CHINA'S VISION OF VICTORY

JONATHAN D. T. WARD

FOREWORD BY ADMIRAL SCOTT SWIFT
COMMANDER OF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, 2015-2018
Someday we may say that we never saw it coming. A new challenger to American power has emerged, on a scale not seen in generations. Working from a deep sense of national destiny, the Chinese Communist Party is guiding a country of 1.4 billion people towards what it calls “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and, with it, the end of an American-led world. Will this generation witness the final act for America as a superpower? Can American ingenuity, confidence, and will power outcompete the long-term strategic thinking and planning of China’s Communist Party? These are the challenges that will shape the next decade and more. China’s Vision of Victory brings the reader to a new understanding of China’s planning, strategy, and ambitions. From seabed to space, from Africa to the Arctic, from subsurface warfare to the rise of China’s global corporations, this book will illuminate for the reader the new great game of our lifetimes, and how our adversary sees it all.

“Jonathan Ward has provided an eye-opening analysis of China’s strategic ambitions. He effectively demolishes the longstanding expectation in Washington that a prosperous rising China will be content to integrate itself into the Western international order – to the contrary, he demonstrates that Beijing’s objectives include nothing less than renovating that order to serve China’s own strategic interests. As the United States debates the future of its China policy, China’s Vision of Victory deserves the widest reading.”

ASHLEY J. TELLIS, Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

“China’s Vision of Victory is a must-read for Western policy makers, intelligence agencies, chief executives, global investors, and globally-minded thinkers. It is a real-life page-turner, if ever there was one.”

J. KYLE BASS, Founder & Chief Investment Officer of Hayman Capital Management

DR. JONATHAN D. T. WARD has been studying the rise of China for over a decade. From travels with truck caravans in Tibet and across the South China Sea by cargo ship in his early twenties, to accessing Communist Party archives that have now been closed to the world while a Ph.D. candidate at Oxford, to consulting for the US Department of Defense and Fortune 500 organizations, he has brought the experience of a traveler, the discipline of a scholar, and the insight of a strategy consultant to one of the toughest, biggest pictures of our time: what does China want, how will it try to get it, and what should America do? Dr. Ward is Founder of Atlas Organization, a consultancy focused on the rise of India and China, and on US-China global competition. He speaks Chinese, Russian, Spanish, and Arabic.
PRAISE FOR

CHINA’S VISION OF VICTORY

AND JONATHAN D.T. WARD

“The extraordinary rise of China is unprecedented in world history and the biggest geopolitical development of the first two decades of the 21st Century; it is likely to continue to be so for decades to come. Jonathan Ward is very well qualified to document China’s extraordinary growth, and he describes it superbly in China’s Vision of Victory, a powerful work that is sure to provoke thought and serious reflection.”

— GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS, US Army (Ret.), former commander of coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and US Central Command, and former Director of the CIA

“Jonathan Ward is a young scholar with not only all the necessary linguistic and travel credentials, but with something even more important, a vision of history rooted in geography that allows him to espy the future.”

— ROBERT D. KAPLAN, author of Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power

“I’ve long admired Jonathan’s determination to get to the truth, on the ground. It is rare to find someone able to combine politics, philosophy, linguistic expertise and hard travel—and bring it to bear on some of the toughest issues of our generation—Jonathan is one of those remarkable people.”

— RORY STEWART, author of The Places in Between and The Prince of Marshes

“This book is a very timely Master Class on China. Everyone with a keen interest in China’s political, military and economic policy, past and present, should study this book carefully. Jonathan Ward’s gimlet-eyed analysis and prescriptive recommendations should be taken to heart by all.”

— JACK DEVINE, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (Ret.), author of Good Hunting: An American Spymaster’s Story
“Jonathan Ward has provided an eye-opening analysis of China’s strategic ambitions. He effectively demolishes the longstanding expectation in Washington that a prosperous rising China will be content to integrate itself into the Western international order – to the contrary, he demonstrates that Beijing’s objectives include nothing less than renovating that order to serve China’s own strategic interests. As the United States debates the future of its China policy, *China’s Vision of Victory* deserves the widest reading.”

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“*China’s Vision of Victory* is insightful, compelling, and long overdue. Whether your interest is business, economics, diplomacy, or politics, Jonathan Ward’s assessments and analysis are on target. More importantly, his book will help you understand the complexity and interconnection of all facets of America’s relations with China. Jonathan has given us a new take on the many challenges we face in addressing Chinese power and its relationship with the world.”


“Dr. Ward tells an absorbing and well-researched story about China’s grand strategy to achieve “supremacy among all nations” by 2049 and the role of Western capital in fueling China’s rise. *China’s Vision of Victory* is a must-read for Western policy makers, intelligence agencies, chief executives, global investors, and globally-minded thinkers. It is a real-life page-turner, if ever there was one.”

—J. KYLE BASS, Founder & Chief Investment Officer of Hayman Capital Management
China's Vision of Victory

And Why America Must Win

Jonathan D.T. Ward
To My Fellow Americans
and
Our Friends and Allies Around the World

2019
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China’s Vision of Victory is insightful, compelling, and long overdue. Whether your interest is business, economics, diplomacy, or politics, Jonathan Ward’s assessments and analysis are on target. More importantly, his book will help you understand the complexity and interconnection of all facets of America’s relations with China. Jonathan has given us a new take on the many challenges we face in addressing Chinese power and its relationship with the world.

This is an important undertaking. To understand China you have to take a multi-dimensional approach, as Jonathan has done. China’s strategy is a *global grand strategy*—dynamic, multifaceted, and utilizing all elements of the nation’s government and society. To truly understand China, you have to look at its strategic intentions in all of its parts, as Jonathan has done.

The author notes that China has leveraged its “economic empowerment through engagement with the United States,” and China “is now returning to the original ideological intentions of the Chinese Communist Party.” I could not agree more. The Chinese have not obscured or hidden their intentions. They have communicated clearly to their citizens their near- and long-term political objectives and their grand strategy for getting there. As Jonathan points out, when Henry Kissinger first visited Beijing, he described China as a “mysterious” country. Through our own shortcomings,
we have unnecessarily “mystified” this grand plan. Our lack of knowledge and understanding explains why America thought the best approach for our emerging relationship with China was “engage but hedge.” Now, not only are we as Americans beginning to grasp the true nature of China’s plans, but the world is as well.

China’s grand strategy plays to its advantages and is derived from a vision of its intended relationship with the world. From that grand strategy China has developed regional strategies to guide its actions in every corner of the world.

China has developed military bases on man-made islands in the South China Sea, engineering marvels emblematic of the success of the implementation of Chinese grand strategic outcomes and its resultant transition from a “mysterious” country to one overtly assuming a commanding position on the global stage.

More broadly, and of even greater concern, China has long pursued a strategy of exploiting the international rules-based order when those rules provide Chinese advantage, while also using economic and military coercion, corruption, intimidation, bullying, and outright force when convenient to achieve national objectives.

China’s success demonstrates the value of a true grand strategy applied effectively and efficiently. China has done this methodically, with frequent updates based upon changing world conditions, as well as China’s assessments of its own ability to advance toward its goals. It has also telegraphed its broad strategic intent, if not its specific objectives. Granted, it has presented goals in much clearer terms to its internal audience than to the international community, but, as Jonathan points out, this is not new and not beyond the view of a careful eye on Chinese discourse.

This reality was reflected in Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s response to Kissinger’s comment about the mystery of Chinese aims when he simply said: “It is not mysterious to us.” Nor should it be a mystery to us. Certainly, reading this book will help lift what is the West’s largely self-created idea of a Chinese veil of mystery.

From behind this veil has emerged the current debate about China as a competitor with the United States. So what does this competition look like? What is the nature of the core competition between the United States and China? And what are the pitfalls to be avoided in managing it?
First, it is important to note that being competitors is not necessarily bad. We compete in business, politics, government, and in our personal and professional lives. But what is necessary in any competition is a common understanding of the rules and a commitment to follow them, hence, the necessity of a stable international rules-based order.

My view, reinforced throughout this book, is that the primary element of this competition is the divergent views of China and the rest of the world on the value of the international rules-based system designed to mitigate frictions that naturally occur between states. China is challenging the rules-based order in areas it views as impinging upon its national sovereignty. Competitive frictions are occurring globally as other states resist China’s refusal to align with the standing international rules-based order, or where China is forcing change merely because it is strong enough to do so.

So what is this “international rules-based order” so many refer to? Some of it is post-Second World War international agreements; some is established international law; some is based on UN conventions and declarations, as well as those of international organizations like the World Trade Organization. Other elements are the result of the evolution of customary business, diplomatic, and military relationships.

What provides the legitimacy of the rules-based order is the value placed on it by international actors. There can and should be differences in views with respect to what constitutes the international rules-based order. This is driven by many factors, not the least of which are the global changes that occur on an increasingly frequent basis. The system itself anticipates this. There are any number of forums in the diplomatic, economic, defense, financial, and law domains where debates discuss the merits of the current rules and consider appropriate changes.

In the Pacific, the system grew from the September 8, 1951 Treaty of San Francisco, which was signed by forty-eight nations and ended the war with Japan. A core motivation behind the convention was to provide mechanisms for peacefully resolving disagreements between the signatory states. The lessons learned from the world’s experience with Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany were painful, and there emerged a general international consensus to ensure the hard lessons learned became lessons applied. The core of the new process was rejection of the use of force to resolve claims or to modify the rules themselves, while embracing the stabilizing tenets of diplomacy and dialogue.
In a very general sense, the rules state that disagreements between nations should be addressed via bilateral dialogue. If this fails, then individually or collectively the concerned nations are supposed to turn to the established international institutions for resolution. The result has been seventy-five years of relative stability in the Pacific. An underpinning of that stability has been the incredible rising tide of prosperity that has benefited all the countries choosing to participate in the international rules-based system. It is a simple formula: shared and applied interests in security result in shared stability which, in turn, helps produce shared prosperity.

Exacerbating competition is the fact that the “Global Stage” is not getting any bigger. If anything, with the interconnected nature of the global economy, along with the international nature of state relationships, international law, business practices, and trade, and the effects of local and regional practices on the climate and environment, all factors have helped increase the necessity of an international rules-based system. These same global drivers are shrinking the global stage, driving us closer together, and increasing opportunities for growth and prosperity. But they also feed increased interstate discord. Overall, global stability is not on a positive vector.

China’s economic power alone is sufficient to make the case for its inclusion on the global stage. It is in everyone’s best interest to welcome and embrace China’s assumption of its rightful position. But the global community should also expect China to assume the obligations of a global leader by its acceptance of and adherence to the international rules-based system.

With China’s emergence on the global stage, some displacement of those already on the stage will occur. Adjustments will have to be made. Those making adjustments will certainly include the United States. This is not something the United States should fear, but for which it should prepare. The questions we and others should be asking are:

- How do we best understand each of our respective new positions?
- Will adjustments be made through force and coercion, or diplomacy and dialogue?
- Will adjustments be regionally and globally destabilizing, or support international stability and prosperity?
At this point, it is important to note that, as a military practitioner of over forty years, with all of my operational tours originating from and terminating in the Pacific, I believe we are overly focused on the military element of this great power competition. The man-made military fortresses in the South China Sea have significant tactical and operational offensive capability, but are strategically static and defensive in nature. More important, they represent only a small part of China’s grand strategy, and they demonstrate China’s whole-of-government approach. When it comes to United States Freedom of Navigation Operations, for example, while the Chinese military may respond tactically, the strategic response to US actions comes from the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

Freedom of Navigation Operations have been a fixture of US Navy operations for decades, well before my first deployment in the early 1970s. Despite their long history, they are not well understood. They are executed in support of a long-standing United States national commitment to the concept of free and open navigation of international waters. Where national claims are excessive, such operations are conducted by the US Navy on behalf of the State Department to allow State to engage in a dialogue with the subject nation, explaining exactly what element of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is being clarified. Regretfully, this reinforcement of the value of discourse and dialogue is being subsumed by the military element. Unlike in other arenas of national competition, when it comes to a miscalculation in the military domain, if a tactical action results in crossing a strategic red line, it is much more difficult to walk that action back. In the military domain, consequences tend to be significant, nationally polarizing, and lasting. The watchwords here should be prudence and caution. At best, Freedom of Navigation Operations may reassure what are now skeptical allies, partners, and friends that the United States is committed to an orderly process to evolve the international rules-based order. But let’s be clear: Freedom of Navigation operations will not deter a determined and now emboldened Chinese government.

This brings me to my last point: the necessity for the United States to develop a grand strategy of its own. We cannot compete successfully with China without one. There is not sufficient time or space here, nor is this the forum, to advocate for what that United States grand strategy should be. That said, I will take a moment here to discuss how a grand strategy might be drafted and implemented.
The ultimate measure of a grand strategy is whether it generates a whole-of-government effort toward common national global goals. By whole of government I mean the organization and alignment of each Presidential Cabinet-level department. The creation and execution of a new American grand strategy should involve not only the traditional strategic departments (Defense, State, and Commerce), but all fifteen federal executive departments. All have important contributions to make, roles to play, and resources to apply toward obtaining our national objectives. This means each has to play a role in designing our grand strategy and empowering its execution. Certainly, Congress should exercise oversight and share its insight, experience, and support, as well as ensuring that necessary funding is available to implement the strategy (though my sense is there is sufficient funding in the current budget to do so). A clear grand strategy would help better apply those funds in support of our national goals.

Grand strategy broadly defines and explains how elements of national power are used to achieve internal and external objectives. From this foundation, regional strategies would be developed by the same branches and departments of government. An effective grand strategy would be very broad, with the aim of standing the test of time and surviving political transitions with only minor changes. It would be guided by the long-standing tenets of the Constitution and our other founding documents and ideals. Regional strategies would be more detailed, with specific actions and outcomes for individual departments of government. Metrics would then be applied to assess progress being made toward achieving the stated national goals.

Using regional strategies as a guide and source of authority, branches and departments of government would develop policy to guide the application and implementation of regional strategies. These steps would support moving us away from merely reacting to the current crisis of the day, reduce governmental confusion and chaos, and leverage a whole-of-government alignment that would increase national and international confidence in America's intentions and actions.

Where nations become engaged in activities to challenge and change the international rules-based order through force and coercion, branches and departments of the United States government would be logically organized and engaged in meaningful and much more effective moves to counter not just a rival's actions, but also their strategic intent. From American resolve,
a rallying of other nations in support of time-honored ideals and agreements is more likely to rise.

I hope your experience with Jonathan Ward’s *China’s Vision of Victory* is the same as mine. I am heartened by his fact-based approach to understanding not only China’s grand strategy, but also the underlying forces at play galvanizing China as a nation to embrace and support the strategy defined by Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party.

Mysteries survive in the darkness of ignorance. As more academics, policy-makers, diplomats, and business and political leaders begin to understand the nature of the grand strategic game China is playing, the more I expect my confidence to grow that we will continue to enjoy the absence of “Great Power” conflict we have experienced since the end of the Second World War.

Jonathan’s book, *China’s Vision of Victory*, is an excellent place to start this learning process as we ask ourselves: “Do we wish the global stage to be defined by the embrace of force and coercion as national tools of choice, or do we wish to continue to value rules-based agreement and the proven practices of diplomacy and dialogue?”

I see work like Jonathan Ward’s becoming more and more vital now as we endeavor to find reasonable solutions that address the growing concerns of the international community of nations. His work is a great source of my confidence and optimism. I trust that in reading this book you may reach a similar conclusion.
Forty years ago, when Henry Kissinger first visited Beijing, he remarked that China was a “mysterious” country. His Chinese host said this: “What is so mysterious about China? There are 900 million of us and it is not mysterious to us.”

For decades since Dr. Kissinger’s first visit, US policy-makers were guided by a beautiful and very American vision. They worked toward an idea that China would eventually liberalize, reform, and otherwise become a “responsible stakeholder,” living and working alongside the United States on the world stage. The Chinese people had been our friends and allies once before, fighting against fascism in the Second World War under the Nationalist Party, now exiled to Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China was a growing market in which American business could prosper. The rise of modern China would be a force for globalization, and, together, America and China could share the world.

The sum of American policymakers’ approach was a strategy called “engage but hedge.” This is one of the most consequential strategic approaches in American history—not because it has succeeded, but because it has failed.

Most importantly, this strategy has brought us to the brink of the end of an American-led world. It is an approach that will eventually bring about the end of American power.

The People’s Republic of China—its rise built substantially on economic empowerment through engagement with the United States—is now returning to the original ideological intentions of the Chinese Communist Party.

What are these intentions? Where is China going? What does it want, not in our eyes, but in the eyes of China’s leaders? This book will answer these questions.
From the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to Xi Jinping’s accession to power in the twenty-first century, in the eyes of Chinese leaders China’s rise has never been about sharing Asia or the world with the United States. It has been about the restoration of Chinese power and the road to unrestricted power among nations. It is the building of a superpower, and the restoration, as China’s leaders see it, of China’s position of supremacy among all nations. Only from this supreme position can China’s destiny be fulfilled.

For a long and trusting moment, over more than thirty years, American policy-makers empowered this rise, perhaps not knowing where it would lead, perhaps knowing only that the Communist Party would lead China.

Our present moment of engagement is finally breaking. The intentions of the Communist Party and the objectives of China’s rise are becoming clearer in America. The US national security community deals on a daily basis with a growing Chinese military that is designed to defeat the United States. Members of our Congress are waking up to the dangers for American prosperity as job losses and deindustrialization imperil the future of this country. The international community has begun to recognize the dystopian landscape of human rights abuses inside and even outside China as new technological breakthroughs enable the Communist Party to build a high-tech surveillance state unlike anything seen in history.

But what is most troubling is not what China does today. It is what the Communist Party plans on for the future of the world.

If China were to settle in as a large East Asian nation with arcane territorial claims against its neighbors, a modernizing military, an anachronistic ideology, and broad economic potential to capture the imaginations of businesspeople and financiers around the world, then perhaps it would remain nothing more than a distant, perhaps fascinating country—or, in Kissinger’s phrasing, a “mysterious” place.

But China’s ambitions have only just begun.

As Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai said to Dr. Kissinger in 1971: “It is not mysterious to us.”

In November 2018, former US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson spoke words that will echo for many years:
There’s this . . . myth that some of us who worked to engage China thought it would become a Jeffersonian democracy, or espouse a liberal Western order. We never thought that. We always knew the Communist Party would play an important, dominant role.¹

Mr. Paulson knew that American engagement with China would bring about a globally empowered China and a globally empowered Chinese Communist Party.

The question, then, is how well did Mr. Paulson and others around him understand the forces that they were working to empower?

How well did he and others understand the Chinese Communist Party?

How well did he and others around him understand China?

Did Mr. Paulson and his colleagues understand the new balance of power that they were bringing about and what it would mean for the world?

What we are verging on for our country—even for our world—is the prospect of a “Chinese Century.”

A litany of speeches, strategy documents, and policies have poured forth from the Communist Party in recent years. All of them explain China’s near- and long-term ambitions. From outer space to the deep sea, from Africa to the Arctic, from artificial intelligence to hypersonic missiles that can “kill” American aircraft carriers, the Chinese Communist Party has mobilized its country and its people to become the global leaders in virtually every form of economic, military, technological, and diplomatic activity on earth. This is not an exaggeration. These are stated goals. This book will explain them in detail.

China’s leaders are proud of their achievements and exuberant about their future.

As Chairman Xi Jinping explained to his country in 2017:

Rooted in a land of more than 9.6 million square kilometers, nourished by a nation’s culture of more than 5,000 years, and backed by the invincible force of more than 1.3 billion people, we have an infinitely vast stage of our era, a historical heritage of unmatched depth, and incomparable resolve that enable us to forge ahead...²
As China's state news agency proclaimed:

By 2050, two centuries after the Opium Wars, which plunged the “Middle Kingdom” [China] into a period of hurt and shame, China is set to regain its might and re-ascend to the top of the world.3

And among China’s citizens, whether by survey or by anecdote, the consensus is that China will replace the United States as the world’s leading superpower.

Here is how one of the leading China scholars in Britain put it: “The way the Chinese look at it is, why shouldn’t they have a go? The British had their turn. America had its turn. Now it’s ours.” In other words, what we are witnessing, in word and deed, is China’s ambition to become the world’s supreme power and, in doing so, to transform human history.

As America churns with division and internal strife, China’s leaders are designing and executing an ascendance to power on a global scale not seen since the British Empire.

The time frame is important. As described by China’s leadership, the completion of China’s rise will take shape by 2049, on the hundredth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. At this point, China would be accepted as the dominant power on Earth, without rival, without peer.

However, in practical terms, the time frame is much sooner.

The next ten years will see a tipping point in the global balance of power from which the United States may never recover.

By 2030, if current trends hold, China will surpass the United States as the world’s top economic power in absolute terms.

Many organizations, from the World Economic Forum to the US National Intelligence Council, to a variety of global investment banks, already take this as an unavoidable outcome.

From that point forward, however, when China reaches a position of economic supremacy, America will enter into a losing contest with China.

Today, in 2019, China’s ability to build global influence, to wield military and industrial power, and to project ideological influence is second only to the United States. Today, China’s economy has grown to be roughly 65
percent of the size of the US economy, as measured in real terms gross domestic product. China’s economy is still growing quickly, at more than twice the speed of the US. Ten years from now, China’s economic might will be double what it is today—equal to, and then with every passing year greater than, America’s. From that point forward, we will have reached a turning point in history. From here, the possibilities for a global China begin to take shape in earnest, and the end of the American era will be accomplished.

China’s economy is the foundation of its power. It is the foundation of its military buildup, its technological advances, and its global influence. While this may have been lost on a generation of American policy-makers, it is not at all lost on the Chinese Communist Party. As an advisor to the Communist Party stated to me in Beijing in 2018, “Chinese strategy is built on China’s economic situation.” Clear and simple. In Chinese aphorism it is this: 富国强兵 “A rich country and a strong military.” These are China’s global goals.

The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have known for decades that the day would come when America questioned China’s rise. Thinking on a multi-decade time frame out to 2049, they have called 2000 to 2020 the “period of strategic opportunity.” This was the time, which is ending now, in which “the international situation” would be favorable to China. The next decade is what some have called a “decade of concern,” the time when the world begins to question and to resist China’s rise to global power.

Within the next ten years, 2020 to 2030, a series of major contests that are already underway will gain even greater momentum: military, technological, industrial, financial, and diplomatic—region by region around the world, sector by sector across the economy, breakthrough by breakthrough across new technologies, domain by domain across the military balance. Within these contests, if China should surpass America, as it intends to do, the bedrock for a Chinese century will be laid in earnest.

These are contests for which the Communist Party has been preparing for quite some time, and in which China is securing victory after victory as America argues and deliberates over the meaning of China’s rise. They are contests in which China has set clear goals and made extraordinary gains.

The United States stands to witness a colossal turning point in less than a generation’s time.

All who are alive today in America were born into a superpower.
Those who are alive today may also be the ones to watch this power perish.
And if this Chinese victory is complete, we will live in a “brave new world” indeed.

What will it mean for America’s democratic process to be manipulated from another continent? Not by a weaker nation, such as today’s Russia, but by a far more powerful global empire ruled by authoritarian China? What will it mean for the prevailing norms in international relations to be decided by an authoritarian state where freedoms of speech, press, and assembly are extinguished for its citizens and those under its power? What will it mean for religious freedom to exist only if it is subordinated to the power of the Communist Party?

In today’s China this isn’t a set of imaginary questions. These are realities of daily life.

In China, in addition to the repression of speech and the press, to forced detentions and even executions of political dissidents, and other continual human rights violations, the Communist Party is unrolling a “social credit system” which aims to monitor the “untrustworthy” behavior of citizens, assigning them a “credit score” as part of the Communist Party’s program of “social management.” The Party is also developing a “youth credit system” in which “dossiers will be created to carry good credit records of trustworthy young individuals.”

Today, in the western province of Xinjiang—a vast expanse of land brought under control by China’s former emperors—the Communist Party has built numerous concentration camps for the Uighur ethnic minority population, and as many as a million people are undergoing “political re-education.” The Party has even, by some accounts, sent a million Chinese citizens to occupy the homes of the Uighur minority people in order to report on their behavior and assist the Party in choosing which ones will be sent to the camps.

The troubles of modern China are one thing when they exist inside China’s borders. It is quite another thing for this country to plan to become the world’s most powerful nation. As China’s corporations, financial institutions, and military expand their reach, we will see what Chinese influence really means.

Today, in America, we have to work again for the things that have been given to us by the past. We have to protect our heritage and our progress from a challenger on a scale not seen in several generations.

Our adversary today understands everyone’s desire to sleep through difficulties. They understand us well. Meanwhile, they work quietly, thor-
oughly, and with extreme dedication. In the end, the objective is to secure their global power without awakening the United States, or awakening us only when it is far too late to stop them.

The purpose of this book is to provide the needed wake-up call. To inform you, so that you will understand and be ready.

If our power is ultimately broken, it will be a danger not only to Americans, but to the world.

The United States, its liberties, its diversity, its opportunity, its creativity, and unlimited potential—all of this cannot be finished simply because, in the Pacific, a dictatorship grows rich and lethal, and its ambitions swell.

America stands in striking contrast to the things for which this new power stands. But the promise of the United States, its commitment to our people, and to many, many nations around the world, cannot be maintained without clear vision and strenuous effort.

There are three things we must do to win:

First, the United States must remain the world’s top economic power.

Second, the United States must work with the world’s democracies—with nations around the globe who share our values and our political systems—in order to preserve an international system of power superior to anything which China can achieve.

Third, the United States must maintain military and technological superiority over China, both on its own, and when combined with the power of its primary authoritarian partner, Russia.

Finally, we must recognize that these are not just short-term problems. These are goals we must sustain over a long-term competition with China, lasting well into the twenty-first century.

These three things can lead us to a victory of our own, to lasting security and prosperity in this new century. Most importantly, if we maintain our power on these three fronts, we can keep the peace and avert the wars which China’s leaders are already calling for.

These three objectives can secure and sustain America, along with our friends and allies around the world.

But first, we must understand our adversary. What it wants. What it has already achieved. Why it does what it does. What it plans to do.

First, we must understand China.
起来！不愿做奴隶的人们！
把我们的血肉，筑成我们新的长城！
中华民族到了最危险的时候，
每个人被迫着发出最后的吼声。
起来！起来！起来！
我们万众一心，
冒着敌人的炮火，前进！
冒着敌人的炮火，前进！
前进！前进！前进！

Rise! Those who will not be slaves!
From our flesh and blood, build our New Great Wall!
The time of greatest danger to the Chinese people has arrived,
Forcing the final howl to erupt from each person.
Arise! Arise! Arise!
We are ten thousand crowds with one heart,
Facing the fire of the enemy, advance!
Facing the fire of the enemy, advance!
Advance! Advance! Advance!

NATIONAL ANTHEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
“THERE ARE JUST TWO COUNTRIES THAT I WANT TO ERASE FROM THE
Earth,” she said.

I looked at her and waited for her to continue.

“Japan and the United States,” said Xiao Qing.

She was a few years older than me. We were in Shanghai. I had returned
from months of travel in China’s desolate western regions and in
Southeast Asia.

“It is not you, Jon,” she said. “It is only that I want to drop a nuclear
bomb on Washington to destroy your government.”

“I like you,” she said. “But in a war, I would have to kill you for my
country.”

It was my first year in China.
The Purpose of This Book

I had just presented on the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese global strategy at one of America’s nuclear research facilities in Northern California. As we chatted afterward, a former senior US Defense Department official offered me a parable. The story tells of many blind men, each touching one object. One feels a tusk, another feels an ear, another a tail. Yet another strokes the rough skin. Each describes in detail what he has found. But none grasps that they are all touching an elephant. “That’s the problem,” my new acquaintance told me. “People endlessly tell us all about China. But no one is describing the whole elephant.”

He fixed his gaze on me. I believed he meant that, based on what I told him in my presentation, I should try to describe the elephant. The idea of this book was born that day. It is about the whole of China’s rise: what is really happening, and what it means.

China and Me

In 2006, I was a 22-year-old backpacker travelling in China’s remotest regions. I had studied Russian and Chinese language at Columbia University, then went to Beijing University to continue my language study. We had a short break that summer, and I spent it staying in monasteries and workers’ camps in China’s heartland. When I returned, one of my tutors said, “How did you become fluent in the language?” The answer was simple: immersion among all kinds of people in their daily lives. I spent a year in the region the first time: riding a bicycle across southern China, motorcycling through China’s northwest deserts, hitchhiking with truck drivers through Tibet and hiding from the People’s Liberation Army under sacks of food and cold-weather blankets at checkpoints on some of the remotest roads in the world. Above all, I came to see and know the people of one of the world’s great countries.

It was also the beginning of a belief that only gets stronger: that the rise of China will be the central story of our lifetime. And I found, when I returned to America and Europe, that most everyone around me had it wrong. My travels continued. I spent five years living and travelling in Russia, China, South and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, learning other languages and meeting thousands of people.
What I was seeing became this book’s central premise—the world is changing, and at the center of these changes is the rise of China.

The next step was to immerse myself in history. I was accepted at Oxford to study with some of the world’s leading scholars. My mentors guided me toward an innovative project: China’s relationship with India. I was trained to be an “expert,” learning what the world looked like not only through the eyes of China’s people, but also through the eyes of the country’s leaders in China’s founding decades as a modern state. I spent years studying China’s strategic outlook and concepts of national destiny, making use of Chinese language archival documents from the opening decades of the People’s Republic of China. Those archives have all been shut down now, as China’s current leader, Xi Jinping, tightens his grip on power and on the narrative of China’s past, present, and future.

This work showed me where China’s leaders believed they were going, what their central mission was, and how they planned to achieve it.

Then came the world of strategic studies. At Oxford, I began interacting with professionals in strategic studies, the military, diplomacy, policy, and in government—those whose job it is to understand and influence the direction of nation states. Returning to America in 2017, I consulted on strategic issues for the US Department of Defense, and began to share my work on China with military, diplomatic, business, and public audiences in America. I began meeting with representatives from around the democratic world, from Australia, India, Japan, Taiwan, and America’s allies in Europe.

In this book, I have tried to take the historian’s perspective, meld it with what I learned from on-the-ground experience and strategic studies, and apply all of this to assessments of the future. It’s not just a matter of China’s past and present, but about how it all adds up.

My view is unequivocal. China is undertaking something dangerous: dangerous for itself, but most importantly, dangerous for the United States and for the wider world.

**An Outline of the Book**

This is an information- and evidence-based work, briefing the reader on China’s rise, according to the words and deeds of China’s leaders, the facts on the ground in many countries, and the overall vision to which these as-
pects all adhere. The world struggles to understand the trajectory of the most important geopolitical and macro-historical phenomenon of our lifetimes—China’s rise to global power—and we continue, far too often, to look at it through nearsighted lenses.

“How the West Got China Wrong.” “We Got China Wrong. Now What?” These are common headlines in Western media coverage. The Western world, which fixated on China’s possible liberalization or democratization as the country grew rich, is now agape at the fact that China is not becoming “like us.” Let us never forget that the history of the world is different in each country’s textbooks. China becoming “like us” is a Western fantasy. Countries in Asia did not buy into this illusion. Few in Japan or India, or Southeast Asia, or Taiwan, would expect China to simply become like the West. The impetus toward China’s modernization is built on something else.

Countries in Asia have experienced the realities of China’s power in their own history. The West has not. Nor has the world as a whole. We are headed toward a world with Chinese power on an enormous global scale should Chinese leaders realize their vision, and on a grander scale than even they have ever known, even in 5,000 years of Chinese history. Take note: we are now in a position to understand China from its own perspective. My generation of scholars and China specialists learned Chinese and studied the country in the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping years. While established experts held forth on the rise of China and the fate of the world in general, younger people were putting in our 10,000 hours, living in the country, speaking with China’s people, reading reams of primary documents in the Chinese language, and learning what is true.

China’s rise is built on the idea of “national resurrection.” Their concept of progress is about achieving “national resurrection” by building tremendous economic and military power.

Modernization—the earning of money and buildup of national industrial, military, and technological power—is not, and never was, for the purpose of liberalization or integration with the wider world. Many people could imagine that, because China was getting richer and demonstrating economic progress as measured by the West, it would follow a known path toward democracy and integration with the institutions used by the rest of the world. It happened in Taiwan, it happened in South Korea and in other nations—notably those that were known in the 1990s as the “Asian Ti-
gers,” which began as dictatorships and then became democracies. What may be true of Taiwan or South Korea is not reducible to a blanket theory of economics and governance applicable to every country on earth.

Instead, China is fulfilling an objective that is nearly one hundred years old called “the resurrection of the ancestral land,” or, as the Communist Party puts it: “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Technology is a part of this. Economics and military prowess are too. Geographical ambitions are central. The end of the current world order is planned.

How to Read This Book

This book is about that great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation: the plans that guide it, the history it comes from, the tenacity which girds it, its geographical and military scope, and the myriad advances that are made every day—whether in economics, technology, military affairs, or diplomacy. We can experience these advances in headlines, news, and book subjects, but they must be pulled together to be truly understood. This book’s findings and conclusions come from China’s own words and sources, and reveal China’s own understanding of itself and of its history.

The reader will find that this book draws heavily on primary sources. This is in order to bring the reader into contact with China’s own discourse, using a wide variety of sources which represent the thinking of China’s leaders and other major actors in China’s political process.

By now, the reader may be questioning the precise meaning of the word “China.” You don’t need be an expert to appreciate that it’s a complex and multifaceted place. By its own measure, the country has 5,000 years of history, fifty-six ethnicities, scores of regional languages, and over a billion people. This complexity can cause us to miss the elephant. And on an opposite extreme, much is said with excessive assurance about “China” as a whole.

What matters here is China’s sense of China as a whole. Chinese leaders, and many Chinese citizens both in China and around the world, have a deep and readily expressible sense of what China means as a nation, as a revolution, and, essentially, as a destiny. It is part of what makes a book like this possible. China has, arguably, one of the most potent and active senses of national destiny that exists on Earth today, and certainly one of the world’s clearest and most active discourses. This discourse is not confined to
Party manuals and speeches. It is expressed daily in Chinese media, in popular culture, civil society, and academia. It is even expressed in the cafés and streets and homes, in countries around the world, where Chinese citizens have “gone out” and now witness the rise of their country from around the globe. Many of China’s citizens at home and abroad feel that they are doing their part to make this rise happen. Much about these narratives is fed by China’s leadership in the Chinese Communist Party, though many people in China feel that the Communist Party does not go far enough. This sense of national destiny will be described in Part One.

One of the primary features of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” is the expansion of China’s geopolitical footprint, a focus on military power and military technology, and a changing strategic geography that is redefining not only Asia, but other regions in the world. This will be covered in Part Two. It is what defense departments around the world are beginning to struggle with every day as a new reality. But this is not a book about Chinese military power alone. It is also about what Chinese leaders and scholars label “comprehensive national power.”

The basis for China’s rise has been the disciplined and wildly successful focus on economic growth. Part Three describes the nature and origins of that economic reach and rise to technological eminence, linking the strategies that guide its advances in economic growth and in critical technologies. But this book is not primarily focused on the Chinese economy— it is meant to demonstrate how China’s splendid new economy is the foundation for something even larger. China already has an economic and trading presence on every continent and in nearly every country on earth. This is a beginning. Its continued rise cannot be sustained within China’s borders. It cannot grow through self-sufficiency. China’s economic engines run on the energy and natural resources of multiple continents. This is covered in Part Four. The population is fed by the food and agriculture of other nations. Its manufacturers need access to new markets around the world. These are ordinary truths of a globally integrated country, but they are also the basis for something greater. In Part Five, we will cover aspects of China’s governance and views of world order.

The Communist Party has declared its intention to build the world’s most powerful military, and to become the world’s leader in advanced technologies. China’s military has officially been tasked with not only national
defense, but protection of China’s expanding overseas interests. China will build a globally capable military to secure its access to resources and markets in other continents. A global China will be backed by global military power and influence. The objective of China’s rise—if the “China Dream” continues—is simple but consequential for the rest of us. Built on economic power, technological mastery, and military supremacy, China will achieve what its official Xinhua News Agency specified explicitly in 2017:

By 2050, two centuries after the Opium Wars, which plunged the “Middle Kingdom” into a period of hurt and shame, China is set to regain its might and re-ascend to the top of the world.6

Note the historical perspective behind this objective, which is vital. Looking forward first, however, this “re-ascendance” will mean the end of an American-led world order, the end of a world order built and sustained by the world’s democracies and rights-based societies. It will mean a world in which China is de facto the world’s leading superpower, capable of extending its military, economic, financial, and ideological influence and power into every place on earth not limited by other nations or by coalitions of nations.

In order to understand and see what China’s rise is and what it means, we will consider these core elements:

1. A Vision of National Destiny
2. Strategic Geography and Military Plans
3. Economic and Technological Ambitions
4. Growing Global Reach
5. A Vision of a New World Order

Each Part is meant to bring the reader to a substantial understanding of each element, in order to understand the larger picture—to see and understand the whole elephant.
PART I

The Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation

China's Vision of National Destiny
Between 500 and 2,000 years ago, there was a period of a thousand years when China was supreme in the world. Her status in the world then was similar to that of Great Britain and America today. What was the situation of the weaker nations toward China then? They respected China as their superior and sent annual tribute to China by their own will, regarding it as an honor to be allowed to do so. They wanted of their own free will to be dependencies of China. Those countries which sent tribute to China were not only situated in Asia but in distant Europe as well.

—DR. SUN YAT-SEN, LEADER OF CHINA'S REVOLUTION IN 1911, KOBE, JAPAN, 1924

We believe that realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the greatest Chinese dream of the Chinese nation in modern times.

—XI JINPING, 2012