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# **Global Competition and Conflict Project**

## **China Futures Study FINAL REPORT**



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For the  
**STRATEGIC MULTILAYER ASSESSMENT  
Office of the Secretary of Defense Joint Staff J-39**

**1 October 2019**

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**Map and Flag of the People's Republic of China**

## Executive Summary

The Competitive Zone (or Gray Zone) is “an operational environment ‘churning with political, economic, and security competitions that require constant attention.’” Given Russia’s military actions in eastern Ukraine and China’s expansion in the South China Sea, “military and academic communities have attempted to describe conflict in the Gray Zone to create shared understanding and spur discussion on conflict and competition in this space.”<sup>1</sup>

The Competitive Zone is further described as “a conceptual space between peace and war, occurring when actors purposefully use single or multiple elements of power to achieve political-security objectives with activities that are typically ambiguous or cloud attribution and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition, yet intentionally fall below the level of large-scale direct military conflict, and threaten US and allied interests by challenging, undermining, or violating international customs, norms, or laws.”

In 2018, the Joint Staff J-39 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) initiated the Global Competition and Conflict (GCC) Project which sought to answer the following overarching question: “How might the US strategize to defend global interests across the spectrum of cooperation to competition and conflict through the coming decade?” This requirement also included a request that the J-39 SMA coordinate with the TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulations Directorate (MSD) to explore options for employing the Athena Simulation in support of this SMA Project.

The Athena Simulation is a sociocultural modeling capability employed by the TRADOC G-2 which is designed to improve a commander’s understanding of the intended and unintended effects of introducing various DIME-FIL<sup>2</sup> engagement strategies across an operational environment (OE) that is described by the operational variables (PMESII-PT<sup>3</sup>).

The SMA GCC Project focused primarily on Russia and China. The Athena modeling effort focused solely on China (with the exception of one study excursion that explored current events in Hong Kong and the long-term implications on regional stability).

This Final Report compiles the insights derived by the Athena team from research, Subject Matter Expert (SME) engagements, Athena Simulation runs, and the collaborative analysis conducted with other members of the SMA community of interest. Insights were also derived as a result of Athena team participation in various related experiments and exercises conducted between January and September 2019.

This Athena-based analysis primarily conducted a deep dive into China’s global outlook, activities, and strategy. The study approach considered three outcome-oriented use cases to assess, compare and contrast potential futures for China over a simulated multi-year period. These use cases are framed as:

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<sup>1</sup> CPT John Chambers, US Army. “Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats.” Modern War Institute at West Point. October 18, 2016.

<sup>2</sup> Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement (DIME-FIL).

<sup>3</sup> Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT).

- Use Case 1: **Status Quo Continuation**
- Use Case 2: **State Capitalist Acceleration**
- Use Case 3: **The Lost Decade**

The use cases are more fully defined in the introduction section, following this EXSUM. In addition, Athena modeling was used to evaluate two “excursions”:

- Excursion 1: A vignette assessing the volatility in Hong Kong.
- Excursion 2: A vignette examining an influx of members from a violent extremist organization (VEO) into Xinjiang

The analytic focus of the Athena modeling effort was oriented on determining how key factors (i.e., government decisions and economic engagements) affect political, economic, and social stability dynamics across China.

A combination of research, SME engagements, and Athena Simulation modeling and analysis produced the following insights:

#### **Insight 1: Popular Support for CCP Remains Stable**

Regardless of the economic growth rate across three use cases, nationwide support for and popular satisfaction with governance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declined mildly over a decade. There was no collapse of CCP influence in any region within China (neighborhood). The Lost Decade use case produced a greater decline in popular support for the central government, but not nearly enough to produce any significant change. The Hong Kong Crisis excursion had virtually no effect on the level of popular satisfaction with CCP governance, while the Xinjiang Uprising excursion produced a sharp decline in this metric until the simulated VEO was decisively defeated.

#### **Insight 2: Popular Mood is Largely Stable**

Nationwide “mood” initially increased and then decreased mildly, roughly mirroring the greatest period of economic growth in the Status Quo and Acceleration cases. In the Lost Decade use case, mood rose negligibly, flattened out, and then declined. When mood was increasing, it was buoyed primarily by the population’s improving sense of safety. When the Hong Kong Crisis and Xinjiang Uprising excursions were applied to all use cases, national mood was virtually unaffected by the Hong Kong Crisis. However, national mood sharply declined during the Xinjiang Uprising and recovered somewhat after it ended. Without excursions, national mood terminates with virtually the same measured effect across all three use cases.

#### **Insight 3: The Lost Decade Hits Hard**

The Lost Decade impacts the mood of the Chinese population much more negatively than the Acceleration case’s effects are positive. Additionally, the positive changes are very small. When included, the Hong Kong Crisis again had minimal impact on national mood, but the Xinjiang Uprising produced a significant negative impact. The economically vital middle class civilian group, “Working Poor,” is especially harmed by the conditions of The Lost Decade. Both their mood and satisfaction with governance decline steeply over ten years. The Working Poor were

specifically assessed in the megacities of Beijing, Chongqing, and Shanghai. The heartland city of Chongqing showed the greatest degree of loss. Along with the Working Poor, the “Power Elite” of Chongqing City saw sharp declines in mood and satisfaction with governance, suggesting a looming threat to CCP legitimacy in the interior if there were significant economic stress.

#### **Insight 4: The Downtrodden Endure**

The Han “Downtrodden” peasant civilian groups in the countryside show durable tolerance for CCP governance. The mood of the Downtrodden in Han Central declines mildly in the Lost Decade case, mostly due to weakening satisfaction with governance, the net change in mood is virtually zero. The mood rises, then returns to its starting point by the end of the decade. In the Status Quo and State Capitalist Acceleration cases, mood sees a significant net increase, indicating the benefits of economic growth on even one of the most marginal groups.

#### **Insight 5: The Elites are Stable**

Chinese political and wealthy elites (“Power Elite” and “Well-Off” civilian groups) generally show durable confidence in CCP governance. There are only slight declines in satisfaction with governance over all three use cases—except in Chongqing City, where elite satisfaction declines precipitously.

#### **Insight 6: The Predictable Pain in Xinjiang**

While mood in Xinjiang decayed sharply in all use cases, the mood of Uyghurs was slightly better under Status Quo and State Acceleration (which includes milder treatment of Uyghurs by the CCP). This suggests that if economic improvements actually impact Uyghurs, it may mitigate their disaffection. In this excursion, the small insurgency in Xinjiang was unable to remove CCP rule or govern the area.

#### **Insight 7: The Hong Kong Turbulence is Temporary**

In Hong Kong, during the Hong Kong Crisis excursion and after, support for the Municipal Government fluctuates turbulently during the protests, but post-crisis, it is virtually identical under all use cases. Support trends slightly higher under State Capitalist Acceleration than the Status Quo. Support for the Municipal Government is slightly lower under the Lost Decade than Status Quo.

### **Conclusion**

TRADOC G-2 employed the Athena Simulation to computationally model three potential Chinese futures in order to assess the political and social outcomes of each by assessing control, support, mood, and satisfaction with governance of the Chinese population. Future analytical efforts will leverage the pathway analysis work that other participants in the SMA enterprise are currently developing.

The modeling and analysis produced four primary conclusions resulting from the seven insights:

1. **The possibility of regime change in China is virtually nonexistent.** (Conclusion from Insight #1)


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2. **China will likely remain stable overall despite any localized disturbances and grievances.** (Conclusion from Insight #2)
3. **Chinese elites are generally satisfied with the status quo of Chinese Communist Party governance.** (Conclusion from Insight #5)
4. **The Hong Kong disturbances are ephemeral and their impact on the rest of China is minimal.** (Conclusion from Insight #7)

## Chapter 1: Global Competition and Conflict - China Study Overview

### Introduction

The Strategic Multilayer Assessment provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are not within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across the US Government (USG) and beyond. The SMA is accepted and synchronized by the Joint Staff J-39 Deputy Director of Global Operations (DDGO).



### Overall Approach of the Future of Global Competition and Conflict Project

At the request of the Joint Staff J-39 and in collaboration with USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, USCENTCOM, USSOCOM, the Services, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of State (DOS), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and NATO, the SMA initiated the Global Competition and Conflict Project. The overarching study question that this SMA effort addressed was: "How might the US strategize to defend global interests across the spectrum of cooperation to competition and conflict through the coming decade?"

The project focused on:

- Conducting a deep dive on the geopolitics of Chinese, Russian, and other emerging regional and non-state threats to better understand how actors view the parameters of cooperation, competition, and conflict, as well as the points at which information and deterrence activities may become escalatory.
- Considered means of defending US security, economic and influence interests in ways that are effective at an individual, state, and regional level, and that are complementary to US global goals and objectives, including avoiding Chinese-Russian cooperation harmful to US interests.



- Examined how the strategic communities in China, Russia, and key regional actors view US motivations and decision-making.

This SMA Project consisted of five co-occurring focus areas:

- Part I: Anticipating the Operating Environment 2019-2029
- Part II: Deep Dive: China's Global Outlook, Activities, and Strategy
- Part III: Deep Dive: Russia's Global Outlook, Activities, and Strategy
- Part IV: Emerging Regional and Non-State Threats
- Part V: Implications for US Strategic Concepts and Capabilities

In support of the GCC Project, the TRADOC G-2 Modeling and Simulation Directorate utilized the Athena Simulation to provide computational modeling and detailed analysis of potential regional challenges associated with China futures (Part II of the GCC effort).

## **Purpose and Organization of this Report**

This report compiles the insights derived from research, Athena Simulation modeling runs, and analysis conducted during the period, January through September 2019. This chapter identifies the study design elements, as well as details the study objectives. Chapter 2 details the analytic insights identified, and Chapter 3 provides conclusions derived from the study. The appendices include the study question architecture, a description of the Athena Simulation, the China modeling guide, a PMESII-based Country Profile on China, a list of key study contributors and SMEs, and finally, identification of the TRADOC G-2 points of contact and a glossary of key terms and acronyms.

## **Constraints, Limitations and Assumptions**

This study was bounded by constraints, limitations and assumptions.

The constraints on this study included:

- 1) Time and opportunities available for collecting data.
- 2) Availability of quantitative data to inform the study objectives.
- 3) The level of classification. The goal was to keep this study at the unclassified level which limits access to various data types as well as bounding potential scenario designs.
- 4) Availability of SMEs to analyze the insights and link them to the study questions.

The primary limitation on the study effort reflects the inability to inform the study objectives fully, generally as a result of the constraints previously indicated. In addition, the study was limited by the information available and the accuracy (or lack thereof) based upon known mis-representation and skewed reporting by the Chinese government.

The study team posited the following assumptions to accommodate the study and supporting scenario design:

- 1) There will be no global economic downturn during the study timeframe.
- 2) External actors (e.g. North Korea, Russian Federation, Pakistan, etc.) will remain committed to current policies.
- 3) The government of Taiwan will not aggressively seek to defy or declare “independence” from the One-China policy

## Study Question and Objectives

The overarching objective of this study was to better understand the implications of potential USG courses of action being implemented in a Competitive Zone or “Gray Zone” environment. Athena results are intended to inform the SMA community of interest of the potential long-term implications of engagement strategies and Chinese actions, and to provide increased understanding of the effects resulting from employing the elements of national power against Competitive Zone challenges. A complete decomposition of the study question architecture can be found in Appendix A.

SMA Primary Research Question: “How might the US strategize to defend global interests across the spectrum of cooperation to competition and conflict through the coming decade?”

Athena Study Question: What conditions in China best enable the US to pursue its global interests within the Competitive Zone over the next ten years?

Objective 1: Identify potential futures in China that set conditions which encourage improved stability within the global Competitive Zone.

Objective 2: Explore approaches for enabling the US to improve its ability to deter, compel and/or manage Chinese actions within the Competitive Zone.

## Methodology

The process by which the study objectives were informed comprised elements of design, collection, research, model runs, synthesis and documentation.

- In the design phase, the analysts developed an understanding of the objective and determined the approach to be taken to provide an objective analysis. The design phase produced the study question architecture which is found in Appendix A.
- The data collection process was designed to support analytic rigor by avoiding bias; unclassified documents were analyzed and interviews were conducted with individuals in the SMA Community of Interest, the TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment and Threat Analysis Directorate (OE&TA), and other regional subject matter experts.

- The research phase was critical to the analysts' understanding of the data that supported the study objectives. Throughout this phase, relevant references were found and evaluated, and discourse with recognized experts continued in order to gain a well-grounded appreciation of the data in the context of this study. The output of these phases informed the modeling data.

## Use Case Scenarios

The Athena modeling team used three outcome-oriented use cases to assess potential futures for China over a simulated multi-year period. The use cases were developed to enable the development of insights (Chapter 2) and conclusions (Chapter 3). These use cases are:

**Status Quo Continuation:** Use Case #1 assesses the social, political, and economic conditions in China given no substantial change in the current economic situation or governing paradigm. The Chinese Communist Party governs using a status quo surveillance state. The CCP continues to carefully compete with its international rivals primarily through economic engagements, strategic deterrence, and cyberwarfare.

**State Capitalist Acceleration:** Use Case #2 assesses conditions in China given an improving situation. To avert a looming economic and political crisis, the CCP strengthens enforcement of the rule of law through a largely apolitical and genuinely empowered anti-corruption unit. This move is enhanced by a pervasive implementation of the digital surveillance state strengthened by artificial intelligence (Ex. "Zero Trust" system). Additionally, the CCP places a greater emphasis on the free market aspect of its state capitalist system and reduces the influence of state-owned enterprises. These moves bring about a decrease in structural corruption. The CCP continues to carefully compete with its international rivals primarily through economic engagements, strategic deterrence, and cyberwarfare.

**The Lost Decade:** Use Case #3 assesses conditions in China given a deteriorating economic situation. Massive inefficiencies and mismanagement in the state-run economy lead to the end of economic growth and stagnation in the Chinese economy. The CCP decides to avoid serious, structural, anti-corruption reforms and instead only strengthens its implementation of the digital surveillance state. Simultaneously, the Party expands the power of state-owned enterprises in order to manage the stagnation. Corruption thrives. To distract domestic audiences and to increase the wealth of the state, China pursues more aggressive strategies with its foreign rivals in economic engagements, strategic deterrence, and cyberwarfare.

## Computational Modeling

The primary computational modeling tool employed in support of the China study was the Athena Simulation. Athena is a government-owned, sociocultural modeling capability which supports a decision maker by providing both a framework to better understand complex PMESII-based problems and a simulation for anticipating the long-term consequences of engagement choices across the totality of the operational environment.

Athena Simulation Description. Athena is a scalable, single user, laptop-based, course of action development and analysis capability used to anticipate the consequences of various DIME-FIL

engagement activities upon noncombatant groups. Athena enables the analysis of second and third order effects upon local civilian groups and those group's possible responses in order to discern potential outcomes from political, military, economic and social interventions. Athena allows leaders and analysts to understand the intended and unintended effects of their proposed actions through a simulation process that incorporates social science 'universals' into course of action analysis and campaign planning. It enables the examination of interdependent political, economic, security/military, and information dynamics; anticipation of emergent actors, factions, and powerbases; and compares and contrasts multiple courses of action. See Appendix C for an expanded description of the Athena Simulation.

**Athena Utilization History.** The Athena Simulation has been used since 2011 to conduct studies and analysis in support of the Joint Staff, various Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) to include Central Command (CENTCOM), Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), as well as, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). In addition, Athena has supported Army experimentation events to include Unified Quest, Silent Quest, and Unified Challenge.

**Athena Support to Operationally Deployed Units.** Beyond its utilization in support of studies and experimentation, the Athena Simulation has been deployed with an Athena Support Team on a variety of real-world operational taskings. The first was in support of CENTCOM Forward – Jordan (CFJ) for the purpose of examining the Syrian refugee crisis and its potential impacts on Jordan. The second was in support of Special Operations Command CENTCOM (SOCCENT) as they established an operational presence to begin contesting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Athena Support Team utilized the simulation and supporting research efforts to help inform commanders and staffs as they sought a better understanding of the motivations and philosophy of the ISIS phenomenon. Finally, a rotating series of Athena Support Teams was deployed to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, from February through August 2015 in support of US Army, Central Command (ARCENT) as part of Combined and Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR).

**Athena Simulation Validation.** The validation of the Athena simulation is a multi-part, multi-year process which includes several validation methodologies including: 1) formal programmatic assessments by qualified Department of Defense (DoD) organizations; 2) heuristic evaluations by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) conducted in conjunction with wargames and workshops; 3) evaluations of the convergence and divergence of results across a broad set of analytic studies, and 4) running the Athena simulation against historical use cases.

## Athena Neighborhoods

The Athena team assessed the configuration of Chinese regional governance and populations distributions and from those developed a series of “neighborhoods” in Athena to model the different conditions. They are depicted in the image below<sup>4</sup>:



**Athena Neighborhoods: China**

## Key Civilian Groups

The Athena modeling team also identified and defined the following four key “Civilian Groups”<sup>5</sup> to examine possible futures for China. The complete list of civilian groups can be found in Appendix C. The four key civilian groups are defined as follows:

- **Power Elite (Source - Monitor 360)**

This segment of the population includes central and local party leaders, military leaders, “princelings,” and captains of business and industry. Members of the power elite have profited immensely from China’s three decades of economic reforms relative to the rest of the population. They are counted as members of the Chinese Communist Party.
- **Well-Off (Source - Monitor 360)**

This segment of the population includes urban professionals, managers, entrepreneurs, scientists, “conservative” and “New Left” intellectuals, and most university students. These groups have been major beneficiaries of China’s fast-paced economic development during the reform era. They are counted as members of the Chinese Communist Party.

<sup>44</sup> There is a larger version located in Appendix C.

<sup>5</sup> Civilian Groups are the way Athena categorizes and organizes civilian populations across the various neighborhoods in the Athena playbox. Civilian groups normally describe groups of people with similar beliefs and demographics.

- **Working Poor Han (Source - Monitor 360)**

This segment of the population includes some of the more successful migrant laborers, factory workers, other members of the working class, more prosperous farmers, and underemployed professionals. These groups, which probably comprise the largest segment of the population, are getting by economically for now but are in a precarious position: they have jobs and have seen their material conditions improve in absolute terms, but not relative to the “Power Elite” and “Well-Off” segments.

- **Downtrodden Han (Source - Monitor 360)**

This segment of the population comprises less successful migrant laborers, dispossessed farmers and villagers, elderly and young left behind in the countryside, older workers laid off from state-owned enterprises—especially from heavy industry in the northeastern ‘rust belt’—and the unemployed. These groups have lost out in or have been left behind economically by China’s reforms.

## **Economic Modeling**

Subject Matter Expert elicitations revealed that while China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate was stated at approximately 6%, the Chinese Communist Party engages in deceptive and economically manipulative practices that obscure the true national GDP growth rate. Michael Pettis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace believes true China GDP growth is less than half of the stated rate.

To more accurately assess China futures, the Athena Simulation applied the following annual GDP growth rates for each of the three use cases:

- In the Status Quo case, the average annual GDP growth rate was 1.47%.
- In the State Capitalist Acceleration case the average annual GDP growth rate was 2.29%.
- In the Lost Decade case, the average annual GDP growth rate was 0.12%.

## Chapter 2: China Study Insights

### Insight Summary

Seven insights were developed from the research and analysis conducted during the study. Here is a summation of those insights, followed by the insight analysis for each:

#### **Insight 1: Popular Support for CCP Remains Stable**

Regardless of the economic growth rate across three use cases, nationwide support for and popular satisfaction with governance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declined mildly over a decade. There was no collapse of CCP influence in any China (neighborhood<sup>6</sup>). The Lost Decade use case produced a greater decline in popular support for the central government, but not nearly enough to produce any significant change. The Hong Kong Crisis excursion had virtually no effect on the level of popular satisfaction with CCP governance, while the Xinjiang Uprising excursion produced a sharp decline in this metric until the simulated VEO was decisively defeated.

#### **Insight 2: Popular Mood is Largely Stable**

Nationwide “mood”<sup>7</sup> initially increased and then decreased mildly, roughly mirroring the greatest period of economic growth in the Status Quo and Acceleration cases. In the Lost Decade use case, mood rose negligibly, flattened out, and then declined. When mood was increasing, it was buoyed primarily by the population’s improving sense of safety. When the Hong Kong Crisis and Xinjiang Uprising excursions were applied to all use cases, national mood was virtually unaffected by the Hong Kong Crisis. However, national mood sharply declined during the Xinjiang Uprising and recovered somewhat after it ended. Without excursions, national mood terminates with virtually the same measured effect across all three use cases.

#### **Insight 3: The Lost Decade Hits Hard**

The Lost Decade impacts the mood of the Chinese population much more negatively than the Acceleration case’s effects are positive. Additionally, the positive changes are very small. When included, the Hong Kong Crisis again had minimal impact on national mood, but the Xinjiang Uprising produced a significant negative impact. The economically vital middle class civilian group<sup>8</sup>, “Working Poor,” is especially harmed by the conditions of The Lost Decade. Both their mood and satisfaction with governance decline steeply over ten years. The Working Poor were specifically assessed in the megacities of Beijing, Chongqing, and Shanghai. The heartland city of Chongqing showed the greatest degree of loss. Along with the Working Poor, the “Power Elite” of Chongqing City saw sharp declines in mood and satisfaction with governance, suggesting a looming threat to CCP legitimacy in the interior if there were significant economic stress.

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<sup>6</sup> Please see Chapter 1 or Appendix C for a map of the Athena “neighborhoods” in China. Neighborhoods are the means used in Athena to break the study area into sub-regions for targeted analysis.

<sup>7</sup> Athena computes the “mood” of each civilian group, which is an average of the group’s satisfactions weighted by their salencies. The four factors that make up satisfaction are: autonomy (governance), culture, safety, and quality of life.

<sup>8</sup> See Chapter 1 for a list of the key Civilian Groups described in this Athena analysis.

**Insight 4: The Downtrodden Endure**

The Han “Downtrodden” peasant civilian groups in the countryside show durable tolerance for CCP governance. The mood of the Downtrodden in Han Central declines mildly in the Lost Decade case, mostly due to weakening satisfaction with governance, the net change in mood is virtually zero. The mood rises, then returns to its starting point by the end of the decade. In the Status Quo and State Capitalist Acceleration cases, mood sees a significant net increase, indicating the benefits of economic growth on even one of the most marginal groups.

**Insight 5: The Elites are Stable**

Chinese political and wealthy elites (“Power Elite” and “Well-Off” civilian groups) generally show durable confidence in CCP governance. There are only slight declines in satisfaction with governance over all three use cases—except in Chongqing City, where elite satisfaction declines precipitously.

**Insight 6: The Predictable Pain in Xinjiang**

While mood in Xinjiang decayed sharply in all use cases, the mood of Uyghurs was slightly better under Status Quo and State Acceleration (which includes milder treatment of Uyghurs by the CCP). This suggests that if economic improvements actually impact Uyghurs, it may mitigate their disaffection. In this excursion, the small insurgency in Xinjiang was unable to remove CCP rule or govern the area.

**Insight 7: The Hong Kong Turbulence is Temporary**


In Hong Kong, during the Hong Kong Crisis excursion and after, support for the Municipal Government fluctuates turbulently during the protests, but post-crisis, it is virtually identical under all use cases. Support trends slightly higher under State Capitalist Acceleration than the Status Quo. Support for the Municipal Government is slightly lower under the Lost Decade than Status Quo.

**Insight Analysis****Insight 1: Popular Support for CCP Remains Stable**


Regardless of the economic growth rate across three use cases, nationwide support for and popular satisfaction with governance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declined mildly over a decade. There was no collapse of CCP influence in any China (neighborhood). The Lost Decade use case produced a greater decline in popular support for the central government, but not nearly enough to produce any significant change. The Hong Kong Crisis excursion had virtually no effect on the level of popular satisfaction with CCP governance, while the Xinjiang Uprising excursion produced a sharp decline in this metric until the simulated VEO was decisively defeated.

In the images below, the average popular support for the CCP is visually depicted across all three use cases. The larger bubbles represent greater levels of average popular support for the CCP. One can see the similarity in support in Status Quo Continuation and State Capitalist Acceleration, while there are steep declines between Status Quo Continuation and The Lost Decade.






Average Total Popular Support for CCP – Status Quo Continuation




Average Total Popular Support for CCP – The Lost Decade





**Average Total Popular Support for CCP – State Capitalist Acceleration**


The study team modeled the CCP Central Government and supporting Local Government actors. Popular support for the Central Government essentially manifests as two trends; (1) an arc of rising support during the first 104 weeks, then a mild decline over the remaining eight years, and (2), declining support over the 104 weeks that flattens out over the remaining eight years.



GDP Measured over Number of Weeks

The (1) trend can be seen in neighborhoods that are immediately able to absorb badly needed infrastructure investment and economic stimulation as opposed to neighborhoods (2) that were, at the start of the simulation, already well-developed or saturated with investment. The declines in support, when occurring, are more pronounced during The Lost Decade case. While GDP growth clearly differs between the cases, support in Status Quo Continuation and State Capitalist Acceleration are almost identical. Excessive or inefficient economic growth does produce increased popular support much in excess of the status quo condition.


The (1) trend was common in rural areas while the (2) was prevalent in urban neighborhoods. The neighborhoods showing increasing support for the CCP were: Han Central, Northeast, North, Southeast, West, Xinjiang, and Tibet. The neighborhoods showing declining support for the CCP Central according to the second trend were: Chongqing City, Beijing City, Tianjin City, Guangzhou City, and Shanghai City. Hong Kong was not simulated as receiving CCP economic interventions due to its special autonomous status under the “One Country, Two Systems” framework. However, support for the Hong Kong government mirrors the (1) trend. This is possible due to indirect social and economic linkages to Mainland China.



### Insight 2: Popular Mood is Largely Stable

Nationwide “mood” initially increased and then decreased mildly, roughly mirroring the greatest period of economic growth in the Status Quo and Acceleration cases. In the Lost Decade use case, mood rose negligibly, flattened out, and then declined. When mood was increasing, it was buoyed primarily by the population’s improving sense of safety. When the Hong Kong Crisis and Xinjiang Uprising excursions were applied to all use cases, national mood was virtually unaffected by the Hong Kong Crisis. However, national mood sharply declined during the Xinjiang Uprising and recovered somewhat after it ended. Without excursions, national mood terminates with virtually the same measured effect across all three use cases.

This continued general decline in the national mood reflects the general economic malaise of the populations that were assessed. If these general trends continue there is the possibility that the CCP will need to put an increasing police/military presence into place throughout the country to maintain local civil stability.




The nationwide mood of the population remained stable, though it declined some after the impact of two years' worth of economic stimuli. This suggests the CCP must manage its economic development more deftly and lift more of its population out of poverty. Economic stagnation would be particularly dangerous. The notional Xinjiang insurgency had a temporary, yet significant affect, on national mood.

When national mood is disaggregated, only the population's satisfaction with their safety is rising, especially during the first two years of the run when the economic stimulus was more intense. Satisfaction with respect for culture declines slightly, while the satisfaction with governance and quality of life decline more steeply. Additionally, the level of satisfaction with governance drops more sharply in The Lost Decade use case. Thus, what is being shown is that although the population feels safe, it desires significant improvements to their quality of life and governance.


### Insight 3: The Lost Decade Hits Hard

The Lost Decade impacts the mood of the Chinese population much more negatively than the Acceleration case's effects are positive. Additionally, the positive changes are very small. When included, the Hong Kong Crisis again had minimal impact on national mood, but the Xinjiang Uprising produced a significant negative impact. The economically vital middle class civilian group, "Working Poor," is especially harmed by the conditions of The Lost Decade. Both their mood and satisfaction with governance decline steeply over ten years. The Working Poor were specifically assessed in the megacities of Beijing, Chongqing, and Shanghai. The heartland city of Chongqing showed the greatest degree of loss. Along with the Working Poor, the "Power Elite" of Chongqing City saw sharp declines in mood and satisfaction with governance, suggesting a looming threat to CCP legitimacy in the interior if there were significant economic stress.

The *Master Narratives Country Report* identifies the Working Poor population segment as economically vital to China's growth. The simulation shows this group's mood to be stable or declining mildly in populous rural neighborhoods like Han Central and in cities like Beijing in Status Quo Continuation and State Capitalist Acceleration. During The Lost Decade there are declines in mood, but especially in the Working Poor of Chongqing City. There, satisfaction with governance and quality of life drop sharply.



**Mood of Mandarin Han Working Poor of Chongqing City Measured over Number of Weeks**




**Satisfaction with Governance of Mandarin Han Working Poor of Chongqing City Measured over Number of Weeks**

This dissatisfaction with governance and quality of life is due to higher levels of unemployment in Chongqing. In Athena, the mood impacts of unemployment on the Working Poor and other civilian groups are more pronounced because they have some affinity with each other. This produces the sense of ‘sympathetic suffering’. Whatever the real impacts on the feelings of people in the heartland megacity of Chongqing, this insight illuminates the threat to stability that may occur over time under conditions of near zero economic growth.

#### **Insight 4: The Downtrodden Endure**

The Han “Downtrodden” peasant civilian groups in the countryside show durable tolerance for CCP governance. The mood of the Downtrodden in Han Central declines mildly in the Lost Decade case, mostly due to weakening satisfaction with governance, the net change in mood is virtually zero. The mood rises, then returns to its starting point by the end of the decade. In the Status Quo and State Capitalist Acceleration cases, mood sees a significant net increase, indicating the benefits of economic growth on even one of the most marginal groups.


The *Master Narratives Country Report* identifies the Downtrodden or so-called “weak groups.” They are described as “less successful migrant laborers, dispossessed farmers and villagers, elderly and young left behind in the countryside, older workers laid off from state-owned enterprises—especially from heavy industry in the northeastern rust belt—and the unemployed.” These groups are simulated in all neighborhoods, but are particularly numerous in hinterland neighborhoods.



**Satisfaction with Governance of Downtrodden Mandarin Han in Han Central Measured over Number of Weeks**

In The Lost Decade use case, the loss of mood among the Downtrodden is partially driven by dissatisfaction with governance. This is due to pervasive unemployment and insufficient social services in the form of government investment in the social services infrastructure. The Central Government is simulated as providing a stronger welfare state to the Working Poor, given their importance; however, the “weak groups” are more neglected, which exacerbates dissatisfaction with governance under strained economic conditions.





**Mood of Downtrodden Mandarin Han in Han Central Measured over Number of Weeks**


The mood of this category of civ group was modeled as starting low—approximately -30 on a scale from -100 to +100. The Downtrodden civilian groups often show mildly rising mood under Status Quo Continuation and State Capitalist Acceleration and mild mood declines during The Lost Decade. Thus, Athena modeling showed no radical shifts in mood of the Downtrodden population during the decade long run.

#### **Insight 5: The Elites are Stable**

Chinese political and wealthy elites (“Power Elite” and “Well-Off” civilian groups) generally show durable confidence in CCP governance. There are only slight declines in satisfaction with governance over all three use cases—except in Chongqing City, where elite satisfaction declines precipitously.

The *Master Narratives Country Report* identified and simulated two segments of the population as Chinese elites worthy of examination. One is the Power Elite, described as: “This segment includes central and local party leaders, military leaders, ‘princelings,’ and captains of business and industry. Members of the power elite have profited immensely from China’s three decades of economic reforms relative to the rest of the population.”

The other segment are the Well-Off: “This segment includes urban professionals, managers, entrepreneurs, scientists, ‘conservative’ and ‘New Left’ intellectuals, and most university students. These groups have been major beneficiaries of China’s fast-paced economic development during the reform era.”



**Satisfaction with Governance of Power Elite of Chongqing City Measured over Number of Weeks**

The elite groups were modeled in Athena as distributed across China, but with greater numbers in more densely populated and politically important neighborhoods like Beijing. These groups start with the highest mood baselines—on a scale of -100 to +100 the Well-Off start at approximately 50 and the Power Elite at approximately 90. It was found that other than in Chongqing City, where unemployment is high or in Xinjiang, a crisis-affected neighborhood, the Power Elite and Well-Off showed slow, mild deterioration in mood over time. The elites show stable satisfaction across all cases.

However, when examined more closely, it was found that there were sharp deteriorations in the level of satisfaction with governance among the Power Elite and Well-Off. These declines were due to the sympathetic effect of unemployment and insufficient government investment in social services in the various neighborhoods in the country. One way to interpret these results is that the elites do actually show some degree of responsiveness to the sufferings of their inferiors. Social development scholar Francis Fukuyama has said<sup>9</sup> that while the CCP offers no democratic franchise to its citizens, there is an informal responsiveness in the institutions of the state. There are thousands of “mass incidents” per year in China—strikes, protests, and peasant uprisings. As a result, the CCP elites must be attentive to ongoing dissatisfaction among disaffected groups in order to preclude having an uprising gain enough traction to threaten the CCP’s control.

<sup>9</sup> *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), P. 381.


### **Insight 6: The Predictable Pain in Xinjiang**

While mood in Xinjiang decayed sharply in all use cases, the mood of Uyghurs was slightly better under Status Quo and State Acceleration (which includes milder treatment of Uyghurs by the CCP). This suggests that if economic improvements actually impact Uyghurs, it may mitigate their disaffection. In this excursion, the small insurgency in Xinjiang was unable to remove CCP rule or govern the area.

The mood of the general Uyghur population of Xinjiang was examined as one among a number of simulated civilian groups in that province. Other civilian groups in the same neighborhood included Mandarin Han Hui Muslims, Power Elites, the Working Poor, and a million Uyghurs being held in re-education facilities. As might be expected, the modeled suppression of an armed insurgency drove the population's mood down. However, the mood of the Uyghur general population (not incarcerated), while always declining to extremely low levels in all use cases, was slightly higher in the Status Quo Acceleration case when the dominant CCP was simulated as taking a more culturally-sensitive approach to governing there. This CCP approach to governance can be equated to an attempt to create a "Sinicized" Uyghur culture.

This suggests that if economic improvements actually impact Uyghurs, it may mitigate their disaffection. In this excursion, the small insurgency in Xinjiang was unable to remove CCP rule or govern the area. Supplementary sensitivity analysis indicated the following:


- Athena modeling revealed that it takes approximately 35,000 VEO personnel to stop the CCP from being able to exercise control in Xinjiang. This VEO activity threw the area into chaos for a 37 week period.
- Experimentation with the notional excursion also revealed that it would require 400,000 VEO personnel to secure the Uyghur general population enough to receive more popular support than the CCP and thus take control of the Xinjiang neighborhood.



**Mood of Uyghurs in Xinjiang Measured over Number of Weeks**

### **Insight 7: The Hong Kong Turbulence is Temporary**

In Hong Kong, during the Hong Kong Crisis excursion and after, support for the Municipal Government fluctuates turbulently during the protests, but post-crisis, it is virtually identical under all use cases. Support trends slightly higher under State Capitalist Acceleration than the Status Quo. Support for the Municipal Government is slightly lower under the Lost Decade than Status Quo.



**Support for Municipal Government in Hong Kong Measured over Number of Weeks**

The simulation of a crisis in Hong Kong included two million protesters and quick shifts by the population from normal civilian groups to the more belligerent protest-oriented civilian groups. The effect of these population shifts can be seen in the graph. During the protests there were only mild declines in the level of satisfaction with governance by civilians outside the protestor population. There were severe declines in civilian groups satisfaction with their safety reflecting an increasing level of fear for one's life, and had these continued beyond the end of the notional crisis in Week 92, and been coupled with the presence of a credible alternative political actor, then losses in support for the municipal government might have been transferred to a challenger resulting in a possible change in control over the Hong Kong neighborhood.

## Chapter 3: China Study Implications, Conclusions, and Relevance to US Policymakers

### General Implications

The duration of any events explored in the scenarios (e.g., government decisions or economic factors which impact the various stability variables) seems to be tied to the impact that the event will have on a select population, and will also relate to how any government response will resonate across the nation. This indicates, for instance, that events will have little impact if they are short-lived.

### Insight Specific Implications, Conclusions, and Relevance to US Policymakers

#### Insight 1: Popular Support for CCP Remains Stable

**Conclusion:** *The probability of causing regime change in China is virtually nonexistent.*

**Relevance to US Policymakers:** The implication for the US is that the CCP has strong popular support no matter the circumstances. US efforts to discredit the party in the eyes of the Chinese population will produce, at best, only minimal effects over a long time horizon. As long as the people's expectations for security and quality of life are not violated, the CCP will continue to receive strong support. The exception, as identified in the use cases explored, is in the event of a strong, violent challenge to the state. Assuming this result is not an anomaly, US covert support to such an uprising might create an opportunity for exploitation. More study of these circumstances is required.

#### Insight 2: Popular Mood is Largely Stable

**Conclusion:** *China will likely remain stable overall despite any localized disturbances and/or grievances.*

**Relevance to US Policymakers:** The implication for the US is that economic well-being continues to drive the PRC and the CCP. As might be expected, mood declines when economic conditions fall below popular expectations. The obvious problem with exploiting these circumstances is that China, as well as the US, is a linchpin of the interconnected world-wide economy, so any decline in the Chinese economy will have a concomitant negative effect on the world economy as a whole. It would likely take worsening economic news (such as an extended contraction of GDP) to produce greater dissatisfaction with the central government.

The presence of a strong, violent challenge to the regime had a large impact on national mood. The only way to test if this is an anomaly is for another violent and sustained uprising to occur. As in Insight 1, if this is not an anomaly, then US covert support to such an uprising could create an opportunity for exploitation.

### **Insight 3: The Lost Decade Hits Hard**

*Conclusion: The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is well-positioned for internal defense so any uprising would likely fail without support from within the military itself, which seems unlikely. However, economic stagnation is a particular threat to CCP legitimacy in the Han interior.*

**Relevance to US Policymakers:** The implication for the US is that the PLA is well-positioned for internal defense so any uprising would likely fail without support from within the military itself, which seems highly unlikely. The Working Poor and the Power Elite of Chongqing are potential target audiences for US influence operations, and perhaps even the introduction of unconventional warfare activities through the application of covert means during times of economic decline and/or uncertainty.

### **Insight 4: The Downtrodden Endure**

*Conclusion: The decline of rural populations will likely continue due to urbanization without affecting overall stability within China.*

**Relevance to US Policymakers:** The implication for the US is that the Han Downtrodden, in spite of their economic circumstances, are not good targets for US influence operations and activities.

### **Insight 5: The Elites are Stable**

*Conclusion: Chinese elites are generally satisfied with status quo CCP governance. Stability of the elite classes means an increasingly outward focus for China as the elites continue to enrich themselves through global business dealings.*

**Relevance to US Policymakers:** The implication for the US is that these groups are not generally good target audiences for US influence operations. The reason for Chongqing City showing susceptibility appears to be a one-off and needs to be explored further to determine if it is an anomaly.

### **Insight 6: The Predictable Pain in Xinjiang**

*Conclusion: A quiescent Uyghur situation may result in increasing ties between China and other countries with Turkic ethnicities (especially Turkey itself), which could have repercussions for US partnerships globally.*

**Relevance to US Policymakers:** The implication for the US is that the CCP plan to use development in Xinjiang to ease Uyghur tensions with the government appears to be an effective course of action. If US goals are to weaken support for the CCP, and Uyghur independence is secondary, then the mere presence of a strong, violent challenge is enough to meet that objective. Providing support with the intent of accomplishing a complete overthrow of CCP rule in Uyghur areas is not necessary to achieve the goal of simply weakening Uyghur support for the CCP in Xinjiang.

### **Insight 7: The Hong Kong Turbulence is Temporary**

*Conclusion: The Hong Kong disturbances are ephemeral and their impact on the rest of China is minimal. However, the short-lived nature of the Hong Kong disturbances may still reverberate across other regions and decrease the likelihood of inspiring other uprisings or disturbances – particularly in Taiwan and Tibet.*

**Relevance to US Policymakers:** The implication for the US is that sustained protests in Hong Kong are not currently possible, and as such, the status quo should be expected to be maintained unless alternative forms of protest can be identified, introduced and sustained over a long term to produce declining support for the CCP.

Both the modeled Hong Kong excursion and current unrest in Hong Kong appear to be having little impact outside of Hong Kong. Because of skewed reporting on the mainland, there is increasing dissatisfaction by most civilian populations across China with the people of Hong Kong; therefore, only a limited impact outside of that area is expected.



## Chapter 4: China Study Excursion #1: Hong Kong

### Summary

#### 1. Describe an incidence of competition/conflict between the CCP and US that could plausibly take place in the next 10 years.

Carrie Lam, the current Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region (SAR), resigns in December of 2019, citing ill health (though everyone assumes it is due to the huge demonstrations against “A highly controversial legislative measure in Hong Kong that would allow criminal suspects to be extradited to mainland China,”<sup>10</sup> which she had been trying to pass. A new harder-line, pro-mainland Hong Kong Chief Executive (HKCE) is appointed. In March 2020 four young leaders from the previous summer’s demonstrations disappear. Three days later phone-video footage is released online that shows all four individuals at the West Kowloon Express Rail Link train station being bundled into a train headed for the mainland by what everyone assumes are plain-clothes PRC security. Hong Kong activists call for demonstrations, and thousands pour into the streets.

The new HKCE calls for calm, but also says, in the Basic Law, that “the Hong Kong SAR government is duty-bound by Article 23 to prohibit certain political activities endangering China's state security [including] - offences of treason, sedition, subversion.”<sup>11</sup> Activists call for more and larger demonstrations, and call for the HKCE’s resignation.

Demonstrations ebb somewhat until July 1, 2020, when the anniversary of 2019’s million-person protest comes around, and once again a million protesters take to the street. Previously the mainland had announced a port call in Hong Kong on July 8 by the PLA Navy’s first indigenously produced aircraft carrier, Type 011A. The port call had been intended as a good will visit, and the ship would have been opened for tours; however, with the unrest continuing the Hong Kong PLA garrison takes the unprecedented step of sending troops to protect the dock where the Type 011A is berthed. Protests in that area increase and a civilian protester is killed by an inexperienced PLA soldier.

#### 2. Describe the key regional actors involved (other than US and CCP, ex. Japan, South Korea, etc.).

Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan

<sup>10</sup> Christopher Bodeen and Yanan Wang, “Extradition bill pushes Hong Kong to a political crisis,” APNews. Com, June 10, 2019, <https://www.apnews.com/70c87c10413e452d8338a760b48ece47>.

<sup>11</sup> H. L. Fu, “9: The Impact of the Chinese Criminal Law in Hong Kong,” in *Hong Kong in Transition: One Country, Two Systems*, ed. Robert Ash, Peter Ferdinand, Brian Hook, and Robin Porter (New York: Routledge, 2002), 152, <http://www.QUESTIA.COM/read/108240785/hong-kong-in-transition-one-country-two-systems>.

**3. Describe the duration of the incident including the moves and counter-moves of actors (a week, two months, a year, etc.).**

Demonstrations continue until the fall, when mainland China announces the arrest and execution of a security official in Guangzhou whom they claim was conducting rogue operations. The US and China negotiate until February 2021, when the provisions of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (HKHRDA), being applied against the Chinese generals, are lifted and the tariffs and counter-tariffs are dropped – so about a year for the entire cycle, or two years if it includes the initial year’s protests.

**4. Describe the CCP’s first move (including whether the CCP is the inciting actor).**

CCP is the inciting actor, as described above.

**5. Describe the US Government’s first move (including whether the US is the inciting actor).**

First Move (US): After the video link of the abducted activists comes online, the US freezes the assets of various Chinese Generals by invoking the 2019 HKHRDA, the US also freezes the assets of, and bars US entry to, the two vice chairman of the PRC’s Central Military Commission. Congress calls on the White House to make clear US support for Hong Kong democracy.

Japan makes a statement supporting democracy in Hong Kong and supports US action.

Taiwan calls for calm.

North Korea makes a statement calling for the US to cease its banditry.

South Korea makes a statement supporting democracy and calls for all parties involved to work on resolving their differences through dialogue.

**6. Describe the CCP’s second move.**

Second Move (CCP): The PRC initiates an embargo of rare earth minerals to the US and decries the video as fake news created by insidious foreign forces. The soldier involved in the death of the civilian is removed and the commander of the PLA garrison is relieved. Foreign “interveners” are blamed for stirring up the incident.

**7. Describe the US Government’s second move.**

Second Move (US): The US reinstates tariffs on Chinese goods and sails a US Seventh Fleet flotilla through international waters off of Hong Kong while calling for calm in Hong Kong.

Japan offers to send a team to the US to discuss how Japan overcame a similar rare earths embargo by China.

North Korea calls on the US to cease its banditry and piracy.

South Korea makes statements supporting democracy.

**8. Describe the anticipated results of the incident and conflict in the following ways:**

- a. How has the Chinese general population's perception of the US changed (if at all)?

The Chinese general public turns strongly against the US and against its compatriots in Hong Kong. A majority of the residence of Hong Kong support the US and the West even more strongly.

- b. How has US influence over the key regional actors been affected?

Approval rating for the US in Japan, already high, goes higher; South Korean approval of the US also improves, though not as much. Approval ratings for the US also go up in Taiwan, though the government makes no new statements.

## Chapter 5: China Study Excursion #2: Xinjiang

### Summary

#### 1. Describe an incidence of competition/conflict between the CCP and US that could plausibly take place in the next 10 years.

A violent extremist organization based in the Northern Tribal Areas of Pakistan and with ties to both Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISIS sends materiel and personnel across the border to China to foment upheaval in Xinjiang in support of their Muslim “brothers.” Three possible scenarios were considered:

1. On the low end of the scale, due to poor tactics, techniques, and procedures, the VEO manages to only smuggle 100 personnel and minimal materiel into Xinjiang.
2. On the medium range, the VEO smuggles approximately 250 personnel and slightly more materiel into Xinxiang.
3. On the high side of the scale, the VEO smuggles in approximately 700 personnel, along with equivalent numbers of arms and a minimal amount of heavier weaponry.

#### 2. Describe the key regional actors involved (other than US and CCP, ex. Japan, South Korea, etc.) Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan.

The VEO is the other actor involved. No other regional players, nor the US, are involved in what they consider to be a domestic issue. Their policy is to respect China’s sovereignty, so there is not much they can or are willing to do during this incident.

#### 3. Describe the duration of the incident including the moves and counter-moves of actors (a week, two months, a year, etc.)

Across all three scenarios, the VEO personnel attempt to foment unrest and social upheaval against the CCP on a pre-planned day of action. Because of previous stringent oppression, a significant number of males of fighting age are already housed in CCP’s “re-education camps” and are not currently living or physically present in the area. The families of the Uyghurs placed in the camps are well aware of the harsh oppression of the Uyghurs by the CCP, as in the case of the July 2009 Urumqi riots, which involved at least 1,000 Uyghurs over a few days. Heavy handed tactics by the CCP, which deployed the People’s Armed Police, resulted in 197 deaths<sup>12</sup>, 1,721 injuries<sup>13</sup>, 400 criminal charges, and 26 death sentences<sup>14</sup>. Consequently, many Uyghurs are afraid to rise up against the CCP, even with external support.

<sup>12</sup> Yan Hao, Geng Ruibin and Yuan Ye (18 July 2009). ["Xinjiang riot hits regional anti-terror nerve"](#). Chinaview. Cn. Xinhua. Archived from [the original](#) on 17 April 2010.

<sup>13</sup> "Initial probe completed and arrest warrants to be issued soon, Xinjiang prosecutor says". South China Morning Post. Associated Press. 17 July 2009. p. A7.

<sup>14</sup> Le, Yu (26 January 2010). ["China sentences four more to death for Urumqi riot"](#). Reuters.

#### **4. Describe the CCP's first move (including whether the CCP is the inciting actor).**

First Move (CCP): As with the 2009 riots, CCP responds in a heavy-handed fashion. In scenarios 1 & 2, CCP tactics are able to quickly put the unrest down as has been the case during previous riots. Considering the numbers of participants involved and the fact that these numbers amount to far less than the 2009 riots, CCP responds in typical fashion with little outside interest.

However, in scenario 3, the number of armed insurgents prompts the Uyghurs to take more of a stand and some of them join the protest along with the VEOs. Neither the VEO nor the People's Armed Police respond with violence at this point, which enables the rioting and protests continue. Some injuries occur but overall the level of violence remains minimal.

Although the CCP cuts internet to the area, some cell phone videos of the demonstrations are smuggled out of the area and begin to go viral online. As a result of this, the CCP determines that it would be counterproductive to attempt to completely quell the uprising through the application of violent tactics because of the outside pressure this would invite. The CCP decides, at this point, that the best approach is to keep the protest areas isolated and to smother the event by allowing the newsworthiness of the events to dissipate as a function of time and distance (i.e., the general remoteness of Xinxiang).

#### **5. Describe the VEO's first move (including whether the VEO is the inciting actor).**

First Move (VEO): The VEO is the inciting actor, having previously chosen the date of uprising ahead of time and heavily publicizing their intentions to show "solidarity" with their Uyghur "brothers" against China's "oppression and torture."<sup>15</sup>

#### **6. Describe the CCP's second move.**

Second Move (CCP): External media attention on the matter embarrasses the CCP and forces them to reconsider how to approach the matter. Once China realizes that their normal heavy-handed tactics will not be entirely sufficient, they withdraw forces to the perimeters of the policed areas to consider their next move.

#### **7. Describe the VEO's second move.**

Second Move (VEO): When the VEO realizes they have gained a foothold against the CCP in supporting the Uyghurs, the VEO doubles down on their demands of Uyghur independence and the release of all people held in the re-education camps. Their backup position is that, at a minimum, China should end its decades of oppression.

China is privately unwilling to accede to their demands, but advises the VEO they will negotiate with them in order to buy time and save face. In reality, the CCP has no intention of letting go of any control, and is merely using the "negotiations" as a backdrop for their real

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<sup>15</sup> <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/04/al-qaeda-declares-solidarity-with-turkistan-islamic-party-in-the-face-of-chinese-oppression.php>

plans which include a double-speak of pretending to negotiate and care about the plight of the Uyghurs, while secretly planning to crack down more harshly on them once the media spotlight is pacified with their elegant talk of reforming their ways.

Publicly, the CCP declares that they will release those being held in the camps, but inside the camps they threaten the detainees to the point that nearly all of them are fearful of leaving. In the interest of propaganda, the CCP invites media in to view how happy the “participants” are and how they have freely decided on their own volition to stay<sup>16</sup>.

The VEO, surrounded and heavily outnumbered militarily, are forced to concede to accept CCP “negotiations” and their terms. Further, the VEO is fearful of Chinese retaliation in Pakistan.

**8. Describe the anticipated results of the incident and conflict in the following ways:**

- a. How has the Chinese general population’s perception of the US changed (if at all)?

Initially, support for the CCP drops slightly (~4%) because of the sympathy the Uyghurs gain after the initial conflict and the CCP appearing to back down gives others a slight bit of hope. However, because of strong internal support for the CCP (either forced or voluntary) and the way the CCP pretends to handle the situation, through diplomacy instead of overt violence, the general population’s support for the CCP remains strong and returns to the pre-incident levels within a few months.

- b. How has US influence over the key regional actors been affected?

Approval ratings for the US in China overall remain low, with many indicating that the US did the right thing by staying out of their domestic affairs. This does not however, buy the US any additional good will within China.

Approval ratings for the US in Xinjiang drops significantly, with many Uyghurs believing the US should have come to their aid in what they view to be a humanitarian crisis.

Approval for the CCP in Xinjiang, already low, drops even further (~12% change). This remains low after the CCP fails to produce any meaningful change and it is evident that their negotiations were a farce. However, as before, most remain unequipped, afraid, or ill-prepared to do anything about it, especially against such a massive and powerful actor as the CCP.

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<sup>16</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-china-48667221/inside-china-s-thought-transformation-camps>

## Appendix A: China Study Questions Architecture

SMA Primary Research Question: “How might the US strategize to defend global interests across the spectrum of cooperation to competition and conflict through the coming decade?”

Athena Study Question: What conditions in China best enable the US to pursue its global interests within the Competitive Zone over the next ten years?

Objective 1.0 – Identify potential futures in China that set conditions which encourage improved stability within the global Competitive Zone.

Issue 1.1 – How will stability in China evolve given the Chinese government seeks to maintain the status quo?

EEA 1.1.1 – How do economic conditions within China change over a decade if the Chinese government maintains the status quo?

MOE/P – How does the GDP change over time?

MOE/P – How does unemployment change over time?

EEA 1.1.2 – What is the economic status of the local Chinese civilian populations that are most responsive to maintaining the status quo?

EEA 1.1.3 - How are social conditions across China changing over a decade if the Chinese government maintains the status quo?

MOE/P – How do social conditions change when measured across the nation?

MOE/P – How do social conditions change for the working poor in Beijing?

MOE/P – How do social conditions change for the working poor in Chongqing?

MOE/P – How do social conditions change for the working poor in Shanghai?

MOE/P – How do social conditions change for the working poor in Xinjiang?

EEA 1.1.4 - How are political conditions across China changing over a decade if the Chinese government maintains the status quo?

MOE/P – How do political conditions change when measured across the nation?

MOE/P – How do political conditions change for the working poor in Beijing?

MOE/P – How do political conditions change for the working poor in Chongqing?

MOE/P – How do political conditions change for the working poor in Shanghai?

MOE/P – How do political conditions change for the working poor in Xinjiang?

EEA 1.1.5 - How is Chinese government influence over various Chinese populations affected if the Chinese government maintains the status quo?

Issue 1.2 – How will stability in China evolve given the Chinese government pursues a more collaborative ruling posture?

EEA 1.2.1 – How do economic conditions within China change over a decade if the Chinese government pursues a more collaborative ruling posture?

MOE/P – How does the GDP change over time?

MOE/P – How does unemployment change over time?

EEA 1.2.2 – What is the economic status of the local Chinese civilian populations that are most responsive to the Chinese government pursues a more collaborative ruling posture?

EEA 1.2.3 - How are social conditions across China changing over a decade if the Chinese government pursues a more collaborative ruling posture?

MOE/P – How do social conditions change when measured across the nation?

MOE/P – How do social conditions change for the working poor in Beijing?

MOE/P – How do social conditions change for the working poor in Chongqing?

MOE/P – How do social conditions change for the working poor in Shanghai?

MOE/P – How do social conditions change for the working poor in Xinjiang?

EEA 1.2.4 - How are political conditions across China changing over a decade if the Chinese government pursues a more collaborative ruling posture?

MOE/P – How do political conditions change when measured across the nation?

MOE/P – How do political conditions change for the working poor in Beijing?

MOE/P – How do political conditions change for the working poor in Chongqing?

MOE/P – How do political conditions change for the working poor in Shanghai?

MOE/P – How do political conditions change for the working poor in Xinjiang?



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EEA 1.2.5 - How is Chinese government influence over various Chinese populations affected if the Chinese government pursues a more collaborative ruling posture?

Issue 1.3 – How will conditions in China evolve given the Chinese government pursues a more aggressive ruling posture?

EEA 1.3.1 – How do economic conditions within China change over a decade if the Chinese government pursues a more aggressive ruling posture?

MOE/P – How does the GDP change over time?

MOE/P – How does unemployment change over time?

EEA 1.3.2 – What is the economic status of the local Chinese civilian populations that are most responsive to the Chinese government pursues a more aggressive ruling posture?

EEA 1.3.3 - How are social conditions across China changing over a decade if the Chinese government pursues a more aggressive ruling posture?

MOE/P – How do social conditions change when measured across the nation?

MOE/P – How do social conditions change for the working poor in Beijing?

MOE/P – How do social conditions change for the working poor in Chongqing?

MOE/P – How do social conditions change for the working poor in Shanghai?

MOE/P – How do social conditions change for the working poor in Xinjiang?

EEA 1.3.4 - How are political conditions across China changing over a decade if the Chinese government pursues a more aggressive ruling posture?

MOE/P – How do political conditions change when measured across the nation?

MOE/P – How do political conditions change for the working poor in Beijing?

MOE/P – How do political conditions change for the working poor in Chongqing?

MOE/P – How do political conditions change for the working poor in Shanghai?

MOE/P – How do political conditions change for the working poor in Xinjiang?

EEA 1.2.5 - How is Chinese government influence over various Chinese populations affected if the Chinese government pursues a more aggressive ruling posture?

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Objective 2.0 – Explore approaches for enabling the US to improve its ability to deter, compel and/or manage Chinese actions within the Competitive Zone.

Issue 2.1 – How will US influence in the Competitive Zone be affected if China maintains the status quo?

EEA 2.1.1 – How is US influence with Chinese populations affected if the Chinese government maintains the status quo?

EEA 2.1.2 – How is US influence over key regional actors affected if the Chinese government maintains the status quo?

Issue 2.2 – How will a more collaborative posture by China affect US influence in the Competitive Zone?

EEA 2.2.1 – How is US influence with Chinese populations affected if the Chinese government pursues a more collaborative ruling posture?

EEA 2.2.2 – How is US influence over key regional actors affected if the Chinese government pursues a more collaborative ruling posture?

Issue 2.3 – How will a more aggressive posture by China affect US influence in the Competitive Zone?

EEA 2.3.1 – How is US influence with Chinese populations affected if the Chinese government pursues a more aggressive ruling posture?

EEA 2.3.2 – How is US influence over key regional actors affected if the Chinese government pursues a more aggressive ruling posture?

## Appendix B: Athena Simulation Description

The Athena Simulation. Athena is a government owned sociocultural modeling capability which supports a decision maker by providing both a framework to better understand complex PMESII based problems and a simulation for assessing the long-term consequences of engagement choices across the totality of the operational environment.

Athena Simulation Description. Athena is a scalable, single user, laptop-based, course of action development and analysis capability used to anticipate force activity consequences upon noncombatant groups. Athena enables the analysis of second and third order effects upon noncombatant groups and those group's possible responses in order to discern potential outcomes from political, military, economic and social interventions. Athena allows leaders and analysts to understand the intended and unintended consequences of their proposed actions through a simulation process that incorporates social science 'universals' into course of action analysis and campaign planning. It enables the examination of interdependent political, economic, security/military, and information dynamics; anticipation of emergent actors, factions, and powerbases; and compares and contrasts multiple courses of action.

Principles Underpinning Athena. Fundamental universals that are recognized in social science form the foundation of the Athena design. These include: 1) cultural narrative, i.e., a person or group's belief in their origin, purpose and destiny, of which there are hybrids or blends, and from which social institutions, organizations and governments evolve; 2) relationships, the concept that human behavior is shaped in part by the relationships we form, e. G., kinship, trade-craft, bureaucratic, patronage and so on; and 3) utility theory, the concept that all people conduct internal cost/benefit analyses to assess the potential impact of proposed actions and decisions. These social science universals are then used by Athena to define the satisfaction or mood of the various population groups within the system.

The Athena simulation is designed to be culturally agnostic, i.e., to generate results which will allow the system to be applicable anywhere in the world. To accomplish this, the social science universals are mapped into Athena group satisfaction vis-à-vis four common concerns. The four concerns are: 1) autonomy with respect to governance, i.e., the group's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with extant governance and/or a group's ability to influence governance; 2) quality of life, i.e., whether the actor or group is satisfied or dissatisfied with their life conditions which include things like employment, healthcare, infrastructure, education, availability of food and water, etc.; 3) culture, i.e., whether one's sacred sites, artifacts, traditions and taboos are respected or denigrated; and 4) safety, i.e., whether the individual or group feels secure in their environment and to what extent. Each of the four concerns is assigned a relevant saliency differentiating between one group and another, what is the most important concern and weighting that appropriately. The four concerns together translate into a group mood weighted by the group's saliency for each concern. The concerns are a representation of how much a group desires change based on impact on those concerns.

Internal Computational Complexity. The true strength of Athena is found in its internal composition and computational linkages. Athena is composed of eight, embedded and interrelated, modeling areas: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Terrain, and Time. During one week time step, each modeling area computes change dynamics

and then shares those results with several other modeling areas initiating additional computational processes. Once the computational dynamics reach their nominal stopping point, change trends for that time step are logged along with a set of all the rules that fired to generate the result occurring at that moment in time and the trend lines that it generated.

Athena uses force activity effects and the effects of other DIME-FIL interventions to assess change over time over non-combatant populations in terms of relationships; volatility and stability; support, influence, and control; and mood and attitude. The Athena simulation enables leader assessments of political, economic, and social stability at the sub-national, nation-state, or regional level by considering PMESII-PT trends over multi-year periods.

Synopsis of Key Athena Concepts and Terms. Definitions for several key Athena concepts and terms are provided below.

- **Neighborhood.** Neighborhoods define geographic regions within the Athena playbox.
- **Actors.** Actors can be individuals, organizations, political parties, Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), or separate nations who are seeking to influence conditions within a neighborhood. Actors have resources that they can apply to an area causing them to gain or lose influence, and thereby shifting control within the neighborhood.
- **Force Groups.** The presence of military or security forces greatly influences the behavior, feelings of safety and security, and the mood of civilian groups. Force groups can span the full spectrum from official militaries and police, to paramilitary forces, to highly informal militias and terrorist cells. The presence of a force group allows an actor to increase the level of control they may have over a neighborhood.
- **Civilian Groups.** Another key element of the design of Athena is the use of civilian groups for defining the local populations. Civilian groups have belief systems and shift their support for various actors based on that belief system and the application of resources by an actor.
- **Mood.** Mood is the average of the four Athena common concerns (i.e., autonomy, culture, safety, and quality of life described above). Each satisfaction level is weighted by a group's saliency for each human factor. Mood is a convenient summary statistic that reflects the changing attitudes of various groups and is an input to a number of other internal Athena modeling areas.
- **Volatility.** Volatility is a measure that describes the level of stability within a neighborhood. The volatility determines how likely it is that a random person in the neighborhood will get caught up in violence unrelated to their presence; as such, it is a major component of a group's security in the neighborhood.
- **Security.** Security is a factor that has several similarities to volatility. It is a major driver for influencing changes to population moods and neighborhood stability. While volatility speaks about the possibility of spontaneous violence impacting an individual, security addresses both where (neighborhood) and who (civilian group) is affected by violence and instability.

- **Support.** Support is a measure of the strength of a population's relationship with an actor. Actors gain or lose influence and thus control of neighborhoods based on the level of support they have from groups. Actors can increase the level of support they receive by expending resources in a neighborhood on a group. The ability of an actor to maintain security by deploying security forces in a neighborhood can significantly increase the support from a group.
- **Influence.** Influence is a measure of an actor's ability to shape the behavior of populations in a neighborhood. It is based on the amount of support the actor has from the residents of the neighborhood relative to other actors.
- **Control.** Control simply defines who 'owns' or is responsible for each neighborhood. When actors are in control of a neighborhood, the residents of the neighborhood hold them accountable for dealing with the neighborhood's problems. The actor in control is blamed when things go poorly and given credit when things go well.
- **Support – Influence – Control.** Actors with sufficient support from the residents of a neighborhood have influence in that neighborhood. Given sufficient influence, they may be able to take control of a neighborhood. If another actor has more influence than the previously controlling actor, and the new controlling actor loses influence, then no one is in control of that neighborhood.

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## Appendix C: China Modeling Guide

### Use Case Modeling

The China Futures project required the Athena study team to design three use cases through which to explore China's economic futures. These are described below with notes on how each was simulated. In addition there were two foreign policy scenarios, called "excursions," that were attached to each use case. These described a crises in Hong Kong and Xinjiang.

#### **Status Quo Continuation**

Use Case #1 assesses the social, political, and economic conditions in China given no substantial change in the current economic situation or governing paradigm. The Chinese Communist Party governs using a status quo surveillance state. The CCP continues to carefully compete with its international rivals primarily through economic engagements, strategic deterrence, and cyberwarfare.

Political corruption and economic inefficiency is simulated by dispensing more essential non-infrastructure (ENI) services to elites (Power Elite, Well Off, Hui Muslims in Xinjiang) than poorer classes (Downtrodden, Working Poor, Dissidents, Tibetans, Uyghurs, Hui Muslims outside of Xinjiang, Southern Ethnic Others, Northern Ethnic Others). Nationwide economic interventions (subsidies, currency intervention/manipulation, etc.) are less efficient, focused on the Goods economic sector only (ex. building empty cities). The surveillance state is simulated in this case through the standard deployment of security forces performing the "Checkpoint" activity in Athena. In Xinjiang the security state is particularly harsh. In Athena, "Stance" is a tactic, measured on a scale of -1.0 to +1.0, which changes the orientation of the security forces towards a particular civilian population. The more negative the number, the more negative the orientation and vice versa. In Xinjiang (*simulated actions in italics*):

*120,000 People's Armed Police and 36,500 People's Police were deployed to Xinjiang. Their Stance was set to -0.5 towards Uyghur civilian group and Uyghurs in Reeducation Camps.*

#### **State Capitalist Acceleration**

Use Case #2 assesses conditions in China given an improving situation. To avert a looming economic and political crisis, the CCP strengthens enforcement of the rule of law through a largely apolitical and genuinely empowered anti-corruption unit. This move is enhanced by a pervasive implementation of the digital surveillance state strengthened by artificial intelligence (Ex. "Zero Trust" system). Additionally, the CCP places a greater emphasis on the free market aspects of its state capitalist system and reduces the influence of state-owned enterprises. These moves bring about a decrease in structural corruption. The CCP continues to carefully compete with its international rivals primarily through economic engagements, strategic deterrence, and cyberwarfare.

Political corruption and economic inefficiency is simulated dispensing more ENI services to elites (Power Elite, Well Off, Hui Muslims in Xinjiang) than to the poorer classes (Downtrodden, Working Poor, Dissidents, Tibetans, Uyghurs, Hui Muslims outside of Xinjiang, Southern Ethnic Others, Northern Ethnic Others).

Governmental reforms to state capitalism are simulated nationwide by more efficient and appropriate economic interventions, focused on multiple economic sectors—Goods and Population. The surveillance state is simulated in this case through the standard deployment of security forces performing the “Checkpoint” activity in Athena. In Xinjiang the security state is generous to the Uyghur population outside of Reeducation Camps, but still harsh towards the detained. In Xinjiang:

*120,000 People’s Armed Police and 36,500 People’s Police to deploy to Xinjiang. Their Stance was +0.5 towards Uyghur civilian group and -.5 towards Uyghurs in Reeducation Camps.*

### **The Lost Decade**

Use Case #3 assesses conditions in China given a deteriorating economic situation. Massive inefficiencies and mismanagement in the state-run economy lead to the end of economic growth and stagnation in the Chinese economy. The CCP decides to avoid serious, structural, anti-corruption reforms and instead only strengthens its implementation of the digital surveillance state. Simultaneously, the Party expands the power of state-owned enterprises in order to manage the stagnation. Corruption thrives. To distract domestic audiences and to increase the wealth of the state, China pursues more aggressive strategies with its foreign rivals in economic engagements, strategic deterrence, and cyberwarfare.

Political corruption and economic inefficiency are simulated by dispensing more ENI services to elites (Power Elite, Well Off, Hui Muslims in Xinjiang) than to the poorer classes (Downtrodden, Working Poor, Dissidents, Tibetans, Uyghurs, Hui Muslims outside of Xinjiang, Southern Ethnic Others, Northern Ethnic Others).

Excessive corruption has caused economic growth to stall. There is no money or popular will for nationwide economic interventions. The increased surveillance state is simulated through a negative Stance towards “terrorists” (dissident groups) and a more positive Stance towards the Downtrodden and Working Poor. The CCP is pandering to the lower classes to ameliorate their lowered quality of life. In Xinjiang the security state is the harshest across all use cases to the Uyghur population. Simulated effects:

*Pervasive Digital Surveillance State: Stance of -0.70 towards Dissidents and +0.50 towards Downtrodden and Working Poor civ groups.*

*120,000 People’s Armed Police and 36,500 People’s Police to deploy to Xinjiang. Their Stance was to -0.7 towards Uyghur civ group and Uyghurs in Reeducation Camps.*

### **Economic Modeling Methodology**

SME elicitations revealed that while China’s GDP growth rate was stated at approximately 6%, the CCP engaged in deceptive and economically manipulative practices that obscure the true GDP growth rate. The Athena Simulation produced the most stable and realistic average annual GDP growth at 1.47% in Status Quo Continuation. Thus, the amount of the economic interventions was doubled in State Acceleration and average annual GDP growth rate increased to 2.29%. Average annual GDP growth rate in The Lost Decade case was far less at 0.12%. All three rates can be increased based on additional SME elicitation.

There are seven overlapping phases of infrastructure investment across all three use cases launched over the first 154 Weeks (roughly three years) of the simulation run. Additionally, there are other simultaneous and overlapping economic stimulus actions started from Weeks 56 to 74. In the State Capitalist Acceleration case, the economic interventions take place sooner and are more diversified, including both the Goods and Population sectors. In Lost Decade, the stimulus actions don't take place at all. These key sectors of the simulated economy are defined:

“The Goods sector includes all production of goods and services in the local economy. The unit of production is the “goods basket”, a notional bundle of goods and services nominally costing \$1.”

“The Population sector includes all labor by the workers in the local region, and all consumption by the population of the local region. The unit of production is the work-year of an average worker. Just as the goods basket represents a notional bundle of goods and services, the average worker represents a notional bundle of skills and kinds of work.”

In Athena, each neighborhood has a production capacity. It may be that production capacity isn't distributed in proportion to population: an urban neighborhood might have proportionally more of it than a more distant or rural neighborhood, with workers coming from nearby suburbs to fill the jobs. The Production Capacity Factor (PCF) is a multiplier, initially set at 1.0, which determines how many shares of production capacity the neighborhood receives per capita. To give a neighborhood twice as much production capacity per capita as other neighborhoods, set its PCF to 2.0.

Thus, PCF was normalized across all Chinese neighborhoods based on GDP per capita:

Neighborhood	Chinese Province(s)	PCF	GDP per capita (\$USD) GDP 2017 is quarterly data (see China National Data), the official: <a href="http://data.stats.gov.cn/english">http://data. Stats. Gov. Cn/english</a> China NBS Data - Regional - quarterly by provinces - National Accounts)
Xinjiang (NCNXJ)	Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region	0.5	12,862
Tibet (NCNXZ)	Tibet Autonomous Region	0.5	11,196
West (NCNWT)	Qinghai and Gansu	0.4	Avg: 10,506
North (NCNNO)	Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning	0.7	Avg: 16,332
Han Central (NCNCL)	Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, Henan, Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Hubei	0.5	Avg: 13,119
Han Northeast (NCNNE)	Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu	0.9	Avg: 22,344
Han Southeast (NCNSE)	Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Macao Special Administrative Region, Hainan	1.6	Avg: 39,167



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Beijing City (NCNNEBEJCIT)	Beijing Municipality	1.5	37,770
Tianjin City (NCNNETIJ CIT)	Tianjin Municipality	1.4	35,007
Shanghai City (NCNSES HACIT)	Shanghai Municipality	1.5	36,528
Hong Kong City (NCNSEHONCIT)	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region	2.5	61,520
Chongqing City (NCNCLCQCIT)	Chongqing Municipality	0.7	18,154
Guangzhou City (NCNSEGDCIT)	Guangzhou City	0.5	12,010

**Infrastructure Status and Investment**

The starting condition for Chinese infrastructure was modeled as approximately 60% of full capacity in hinterland neighborhoods like North, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and 90% or more in the southeastern and central core regions. A key source was the World Economic Forum's [\*The Global Competitiveness Report 2018\*](#). In this report China's various forms of infrastructure from roads to rail to airport connectivity was often given a quality rating of approximately "4.6" on a scale of 1 to 7. This translates into roughly 65% percentile in the rankings. Thus, 60% was taken to be the floor of simulated infrastructure condition and was assumed to be mostly in rural neighborhoods.

Chinese Neighborhood	Starting Condition of Infrastructure (percent of full functionality)	Infrastructure Investment Percentage (Phase #1)
Han Central (NCNCL)	90%	12.7%
Chongqing City (NCNCLCQCIT)	90%	12.7%
Han Northeast (NCNNE)	60%	2.3%
Beijing City (NCNNEBEJCIT)	95%	12.7%
Tianjin City (NCNNETIJ CIT)	95%	12.7%
North (NCNNO)	60%	2.3%
Han Southeast (NCNSE)	95%	12.7%
Guangzhou City (NCNSEGDCIT)	95%	12.7%
Hong Kong City (NCNSEHONCIT)	95%	0% (Maintenance only)
Shanghai City (NCNSES HACIT)	95%	12.6%
West (NCNWT)	60%	2.2%
Xinjiang (NCNXJ)	60%	2.2%
Tibet (NCNXZ)	60%	2.2%

Economic Stimulus Sector	Status Quo Continuation (Start Week 56)	State Capitalist Acceleration (Start Week 47)	Lost Decade (Start Week N/A)
Goods	\$800 million/week	\$880 million/week	\$0/week
Population	\$0/week	\$2.64 billion/week	\$0/week

## Miscellaneous

(\*) The GINI Coefficient used for China of 42.2 was based on [World Bank \(2012\)](#).

(\*) The starting Chinese GDP selected was \$14.536 trillion.

International Monetary Fund reports estimate of China's GDP in 2019 at:  
\$14,172.199 trillion (USD, Current Prices)  
(World Economic Outlook Database, October 2018)

China's GDP (end 2018) according to Dr. Derek Scissors is \$15,421,293,000,000.

(\*) Remittances into China in 2018 were \$67 billion according to [Bloomberg/World Bank](#).

(\*) Chinese Remittances increased by approximately 5.27% from 2017 to 2018 based on [World Bank data](#). A 5.3% increase from year to year was assumed.

## Labor Strike and Protest Model

Labor strikes and protests (mass group incidents), tens of thousands of which take place every year in China, were included in the simulation. It was decided to only model strikes or protests with participants numbering between 1,000 and 10,000 people. Mass group incidents by province, drawn from the [China Labour Bulletin](#) between 2011 and 2016, were processed to produce a per-year average. Precise number of participants between 1,000 and 10,000 could not be located. Thus, the number of 5,000 protestors was assumed for the baseline (Status Quo Continuation) use case. It was assumed that in the State Capitalist Acceleration use case, improving economic conditions would halve this number and in the Lost Decade case, the number of protestors would increase by 50% (to 7,500). Where there was no data on mass incidents, none were simulated.

Guangdong: 112 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Jiangsu: 25 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Shandong: 16 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Heilongjiang: 13 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Henan: 12 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Zhejiang: 21 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Fujian: 9 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Liaoning: 8 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Sichuan: 8 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Guangxi: 7 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Anhui: 7 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Hunan: 6 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Hubei: 6 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Gansu: 6 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Hebei: 5 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Jilin: 4 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Shanxi: 4 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
Nei Mongol: 3 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)

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Yunnan: 3 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
 Guizhou: 3 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)  
 Qinghai: 2 strikes of 1,000 to 10,000 people (2011-2016)

Modeled In Athena:

<b>Neighborhood</b>	<b>Chinese Province(s)</b>	<b>Average Labor Strikes Per Year (5,000 people each) [Status Quo Continuation]</b>	<b>Average Labor Strikes Per Year (7,500 people each) [Lost Decade]</b>	<b>Average Labor Strikes Per Year (2,500 people each) [State Capitalist Acceleration]</b>
Xinjiang (NCNXJ)	Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region	N/A	N/A	N/A
Tibet (NCNXZ)	Tibet Autonomous Region	N/A	N/A	N/A
West (NCNWT)	Qinghai and Gansu	Two incidents equaling 10,000 people	Three incidents equaling 22,500 people	One incident equaling 2,500 people
North (NCNNO)	Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning	Six incidents equaling 30,000 people	Eight incidents equaling 60,000 people	Three incidents equaling 7,500 people
Han Central (NCNCL)	Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, Henan, Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Hubei	Eleven incidents equaling 55,000 people	Seventeen incidents equaling 127,500 people	Six incidents equaling 15,000 people
Han Northeast (NCNNE)	Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu	Nine incidents equaling 45,000 people	Fourteen incidents equaling 105,000 people	Five incidents equaling 12,500 people
Han Southeast (NCNSE)	Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Macao Special Administrative Region, Hainan	Twenty-eight incidents equaling 140,000 people	Forty-three incidents equaling 215,000 people	Fourteen incidents equaling 35,000 people

A baseline level of labor strikers is simulated through five civilian groups. Given unemployment over the course of a year, the number of strikers in these civilian groups increases upward to approximately twice the annual mass incident total for that neighborhood. These additional people were drawn from Working Poor civilian groups in the same neighborhood.

**Status Quo Continuation Case**

If Chinese Unemployment (Constrained by Labor and Goods Capacities) is greater than 9.7%

Then:

Flow up to 9237 people from Working Poor Mandarin Han of West → Strike Group of West (10,000)

Then:

Flow up to 33,102 people from Working Poor Mandarin Han of North → Strike Group of North (30,000)

Then:

Flow up to 51,260 people from Working Poor Mandarin Han of Han Central → Strike Group Han Central (55,000)

Then:

Flow up to 48,043 people from Working Poor Mandarin Han of Northeast → Strike Group Northeast (45,000)

Then:

Flow up to 138,298 people from Working Poor Hakka Han of Southeast → Strike Group Southeast (140,000)

**State Capitalist Acceleration Case**

If Chinese Unemployment (Constrained by Labor and Goods Capacities) is greater than 9.7%

Then:

Flow up to 9237 people from Working Poor Mandarin Han of West → Strike Group of West (2,500)

Then:

Flow up to 33,102 people from Working Poor Mandarin Han of North → Strike Group of North (7,500)

Then:

Flow up to 51,260 people from Working Poor Mandarin Han of Han Central → Strike Group of Han Central (15,000)

Then:

Flow up to 48,043 people from Working Poor Mandarin Han of Northeast → Strike Group Northeast (12,500)

Then:

Flow up to 138,298 people from Working Poor Hakka Han of Southeast → Strike Group Southeast (35,000)

### **The Lost Decade Case**

If Chinese Unemployment (Constrained by Labor and Goods Capacities) is greater than 9.7%

Then:

Flow up to 9237 people from Working Poor Mandarin Han of West → Strike Group of West (22,500)

Then:

Flow up to 33,102 people from Working Poor Mandarin Han of North → Strike Group of North (60,000)

Then:

Flow up to 51,260 people from Working Poor Mandarin Han of Han Central → Strike Group of Han Central (127,500)

Then:

Flow up to 48,043 people from Working Poor Mandarin Han of Northeast → Strike Group of Northeast (105,000)

Then:

Flow up to 138,298 people from Working Poor Hakka Han of Southeast → Strike Group Southeast (215,000)

### **Excursions**

#### **Xinjiang Uprising**

In this scenario, a VEO moves into Xinjiang from a neighboring country with the goal of inciting a popular uprising against CCP governance.

#### **The Beginning**

A violent extremist organization based in the Northern Areas of Pakistan and with ties to both Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISIS sends materiel and personnel across the border to China to foment upheaval in Xinjiang in support of their Muslim “brothers.” There are 3 possible scenarios:

1. On the low end of the scale, due to poor tactics, techniques, and procedures, the VEO manages to only smuggle 100 personnel and minimal materiel into Xinjiang.
2. On the medium range, the VEO smuggles approximately 250 personnel and slightly more materiel into Xinxiang.
3. On the high side of the scale, the VEO smuggles approximately 700 personnel, along with equivalent numbers of arms and a minimal amount of additional weaponry.

*Start Date: Week 100 (6/1/2020)*

*Islamic VEO Force Group: VEO w/ 700 members similar to ISIS in Marawi*

*Force Type: Irregular Military*  
*Training: Fully Trained*  
*Base Personnel: 700*  
*Demeanor: Aggressive*

*Islamic VEO Strategy*  
*Deploy in Week 100*  
*Activity: Patrol*  
*Attack People's Armed Police (10/week) and the People's Police/ Public Security Forces (5/week) and the PLA (5/week).*  
*Stance: 1.0 towards Uyghurs in Re-education Camps, the general Uyghur population, and the Hui Muslim population in Xinjiang*

*Receives 1,000 in reinforcements from local Uyghurs from Week 101 to 111.*  
*20 civilians killed per week as long as VEO personnel deployed is over 50. VEO and CCP blamed.*

The VEO is the other actor involved. No other regional players, nor the US, are involved in what they consider to be a domestic issue. Their policy is to respect China's sovereignty, so there is not much they can or are willing to do during this incident.

#### Attempting to Raise Xinjiang

Across all three scenarios, the VEO personnel attempt to foment unrest and social upheaval against the CCP on a pre-planned day of action. Because of previous stringent oppression, a significant number of males of fighting age are already housed in CCP's "re-education camps" and are not currently living or physically present in the area. The families of the Uyghurs placed in the camps are well aware of the harsh oppression of the Uyghurs by the CCP, as in the case of the July 2009 Urumqi riots, which involved at least 1,000 Uyghurs over a few days. Heavy handed tactics by the CCP, which deployed the People's Armed Police, resulted in 197 deaths, 1,721 injuries, 400 criminal charges, and 26 death sentences. Consequently, many Uyghurs are afraid to rise up against the CCP, even with external support.

#### The CCP Counters

As with the 2009 riots, CCP responds in a heavy-handed fashion. In scenarios 1 & 2, CCP tactics are able to quickly put the unrest down as has been the case during previous riots. Considering the numbers of participants involved and the fact that these numbers amount to far less than the 2009 riots, CCP responds in typical fashion with little outside interest.

*CCP Strategy*  
*Deploy PLA (20,000) from Week 102 to Week 106*  
*Activity: Patrol*  
*Attack Islamic VEO 10 times/week*

Although the CCP cuts internet to the area, some cell phone videos of the demonstrations are smuggled out of the area in the chaos and begin to go viral online. As a result of this, Therefore, the CCP determines that it would be counterproductive to attempt to they will not be able to completely quell the uprising through the application of sheer violent tactics because of the outside

pressure this would invite. The CCP decides, at this point, that the best approach is to keep the protest areas isolated and to smother the event by allowing the newsworthiness of the events to dissipate as a function of time and distance (i.e., the general remoteness of Xinxiang).

The VEO heavily publicizes their intentions to show “solidarity” with their Uyghur “brothers” ahead of time against China’s “oppression and torture.”

*Infrastructure Damage to Xinjiang during fighting: from 0.60 to 0.30, or 50% of normal.  
[As long as more than 50 VEO fighters are deployed]*

External media attention on the matter embarrasses the CCP and forces them to reconsider how to approach the matter. Once China realizes that their normal heavy-handed tactics will not be entirely sufficient, they withdraw forces to the perimeters of the policed areas to consider their next move.

*CCP Strategy  
Deploy PLA (0) at Week 107*

When the VEO realizes they have gained a foothold against the CCP in supporting the Uyghurs, the VEO doubles down on their demands of Uyghur independence and the release of all people held in the re-education camps. Their backup position is that, at a minimum, China should end its decades of oppression.

China is privately unwilling to accede to their demands, but advises the VEO they will negotiate with them in order to buy time and save face. In reality, the CCP has no intention of letting go of any control, and is merely using the “negotiations” as a backdrop for their real plans which include a double-speak of pretending to negotiate and care about the plight of the Uyghurs, while secretly planning to crack down more harshly on them once the media spotlight is pacified with their elegant talk of reforming their ways.

Publicly, the CCP declares that they will release those being held in the camps, but inside the camps threatens the detainees to the point that nearly all of them are fearful of leaving. In the interest of propaganda, the CCP invites media in to view how happy the “participants” are and how they have freely decided on their own volition to stay.

The VEO, surrounded and heavily outnumbered militarily, are forced to concede to accept CCP “negotiations” and their terms. Further, the VEO is fearful of Chinese retaliation in Pakistan.

*The VEO is attrited to less than 50 members (36) at Week 142.  
The Infrastructure Repair Level of Xinjiang is 0.33 at Week 142 and continues to climb thereafter.*

### **Excursion: Hong Kong Crisis**

In this scenario, protests in Hong Kong against Carrie Lam and the extradition law escalate when protestors are killed and the US Government imposes sanctions. The US-CCP trade war escalates.

### The Beginning

Carrie Lam, the current Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region (SAR), resigns in December of 2019, citing ill health (though everyone assumes it is due to the huge demonstrations against “A highly controversial legislative measure in Hong Kong that would allow criminal suspects to be extradited to mainland China,” which she had been trying to pass. A new harder-line, pro-mainland Hong Kong Chief Executive (HKCE) is appointed. In March 2020 four young leaders from the previous summer’s demonstrations disappear. Three days later phone-video footage is released online that shows all four individuals at the West Kowloon Express Rail Link train station being bundled into a train headed for the mainland, , by what everyone assumes are plain-clothes PRC security. Hong Kong activists call for demonstrations, and thousands pour into the streets.

The new HKCE calls for calm, but also says, in the Basic Law, that "the Hong Kong SAR government is duty-bound by Article 23 to prohibit certain political activities endangering China's state security [including] - offences of treason, sedition, subversion.” Activists call for more and larger demonstrations, and call for the HKCE’s resignation.

### Unrest Rises

Demonstrations ebb somewhat until July 1, 2020, when the anniversary of 2019’s million-person protest comes around, and once again a million protesters take to the street. Previously the mainland had announced a port call in Hong Kong on July 8 by the PLA Navy’s first indigenously produced aircraft carrier, Type 011A. The port call had been intended as a good will visit, and the ship would have been opened for tours; however, with the unrest continuing the Hong Kong PLA garrison takes the unprecedented step of sending troops to protect the dock where the Type 011A is berthed. Protests in that area increase and a civilian protester is killed by an inexperienced PLA soldier.

*Simulation Start Time 6/1/2019 (Week 0).*

*Hong Kong Protest Group [CCNSEHONCITPRO]*

*Base Population: 2,000,000*

*Demeanor: Aggressive*

*Population Growth Rate: 0%*

*Labor Force Participation Rate: 0%*

*From Dissidents of Hong Kong (75%), Downtrodden Hakka (25%)*



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*Beliefs:*

<b>Belief Topic</b>	<b>Position<sup>17</sup></b>	<b>Emphasis<sup>18</sup></b>
T01 [Wealth and Power]	Passionately Against	Disagreement Extreme
T02 [China's Rightful Place in the World]	Passionately Against	Disagreement Extreme
T03 [Only the Communist Party Can Save China]	Passionately Against	Disagreement Extreme
T04 [To Get Rich is Glorious]	Passionately Against	Disagreement Extreme
T05 [Quest for Social Justice]	Passionately For	Disagreement Extreme
T06 [Restoration of the Great Tradition]	Passionately Against	Disagreement Extreme
T07 [Quest For Democracy]	Passionately For	Disagreement Extreme
T08 [Tibetans Demand True Autonomy]	Passionately For	Disagreement Extreme
T09 [The Oppressed Uyghurs]	Passionately For	Disagreement Extreme
T010 [Mandarin Han Identity]	Passionately Against	Disagreement Extreme
T011 [Southeastern Han Identity]	Passionately For	Disagreement Extreme
T012 [General Islamic Identity]	Ambivalent	Neither
T013 [Political Quietism]	Passionately Against	Disagreement Extreme
T014 [China's Corrupting Influence (Philippines)]	Passionately For	Disagreement Extreme

Demonstrations continue until the fall, until the mainland announces the arrest and execution of a security official in Guangzhou, whom, they claim was conducting rogue operations. The U. S. and China negotiate until February 2021, when the provisions of the HKHRDA against the Chinese generals are lifted, and the tariffs and counter-tariffs are dropped – so about a year for the entire cycle, or two years if you count from this year's protests.

*Simulation Time: 7/7/2020 (Week 57)*

*Demonstrators fall from 1.7 million (by 100%) from 7/7/2020 (Week 57) to 3/1/2021 (Week 92).*

The CCP's 1<sup>st</sup> Move

Demonstrations ebb somewhat until July 1, 2020, when the anniversary of 2019's million-person protest comes around, and once again a million protesters take to the street. Previously the mainland had announced a port call in Hong Kong on July 8 by the PLA Navy's first indigenously produced aircraft carrier, Type 011A. The port call had been intended for good will, and the ship would have been opened for tours. With unrest continuing the Hong Kong PLA garrison takes the unprecedented step of sending troops to protect the dock where the Type 011A is located. Protest in that area increase, and a civilian protester is killed by an inexperienced PLA soldier.

*Simulated Protests*

*Phase #1*

<sup>17</sup> In a civilian group or actor's belief system, the entity's belief about a topic is represented as a 'position' and an emphasis on agreement or disagreement with that position. The position is a number from 1.0 to -1.0 that represents not only whether the entity is for or against the topic, but also the strength of that position. That number is normally derived using a Likert scale that runs from 'Passionately For' to 'Passionately Against', a particular belief.

<sup>18</sup> In a civilian group or actor's belief system, the 'emphasis' expresses a relational agreement or disagreement with that civilian group or actors 'position' by another civilian group or actor (i.e., if you disagree with me on this issue, how much will I still like or dislike you).

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*Inject declining protest group of 2,000,000 (decline by 100%) from 7/1/2019 (Week 4) to 3/7/2020 (Week 41)*

### *Phase #2*

*Protestors spike to 2,000,000 again at 3/7/2020 (Week 42) (declined by 42%) past 6/21/2020 (Week 55) to 7/1/2020 (Week 56)*

### *Phase #3*

*Protestors spike to 1,770,245 at 7/7/2020 (Week 57).*

### The US Government's 1<sup>st</sup> Move

After the video link of the abducted activists comes online, the U. S. freezes the assets of Generals Invoking the 2019 [Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act](#) (HKHRDA), the U. S. freezes the assets of, and bars U. S. entry to the two vice chairman of the PRC's Central Military Commission. Congress calls on the White House to make clear U. S. support for Hong Kong democracy.

Japan makes a statement supporting democracy in Hong Kong and supports U. S. action.

Taiwan calls for calm.

North Korea makes a statement calling for the U. S. to cease its banditry.

South Korea makes a statement supporting democracy and calls for all parties involved to solve differences through dialogue.

*Simulation Time: 3/7/2020 (Week 41).*

*US broadcasts Pro-US message.*

### The CCP's 2<sup>nd</sup> Move and the Trade War

The PRC embargoes rare earth minerals from export to the U. S., decries the video as fake news created by insidious foreign forces. Removes the soldier involved in the death of the civilian and relieves the commander of the PLA garrison, but blames foreign "interveners" for stirring up the incident.

*Simulation Time: 3/14/2020 (Week 42) – 3/21/2020 (Week 43)*

*CCP broadcasts anti-US message (3/14/2020) (Week 42)*

*Exports to US drop (rare earths) (3/21/2020) (Week 43)*

*\$160 million drop in exports to US*

*CCP: Increase Goods sector expenditures on World by \$160 million*

*[Are Rare Earths the Next Pawn in the US-China Trade War?](#)*

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*Trade War Starts (Week 45 to Week 92)*

*The US-CCP trade war was simulated as a series of declines in imports and exports (US or CCP expenditures on the World sector of the Economic model) from both the US and Chinese perspectives in a series of declines and recoveries as each economy adapts to the new state of affairs before the next round of tariffs starts.*

<b>Date (Week)</b>	<b>US Imports from China</b>	<b>Economic Tactic</b>
45 (4/7/2020)	\$31,175,700,000	US: Expenditures on World \$31,175,700,000
46	\$29,605,908,333	US: Expenditures on World \$29,605,908,333
47	\$28,036,116,666	US: Expenditures on World \$28,036,116,666
48	\$26,466,324,999	US: Expenditures on World \$26,466,324,999
49	\$24,896,533,333	US: Expenditures on World \$24,896,533,333
50	\$24,036,819,444	US: Expenditures on World \$24,036,819,444
51	\$23,177,105,555	US: Expenditures on World \$23,177,105,555
52	\$22,317,391,666	US: Expenditures on World \$22,317,391,666
53	\$21,457,677,778	US: Expenditures on World \$21,457,677,778
54	\$20,124,578,704	US: Expenditures on World \$20,124,578,704
55	\$18,791,479,630	US: Expenditures on World \$18,791,479,630
56	\$17,458,380,556	US: Expenditures on World \$17,458,380,556
57	\$16,125,281,481	US: Expenditures on World \$16,125,281,481
58	\$15,107,772,530	US: Expenditures on World \$15,107,772,530
59	\$14,090,263,579	US: Expenditures on World \$14,090,263,579
60	\$13,072,754,628	US: Expenditures on World \$13,072,754,628
61	\$12,055,245,679	US: Expenditures on World \$12,055,245,679
62	\$10,827,343,313	US: Expenditures on World \$10,827,343,313
63	\$9,599,440,947	US: Expenditures on World \$9,599,440,947
64	\$8,371,538,581	US: Expenditures on World \$8,371,538,581
65	\$31,175,700,000	US: Expenditures on World \$29,605,908,333
66	\$29,605,908,333	US: Expenditures on World \$29,605,908,333
67	\$28,036,116,666	US: Expenditures on World \$28,036,116,666
68	\$26,466,324,999	US: Expenditures on World \$26,466,324,999
69	\$24,896,533,333	US: Expenditures on World \$24,896,533,333
70	\$24,036,819,444	US: Expenditures on World \$24,036,819,444
71	\$23,177,105,555	US: Expenditures on World \$23,177,105,555
72	\$22,317,391,666	US: Expenditures on World \$22,317,391,666
73	\$21,457,677,778	US: Expenditures on World \$21,457,677,778
74	\$20,124,578,704	US: Expenditures on World \$20,124,578,704
75	\$18,791,479,630	US: Expenditures on World \$18,791,479,630
76	\$17,458,380,556	US: Expenditures on World \$17,458,380,556
77	\$16,125,281,481	US: Expenditures on World \$16,125,281,481
78	\$15,107,772,530	US: Expenditures on World \$15,107,772,530
79	\$14,090,263,579	US: Expenditures on World \$14,090,263,579
80	\$13,072,754,628	US: Expenditures on World \$13,072,754,628
81	\$12,055,245,679	US: Expenditures on World \$12,055,245,679
82	\$10,827,343,313	US: Expenditures on World \$10,827,343,313

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83	\$9,599,440,947	US: Expenditures on World \$9,599,440,947
84	\$8,371,538,581	US: Expenditures on World \$8,371,538,581
85	\$31,175,700,000	US: Expenditures on World \$31,175,700,000
86	\$29,605,908,333	US: Expenditures on World \$29,605,908,333
87	\$28,036,116,666	US: Expenditures on World \$28,036,116,666
88	\$26,466,324,999	US: Expenditures on World \$26,466,324,999
89	\$24,896,533,333	US: Expenditures on World \$24,896,533,333
90	\$24,036,819,444	US: Expenditures on World \$24,036,819,444
91	\$23,177,105,555	US: Expenditures on World \$23,177,105,555
92 (3/1/2021)	\$22,317,391,666	US: Expenditures on World \$22,317,391,666

<b>Date (Week)</b>	<b>US Exports to China</b>	<b>Economic Tactic</b>
45 (4/7/2020)	\$7,134,300,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$7,134,300,000
46	\$7,459,125,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$7,459,125,000
47	\$7,783,950,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$7,783,950,000
48	\$8,108,775,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$8,108,775,000
49	\$8,433,600,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$8,433,600,000
50	\$8,931,825,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$8,931,825,000
51	\$9,430,050,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$9,430,050,000
52	\$9,928,275,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$9,928,275,000
53	\$10,426,500,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$10,426,500,000
54	\$10,809,125,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$10,809,125,000
55	\$11,191,750,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$11,191,750,000
56	\$11,574,375,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$11,574,375,000
57	\$7,134,300,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$7,134,300,000
58	\$7,459,125,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$7,459,125,000
59	\$7,783,950,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$7,783,950,000
60	\$8,108,775,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$8,108,775,000
61	\$8,433,600,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$8,433,600,000
62	\$8,931,825,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$8,931,825,000
63	\$9,430,050,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$9,430,050,000
64	\$9,928,275,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$9,928,275,000
65	\$10,426,500,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$10,426,500,000
66	\$10,809,125,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$10,809,125,000
67	\$11,191,750,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$11,191,750,000
68	\$11,574,375,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$11,574,375,000
69	\$7,134,300,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$7,134,300,000
70	\$7,459,125,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$7,459,125,000
71	\$7,783,950,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$7,783,950,000
72	\$8,108,775,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$8,108,775,000
73	\$8,433,600,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$8,433,600,000
74	\$8,931,825,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$8,931,825,000
75	\$9,430,050,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$9,430,050,000
76	\$9,928,275,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$9,928,275,000
77	\$10,426,500,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$10,426,500,000

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78	\$10,809,125,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$10,809,125,000
79	\$11,191,750,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$11,191,750,000
80	\$11,574,375,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$11,574,375,000
81	\$7,134,300,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$7,134,300,000
82	\$7,459,125,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$7,459,125,000
83	\$7,783,950,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$7,783,950,000
84	\$8,108,775,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$8,108,775,000
85	\$8,433,600,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$8,433,600,000
86	\$8,931,825,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$8,931,825,000
87	\$9,430,050,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$9,430,050,000
88	\$9,928,275,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$9,928,275,000
89	\$10,426,500,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$10,426,500,000
90	\$10,809,125,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$10,809,125,000
91	\$11,191,750,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$11,191,750,000
92 (3/1/2021)	\$11,574,375,000	CCP: Expenditures on World \$11,574,375,000

The US Government's 2<sup>nd</sup> Move

The U. S. reinstates tariffs on Chinese goods. Sails a U. S. Seventh Fleet flotilla through international waters off of Hong Kong. Calls for calm in Hong Kong.

Japan offers to send a team to the U. S. to discuss how Japan overcame a similar rare earths embargo by China earlier.

South Korea makes statements supporting democracy.

North Korea calls on the U. S. to cease its banditry and piracy.

*Simulation Time: 4/14/2020 (Week 46) – 4/21/2020 (Week 47)*

*US broadcasts anti-CCP message (VREL +10 payload) (4/14/2020) (Week 46)*

*US exports to China drop (tariffs) by \$50 billion (4/21/2020) (Week 47)*

*[How did rare earths get caught up in the US-China trade war?*

*Beijing has been looking for further leverage in its trade war with the US, which escalated earlier this month when Donald Trump announced he was increasing tariffs on \$200bn of Chinese goods from 10% to 25%.] = \$50 billion*

[US-China trade: what are rare-earth metals and what's the dispute?](#)

*CCP: Increase Goods sector expenditures on World by \$50 billion*

[US-China trade: what are rare-earth metals and what's the dispute?](#)

## Neighborhoods

China was divided into 13 geographical regions, or neighborhoods, based on historically and culturally significant regions and those relevant to the study. We consulted a series of *The Diplomat* articles called “12 Regions of China”<sup>19</sup> as well as a Statfor, the global intelligence firm, source on China’s geographical challenges.



<sup>19</sup> <https://thediplomat.com/tag/china-12-regions/>



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These are the Athena neighborhoods in China with population figures:

<b>Neighborhood</b>	<b>Chinese Province(s)</b>	<b>Population (2017 Estimate)</b> <a href="#"><u>China National Bureau of Statistics (2017 Estimate)</u></a>	<b>Population Density (people per square kilometer)</b>
Xinjiang (NCNXJ)	Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region	24,450,000	13.13
Tibet (NCNXZ)	Tibet Autonomous Region	3,370,000	2.44
West (NCNWT)	Qinghai and Gansu	32,240,000	32.045
North (NCNNO)	Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning	140,860,000	129.304
Han Central (NCNCL)	Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, Henan, Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Hubei	623,030,000	269.217
Han Northeast (NCNNE)	Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu	255,550,000	590.77
Han Southeast (NCNSE)	Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Macao Special Administrative Region, Hainan	202,782,500	418.06
Beijing City (NCNNEBEJCIT)	Beijing Municipality	21,710,000	1,167.40
Tianjin City (NCNNETIJCIT)	Tianjin Municipality	15,570,000	1,144.46
Shanghai City (NCNSESHACIT)	Shanghai Municipality	24,180,000	3,630.20
Hong Kong City (NCNSEHONCIT)	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region	7,448,900 (2018 Est., Hong Kong Census Dept.)	6,396.01
Chongqing City (NCNCLCQCIT)	Chongqing Municipality	30,750,000	350.50
Guangzhou City (NCNSEGDCIT)	Guangzhou City	14,498,400 (2017 Est., Guangzhou Economic and Social Development Statistics Bulletin 2014. Guangzhou Daily.)	~ 1,800
<b>Total</b>		1,396,439,800	

Population Growth Rate: 0.37% (2018 Est., CIA World Factbook)

## Civilian Groups

The process of dividing up China into Athena neighborhoods and the populations (“civ groups”) residing there was performed in this fashion:

- (1) Find open source total population for the nation and each relevant subdivision/neighborhood within it.
- (2) Apply ethnic, political, social, and/or religious lenses to the population of the nation. Generate the types of civilian groups needed for the study.
  - (2a) Apply national population growth rate to all civilian groups within the nation if more detailed information is not available or appropriate.
- (3) Construct belief topics for civilian groups and actors that represent all the ethnic, political, social, and/or economic fault lines in area of interest, which may include multiple nations.





The civ groups generated were primarily based on “Master Narratives” reports on China from Monitor 360 (now called Protagonist). The reports were: *Master Narratives Country Report: China* and *Master Narratives Transnational Report: Regional Master Narratives of China South China Sea Case Studies: The Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia*.

Listed below are the civ groups which were identified for representation in this study:

**Power Elite (Monitor 360)**

This segment includes central and local party leaders, military leaders, “princelings,” and captains of business and industry. Members of the power elite have profited immensely from China’s three decades of economic reforms relative to the rest of the population. Counted as members of the Chinese Communist Party.

**Well-Off (Monitor 360)**

This segment includes urban professionals, managers, entrepreneurs, scientists, “conservative” and “New Left” intellectuals, and most university students. These groups have been major beneficiaries of China’s fast-paced economic development during the reform era. Counted as members of the Chinese Communist Party.

**Dissidents (Monitor 360)**

This small segment is comprised of “liberal” intellectuals, human rights activists, activist lawyers, and others whom the party considers dissidents. They share a commitment to the expansion of civic rights and rule of law, with some holding the ideal of ultimately establishing a multi-party democracy.

**Working Poor Mandarin Han (Monitor 360)**

This segment includes some more successful migrant laborers, factory workers, other members of the working class, more prosperous farmers, and underemployed professionals. These groups, which probably comprise the largest segment of the population, are getting by for now but are in a precarious position: they have jobs and have seen their material conditions improve in absolute terms, but not relative to the “Power Elite” and “Well-Off” segments.

**Downtrodden Mandarin Han (Monitor 360)**

This segment comprises less successful migrant laborers, dispossessed farmers and villagers, elderly and young left behind in the countryside, older workers laid off from state-owned enterprises—especially from heavy industry in the northeastern rust belt—and the unemployed. These groups have lost out in or have been left behind by China’s reform.

**Working Poor Hakka/Southern Han**

Working Poor identity with a Hakka Han cultural bias. This group also includes the Southeastern ethnic groups: Min, Yue, Wu, and others.

**Downtrodden Hakka/Southern Han**

Downtrodden identity with a Hakka Han cultural bias. This group also includes the Southeastern ethnic groups: Min, Yue, Wu, and others.

**Tibetans (Monitor 360)**

This group consists of ethnic Tibetan residents of China. The majority of the 5.4 million Tibetans in China (less than one percent of the population) live in a province-level administrative unit—the Tibetan Autonomous Region—commonly known as Tibet and administered by the CPC. The remainder live in special Tibetan jurisdictions in Western China in the provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan (both contiguous with Tibet) and Gansu.

**Uyghurs (Monitor 360)**

This group consists of ethnic Uyghurs, a Muslim Turkic people. As of the 2000 PRC census, there are estimated to be about 8.5 million Uyghurs in China (less than one percent of the population), the vast majority of whom live in a province-level administrative unit—the Xinjiang Autonomous Region—commonly known as Xinjiang. Uyghurs resent what they see as increasing Han domination of their historical territory and dilution of their culture.

**Northern Ethnic Others** – Mongols, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Salars, Manchus, Koreans, and other foreigners living in Northern China. This group is largely composed of political quietists and will be adopt many Mandarin-speaking Han beliefs, but to a lesser extent.

**Southern Ethnic Others** – Miao/Hmong-Yao, Kam-Ta, Yi, and Tujia ethnic groups, along with Filipinos, South Asians, and other foreigners living in Southeast China. This group is largely composed of political quietists and will be adopt many Hakka Han beliefs, but to a lesser extent.

**Hui** – Mandarin Han Muslims. This group is largely composed of political quietists and will be adopt many Mandarin-speaking Han beliefs, but to a lesser extent. They are antagonistic towards Uyghurs due to struggles against them in the 20th Century.

**Note: Hui-Uyghur antagonism leads Hui groups to be Against this topic while Uyghurs are strongly For this topic.**

**Beliefs**

All civ groups and political actors are encompassed in Athena’s belief system. All entities are for or against a series of “belief topics,” or topics of interest to the populations and governments in the simulated region. The belief topics we selected also borrowed heavily from Monitor 360’s *Master Narrative* reports.

**Note: These beliefs are oriented towards a Chinese internal study. Thus, metrics measuring the attitudes of neighboring governments and populations will not be nearly as well researched or simulated.**

**(1) Wealth and Power (Monitor 360)**

*Broadly held across Han segments*

Ever since Western imperialism reduced China—a great ancient civilization and world power—to poverty and weakness in the nineteenth century, the Chinese people have searched for ways to restore the country’s wealth and power. The Chinese people stood up in 1949 and have made remarkable progress in the reform era. Although Western countries still plot to keep China down,

China must continue to adopt whatever is useful from more advanced countries to develop its economy and military, and it will inevitably reclaim its rightful place as a world power.

## **(2) China's Rightful Place in the World (Monitor 360)**

*Broadly held across Han segments*

China played a central role in the world for over two thousand years until Western and Japanese imperialist aggression led to a century of humiliation. Even though China stood up when the CPC came to power, capitalist powers led by the United States have sought to contain China. China must focus on economic growth and keep a low profile on international issues beyond its core interests until its economy is strong and stable. China can then take on a greater role in the world and resume its rightful place as a dominant power at the center of the East Asian regional order.

## **(3) Only the Communist Party Can Save China (Monitor 360)**

*Power Elite*

While prior attempts to modernize failed, the CPC's founding in 1921 set the Chinese people on the road to independence and prosperity. Only the CPC could save China, uniting the country to defeat imperialist aggression. The Chinese people stood up, becoming masters of their country, and creating unprecedented ethnic unity. The CPC established a socialist system with Chinese characteristics and launched a great new revolution of reform and opening up. China must forge ahead with reform and opening up to build a socialist market economy while maintaining unity and stability.

## **(4) To Get Rich is Glorious (Monitor 360)**

*Power Elite, Well-Off, a portion of the Working Poor*

Since Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms reversed nearly two decades of economic stagnation and political turmoil, the CPC has guided China to a miraculous leap in economic development and delivered on Deng's promise to make people wealthy. The Chinese people's lives are unimaginably better than just a generation ago. While problems such as pollution and food safety persist, party leaders are addressing these issues. The CPC must continue to maintain political stability and economic growth and prevent problems from threatening China's economic development.

## **(5) Quest for Social Justice (Monitor 360)**

*Working Poor, Downtrodden, Dissidents, and a portion of the Well-Off*

Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms produced over three decades of astounding growth and created enormous wealth for those fortunate enough to be in the right place at the right time. However, China's rise now appears to be coming at the expense of the health and welfare of many ordinary Chinese citizens, and of the country's environment. The government must fix this ever-widening disparity in rights, opportunity, and income and create a more just society for all Chinese citizens.

## **(6) Restoration of the Great Tradition (Monitor 360)**

*Power Elite, a limited segment of Well-Off; some parts resonate more broadly*

China is a glorious 5000-year old culture that was nearly destroyed by Western imperialism. Modernization has made China materially prosperous, but has created a spiritual void and moral decline in society that Western values cannot fill. China must revive its traditional values in order to restore both the health of society and the country's rightful place as a world power.

**(7) Quest For Democracy (Monitor 360)***Dissidents*

China's historic transformation since the mid-nineteenth century exposed the decadence of traditional Chinese autocracy and paved the way for unprecedented change. Even though the CPC has delivered impressive economic growth and allowed a measure of individual freedom and civil society, lack of political reform prevents China from becoming a truly modern nation. Chinese citizens must band together to fulfill the dream of establishing a democratic political system that embraces universal values.

**(8) Tibetans Demand True Autonomy (Monitor 360)***Tibetans*

Tibetans have a unique ethnicity, language, and culture and have historically managed their own affairs. When the CPC established the "Tibetan Autonomous Region" in 1949, the Han government promised that Tibetans could maintain their language and culture, as well as practice their religion under His Holiness, the Dalai Lama. The government reneged on this promise, however, and hatred of Han repression is now widespread. Tibetans must unite in the struggle for genuine autonomy and demand the Dalai Lama's return so that they can preserve their culture and freely practice their religion.

**(9) The Oppressed Uyghurs (Monitor 360)***Uyghurs*

Xinjiang was once an independent Uyghur territory, but the People's Liberation Army imposed Han rule over the region in 1949. Ever since, the Han government has encroached on the Uyghur way of life and has treated Uyghurs as unequal subjects. Han discrimination poses a grave danger to Uyghur culture. Uyghurs must prevent Han interference in their religion and demand the use of Uyghur as Xinjiang's primary language, equal access to jobs, and an equal share in the fruits of economic development. Ultimately, Uyghurs should press for restoring an independent Uyghur state.

**(10) Mandarin Han Identity [For or Against]** – "Support for a Northern or Mandarin Han identity." Northern Han and Central Han civilian groups are For this topic while others are Ambivalent or Against.

**(11) Southeastern Han Identity (Hakka and Hokkien) [For or Against]** – "Support for a Southeastern Han or Hakka identity." Southeastern Han civilian groups are For this topic while others are Ambivalent or Against.

**(12) General Islamic Identity [For or Against]** – "Support for a general Muslim identity." Hui, Uyghurs, and Northern Ethnic Others are For this topic to some extent. Other groups are Ambivalent or Against.

**(13) Political Quietism [For or Against]** – "Ethnicity and religion should not be politically expressed." Northern Ethnic Others, Southern Ethnic Others, and Hui are For this topic. Tibetans and Uyghurs are Against this topic.

**(14) China's Corrupting Influence (Philippines) (Monitor 360)***Broadly held across segments*

China has portrayed itself as a benevolent neighbor to the Philippines, but scandals involving Chinese firms have shown China's true intentions to exploit the Philippines' resources and its people. Filipinos must remain wary of furthering ties to authoritarian China. Only through vigilance can Filipinos preserve their values, secure the country's prosperity, and prevent suffering at the hands of an outside power.

**Population Sentiment Modeling**

Each civilian group possesses a sentiment score called Satisfaction, which contains four aspects or concerns—Satisfaction with Autonomy (governance), Quality of Life, Culture (identity), and Safety (perception of safety). Each concern possesses a Saliency or weighting signifying the importance of that concern to the group in question. When all the Satisfaction concerns are aggregated, this value is called "Mood." The Saliency levels and initial, baseline, values for Satisfaction concerns were designed and set based on studying the audience segments in the Master Narratives reports and translating those to Athena values.

<b>Civ Group Type</b>	<b>Baseline Satisfaction Autonomy</b>	<b>Baseline Satisfaction Culture</b>	<b>Baseline Satisfaction Quality of Life</b>	<b>Baseline Satisfaction Safety</b>
Power Elite	100	100	75	75
Well-Off	25	50	50	75
Working Poor	0	0	-25	20
Downtrodden	-25	-25	-50	-20
Dissidents	-50	-50	-50	-40
Hui and Ethnic Others	40	75	25	25

<b>Civ Group Type</b>	<b>Satisfaction Autonomy Saliency</b>	<b>Satisfaction Culture Saliency</b>	<b>Satisfaction Quality of Life Saliency</b>	<b>Satisfaction Safety Saliency</b>
Power Elite	1.0	1.0	.60	.70
Well-Off	.75	.75	.75	.85
Working Poor	.60	.60	.75	.85
Downtrodden	.75	.50	.60	.75
Dissidents	1.0	1.0	.50	.50
Hui and Ethnic Others	.60	.80	.80	.75

## **Chinese Communist Party Governance**

The Chinese Communist Party or “central government” is simulated as an actor representing the President’s Office and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party). Other actors that support President’s Office and General Secretary are (1) the Central Military Commission and (2) the local level of the Chinese Communist Party (provincial level). The Municipal Government of Hong Kong actor does not support the Central Government, but governs independently as befits the “One Country, Two Systems” paradigm.

In terms of security forces, the Central Government controls the People’s Police, while the Central Military Commission controls the People’s Liberation Army (Ground, Air, and Navy) and the People’s Armed Police (gendarmerie). The Hong Kong Municipal Government controls the Hong Kong Police Force. The PLA garrison in Hong Kong is controlled by the Central Military Commission.

The Central Government controls all infrastructure maintenance and investment while the provincial CCP actor dispenses social services (Essential Non-Infrastructure Services in Athena). Twice as much ENI is dispensed to civ groups perceived to be more loyal to or necessary to the CCP. The Well-Off and Working Poor are key to the CCP and thus receive more ENI than the Downtrodden, Dissident, Ethnic Others, Uyghurs, etc.

## **Security Forces of People’s Republic of China**

<b>Neighborhoods / Forces</b>	<b>People’s Police (Ministry of Public Security Forces) [1.9 million personnel] *</b>	<b>People’s Armed Police (Gendarmerie) [600,000 personnel] *</b>	<b>People’s Liberation Army (Ground (900,000), Air (398,000), and Navy (235,000) *</b>
Xinjiang (NCNXJ)	36,500 (speculative)	120,000 ****	
Tibet (NCNXZ)	36,500 (speculative)	120,000 ****	
West (NCNWT)	41,720 *****	120,000 ****	254,500 ****
North (NCNNO)	158,525 *****	120,000 ****	254,500 ****
Han Central (NCNCL)	853,082 *****	120,000 ****	254,500 ****
Han Northeast (NCNNE)	349,911 *****		
Han Southeast (NCNSE)	277,659 *****		254,500 ****
Beijing City (NCNNEBEJCIT)	29,726 *****		
Tianjin City (NCNNETIJCIT)	21,319 *****		
Shanghai City (NCNSESACIT)	33,108 *****		254,500 ****

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Hong Kong City (NCNSEHONCIT)	34,000 (Hong Kong Police Force)		6,000
Chongqing City (NCNCLCQCIT)	42,104 *****		
Guangzhou City (NCNSEGDCIT)	19,851 *****		254,500 *****

\* [Total Security Force Personnel Numbers] Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2017: A Comparative Analysis by Anthony H. Cordesman (Page 224)

\*\* [Chinese Police Monitoring Stations in Xinjiang: 7,300+]  
[“Why China is keeping a tight grip on Xinjiang” South China Morning Post](#)

\*\*\* [People’s Armed Police: 1.5 million]  
[“China brings People’s Armed Police under control of top military chiefs” South China Morning Post](#)

\*\*\*\* Deployed evenly

\*\*\*\*\* Deployed proportional to civilian population

In Athena:

**People’s Police (Ministry of Public Security Forces)**

**Type:** Police

**Training Level:** Partial

**Demeanor:** Aggressive

**Owner:** Chinese Communist Party (Presidents Office and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party)

**People's Armed Police (Gendarmerie)**

**Type:** Paramilitary

**Training Level:** Fully Trained

**Demeanor:** Average

**Owner:** Chinese Central Military Commission

**People’s Liberation Army (Ground (900,000), Air (398,000), and Navy (235,000))**

**Type:** Regular Military

**Training Level:** Partial

**Demeanor:** Average

**Owner:** Chinese Central Military Commission

**Hong Kong Police Force (34,000)**

**Type:** Police

**Training Level:** Fully Trained

**Demeanor:** Average

**Owner:** Hong Kong Municipal Government

**Appendix D: Country Profile: People's Republic of China, Utilizing a PMESII-Based Descriptive Framework**

# **Country Profile**

## **People's Republic of China**

**Utilizing a PMESII-Based Descriptive Framework**



**TRADOC G-2**  
**Modeling & Simulation Directorate**  
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**August 23, 2019**

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The overall classification of this document is UNCLASSIFIED  
All portions of the appendix are UNCLASSIFIED

## People's Republic of China



Map of China

## Organization of This Document

This document utilizes the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) framework to present facts about China. A PMESII-structured framework describes the foundational human, social, cultural, and behavioral features of a state and can assist not only in determining the state's strengths and weaknesses, but also in assessing the effects that various engagement strategies may have on the state.

## Basic Facts about China

The information immediately below is derived from the CIA World Factbook: China (as of February 1, 2019).

Population:	1,384,688,986 (July 2018 est.)
Population Growth Rate:	0.37% (2018 est.)
Total Land Area:	9,326,410 sq km, slightly smaller than the U. S.
Capital:	Beijing
Type of Government:	Communist party-led state
Founding date:	1 October 1949 (People's Republic of China established); notable earlier dates: 221 B. C. (unification under the Qin Dynasty); 1 January 1912 (Qing Dynasty replaced by the Republic of China)
Constitution:	Latest promulgated 4 December 1982 (2018) <b>Amendments:</b> proposed by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress or supported by more than one-fifth of the National People's Congress membership; passage requires more than two-thirds majority vote of the Congress membership; amended several times, last in 2018 (2018)
Current President:	Xi Jinping (election last held on 17 March 2018 (next to be held in March 2023))
Primary Ethnic Groups:	Han Chinese 91.6%, Zhuang 1.3%, other (includes Hui, Manchu, Uighur, Miao, Yi, Tujia, Tibetan, Mongol, Dong, Buyei, Yao, Bai, Korean, Hani, Li, Kazakh, Dai, and other nationalities) 7.1% (2010 est.) <b>Note:</b> the Chinese Government officially recognizes 56 ethnic groups
Languages:	Standard Chinese or Mandarin (official; Putonghua, based on the Beijing dialect), Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghainese), Minbei (Fuzhou), Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, Hakka dialects, minority languages (see Ethnic groups entry) <b>Note:</b> Zhuang is official in Guangxi Zhuang, Yue is official in Guangdong, Mongolian is official in Nei Mongol, Uighur is official in Xinjiang Uygur, Kyrgyz is official in Xinjiang Uygur, and Tibetan is official in Xizang (Tibet)
Religions:	Buddhist 18.2%, Christian 5.1%, Muslim 1.8%, folk religion 21.9%, Hindu < 0.1%, Jewish < 0.1%, other 0.7% (includes Daoist (Taoist)), unaffiliated 52.2% (2010 est.) <b>Note:</b> officially atheist
Literacy:	96.4%
Percentage of Poor:	3.3% (2016 est.) <b>Note:</b> in 2011, China set a new poverty line at RMB 2300 (approximately US \$400)

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GDP (Official Ex Rate):	\$12.01 trillion (2017 est.) <b>Note:</b> because China's exchange rate is determined by fiat rather than by market forces, the official exchange rate measure of GDP is not an accurate measure of China's output; GDP at the official exchange rate substantially understates the actual level of China's output vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP): \$23.21 trillion (2017 est.)
Unemployment:	3.9% (2017 est.)
Inflation Rate:	1.6% (2017 est.)
Exports:	electrical and other machinery, including computers and telecommunications equipment, apparel, furniture, textiles
Revenues:	2.553 trillion (2017 est.)
Expenditures:	3.008 trillion (2017 est.)
Agriculture:	world leader in gross value of agricultural output; rice, wheat, potatoes, corn, tobacco, peanuts, tea, apples, cotton, pork, mutton, eggs; fish, shrimp
Natural Resources:	coal, iron ore, petroleum, natural gas, mercury, tin, tungsten, antimony, manganese, molybdenum, vanadium, magnetite, aluminum, lead, zinc, rare earth elements, uranium, hydropower potential (world's largest), arable land
Climate:	extremely diverse; tropical in south to subarctic in north
Terrain:	mostly mountains, high plateaus, deserts in west; plains, deltas, and hills in east

## Brief Historical Sketch of China



*Timely is not a word to apply to China. The great landlocked tideless body of its history seems in perspective changeless and unchanging through ages that stretch historically unbroken back to the youth of Mesopotamia and the Nile. The storms of invasion and conquest that have swept China from time to time seem to have sunk in futile exhaustion into the calm, and the wreckage is borne idly on the surface or sinks unmarked into the formless mystery called China.<sup>1</sup>*

The idea of China and the Chinese are contested; an empire before a nation-state and a civilization before either, the when, who and where of China has been and is, in some ways, in flux. There are disagreements, for instance, as to what constitutes the beginning of a Chinese state.<sup>2</sup> The Chinese usually cite a 5000-year history, and though archaeological evidence indicates civilization in the area is probably even older, written records only date back the Shang Dynasty, which is dated from 1766, B. C.<sup>3</sup> Just as the “when” of China, the “where” has been contested for millennia. The Shang and the next historically attestable dynasty, the Zhou, controlled territory much smaller than current-day China, in areas centering around the central portion of the Yellow or Huang River. The Zhou dynasty eventually dissolved into several feuding kingdoms, as China entered its Warring States period, lasting over 200 years. There were seven states by the time one of them, the Qin, from which the name China is derived, conquered the others, in 221 B. C.<sup>4</sup> By the time of the Qin consolidation Chinese territory had expanded to the northeast and south especially, and Chinese territory continued to expand and contract under following dynasties. It was during the final, Qing, dynasty (1644-1912) that China expanded west into (and beyond current) Xinjiang, and came to control Tibet, as well as the territory that now constitutes Mongolia. The PRC itself is smaller in terms of land territory than its predecessor, the Qing state, but, notwithstanding the PRC’s fallacious claims of historicity, now makes unprecedented claims for sovereignty in an extended maritime area. Finally, the “who” of China can also be contested. The current regime in China declares almost 92 percent of Chinese are ethnically Han, a designation derived from the dynasty which followed the Qin, but this designation actually encompasses many ethnicities, and is constituted of what Benedict Anderson would call an “imagined linkage”<sup>5</sup> to common ancestors in the eponymous dynasty.

-- Regarding the civilization of China, or the fundamentals of Chinese culture, it would be difficult to overstate the impact of Confucianism: "Confucius (551 B. C. E.-479 B. C. E.) was a teacher and philosopher who lived during the Zhou (Chou) Dynasty (1045-256 B. C. E.), in what is known as the Spring and Autumn era (722 B. C. E.-481 B. C. E.)."<sup>6</sup> And the teachings of Confucius, especially those collected from or at least attributed to the teacher after his death, in the *Analects*, gave a meritocratic slant to Chinese society, at least for men. Confucianism taught people are born equal, in terms of potential learning and virtue, and can improve themselves through education.<sup>7</sup> The classic rags-to-riches story in dynastic China was thus of a village pooling

all its resources to support its most promising male child while he studied for the Mandarin examinations. This study could go full time from the time a child was five or six, sometimes until the mid-30s. If the chosen one finally passed the examination, and many did not, he could bring benefits to his village and region. While stressing the inherent potential for improvement among those who assiduously applied themselves to study, Confucianism also stressed hierarchy, based on relationships: "These relationships were those of ruler and minister, father and son, elder brother and younger brother, and husband and wife. (Later, followers of Confucius added a fifth relationship, more egalitarian than the others but never stressed as much: that between friend and friend.)"<sup>8</sup>

-- Two other important cultural components are Taoism and Legalism. Taoism is a naturalistic belief system, supposedly first articulated by Lao Tzu (which just means "Old Master"), a contemporary of Confucius. Tao means "way," and is referring to the way of nature, which is a way of always interacting opposites, the balance between contraries changing as those opposites interact with other pairings. Taoism gives the world yin and yang – light and dark, man and woman, good and evil – but what many Westerners fail to grasp is those qualities wax and wane, depending on circumstances. Never is a quality wholly light or wholly dark; never is a man completely masculine nor a woman completely feminine. Martin J. Gannon and Rajnandini Pillai write this belief in relativistic dualism encourages "both-and" thinking, as opposed to the "either-or" thinking more common in the West.<sup>9</sup> As well, because Taoism was radically egalitarian, and thus opposed to elitist, hierarchical Confucianism, it became the common people's repository for much of the Chinese society's thinking on animism, spiritualism, alchemy and other superstitions and legends. Finally, a component of Chinese culture always present to some degree in the ruling class, is Legalism, which taught control must be maintained by the ruthless enforcement of rules crafted social control, and that a ruler's only aim was to maintain his power, no matter the cost to anyone else.<sup>10</sup> Francis Fukuyama calls this a "rule by law" rather than a "rule of law."<sup>11</sup>

-- Shaped by its rich traditions, "Chinese state formation . . . began extremely early," as Fukuyama also says, and this "state was centralized, bureaucratic and enormously despotic."<sup>12</sup> Confucianism, Taoism and Legalism all remain important influences in Chinese culture, but this early-developed political structure radically changed, beginning in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. At the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century China was probably the richest, most advanced nation on earth. While China is the home of many firsts – the magnetic compass, horse stirrup, printing and paper money, for instance – it did not industrialize when the West, beginning with Great Britain, did. By the time Great Britain and other Western powers were expanding and colonizing, China had fallen behind technologically. It could not compete militarily with the West. Beginning with the first Opium War in 1839 China lost wars and battles against invaders from the West, including Great Britain and France, and from Russia, while in 1895 it lost a war with Japan. China was forced to cede territory and aspects of sovereignty over its remaining territory (central to its current narrative, China now refers to the period beginning with the Opium Wars as the "Century of Humiliation.")<sup>13</sup>

-- At the same time the weakening Qing dynasty was facing the kinds of internal uprisings historically common in China's dynastic cycle, the greatest of which was the Taiping Rebellion, 1850-1864. The Taiping Rebellion was the bloodiest civil war in world history, with over 25 million deaths.<sup>14</sup> The creaking edifice of dynastic history came to a final end in 1911, with the beginning of the Republican Revolution. In 1912 the rebellion's leader, Sun Yatsen, was named

the first president of the Chinese Republic, but he was soon pushed aside by his most successful general, Yuan Shihkai. Yuan became increasingly dictatorial, and tried to declare himself emperor in 1915, but, perhaps marking the truest end of the dynastic cycle, essentially no one paid attention, and Yuan died shortly thereafter. China entered its warlord era.

-- Sun Yatsen's Republican Party (Guomindang, or GMD/Kuomintang or KMT, depending upon the Romanization system), began immediately to try to reunite the country, first under Sun and later under his successor, Jiang Jieshi (or Chiang Kaishek). After its founding in 1921 leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – including Mao Zedong, a young librarian who had been inspired by the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement, a largely student-led revolutionary action, which occurred one-hundred years ago – to a certain extent cooperated with the GMD in the first United Front. In 1927 Jiang turned the GMD's guns on the CCP. The CCP was nearly eradicated. The GMD set up its capitol in Nanjing with the intent of completing its reunification of China. The CCP continued a guerilla resistance in the countryside, while Jiang continued to try to wipe them out. After a series of campaigns, in 1934, Jiang seemed on the cusp of success; the GMD had trapped a majority of the CCP, about 100,000, and its key leaders, in Jianxi province. But the CCP escaped. The year-long, 6000-mile Long March, ensued, ending in Shaanxi province, with "four to eight thousand" survivors.<sup>15</sup> The Long March, epic by any definition, is, in many ways, the true origin story of the CCP. Mao emerged from it the undisputed leader, and remained so for the rest of his life. Survivors of the Long March had a special, almost mythic status, for the rest of their lives.<sup>16</sup>

-- In 1937, after a low-intensity conflict in Manchuria for six years, Japan invaded the rest of China. Later in 1937 the GMD and CCP were persuaded to form the Second United Front to fight the Japanese. Chalmers A. Johnson writes it was the experience of the CCP's Red Army fighting the Japanese that spread the popularity and ideology of the CCP among the Chinese people.<sup>17</sup> After victory over the Japanese in 1945, the Chinese civil war recommenced, the CCP winning in 1949, as the GMD fled to Taiwan.

-- On October 1, 1949 the People's Republic of China, with Chairman Mao as paramount leader, was established. Though China's dynastic history ended in 1911-1912, "where others succeeded only in muting the influence of China's ancient culture, Mao came close to extirpating its very roots and thus its hold on several subsequent generations of Chinese."<sup>18</sup> Mao's policies resulted in the continuing impoverishment of the Chinese people and the death of millions. He declared a "permanent revolution," culminating in his two most disastrous programs, the Great Leap Forward, 1958-1961 and the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976. The Great Leap Forward was a collective leap over a cliff. All the farmland in the country, which had been redistributed scant years earlier to peasants after more than a million of the original property owners were killed, was collectivized, and everything – "houses, livestock, tools, meals and even bathing" in rural China, communalized. The farmers were further instructed "to set up small backyard furnaces"<sup>19</sup> to smelt iron, with the intent of unleashing China's agricultural and industrial prowess. The result was an estimated 36 million deaths from starvation. More pragmatic leaders were able to nudge Mao temporarily into a more background role as they tried to repair the damage, but Mao came roaring back in the mid-60s. The chairman had assembled a small, hand-held book of his own quotations that he had distributed to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in order to give them political guidance. The little red books, so-called because of their red covers, became popular beyond the PLA, particularly with student groups. Already in 1963 Mao had launched the Socialist Education Campaign, a call to purify the thinking of the masses, and he began to warn

publicly about “reactionary” forces determined to undo China’s revolution. In 1966 groups of young people studying the little red book who had proclaimed themselves to be Red Guards, and donned red armbands, began demonstrating against anything and everything they deemed insufficiently revolutionary, and the Cultural Revolution commenced. The CCP was purged of moderates and soon, with Mao’s urging, the Red Guards were rounding up, humiliating, beating and killing teachers, parents and others. China devolved into chaos, Government functions at all levels ceased, and in a country that for thousands of years had enshrined education as the way to success, schooling shut down. By the next year armed bands of Red Guards were fighting each other. The PLA was finally called in to restore order, but the Cultural Revolution, “eviscerating the Communist Party; impeding the country’s economic development; bringing the Chinese education system to a standstill; splitting up countless families by sending many millions into rural exile; and causing the deaths of untold numbers by murder, suicide, executions and even acts of ritual cannibalism,” lasted until Mao’s death in 1976.<sup>20</sup>

-- After Mao’s death Deng Xiaoping, whose son had been paralyzed during the Cultural Revolution after being forced to jump from the fourth floor of a building, and who, himself, suffered a permanent limp after being roughed up and sent, twice, to the countryside for re-education, became China’s new strong man in 1978. It was Deng who introduced pragmatic reforms, and especially, opened China’s economy to the free market. The result was more than three decades of double-digit economic growth, with the PRC passing Japan in 2010 to become the second-largest economy in the world. Fukuyama describes the transition from Mao to Deng:

A high degree of state autonomy free of any form of democratic accountability and unencumbered by a rule of law is a very dangerous thing. This was the story of China during the Maoist period, when a single leader with unlimited policy discretion could unleash untold suffering and cause the deaths of tens of millions of people through willful innovations like the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. But the same degree of autonomy in the hands of a wiser and less crazed leader like Deng Xiaoping could bring about transformations for the better that would be scarcely conceivable in a liberal democracy.<sup>21</sup>

In his concluding comment, Fukuyama was referring specifically to Deng’s economic policies, which moved more people more quickly out of absolute poverty than any other regime’s policies in history. But, despite initiating policies that brought hundreds of millions of people out of destitution, Deng, like Mao, could be ruthless. Mao once said, “the more people you kill the more revolutionary you are.”<sup>22</sup> Deng, then, was more revolutionary, for instance, when he sent the PLA to Yunnan after some Muslim villagers refused to pay a grain tax as a protest against religious intolerance; “an estimated sixteen hundred men, women, and children were killed in the twenty-one day ‘pacification’ operation that followed.”<sup>23</sup> Again in 1989 – almost exactly 30 years prior to this writing – Deng was more revolutionary ordering the PLA crackdown that resulted in the Tiananmen Massacre, when “[u]ntold hundreds, perhaps thousands were killed or wounded.”<sup>24</sup>

-- Deng was followed by two leaders he handpicked, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, whose own powers were more constrained by the other six members of their respective Politburo Standing Committees. The current president of China, however, Xi Jinping, who took office in 2012, has taken steps to further centralize power and is arguably the most powerful leader since Mao and certainly since Deng.

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## Provinces of China

There are 22 provinces in the People's Republic of China (and the PRC claims Taiwan as a 23<sup>rd</sup> province): Anhui, Fujian, Guangdong, Gansu, Guizhou, Henan, Hubei, Hebei, Hainan, Heilongjiang, Hunan, Jiling, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Qinghai, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Yunnan, and Zhejiang; four separately administered municipalities: Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin; five autonomous regions: Guangxi Zhuang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia Hui, Xinjiang Uyghur, and Tibet; and two Special Administrative Regions: Hong Kong and Macau.

### Administrative Divisions of China



## Chinese Communist Party (CCP)/Government of PRC

It has been said China is a civilization masquerading as a country, but the People's Republic of China (PRC) is best understood as a party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), that has arrogated



to itself the status of a country; the PRC is less a nation-state than a party-state.<sup>25</sup> Other parties exist; “the CCP has allowed some eight so-called minor parties to continue to function, these parties have only about a half million members among them, have no corporate status, and are unable to raise funds or own property.”<sup>26</sup> The other parties are for show. From the local to the national level, where there is a state institution, there is a CCP organization, and CCP positions always outrank state-position equivalents.<sup>27</sup> Leaders, at all levels, from the village to the national, are appointed by the CCP. Such leaders are told, at the beginning of their time in the position, that they have two main jobs: to increase the economic productivity in their area and to ensure stability. Their party superiors come back and talk to them about how well they have done in about a year. Those deemed to have done well move up the ranks of the CCP (of course, the children of high-ranking CCP members have built-in advantages of wealth, privilege and connections, and thus tend to progress at a better rate than others. The current president, Xi Jinping, is one such; his father was a general in the Red Army, and survivor of the Long March. Exalted scions like Xi Are known as princelings.)

### ***Constitution***

Like All other aspects of governance, the constitution is designed to maintain the power of the CCP in the party-state. It is regarded as a legitimizing document, and has been used by Xi to demonstrate he is more legitimate than others, with the recent inclusion of “Xi Jinping Thought” in the document. The true authority in the country is made clear; “the Chinese constitutional order is grounded on a principal of separation of powers that distinguishes between an administrative power assigned to the government and a political authority assigned to the Chinese Communist Party.”<sup>28</sup>

### ***Executive***

As Elizabeth Economy points out, 2012 was a watershed year for the PRC party-state’s executive, in that, for the first time in over 20 years, the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party was not picked by Deng Xiaoping, who had “led China out of the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and set the country on its historic path of economic reform and opening up.”<sup>29</sup> Instead the general secretary, and the seven-man Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), came out of the secret wranglings of the 200-person-plus Central Committee. The PBSC constitutes the true executive leadership of the PRC, rather than the central government’s State Council, which is headed by the prime minister and the pinnacle of the state’s administrative apparatus. Under Deng’s immediate, hand-picked successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the PBSC exercised collective leadership, through the consensus of its members. Xi Jinping, however, has been able to move the system towards one under his paramount rule. In 2017 “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” was enshrined in the constitution, “granting his ideas the same status as those of Mao,” the only other PRC leader so honored.<sup>30</sup> Xi abolished term limits for the state president in 2018, and, in another break with tradition, he has no clearly designated successor. There is evidence of some push back in China, including an article by an academic, accusing Xi, though not directly naming him, of “effectively returning China to an era of totalitarian politics and a style of dictatorship last seen under Mao Zedong,”

and there have been unconfirmed rumors of coup attempts,<sup>31</sup> but Xi remains, by most indicators, the most powerful strong-man ruler in China since Deng or even Mao. Economy argues persuasively China under Xi is now undergoing a “Third Revolution,” after the first two ushered in by Mao and Deng respectively.

### ***Legislature***

Legislating in the PRC remains a complicated business: “the Chinese law-making system should be seen as a ‘multi-arena’ process, with draft laws passing through three major policy-making ‘arenas’: the CCP central apparatus; the State Council (China’s cabinet and its ministries); and the National People’s Congress system. Law-making processes and power relationships among these arenas are not clearly defined--either formally or informally--and continue to evolve.”<sup>32</sup> Thus, the National People’s Congress (NPC), the formal national-level legislature, is not a national legislature as it is conceived in the West. Though some in China were hoping for a “new era of rule of law,” when Xi proclaimed, in 2012, “[i]n essence, the rule of law is rule by the Constitution; the key to law-based governance is Constitution-based governance,” this has not occurred. As Economy explains, “[i]n the West the rule of law was developed as a means of restraining arbitrary actions by those in power. In China, however, the rule of law is equated with rule by law or ruling the country according to law. The law is an instrument with which the Communist Party can ensure the dominance of the party itself.” Xi has used legal reform “to strengthen the coercive power of the state,” and has cracked down on lawyers, journalists and others deemed to be “working to overthrow the Communist Party.”<sup>33</sup>

### ***Judiciary***

The judiciary at all levels are appointed by the CCP. There have been attempts to professionalize them in recent years, making sure more of the appointees have actual knowledge of the law, for instance, but “[i]ts principle purpose is to serve as part of the apparatus of social control, alongside the police and prosecutors’ offices. Verdicts are subject to review and modification by senior party leaders at each level.”<sup>34</sup> There is a Supreme People’s Court, but its rulings are subject to change by the politburo.

### ***Foreign Relations***

While under Deng and his two immediate successors China pursued an international strategy of a “peaceful rise,” Xi is focused on achieving the Chinese dream. With Xi at the helm “Chinese leaders have . . . shed the low-profile foreign policy advanced by Deng Xiaoping in favor of bold initiatives to reshape the global order.”<sup>35</sup> Xi has thus advocated, among other policies “big country diplomacy,” and has insisted he will “make China’s voice heard, and inject more Chinese elements into international rules.”<sup>36</sup>

-- China has tried to promote a positive international image through media, Confucius Institutes (more than 400 worldwide, funded by the PRC to teach Chinese language and culture), government think tanks and especially the Belt and Road Initiative, a huge global infrastructure scheme. Only partially effective, polling indicates Africa has “the highest popular approval ratings

for China,” at over 70 percent. In 2016 the approval rate for China was 36 percent for Americans. In Europe ratings vary from 57 to 26 percent, while in Australia it is 52 percent, and in Japan popular approval of China reaches its lowest, at 11 percent.<sup>37</sup>

-- A contradiction at the center of its foreign policy, “while China takes advantage of the openness of the United States and other market-based liberal democracies to further its economic interests and advance its political and cultural influence, it increasingly constrains opportunities for foreign actors to participate in China’s political and economic development.”<sup>38</sup>

-- The CCP prefers bilateral negotiations of international interests, because the power disparity gives it the advantage in almost every case.<sup>39</sup> Its case for world leadership is not helped, particularly in the West, by periodic outbursts from Chinese leaders, such as from PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi in 2016. Responding to a question at a joint press conference from a Canadian reporter about human rights violations in China, “Wang attacked the reporter, angrily stating ‘Your question is full of prejudice and against China and arrogance . . . I don’t know where that comes from. This is totally unacceptable . . . other people don’t know better than Chinese people about human rights condition in China, and it is the Chinese people who are in the best position to have a say about China’s human rights situation.’”<sup>40</sup>

### ***International Government Organizations (IGOs)***

China is part of several International Governmental Organizations or IGOs, for instance the: Association of Southeast Asia Regional Forum on Security, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, East Asian Community and Group of Eight Plus Five [Plus One].

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*Every Communist must grasp the truth, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.<sup>41</sup>*

*The PLA's involvement in politics has been evident in every key political crisis since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC).<sup>42</sup>*

## Strategy and Armed Forces of PRC

### Strategy

Since the PRC's founding in 1949, the PRC's armed forces -- more precisely, the CCP's armed forces -- have been shaped by nine sets of strategic guidelines, three of which constitute national security strategies that "marked efforts to transform the PLA in order to wage war in a new kind of way."<sup>43</sup> A major principle of all strategies after 1949 has been "active defense," which focuses on strategic defense and assumes an enemy "numerically or technologically" superior.<sup>44</sup> In 1956 the PLA adopted a strategy that required upgrading the army from mostly infantry to partially mechanized, and adding naval and air forces (to defend against invasion of the homeland in combined operations).<sup>45</sup> In 1980, particularly concerned about a Soviet threat, the PLA adopted "a forward defense that would be based on positional warfare and supplemented by small-scale mobile warfare."<sup>46</sup> In 1993, with the demise of the Soviet Union, and the lessons of the Gulf War, in particular, in mind, the CCP made its third major change in strategy, which remains its primary strategy, albeit with tweaks, today, translated as "Winning Local Wars under High-Technology Conditions." It focuses on "different types of local or limited wars China might fight around its periphery."<sup>47</sup> The strategy places a premium on joint operations. In 2004 and 2014 China adjusted this strategy, stressing, in 2004, that China must fight in "informatized" conditions. This strategy adjustment added concerns for new domains, maritime and outer space, as well as digital. In 2014 new strategic guidelines were published for the ninth and, so far, final time since 1949. Called "Winning Informatized Local War," it further emphasizes the information-aspects of modern war, calling, for instance, "space and cyber domains . . . the 'commanding heights of strategic competition.'"<sup>48</sup>

### ***People's Liberation Army (PLA)***

The PLA was founded August 1, 1927,<sup>49</sup> the month and day reflected in the 8 and 1 characters on its flag and symbols. Recently, the PLA has been reorganized in sweeping ways, as outlined in China's 2019 Defense White Paper, published July 22. Beginning in 2016 the reorganization aimed to produce "a modern and specialized military capable of fighting and winning wars in the information age."<sup>50</sup> Seven Military Regions were replaced by five theater commands: "East, South, West, North, and Central, in protocol order,"<sup>51</sup> which are joint commands and which report directly to the Central Military Committee (CMC); four General Departments were abolished; a new army centralized command, to match those of the other services, was formed; operational command and control now proceeds from the CMC's new Joint Staff Department; established the CMC Chairman Responsibility System (making Xi, CMC chairman, the commander in chief); and established the Rocket Force (PLARF) as a fourth branch of service. The PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSC) was also established, which some consider a fifth service – it does report directly to the CMC – but it is probably better compared to a functional command.<sup>52</sup>

-- Since the PLA has not engaged in combat since its 1979 conflict with Vietnam, its capabilities remain untested.

-- In addition, as in all sectors of China's economy, graft and corruption are problems in the PLA, which for decades ran many business concerns. Jiang Zemin directed the PLA to divest itself of its business holdings in 1998. Twenty years later, Xi did the same thing in 2018, giving the PLA until the end of the year to comply.<sup>53</sup>

### ***PLA Army (PLAA)***

In 2015 Xi announced a 300,000-person reduction in the PLAA, and its 18 group armies were reduced to 13. The numbering of these group armies was changed from 71-83, "because 70 corps existed in the PLA at the time the People's Republic of [China](#) was created in 1949. This presumably allows Xi to start the corps with a clean slate."<sup>54</sup> The reduction in endstrength followed reductions announced in 1985, 1987, 1990, 1997 and 2003, bringing down the overall numbers of the PLA from about four million to less than 2.3 million. The PLAA is estimated to number about 1.3 million. The maneuver units of the PLAA, for the most part, are organized as army groups-brigades-battalions, though some divisions – mechanized infantry, motorized infantry and amphibious operations – as well as specialized regiments, remain. The PLAA has both internal and external security roles. President Xi has announced goals of a "modernised army" by 2035, and "one of the world's greatest armies" by 2050."<sup>55</sup>

### ***PLA Air Force (PLAAF)***

The PLAAF is growing in importance under Xi's reforms. Its troops numbering about 325,000, the PLAAF has engaged in a vigorous modernization program, including "combat aircraft, weaponry, support aircraft (including transports), air defence missiles, and airborne troops."<sup>56</sup> Similar to army, the air force is reorganizing, "with the old division/regiment/squadron structure being progressively replaced by a brigade-type establishment,"<sup>57</sup> though some air divisions currently remain. Its missions "include air defence, medium-range nuclear weapon delivery, attack, close

air support (CAS), anti-aircraft missile and gun defence. . . support for airborne forces . . . the PLAAF may also be preparing to undertake a new mission of long-range strategic strike.”<sup>58</sup> The PLAAF is focused on increasing and improving the indigenous aircraft in its inventory, as well as developing and including UAVs. Flight-training hours have increased, but still do not match those of Taiwan’s military pilots. Not active, so far, in China’s PKO missions abroad, the PLAAF has been increasingly active, especially in the East and South China Seas, where it has gained a reputation, especially among Japanese and U. S. military pilots, of provocative and even dangerous approaches by its aircraft. In 2014 President Xi visited PLAAF headquarters to extol the importance of the air force in the new type of military China was to create. At the end of March, this year, “PLAAF jets crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait” for the first time in two decades,<sup>59</sup> a clear message from Xi about how important he considers the PLAAF in what has been a core interest of the CCP since 1949.

### ***PLA Navy (PLAN)***

The PLAN has 235,000 personnel, including about 26,000 in the PLAN Air Force (and about 600 aircraft), and some 30,000 marines. Reports posit the “navy personnel would grow by some 15% in conjunction with the expansion of the PLAN Marine Corps.”<sup>60</sup> The PLAN has been integral to Xi’s plan of achieving the Chinese Dream of rejuvenation; “Since 2012, China’s armed forces have deployed vessels on over 4,600 maritime security patrols and 72,000 rights protection and law enforcement operations and safeguarded maritime peace, stability and order.”<sup>61</sup> The PLAN is organized into three fleets, North, East and South. The navy has been particularly active regionally, in the East China (ECS), South China (SCS) and Yellow Seas, but has deployed to the Mediterranean, in 2011, conducted NEO operations off Libya and Yemen, in 2011 and 2015, respectively, established a permanent base in Djibouti, in 2017, and participated in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, among other operations. In the ECS China has increasingly contested waters around the islets each country claims, called the Senkaku in Japan and the Daoyutai in China. In the SCS China has been much more active; the PRC claims practically all of the SCS as sovereign territory, including the Spratley and Paracel islands, which are also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. Since 2013 China has aggressively pursued reclamation and militarization of features: “As of June 2015, [China](#) had reclaimed more than 2,900 acres (1,170 hectares) of land. The DoD asserted ‘[China](#) has now reclaimed 17 times more land in 20 months than the other claimants combined over the past 40 years, accounting for approximately 95% of all reclaimed land in the Spratly islands.”<sup>62</sup> Despite a promise from President Xi to the contrary, China has militarized the islands, including airfields, radar and jamming facilities, barracks and missile installations.<sup>63</sup>

-- In its “submarine, surface vessel, naval aviation, marine corps, and coastal defence arms,” the PLAN maintains a wide array of vessels and equipment, as it progresses from a formerly coastal focus to a “green-water,” (up to the first island chain, including Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines), and by 2050, a bluewater (up to the second island chain, including Guam, the Marianas and Indonesia) capability.<sup>64</sup> A particular focus has been aircraft carriers, with one, bought from Ukraine, in service, a second undergoing sea trials, a third in production and more planned.

***PLA Rocket Force (PLARF)***

Formerly the Second Artillery, the PLARF was designated as such on December 31, 2015. Its mission remains nuclear deterrence – by way of surviving a first attack to launch a nuclear counterattack<sup>65</sup>-- and the new service now controls conventional ballistic as well as cruise missiles. The PLARF is estimated at 100,000 personnel, and has “six army-level bases numbered 51 to 56. Each base is composed of at least three launch brigades plus supporting units such as training, transportation, warhead storage and handling, repair and maintenance, and communications.”<sup>66</sup> While the nuclear mission remains unchanged, and has been relatively detached from China’s conventional military strategy, conventional missiles are key to the PRC’s military hopes, in keeping the U. S. and other adversaries outside of the first island chain, in case of a conflict, or as first salvos to take out key military, communications and political target in Taiwan, in case the PRC invades the island.

***PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSSF)***

While not a fifth service, the PLASSF reports directly to the CMC, and is integral to the PLA’s concept of informatized operations. It has two subcomponents, a Space Systems Department and a Network Systems Department and it “combines assorted space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities from across the PLA services and its former General Departments.”<sup>67</sup> Numbers and budget for the PLASSF are unclear, but it is often compared to both the U. S. Space and the U. S. Cyber Command. Unlike its U. S. counterparts, the PLASSF – like the rest of the PLA – has domestic as well as external missions. Its troops hack Chinese citizens and entities as well as foreign, for instance.<sup>68</sup>

**Law Enforcement in China*****People’s Armed Police (PAP)***

The People’s Armed Police were formed in 1982, after a large segment of demobilized PLAA soldiers were so redesignated, though the force retained much of their equipment and rank structure. Originally under the dual control of the CMC and the State Council, the PAP has been under the sole control of the CMC since December 2017. In 2018 the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) was placed under the PAP in 2018, “its formal name to become the Maritime Police Contingent.”<sup>69</sup> Having been divested of other missions, including border patrol, firefighting and resource protection, the PAP has “three core missions – internal security, maritime security and supporting the PLA in times of war,”<sup>70</sup> while the CCG’s missions, which remain largely unchanged, “include combating maritime crimes, protecting maritime security, developing maritime resources, maritime ecological protection, and fisheries management.”<sup>71</sup> Estimates of the number of PAP personnel vary widely, some sources saying 800,000 or more,<sup>72</sup> while others posit around 660,000.<sup>73</sup> Though the numbers involved, nature of and the specifics of operations are unpublished, it is clear a significant portion of PAP has been involved, for a number of years, in what the CCP describes as counterterrorism in Xinjiang. Its maritime arm, the CCG, has “more than 130 ships, making it by far the largest coast guard force.”<sup>74</sup> As well its fleet includes “two

12,000 tonne cutters – the largest coast guard ships in the world.”<sup>75</sup> The CCG has been the centerpiece of China’s campaign to normalize its claims over disputed territories in the East and South China Seas.

-- The CCG is aided in its coercion and harassment campaigns – conducted in accordance with PLA doctrine to coerce adversaries at a level short of going to war – by the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). The PAFMM, “the only government-sanctioned maritime militia in the world,” has harassed shipping from U. S. naval vessels to Filipino and Vietnamese fishermen. Numbers are difficult to judge. Some vessels are owned outright by the PRC, many others are rented, and others are fishing vessels outfitted by China, but functioning only part-time in a militia role. Likewise, some members of the PAFMM receive government salaries and are full time, while many more are part-time.<sup>76</sup>

### ***Ministries of Public Security and State Security***

In a society subjected to rule by law, rather than rule under law, and given the PRC’s endemic corruption, it is no surprise police operations have undergone several attempts at reform to root out abuses.<sup>77</sup> Especially since the reforms instituted to the PAP in December 2017, civilian police force operations have been consolidated under the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). Since the 2018 implementation of the reforms, MPS now manages the Border Defense Force, and Guards Force,<sup>78</sup> as well as civilian police forces. Numbers are hard to come by, and can range from 1.6 million to 4.8 million. Even the latter number is low, as it would constitute only 11 police officers per 10,000 Chinese citizens. With these low numbers in mind, though, police work is embedded within the CCP idea that “[t]he principle of policing is reliance on the masses and related informal organizations. There are 1.2 million public security committees throughout the country with more than 5.8 million members. There are also 2.6 million public security groups, with 6.3 million members. Totally, there are more than 3.8 million public security organizations with about 12 million people.”<sup>79</sup> Along with the PLA, and the MPS, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) is a body that focuses on Cyber operations.<sup>80</sup> In contrast to U. S. entities like the National Security Agency or U. S. Cyber Command, MSS operations target domestic as well as international targets.



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*When Heaven is about to confer a great office on any man it first exercises his mind with suffering, and his sinews and bones with toil. It exposes his body to hunger, and subjects him to extreme poverty. It confounds his undertakings. By all these methods it stimulates his mind, hardens his nature, and supplies his incompetencies<sup>81</sup>*

-- Mencius

## Economy of PRC

Deng Xiaoping's exhortation "It is glorious to get rich," is well known. Less well known is what the diminutive paramount leader, tempered in the Mencian way mentioned above, had to say soon after opening China to market forces: "Socialism means eliminating poverty. Pauperism is not socialism, still less communism. The superiority of the socialist system lies above all in its ability to develop the productive forces and to improve the people's material and cultural life." Setting aside questionable assertions, Deng's homily reveals a concern that has been consistent from the Deng era until now: that Chinese incomes continue to increase, and their quality of life continue to improve. This was not out of the kindness of the hearts of the leaders involved, but has to do with their first priority: staying in charge. The CCP's claim to legitimacy is "derived almost entirely from delivering on the promise of prosperity."<sup>82</sup> Xi Jinping, singular as his leadership so far has been, is not immune from this. His predecessor, Hu Jintao promised to double both China's GDP and the per capita income between 2010 and 2020. Xi reaffirmed the goals when he came to power, but a variety of factors may prevent China from achieving these goals.<sup>83</sup> Last year, "China's economic growth in 2018 was the slowest since 1990."<sup>84</sup> This year's latest figures indicate a growth rate of 6.2 percent for the second quarter for 2019, below the rate needed to achieve the doubling goals, and though the CCP "has started to spend more on infrastructure, a tried and tested method in China for revving up growth," Xi "has declared containing financial risks is a matter of national security," and there is a great deal of concern in the CCP leadership about China's level of debt. Huge economic bailouts similar to the past are thus unlikely. *The Economist* warns "get used to headlines about Chinese growth at multi-decade lows. They are likely to appear again in three months and, again, three months after that."<sup>85</sup>

-- In 2010 China's GDP passed that of Japan, making China the second wealthiest country in the world. From 1978 China averaged more than 10% GDP growth a year, "the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history,"<sup>86</sup> but its growth has slowed down since 2012. China is a manufacturing powerhouse, and many think the export of manufactured goods has led China's GDP expansion, but infrastructure investment has been the true engine of growth. China leads the world in many categories of infrastructure, now, but the previous pace is unsustainable. Since 2006, the CCP has been "faced with significant production overcapacity in sectors such as steel, cement and coal."<sup>87</sup>

-- The Bridge and Road Initiative, or BRI, has been seen "at least a partial way out,"<sup>88</sup> of this dilemma. Originally described as a new Silk Road, the plan in 2015 included "sixty nations in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe." By 2017 "all the countries in the world" had been

invited to participate. Analysts estimate China has a \$40 billion fund focused only on BRI, “alongside pledges of over \$100 billion in project financing through its banks.”<sup>89</sup> Not only an economic strategy, China’s hopes to burnish its world leadership with the initiative, as “[i]n theory, participating countries will become tied to China through trade and investment, culture, finance, and potentially even security.” Some countries are leery, worried about a debt trap,<sup>90</sup> or, like India, about “the degree of Chinese economic penetration or naval encirclement the BRI might bring about.”<sup>91</sup>

-- In its economic development China has tried to climb the value-added ladder, with some success. The CCP has an industrial policy, and having earlier decided to move into the high-technology sector, now wants to focus on such things as artificial intelligence and electric cars. Its tightening grip on information flow, a lack of “intellectual property rights protection . . . appetite for risk, and a willingness to fail,” as well as “a long timeframe for investment,”<sup>92</sup> makes innovation problematic, and innovation is necessary in the creation of break-out products that then garner global market share – which China distinctly lacks -- but also for competing in already established technology markets. China certainly does better in the latter, but “across publicly listed technology, media, and telecommunications (TMT) companies, last year’s earnings dropped 140 percent from 2017 — a larger plunge than any other Chinese sector.”<sup>93</sup>

-- Another problem China’s economy has is excessive debt: “China’s total debt-to-GDP ratio hit 300 percent in 2018, with corporate and public at 160 percent of GDP last year, compared with 90 percent in 2008. Some economists think the country’s debt problem could drag down global economic growth, or even cause a new financial crisis, while others think China’s economy still has so far to grow that the huge debt burden will evaporate with inflation.”<sup>94</sup>

-- Demographics present another significant concern for China’s economy. China is rapidly growing old, and it has not yet reached per capita level of wealth that other countries facing the same dilemma, like Japan and Korea, have. Those countries are developed and, in other words, rich. In the PRC’s case, “As a result of China’s previous ‘one child’ policy, enacted in 1979, the country is destined to grow old before it becomes rich, at least by Western standards.”<sup>95</sup> Just four years ago in “2014, the share of China’s population older than 60 reached roughly 15 percent; demographers predict that figure will double by 2050, reaching the equivalent of nearly 450 million people, or about one-quarter of the world’s elderly.”<sup>96</sup> Median age will increase to around 45. Productivity will decrease and costs for support to the elderly will increase.

-- Yet another economic challenge China faces is the current trade war with the United States. PBSC member Wang Yang said recently “the trade war could trim as much as 1 per cent,” from China’s GDP.<sup>97</sup> China has already demonstrated one weapon in its trade war arsenal:



devaluing the yuan against the dollar. Chinese officials had explained a few years ago that one of the lessons they took from the “global financial crisis” was to manage the value of their country’s currency: “The capital account convertibility China is seeking to achieve is not based on the traditional concept of being fully or freely convertible . . . China will adopt a concept of

managed convertibility.”<sup>98</sup> President Xi has said China must ready itself for a new Long March, regarding this trade war,<sup>99</sup> so this managed convertibility will likely become an issue again.

-- Unrest in Hong Kong may also represent economic risk. While Hong Kong's economic contribution to China's GDP has shrunk from twenty percent in 1997, when it was handed back to China under a one-country, two-systems deal, it still makes up three percent. Under Xi, the PRC's economy has stopped opening to the international economy and has become more closed, in some respects. As a result:

Hong Kong's economy is disproportionately useful to China. It has a status within a body of international law and rules that gives it seamless access to Western markets. The status is multifaceted. It includes: a higher credit rating; lower risk-weights for bank and counterparty exposures; the ability to clear dollars easily; independent membership of the WTO; "equivalence" status for its stock exchange with those in America, Europe and Japan; recognition as a "developed" stockmarket by index firms and co-operation agreements with other securities regulators.<sup>100</sup>

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*The frontiers of the political state have fluctuated through the centuries, but the area of Chinese civilization has steadily increased. No territory once fully subjected to this civilization has ever been wholly lost, and no territory permanently incorporated in the Chinese area has withstood the penetration of Chinese culture. The process of absorption has sometimes been slow, but always complete and final. This fluidity of frontiers is explained by the fact that the Chinese are less a nation than a fusion of peoples united by a common culture, and the history of China is the record of an expanding culture, not that of a conquering empire.<sup>101</sup>*

*The recorded Sinitic surnames of rulers, alone, does not indicate Han origin, necessarily, as many times those are adopted rather than original surnames.<sup>102</sup>*

### Political and Social Stressors

There are numerous stressors in Chinese society. As mentioned in the introduction, Han ethnicity, though claimed by a majority of the population, is contestable, yet abuse of non-Han minorities in China, including, among other minority groups, Uighurs, other Muslims and Tibetans, involving police harassment, mass incarceration and even forced sterilizations of Uighur women in detention camps, is a major social stressor.<sup>103</sup> Another stressor, and one of the biggest concerns of everyday citizens is corruption. According to David Lampton, at least up until 2010, the overwhelming majority of surveyed Chinese citizens – no matter where they lived in China – felt their local officials were corrupt.<sup>104</sup> Widespread corruption can be traced, not only to long-standing tradition, but to the fact that CCP officials, in order to be promoted, must produce economic gain in their respective locales. As further incentive, the CCP allowed “local governments to keep surplus revenues and use them for their own purposes.”<sup>105</sup> In a huge country that has grown so quickly, with no rule of law to limit abuses, Fukuyama cites Minxin Pei, who “argues that China’s gradual political transition has resulted in a system of ‘decentralized predation,’ in which locally empowered officials throughout an enormous government system take advantage of the opportunities provided by their political control to extract a host of rents and bribes.”<sup>106</sup>

### Narratives of China

The Open Source Center and Monitor 360 have published a number of what they call *Master Narratives*, which help to identify and explain the “historically grounded stories that reflect a community’s identity and experiences, or explain its hopes, aspirations, and concerns”. The insights gleaned from the narratives “can be used to better understand critical audience segments and key influencers, build analytic capabilities, and develop actionable messaging and counter-messaging strategies”. The following borrows directly from the seven narratives found in *Master Narratives, Country Report: China*, which was produced in March, 2012.

### Wealth and Power

Ever since Western imperialism reduced China—a great ancient civilization and world power—to poverty and weakness in the nineteenth century, the Chinese people have searched for ways to restore the country's wealth and power. The Chinese people stood up in 1949 and have made remarkable progress in the reform era. Although Western countries still plot to keep China down, China must continue to adopt whatever is useful from more advanced countries to develop its economy and military, and it will inevitably reclaim its rightful place as a world power.

### ***China's Rightful Place in the World***

China played a central role in the world for over two thousand years until Western and Japanese imperialist aggression led to a century of humiliation. Even though China stood up when the CPC came to power, capitalist powers led by the United States have sought to contain China. China must focus on economic growth and keep a low profile on international issues beyond its core interests until its economy is strong and stable. China can then take on a greater role in the world and resume its rightful place as a dominant power at the center of the East Asian regional order.

### ***Only the Communist Party Can Save China***

While prior attempts to modernize failed, the CPC's founding in 1921 set the Chinese people on the road to independence and prosperity. Only the CPC could save China, uniting the country to defeat imperialist aggression. The Chinese people stood up, becoming masters of their country, and creating unprecedented ethnic unity. The CPC established a socialist system with Chinese characteristics and launched a great new revolution of reform and opening up. China must forge ahead with reform and opening up to build a socialist market economy while maintaining unity and stability.

### ***To Get Rich is Glorious***

Since Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms reversed nearly two decades of economic stagnation and political turmoil, the CPC has guided China to a miraculous leap in economic development and delivered on Deng's promise to make people wealthy. The Chinese people's lives are unimaginably better than just a generation ago. While problems such as pollution and food safety persist, party leaders are addressing these issues. The CPC must continue to maintain political stability and economic growth and prevent problems from threatening China's economic development.

### ***Quest for Social Justice***

Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms produced over three decades of astounding growth and created enormous wealth for those fortunate enough to be in the right place at the right time. However, China's rise now appears to be coming at the expense of the health and welfare of many ordinary Chinese citizens, and of the country's environment. The

government must fix this ever-widening disparity in rights, opportunity, and income and create a more just society for all Chinese citizens.

### ***Restoration of the Great Tradition***

China is a glorious 5000-year old culture that was nearly destroyed by Western imperialism. Modernization has made China materially prosperous, but has created a spiritual void and moral decline in society that Western values cannot fill. China must revive its traditional values in order to restore both the health of society and the country's rightful place as a world power.

### ***Quest for Democracy***

China's historic transformation since the mid-nineteenth century exposed the decadence of traditional Chinese autocracy and paved the way for unprecedented change. Even though the CPC has delivered impressive economic growth and allowed a measure of individual freedom and civil society, lack of political reform prevents China from becoming a truly modern nation. Chinese citizens must band together to fulfill the dream of establishing a democratic political system that embraces universal values.

### ***Tibetans Demand True Autonomy***

Tibetans have a unique ethnicity, language, and culture and have historically managed their own affairs. When the CPC established the "Tibetan Autonomous Region" in 1949, the Han government promised that Tibetans could maintain their language and culture, as well as practice their religion under His Holiness, the Dalai Lama. The government reneged on this promise, however, and hatred of Han repression is now widespread. Tibetans must unite in the struggle for genuine autonomy and demand the Dalai Lama's return so that they can preserve their culture and freely practice their religion.

### ***The Oppressed Uyghurs***

Xinjiang was once an independent Uyghur territory, but the People's Liberation Army imposed Han rule over the region in 1949. Ever since, the Han government has encroached on the Uyghur way of life and has treated Uyghurs as unequal subjects. Han discrimination poses a grave danger to Uyghur culture. Uyghurs must prevent Han interference in their religion and demand the use of Uyghur as Xinjiang's primary language, equal access to jobs, and an equal share in the fruits of economic development. Ultimately, Uyghurs should press for restoring an independent Uyghur state.

### ***Religion in China***

The CCP's official ideology is atheist, but religious affiliation in China, during the more open era of Dengist policies, was flourishing. However, as in most other matters, Xi saw a need for control: "In 2016, President Xi Jinping highlighted the need to Sinicize China's five official religions—Islam,

Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, and Taoism—in order to ‘actively guide them to adapt to socialist society.’ At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi [reinforced](#) his intentions: ‘We will fully implement the party’s basic policy on religious affairs, insist on the Sinicization of Chinese religions, and provide active guidance for religion and socialism to coexist.’”<sup>107</sup> To further consolidate this control, “China released [new regulations](#) in 2017 on religious organizations and their activities, including an explicit ban on any unregistered religious activities.”<sup>108</sup> And to insure religious bodies receive the active guidance required, “all religious organizations now report directly to the Chinese Communist Party. You Quan, the head of the United Front, [emphasized](#): ‘The party’s leadership over religious work must be upheld.’”<sup>109</sup>

POLITICAL  
SOCIALMILITARY  
**INFRASTRUCTURE**ECONOMIC  
INFORMATION**Infrastructure in China**

-- Unless otherwise cited, the following facts and figures come from the CIA World Factbook, China.<sup>110</sup>

**Infrastructure for Growth**

It is likely China has made more strides, faster, in physical infrastructure than any country in history. But, given China's size – an old Chinese proverb says “the mountains are high, and the Emperor is far away.” Thus, despite the centralized planning tradition of the CCP, “[b]ecause urban infrastructure is also a local (sub-provincial) responsibility, a vast majority of spending is done by local governments.”<sup>111</sup> The CCP incentivized local cadres “by in effect permitting local governments to keep surplus revenues and use them for their own purposes.”<sup>112</sup> Given this fact, as well as the fact that cadre are promoted in the CCP based on whether or not their particular locales made money in a year's time and the tradition of graft in the country, it is unsurprising so many infrastructure projects, “often poorly built *doufu* (bean curd) construction, decays rapidly and requires serious maintenance almost as soon as it is completed.”<sup>113</sup> It is also unsurprising, as Michael Beckley has said, “China has the world's largest number of useless infrastructure projects.”<sup>114</sup>

***Electricity and Natural Gas***

Electricity production -- 5.883 trillion kWh (2016 est.), number one in the world

-- Electricity consumption -- 5.564 trillion kWh (2016 est.), number one in the world

[Natural gas - production](#) -- 145.9 billion cu m (2017 est.), sixth in the world

-- [Natural gas - consumption](#) -- 238.6 billion cu m (2017 est.), third in the world

***Water and Sanitation*****[Drinking water source:](#)**

-- Improved: urban: 97.5% of population

-- Rural: 93% of population

Sanitation facility access:

-- Improved: urban: 86.6% of population (2015 est.)

-- Rural: 63.7% of population (2015 est.)

***Food***

World leader in gross value of agricultural output; rice, wheat, potatoes, corn, tobacco, peanuts, tea, apples, cotton, pork, mutton, eggs; fish, shrimp



***Roads, Airports, and Railways***

Roads -- 4,773,500 km (2017), 2<sup>nd</sup> in the world

-- Paved: 4,338,600 km (includes 136,500 km of expressways) (2017)

-- Unpaved: 622,000 km (2017)

Airports (paved -- 463 (2017)

Rail -- 131,000 (2018), 2<sup>nd</sup> in the world

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## Information in China

As China opened up to the world, under Dengist policies, the CCP's attitude towards a free flow of information fluctuated, with "periods of relative openness punctuated by periods of renewed restraint."<sup>115</sup> Xi cracked down, as he has done in so many areas, unwilling to allow any criticism of the Party to surface. Soon after assuming power he issued an internal Party directive, listing "taboos for all institutions, including the media. The list included a warning against 'the West's idea of journalism' and freedom of the press, which it said was meant to 'oppose the Party's leadership in the media, and gouge an opening through which to infiltrate our ideology.'"<sup>116</sup> These policies have "taken China rapidly into reverse in ways that are disturbingly reminiscent of the pre-reform era."<sup>117</sup> And this is manpower intensive. The Chinese are online: "According to a recent report from the China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC), the number of internet users in China amounted to 829 million at the end of 2018, with a penetration rate close to 60 percent."<sup>118</sup> An army of censors are online with Chinese citizens, carefully pruning thought critical of the Party or of Xi from the digital flora. But people are clever, and online communication is always morphing; it is likely people are finding ways to voice complaints and make criticisms in code that exists at least for a while before the censors catch on. Even the dedicated cleaners within China's Great Firewall will not be able to sweep away all critical thought all the time. But it will not be due to a lack of trying.

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## **Appendix F: Acronyms and Abbreviations**

CCP – Chinese Communist Party  
COCOM – Combatant Command  
DIME-FIL – Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement  
M&S – Models and Simulations  
MSD – Modeling & Simulation Directorate  
OE – Operational Environment  
OE&TA – Operational Environment & Threat Analysis  
PLA – People’s Liberation Army  
PMESII-PT – Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment and Time  
PRC – People’s Republic of China  
SMA – Strategic Multilayer Assessment (Joint Staff J-39)  
SME – Subject Matter Expert  
TRADOC – U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command  
USG – U.S. Government