

UW Countergovernance: **Political Warfare in Great Power Competition**

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22 APR 2019

SOF Paradigm in Great Power Competition

* The views expressed are the authors' and do not represent official NDU, DOD, or USG positions.

Unclassified Brief

Agenda

1. 1st Special Forces Command's 2014 Realignment
2. Governance: Wielding the Political and Economic Variables
3. Countergovernance: Weaponizing the Political and Economic Variables
4. Iranian Countergovernance
5. Russian Countergovernance
6. Countergovernance: USSOF application against Great Power Competition
7. Recommendations

1st SFC 2014 Realignment and Division of Labor

USSOF Cross-Functional Integration

Instruments of National Power

Diplomatic: Civil Affairs

Informational: Psychological Operations

Military: Special Forces/Naval Special Warfare/MARSOC

Economic: Civil Affairs

Operational Variables

Political: Civil Affairs

Military: Special Forces/Naval Special Warfare/MARSOC

Economic: Civil Affairs

Social: All

Information: Psychological Operations

Infrastructure: Civil Affairs and Special Forces Focus

Physical Environment/Time: All

Governance: Wielding the Political and Economic Variables

1. Governance (Take 1): The state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society (**JP 3-24 2009**).

Ungoverned Area: “where a state is unable or unwilling to extend control . . .and where a provincial, local, tribal or autonomous government does not effectively govern (JP 3-24).

2. Governance (2.0): Population control practices employed by power holders to gain and maintain authority and/or influence over a target populace and its resources within the human environment (**JHU & 95th CA BDE 2017**).

Government: Is the formal authority to implement policy and enforce laws (**Rosenau**).

3. Governance (2.1): JP 3-24 2018 drops the word “state” and adds “locally governed area” for governance within or outside of the state.

Governance: Wielding the Political and Economic Variables

- **Stability, FID, and COIN relevance:** The military variable should be indivisible from the political/economic variables. Thus as a military force exploits the combat initiative and gains a relative advantage over the enemy (subdues the enemy) political and economic means must expeditiously consolidate gains and fill the power vacuums.
- **UW relevance:** If governance can be separated from government, and if governance can occur where ever a group of people gather, then actors can wield the political and economic variables by, with, thru sub-state and non-state actors—against the state. Examples: Iran in Lebanon and Russia in Ukraine.

Countergovernance: Weaponizing the political and economic variables

DODD 5100.01: US Army is required to conduct military government (governance) and Civil Affairs Operations


DODD 2000.13: SOCOM trains, organizes, equips CA to influence relations between military and non-military actors in friendly, neutral, and hostile environments.

CME DIR 525-38: SOF CA “Partner with friendly networks, engage neutral networks, and counter threat networks”

Countergovernance (JHU/95th CA BDE 2018): Activities in the human environment that intentionally **undermine** and/or **compete** with power holders’ governance practices and their associated authority & influence.

(A) **Negative Governance:** focuses on degrading an adversary’s governance activities, capabilities, and legitimacy.

(B) **Competing Governance:** Two or more actors maintaining parallel governance structures, vying for recognition and legitimacy via governance activities



CA Support to UW (JP3-05)

Operationally Framing Countergovernance—Short of Conventional War


Permissive		Environment		Denied
Friendly		Governing Authorities		Hostile
Strategic	National Security Strategy (JP-1)			
	National Defense Strategy (JP-1)			
	Political Warfare (Kennan) & Hybrid Warfare (Gerasimov)			
	Executive Orders (EXORDs), Presidential Directives, Presidential Findings (JP-1)			
Operational	FID (JP 3-22)	COIN (JP3-24)	Stability (JP 3-07)	UW (JP 3-05)
	CT (JP3-26)			
	IW (JP 3-05 and DODD 3000.07)			
	Counterstate Sovereigns (Mampilly)			
	Rebel Governance (Mampilly)		Warlordism (Mampilly)	
Tactical	Governance (JP3-07) (DODD 2000.13)		Countergovernance (DODD 2000.13, CME Dir 525-38)	
	Interorganizational Integration (CME Directive 525-38)			
	Network Analysis (CME Directive 525-38)			
	Network Engagement (CME Directive 525-38)			
	Civil Reconnaissance (CME Directive 525-38)			

Iranian Countergovernance in Lebanon

Geographic distribution of Lebanon's population

Estimated Breakdown

- 35.5% Christian
- 28% Sunni
- 28% Shia
- 5.2% Druze



Countergovernance in Lebanon

*Iranian Revolution (1979) + Lebanese Civil War (1975-90) = **Hezbollah**

Conditions for Hezbollah's countergovernance

- The weakened Lebanese government & the ousting of the PLO created a power vacuum creating permissive factors for Hezbollah.
- Significant disparity in the standard of living between the Shia and the Christians created Shia resentment and distrust for the government
- Marginalization likely due to the 1943 National Pact and Article 24 of the Lebanese Constitution—unequal democratic representation.

Hezbollah Negative Governance

1) Terrorism:

- A. 1983 car bomb at the USEMB in Beirut
- B. 1983 truck bomb destroying US & French barracks—killing 299.
- C. 1983 car bomb destroying the Israeli HQ in Tyre, Lebanon
- D. Multiple Kidnappings and murders of Sunni, Christian & Westerners

Hezbollah Competing Governance

- 1) The Shia enclave's lack of security and high unemployment was solved by creating a security (military) force.
- 2) Social branch consisted of social work, education, and healthcare.
- 3) Hezbollah media glamorizes Hezbollah operations and activities
- 4) Participated in every parliamentary election since 1992.

Russian Countergovernance in Crimea



Countergovernance in Crimea

2008: RU NGOs active in Crimea

26FEB14: RU news broadcasted
“Russians were under threat in
Crimea” narrative

~**26FEB14:** Russia recruits Berkut
Special police

27FEB14: RU Spetsnaz seize
Crimean Parliament and critical civil
infrastructure

27FEB14: Sergey Aksyonov installed
as Crimean Prime Minister

28FEB14: RU severs communications
with mainland UA

09MAR14: RU turns off Nine UA TV
channel stations

16MAR14: Crimean’s coerced to
conduct referendum to secede to RU

18MAR14: Aksyonov signs treaty for
Crimea to secede from UA to RU.

2014: RU Orthodox Church
legitimizes the annexation of Crimea
stating it is “Russia’s divine right.”

Russian Countergovernance in the Donbas



Countergovernance in the Donbas

2014: GONGOs directly aids Donbas separatists

07APR14: Protestors seize government buildings in Donetsk and Luhansk

11MAY14: DNR & LNR conduct referendums to secede from UA


11–12MAY14: DNR & LNR declare themselves independent republics

24MAY14: The DNR & LNR unite into a single republic

MAY2014–2015: RU Media depicting UA military as “fascists” and the separatists as “defenders”

2015: RU cyber attacks target Dnipropetrovsk government infrastructure, then power companies across Ukraine.

15FEB15: Minsk-2 treaty signed, codifying UA to decentralize power to the Donbass



Find: SOF operational design and civil reconnaissance (CR) maps systems (clan, tribe, village, district, county, oblast, or region) that are being exploited by enemy networks.

Fix: Network Engagement seeks to partner with friendly, capitalize on neutral and exploit the vulnerabilities of enemy networks within the system. Network analysis leads to critical factors analysis to determines both the system's critical civil vulnerabilities and the enemy network's critical civil vulnerabilities.

Finish: Led by partner proxy force, **countergovernance** undermine an adversary power holder (isolate, defeat, deceive, contain, reduce, or disrupt) while simultaneously, creates a competing governance to bolster a partner proxy power holder (enable, influence, support, protect).


Exploit: Proxy power holder gains and maintains a legitimate monopoly on population control measures within the system by filling key power vacuums at the time and place of the finish phase.

Anticipate (Fix, Finish, Exploit): Thru predictive and pattern analysis continuously determine the 2nd and 3rd order effects of an enemy's action resulting from the "finish" phase.

Analyze: CA assesses thru unbiased methods to ensure the OAs are executed correctly (measures of performance (MOP)) and to ensure the targeted system's center of gravity is moving toward the desired end state (measure of effectiveness (MOE)).

Disseminate: Capture OAs thru the GCC/TSOC (& IA partners) to expeditiously share best/worst practices with SOF community & adapt faster than our enemies.

What if ? Countergovernance 2.0 in Crimea



Conditions for Tatar's countergovernance in Crimea

1. Historic Russian discrimination and deportation
2. RU outlaws Tatar Parliament (Mejlis) (26APR16)
3. Tatar media banned in Crimea
4. Tatar politicians & activists arrested/banned in Crimea
5. Tatar populations relocated from Coastal Crimea

Preparation

- ✓ Must first stabilize Ukraine politically and economically (RU GDP per capita $3x > UA$)

Initial Contact and Infiltration


- ✓ Mobilize Tatar and Ukrainian diaspora populations in Turkey and Ukraine

Organization and Build-up

- ✓ Build political coalitions with other minorities
- ✓ Establish competing media/social media capability in UA
- ✓ Establish funding sources through third party entities

Employment (Create factions within RU pop. & unify the UA pop.)

- ✓ Use media/social media to capture discrimination and economic hardships for Crimean's (inflation and low wages)
- ✓ Create politically dominate Tatar/minority enclaves with competing social structures within key administrative regions
- ✓ Play the game—Gradually create a coalition in the State Council
- ✓ Disrupt Russia's economy from "outside in"—Sanctions/boycotts
- ✓ Disrupt Russia's economy from "inside out" (tourism, agriculture, fishing, minerals)



Recommendations Going Forward

Flexible Funding

1. Title 10, sec. 401 OHDACA
2. Title 10, sec. 403 Stabilization Activities: designed for Iraq/Syria-like stability environments
3. Sec. 1202 NDAA for Irregular warfare (signed into law, yet no policy or appropriation)

Political Warfare (Countergovernance) Authorities

1. Current directives are supplementary for conducting political and economic warfare

UW/IW Readiness

1. Force Design: SOF CA is poorly organized and equipped to engage in GPC
2. Training: A hard 1:2 D2D is good, 1:3 D2D provides time for advanced individual and cross functional training in near peer environments to include certify and validate units prior to deployment.

Questions