



Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Reach Back Effort in Support of USCENTCOM, Afghanistan Study – Phase II

Negotiated Settlement in Afghanistan: Elements of a Grand Bargain White Paper



11 February 2019, 1400-1530

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Report Outline



SETTING THE STAGE

Chapter 1. Grand Bargain vs. Great Game in Afghanistan, **Dr. Barnett Rubin**

Chapter 2. What do Afghans Want? **Dr. Thomas Barfield**

Chapter 3. Afghanistan: Is an Exit Strategy Possible? **Dr. Hodayun Sidky**

PART II ELEMENTS OF A GRAND BARGAIN

Chapter 4. What Role Might China Play in a Grand Bargain in Afghanistan? **Mr. Raffaello Pantucci**

Chapter 5. New Constitution and Elections, **Mr. Sher Jan Ahmadzai**

Chapter 6. Modeling Power Sharing, **US Army Training and Doctrine Command**

Chapter 7. Power Sharing with the Taliban, **Mr. Vern Liebl**

Chapter 8. Pakistan and the Potential for a Grand Bargain in Afghanistan, **Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler**

PART III SPOILERS

Chapter 9. Organizational and Leadership Consolidation and Fragmentation in AFPAK Region, **Dr. Gina Ligon & Mr. Michael Logan**

Chapter 10. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) Plays the Spoiler, **Dr. Craig Whiteside**

Chapter 11: No Deal, **LTG (ret.) Daniel Bolger**



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

ELEMENTAL STEPS FOR POST-NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AFGHANISTAN

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
Jumanne Donahue, PhD
Lead Modeler



How do different elemental steps influence a post-negotiated settlement Afghanistan?



TRADOC G27 assessed the effects of a GIRoA/QST truce, power-sharing government and reintegration of QST fighters into the ANSF on GIRoA control and popular support. Of all the variables assessed QST fighter demobilization resulted in the greatest improvement of GIRoA control and increase in GIRoA popular support.



Afghan Population support for GIRoA



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How do different elemental steps influence a post-negotiated settlement Afghanistan?



TRADOC G27 assessed the effects of a GIRoA/QST truce, power-sharing government and integration of QST fighters into the ANSF on GIRoA control and popular support

- Truce: While a logical prerequisite for any negotiated settlement, a truce without full or substantial (70%) QST fighter demobilization did not substantially increase GIRoA control or support
- Power sharing: Both power sharing at the ministerial level and through a decentralized government only marginally increased GIRoA control and popular support, compared to a truce with substantial QST fighter demobilization
- Reintegration: Irrespective of how QST fighters integrated into the ANSF (both number and ANSF organization), it did not substantially effect GIRoA control or popular support

QST fighter demobilization resulted in the greatest improvement of GIRoA control and increase in GIRoA popular support of all the variables we assessed



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
VEO LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

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



What Are Drivers and Barriers to Stability in Afghanistan?



AFPAK Violent Extremist Organizations Causing Most Instability over Past Decade (2007-2017)

ID	VEO Name	# of Attacks
1	Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)	21
2	Halqa-e-Mehsud (HeM)	30
3	Haqqani Network	97
4	Hizb-I-Islami	44
5	Jaish-e-Islam (Jaish-ul-Islam)	25
6	Jamaat-ul-Ahrar	19
7	Jundalluh Group (Pakistan)	32
8	Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State (IS-K)	387
9	Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI)	132
10	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)	164
11	Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)	16
12	Mujahideen Ansar/Ansarul Majahideen	19
13	Taliban	7099
14	Tehrik-e-Khilafat (TeK)	16
15	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	1397



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What Are Drivers and Barriers to Stability in Afghanistan?



Leadership and Organizational Structure Changes in the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban Precede Periods of Instability.

- In 2014, coinciding with a troop withdrawal and absence of a “formidable outgroup” to Afghan Taliban, you see weak leadership and splintering/fractionalization into smaller, less coherent VEOs
- In 2015, coinciding with the emergence of a formidable outgroup (IS-K), you see S. Haqqani taking on a more significant role in leadership and consolidation into a larger, more strategic Taliban
- The leadership team that exists in the present (2018) Afghan Taliban has resulted in greater potential for continued instability and reduced the likelihood of reconciliation.

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