

China Inequality Report

Eric Kuznar
October 2019

Executive Summary

Data

Two datasets on wealth and status distribution in China were analyzed: 2012 World Bank quintile and decile estimates of income, and 2011 net wealth centiles compiled by the Chinese government's Household Finance Survey.

Results

Both datasets show that China's population is risk acceptant. The data provided by the World Bank not only show a population that is on average risk acceptant, but also demonstrate that the entire population is risk acceptant with the wealthy exhibiting the greatest risk acceptance.

Significance for Risk Taking and Stability

While China's ethnic makeup is 91% Han, the remaining 8% number more than 100 million Chinese citizens that belong to 55 ethnic minorities, many of whom reside in China's outer provinces and consider their particular ethnic groups autonomous from China (Clarke, 2017). The highly restrictive and autocratic practices of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) experienced by these minority groups creates the potential for further civil strife throughout the country. Examples of ethnic repression as domestic policy are the CCP's preemptive limiting of the Uighur population's freedom and imposing military control over Tibet (Clark, 2017; Maizland, 2019). Beijing's growing repressive civil policies for Chinese citizens and targeted persecution toward its minorities, combined with China's highly risk acceptant population has the potential to spark widespread civil unrest and instability.

Implications for US Interests

The US has a competitive relationship with China that occasionally turns into necessary collaboration, as both economies are interdependent and are heavily reliant on each other for success (Egan, 2019). Politically, the US has concerns with China's intrusion into US international interests and influence (Hass & Rapp-Hooper, 2019). This makes the risk acceptant nature of China's population and the present ethnic fissures an opportunity for the US to influence its competitor from the inside. Current unrest in Hong Kong¹—where per capita GDP is approximately five times higher than the rest of China—may be an example of this potential, as China's most risk acceptant societal elements, who are therefore more likely to protest government policies, are at the high end of the income scale.

Implications for China's Interests

The risk acceptance of China's population threatens its national and international interests from within. The CCP views the ethnic fissures and perceived separatist mentality of its minority groups as a direct threat to its regime stability and China's outward BRI projects, which must go through some of these provinces (Clarke, 2017). Furthermore, inequality could fuel protest even at the higher end of the

¹ The sustained riots in Hong Kong are covered daily in the news media. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/16/world/asia/hong-kong-protests.html>

economic scale. However, risk taking can be done in pro-social ways, such as business investment and start-up businesses. If the CCP can re-start the Chinese economy and provide growth and opportunity, this potential liability could be turned into an asset.

Implications for Russia's Interests

Russia relies deeply on its cooperative activities with China, including interacting with countries in foreign regions with the expressed purpose of weakening Western democratic values and US political influence (Oliker, 2016; Gurganus, 2018). Given its strong political and economic ties to China, Russia may stand to lose economic and geopolitical power in certain regions including South Asia and the Asia Pacific if the CCP's legitimacy is weakened by inner turmoil from its repressed and risk acceptant population.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	1
Introduction.....	4
Why China?	4
Great Power Interests in China	4
Literature Review on Inequality in China	6
Country-Level Measures of Inequality in China	7
Prognosis for Change to 2029	8
Empirical Data on Inequality in China	9
<i>Dataset 1: 2012 China World Bank Quintile Data</i>	9
<i>Dataset 2: Chinese 2011 Household Finance Survey of Net Wealth Quintiles</i>	10
Findings on Inequality in China.....	11
References.....	13

Introduction

This is a summary report on inequality in China compiled as part of the Aggrieved Populations project conducted in support of the 2019 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Future of Great Power Competition and Conflict project conducted for the JS-J39.

This report provides background on why the country was chosen, relevant historical background, literature review concerning inequality in the country, synopses of empirical data sources and analyses, and a concluding section that summarizes the findings. It is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of inequality and grievance in the country, but to place the empirical analyses conducted on this country in an appropriate social and political context, as well as to highlight interesting cases of inequality pertinent to risk acceptance and great power competition that can serve as the basis for further research. The analyses focus on the measurement of risk sensitivity as a function of measured inequality and produce the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion, whose positive values indicate risk aversion and negative values indicate risk acceptance. Studies have shown that risk acceptance is associated with social unrest, terrorism, and other forms of social disruption (Kuznar 2007; 2019).

Why China?

China was chosen for four reasons: 1) It is a near-peer competitor to the US, 2) China has experienced a rise in new economic elites as it has opened up to global markets, potentially leading to new forms of inequality, 3) there are serious urban/rural and ethnic divisions in Chinese society, and 4) Russia and China appear to be seeking partnerships in global power competition.

Great Power Interests in China

The United States has strong interests both within China and in China's global interactions. The two countries have the most important bilateral economic relationship in the world as they possess the two largest global economic engines (Egan, 2019). With their strong economic relationship and its importance to the world economy, a looming trade war between the two countries is seen with trepidation as it will hurt both countries and possibly the world economically. The sustainability of a trade war is brought into question by experts, as both countries are each other's largest trade partners. As an example, China's burgeoning middle class is a source of consumer growth for US companies (e.g., Nike, Boeing and Apple), while the US is one of China's largest destinations for affordable goods. Despite their economic interdependence, Beijing and Washington fervently compete in the same economic and political environment touting two very different political ideologies (Dollar, Hass, & Bader, 2019). After US President Trump took office in 2017, part of his agenda was addressing what many in his party considered a weak China policy. In response, the current administration has taken an America-First, mercantilist approach to economic policy, which is partly contributing to the looming trade war with China.

The unique relationship that China and the US share is turning increasingly competitive as both countries try to gain the upper hand in a great power struggle around the globe. The battle ground for this competition is continually shifting toward developing countries that are seeking to grow their own economic capability and regional geopolitical prominence. This competition for political clout is especially important for China as it is seeking to create a new multipolar world (Hass & Rapp-Hooper, 2019). The US and China also compete on a fundamental ideological level. The US's objective is to spread a democratic capitalistic worldview, while more importantly supporting countries that will enhance its

interests within a region. China, which is an increasingly autocratic state marketing a command economy, is vying for similar influence and control in these regions to assert itself as global leader and increase the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) global prestige. Due to the highly interdependent economic relationship between the US and China, Chinese leadership does not want to bring down the current world order but rather reorient it with China at the helm (Stevenson, 2017).

The US seeks to limit the influence and control of China in certain activities and regions. Beijing is building its political influence in developing countries around the world through financial investment in infrastructure, successfully supporting anti-US regimes, and partaking in espionage targeting United States' universities and military institutions (Diamond & Schell, 2018). Diamond and Schell make several policy suggestions in their 2018 report, including:

- increasing business ties with developing countries;
- politically supporting Taiwan and Tibet;
- utilizing media to expose Chinese propaganda that is tailored for a country's civilians;
- keeping China from influencing America's Chinese American population; and
- controlling how much access China has to US technology companies' data, intellectual property, and other proprietary information.

In his 2017 visit to Beijing, President Trump outlined three areas where he would like to advance cooperation between the two nations to include working together to neutralize North Korea's nuclear program, advancing trade talks by increasing bilateral investments, and limiting the flow of opioids from China to the US (Branstad, 2018). Politically, the talks between Washington and Pyongyang that China helped initiate have stalled upon a disagreement surrounding the definition of denuclearization (USIP, 2019). Despite China's focus on investments as a political tool, it has drastically cut foreign direct investment (FDI) into the US by more than 80% from 2017-2018 due to the prospects of a looming trade war (Saiidi, 2019). And, while the US receives most of its opioids from Mexico, those that arrive from Central Asia using China as a conduit have not abated (Felter, 2019).

Russia has very strong interests in China as it is the largest destination for Russian petroleum aside from European Union member states as a collective (OEC, 2017). China is also Russia's largest provider of everyday goods. This economic relationship, along with its strong geopolitical ties, makes Beijing a crucial partner for the Kremlin. Both Eurasian powers signed a treaty of friendship and good neighborliness in 2001, marking a new era of cooperation that was designed to ward off Western ideological encroachment into Eurasia and begin competition for a new multipolar world order (Cohen, 2001). Russia has supported China in aiding anti-US regimes in Venezuela, Syria, and Iran while pushing its influence in regions across the globe including former Soviet republics and, closer to the US's home, in Latin America (Gurganus, 2018). Russia's entrenched economic and political interests in China ensure that Moscow is highly dependent on the bilateral relationship the two countries share.

China is strongly driven to challenge the current multipolar order of the world as it looks to assert its influence and its interests in several different regions. It is pursuing economic and security interests including the funding of infrastructure projects and backing anti-US regimes in Latin America, Africa, Southern Asia, and the Middle East. China has also adopted more global strategies including cultural engagement through education, inserting its news media and propaganda into cable packages, and pursuing investments into ports and mineral extraction around the world (The Economist, 2016). At the forefront of China's aggressive outward looking strategy is its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which seeks

to increase the connectedness of Chinese markets with countries from the Middle East, Africa, and Northern Europe (Chatzky & McBride, 2019). While China's BRI has stalled due to a mixture of security concerns and political issues, it has been expanding Chinese cultural familiarity into previously unfamiliar states along the initiatives proposed pathway improving China's image in these areas and generating a cultural acceptance of its world views (Albert, 2018). While these efforts take place through several different outlets, they almost always include person-to-person interaction and/or Chinese influence over regional mass media.

While China has an aggressive outward economic and geopolitical strategy, there are numerous domestic pressures and issues (Ming, 2018). China is preoccupied with several key obstacles facing its geopolitical and economic outreach including: modernizing its economy to allow for more innovation, increasing its ability to maintain power within the Asian Pacific, and continuing to solidify its regime control through the CCP along with its long-time leader President Xi Jinping. China has also increased its military spending on its army, naval capacity, and space warfare (Cordesman & Burke, 2019). These newfound military applications can be observed in the South China sea as it has bolstered its military along its borders, pushed island bases into contested waters, and invested in ports that carry dual use purposes.

For Xi Jinping, the survival of the CCP, which has run China's one-party system for decades, is synonymous with his retention of power (Albert & Xu, 2018). Despite political corruption scandals, the CCP has maintained a political monopoly in China since its founding, pulling strong support from both China's male population and rural workers and fishermen who comprise 30% of party membership. While China aggressively pushes propaganda to foreign countries, Xi Jinping and the CCP leadership are very active in disseminating propaganda within their own party. One notable instance was in 2013 when a memo was distributed that listed seven threats to the CCP's control, some of threats listed included Western constitutional democracy and neoliberalism (Albert & Xu, 2018).

China also has a deep interest in containing Islamic extremism that threatens to spread into the western province of Xinjiang, this is resulting in a humanitarian crisis that much of the world acknowledges and China denies (Maizland, 2019). Beginning in 2017, China began detaining its Uighur Muslim population located in its western province of Xinjiang and placing them in self-purported "vocational schools," but what many others consider internment camps (Westcott, 2019). Escapees from these camps describe being forced to renounce Islam, pledge loyalty to the CCP, and being forced to learn the Mandarin Chinese language. This crackdown on its Uighur population in Xinjiang is in response to concerns that the Uighurs hold separatist and religious extremist views (Maizland, 2019). By controlling the population, China is seeking to control a perceived threat to its territorial and governmental integrity.

Literature Review on Inequality in China

China is a country with a large income gap among not only its citizens, but also across regions and ethnic divisions. Partly due to the concentration of national and international tourism in certain regions throughout China, some regions are much more developed than others in both industry and agriculture (Li, Chen, Li, & Goh, 2016). China also has strong income inequality that is comparable to the US and other highly developed market-based economies, where the top 20% of its population control a disproportionate amount of the wealth (Han, Zhao, & Zhang, 2016).

Before China's repression of the Uighur ethnic group, there was still ethnic repression felt by its 55 minority groups that make up more than 8% of China's population (Clarke, 2017). While China is ethnically

and racially dominated by the Han ethnic group, the remaining 8% comprised of ethnic minorities number more than 110 million people. Minorities living in Xinjiang, inner Mongolia, and Tibet have faced a history of systematic ethnic isolation, surveillance, and repression by both the CCP and China's central government. The Uighurs in China's western province of Xinjiang have experienced the most recent and notable persecution by Beijing. Millions have been placed in internment camps that China claims are used for the political re-education of its population (Maizland, 2019). China has infringed upon the Uighur's and its other citizens' rights by using an algorithmic approach of surveilling "suspicious behaviors" (Human Rights Watch, 2019). The algorithmic approach does not necessarily target a specific ethnic or religious group and instead deals with basic human interaction, including how often people interact with their neighbors. However, some more acute behaviors flagged by China's Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) surveillance system as suspicious include citizens that openly preach from the Quran or make financial donations to mosques. China defends its use of the system by asserting its precise documentation of citizens interactions and patterns discourage terrorist related activities.

Country-Level Measures of Inequality in China

China was initially assessed with a collection of country-level metrics. These metrics provide measures of the country's inequality compared to other nations, inequality within the country, social conditions that may be consequences of that inequality, and the prognosis for stability in the future (**Error! Reference source not found.**).

While China possesses the world's second largest economy, its GDP per capita (\$8643) is less than the median found in this study. The Gini coefficient is high, placing it in the top 15 countries in the study. China also possesses a large informal economy, where 54.4% of total employed population is informally employed. While China does not score particularly low or high in state fragility, it is at a greater risk of mass killings and influence from terrorism than most countries in this report. China's population is overall risk acceptant, with an Arrow-Pratt score of -4.31. This score is neither high nor low when compared to the rest of the countries in this study. Where China is relatively unique is in that all of its population was scored as risk acceptant.

Table 1. China: Basic Statistics on Inequality

Measure	Value	Rank	Source
<i>Inequality Compared to Other Nations</i>			
Per Capita GDP 2018	\$8643	72 of 187	WB
<i>Country Measures of Inequality</i>			
Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) 2018	0.643	62 of 151	UN
Gini Coefficient	51.1%	15 of 184	WB
Informal Economy as % GDP	54.4%	57 of 112	ILO
<i>Measures of State Instability</i>			
Fragile States Index	72.4	89 of 175	FFP
Terrorism Index	5.108	36 of 160	IEP
Probability of Mass Killing	0.023	30 of 161	EWP
<i>Risk Sensitivity</i>			
Average Arrow-Pratt Measure	-4.31	78 of 158	This Study
*EWP – Early Warning Project, FFP – Fund for Peace, IEP – Institute for Economics and Peace, ILO – International Labor Organization, UN – United Nations, WB – World Bank			

- The Fragile States Index is based on twelve conflict risk that include security apparatus, factionalized elites, group grievance, economy, economic inequality, human flight and brain drain, public services, state legitimacy, human rights and rule of law, demographic pressure, refugees and IDPs, and external interventions. The potential range of the index is zero (no fragility) to 120 (total fragility).
- The Terrorism Index scores each country on a scale from 0 to 10; where 0 represents no impact from terrorism and 10 represents the highest measurable impact of terrorism.

Prognosis for Change to 2029

China's outward and aggressive political and economic strategies will continue as it pursues mineral, port, and infrastructure investments around the world (The Economist, 2016). China shows no signs of stopping its invasive encroachment into the South China Sea and other regions as it continues to militarize islands and conduct joint military operations with Russia in the Baltic Sea (Dobbins, Shatz, & Wyne, 2019). China's civil unrest does not seem to influence its outward momentum as President Xi Jinping and the rest of the CCP rely on a highly militarized police and sophisticated surveillance system that allows it to retain both regime security, as well as a firm grasp on Chinese society (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

The use of its surveillance system identifies specific actions that the CCP deems as suspicious (Human Rights Watch, 2019). This ensures that those in positions to make decisions on surveillance both support the system and are active in its implementation. China also practices aggressive ethnic repression in its western province of Xinjiang, Tibet, and inner Mongolia, all areas that claim to be autonomous but also experience deep and strong Chinese influence (Clarke, 2017). Non-Han ethnic groups are consistently lower on the socio-economic scale according to the overall analyses in this study and tend to be among the more risk acceptant populations, which may make them more likely to engage in political activism. Potentially more disruptive are the higher income brackets of society, whom are the most risk acceptant. Recent protests in Hong Kong, while focused on the legal issue of extradition, may be manifestations of the discontent felt at the higher echelons of Chinese society (BBC, 2019).

While a trade war with the United States seems imminent, its sustainability by either side is doubted by many scholars and experts because of the negative economic impacts both sides would feel (Egan, 2019). However, a combination of systematic repression against its minorities, invasive surveillance of its total population, a slowing economy, and its population's acceptance of risky behavior are factors that could spur societal shifts threatening the CCP's interests and objectives. It should also be recognized that since the CCP monopolized Chinese politics in the 1920's, it has become adept at not only navigating, but controlling and asserting regime stability in this type of political and social environment (Albert & Xu, 2018).

Empirical Data on Inequality in China

Dataset 1: 2012 China World Bank Quintile Data

The World Bank provides data on the lowest and highest decile, and quintiles of percentage of income or consumption.² These data are used to calculate the Gini coefficient. While this does not exactly measure the actual income, the percentage of overall income provides an approximation. The data were gathered in 2012. **Error! Reference source not found.** presents the original data and the fitted distribution curve from which the Arrow-Pratt risk sensitivity measures will be derived, as well as the Arrow-Pratt measures of risk sensitivity.

According to the income data provided by the World Bank, China's entire population is risk acceptant and has a mean Arrow-Pratt score of -4.31. The highest income earners in China's society are risk acceptant with a score of less than -8. The closest the data comes to being risk averse can be found at the fourth centile of data with a score of slightly less than zero. The distribution of income in this dataset exhibits a largely exponential increase, indicating an extremely skewed wealth distribution toward the very wealthiest of Chinese society.




Figure 1: Distribution of Income, World Bank Quintiles China 2016 and associated Risk Sensitivity.

Summary Dataset 1: 2016 China World Bank Quintile Data

The data provided by the World Bank in 2016 shows that all China's population is risk acceptant. According to the data, China's population moves toward risk aversity up until the second quintile. However, the data never demonstrates true risk averseness, and after the second quintile the data turns

² Data drawn from: <http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.3>

into a downward trajectory, representing a linearly increasing relationship between risk acceptance and Chinese citizens with high-income levels.

Dataset 2: Chinese 2011 Household Finance Survey of Net Wealth Quintiles

The second dataset was provided by China's Household Finance Survey, which gathers data at the quintile level on the net wealth of Chinese households, excluding debts held.




Figure 2. Chinese 2011 Household Finance Survey of Net Wealth Quintiles

Summary Dataset 2: Chinese 2011 Household Finance Survey of Net Wealth Quintiles

According to the quintile data from the China Household Finance Survey, the Chinese households that accrue the largest net wealth are also the most risk acceptant with an Arrow-Pratt score of less than -15. The only quintile of data that is risk averse is the second quintile, with an Arrow-Pratt score of less than 5.

Findings on Inequality in China

China's inequality takes several different forms including economic attainment, regional growth, and targeted surveillance for the restriction of its minority populations. China's top 20% controls most of its wealth in a comparable way to the US and other capitalist countries (Han, Zhao, & Zhang, 2016). While China's inequality is not as high as the countries that use true capitalist market-based economies, it is in fact comparable; this is an important distinction as it clashes with CCP ideology as a socialist state. The growth by region also experiences large variation throughout the country as regions that experience higher amounts of national and international tourism flourish both industrially, and agriculturally, leaving their less visited counterparts behind (Li, Chen, Li, & Goh, 2016). While all of China's citizens face governmental surveillance, China's 55 ethnic minorities face the most targeted surveillance and sometimes restrictive policies (Clarke, 2017). This can be seen in Tibet and in Inner Mongolia, but most visibly in China's western province of Xinjiang, where millions of ethnic Uighurs have been placed in internment camps (Maizland, 2019).

Finally, inequality data indicate that much and perhaps all of the Chinese population is risk acceptant. This creates a challenge for the CCP to channel that risk acceptance into pro-social activities that can support the regime. The best way to provide an outlet for a risk acceptant population would be economic opportunities, which means that the CCP must provide economic growth across China's population. China's recent economic slow-down threatens the state's ability to provide growth, thwarting the population's ambitions. This is a formula for social discontent, known by political scientists as the J-curve (Davies, 1964). Considering the continued poverty of rural regions and that of China's minority populations, the risk acceptance this inequality generates has the potential for fueling discontent and rebellion against the state.

Relevance to Instability and Social Cleavages

China relies upon its systematic and authoritarian approach to maintain security over its population. It employs its state-run surveillance system to assign points for suspicious behavior, targeting its minority communities disproportionately (Human Rights Watch, 2019). China's response is in the form of a military presence to police the local population and send citizens accused of suspicious activity to political re-education camps (Maizland, 2019; Westcott, 2019).

Opportunities and Pitfalls for the US and Adversaries

The US has an extremely complex relationship with China as their economies are inextricably linked, making an oncoming trade war likely, but not sustainable (Egan, 2019). China's risk acceptant population gives the US an opportunity to see President Xi Jinping and the rest of the CCP's interests stifled from within, especially if the Chinese economy slows down. However, due to the US and China's interdependent economic relationship, a Chinese economic slow-down may harm the US economy.

China

China's population's risk acceptance is a liability for its national security and international interests, especially if strong economic growth cannot be maintained. The Chinese state relies upon its military and police to maintain control through surveillance of its entire population, and most of all its minority population (Clarke, 2017). Maintaining control of its population in these regions is important for China's BRI, which will have to traverse through some of these regions and will need a degree of security to function (Maizland, 2019).

Russia

Russia has deep ties and interests to China as an ally and supporting actor. It has deep economic ties to China as its largest trading partner (OEC, 2017) and would stand to lose not only a significant amount of trade, but also political clout if China's stability unravels; as Russia and China have only strengthened their ties since the 2001 treaty of friendship and good neighborliness (Cohen, 2001). China and Russia have jointly supported each other and anti-US actors in regions including Latin America and the Middle East (Gurganus, 2018).

References

- Albert, Eleanor. 2018. China's Big Bet on Soft Power. Council on Foreign Relations. From: <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/chinas-big-bet-soft-power>
- Albert, Eleanor. 2018. The Chinese Communist Party. Council on Foreign Relations. From: <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/chinese-communist-party>
- BBC. 2019. Hong Kong protest: nearly two million join demonstration. BBC News. From: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48656471>
- Branstad, Terry. 2018. Representing American Values and Interests in China. Council of American Ambassadors. From: <https://www.americanambassadors.org/publications/ambassadors-review/spring-2018/representing-american-values-and-interests-in-china>
- Chatzky, A. McBride, J. 2019. China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative. Council on Foreign Relations. From: <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative>
- Clarke, Michael. 2017. The Impact of Ethnic minorities on China's Foreign Policy: The Case of Xinjiang and the Uyghur. National Security College. From: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0009445516677361>
- Cohen, Ariel. 2001. The Russia-China Friendship and Cooperation Treaty: A Strategic Shift in Eurasia? The Heritage Foundation. From: <https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/the-russia-china-friendship-and-cooperation-treaty-strategic-shift-eurasia>
- Cordesman, A. & Burke, A. 2018. Chinese Strategy, Military Forces, and Economics: The Metrics of Cooperation, Competition and/or Conflict. Center for Strategic and International Studies. From: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180919_China_Strategy_Metrics_Report.pdf?bgjttRelklyFTTJo3YqYUZ3cHG1E3hWr
- Davies, J. C. (1962). Toward a Theory of Revolution. *American Sociological Review*, 27(1), 5-19.
- Diamond, L. & Schell, O. 2018. Chinese Influence & American Interests. Hoover Institute Press. Stanford University. From: https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/chineseinfluence_americaninterests_fullreport_web.pdf
- Dobbins, J, Shatz, H, Wyne, A. 2019. Warming Trend in China-Russia Relations. Rand. From: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/04/a-warming-trend-in-china-russia-relations.html>
- Dollar, D. Hass, R. & Bader, J. 2019. Assessing US-China relations 2 years into Trump presidency. Brookings. From: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/15/assessing-u-s-china-relations-2-years-into-the-trump-presidency/>

- Egan, Matt. Why the US-China trade war won't last. CNN. From: <https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/14/business/china-united-states-economy-trade-war/index.html>
- Felter, Claire. 2019. The US Opioid Epidemic. Council on Foreign Relations. From: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/us-opioid-epidemic>
- Gurganus, Julia. 2018. Russia: Playing a Geopolitical Game in Latin America. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/03/russia-playing-geopolitical-game-in-latin-america-pub-76228>
- Han, J., Zhao, Q., & Zhang, M. (2016). China's income inequality in the global context. *Perspectives in Science*, 7, 24-29.
- Hass, R. & Rapp-Hooper, M. 2019. Responsible competition and the future of US-China relations: Seven critical questions for Strategy. Brookings. From: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/06/responsible-competition-and-the-future-of-u-s-china-relations/>
- Human Rights Watch. 2019. China's Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App. From: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass-surveillance>
- Kuznar, L. A. (2007). Rationality Wars and the War on Terror: Explaining Terrorism and Social Unrest. *American Anthropologist*, 109(2), 318-329.
- Kuznar, L. A. (2019). Metrics of Social Disruption and the Role of Risk Sensitivity in Greed and Grievance. In G. Ligon, R. Jones, & M. Yager (Eds.), *The Age of Disruption: How Power Shifts Create More Conflict*. Arlington, Virginia: Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication, OSD/ASD (R&E)/RSD/RRTO.
- Li, H., Chen, J. L., Li, G., & Goh, C. (2016). Tourism and regional income inequality: Evidence from China. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 58, 81-99.
- Maizland, Lindsay. 2019. China's Crackdown on Uighurs in Xinjiang. Council on Foreign Relations. From: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/chinas-crackdown-uighurs-xinjiang>
- Ming, Cheang. 2018. Beijing is more worried about domestic issues than its trade war with Washington, research firm says. CNBC. From: <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/06/domestic-issues-not-trade-war-are-chinas-top-priorities-ts-lombard.html>
- OECD, 2017. Russia. From: <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/rus/>
- Oliker, Olga. 2016. Unpacking Russia's New National Security Strategy. CSIS. From: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-russias-new-national-security-strategy>
- Saiidi, Uptin. 2019. China's Foreign direct investment into the US dropped precipitously in 2018, data show. CNBC. From: <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/15/chinese-foreign-direct-investment-to-the-us-falls-in-2018-data.html>

Stevenson, John. 2017. NSI Concept Paper, Violating normal: How international norms transgressions magnify gray zone challenges. Arlington, VA: Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA). Retrieved from <http://nsiteam.com/sma-publications-violating-normal/>

The Economist. 2016. The evolving role of China in Africa and Latin America. From: https://www.lampadia.com/assets/uploads_documentos/7ffa7-the-evolving-role-of-china-in-africa-and-latin-america.pdf

USIP. 2019. China's Role in north Korea Nuclear and Peace Negotiations. United States Institute of Peace. From: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/05/chinas-role-north-korea-nuclear-and-peace-negotiations>

Westcott, Ben. 2019. China denies having 'concentration camps,' tells US to 'stop interfering'. CNN. From: <https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/06/asia/china-us-xinjiang-concentration-camps-intl/index.html>