





Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) of The Future of Global Competition & Conflict

And the Nature of Deterrence, Extended Deterrence, Compellence, Escalation Management, and Persuasion in a Dynamically Changing World





Timed Influence Net Application: Globally Integrated Ops Planning

6 November 2019



Outline: Support to Globally Integrated Ops Planning



Background: SMA Request

Globally Integrated Ops (GIO): Challenges and Goals

TIN Model Framework and Approach

- Identify US objectives to be protected or advanced, and adversary objectives that are likely to be detrimental to the U.S. and its global partners
- Identify potential U.S. and adversary shaping actions to achieve their respective objectives
- Identify potential **U.S.** and adversary response actions to each other's shaping actions and assess their impact on U.S. and adversary objectives
- Conduct experiments to assess effectiveness of possible U.S. and adversary shaping and response courses of action (COAs) and use to derive insights relative to GIO goals

Globally Integrated Operations Planning Insights



Globally Integrated Operations (GIO)



Challenge: Coordinate global activities and messaging to promote US objectives and disrupt adversary objectives detrimental to the U.S. and its global partners

Globally Integrated Operations Goals:

- Identify potential crises before they develop and manage escalation (to include de-escalation) favorable to the U.S.
- Identify and counter competitor shaping activities that limit U.S. freedom of action
- Coordinate, synchronize, and de-conflict activities and messages across COCOMs and with DoD partners (US and coalition)
- Counter competitor influence messaging when adverse to US objectives
- Assess intent of adversary activities (and messaging) and respond where appropriate
- Assess adversary assessment of U.S. and partner global activities and messages
- Assess risk of potential U.S. and partner mitigation options



Assessment of the Future of Global Competition & Conflict



J39 Request: Develop a sound understanding of the future of global competition and conflict, and the nature and characteristics of warfare, deterrence, extended deterrence, compellence, escalation management, and persuasion in a dynamically changing world

- Strategize to defend its global interests against activities across the spectrum of competition that are intended to undercut those interests
- Defend U.S. interests against threats by regional competitors in ways that are complementary to U.S. strategy vis-a-vis China and Russia but which do not undercut other U.S. interests
- Prepare the Joint Force to respond to inevitable unexpected developments in global politics and technology development, including identifying key areas that must be considered in order to effectively address opportunities for cooperation to mitigate the threat of activities short of armed conflict and to deter armed conflict



THE JOINT STAFF

Reply ZIP Code: 20318-3000

5 November 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR the Joint Staff J-39 Strategic Multilayer Assessmen


SUBJECT: (U) Assessment of the Future of Global Competition & Conflict

- 1. At my request, the Joint Staff I-39 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) will initiate an effort to develop a sound understanding of the future of global competition and conflict, and the nature and characteristics of warfare, deterrence, extended deterrence, compellence, escalation management, and persuasion in a dynamically changing world. This assessment will consider these issues from the present to 2029, and will determine how the U.S. should:
 - Strategize to defend its global interests against activities across the spectrum of competition that are intended to undercut those interests;
 - Defend U.S. interests against threats by regional competitors in ways that are complementary to U.S. strategy vis-à-vis China and Russia but which do not undercut other U.S. interests: and
 - Prepare the Joint Force to respond to inevitable unexpected developments in global
 politics and technology development, including identifying key areas (e.g., trade,
 commerce, diplomacy, cyber, environment, etc.) that must be considered in order to
 effectively address opportunities for cooperation and to mitigate the threat of
 activities short of armed conflict and deter armed conflict.
- 2. Both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy highlight that the U.S. is entering a new era of increasing geopolitical competition. Many observers expect that future confrontations between major powers will most often occur below the level of armed conflict. In this environment, economic competition, influence campaigns, paramilitary actions, cyber intrusions, and political warfare are likely to take on greater roles. Such confrontations, especially between powers with significant military strength increase the risk of miscalculation that leads to armed conflict. In this context, the U.S. capability to influence the outcomes of both global and regional events must be reconsidered. In addition, the growing divergence amongst the great powers (i.e., U.S., China, and Russia) regarding what constitutes legitimate or acceptable deterrence, compellence, and escalation management activities should be carefully examined.
- To that end, the SMA effort needs to address the geopolitics of Russian and Chinese activities while building an enhanced fundamental understanding of the contemporary and future influence environment. See Tab A for key questions to address these geopolitical issues.



Timed Influence Net Globally Integrated Ops Framework





Note: China-Russia Interactions were also considered



China and Russia TIN Model Goals, Objectives



China Strategic Goal: Most powerful country in the world with China-led international order

- Global economic and trade leader
- Promote ideology across globe
- International socio-political leader (Chinese system)
- Regional security and economic hegemon
- Counter US influence in Pacific and other Chinese areas of interest

Russia Strategic Goal: Restore the Russian Empire with Russia-led international order

- Central and Eastern Europe, and Central Asia security hegemon
- Recognized global military power with favorable nuclear balance with respect to U.S.
- Expand Eurasia Economic Union
- International socio-political leader (balance of power politics)
- Counter US freedom of action in Europe and the Arctic

US TIN Model Strategic Goal, Objectives






US Strategic Goal: Leader of free world – democracy, freedoms, equality, justice, capitalism

- Favorable US balance of power in all regions security, economic, trade
- Atlantic, Pacific, and Southwest Asia security power
- Promote democracy and capitalism ideology
- US-led international order
- Pre-eminent global military power
- Counter Chinese socialist ideology across globe
- Counter Chinese influence in Northeast Asia
- Counter Russian influence in Europe and Central Asia



Timed Influence Net (TIN) Model COA Development







Notional China Shaping-Response Courses of Action



- CH action to limit US Global Political Influence
- CH action to contain US Global Freedom of Action
- CH action to eliminate domestic threat to Chinese Communist Party
- CH action to attain status as regional security guarantor
- CH action to impose Chinese Political-Economic order globally
- CH action to dominate International economy
- CH Action to control regional information environment
- CH Action to expand Chinese social order regionally
- CH Counter-US Action to stimulate economy



Notional Russian Shaping-Response Courses of Action



- RUS action to alter Nuclear Balance
- RUS actions to counter US relationship with Russian Federation Border States
- RUS action to challenge US freedom of action in Central Europe
- RUS action to alter International Order to Balance of Power Politics
- RUS actions to re-establish control in former Russian empire states
- RUS counter-West action to stimulate Russian economy
- RUS actions to expand Eurasia economic union
- RUS action to alter Global economic order to RUS-favored Relation Based order
- RUS actions to expand Russian social order to adjacent states
- RUS act to control domestic Information environment
- RUS act to control global information environment for socio-economic purposes



Notional USA Shaping-Response Courses of Action




- US Action to preserve military Advantage
- US Action to limit China NEA Security Role
- US Action to limit Russian European security role
- US action to limit Chinese access to US Information environment
- US action to limit Russian access to US Information environment
- US Counter-China action to stimulate US economy
- US action to expand US-led Socio-Economic order
- US action to control global economy
- US social order expanded into current China clients




TIN Model and Sample Output



Combined Objectives









- Comparing U.S. and competitor regional objectives and identifying those that are in conflict
 with one another will highlight likely areas of competition that could develop into crises and
 can also be used to develop indications and warning for monitoring purposes
 - Examples: Activities that advance competitor political, economic, and social systems, increase regional influence, promote acceptance as a regional security guarantor, or counter U.S. objectives in a region
 - This same approach can be used to envisage shaping strategies that a competitor might employ to limit U.S. freedom of action in a region—this enables the development of plans to counter these strategies that can be executed proactively in non-escalatory ways
- Since the activities of multiple US and partner agencies must be coordinated to provide synchronization and de-confliction, but no clear leader has been designated, it is difficult for the US to shape the environment and respond to aggressive competitors (such as China and Russia) effectively – Coordinating regional strategies through GIO can reduce this problem
 - For the same reason, it is also relatively easy for US competitors to identify and exploit seams in US/Partner lines of effort – The GIO "conductor" can use integrated campaign planning and Dynamic Force Employment to take away this current competitor advantage





- Since it is difficult to assess the intent of competitor activities, where the worst-case effect
 would undermine U.S. objectives in a region, planners can develop strategies to mitigate the
 potential nefarious effects and also prepare plans to counter the competitor strategies when
 they are no longer ambiguous
- US and partner activities in response (counter-shaping) to one competitor's actions can be
 easily misinterpreted by other competitors due to lack of context, as well as purposefully
 misinterpreted to use as leverage for their own counter-US or counter-West campaigns
 - Russia and China essentially have a single competitor (the US and its partners) so opportunistic activities can be conducted easily—very little planning required (compared to US and its partners)
- The risk of the US or partners taking actions to shape the environment as a prophylactic against competitor counter-west shaping activities is the potential for misinterpretation leading to a disturbance affecting regional stability and potential escalation to a crisis
 - However, a greater risk is to allow the competitor any advantage which would prevent the US and partners from later challenging a competitor's adverse behaviors or signal acceptance of a new "normal"



Summary: SMA Support to Globally Integrated Operations



TIN Model Framework examined use of global activities and messaging to promote US objectives and disrupt adversary objectives detrimental to the U.S. and its partners in support of US Globally Integrated Operations (GIO) goals:

- Identify potential crises before they develop and manage escalation favorable to the U.S.
- Identify and counter competitor shaping activities that limit U.S. freedom of action
- Coordinate, synchronize, and de-conflict activities and messages across COCOMs and with DoD partners (US and coalition)
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