

The DPRK Nuclear Issue and Western Pacific Regional Dynamics I-R-C

20 November 2018

Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI

NSI Interest-Resolve-Capability (I-R-C): Analysis of Western Pacific Regional Dynamics

How will regional actors respond to US actions vis a vis DPRK?

I-R-C
Theoretical
Foundation

Cognitive decision theory; subjective decision analysis; international relations research

Main
Research
Questions

- 1) What are the regional dynamics that emerge from the combined interactions of the full range of key actor's interests? Would these drive events in the PACOM AOR toward or away from stability and compatibility with US economic and security interests?
- 2) How might the US/PACOM alter these dynamics?


Approach

Interest-Resolve-Capability (I-R-C) Analysis


I-R-C is a multi-step analytic method for exploring most likely regional futures by

- identifying the interrelations among each actor interests
- Plus, the multi-layer dynamics between actors (resolve and capability) that drive the regional system

- Alignment of security, domestic, economic, and international **interests among actors in a region**
- Each actor's willingness or, **resolve to accept or reject** an outcome
- The regional distribution of **capabilities** *that are relevant* to a particular outcome



Measuring Actor Interest, Resolve & Capability: Analytic Process



1 Literature Review to define **outcomes** and **subjective actor interests**

2 Actor perceived interests at stake in conflict

Actor → **Australia Interest Matrix**

DPRK Nuclear Weapons

SECURITY Defend against threats to territory (incl. offshore & EEZ) by PRC, other regional military modernization	ECONOMIC Avoid regional instability & protect openness of maritime trade routes	ECONOMIC, SECURITY Balance need for economic ties to China against growing Chinese softpower & domestic influence	SECURITY Maintain strategic partnership with US but strengthen regional & multilateral partnerships	RANK Unweighted cross-interest rank
---	---	---	---	---

Posited outcomes →

Denuclearization DPRK CVID in return for improved relations with US, economic incentives	2	1	1	1	Best outcome
Acceptance US Acceptance of DPRK as controlled nuclear state	6	6	5	5.5	Worst outcome
Stalemate DPRK refuses to denuclearize, US intensifies sanctions	4	4	4	3	Fourth best
Bilateral Talks Ongoing bi-lateral talks (US, DPRK, ROK) on phased denuclearization (short of CVID) for lifted sanctions, normalization	3	3	2.5	4	Third best
Multilateral Talks Ongoing multi-lateral talks on phased denuclearization (short of CVID) for lifted sanctions, normalization	1	2	2.5	2	Second best
US Unilateral Limited Strike US strike against nuclear program to pressure DPRK	5	5	6	5.5	Fifth best

interest matrix created for each actor for each conflict to rank posited outcomes by interest satisfaction and produce simple normative outcome preference orders.

sensitivity analysis of outcome preference to different choice rules, weights and parameters

Simple Normative		Weighted Normative		E(Utility)		Weighted E(Utility)		Satisficing		Lexicographic Choice		Elimination by Aspects	
SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK	SCORE	RANK
11.00	6	7.61	6	0.00	6	0.00	6						
36.00	1	36.00	1	10.80	2	10.80	3			100.0%	1	33.3%	1
16.00	4	14.59	4	8.00	5	7.29	5					33.3%	1
30.00	2	30.00	2	15.00	1	15.00	1	30.00	1			33.3%	1
20.00	3	23.26	3	10.00	3	11.63	2						
13.00	5	14.54	5	9.23	4	10.32	4						

Fitness Threshold 0.30
Cutoff Rank 1.80

Ordering

Fitness Threshold 0.33
Cutoff Rank 1.98

$$resolve = \sum_{i=1}^i \frac{(o^1 - o^2)}{(oi) - i} \text{ where } i = \text{interests in the interest matrix; } o = \text{outcomes}$$

interest matrixes used to calculate actor **resolve** toward outcomes

Low Influence
Moderate-Low Influence
Moderate Influence
High Influence
Control

Some I-R-C Results

- **Given the current distribution of actor interests, capabilities and resolve (I-R-C), North Korean denuclearization is highly unlikely without significant change in regional interests and conditions. Under current conditions:**
 - Neither economic incentives nor threats change the DPRK view of denuclearization –an outcome it can veto.
 - China is both incentivized and has the ability to undermine FFVD.
 - A US-brokered FFVD of North Korea would require change in core US, Chinese, Russian and DPRK threat perceptions and worldviews.
- **The current US approach to regional leadership appears out-of-touch with regional interests and concerns.**
- **The success of US efforts to balance China in regional security matters facilitates the growth of Chinese regional influence at the expense of the US**
- **How the US approaches the DPRK nuclear issue may be equally or more important for its long-term regional interests and influence than whether an agreement on denuclearization is achieved**

- back-up

The “I” in I-R-C: Normative, non-weighted actor preferences over posited outcomes

	Australia	China	Indonesia	Japan	North Korea	South Korea	Malaysia	Philippines	Russia	US
Denuclearization	Best Outcome	Fourth Best	Fourth Best	Best Outcome	Fifth Best	Best Outcome	Third Best	Best Outcome	Fourth Best	Best Outcome
Acceptance	Fifth Best	Fifth Best	Third Best	Fifth Best	Best Outcome	Fourth Best	Fourth Best	Third Best	Second Best	Fifth Best
Stalemate	Fourth Best	Second Best	Fifth Best	Fourth Best	Fourth Best	Fifth Best	Fifth Best	Fifth Best	Third Best	Fourth Best
Bilateral Talks	Third Best	Third Best	Second Best	Third Best	Second Best	Second Best	Second Best	Fourth Best	Fifth Best	Third Best
Multilateral Talks	Second Best	Best Outcome	Best Outcome	Second Best	Third Best	Third Best	Best Outcome	Second Best	Best Outcome	Second Best
Limited US Mil. Action	Fifth Best	Fifth Best	Fifth Best	Fifth Best	Fifth Best	Fifth Best	Fifth Best	Fifth Best	Fifth Best	Fifth Best



The I, the R and the C for Western Pacific ...

