

RETHINKING GRAND STRATEGY

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Abstract: *Grand strategy may seem an irrelevant idea but it's not. As Colin Gray declares "all strategy is grand strategy." Without a grand strategy that explains the ends, works the means and sets out the ways, lower-level strategies will be uncoordinated, work at odds with each other and be unlikely to succeed. Grand strategy seems superfluous as its gotten unhelpfully confused with the National Security Strategy. It should be instead thought of as a practical problem solving methodology you can apply to particular real-world problems. This article rethinks grand strategy to provide just that.*

Grand strategy has a bad rap but it's not the concept's doing. A perception has developed that the National Security Strategy (NSS) and grand strategy are the same. This is a major error. The NSS addresses certain matters of particular Congressional concern as required under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. The NSS is simply a particular example of a grand strategy, not the whole of grand strategy as a problem-solving approach.

Worse the NSS seems disoriented. The NSS is a late Cold War creation when the Soviet Union was the obvious central focus. Similarly if more generically, grand strategy in originating in war stressed staying focused on the adversary. Post Cold War though, with the USSR dismantled, the NSS lost its concentration, drifting into what John Ikenberry calls a milieu grand strategy, one aiming to shape the general international environment.¹

It's easy to be sceptical of this sub-type of grand strategy. As a recent book, 'The End of Grand Strategy', nicely argues it's really hard to see how one grand strategy can address all the problems a state faces.² But the book goes a step too far in deciding that, as the NSS is a poor grand strategy format, the idea of grand strategy is now of little value.

This confusion is important as the post-Cold War era ends and our problems intensify. It's not just the Greater Middle East's 'forever wars', North Korea's rockets or Russian malfeasance but crucially the rise of China. China has both the economic potential to outspend America and its allies on defense and the population base to man any size military force structure acquired. The West's post-Cold War era military and economic overmatch is receding. Our edge may become using our national power better, more effectively and more efficiently. Better thinking could be crucial.

The concept of grand strategy can help gain the thinking edge. Even a small gain would be valuable in offsetting greater material power. Historian Hew Strachan observes: "if ambition outstrips resources, the need for grand strategy, and for a coherent grand

1. G. John Ikenberry, "From Hegemony to the Balance of Power: The Rise of China and American Grand Strategy in East Asia," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2014), p. 48.

2. Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski, *The End of Grand Strategy: U.S. Maritime Operations in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017).

strategy at that, is all the greater because waste is both unaffordable and unforgivable.”³

We need to rethink grand strategy focusing on its use as a practical problem-solving methodology. Such an idea immediately enters the Jomini versus Clausewitz debate. In a very broad sense, Jomini gave readers a list of principles to apply to all future wars. Clausewitz instead sought to educate readers allowing them to apply his broad insights as they saw fit.

Treating grand strategy as a practical problem-solving methodology is a bit of both. It's easier to approach a complex problem if you have some form of structured way to think about the issues. This notion tends to privilege agency. It forces people to focus on what they want to achieve and how. On the other hand structuring thinking only goes so far.

Context is clearly crucial albeit a deep understanding of the context can really only be obtained after the event – the famous 20:20 hindsight. Context is, to say the least, complicated and confusing, and worse, constantly evolving. This is where history is really useful however it is not by itself the full solution. History looks backwards. It is written knowing what happened whereas we look forward into an uncertain future.

So using grand strategy as a practical problem-solving methodology means applying a structure to your problem's context. It can help you think but it doesn't do your thinking for you. This is of course very different to those frequent exhortations to adopt this or that highly-specific grand strategy. If you treat grand strategy as a problem-solving tool, you need to do the hard intellectual work yourself. Chances are however, you know more about your own problems than a distant writer in some ivory tower.

In discussing this, it helps to use Art Lykke's famous model that deconstructs strategy into 'ends' (objective), 'means' (instruments of national power) and 'ways' (course of action).⁴ The 'ends' are achieved by using the 'means' in appropriate 'ways'. Purists will note that may be expressed as $E=W+M$. Lykke's seminal article however used $\text{Strategy} = E+W+M$. The difference is important for more than just pedants.

Ends

Strategy involves interacting with particular intelligent and adaptive others trying to change our relationship with them for the better.⁵ In this though Liddell-Hart discerned an important issue: “while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace.”⁶ A grand strategy then tries to take us to a better future where our relationship with specific states or non-state actors is improved - even if only from our perspective.

3. Hew Strachan, “Strategy and Contingency”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 6 (2011), pp. 1283-1284.

4. Arthur F. Lykke Jr, “Defining Military Strategy”, *Military Review*, Vol. LXIX, No. 5, (May 1989).

5. See also: Peter Layton, “Using a Clausewitzian Dictum to Rethink Achieving Victory”, *The Strategy Bridge*, 15 May 2018, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/5/15/using-a-clausewitzian-dictum-to-rethink-achieving-victory>

6. B.H. Liddell-Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd Revised Edition. (New York: Penguin, 1991), pp. 321-22.

This better future may be best expressed in terms of international politics. Clausewitz would have understood: “the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it”.⁷ The field of politics between states has long been examined in the International Relations academic discipline. Its language, concepts and theories can assist defining the desired ends.⁸ Crucially however, the ends and the ways are directly related as discussed later. The ends chosen bound the possible ways - and vice versa. The ends sought may need to change depending on what ways are practical.

Defining the ends highlights the importance of knowing the object of a grand strategy. A grand strategy needs to be quite clear on who the target is, in terms of non-state actors, single states, alliance partners, regional groupings or the complete international system.

If contemporary NSSs are milieu grand strategies, the other type are positional grand strategies that focus on a specific state or group of states. The Cold War era containment grand strategy was a positional type. It gradually grew to involve taking actions across the globe however it was consistently focussed on a single bi-lateral relationship, that between the US and the USSR. For America, the rest of the world comprised others who could help, hinder or distract from its containment grand strategy but were considered unimportant in themselves, being seen instead in terms of the American/ USSR relationship. This thinking is well illustrated in comments made in 1970 by US National Security Council staffer Marshall Wright:

“both in Africa and in the UN our policy is essentially defensive. Neither is central in any way to US foreign policy operations or interests. We deal with them because they are there, not because we hope to get great things out of our participation. We aim at minimizing the attention and resources which must be addressed to them. What we really want from both is no trouble. Our policy is therefore directed at damage limiting, rather than at accomplishing anything in particular.”⁹

Conceiving a grand strategy’s ends as involving changing our relationship with others means the oft-used term ‘national interest’ becomes simply an input in grand strategy deliberations not a central driver. The term has long been criticised as meaning different things to different people, having an imprecise meaning and of being used to justify any policy the term’s user decided to support.¹⁰

More tellingly, in terms of practical implementation, declarations of national interests are difficult to link to strategy, as they provide no defined objective. It is then unknown when

7. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 87.

8. This is done in: Peter Layton, *Grand Strategy*, (Brisbane: Amazon, 2018), pp. 74-93, <https://www.amazon.com/Grand-Strategy-Peter-Layton/dp/0648279308>

9. Marshall Wright, 'Memorandum to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 10 1970 ', in Louis J. Smith and David H. Herschler (eds.), *Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972*, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976: Volume I, (Washington: Department of State, 2003), p. 163.

10. Arnold Wolfers, "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (December 1952), p. 481.

it is reached or the time it should be reached by or where it ranks in resource priority order. National interest statements are more expressions of national aspirations than purposeful policy shapers.¹¹ For example, the latest NSS lists one of four vital national interests as “promote American prosperity.” It’s reasonable to assume all Administrations have had such a desire, rather than the converse. With an enhanced understanding of the better peace sought, national interest declarations can be shifted from being a primary strategy determinant to having a more secondary, rhetorical function.

Means

The ‘means’ further differentiates strategy from grand strategy. A grand strategy applies all the instruments of national power including diplomatic, informational, military and economic measures. In contrast, a strategy focuses on applying a single type of instrument. Moreover unlike strategy, a grand strategy also involves developing the resources needed for implementation: people, money, materiel, soft power and legitimacy. As J.F.C. Fuller observed: “While strategy is...concerned with the movement of armed masses, grand strategy...embraces the motive forces which lie behind them both - material and psychological.”¹² Crucially, if current resources are insufficient, the grand strategy guides their expansion and this can have a big impact.

Aaron Friedberg argued that during the Cold War America developed its required resources better than the Soviet Union.¹³ The Soviet Union with a strong statist political culture choose a grand strategy that made it into a “garrison state”, where primacy was given to military preparation at significant detriment to society and the ultimate collapse of the USSR. Conversely, the US with an anti-statist ideology was more prudent and struck a better balance between military preparedness, long-term economic growth and societal prosperity. The US became a “contract state”, limiting extraction and mobilization to very specific areas of the economy and becoming reliant upon private enterprise for the necessary research, development and manufacture of armaments. The American grand strategy as it evolved progressively imposed less of a burden on its society and this gave the U.S. greater resilience and robustness than the increasingly brittle Soviet Union.

Ways

There are many ways possible, far too many for any policymaker to recall especially when busy, time-constrained or stressed. A simpler approach is to consider the fundamental ways of changing an existing relationship into something better: stopping them doing something, working with them or trying to change their minds. Incorporating

11. Scott Burchill, *The National Interest in International Relations Theory* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 206. Alan S. Milward, *The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy: The UK and the European Community Volume I* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), pp. 6-7. The practical utility of the term for contemporary policymakers is further discussed in Simon Williams, *The Role of the National Interest in the National Security Debate* (London: Royal College of Defence Studies, July 2012).

12. Col. J.F.C. Fuller, *The Reformation of War*, 2nd Edition, (London: Hutchinson and Co, 1923), p. 219.

13. Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 75-80, 341-51.

International Relations theoretical thinking (including on power¹⁴) then leads to three broad types of grand strategy: denial, engagement and reform.¹⁵

A denial grand strategy assumes superior relative power determines outcomes; you can stop others achieving their objectives by being more powerful than them.¹⁶ In such a grand strategy military and economic might is used in ways that means that others will in fear avoid disagreeable behaviours or, if needs be, can be physically stopped through using force.

An engagement grand strategy makes use of groups in the other state that have interests and desires that you share, or at least that are useful to you.¹⁷ You can support these helpful groups so they prevail in the continual jostling between domestic interest groups rather than groups you disapprove of. The aim is to ensure that the ‘right’ people govern. Ensuring what the other state wants is what you want is the goal.

A reform grand strategy changes the ideas people hold.¹⁸ The old ideas first need to collapse with people convinced a new replacement idea is essential. Then those particular members of a society who have a strong influence on the ideas people adopt need to be convinced that some new notion (of yours) is the answer. After this, these idea advocates need supporting until their message convinces enough people that a tipping point is reached, a cascade occurs and most accept the new thinking.

In this, it’s important to note that the ends and the ways are directly related. Specific ends are only achievable with particular appropriate ways. For example, a denial grand strategy will not change people’s deeply held norms and identities.

It’s also important not to perceive a grand strategy as a set-and-forget, launch-and-leave methodology. The effectiveness and efficiency of a grand strategy as initially conceived will inevitably change as others over time take actions opposing or supporting it, either deliberately or unintentionally. Grand strategies accordingly have a distinct life cycle: they arise, evolve through learning (some call this emergent¹⁹) and then at some point finish and transition to another grand strategy or an alternative.²⁰

Such broad thoughts on rethinking grand strategy suggest America’s future grand

14. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 1, (Winter 2005).

15. This step is explained and critiqued in some detail in: Peter Layton, *Grand Strategy*, (Brisbane: Amazon, 2018), pp. 37-74, <https://www.amazon.com/Grand-Strategy-Peter-Layton/dp/0648279308>

16. Makes use of [amongst others]: John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001)

17. Makes use of [amongst others]: Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics", *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997).

18. Makes use of [amongst others]: Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998)

19. Ionut C. Popescu, “Grand Strategy vs. Emergent Strategy in the Conduct of Foreign Policy”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 41, Issue 3, (2018).

20. Alternatives are discussed in: Peter Layton, “The 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review choices: grand strategy, risk management or opportunism?” *Defence Studies*, Vol.15, Issue 1, [2015].

strategy options from a problem-solving viewpoint. If the rise of China overshadows all, then a positional grand strategy focussed on China might appeal. Under this other states and regions - like Russia and the Middle East - would be managed depending on how they helped or hindered the building of the future desired relationship between the US and China. Some issues like terrorism might then be managed using risk management, that is trying to limit the damage any future acts of terrorism could cause rather than trying to cleanse the world of such political violence.

On the other hand, it might be better to have several positional grand strategies tailored for the major issues perceived, say one each for China, Russia and the Middle East. Middle Eastern jihadism clearly calls for a different approach to managing peer competitors but even in the later case China and Russia are not the same, suggesting quite different grand strategies would be sensible. The various grand strategies in play would still be grand strategies in the sense of being about interacting relationships and applying and building power in appropriate ways. The methodology can be applied simultaneously across varying levels of the international system; it is simply a problem-solving device.

Devising grand strategies however hinges on being able to define the ‘ends’ you want. This may not be an intellectually easy task, making risk management and opportunism appealing alternatives. Both approaches await events meaning defining a desired future is unnecessary. Risk management tries to lessen the damage an identified risk causes if it eventuates; opportunism tries to take advantage of new situations that emerge. Being event driven makes a big difference. Only the grand strategy methodology tries to shape events and take us to our desired future. It may not succeed but its ambition suggests grand strategy is worth a try.

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Added Additional Enclosures:

1. Grand Strategy Process (relevant extract from book)
2. Review of ‘Grand Strategy’ by Lukas Milevski, author of *The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought*, Oxford University Press, 2016

Making Better Grand Strategies: A Practical Approach

How can we assist people imagine better grand strategies? This chapter builds from the previous, theoretically-oriented and somewhat complicated chapter in setting out in a simple manner the form and the content of the grand strategy diagnostic process. This process is designed to help people structure their initial thinking about a grand strategy problem and provide a useful starting point for developing alternative courses of action. Using this process, people can ascertain what is relevant amongst the typically large amount of information presented, how all this fits together and what further confirmatory information should be sought. It helps thinking to be focused so better judgments can be made.

Chapter Two determined that: *grand strategy is the art of building and applying diverse forms of power in an effective and efficient way to try to purposefully change the order existing between two or more intelligent and adaptive entities.* Chapter Three devised ‘building power’ and ‘applying power’ frameworks that when combined creates the complete grand strategy process summarized in Figure 4 below. This diagram is the book in a single image.




Figure 4. Grand Strategy Process

Some specific characteristics are worth noting. Firstly, while the diagram flows left to right the key issue to initially address is the type of order desired and if that seems achievable given the context. In this, the process deliberately forces users to be quite precise about the outcomes they wish to achieve. Secondly, ends and ways are directly linked. The type of order sought is related to the manner in which the means are used to achieve it. This importance of this is highlighted in the case study of the George W. Bush 2002 grand strategy that sought to use military force to bring democracy to Iraq. Thirdly, the process is explicitly structured on the proposition that the three grand strategy types should be considered as mutually exclusive. The goal sought can only be met by one particular type of grand strategy the specific paradigm it is paired with. Blending grand strategy types produces incoherence and confusion as the case study example of the British appeasement grand strategy brings out.

Lastly, the schemas are a crucial element. While their basis and how they were derived were discussed in Chapter Three, they were not detailed. This task is done below. The schemas are the lenses through which grand strategy problems are viewed. The description of each schema follows a similar structure allowing ready comparisons to quickly discern contrasts if needed. It will become quickly apparent that each schema focuses on very different aspects: states (denial), sub-state groups (engagement) or ideas (reform).

Extract finishes here



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Enclosure 2

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Grand Strategy

Lukas Milevski

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cannot address all the problems that trouble states. Having a variety of approaches is both useful and necessary.

The End of Grand Strategy: US Maritime Operations in the Twenty-First Century insightfully examines both the contemporary US NSS approach and current US Navy operations across the globe. While American-centric by intent, the book contains many concepts and ideas that smaller nations may find useful, especially in contemplating future multilateral naval operations, an area of growing importance. The book offers much for policymakers, military planners, academics and all those concerned with understanding the business of strategising. ■


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Grand Strategy

Peter Layton
2018



Grand Strategy by the Australian academic and defence analyst Peter Layton is one of the latest contributions to the ever-growing literature on grand strategy. Fortunately, Layton's work does not represent the usual tired fare that characterises the literature – that is, the endless rounds of

policy prescription for this or that 'grand strategy', most often proposed without any serious thought dedicated to translating the prescription into real-world action and practice. This reviewer has previously identified Layton through his earlier work on grand strategy as representing a new wave in the conceptualisation of grand strategy, along with Hal Brands in the US. This new wave interprets grand strategy as a particular type of decision-making process – Layton contrasts it with risk management and opportunism as alternative ways of making decisions and interacting with the world (Brands by comparison sees no feasible alternative to grand strategy). Layton's *Grand Strategy* represents the culmination of several years of study and thought to develop this particular interpretation of grand strategy.

The result is not a work of policy prescription, but rather is the elucidation of an optimised grand strategy diagnostic process designed to benefit busy policymakers by providing them with a model of how to think about grand strategy. *Grand Strategy* begins by creating this diagnostic process step by step, allowing readers to follow the logic that underpins the model as a whole. Layton's logical sequence opens with a conceptual exposition of grand strategy. This transitions into the second step, a two-stage discussion of applying and developing power, both vital for Layton's interpretation of grand strategy. The third step considers the new well-elucidated vision of grand strategy in a more practical, real-world sense, which culminates in the fourth and final step of case studies of each of the three types of grand strategy.

His first step is to discuss grand strategy conceptually: what *is* it, actually (according to Layton)? He identifies three key elements, which also serve to distinguish grand strategy from strategy: grand strategy enacts change in the long term (as opposed to strategy, which focuses on immediate concerns); in principle it involves the use or potential use of all instruments of power (unlike strategy, which employs a single instrument at a time); and it subsumes under its purview the responsibility for *developing* the instruments of power that

it would then use (which lies beyond regular notions of strategy). Along with these core features, Layton also discusses the importance of recognising the lifecycle of a grand strategy and knowing when to end it, whether due to its success or to its failure, and the need to transition to a new grand strategic, or other, approach.

From this conceptual basis, Layton takes his next step, which is to examine in greater theoretical detail the problems of both applying and developing power – a step with two stages, the first for application of power and the second for its development. He identifies three major categories of applying power: denial, or trying to stop another state or entity from achieving a desired objective; engagement, or trying to cooperate with another polity to achieve a jointly desired objective; and reform, or trying to transform altogether the thinking of another state or other political entity. He broadly associates these three categories of grand strategy with realism, liberalism and constructivism, respectively. Denial and realism emphasise the competitive and conflictual elements of international affairs and the role of hard power – they may achieve goals such as balancing power among rivals, creating a concert of powers (great powers acting together to manage international affairs), or the achievement of hegemonic stability (the enforcement of international stability by the most-powerful actor). Engagement and liberalism focus on cooperation and non-military instruments and, by subverting existing power structures in other states and accomplishing a regime change from an illiberal to a liberal one, may engineer complex interdependence, liberal institutionalism or the liberal peace. Layton also notes that it can be used to promote illiberal regimes as well, and employed Iranian support for Hizbullah from 1982–2006 as one of his cases. Reform and constructivism highlight norms in international behaviour and the ability to change those norms or even the social identity of other actors.

The second stage of Layton's second step is his analysis of how to develop power. Here again he builds a model that differentiates issues, situations and approaches. First, the policymaker must identify whether the issue at stake is a

near-term or longer-term issue. If the former, is it a situation of necessity or of choice? If the latter, is it a situation of relative certainty or uncertainty? Near-term situations of necessity call for near-term managerial approaches, whereas near-term situations of choice are appropriate for near-term market approaches, which are based on manipulating and exploiting local and global market forces, with inducements, incentives, regulations and the like. Similarly, longer-term situations of relative certainty call for long-term managerial approaches, whereas longer-term situations of relative uncertainty are appropriate for long-term market approaches. Both the applying power and developing power stages of Layton's second step are accompanied by models which clarify graphically what Layton enunciates through writing. He then takes all these figures and combines them into a single, yet still PowerPoint-friendly model.

This ultimate model is the foundation for Layton's next step, which is to get away from the theory and consider the question of making grand strategy from a more practical perspective. Here he considers each essential category of grand strategy – denial, engagement and reform – individually and explains its logic of operation in practice. He explains what the role of each broad type of power – military, economic, diplomatic, informational and international institutional – plays within each of the categories of grand strategy. To take the military instrument as an example, in denial grand strategies it is directed against the adversary's military capabilities, whether through war, blackmail or deterrence, among others; in engagement grand strategies, military power may be targeted against that which adversarial social groups within a state or organisation value most, but not against the liberal aspects of the state or organisation, as Layton assumes we are acting in their favour to strengthen them; and in reform grand strategies the military instrument is a supporting instrument for advancing the desirability of the reforms proposed. Layton also considers the various conditions that favour success for each category of grand strategy.

Having laid out this model and explored its practical workings, albeit still fairly conceptually, Layton's next step is to examine case studies of each category of grand strategy. Layton provides three cases for each essential variant. One is always a success, one is always a success in a difficult case and one is always a failure of grand strategy. The cases span a wide range of grand strategies in practice, from the Tamil Tigers' denial grand strategy, 1990–2002; to the US European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan) grand strategy, 1947–52; to the campaign to ban landmines, 1992–99. As his final step, Layton considers a vital question: when not to use grand strategies to solve a problem, in favour of risk management or opportunism.

Layton has made a valuable contribution to the grand strategic literature by avoiding the usual policy prescription in favour of elucidating how a policymaker may think about conceptualising and then practising grand strategy. There are sure to be quibbles and disagreements over Layton's conceptualisation of grand strategy (this reviewer has various disagreements and dissatisfactions with the book on this front – for example, Layton fully embraces the evolution of the concept of grand strategy, whereas this reviewer is rather more sceptical), or his distinctions, for instance, among the essential categories. However, the focus on how to think rather than on what to think and what grand strategy to pursue is undoubtedly and ultimately a far more productive perspective on grand strategy. For those interested in improving the practice of grand strategy or foreign policy, this is a highly recommended work. ■


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Defending the Rock: How Gibraltar Defeated Hitler

Nicholas Rankin
Faber and Faber, 2017



In this lengthy and broad-ranging history of Gibraltar, Nicholas Rankin attempts to make the case that Gibraltar was central to the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War.

Rankin's claim as to Gibraltar's vital importance in the defeat of the Axis powers rests upon the evidence of Adolf Hitler himself. In the months before Hitler's suicide in April 1945, the Führer reflected that 'we ought to have attacked Gibraltar in the summer of 1940' (p. 345). But Hitler's declining mental faculties by 1945, combined with several years of chronic abuse of opiates and amphetamines, calls seriously into question whether his analysis should be given any weight. If anything, Hitler laying the blame for his defeat at the feet of an Anglo-Saxon European colony seems entirely consistent with his desire to avoid a truth that for him was utterly unpalatable – that the real turning point in the war was his army's defeat at the hands of the Soviets at the Battle of Stalingrad.

If you've gotten this far you must be interested! If you would like a review copy of *Grand Strategy* please let me know on p.layton@griffith.edu.au. No such thing as a free lunch though ;-) There is a cost: a book review in some august blog, magazine or journal.