokyo's decision to allow the deployment of Aegis Ashore, whereas Russia has not been as direct in its criticism of South Korea over THAAD.

As far as domestic conditions are concerned, the US must make it clear to South Korea that unification between North and South Korea should be a gradual process. In the immediate term, the US and its allies should push for a gradual improvement in the human rights situation in North Korea while allowing the Kim Family Regime and the North Korean elites to maintain power. Pushing for regime change or a fundamental change in North Korea's system of government will likely lead to upheaval that would be detrimental to US interests, and be unwelcome by China and Russia. Given North Korea's abysmal human rights record, even in comparison to other countries with poor human rights situations, even the smallest improvement in human rights would help gradually bring North Korea up to level more agreeable for other countries.

Dr. Sheila Smith

Senior Fellow for Japan Studies (Council on Foreign Relations)

28 May 2018

As non-nuclear states, Japan and South Korea are militarily vulnerable to China, the DPRK and Russia. The U.S. must demonstrate its full commitment to defend its allies. The U.S. and ROK militaries have full operational understanding of what they would do together. The U.S. and Japanese militaries do not. Integrating U.S. and Japanese forces (co-basing, contingency planning, etc.) is required. Democratic values are at the core of U.S., South Korean and Japanese societies. No compromise of our identities as democracies should be tolerated. This includes our refusal to ignore human rights abuses. Should the U.S. and our allies fail to ensure our citizens' economic well-being, the alliances will weaken. Protectionism and other discriminatory trade practices should not be used to U.S. advantage, nor allowed to flourish in Asia. The U.S. should not abandon its economic leadership, nor compromise its long-term strategic investment in Asia for a quick win on trade.

Brig Gen Rob Spalding

Special Assistant to the United States Air Force Vice Chief of Staff (United States Air Force)

15 May 2018

This is not possible. Absent a change in the Chinese Communist Party, China will pursue a long-term strategy designed to weaken the US and eventually force it out of Asia, politically, militarily and economically. There is no grand bargain possible. China sees only one path and that is dominance in Asia. The DPRK issue is a component of a longer-term strategy. China will

take what gains it can using DPRK to cleave US from allies and partners, exhaust it financially, and weaken it militarily. They realize the US is spread too thin and the US military will eventually buckle under the pressure.

Yun Sun

Co-Director, East Asia Program (Stimson Center)
Director, China Program (Stimson Center)
29 May 2018

As a China specialist, I will say that China will not support a stable regional order aligned with US and ally interests, because that is essentially seen as against China's interests. Factors to generate such stability would require the removal of China's ambition to challenge US dominance/presence in the West Pacific. That could either be the implosion of the Chinese regime, or significant reduction of the Chinese capacity, hence its ambition. If the US top priority is to counter China's rise, the removal of DPRK as a piece of leverage for China will be conducive. But that requires US to adopt a completely different policy toward DPRK, which may not be feasible.

Dr. Michael Swaine

Senior Fellow (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
25 May 2018

A stable, long-term order in the Asia Pacific will require a stable balance of power between the U.S./Japan alliance and China, with the support of other key Asian nations. Such a balance implies a fundamental change in the current U.S. policy of zero-sum competition with Beijing through a strengthening of the so-called Quad alliance of Asian democracies (a key component of the FOIP), toward a set of more defensive-oriented military postures and understandings regarding the most likely sources of future conflict in the region. Efforts to double down on U.S. predominance, with or without allied support, are likely to prove futile and excessively destabilizing. I have presented this argument in some detail in my 2016 Carnegie report entitled *Creating a Stable Asia: An Agenda for a U.S.-China Balance of Power*. A shorter version of this argument was submitted this week as written testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asia.

Yuki Tatsumi

Co-Director, East Asia Program (Stimson Center)
Director, Japan Program (Stimson Center)
31 May 2018

Note: the following response focuses on the Japanese and ROK perspectives.

The overall minimum regional and domestic political, economic, and social conditions essential for achieving a stable regional order in Northeast Asia that is in alignment not only with the US but also with our allies' interests have the following major attributes:

1. Absence of the risk of military conflict, and the provocations, both military and para-military, that may lead to a military conflict.
2. Stable domestic political situation in each of the stakeholder countries—PRC, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Russia. In case of North Korea and China, in particular, the absence of major threat to the country's leadership—social stability in these three countries, in other words—is essential for China, North Korea and Russia. In case of Japan and ROK, social stability and its impact.
3. Uninterrupted trade within the region.

Given the importance of these components for a stable regional order in Northeast Asia, the current developments toward a possible agreement between the US and North Korea on the denuclearization of North Korea is a very positive trend.

However, the devils are in the details, as it always has been for the past agreement on the denuclearization of North Korea. Even if some kind of an agreement on the principles toward the path for North Korea's denuclearization can be reached

between the US and North Korea, a complex, step-by-step, reciprocal plan for denuclearization need to be worked out, and any sustainable plan needs to have a buy-in from all the stakeholders in the region.

What will be challenging for the United States moving forward is that the national interest of Japan and the ROK—US allies in this region—differs. The difference between what Japan considers to be a desirable solution and what the ROK regard as such is not drastic, but there is enough divergence between the two that, aggravated by the mutual mistrust that continues to persist between Tokyo and Seoul, makes it difficult for the US to navigate through.

Difference between Japan and the ROK on what they consider to be their desirable outcome is driven by fundamentally different perception of North Korea. Japan considers North Korea as its primary short-term security threat. Such a sense has been only aggravated by North Korea's nuclear activities, of course, but also by Pyongyang's frequent ballistic missile testing.

Furthermore, the bilateral issue that Japan has had with North Korea on so-called “abductee” issue—the account of the 12 Japanese citizens who North Korea have confirmed that its spy agents kidnapped and then take them back to North Korea to train its agents to be able to behave like Japanese—remains as the politically most challenging issue for Japanese leadership to resolve.

Give such context, for Japan, therefore, any agreement that the US might reach with North Korea will have to have the following three components:

1. Denuclearization of North Korea (as opposed to “Korean Peninsula” which would raise serious questions about the sustainability of US extended nuclear deterrence in this region in the eyes of Japan).
2. Disarmament of North Korea's ballistic missile capabilities (not only ICBMs but also MRBMs and SRBMs).
3. Resolution of the abduction issues (which can be included under the broader issue of “North Korea's human rights issue.”)

Furthermore, should the agreement for North Korea's denuclearization eventually pave the way toward the end of hostilities between the US and North Korea and a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula, Japan has a critical interest in ensuring that the reunified Korean Peninsula remains (a) pro-US (preferably continues to allow some level of US force presence on the Peninsula) and (b) cautious of China's intentions and behaviors.

The ROK, on the other hand, has a fundamentally different perception of North Korea from Japan. For the ROK, North Korea is a hostile country for now, but it also considers North Korea as a “brethren” that has been divided by the Korea War. Also, as the generation that fought the Korean War moves on, the younger generation tends to be more influenced by diplomatic overture and what can be perceived as a friendly gesture by North Korea. Furthermore, unlike Japan, the ROK government's policy toward North Korea has a greater tendency to waver depending on the political leaning of its President and the ruling party at any given time, as the considerable shift in its posture under the incumbent Moon administration has amply demonstrated. As such, the ROK also tends to focus more on the reunification of the Peninsula, and should the preparatory talks on reunification begin under the Moon administration, they will be less concerned about the prospect of smaller (or no) US military footprint on the Peninsula post-reunification.

As such, the ROK's attitude toward the three components that Japan considers to be essential in any agreement between the US and North Korea, for example, are different:

1. Denuclearization—while Japan focuses on that of North Korea, the ROK is more open to the idea of denuclearization of “the Peninsula”, depending on the context in which denuclearization occurs.
2. Disarmament of North Korea's non-nuclear capability—Japan's primary focus is on MRBMs and SRBMs, while the ROK's focus is on the conventional capability, such as artillery.
3. Resolution of abduction issue—non-issue for the ROK.

There are the differences between the two US allies already apparent at this very early stage. These divergences can grow further as the process move on. Therefore, for the United States, these two conditions are something that the US should not be negotiated away at minimum:

1. Sequencing between the denuclearization of North Korea and the discussion of the permanent peace regime of the Peninsula—any potential agreement with North Korea should be front-loaded with denuclearization of North Korea (not the Peninsula), and any commitment to the dialogue toward the permanent peace regime should not be phased in until a certain denuclearization benchmark, which should be carefully consulted with both Japan and the ROK, have been met by North Korea's tangible actions.
2. Sequencing of the discussion of potential adjustment of US forces in Korea—this issue should be put on the table *only after* the preliminary talks begin toward the permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

Dr. Miles Yu

Professor (United States Naval Academy)

6 June 2018

First, to revise the current bi-lateral alliance approach and form a multi-lateral alliance. Start with a multilateral treaty alliance with Japan and ROK to minimize the petty spats over history and sentimental nationalism, then this multilateral alliance may be expanded to include India, Australia and some ASEAN nations.⁸ Second, "Permanent, Irreversible, Verifiable Denuclearization Without Delay" as revised at SecState Pompeo's swear-in ceremony. The key is "without delay" as Kim is playing a Fabian tactics by dragging on the process of de-nuclearization to wear out the vigor and urgency of the POTUS.

⁸ For more on this point, see: <https://www.hoover.org/research/its-time-change-americas-alliance-approach-asia>

Subject Matter Expert Biographies

Dr. Bruce Bennett

Senior International/Defense Researcher (RAND)



Bruce W. Bennett is a senior international/defense researcher at the RAND Corporation who works primarily on research topics such as strategy, force planning, and counterproliferation within the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center and the RAND Arroyo Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. Bennett's work applies war gaming, risk management, deterrence-based strategy, competitive strategies, and military simulation and analysis. He specializes in "asymmetric threats" such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and how to counter those threats with new strategies, operational concepts, and technologies. He is an expert in Northeast Asian military issues, having visited the region more than 110 times and written much about Korean security issues. He has also done work on the Persian/Arab Gulf region. His Northeast Asian research has addressed issues such as future ROK military force requirements, the Korean military balance, counters to North Korean chemical and biological weapon threats in Korea and Japan, dealing with a North Korean collapse, potential Chinese intervention in Korean contingencies, changes in the Northeast Asia security environment, and deterrence of nuclear threats (including strengthening the U.S. nuclear umbrella). He has worked with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, U.S. Forces Korea and Japan, the U.S. Pacific Command and Central Command, the ROK and Japanese militaries, and the ROK National Assembly. Bennett received his B.S. in economics from the California Institute of Technology and his Ph.D. in policy analysis from the Pardee RAND Graduate School.

Dr. Stephen Blank


Senior Fellow for Russia (American Foreign Policy Council)



Dr. Blank is an internationally known expert on Russia and the former Soviet Union, who comes to AFPC from the US Army War College where he spent the last 24 years, 1989-2013 as a Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, PA. Dr. Blank's expertise covers the entire Russian and post-Soviet region and has also written extensively on defense strategy, arms control, information warfare, energy issues, US foreign and defense policy, European, and Asian security. He is currently writing a book on Russian policy in East Asia and is the author of over 900 publications, books, monographs, scholarly and popular articles and has appeared frequently on television and radio and at professional conferences in the US, Europe, and Asia. Prior to joining the Army, Dr. Blank taught at the University of California, Riverside, University of Texas, San Antonio, and was a Professor of National Security Studies at the US Air War College's Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education. He holds a B.A. in Russian History from the University of Pennsylvania and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Russian History from the University of Chicago.

Dr. Stephen Cimbala

Distinguished Professor of Political Science (Penn State Brandywine)



Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine. He is the author of numerous works in the field of national security studies and nuclear arms control, among other topics. Dr. Cimbala is also an award winning Penn State teacher. His most recent work is *Getting Nuclear Weapons Right* (Lynne Rienner Publishers: 2018). He is available at sjc2@psu.edu

Dr. David Hunter-Chester

Senior Research Analyst, Athena Team (Training and Doctrine Command G-2)
Senior Research Analyst (Intelligent Decisions Systems, Inc.)



Dr. David Hunter-Chester is a Senior Research Analyst, working for Intelligent Decisions Systems, Inc (IDSI), on the Athena Team, Training and Doctrine Command G-2. He served in the United States Army from 1981 until his retirement as a Colonel in 2007. Dr. Hunter-Chester was selected as a Foreign Area Officer for Northeast Asia (Japan and Korea) in 1985. His tactical assignments were in Germany and Japan. Among other positions he was the chief of the US Forces Japan liaison office in Okinawa, the head of government relations for US Forces Japan, the Country Director for Japan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Assistant for the Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq. After retirement from the Army, he was an assistant professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the director for Raytheon's Japan Remote Island Defense Initiative before assuming his present position. Dr. Hunter-Chester has a Master of Arts degree in East Asian Studies from Stanford University and a doctorate in East Asian History from the University of Kansas. He is the author of a book on Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force and of several articles.

Ken Gause

Director, International Affairs Group, Center for Strategic Studies (CNA)



Ken Gause is the director of the International Affairs Group, a part of CNA's Center for Strategic Studies. He is CNA's senior foreign leadership analyst and has spent the last 20 years developing methodologies for examining leadership dynamics of hard-target, authoritarian regimes. In particular, he is an internationally respected expert on North Korea who has written three books on North Korean leadership. His latest book is "North Korean House of Cards: Leadership Dynamics Under Kim Jong-un." Leadership and opposing force (OPFOR) analysis are core areas of expertise within CNA Strategic Studies and Gause has personally directed studies on the North Korean, Iranian and Russian leadership and decision-making. His work on foreign leadership dates back to the early 1980s with his work on the Soviet Union for the U.S. government. Over the last three decades, he has devised analytical techniques used to understand adversary decision-making. These techniques span a five-tier set of methodologies that range from biographical analysis to studies on how to impact and shape an authoritarian or totalitarian regime's actions. These studies include a range of approaches from sophisticated game design to proprietary analysis based on a "virtual network" of researchers around the world dedicated to providing analysis on regimes of interest, their leadership, and how they make decisions. Gause has also published numerous articles on leadership structures for such publications as Jane's Intelligence Review, Jane's Defense Weekly, and the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. He has a B.A. from Vanderbilt in Russian and Political Science and an M.A. from The George Washington University in Soviet and East European Affairs.

Shihoko Goto

Senior Northeast Asia Associate, Asia Program (Wilson Center)



Shihoko Goto is the senior Northeast Asia associate at the Woodrow Wilson Center's Asia Program, where she is responsible for research, programming, and publications on Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. She is also a contributing editor to The Globalist, and a fellow of the Mansfield Foundation/Japan Foundation U.S.-Japan Network for the Future for 2014 to 2016. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, she spent over ten years as a journalist writing about the international political economy with an emphasis on Asian markets. As a correspondent for Dow Jones News Service and United Press International based in Tokyo and Washington, she has reported extensively on policies impacting the global financial system as well as international trade. She currently provides analysis for a number of media organizations. She was also formerly a donor country relations officer at the World Bank. She received the Freeman Foundation's Jefferson journalism fellowship at the East-West Center and the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation's journalism fellowship for the Salzburg Global Seminar. She is fluent in Japanese and French. She has a BA in Modern History from the University of Oxford, and an MA in international Policy Theory from Waseda University.

Dr. Jeffrey Knopf

Professor (Middlebury Institute of International Studies)



Jeffrey W. Knopf is a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies (MIIS) in Monterey, California, where he serves as the chair of the M.A. program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies. He is also a senior research associate with the Institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Dr. Knopf received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University. Prior to joining the MIIS faculty, he taught at the University of Southern California, the University of California-Santa Cruz, and the Naval Postgraduate School. Dr. Knopf is the co-editor of a forthcoming volume on *Behavioral Economics and Nuclear Weapons*. He is also the editor of *International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation* (University of Georgia Press, 2016) and *Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation* (Stanford University Press, 2012) and the author of *Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on U.S. Arms Control Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

Dr. Gregory Kulacki

China Project Manager (Union of Concerned Scientists)



Gregory Kulacki is an expert on cross-cultural communication between the United States and China. Since joining UCS in 2002, he has promoted dialogue between experts from both countries on nuclear arms control and space security and has consulted with Chinese and U.S. governmental and non-governmental organizations, including the U.S. House China Working Group, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the U.S. National Academies, NASA, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Over the last decade, Kulacki has been cited by a number of U.S. and Chinese news organizations, including the Christian Science Monitor, Nature, New York Times, NPR, Washington Post, and Washington Times. Dr. Kulacki, who is fluent in Mandarin Chinese, has lived and worked in China for more than 20 years. Prior to joining UCS, he served as an associate professor of government at Green Mountain College, director of external studies at Pitzer College, and director of academic programs in China for the Council on International Educational Exchange. Dr. Kulacki earned a doctorate degree in political theory and a master's degree in international relations from the University of Maryland in College Park. He also completed graduate certificates in Chinese economic history and international politics at Fudan University in Shanghai.

Dr. Andrew O'Neil

Dean, Research (Griffith University)

Professor, Political Science (Griffith University)



Andrew is Dean (Research) and Professor of Political Science in the Griffith Business School. Prior to being appointed Dean in April 2016, he was Head of the School of Government and International Relations (2014-2016) and Director of the Griffith Asia Institute (2010-2014). Before coming to Griffith in 2010, Andrew was Associate Head (Research) in the Faculty of Social Sciences at Flinders University, and prior to entering academia he worked as a Commonwealth public servant with Australia's Department of Defence. Andrew's research expertise focuses on the intersection of strategic, political, and economic change in the Asia-Pacific with particular emphasis on the security dimension of international relations, and he is a frequent media commentator on these topics. Working in teams, Andrew is the recipient of Australian Research Council (Discovery and Linkage Project) funding, and he has also received competitive industry funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Japan Foundation, and the Department of Defence. He is a former member of the Australian Foreign Minister's National Consultative Committee on National Security Issues and former advisory board member of the Lowy Institute's G20 Studies Centre. Andrew is the former editor-in-chief of the Australian Journal of International Affairs and is currently an editorial board member of the *Korean Journal of International Studies*, the *North Korean Review* the *Journal of Intelligence History*, and *Security Challenges*.

Dr. John Plumb

Senior Engineer (RAND)



Dr. John Plumb has served in national security roles for over 20 years at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. He has served at the White House, the Pentagon, and the Senate in senior defense staff roles with a focus on missile defense, nuclear weapons, and deterrence. His past positions include Director, Defense Policy and Strategy on the National Security Council staff – where he worked to counter North Korea's emerging nuclear capability; Principal Director for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy at the Pentagon – where he helped drive successful missile defense negotiations with NATO and with Japan; and as a Military Legislative Assistant in the Senate. Dr. Plumb also has over 20 years active and reserve service as a US Navy Submarine Officer. A Captain in the Navy Reserve, he currently serves as the Commanding Officer of 80 personnel responsible for the Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection certification of US warships. He holds a Ph.D. in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Colorado and an undergraduate degree in Physics from the University of Notre Dame. He currently works as a Senior Engineer at RAND.

Anthony Rinna

Senior Editor (Sino-NK)



Anthony V. Rinna is a Senior Editor at Sino-NK, a research organization dedicated to the study of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Rinna is a specialist in Russian defense and economic policy in Northeast Asia, and regularly publishes on those topics in academic journals and policy forums. He also frequently gives commentary to the media on Russia's North Korea policy. He has a working knowledge of Korean, Russian and Spanish. A US citizen, Rinna has lived in South Korea since 2014.

Dr. Sheila Smith

Senior Fellow for Japan Studies (Council on Foreign Relations)



Sheila A. Smith, an expert on Japanese politics and foreign policy, is senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). She is the author of *Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China* (Columbia University Press, 2015) and *Japan's New Politics and the U.S.-Japan Alliance* (Council on Foreign Relations, June 2014). Her current research focuses on how geostrategic change in Asia is shaping Japan's strategic choices. In the fall of 2014, Smith began a project on Northeast Asian Nationalisms and Alliance Management. Smith is a regular contributor to the CFR blog *Asia Unbound*, and frequent contributor to major media outlets in the United States and Asia. She joined CFR from the East-West Center in 2007, where she directed a multinational research team in a cross-national study of the domestic politics of the U.S. military presence in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. She was a visiting scholar at Keio University in 2007-08, where she researched Japan's foreign policy towards China, supported by the Abe Fellowship. Smith has been a visiting researcher at two leading Japanese foreign and security policy think tanks, the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Research Institute for Peace and Security, and at the University of Tokyo and the University of the Ryukyus. Smith is vice chair of the U.S. advisors to the U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Exchange (CULCON), a bi-national advisory panel of government officials and private sector members. She also serves on the advisory committee for the U.S.-Japan Network for the Future program of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation. She teaches as an adjunct professor at the Asian Studies Department of Georgetown University and serves on the board of its *Journal of Asian Affairs*. She earned her MA and PhD degrees from the department of political science at Columbia University.

Brig Gen Rob Spalding

Special Assistant to the United States Air Force Vice Chief of Staff (United States Air Force)



Brig Gen Robert S. Spalding III assumed the duties of Special Assistant to the U.S. Air Force vice chief of staff in February 2018. General Spalding received his commission through Fresno State University's Reserve Officer Training Corps program in 1991. He earned his doctorate in economics and mathematics from the University of Missouri at Kansas City in 2007. The general attended undergraduate pilot training in 1993, and was subsequently assigned as a B-52 Stratofortress co-pilot in the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota. He subsequently transitioned to the B-2 Spirit at Whiteman AFB, Missouri. In 2001, he was selected as one of three Air Force Olmsted Scholars, and was a distinguished graduate of Mandarin Chinese language training at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. Afterward, the general attended Tongji University in Shanghai as a graduate research student. He then returned to Whiteman AFB as a B-2 evaluator pilot and assistant director of operations for the 393rd Bomb Squadron. The general was then assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Prisoner of War Missing Personnel Office as the military assistant for the deputy assistant secretary of defense. During the Iraq surge in 2007, General Spalding deployed to Baghdad and directed the Personal Security Coordination Center. After a stint at the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, he was reassigned to the B-2 at Whiteman AFB. While at Whiteman AFB, he was the chief of safety, operations group commander and vice wing commander. He was then selected as a Military Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York. General Spalding then served as the chief China strategist for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, Arlington, Va. Prior to his current assignment he served at the White House as the Senior Director for Strategic Planning at the National Security Council, Washington, D.C. General Spalding speaks Chinese-Mandarin and Spanish.

Yun Sun

Co-Director, East Asia Program (Stimson Center)
Director, China Program (Stimson Center)



Yun Sun is co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. Her expertise is in Chinese foreign policy, U.S.-China relations and China's relations with neighboring countries and authoritarian regimes. From 2011 to early 2014, she was a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, jointly appointed by the Foreign Policy Program and the Global Development Program, where she focused on Chinese national security decision-making processes and China-Africa relations. From 2008 to 2011, Yun was the China Analyst for the International Crisis Group based in Beijing, specializing on China's foreign policy towards conflict countries and the developing world. Prior to ICG, she worked on U.S.-Asia relations in Washington, DC for five years. Yun earned her master's degree in international policy and practice from George Washington University, as well as an MA in Asia Pacific studies and a BA in international relations from Foreign Affairs College in Beijing.

Dr. Michael Swaine

Senior Fellow (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)



Michael Swaine is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies. Formerly a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, Swaine is a specialist in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asian international relations. He has authored and edited more than a dozen books and monographs and many journal articles and book chapters in these areas, directs several security-related projects with Chinese partners, and advises the U.S. government on Asian security issues. He received his doctorate in government from Harvard University.

Yuki Tatsumi

Co-Director, East Asia Program (Stimson Center)
Director, Japan Program (Stimson Center)



Yuki Tatsumi is Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the Japan Program at the Stimson Center. Before joining Stimson, Tatsumi worked as a research associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and as the special assistant for political affairs at the Embassy of Japan in Washington. Tatsumi's most recent publications include *Balancing Between Nuclear Deterrence and Disarmament: Views from the Next Generation* (ed.; Stimson Center, 2018) *Lost in Translation? U.S. Defense Innovation and Northeast Asia* (Stimson Center, 2017). She is also the editor of four earlier volumes of the *Views from the Next Generation* series: *Peacebuilding and Japan* (Stimson Center, 2017), *Japan as a Peace Enabler* (Stimson Center, 2016), *Japan's Global Diplomacy* (Stimson Center, 2015), and *Japan's Foreign Policy Challenges in East Asia* (Stimson Center, 2014). She is author of *Opportunity out of Necessity: The Impact of U.S. Defense Budget Cuts on the U.S.-Japan Alliance* (Stimson Center, 2013), a co-author of *Global Security Watch: Japan* (Praeger, 2010), an author of *Japan's National Security Policy Infrastructure: Can Tokyo Meet Washington's Expectations?* (Stimson Center, 2008), and an editor/contributing author of *U.S.-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges* (Stimson Center, 2015), *The New Nuclear Agenda: Prospects for US-Japan Cooperation* (Stimson Center, 2012), *North Korea: Challenge for the US-Japan Alliance* (Stimson Center, 2010), *Strategic Yet Strained: US force realignment in Japan and its impact of Okinawa* (Stimson Center, 2008), and *Japan's New Defense Establishment: Institutions, Capabilities and Implications* (Stimson Center, 2007). In September 2006 Tatsumi testified before the House Committee on International Relations. She is a recipient of the 2009 Yasuhiro Nakasone Incentive Award. In 2012 she was awarded the Letter of Appreciation from the Ministry of National Policy of Japan for her contribution in advancing mutual understanding between the United States and Japan. A native of Tokyo, Tatsumi holds a B.A. in liberal arts from the International Christian University in Tokyo, Japan and an M.A. in international economics and Asian studies from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University in Washington.

Dr. Miles Yu

Professor (United States Naval Academy)



Miles Maochun Yu is a professor of East Asia and military and naval history at the United States Naval Academy (USNA). He is the author of numerous scholarly articles on military and intelligence history and newspaper columns; his books include *OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War*.

Author Biographies

Dr. Belinda Bragg

Principal Research Scientist



Dr. Belinda Bragg is a Principal Research Scientist for NSI. She has provided core support for DoD Joint Staff and STRATCOM Strategic Multi-layer Analysis (SMA) projects for the past six years. She has worked on projects dealing with nuclear deterrence, state stability, U.S.–China and U.S.–Russia relations, and VEOs. Dr. Bragg has extensive experience reviewing and building social science models and frameworks. She is one of the two designers of a stability model, (the StaM) that has been used analyze stability efforts in Afghanistan, state stability in Pakistan and Nigeria, and at the city-level to explore the drivers and buffers of instability in megacities, with a case study of Dhaka. Prior to joining NSI, Dr. Bragg was a visiting lecturer in International Relations at Texas A&M University in College Station. Her research focuses on decision- making, causes of conflict and political instability, and political uses of social media. Dr. Bragg earned her Ph.D. in political science from Texas A&M University, and her BA from the University of Melbourne, Australia.

George Popp

Senior Analyst



Massachusetts, Amherst.

George Popp is a Senior Analyst at NSI, Inc. where he conducts research and analysis on a broad range of multidisciplinary analysis projects that focus on understanding the political, economic, and social dynamics of emerging conflict situations and environments throughout the world. The bulk of George's work has been in support of NSI's government initiatives, particularly leading and contributing to human behavior analytics efforts completed for the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) program on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in support of direct requests from US Combatant Commanders to the Department of Defense. George has also supported NSI's commercial initiatives, conducting business intelligence analyses for clients in the video game industry. George started with NSI as an Intern, and has risen through the ranks since. He was promoted to Senior Analyst in 2017. George's degree is in Economics from the University of