

Nonviolent Resistance and Expanding the Unconventional Warfare (UW) Toolkit

SMA NDU Speaker Series
“SOF Paradigm in Great Power Competition”
06 MAY 19

Presenters:

MAJ Robert McBride - USASOC
robert.c.mcbride.mil@socom.mil

MAJ Thomas Doherty - USASOC
thomas.w.doherty@socom.mil

* The views expressed are the authors' and do not represent official NDU, DOD, or USG positions.

Unclassified Brief

Agenda


- Ties to UW Countergovernance SMA brief
- Expanding UW
- Clarification of Terms – Principled vs. Strategic Nonviolence
- Theory of Strategic Nonviolent Resistance
- Methods and Case Studies
- Enabling NvUW – Pure and Hybrid
- Recommendations

Ties to UW Countergovernance SMA Brief (22APR19)

- Countergovernance (JHU/95th CA BDE 2018): Activities in the human environment that intentionally undermine and/or compete with power holders' governance practices and their associated authority & influence.
 - (A) Negative Governance: focuses on degrading an adversary's governance activities, capabilities, and legitimacy.
 - (B) Competing Governance: Two or more actors maintaining parallel governance structures, vying for recognition and legitimacy via governance activities
- *Both aspects encompass components of Strategic Nonviolent (SNV) Resistance*

Expanding Unconventional Warfare

- Defined by US Public Law 114-92 as "activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, **or** guerrilla force in a denied area."
 - *Ends not always accomplished through traditional guerilla insurgencies who utilize violent tactics — in era of Great Power Competition, these tactics could be too provocative*
 - *Strategic Nonviolence has also successfully achieved UW ends — however, using different means and ways creating NvUW*
 - *Chenoweth and Stephan study*



Principled vs. Strategic Nonviolence

- *Principled* Nonviolence: attributed to an ideological position that is against all violence on religious and/or ethical bases (generally called pacifism).
 - NV resistance is not simply a Christian or Hindu specialization
 - Majority of participants in NV resistance are not pacifists
- *Strategic* Nonviolence: civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, psychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence
 - Methods are deemed by the practitioner to be more useful than violent tactics
 - Not ideological, thus the strategy can appeal to a broad-base audience within a society — *key is to enable mobilization for mass resistance from the populace*

Strategic Nonviolent Resistance

- Underlying Assumption: “Consent” Theory of Power
 - Power is pluralistic, not monolithic, connecting the legitimacy of a regime through obedience (tacit or explicit)
 - Governments can be overthrown if the people openly withdraw their consent and cooperation towards it
 - State power still relevant (but not all encompassing) – Russia, China, Iran all strong states with imbedded institutions and societal control yet dependencies and opportunities for resistance still exist
- Strategic Focus — shift obedience patterns from supporting the regime to supporting a NV movement, creating a crisis of effectiveness in governance
- Operational Focus — target regime “pillars of support” while strengthening movement’s pillars:
 - Common Regime Pillars: *Internal*—Military, Police, Judiciary, Civil-Servants, State-Controlled Media, Corporations, Certain Religious Groups, Education System, etc. *External*—Multinational corporations, Friendly governments providing materials, trade, or technical expertise, etc.
 - Common Movement Pillars: *Internal*—Labor Unions, Students, Teachers, Academic or Professional Organizations, NGOs, Human/Women/Minority Rights Organizations, etc. *External*—Friendly governments providing diplomatic support or sanctions, IGOs, etc.
- Tactical Focus — three categories of NV resistance: Protest and Persuasion, Noncooperation, and Nonviolent Intervention

Methods - Protest and Persuasion

- Signal serious objections from the populace to certain actions and policies of a regime and attempt to persuade others to join cause
- **Examples:** formal statements, communications with a wider audience, group representations, symbolic public acts, pressures on individuals, processions, honoring the dead, public assemblies, withdrawal and renunciation.
- Indian Independence Movement
 - Anti-occupation movement
 - Included radical flanks
 - Cross class/caste social structures
 - Survived violent repression
 - Transitioned to SNV



Methods - Nonviolent Noncooperation



- Often most powerful method; directly affects ability for regime to function; can also extend internationally from organizations outside the state
- **Examples:** economic boycotts, tax refusal, strikes, slowdowns, electoral boycotts, refusal to obey orders/mutiny, trade embargoes, severing diplomatic relations, targeted sanctions, etc.
- “Solidarity” Movement in Communist Poland
 - Industrial worker origins
 - Social movement spread to encompass other key aspects of Polish society (Catholic Church, academia, agriculture, etc)
 - Repression via Martial Law and subsequent external support
 - Establishment of Democracy in Poland and subsequent domino effect in the Eastern Bloc countries culminating in the fall of the Soviet Union

Methods - Nonviolent Intervention

- Intent or effect is to disrupt established behavior patterns, policies, relationships, or institutions
- **Examples:** psychological intervention, physical intervention, social intervention, economic intervention, political intervention.
- 1986 Philippine People Power Revolution
 - Regime change
 - Started as a military coup (violent)
 - Included radical flanks
 - Cross class social structures
 - Open coordination between VRM and NvRM
 - NvRM in direct support of VRM



“Backfire”

- An action that recoils against its originators.
- Outcome is not just worse than anticipated — it is negative, namely worse than having done nothing.



Funeral of Father Jerzy Popieluszko
Poland, 1984



Vietnam




Dili, East Timor

Enabling Strategic Nonviolent UW

- ARSOF Contributions:
 - Human Network Analysis to ID Key Influencers/Brokers for Mobilization
 - Social Network and Behavioral Trend Analysis
 - Media Assessments and ID Key Communicators
 - Strategic Messaging/Framing – Mobilization and Legitimacy
 - Frame Bridging, Amplification, Extension, Transformation
 - Target Audience Analysis and Behavioral Change Methodology
 - Training and Resourcing of Movements
 - Enabling Underground Communications
 - Overcoming Censorship
- “Whole of Government” effort via Interagency Coordination (DOS, DOT, DOJ, NGOs, etc)

NvUW as “Hybrid warfare”

- Doctrine defines Hybrid Threat not Warfare
- Combination of two or more distinct elements
- Parallel or supporting efforts



Recommendations (1 of 2)

- Understand power relationships within (and outside) a society akin the “Human Domain”
 - “Pillars of support” and associated linkages of strengths/vulnerabilities
 - Understand when violent intervention is not appropriate – yet explore other pragmatic solutions
 - Recognize conditions perhaps more conducive to NV resistance
- Recognize/exploit *opportunities* and identify/avoid *vulnerabilities* as they present themselves
 - Backfire messaging
 - i.e. Venezuelan Opposition remaining nonviolent in face of Maduro repression and continuing to target key pillars of support (domestically and internationally)

Recommendations (2 of 2)

- SOF must understand how to enable SNV movements
 - Resourcing, Training, Messaging, Mobilization (Covert vs. Overt)
 - Apply current capabilities with “nontraditional” partners (labor unions, human rights orgs, intelligentsia, etc)
 - Develop new Doctrine and Capabilities (training NV resistance methods, underground communications, etc)
 - Incorporate NvUW in SOF training events (combined Robin Sage, Jade Helm, etc)
 - Understand Counter-NV Resistance (Russia/Iran/China censorship practices, counterprotests, etc)
 - Create new authorities or revise existing authorities as required
- Explore Civilian-Based Defense (NV SFA/FID) as an additional deterrent option (Baltic States, Ukraine, Georgia, Taiwan, Hong Kong?)

Questions

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