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THE CENTER FOR ADVANCED RED TEAMING

UNIVERSITY AT ALBANY
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Red Teaming Report for Strategic Multilayer Assessment

Question B14: (Revised) How might Great Power Competition and regional dynamics change following the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani?

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About This Report

This research was conducted in support of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment initiative, through a collaborative effort between the College of Emergency Preparedness Homeland Security, and Cybersecurity (CEHC) and Rockefeller College (ROC) of the University at Albany (SUNY). The Strategic Dynamic Red Teaming exercise (SDRT) was implemented and subsequently analyzed by the Center for Advanced Red Teaming (CART).

This Report represents the opinions of its authors and should not be viewed as the opinions or policy of CEHC, ROC, the University at Albany (SUNY), NSI, the Department of Defense, or any other entity of the United States Government.

About the Center for Advanced Red Teaming

The Center for Advanced Red Teaming (CART) is an interdisciplinary Research Center within the College of Emergency Preparedness, Homeland Security and Cybersecurity at the University at Albany (SUNY). As the first academic center devoted to advancing the art and science of red teaming, CART seeks to develop research, practice and education in this growing area of security studies.

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Executive Summary

As a pilot study, the Center for Advanced Red Teaming conducted a series of four simulation sessions in January 2020 to explore the question of how Great Power Competition (GPC) and regional dynamics might change following the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani. These employed Strategic Dynamics Red Teaming, a technique that varies RED players across multiple simulations, while keeping BLUE and GREEN teams constant. Simulated actors included the PRC, Iran, and Russia as RED, the United States as BLUE and KSA, Israel and the EU as GREEN. Four simulation sessions were conducted, three of which involved experts and one student as participants. The process collects a variety of information relevant to gaining a picture of strategic developments over the simulated timeframe (2020-2022), including data on: longer-term strategic objectives, strategic assumptions, risk proclivities, shorter-term “operational” objectives, overt and covert actions and a post exercise strategic assessment.

Analysis of the collected data yielded a variety of expected developments, like Chinese economic expansion into the AOR and continued Iranian support for proxies in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. However, the simulations also revealed several developments that were less expected or displayed one or more novel characteristics. Among the more notable of these were:

- The PRC seeking to forward base Chinese naval and maritime patrol assets in the AOR (e.g., in Djibouti and Gwadar) and in several cases securing the right to build bases in the AOR.
- Russia acting to forcibly dissolve Iran’s militias in Syria, in coordination with the Assad regime.
- Iran conducting a false flag attempted attack against its own pipelines carrying oil to China and accusing the U.S. of trying to cut it off, in order to secure international sympathy and encourage the PRC to buy more Iranian oil and equip Iran with a modern fighter force.
- KSA working to develop its own version of the IRGC Quds Force, which would support the training of both sympathetic government and non-government actors in the region to curb Iranian influence.
- KSA establishing an alliance with the PRC and allowing China to purchase a lease for naval facilities on Saudi soil (ostensibly to aid in its deradicalization efforts).
- The EU creating and maintaining its own Freedom of Navigation mission in the Persian Gulf (with France and Germany in the lead).
- The United States stationing advanced tactical fighters and associated military personnel at bases in the north and south of Israel as part of a new strategic aerial effort in the region.
- The United States, using a cyberattack, causing an Iranian military plane to crash into the Fordow enrichment facility and planting doctored footage to make it seem that the Iranians shot it down via an anti-aircraft missile after mistaking it for an enemy plane.

Comparatively, all of the adversaries across most sessions had as an explicit strategic goal to diminish U.S. power and influence in the AOR and all three adversaries sought to expand their geopolitical influence in the AOR in at least one session. Both China and Iran in several sessions sought to create military and/or economic dependencies with state and non-state actors in the region. Russia and China both sought to expand their economic growth through engagement in the region, and both desired to increase their status as a regional diplomatic partner and convener. China also notably sought to secure vital energy resources, while (together with the EU) it was the only actor that had a deep desire to avoid the eruption of conflict in the region (especially between the United States and Iran). Somewhat surprisingly in the case of Iran, only one of four participants had acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability as an explicit strategic goal. With respect to overall strategic risk tolerance, Russia’s was the highest of the three RED adversaries, but it is noteworthy that the expert participants who played KSA, Israel and the United States in Sessions 1-3 all rated their countries’ risk tolerance higher than any of the adversaries in any of the sessions.

Across actors, simulation sessions and rounds, the most common shorter-term “operational” objectives were to increase economic ties and investments in the AOR and to coordinate diplomatically in order to



stabilize the region and prevent war between Iran and the United States. Both the PRC and Russia intended to force U.S. military personnel out from the AOR in most sessions. Perhaps as expected, both China and Russia in at least one session sought to increase their military presence in the region, but perhaps more surprisingly, both the expert and student participants representing the EU decided to increase the EU's naval activity in the Gulf. Turning to individual states, China generally attempted to reduce U.S. influence in the region and protect or expand their economic influence (through the Belt and Road Initiative). The PRC supported Iran politically but was also willing to work with all regional parties to avoid an open conflict. In addition to the goals noted above, Russia worked to marginalize Iran in Syria, as well as to undermine U.S. influence in the region, including through covert disinformation campaigns. It also sought to solidify and deepen its influence in Central Asia to counter an encroaching China and – unlike many of the other actors – actually looked to increase the price of oil, which would benefit it economically; therefore, regional instability could actually help Russia in this regard. Aside from those goals already mentioned, Iran in a single session worked to acquire and then later to relinquish a nuclear weapons program. It also sought to hinder traffic in the Straits of Hormuz and to lessen the effects of sanctions.

The most common overt actions across the four sessions were engaging in trade negotiations (or concluding trade deals), diplomatic offers to act as a peace broker between competing sides, and offers of (or activities demonstrating) peaceful cooperation between two or more states. Military aid and propaganda were also fairly common. There was only one case of major overt kinetic action (a missile strike by Iran against an American base in Oman). Unsurprisingly, the EU took the greatest number of overt actions, mainly acting diplomatically and economically. Somewhat more interestingly, Russia also took a large number of overt actions, primarily diplomatically, but also militarily. The bulk of United States actions were military in nature.

All of the actors in the simulations engaged in several different types of covert action. By far the most common type of covert action was backchannel discussions, threats and negotiations, but this was mainly due to their prolific use by the European Union. Prominent across multiple actors were espionage, cyberattacks, covert arms transfers, disinformation campaigns and funding sub-state proxies. With respect to differences across actors, the RED actors tended to utilize military covert actions, while GREEN and BLUE tended to engage in more intelligence-focused actions. The Great Power Competitors (United States, PRC and Russia) all engaged in disinformation campaigns in at least one session.

Extent to Which Participants Assessed Progress on Strategic Objectives by the End of the Simulated Period

Actor	Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4
People's Republic of China	+	+	/	++
Russia	+	+	+++	++
Iran	++	+	-	--
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	+	/	+	/
EU	--	--	--	++
Israel	+	+++	+	+
United States	+	-	+++	+

Key: -- = Substantial strategic setback; - = Moderate strategic setback; / = No strategic progress; + = Moderate strategic gain; ++ = Substantial strategic gain; +++ = High strategic gain

Although this effort represented only a pilot study, it demonstrated that Strategic Dynamics Red Teaming is capable of rapidly and at low cost exploring complex strategic dynamics in an AOR. Beyond merely narrative output, the multiple simulations involved allow for sophisticated analysis. For example, the study applied natural language processing techniques to the outputs of the exercises. While the results were only illustrative, they indicated that future SDRT studies could benefit from this approach.



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Introduction

As part of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment effort titled *Strategic Implications of Population Dynamics in the Central Region*, prepared for USCENTCOM, a need was identified to explore the effects of potential black swan scenarios in the CENTCOM AOR. The Center for Advanced Red Teaming (CART), at the University at Albany (SUNY) utilized a red team simulation approach to explore these types of events in a pilot set of simulations.

The study responded to the following specific question:

B14 (Revised):² *How might Great Power Competition (GPC) and regional dynamics change following the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani?*

The project's objective was thus to explore broader strategic dynamics in the CENTCOM AOR with respect to key competitors, namely the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), the People's Republic of China (China), and the Russian Federation (Russia) following the "shock" of the targeted killing of Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps' Qud's Force and the major architect of Iranian external military and covert activities in the region. The focus was on capturing a range of potential strategies employed by the key competitors – hereafter collectively referred to as RED in this report. An additional interest of the research team was in distinguishing strategic dynamics that appear to be "path dependent" based on systemic, structural forces from those which are more highly contingent on factors like leadership idiosyncrasies and particular moves by other players.

The project was led by Dr. Gary Ackerman, CART Director, with Mr. Douglas Clifford, CART Program Manager and Dr. Victor Asal, Professor of Political Science in Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy acting as co-Principal Investigators.

¹ For a definition and discussion of the red teaming approach, see: Gary A. Ackerman and Douglas Clifford, "Towards a Definition of Red Teaming," Center for Advanced Red Teaming (Albany, NY: University at Albany, 2019), available at: <https://www.albany.edu/sites/default/files/2019-11/CART%20Definition.pdf>.

² The original question from CENTCOM was listed as follows: *B14: (Black Swan) How might GPC and regional dynamics change if another 9-11 scenario occurred that emanated from the Central Region?* However, during the preparation of the study, the targeted killing of Soleimani occurred. This provided a real-world instance of an unanticipated shock to the region, which was felt to provide a better basis for the simulations. Furthermore, using this incident as the foundation of a simulation that was already at the advanced planning stages could provide CENTCOM with a rapid response analysis of the repercussions of a salient, real-world event. The envisaged occurrence of a large-scale terrorist attack on CONUS was incorporated into the later stages of the scenario, thus including the effects of this type of Black Swan as well.



Technical Approach

Simulation Method: The study used a specific type of red teaming, Strategic Dynamics Red Teaming (SDRT). This simulation technique utilizes multiple red team simulations of the same scenario, varying the RED actors, but keeping other actors constant where possible. It allows for examination of the strategic and operational considerations and actions of all players over multiple rounds. The current effort managed to conduct four iterations of the simulation.

Pilot: This effort was structured as an unfunded pilot, with the purpose of illustrating the potential value of the SDRT approach.

Actors: The simulation involved the following actors:

- RED TEAM: Iran, PRC, Russia
- BLUE TEAM: United States
- GREEN TEAM: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Israel, the European Union (EU).
- WHITE TEAM³: Exercise facilitators (representing the rest of the world)

Participants: The study involved independent sets of RED involved in four separate but identical, four-hour simulations conducted over a two-day period from January 20th to January 21st, 2020. Three of the four simulations involved senior scholars from the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy and the College of Emergency Preparedness, Homeland Security and Cybersecurity at the University at Albany. While some of these scholars possessed region-specific expertise in the AOR, others were drawn from a variety of disciplines, including Economics, Public Policy, and International Relations. Furthermore, these three simulations also had the same individuals playing BLUE, GREEN and WHITE. The fourth simulation involved graduate (primarily doctoral level) students and select undergraduate students who had completed their undergraduate degree. Appendix A provides a list of participants, positions and discipline.

Preparations: Preparations for the simulations began with the iterative development of a SDRT Protocol, incorporating feedback from SMA personnel. The protocol set the parameters for the scenario, laid out the scenario structure, provided a “script” for the flow of the simulation and prescribed necessary preparatory activities. The focus in the protocol was placed on ensuring that the simulations yielded the correct type and granularity of outputs in order to inform the project goals.

The protocol divides each simulation into four phases:

- Phase 0: Background Activities
- Phase 1: Introducing the Scenario and Simulation Parameters
- Phase 2: Order of Play (separated into three consecutive rounds)
- Phase 3: Hot-Wash and Assessment

A copy of the final protocol is attached as Appendix B.

Priming and Debiasing: To assist those participants with less expertise and familiarity with their roles, the research team prepared detailed role information for RED as well as KSA and the EU.⁴ Materials were disseminated to participants in advance of the simulation and consisted of: a) a primer on red teaming; b)

³ For a more in-depth explanation of Red Teaming terminology, see “Glossary of Common Red Teaming Terms,” Center for Advanced Red Teaming (Albany, NY: University at Albany, 2019), available at: <https://www.albany.edu/sites/default/files/2019-11/CART%20Glossary.pdf> .

⁴ The participant acting as Israel had extensive expertise in Israeli foreign policy, so providing detailed information was unnecessary, while the student playing Israel conducted her own preparations for the role.



a basic leadership profile for their country role, identifying the decision making structure and leader personality characteristics; c) any evidence of the country's current strategic orientation vis-à-vis the United States and the CENTCOM AOR; and d) a list of recent activities / actions by the country in connection with the CENTCOM AOR.

Cognitive and other biases are major impediments to obtaining useful results in simulations. There is some evidence that drawing attention to cognitive biases can mitigate them to a limited extent, so all participants were also asked to review, prior to the simulation, a presentation highlighting, in an engaging manner, several of the most prominent cognitive biases.

Summary of Simulation Content: During the simulation, participants formulated broad strategies and operational objectives according to interests, communicated with other actors, and iteratively responded to the overt and covert actions taken by other players, as follows (see Appendix B for more detail):

- a) Each simulation began with an introduction, followed by an exercise designed to acclimatize participants to their roles and limit mirror imaging bias.
- b) Participants then were asked to create a brief "Top Secret" strategic memo (shared only with the White Team) detailing their baseline strategic objectives with respect to both the United States and the AOR prior to December 15, 2019. It included their initial strategic assumptions (usually about the environment with respect to consideration of other state actors) and baseline risk tolerance.
- c) This was followed by the presentation of the scenario (which included excerpts from *The Economist* relating to the death of Soleimani), after which the simulation proper began.
- d) Each of the three rounds commenced at the beginning of 2020, 2021 and 2022 in simulated time, respectively. One-year intervals were selected to encourage participants to focus on the strategic levels of interaction.
- e) For each round, each participant established operational objectives with respect to the United States and the AOR for the upcoming year, conducted planning on how to achieve or advance said objectives, and selected overt and/or covert actions that their country would take during this time. The system allowed players to communicate overtly or covertly with other states during the planning phase.⁵
- f) At the end of each round, all actions were transmitted to the White Team, who synthesized these across actors and presented to all participants the overt actions taken by other actors over the period of the particular year, as well as the observable outcomes of covert actions (if applicable).
- g) After three rounds, the simulation concluded with a hot-wash out of role, where participants provided an evaluation of progress with respect to their country's strategic goals, changes in threat perceptions, what they believed CENTCOM should take away from the simulation, and any artifacts of the simulation process that might skew the outcomes.

Assumptions and Injects: At the end of the first round, participants were informed that President Trump had been reelected at the end of 2020. Since the study focused on the strategic development of RED, it was decided not to introduce any major discontinuities in BLUE that might arise as a result of a change in administration. Furthermore, at the end of the second round, participants received notice that a vehicle bomb had detonated at Fort Dix, New Jersey during the base Christmas party on Dec 20, 2021 in which 72 service members and 34 civilians were killed and 124 people injured. No claims of responsibility were made but some intelligence linked the perpetrators to Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq. This inject allowed for consideration of how a major terrorist attack on the United States emanating from the CENTCOM AOR might impact regional strategic dynamics.

⁵ Note that this simulation was not designed as a bargaining or process simulation, which focuses on the process and evolution of negotiating positions across parties. Interaction was allowed expressly for the purpose of allowing parties, if they so wished, to coordinate strategic actions with other actors.



Data and Analysis: Detailed data was collected from each participant and each round in each simulation, on the following: longer-term strategic objectives, strategic assumptions about other actors, risk proclivities, shorter-term “operational” objectives for the AOR, overt and covert actions, and a post-simulation overall strategic assessment. Analysis consisted of a narrative summary of each simulation, with identification of “unanticipated developments” (which might signify Black Swans or Grey Rhinos); qualitative comparative analysis across simulations of each major variable; and an illustrative quantitative application of computational content analysis.

Data Collected from each participant is attached as Appendix C.

Box 1: Ideal Methodology

The technical approach utilized for the current study was as described above. As an exploratory pilot, the project was unfunded, which limited available resources. This necessitated reducing the scope and scale of the study far below that which would be methodologically optimal for SDRT. Much of the analysis is by extension illustrative and suggestive, rather than robust and statistically significant. While the research team still believes that there is value in the results of this study, we feel it is necessary to lay out what a more methodologically rigorous version of the current study would entail, were resources available:

- Instead of the four simulation iterations utilized here, a more robust study would utilize at least 12-15 different simulation iterations.
- Ideally, for a sizeable percentage of simulations (at least 1/3) all participants would be recognized experts in the countries that they were role-playing. (Note that it is almost always useful to have at least some non-expert simulations in order to obtain as divergent perspectives as possible). Optimally, at least some of the simulations would also involve individuals native to each country represented.
- An ideal methodology would allow for separate treatments in an experimental fashion. For example, in half of the simulations the current Administration would be reelected, while in the other half, there would be a new Administration after 2020. This would allow for isolating and comparing the impact on strategic AOR dynamics of specific events / shifts in one or more actors.
- Ideally more actors would have been included in the simulation. Actors that were considered, but resources did not allow for, included: Pakistan; Egypt; Syria; Iraq; Kazakhstan; Turkey.
- The preference would be to include sufficient rounds to extend the simulation to five years in the future, in order to let longer-term strategic dynamics, play out further. This would entail five rounds instead of the three to which the current study was restricted.



Narratives and Summary of Play

Session 1 Narrative

Initial Objectives and Assumptions

People's Republic of China

Chinese objectives were based on their desire to not only establish themselves as a political and economic powerhouse but expand into strategically valuable territories. Chinese leadership expressed interest in securing vital energy and oil sources while simultaneously undermining U.S. dominance in the region through their strategic partnerships and economic investments. It is important for China to limit regional risks that may pose a threat to their strategic aims. China aimed to push at the margins of other nations' risk tolerance but leaned toward subtle maneuvering and manipulation to achieve their goals without getting directly involved in conflict.

Russian Federation

Russia aimed to supplant U.S. presence and influence in the Middle East. Central Asian states were prime targets for Russian economic cooperation to reduce Chinese influence in the region. Russian leadership also sought to develop closer ties with Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to capitalize on regional tensions. Domestic political concerns resulted in a low-to-moderate risk tolerance for Russian leadership, which was not interested in substantial military action.

Islamic Republic of Iran

Iranian strategic objectives overlapped significantly with each other, creating a highly cohesive strategy and clear direction for Iranian leadership. Broadly speaking, Iranian objectives were to reduce U.S. influence and presence in the Gulf, compete with Saudi Arabia, and use the nuclear program as a carrot to extract benefits from European diplomats. The Iranian leadership had a low-to-moderate risk tolerance, seeking to avoid strongly provoking the Americans while wearing down U.S. domestic public opinion with repeated low intensity attacks through proxy actors.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Saudi leadership prioritized internal stability and curbing Iranian expansion. There was also interest in continued relations with the United States and economic diversification, however both of these fell below the more immediate objectives pertaining to the stability and survival of the Kingdom. This lack of priority stems from the Saudi view that relations with the United States were gradually falling apart. Saudi leadership believed Iran to be making headway at the expense of Saudi interests. This, combined with Saudi confidence in internal stability, created a moderate-to-high risk tolerance in Saudi leaders.

Israel

Israeli strategic objectives were closely focused on survival. Essential to this goal was the maintenance of their current military and diplomatic edge, reductions in Iranian influence, and solidified control over the West Bank. Israeli risk tolerance was moderate-to-high depending on the threat posed by other actors. Israel was highly interested in maintaining relations with the United States, but also very willing to build relations across the board with Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia.

European Union

The EU sought to contain conflict, limit proliferation of WMD, promote human rights, and secure access to strategic resources and markets. EU policy towards the North African and Middle Eastern states was to encourage political and economic reform and support regional cooperation with the EU. Resolving the



Arab-Israeli conflict with a two-state solution was a fundamental interest of the EU. European leadership remained risk is adverse due to the need to balance internal and external priorities.

United States

U.S. strategic objectives prioritized deterring Iranian nuclear efforts, dismantling ISIS, strengthening regional partnerships, and a gradual regional drawdown. Russia and Saudi Arabia were viewed as necessary partners for success in the region, particularly in an effort to challenge Chinese influence. American leadership was less concerned with the EU and organizations like NATO, viewing them as disappointments and failing to provide results. The United States was willing to take unconventional actions and shake up the status quo if it matched domestic political alignments.

Session 1 - Summary of Play

2020: U.S. action dominated the headlines of 2020. A joint statement issued by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu announced the continuation of joint exercises, including a renewed Exercise Joint Cobra, in addition to joint operations between the U.S. Air Force and the Israeli Airforce to begin in 2020 and continue indefinitely. The U.S. Air Force announced that an F-35 squadron was being deployed to Ovda Airport in southern Israel, and a squadron of F-15E Strike Eagles had already arrived for a deployment at Palmachim Airbase near Tel Aviv. The the United States conducted a unilateral campaign of drone strikes against Kataib Hezbollah's leadership, killing 3 senior leaders in a single month. The National Security Agency was covertly tasked with conducting constant cyberattacks on Iranian military and nuclear assets in an operation that was broader in scale and scope than the one which resulted in Stuxnet.

Russia and China formed a partnership in a show of unity against U.S. aggression. They released a joint statement warning against disregard for international law and national sovereignty and indicated that they were prepared to respond to any future intervention in the region. Rosoboronexport proceeded with the sale of 30 BMP-1P, 33 T-90s, and 230 9M119M Refleks anti-tank missiles to Iraq. Russia and Syria quietly ramped up a campaign of coordinated strikes on Iranian militias in Syria.

Small boats of Iranian origin harassed American flagged vessels in the Strait of Hormuz with small arms on a regular basis throughout the year. On several occasions, these vessels were being escorted by U.S. Navy ships. In one case, an F/A-18F of the USS Abraham Lincoln was diverted from routine patrol to perform a close pass of a vessel under attack. The aircraft took minor damage to a horizontal stabilizer from small-arms fire during the encounter. Iran directed proxy actors in Iraq to conduct frequent low-intensity assaults on U.S. forces in order to erode American domestic support for involvement in the region. Most of these attacks were conducted with mortars and small arms, though some utilized lightly modified off-the-shelf unmanned aerial vehicles for delivering small payloads of explosives.

The European Union largely pursued diplomatic measures, including public high-level dialogue with Russia regarding Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Meanwhile, EU Member states began to ready resources for emergency diplomatic security missions and for a Freedom of Navigation mission in the Persian Gulf. European negotiators covertly offered mediation between the United States and Iran towards deescalation and held discussions with Saudi Arabia and Israel regarding human rights issues.

Saudi leadership began internal proceedings to stand up the Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) Force, a structure designed to serve a similar role as the Iranian Quds force, after Saudi analysts suggested such an organization would be well adapted to accomplishing Saudi objectives in the region.

2021: U.S. forces continued all of the operations initiated in 2020. Rumors circulated through the Armenian media that the Russian FSB was funding politicians through shell companies and stolen identities. Social media analysts later traced the rumors back to several accounts located in the U.S. which represented themselves as Armenian and had a large number of Armenian followers. Simultaneously,



similar rumors regarding Iraqi politicians receiving funds from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps went viral on Twitter in Iraq.

The EU Freedom of Navigation mission began in earnest with a small task force consisting of the *FS Forbin*, *FS Aquitaine*, *FGS Saschen*, and *FGS Berlin*. The EU and Saudi Arabia negotiated on Saudi economic diversification and arms sales. European negotiators continued to act as the go-between for the United States and Iran, but quietly threatened that they would halt their involvement if attacks by Iranian boats in the Strait of Hormuz continued.

While Chinese attention was on the Gulf, Russia developed trade deals with several Central Asian states in an effort to combat Chinese influence. Russia and China both sold surface-to-air missile systems to Saudi Arabia, while Russia continued selling arms to Iraq and Yemen. Saudi Arabia quietly increased support for anti-Houthi forces in Yemen.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps began shipping small arms to proxies in Lebanon. Iran launched cruise missiles on oil pipelines and refineries in eastern Saudi Arabia, causing significant economic losses and driving oil prices up. Iran also conducted four strikes on U.S. forces in Iraq throughout the year, causing 12 deaths and 47 casualties.

2022: Following the late 2021 attack on Ft. Dix, Iran became a hotbed of new activity. The identification and elimination of any Iranian nationals who were connected with the Ft. Dix attack was a top priority, in order to avoid U.S. retaliation. Iran also covertly began conducting cyberattacks on the U.S. Federal Reserve, the international settlement system, and several international banking institutions, while stepping up support for external proxies. Low-level meetings were held between Iranian representatives and senior Peshmerga commanders, with Iran offering financial assistance to aid the military wing of the Kurdistan Workers' Party in their fight against Turkish and Russian forces. Iran-backed militias in Iraq began receiving funds with instructions to discreetly direct the money towards pro-Iran political parties. Houthi missile attacks on Saudi Arabian oil infrastructure were commonplace throughout the year. Iran also deployed anti-shipping missile batteries along the entire length of the Gulf coast to improve its defensive posture against potential U.S. retaliation.

The United States maintained their posture from previous years, while covertly planning coordinated strikes against Iran with Israel in response to the Ft. Dix attack, against the wishes of the EU; which saw a direct retaliation on Iranian territory as a highly inflammatory and destabilizing action. A joint Russo-American exercise took place in Armenia as a show of force intended to display a unified front against Iranian aggression. U.S. and Israeli forces continued their campaign against Hezbollah's leadership. President Trump tweeted that the United States was open to speaking directly with Iran; when asked for comment, a State Department spokesperson stated that the offers had also been made through diplomatic channels, but the department had yet to hear back.

The PRC took the opportunity to call for international counter-extremism efforts, directing attention away from the quietly continued expansion of Uighur reeducation camps in Xinjiang. The Peoples Liberation Army Navy began conducting regular patrols in the Persian Gulf, in partnership with Saudi Arabia. China and Afghanistan conducted an exchange and training program between the Peoples Liberation Army and the Afghan National Army.



Box 2: Session 1 Unanticipated Developments

- Russia acts to forcibly dissolve Iran's militias in Syria, in coordination with Assad regime.
- Russia and KSA conclude a trade deal whereby Russia sells anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems, as well as agricultural goods to KSA for defense against Iranian aggression.
- KSA works to develop its own version of the IRGC Quds Force, which will support the training of both sympathetic government and non-government actors in the region to curb Iranian influence.
- Iran installs heavily shielded anti-ship missile batteries in the Straits of Hormuz and engages in periodic small boat harassment and testing of the U.S. fleet in the Persian Gulf.
- Iran launches lower-level cyber intrusions wherever possible to investigate vulnerabilities in the international settlements system, the Federal Reserve, and large international banks.
- The United States stations advanced tactical fighters at bases in the north and south of Israel as part of a new strategic aerial effort in the region.
- The United States engages in a misinformation campaign depicting Russian influence within Armenia in order to put pressure on the Russian presence at Armenian military bases.
- The EU creates and maintains an EU Freedom of Navigation mission in the Persian Gulf (with France and Germany in the lead), but with close coordination with US/NATO/UK.
- Israel collaborates with the United States for a covert strike against Iran.

Session 2 Narrative

Initial Objectives and Assumptions

People's Republic of China

The Chinese government was highly focused on retaining control over Asia and preventing the instability in the Middle East from impacting the current sphere of Chinese influence. With the turmoil distracting the United States, the PRC's focus became extending its influence over nations with existing relationships with China, and investment via the Belt and Road Initiative to build new relationships.

Russian Federation

Russian objectives were modest and made no assumptions about the future of the AOR. Instead, Russian focus remained on supplanting U.S. influence in the region, developing stronger relationships with regional states, while simultaneously drawing their new partners away from the United States.

Islamic Republic of Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran focused on the development of regional military and cultural hegemony. Iran viewed its rightful place as the leader of the Islamic world and sought to enhance domestic stability through external strength.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

As in Session 1.

Israel

As in Session 1.

European Union

As in Session 1.



United States

As in Session 1.

Session 2 - Summary of Play

2020: 2020 proved to be an eventful year in the AOR. In March, President Donald Trump invited Turkey's President Erdogan to the White House to stabilize relations after the United States blocked the delivery of F-35s to Turkey following Turkey's purchase of the S-400. Several days later, President Trump announced via Twitter, "GREAT NEWS! DRAWDOWN in IRAQ is COMING!!! HEROES will be coming home VICTORIOUS!" following a meeting between Secretary Pompeo and the Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs. A Pentagon spokesperson confirmed that the drawdown process would begin in 2020, but this was only an initial step, not a plan for full drawdown. The United States hosted multilateral trade talks and proposed a deal with Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. A spokesperson for the State Department confirmed to reporters that these talks were intended to help offset some of the issues created by the trade war with China, and for that reason China was not invited.

The U.S. Air Force announced that the lease for Thumrait Air Base in Oman had been extended by 30 years, and that it would be standing up a new Expeditionary Air Wing which would primarily conduct unmanned operations.

The NSA was quietly directed to coordinate with the agency's counterparts in Saudi Arabia against Iran. In one operation, a prototype Qafer-313 aircraft conducting its first flight test was crashed into the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant by exploiting a feature of its maintenance systems intended for unmanned start-ups and pre-flight systems checks. Damage assessments concluded minimal, if any, damage had been done to the buried enrichment facilities; but noted that one of the tunnel entrances had collapsed, and another had been severely damaged in the fires resulting from the crash. NSA operators connected to the jet via satellite and gained access to all three flight computers, feeding the computers false airspeed and orientation data and enabling them to crash the aircraft. Doctored footage emerged of an Iranian surface-to-air missile downing the prototype, causing widespread protesting in Iran. It is rumored that Israeli intelligence also participated in the operation.

Several prominent Iranian nuclear scientists were found dead, floating in a pool at one of their homes. All three of the scientists had high-blood alcohol content, and authorities found a large amount of smuggled liquor inside the home. Rumors circulated that Mossad had conducted the killing with American support, however Iranian leadership was reluctant to admit that they could not protect their own and kept things quiet.

Chinese ambassadors to Syria, Iraq and Kazakhstan met with representatives of their host nations to offer economic aid and assistance. Zhong Shan of China's Ministry of Commerce met with Iranian representatives to discuss increasing Chinese imports of Iranian oil. Simultaneously, unofficial discussions were being held to explore the potential for joint military exercises between China and Iran. Social media reports emerged of People's Liberation Army special forces operating in tandem with their Russian counterparts in Syria. Similarly, war correspondents in Afghanistan began reporting an increased number of Chinese units conducting patrols in the country.

#NotYourOil grew as a viral campaign on the social media app Line, one of few such apps which Iran has not yet blacklisted. The campaign was an attempt to convey Iranian displeasure with foreign interference. Amateur open-source analysts following the campaign suggested much of the early activity was conducted with bot accounts that regularly disseminate pro-Iran messaging.

Iran conducted several ballistic missile tests throughout the year, with IRNA anchors stating that 'the tests were extremely successful and prove yet again that Iran is able to outmatch the U.S. military whenever necessary.' The Iranian nuclear program noticeably accelerated as Iran began bringing mothballed enrichment centrifuges back online.



2021: As the second Trump Administration got underway in 2021, the region continued to be highly active. Analysts from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency concluded that increased activity at Iranian naval bases could be attributed to preparations necessary to conduct minelaying on a massive scale. HUMINT gathered by the CIA suggested that, in addition to minelayers, several Iranian submarines had left their drydocks. This was confirmed after sonar operators aboard the USS *John Finn*, USS *Paul Ignatius*, and USS *Spruance* observed multiple geographically dispersed sonar signatures consistent with Ghadir class submarines.

Iran and China conducted joint wargames in the Gulf of Oman, confirming prior rumors. The exercise simulated minelaying operations, anti-submarine warfare patrols, blue-water surface combat, and littoral operations. Soon after the conclusion of the wargames, Iran deployed a large number of coastal patrol vessels which were tasked with conducting inspections on commercial cargo ships transiting the Iranian side of the Strait of Hormuz.

The President of the European Commission issued a statement urging all parties to exercise restraint and act sensibly. In a meeting on humanitarian aid to Syria between several European Foreign Ministers and the U.S. Ambassador to the EU, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs confronted Ambassador Smith, stating that that, “Frankly, Mr. Smith, the I’m not happy, and the European Union is not happy. Your country’s reckless and unrestrained behavior in the region is the reason there’s any problem at all. You must step back, or the EU will refuse to moderate discussions.” The United States did not offer any response.

The Russian Pacific Fleet increased its presence in the Indo-Pacific. Unsafe encounters with U.S. vessels conducting freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea were plentiful throughout the year. Additionally, Russian vessels would frequently shadow U.S. support ships at distances of several miles, and the USS *Impeccable* identified at least two unique Akula class and four unique Kilo class submarines transiting south through the Sea of Japan. Russia announced that it would be signing a trade agreement with Iran and the PRC. The full details were not made clear at the time of announcement.

The United States began a campaign of drone strikes against Lebanese Hezbollah leaders. In December of 2021, a helicopter carrying Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps chief-commander Major General Hossein Salami and Hassan Nasrallah was shot down near Riyaq, Lebanon by a Reaper drone equipped with the AIM-92, an air-launched version of the stinger missile.

Two Saudi Arabian bloggers disappeared under mysterious circumstances after a confrontation with the Mutaween (religious police). The bloggers had both suggested that the Saudi Government had been cooperating with Israel. Though the Mutaween have been gutted by reforms, it appears that some were taking matters into their own hands. The Saudi air campaign against Houthi positions ramped up, but at the same time saw a significant decrease in collateral damage, suggesting that rumors regarding the rapid expansion of Saudi intelligence capabilities are true.

Several large blasts, initially attributed to Kataib Hzbollah, rocked the northernmost reaches of Al-Anbar province in Iraq, through early June and July. The attacks, quietly organized by Israeli intelligence operatives, caused a significant reduction in local support for Kataib Hezbollah.

Russian troll farms ramped up their social media presence as the U.S. midterm elections approached, supporting divisive candidates on both sides and sowing discord. Renewed calls for the federal government to devote greater resources to this issue went unanswered, while Facebook and Twitter remained too overwhelmed to pursue the issue further.

American officials announced the formation of the Indo-Pacific Free Trade Agreement, or IPFTA, with Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Analysts concluded that the deal would stimulate up to \$300 billion in new trade from the region. A spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Commerce stated that all of the IPFTA nations, except the United States, had been invited to participate in trade talks with China, and that such talks would be conditioned on their withdrawal from negotiations with the U.S.

2022: Events continued to escalate to an extreme degree in 2022. The attack on Fort Dix only intensified tensions which were already running high and as a result, open conflict erupted. Iran did not take responsibility for the Ft. Dix attack, but rumors abounded of its involvement.



Coordinated cyberattacks on Iran resulted in protests and chaos in Tehran in late January. An attack on the Karun-3 hydroelectric dam in Iran resulted in severe damage to the generators which resulted in rolling blackouts through the remainder of summer. The Iranian military's healthcare information technology systems found that the infiltrators had wiped medical records for Iranian military personnel and contractors. These remained missing for several days, but ultimately were restored thanks to a well-hidden system of offline backups. Glitches plagued Tehran's traffic control systems after hostile agents sabotaged the systems with faulty software one night. It took more than a week for the majority of Tehran's traffic lights to return to normal function, with over 15 people dying from accidents related to the issues before the problem was identified. Tehran shut down all traffic lights for three days while the patch was manually deployed to each independent system. Months later, reports circulated on infosec blogs attributing the attack to the NSA.

Iran was not the only national to be impacted by cyber-attacks. During an FAA cyber-defense exercise in the United States, a vulnerability in a networked coffee machine allowed hackers to gain access to FAA traffic management systems. The hackers spoofed signatures of ground vehicles causing mass confusion and widespread delays at John F. Kennedy International Airport. It took an hour to respond because the majority of the facility's cybersecurity employees were offsite for the exercise. Technicians unplugged the router and the problems persisted until the operating systems of the affected control stations reset to a backup. Throughout the year, multiple major U.S. cities experienced protracted cyber campaigns, presumably from sources in Russia. Federal resources were brought in to combat the intrusions after a cyberattack on the D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency Management sent out two false alerts to the Capital stating that Iranian submarines had launched ballistic missiles on the Capital.

Iranian citizens were arrested in China after being uncovered during a large sting operation to prevent human trafficking. A disinformation campaign convinced much of China that Iranians were utilizing the new China-Iran trade deal to arm their Uighur brothers in China. Simultaneously, a disinformation campaign in Iran pushed the narrative that China had detained the Iranians because of suspected ties with Uighur families, and that they had now been sent to re-education camps and forced to eat pork. Several viral posts on reddit provided limited evidence that these campaigns were being run by the CIA. Several conspiracy theorist websites went so far as to say that the CIA had even staged the human trafficking itself.

A Tajik National Army Commander who had publicly expressed anti-Russian sentiments mysteriously died in his home, with symptoms consistent with a variant of the Novichok nerve agent used to poison Sergei Skripal in Salisbury, Wiltshire, England in 2018. Russian involvement was suspected. Later in the year, the same agent was used on Major-General Ismail Ismailov, the Chief of the General Staff of Turkmen Armed Forces. *Russia Today* reported the killings as part of an elaborate ploy by the United States to frame Russia and incite war between friendly neighbors.

In November, massive movements of Russian troops were detected near the borders of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan resulting in low level clashes along the Kazakh border.

In December, Iran launched 35 Hoveyzeh cruise missiles on Thumrait Air Base, killing 13 Americans and five Omanis, and damaging 12 hardened aircraft shelters, two fuel storage tanks, severely cratering the runway. Hassan Rouhani proclaimed on IRNA, "The assassination of beloved General Salami was an act of war, and we have responded proportionally. Americans believe they can strike us from safety, and we have done what is necessary to prove them wrong. Operation Martyr Salami was a success."



Box 3: Session 2 Unanticipated Developments

- Iran acts to hinder traffic in the Strait of Hormuz in order to pressure the US/KSA/Kuwait/Iraq.
- Iran increases its ties (military and economic) with both Russia and the PRC.
- Israel incites violence in northern Iraq and attributes this to Ketaib Hezbollah.
- Israel, with U.S. support, engages in increasing covert assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists.
- The United States, using a cyberattack, causes an Iranian military plane to crash into the Fordow enrichment facility, planting doctored footage to make it seem that the Iranians shot it down via an anti-aircraft missile, after mistaking it for an enemy plane.
- The United States releases disinformation on Weibo that Iranians are using the new trade deal with the PRC to help arm their Uighur brothers in Western China.
- The United States engages in the CIA-coordinated clandestine assassination of Tajik military officials in Tajikistan and Turkmen military officials in Turkmenistan, planting evidence that this was perpetrated by Russia.

Session 3 Narrative

Initial Objectives and Assumptions

People's Republic of China

The focus of China's strategy was the preservation of stability in China's sphere of influence through maintained economic growth, countering power projected by the United States and revising international institutions and norms to benefit China. China considered the United States to be a gatekeeper to power but was aware of the limitations imposed on the United States by its dependence on Chinese trade and diplomatic influence in problematic regions, particularly with North Korea. China assumed that Iranian action would mainly come through proxy actors, seeking to avoid large scale conflict but raising the costs of continued United States involvement. The potential for Russia to use the crisis to further propel a global resurgence in Russian influence was a big worry for the Chinese leadership.

Russia

An interest in expanding influence in the Middle East and Central Asia drove Russian strategic thinking. Russian leadership sought to enhance Russia's global diplomatic leadership and stature. Increased exports of military equipment, fossil fuel, and commercial products were part of a Russian plan to improve its economy and recover from U.S. sanctions.

Islamic Republic of Iran

Survival drove Iranian strategy. The absolute priority of the regime was to maintain the independence, stability, and territorial integrity of the Republic. The Iranian leadership assumed that further development of their nuclear weapons program would deter attacks by the United States or Israel, and as such Iran planned to attempt a nuclear breakout. After years of crushing sanctions, Iran was also desperate to gain better access to global markets and enhance international trade. Iraq was viewed as an easily influenced target, leading Iran to desire to continue a trend toward pro-Iranian politics in Iraq. Negotiations with the United States were considered to be a subterfuge enabling the Americans to overthrow the Iranian regime.



Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

As in Session 1.

Israel

As in Session 1.

European Union

As in Session 1.

United States

As in Session 1.

Session 3 - Summary of Play

2020: This was a quiet year to start. A delegation from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted low-level discussions with the United States regarding the situation in the Middle East, making it clear that Chinese interests would not be sacrificed in the region without an end of the U.S. trade war. Chinese representatives also met in Riyadh to discuss energy cooperation, both with respect to petrochemicals and renewables, in order to meet the objectives of Saudi Vision 2030.

The EU Commission issued a statement calling for all parties to exercise restraint and announcing that it was preparing a freedom of navigation operation in the Gulf for 2021.

The Iranian oil industry suffered many setbacks in January and February as drills would inexplicably run beyond their normal operating parameters and overheat, causing the drill head to melt into the bottom of the well. Rumors circulated online that the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate had also purchased zero-day exploits from Israeli intelligence for conducting operations against Iranian oil wells.

Six of Iran's finest nuclear scientists were killed following a suspicious gas explosion at a social gathering. Very clear evidence that Israel was involved was found at the scene, however the story was repressed by the Iranian media because the Ayatollah did not want to publicly admit that he could not protect his own.

In mid-2020, intercepted communications between the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps Commander Hossein Salami and Ayatollah Khamenei suggested that Iran was beginning working towards a nuclear breakout. The United States then imposed a naval blockade. Russia and China drafted a UN Security Council resolution condemning the U.S. naval blockade of Iran as an illegal action which the US had no right to conduct. After a week of trying and failing to get the French representative on board with the resolution, reports state that she stormed out of the meeting saying, "I cannot simply denounce the Americans – no matter how much I agree with you. Even abstaining isn't an option. We're done."

Surprisingly, in the latter part of 2020 the United States and Iran agreed on a tentative framework for a new nuclear deal, which began a regional de-escalation began. After several months of the blockade, which many feared would only escalate hostilities, Iran came to the negotiating table. The specific details of the deal were not released until 2021, but the general sense given to reporters from the Pentagon spokeswoman was that the United States would cooperate to invest in renewable energy in Iran and gradually lift sanctions and the blockade if Iran fully cooperated in relinquishing its nuclear program. During the blockade, rumors circulated of Russian made anti-ship missile batteries arriving in Iran, however their presence was never confirmed to the public and they were never used.

On the other side of the Gulf, the Saudi Ministry of Defense confirmed reports that it was purchasing the S-400 from Russia, a blow to America's relationship with the Kingdom. The Saudi leadership decided internally to stand up the "Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) Force" after analysts



suggested that having a structure similar to the Quds Force would be the best way to achieve many Saudi objectives covertly.

2021: Efforts to create a new oil trade organization between the Gulf Cooperation Council, Russia, and China failed when Saudi representatives walked out on the deal after the other representatives refused to make concessions.

Xuzhou, a Chinese Type-54A frigate, began conducting patrols in the Gulf and shadowing U.S. Navy vessels participating in the blockade. During an interview with Chinese state media, Xi Jinping commented that, “The U.S. actions in the gulf are illegal and are in direct contrasts with both the interests of China and the interests of the globe. If the U.S. does not stand down China will be forced to take action.” The *Xuzhou* collected intelligence on the U.S. vessels operating in the area, which was then discreetly passed to Iranian diplomats alongside other information regarding U.S. troop movements in the region.

Chinese cybersecurity specialists flew to Iran to assist with the investigation of the recent cyber-attacks and mitigating future vulnerabilities. Chinese and Iranian media both reported the visit as a great success.

In July, President Donald Trump and Hassan Rouhani released a joint statement to the press detailing the new nuclear deal after further negotiations took place in Brussels. The Multilateral Nuclear Material Repatriation Program (MNMRP) consisted of plans for Iran to repatriate nuclear fuel to Russia over the course of 10 years. U.S. negotiators offered Russia gradual relief from all current sanctions in return for their participation in the deal. After reaching a tentative deal, the U.S. naval blockade was lifted as a sign of good faith. Sanctions on Iran would also gradually lift, and the United States would then offer incentives for American companies to do business in Iran, particularly in the renewable technologies sector. Behind the scenes, preparation was underway in the United States to conduct attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities should the deal fall through.

Under the cover of darkness, members of the Saudi MBS Force smuggled small arms to anti-Houthi groups in Yemen. The weapons were rumored to be of Israeli origin, but this was never confirmed.

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov met with his counterpart in Iraq to discuss the conflict and ways in which Russia could help to ease tensions. While Lavrov met with Iraqi officials, other Russians quietly met with the leaders of Iraqi militias, hoping to develop relationships which would aid in the fight against a resurgent ISIS. In a press conference at the Ministry’s headquarters in Moscow, Lavrov stated that a formal invitation had been extended to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei for a formal state visit.

2022: Following the attack on Fort Dix in early 2022, Russian Ambassador to the US offered condolences to those affected in a meeting with the President. She shared intelligence collected from several friendly Iraqi militias over the past year which supported the conclusion that the attack was conducted by Kataib Hezbollah, but without Iranian backing. This intelligence was used by the Americans to direct drone strikes on key leaders of Kataib Hezbollah. Following the strikes, Russians embedded with the militias were instructed to reassure local forces that the United States would not be ramping up hostilities following the strikes.

The EU announced similar sentiments and relayed that EUROPOL’s European Counter Terrorism Center would place a high priority on cooperation and intelligence sharing with the U.S., NATO, UK, and Israeli intelligence communities. The chair of the EU Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy urged restraint for all parties involved in the region. The EU freedom of navigation operations in the Gulf continued, but multiple unidentified sources high in the EU chain of command for the operation suggested that operations would soon be winding down.

The United States and Iran met for a final peace summit and presented the full details of the MNMNP, which included a 60-day span for both parties to sign, two years to fully transfer all nuclear fuel, and 10 years to completely wind down the nuclear program. The United States signed the deal and the Senate ratified it in a nearly unanimous vote. Several days later, Iran officially signed and began



preparations for the transfer of their fuel to Russia. After signing the deal, Iranian officials informed the United States that they had attempted to conduct quiet negotiations with Israel but had been rebuffed.

The Department of Defense approved the sales of six F-15SA fighters and two fast-attack craft to Saudi Arabia. A Pentagon spokeswoman also announced later that year that a new hypersonic missile delivery program was underway. The Pentagon committed to placing nuclear warheads on the yet unnamed delivery vehicle.

China obtained permission from Pakistan to operate drones from Gwadar. Pakistan also agreed to lease land for the Chinese military to construct runways and support facilities, as long as the Pakistani military could also operate from the bases.

Almost all of Iran's remaining nuclear scientists were killed in an accident on a yacht in the Caspian Sea. The scientists had been celebrating news of the new nuclear deal, when the vessel's batteries caught fire and melted the engine, leaving it dead in the water with no communications. Corrosive materials from the battery reacted with an alloy in the ship's hull to produce a noxious gas, forcing the scientists to abandon ship. Nobody was able to reach the vessel in time to rescue the scientists from the frigid winter waters. The incident was suspicious, and there was speculation that Israel had somehow played a role, but no evidence left behind indicated that anyone other than the scientists were aboard the vessel.

Box 4: Session 3 Unanticipated Developments

- The PRC seeks to forward base Chinese naval and maritime patrol assets in the AOR (Djibouti and Gwadar). The PRC later seeks permission from Pakistan to operate drones from southwestern Pakistan (Gwadar), including building facilities, including airfields, as needed.
- The PRC shares information with Iran that it has gained about U.S. troop presence in the region, the location of U.S. naval vessels in the Persian Gulf, and any information about security procedures at U.S. facilities.
- Russia exports advanced anti-ship missile technology to Iran in return for concessional energy sector investments. Russia also agrees to work with KSA, the GCC, and China to create an exchange for oil that avoids U.S. chokepoints for international sales.
- Later in the simulation, Iran and the United States agree to a peace deal whereby sanctions will be lifted and the United States will invest in renewable energy in exchange for Iran ending its nuclear program. As part of this, there is a deal with Russia, Iran, and the United States (with support from China) to begin the repatriation of all nuclear fuel from Iran and the 10-year wind down of Iran's nuclear program.
- The United States announces the development, testing, and certification of new hypersonic missile technology that can evade air defenses, and commits to placing nuclear warheads on this technology to encourage deterrence.
- [As in Session 2: Russia sells KSA anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems in return for cash and investments; KSA develop its own version of the Quds Force; Israel kills increasing numbers of Iranian nuclear scientists.]



Session 4 (Student Session) Narrative

Initial Objectives and Assumptions

People's Republic of China

Chinese strategic objectives primarily highlighted their reliance on Middle Eastern energy resources, with three of their six goals centered on ensuring energy security. China also sought modest reductions in American and Russian influence in the region. De-escalation and conflict avoidance were considered the best way to secure Chinese interests in the region. However, China was prepared to deploy naval forces to the Gulf if their initial strategy failed. As a means of increasing their influence, China also expressed interest in selling arms to all parties in the region. The Chinese leadership's assumptions emphasized that their economic expansion took priority over the reduction of American influence, and as such the destabilizing and erratic behavior of the United States and Iran were not in their best interests. China considered Iran to be a wildcard, a potential ally against the US, but also a potential competitor, specifically concerning Iran's desire to become a regional superpower. Chinese leadership displayed an aversion to risk, expressing a desire to avoid being overly confrontational with the United States, as well as to avoid getting involved in military conflict.

Russian Federation

The Russian Federation took a low-risk approach to the region, largely seeking to work within existing international organizations and laws to become a power broker for the Middle East. Russian leadership sought to create economic leverage in the region through the use of energy investments. Russia's strategic objectives were all founded on the assumption of status quo, both within the region and worldwide.

Islamic Republic of Iran

Iran's strategic objectives were highly focused on U.S. and Saudi influence in the region. This reflected Iranian assumptions that American leadership was averse to direct conflict, particularly a situation similar to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. However, Iran decided to increase its influence in the region through the use of proxies rather than directly. Iran was highly interested in eroding Saudi ties to international sources of power, especially in relation to the United States. Iranian leadership assumed that the Saudi-American relationship was weak and mostly motivated by a Saudi desire to compete with Iran. In a similar manner, Iran also assumed that support for the United States across the Middle East was low, whereas many states currently depended on U.S. support to survive. The leadership had a low-medium risk tolerance, bounded by a desire to prevent further international intervention.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom maintained a very narrow focus in its objectives, namely those critical to its short and long-term survival. Maintaining internal stability was the most immediate concern, followed by countering Iranian influence in the region. Continued relations with the United States and creating a more diverse economy were viewed as critical to the Kingdom's long-term survival.

Israel

Based on maintaining the status quo, Israeli strategy was similar to that of Saudi Arabia, with survival as the core concern. Consequently, Israel demonstrated a very high risk tolerance when matters that it perceived as existential were concerned.

European Union

The EU largely focused on goals which could be accomplished primarily through diplomatic means and addressed both domestic issues and international issues at the same time. Similar to China, the EU was extremely concerned with energy security and diversification. Maintaining peace and security was seen as



crucial to this goal. The EU was also interested in addressing root causes of migration from the region. Growing divisions and between, and within, Member States were partially attributed to migration.

United States of America

U.S. strategy had no clear focal point within CENTCOM's AOR, but was generally oriented towards maintaining international relationships, boosting trade, and deterring terrorism and extremism. Improved relations with both China and Russia were explicitly stated as goals.

Session 4 - Summary of play

2020: Following Soleimani's killing, in 2020 the European Union emerged as an unexpectedly strong and influential player. Spain and Italy announced the withdrawal of their vessels from EU anti-piracy operations for reassignment to Operation Safe Passage in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman to protect commercial shipping vessels from hostilities. In an unexpected move, a statement made on IRNA by Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif welcomed the EU's involvement in the region, while at the same time suggesting Gulf states should be more than capable of patrolling their own waters. The European Commission publicly backed the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) while urging the United States and Iran to recommit to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). European negotiators worked behind-the-scenes with Iran to salvage the JCPOA, though Europe was hardly the only actor to be holding such talks.

In fact, every nation except for the United States and Israel worked behind the scenes with Iran to try and deescalate the situation. China offered Iran a technological exchange program with engineers and researchers from the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation as a way to incentivize Iranian restraint. Similarly, the Russian Foreign Ministry offered military assistance to Iran under the table as well as limited formal cooperation and defense and education exchanges. Many of the avenues presented to Iranian leadership incentivized decreased aggression while appealing to their desire to become a greater regional power.

Though Iran was being presented with many incentives for peace, the Quds Force was tasked with committing a false flag attack on the Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline, which is under construction. The attack failed when maintenance personnel discovered the explosives near a compressor station during routine activities and reported it to local police. The intent of the ersatz attack was to stoke tensions and encourage Chinese involvement in the region to balance against U.S. actions and presence in the region.

Israel and the United States largely acted in a bubble with each other, and 2020 marked the continuance of the biennial Exercise Juniper Cobra. Just under 5,500 US service members were deployed to Israel to take part in the exercise, which featured a continued focus on interoperability and ballistic missile defense. After the exercise, many of those deployed remained in Israel for what an Israeli spokesperson said was "continued training."

Russia and Saudi Arabia largely remained to themselves, with Saudi Arabia focused heavily on the conflict in Yemen and Russia focused mainly on negotiations and concerns in other AORs.

2021: China and the EU both played key roles in shaping regional dynamics in 2021, particularly in influencing Iranian behavior. China secured leases for military facilities in both Iran and Saudi Arabia. As part of the basing agreements, China agreed to increase Iranian oil imports and sell 24 FC-20 multi-role fighters to Iran at a low-cost equivalent to US\$23.2 million per unit. The EU continued to covertly negotiate with Iran regarding the JCPOA and convinced Iranian leadership to return to compliance by offering to further develop INSTEX. Negotiations began on the development of the Persian Pipeline to bring Middle Eastern oil through Turkey and Greece for distribution throughout the EU.

The European commission announced that it was interested in a fact-finding mission into Uighur re-education camps in China, which an official release from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs



called “a gross interference in the domestic affairs of China, which no foreign force has the right, nor strength, to influence”.

Iran was keen to continue to place pressure on China to invest heavily in Iranian oil and natural gas industry. Iran continued in its duplicity, however, making a deal on the surface, while covertly funding piracy on oil trade in the South China Sea and Straits of Malacca on vessels bound for China or the United States, seeking to create greater Chinese reliance and investment in pipelines, while attempting to draw global attention elsewhere in the globe.

Israel and United States continued their trend of isolation, largely keeping to themselves and disregarding the other actors in the AOR. The sole exception to this trend was a trade deal negotiated between Israeli and Chinese representatives, which expanded Chinese trade to Israel via the Red Sea. Such passive U.S. leadership left a power vacuum that China and the EU were eager to fill. The American–Israeli exercises drew the ire of Russian officials, however, who were quick to denounce such actions as inflammatory and call for a meeting of the UN Security Council.

The Chinese Ministry of Defense announced that it would begin leasing naval bases from Saudi Arabia in exchange for a Saudi hosted summit with Iran. The Chinese ambassador in Riyadh had also quietly begun aiding with the Saudi campaign against the Houthis in Yemen. China also began conducting negotiations to secure leases for facilities in Myanmar and Pakistan.

2022: The Ft. Dix attack and cyber-attacks on the U.S. had little effect on the AOR. Realizing that such attacks were justification for renewed U.S. engagement in the region, Iran’s Foreign Minister quickly denounced those responsible and offered investigative assistance to the United States. The United States denied the offer of assistance, while the CIA worked with Mossad to investigate the Ft. Dix attack and identify the perpetrators.

China and Europe continued to compete with each other for influence in the region. The EU asked both Iran and Saudi Arabia to reconsider Chinese basing agreements. In exchange for Iranian reconsideration, the EU began quietly approving requests for arms transfers between member states and Iran.

Upon realizing that China was hedging its bets by securing bases in both Saudi Arabia and Iran, Iranian leadership grew reluctant to work with their former Chinese allies. The Ayatollah announced via IRNA that “Iran does not work with backstabbers and double dealers. We will be scaling back our involvement with China”. The Quds Force successfully perpetrated false-flag VBIED attacks on leased Chinese bases, injuring many Iranian personnel in the process. In response to these attacks, the Ayatollah announced that the Chinese military presence was too divisive and that they were no longer welcome in the country. The Chinese military facilities were returned to Iranian control within a month.

America and Israel broke their pattern of bilateral relations. Israel continued to work with China on matters of trade. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Israel and Iran both had his full support to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as Dialogue Partners. Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of State agreed on a deal with China to reduce the amount of U.S. national debt held by China in exchange for a reduction in American presence in the South China Sea. China also agreed to participate in the newly formed Renewable Industries Commission, which would encourage international partnerships and information sharing between Chinese and American renewable energy companies to promote the development of renewable energy sources, with heavy Chinese investment in U.S. renewables.

President Trump announced that the next budget released by his administration would focus heavily on domestic infrastructure. Citing high-level sources in the Pentagon, a Washington Post article suggested that a large portion of the funding for the ambitious national infrastructure program was quietly being taken from the Pentagon’s budget.



Box 5: Session 4 Unanticipated Developments

- The PRC uses tensions in the Middle East to increase its expansion in Southeast Asia, Pakistan and elsewhere, seeking leases for naval and air facilities in Myanmar, Djibouti, Pakistan and Central Asia. The PRC expands its naval presence in the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, the Red Sea and East Africa.
- The PRC seeks to limit but not completely curtail Russian influence in the AOR, while encroaching further into Russia's Central Asia sphere of influence, such as Kyrgyzstan.
- The PRC secures a deal with Iran for base leases and arms sales to supplant Russian military aid.
- Russia draws closer to Iran, supporting both Iranian and Israeli membership in the SCO.
- Iran conducts a false flag attempted attack against its own pipelines to China, accusing the U.S. of trying to cut it off, in order to secure international sympathy and encourage the PRC to buy more Iranian oil and equip Iran with a modern fighter force.
- Later in the simulation, Iran pulls out of its agreements with China and accepts an EU defense deal.
- KSA establishes an alliance with the PRC and allows China to purchase a lease for naval facilities on Saudi soil (ostensibly to aid in its deradicalization efforts).
- The EU deploys a small naval force independent of the U.S. in the Straits of Hormuz to protect EU shipping and commercial interests in the region. It also publicly backs the INSTEX alternative trading mechanism to circumvent US sanctions.
- Israel works with China to support trade in the Red Sea and secures agreement from Russia to join the SCO as a dialog partner.
- The United States redirects overseas military commitment funding to improve domestic infrastructure.



Comparative Qualitative Analysis

The previous section traced the progression of each simulation and identified elements that the project team regarded as unanticipated or novel. The analysis now turns to a broader comparative examination of key themes across both sessions and adversaries. These are conducted according to each of the major variables considered during the simulations (Strategic Objectives; Risk Tolerance; Operational Objectives; Overt Actions; Covert Actions; and Strategic Progress). Given the overall focus of the project, in the discussion below most of the attention will be given to RED, with only brief references to GREEN and BLUE.⁶

Strategic Objectives

Table 1 provides a cross-simulation and cross-actor summary of major identified strategic objectives. All the adversaries across most sessions had as an explicit strategic goal to diminish U.S. power and influence in the AOR and all the adversaries sought to expand their geopolitical influence in the AOR in at least one session. Both China and Iran in several sessions sought to create military and/or economic dependencies with state and non-state actors in the region. Russia and China both sought to expand their economic growth through engagement in the region, and both desired to increase their status as a regional diplomatic partner and convener, with Russia placing particular emphasis on this multilateral role in two of its sessions.

Turning to individual countries, PRC objectives were fairly consistent across sessions. In addition to goals already mentioned China notably sought to secure vital energy resources, while (together with the EU) was the only actor that really wanted to prevent conflict in the region (especially between the United States and Iran). Across all sessions, neither Russia nor Iran exhibited any major strategic goals aside from those mentioned above, although there tended to be less consensus across sessions with respect to Iranian objectives. The one real exception in the case of Iran was its pursuit of nuclear weapons, but – somewhat surprisingly – only one participant had acquisition of a weapons capability as an explicit strategic goal. Also of note, China and Russia each had as a goal to limit the other's influence in the region, albeit not in the same session.

Two observations with respect to non-adversaries are worth noting: Russia was viewed by both participants playing the United States as an ally (unlike the case with respect to China); and the participants playing Israel took very different strategic approaches, with one focusing on Israel's desire to act as a democratic state in the region, while the other had more realist motives of maintaining military dominance and checking Iran.

⁶ In addition, because the same participants played Green and Blue actors in the first three sessions, there was intentionally fewer data for these actors.



Risk Tolerance

With respect to the overall risk tolerance demonstrated by the different adversaries (where participants explicitly reported this), Table 2 indicates that both the PRC and Iran tended to have low or low-medium risk tolerance, while Russia’s was slightly higher than the other two. Interestingly, the expert participants who played KSA, Israel and the United States in Sessions 1-3, all rated their countries’ risk tolerance as being medium-high, which was higher than any of the adversaries in any of the sessions.

Table 2: Risk Tolerance in AOR

	Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 (Students)
PRC	Low-Medium	Not Reported	Low	Not Reported
Russia	Medium	Not Reported	Medium	Not Reported
Iran	Not Reported	Not Reported	Medium	Low-Medium
KSA	Medium-High			Not Reported
EU	Low-Medium			Very Low
Israel	Medium-High			Not Reported
US	Medium-High			Low



Operational Objectives

Although the different actors often responded to other actors' behavior in the simulations and their actions evolved across the simulated timeframe of 2020-2022, the operational (shorter-term) goals of most actors were fairly constant.⁷ Therefore, Table 3 below aggregates these objectives across the three rounds of play (see Appendix C for a detailed round-by-round breakdown of operational objectives). Moreover, the table only parses out those goals shared by more than one actor, with goals unique to a single actor listed in the "Other" column.

Across actors and rounds, the most common objectives were to increase economic ties and investments in the AOR and to coordinate diplomatically in order to stabilize the region and prevent war between Iran and the United States. Iran, Israel and KSA all sought to expand economic ties with states outside of the AOR in at least one session, and both the PRC and Russia intended to force U.S. military personnel out from the AOR in most sessions. As perhaps expected, both China and Russia in at least one session sought to increase their military presence in the region, but perhaps more surprisingly, both the expert and student participants representing the EU decided to increase the EU's naval activity in the Gulf.

As for individual states, China generally attempted to reduce U.S. influence in the region and protect or expand their economic influence (through the Belt and Road Initiative). The PRC supported Iran politically but was also willing to work with all regional parties to avoid an open conflict. Ramps all of this up over the course of the game but essentially the same goals. In addition to the goals noted above, Russia worked to marginalize Iran in Syria, as well as to undermine U.S. influence in region, including through covert disinformation campaigns. It also sought to solidify and deepen its influence in Central Asia to counter an encroaching China and – unlike many of the other actors – actually looked to increase the price of oil, which would benefit it economically; therefore, regional instability could actually help Russia in this regard. Aside from those goals already mentioned, Iran in a single session worked to acquire and then later to relinquish a nuclear weapons program. It also sought to hinder traffic in the Straits of Hormuz and to lessen the effects of sanctions.

For the non-adversary actors, many of the goals were as expected. Some interesting outputs were that the student EU player became more interested in the Uighur issue over time, which caused some friction with the PRC, the EU being driven by a desire not to have a flood of refugees / migrants spill from the AOR into Europe, and the Saudi willingness to build closer relationships with Russia and China while trying to balance continued close ties with the United States.

⁷ There were only two only exceptions. First, over time, Iran actively sought to establish closer relationships with China and Russia (esp. in military domain). Iran also become more willing to negotiate (up to and including a grand bargain / peace talks) over time in two of the four sessions and less willing in another. Second, Israel seemed to take a greater interest in countering Lebanese Hizb'allah as the rounds progressed.



Overt Actions

Given the diversity of actions and that most actions are unique to a given actor and its capabilities, the actions taken by each actor will be placed into fairly broad categories (loosely based on the DIMEFIL rubric) for purposes of comparison. Details of each specific action undertaken by each actor in each round of each session can be found in Appendix C. It should be noted that only new actions are counted, so if a given action extended over multiple rounds it was only counted once. Conversely, joint actions, where these are taken by two actors in the simulation, are counted separately for each actor.

Overall, 168 overt actions were taken across the four simulation sessions, with the frequency of each type of action shown in Table 4. The most common actions overall were engaging in trade negotiations (or concluding trade deals), diplomatic offers to act as a peace broker between competing sides and offers of (or activities demonstrating) peaceful cooperation between two or more states. Military aid and propaganda were also fairly common. There was only one case of major overt kinetic action (a missile strike by Iran against an American base in Oman). Unsurprisingly, the EU took the greatest number of overt actions, mainly acting diplomatically and economically. Somewhat more interestingly, Russia also took a large number of overt actions, primarily diplomatically, but also militarily. The bulk of United States actions were military in nature.

Table 4: Overt Actions

	Economic				Diplomatic				Military							Communications					
	Provide Economic Aid	Increase Foreign Investment	Engage in Trade Negotiations / Deals	Break Trade Deals	Issue Diplomatic Rebuttle	Offer to Act as Peace Broker	Assist Iran	Offers / Activities of Peaceful Cooperation	Peace Deal / Negotiations	Naval Maneuvers in AOR	Military Aid / Arms Sales	Expand Military Presence (Bases)	Deploy Troops Overseas	Joint Exercises	Strikes Against VNSA	Small Scale Kinetic Activity Against Rivals	Larger-Scale Kinetic Activity Against Rivals	Increase Defenses / Military Capabilities	Propaganda Against Rivals or For Allies	Intelligence Sharing	Total
PRC	Session 1	2			1	2															5
	Session 2	1	1				1														4
	Session 3		1	1	2	1	1												2		8
	Session 4 (Students)			3		1	1	2		1	1	3									12
Russia	Session 1		2							2			1	1							7
	Session 2		1	1	1		1	3		1			1						1		9
	Session 3		1	1	1	4	3			2	1				1					1	14
	Session 4 (Students)		1	1	1	1	2												1		6
Iran	Session 1	1									1				3						5
	Session 2			2			2									1					6
	Session 3																				1
	Session 4 (Students)	1			1			2	1												6
KSA	Session 1																				2
	Session 2																				0
	Session 3			1									1						1		4
	Session 4 (Students)	2	1						1												4
EU	Session 1		1	1	1	3							1	1					1		10
	Session 2		1	1	1	3							1	1					1		10
	Session 3		1	1	1	3							1	1					1		10
	Session 4 (Students)	2	1			2	1	1										1			10
Israel	Session 1																				0
	Session 2																				0
	Session 3																				0
	Session 4 (Students)			1				1	1				1								4
US	Session 1																				10
	Session 2			2			2						1	1					1		10
	Session 3			1							2								1		9
	Session 4 (Students)	1							1	1											5
	8	5	22	4	13	19	3	19	5	10	8	4	7	5	3	1	5	12	3		168



Covert Actions

Covert actions are handled the same as overt actions in terms of counting and representation. There was a total of 136 different covert actions taken during the four simulation sessions, as shown in Table 5 below. All of the actors in the simulations engaged in several different types of covert action. By far the most common type of covert action was backchannel discussions, threats and negotiations, but this was mainly due to their prolific use by the European Union. Prominent across multiple actors were espionage, cyberattacks, covert arms transfers, disinformation campaigns and funding sub-state proxies. With respect to differences across actors, the RED actors tended to utilize military covert actions, GREEN and BLUE tended to engage in more intelligence-focused actions. The Great Power Competitors (United States, PRC and Russia) all engaged in disinformation campaigns in at least one session.

Table 5: Covert Actions

	Military										Intelligence					Social			Communication			Economic			Total
	Covert Arms Sales / Gift	Deploy Forces	Expand Military Presence	Other Military Collaboration	Naval Maneuvers	Strikes Against VNSAs	Small-Scale Kinetic Actions	Build Up Capabilities	Espionage (Collection)	Intelligence Sharing	Cyberattacks	Assassinations	Domestic Oppression	Foment Social Instability	Disinformation Against Rivals	Backchannel Demarches / Offers of Support / Negotiations	Illicit Resource Acquisition / Sanctions Busting	Trade Talks	Fund VNSAs / Political Groups						
PRC	Session 1	1	1						1											5					
	Session 2		2	1											1					4					
	Session 3			1					2	1					1					6					
	Session 4 (Students)	2				1									1					5					
Russia	Session 1	1				1														3					
	Session 2							2			1				2	1				7					
	Session 3	1			1															2					
	Session 4 (Students)	1		1	1						1			1				1		7					
Iran	Session 1									1										1					
	Session 2					1				1										4					
	Session 3				1															1					
	Session 4 (Students)						2													2					
KSA	Session 1																			4					
	Session 2						2													4					
	Session 3	2																		7					
	Session 4 (Students)																			7					
EU	Session 1								1	1										7					
	Session 2								1	1										7					
	Session 3								1	1										7					
	Session 4 (Students)	1									1									3					
Israel	Session 1					1 (with US/Russia)	1 (with US)			1										2					
	Session 2																			2					
	Session 3	2									1									3					
	Session 4 (Students)																			4					
US	Session 1								1											2					
	Session 2										1 (with KSM/Israel)	2								5					
	Session 3										1									2					
	Session 4 (Students)																			2					
	11	3	4	4	2	2	4	5	14	8	12	4	3	5	13	27	1	4	10	131					



Strategic Outcome

Participants were asked at the end of each simulation to estimate the extent to which the country that they represented achieved the strategic goals they had described at the beginning of the simulation. Table 6 below summarizes the participant estimates in this regard.

Key

- = Severe strategic setback
- = Substantial strategic setback
- = Moderate strategic setback
- / = No strategic progress
- + = Moderate strategic gain
- ++ = Substantial strategic gain
- +++ = High strategic gain

Table 6: Strategic Outcome

	Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 (Students)	Summary
PRC	+	+	/	++	China mostly achieved its (rather modest) regional goals by preserving or expanding influence slightly and preventing major war in most sessions.
Russia	+	+	+++	++	In two of the sessions, Russia made marginal, if any, progress towards its strategic goals (but did not go backwards); in the other two sessions, it made substantial strategic gains through expanded influence or sanctions relief.
Iran	++	+	-	--	In two of the sessions Iran made marginal, if any progress towards strategic goals; in one game essentially capitulated (but got sanctions relief) and in another suffered strategic setback.
KSA	+	/	+	/	Did not make major progress in any session, but ensured internal stability (main goal) and preserved strategic position.
EU	--	--	--	++	In three of the sessions, did not make progress on its strategic objectives (actually suffered varying degrees of setbacks); in one session where avoiding migration to EU was a key objective, it did achieve that, which represented strategic success on that front.
Israel	+	+++	+	+	Made some strategic gains (varied by game how much) in terms of Iranian influence diminishing and in some sessions, it achieved closer relationships with Russia and China while preserving the US relationship.
US	+	-	+++	+	Did not achieve its strategic goal of reducing military presence in region (more involved than intended) in 3/4 sessions. However, in one session, it forced the Iranians to give up its nuclear weapons (big strategic achievement) and in two sessions, collaborated with Russia. In one session, competition with China decreased a little and in others escalated.



Content and Text Analysis of Participant Outputs

Note: The volume of text used is far below the usual minimums for these approaches. The following results therefore lack statistical significance and are merely illustrative of what might be obtained from a larger sample.

Computational analysis (natural language processing or NLP) of the communications and other text-based outputs produced by the participants during the red teaming can be utilized for two purposes. The first is to identify and explore emergent themes. Tables 7, 8 and 9 below depict a sample application of topic modelling to the outputs of the four red team simulations. It uses latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA), a bag-of-words model, English stopwords and analyzes bi- and trigrams. The analysis statistically identified through machine learning different topic clusters (8 topic, 7 topic and 6 topic analyses are shown). These could be explored more deeply to elucidate unidentified themes and similarities across simulations, however this would only yield relevant information if the topics were derived from a larger, more representative sample.

Table 7: Illustrative Topic Model of Simulation Outputs (8 topics)

Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 5	Topic 6	Topic 7	Topic 8
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strait Hormuz • military bases • Central Asian • Syria The • Islamic Republic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strait Hormuz • trade agreement • US presence • government Iraq • nuclear program • US aggression • peace talks • pressure US 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central Asian • trade agreement • US presence • military presence • support Iran • concentrating peaceful 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United States • Middle East • Saudi Arabia • UN Security • Islamic Republic • Central Asia • President Putin • nuclear program • war Iran • large scale 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • diplomatic presence • anti tank weaponry • Persian Gulf • missile defense systems • involved war • lease naval • US Iranian • direct confrontation • naval presence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US naval • trade agreement • China Russia • Support Shiite • parties Iraq • Central Asia • peaceful resolution • region well 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • lease naval • South China Sea • Persian Gulf • sphere influence • campaign Saudi Arabia • increase oil • Central Asia • China reduce 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Saudi Arabia • Central Asia • Persian Gulf • Middle East • Iranian aggression • South China Sea • military presence • Fort Dix

Table 8: Illustrative Topic Model of Simulation Outputs (7 topics)

Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 5	Topic 6	Topic 7
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central Asian • Islamic Republic • military bases • Syria The • Iran sends 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • trade agreement • Strait Hormuz • US presence • nuclear program • US aggression • peace talks • pressure US • concentrating peaceful 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Saudi Arabia • United States • military support • Islamic Republic • Central Asian • nuclear program • Central Asia • mutually beneficial 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Middle East • United States • UN Security • Central Asia • large scale • war Iran • presence region • sanctions Iran • risk acceptant 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Persian Gulf • Central Asia • Saudi Arabia • South China Sea • lease naval • Iranian aggression • North Korea • military presence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fort Dix • economic aid • trade deal • forces Syria • middle eastern • peaceful nuclear • PR China Full • Gulf Oman 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Middle East • Saudi Arabia • Houthis Yemen • influence Middle • South China Sea • increase oil • support Houthis Yemen




Table 9: Illustrative Topic Model of Simulation Outputs (6 topics)

Topic 1	Topic 2	Topic 3	Topic 4	Topic 5	Topic 6
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Central Asian • Islamic Republic • military bases • Strait Hormuz • Syria The 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Middle East • United States • UN Security • US aggression • Houthis Yemen • Strait Hormuz • US presence • trade agreement • nuclear program • pressure US 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Saudi Arabia • United States • Islamic Republic • military support • anti aircraft • military presence • nuclear program • Central Asian • Central Asia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Middle East • Central Asia • deal Iran • war Iran • Kataib Hezbollah • Assad regime • presence region • proxy attacks • strategic partnerships 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Persian Gulf • Central Asia • Saudi Arabia • South China Sea • lease naval • Iranian aggression • North Korea • military presence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fort Dix • economic aid • trade deal • forces Syria • middle eastern • peaceful nuclear • PR China Full • Gulf Oman

A second usage of NLP tools in the simulation is to 1) provide unobtrusive manipulation checks for players and 2) uncover relationships between individual differences and exercise outcomes. This involves Leadership Trait Analysis and similar approaches (such as Operational Code Analysis, Motive Analysis, Conceptual Integrative Complexity, Verbal Behavior Analysis). The following provides several illustrative examples:

1. *Levels of Distrust of Other Players:* for all of the simulations, each adversary player was given a read-ahead and went through a de-biasing exercise to align the players with the assessed mindset of their assigned adversary. Well-calibrated adversary players should evidence high levels of distrust of adversaries. As shown in Figure A below, an analysis of all communications from the players indicates that distrust levels were in general inconsistently set for China and Iran players but not for the Russia players.


Figure A: Levels of Distrust of Other Players






2. *Task Focus*: An analysis of communications reveals that players in session 3 were much less task focused than players in the other three sessions, as seen in Figure B Below.

Figure B: Task Focus



3. *Differentiation*: Figure C shows that China players showed higher levels of differentiation (making distinctions among dimensions in the environment).


Figure C: Differentiation





4. *Evaluators*: The evaluators measure captures the degree to which the speaker makes judgments in the areas of right and wrong, correct and incorrect, and usefulness and uselessness. Session 4 players used evaluators at a higher rate. While no conclusions can be drawn from this small sample, in other cases evaluators may indicate emotional instability.

Figure D: Evaluators



Note: The above results should not be substantively interpreted, given the small sample size. However, in a larger exercise, we could use this type of analysis to examine the relationship between individual differences and scenario outcome, providing some robustness to the exercise results in the face of changing adversary players.



Conclusion

As a pilot study, the Center for Advanced Red Teaming conducted a series of four simulation sessions in January 2020 to explore the question of how Great Power Competition (GPC) and regional dynamics might change following the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani. These employed Strategic Dynamics Red Teaming, a technique that varies RED players across multiple simulations, while keeping BLUE and GREEN teams constant. It collected a variety of information relevant to gaining a picture of strategic developments over the simulated timeframe (2020-2022).

Box 6: Participant Advice for CENTCOM

At the end of each simulation, participants were asked, based on the decision-making and developments they had just experienced, to suggest any broad points about the strategic situation in the AOR that they might want to share with CENTCOM. Some of the main suggestions included:

- The observation that, even more so than many other regions, the CENTCOM AOR is an area of immense complexity, where everything is related to everything else and multiple causes / consequences are difficult to identify and isolate from one another.
- Iran is facing a delicate balancing act between following its ideological tendency towards expansion and dominance, and facing the reality of sanctions and other curbs on its freedom of action. Small perturbations in regional dynamics could quickly shift Iran into overt aggression or just as easily into capitulation.
- Predictability and strategic discipline should not be expected from many of the actors in the AOR.
- It is important for any U.S. responses to be seen as proportional by actors in the AOR in order for them to also act proportionately.
- Simulations suggested that the region is especially ripe for proxy attacks, cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.
- Internal control and stability influences surrounding regions and political decisions; where there is internal political instability, actors seek to exert political / military control in the region, whereas where there is internal stability, they tend to focus on economic expansion.
- Due to recent strategic moves, Russia has enormous freedom of action in the AOR and can act opportunistically and flexibly to maximize its benefit as developments arise.
- Are we prepared if Iran becomes conciliatory, or could this cause new strategic dislocations in the region?
- We need to expect that our regional allies (including Israel) may not be exclusively in our orbit and may also ally with our adversaries.
- Do not underestimate China's growing influence in the AOR, which in the short term might appear slight and marginal, but is cumulative and formidable when viewed from China's longer-term strategic outlook.
- Impulsive decisions can affect outcomes and their prospect should not be ignored.

The simulations proceeded without any setbacks and substantial amounts of data were collected. Below is a summary of key features that emerged with respect to each adversary:

China

- The PRC's overall strategy generally consisted of securing and expanding its economic and political influence, primarily through the Belt and Road Initiative. In so doing, it sought to limit the possibility of a major destabilizing conflict between Iran and the United States, while simultaneously working behind the scenes to reduce US influence in the region. One participant also had the PRC act to limit Russian power in Central Asia.



- Among the PRC's methods of achieving these goals were to support Iran politically (and covertly with respect to arms sales) but also working with all parties to reduce tensions.
- Overt actions by China focused primarily on expanding the Belt and Road initiative and increasing economic influence in the AOR. They openly opposed the United States politically and diplomatically with regards to Iran but took no major actions. Covertly, the PRC supplied weapons and military support to Iran, Syria, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. The PRC also increased intelligence gathering in the AOR, primarily to share information with Iran regarding U.S. military dispositions.

Russia

- Russia's overarching strategic goal in the AOR was to supplant U.S. regional influence, while a secondary goal was to reduce the pull of China among Central Asian states that it regards as part of its sphere of influence.
- To accomplish this, Russia adopted the short-term goals of setting itself up as the diplomatic broker in the region, conducting disinformation campaigns against the U.S. and marginalizing Iran in Syria so as to consolidate its gains there.
- Russia's overt actions focused on a diplomatic role, opposing U.S. actions in the AOR and providing military aid to Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In two simulations, Russia engaged in trilateral trade with China and Iran. Covertly, Russia provided financial and military support to Iran, worked with the Kurds against US government influence, and conducted varying levels of disinformation and cyber campaigns against the United States.

Iran

- Driven by a foundational desire to preserve the revolution, Iran's broad strategic goals across the simulations included maintaining its dominant position in the Shia Islamic world. They did so by working through proxies, escaping the sanctions bind and decreasing United States influence in the region, although without provoking it to the point of open conflict. Interestingly, only one player openly expressed a desire in acquiring nuclear weapons as a core strategic goal for Iran, but its use as a bargaining chip did feature in a few cases.
- Iran's shorter-term objectives included fomenting anti-U.S. feelings in Iraq to result in the expulsion of U.S. troops, continuing to badger Saudi Arabia (primarily in Yemen) and putting additional pressure on the United States by harassing shipping in the Straits of Hormuz and installing new missile batteries there. Iran also actively sought in the simulations to establish closer military and economic relationships with both China and Russia. In two of the simulations, Iran became more open to negotiate with the United States and in one of these it concluded a grand bargain for peace where it gave up its nuclear weapons, while in another simulation it became more recalcitrant.
- Overt actions conducted by Iran were frequently conducted through proxies, including the use of small boats to harass U.S. traffic in Persian Gulf. Covertly, Iran provided weapons and financial aid to their proxies to stockpile for future use and engaged in multiple cyberattacks against international finance and U.S. infrastructure, like the air traffic control system.

Analysis of the collected data yielded a variety of expected developments, like Chinese economic expansion into the AOR and continued Iranian support for proxies in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. However, the simulations also revealed several developments that were less expected or displayed one or more novel characteristics. Among the more notable of these were:

- The PRC seeking to forward base Chinese naval and maritime patrol assets in the AOR (e.g., in Djibouti and Gwadar) and in several cases securing the right to build bases in the AOR.
- Russia acting to forcibly dissolve Iran's militias in Syria, in coordination with the Assad regime.



- Iran conducting a false flag attempted attack against its own pipelines carrying oil to China and accusing the U.S. of trying to cut it off, in order to secure international sympathy and encourage the PRC to buy more Iranian oil and equip Iran with a modern fighter force.
- KSA working to develop its own version of the IRGC Quds Force, which would support the training of both sympathetic government and non-government actors in the region to curb Iranian influence.
- KSA establishing an alliance with the PRC and allowing China to purchase a lease for naval facilities on Saudi soil (ostensibly to aid in its deradicalization efforts).
- The EU creating and maintaining its own Freedom of Navigation mission in the Persian Gulf (with France and Germany in the lead).
- The United States stationing advanced tactical fighters and associated military personnel at bases in the north and south of Israel as part of a new strategic aerial effort in the region.
- The United States, using a cyberattack, causing an Iranian military plane to crash into the Fordow enrichment facility and planting doctored footage to make it seem that the Iranians shot it down via an anti-aircraft missile after mistaking it for an enemy plane.

Comparatively, all of the adversaries across most sessions had as an explicit strategic goal to diminish U.S. power and influence in the AOR and all three adversaries sought to expand their geopolitical influence in the AOR in at least one session. Both China and Iran in several sessions sought to create military and/or economic dependencies with state and non-state actors in the region. Russia and China both sought to expand their economic growth through engagement in the region, and both desired to increase their status as a regional diplomatic partner and convener. China also notably sought to secure vital energy resources, while (together with the EU) was the only actor that had a deep desire to avoid the eruption of conflict in the region (especially between the United States and Iran). Somewhat surprisingly in the case of Iran, its only one of four participants had acquisition of a weapons capability as an explicit strategic goal. Also of note, China and Russia each had as a goal to limit the other's influence in the region, albeit not in the same session. With respect to overall strategic risk tolerance, Russia's was the highest of the three RED adversaries, but it is noteworthy that the expert participants who played KSA, Israel and the United States in Sessions 1-3 all rated their countries' risk tolerance higher than any of the adversaries in any of the sessions.

Across actors, simulation sessions and rounds, the most common shorter-term "operational" objectives were to increase economic ties and investments in the AOR and to coordinate diplomatically in order to stabilize the region and prevent war between Iran and the United States. Iran, Israel and KSA all sought to expand economic ties with states outside of the AOR in at least one session, and both the PRC and Russia intended to force U.S. military personnel out from the AOR in most sessions. As perhaps expected, both China and Russia in at least one session sought to increase their military presence in the region, but perhaps more surprisingly, both the expert and student participants representing the EU decided to increase the EU's naval activity in the Gulf.

As for individual states, China generally attempted to reduce U.S. influence in the region and protect or expand their economic influence (through the Belt and Road Initiative). The PRC supported Iran politically but was also willing to work with all regional parties to avoid an open conflict. In addition to the goals noted above, Russia worked to marginalize Iran in Syria, as well as to undermine U.S. influence in region, including through covert disinformation campaigns. It also sought to solidify and deepen its influence in Central Asia to counter an encroaching China and – unlike many of the other actors – actually looked to increase the price of oil, which would benefit it economically; therefore regional instability could actually help Russia in this regard. Aside from those goals already mentioned, Iran in a single session worked to acquire and then later to relinquish a nuclear weapons program. It also sought to hinder traffic in the Straits of Hormuz and to lessen the effects of sanctions.



Overall, 168 overt actions were taken across the four simulation sessions. The most common actions overall were engaging in trade negotiations (or concluding trade deals), diplomatic offers to act as a peace broker between competing sides, and offers of (or activities demonstrating) peaceful cooperation between two or more states. Military aid and propaganda were also fairly common. There was only one case of major overt kinetic action (a missile strike by Iran against an American base in Oman). Unsurprisingly, the EU took the greatest number of overt actions, mainly acting diplomatically and economically. Somewhat more interestingly, Russia also took a large number of overt actions, primarily diplomatically, but also militarily. The bulk of United States actions were military in nature.

There was a total of 136 different covert actions taken during the four simulation sessions. All of the actors in the simulations engaged in several different types of covert action. By far the most common type of covert action was backchannel discussions, threats and negotiations, but this was mainly due to their prolific use by the European Union. Prominent across multiple actors were espionage, cyberattacks, covert arms transfers, disinformation campaigns and funding sub-state proxies. With respect to differences across actors, the RED actors tended to utilize military covert actions, GREEN and BLUE tended to engage in more intelligence-focused actions. The Great Power Competitors (United States, PRC and Russia) all engaged in disinformation campaigns in at least one session.

Last, when it came to the actors' own assessments of the degree to which their original strategic objectives had been advanced (or otherwise) during the three years of simulated play, the following was observed with respect to each country:

- China mostly achieved its (rather modest) regional goals by preserving or expanding its influence slightly and preventing major war in most sessions.
- In two of the sessions, Russia made marginal, if any, progress towards its strategic goals (but did not suffer setbacks); in the other two sessions it made substantial strategic gains through expanded influence or sanctions relief.
- In two of the sessions Iran made marginal, if any progress towards strategic goals; in one game essentially capitulated (but got sanctions relief) and in another suffered strategic setback.
- KSA did not make major progress in any session but ensured internal stability (main goal) and preserved strategic position.
- In three of the sessions, the EU suffered varying degrees of strategic setbacks; in one session where avoiding mass migration to the EU from the AOR was a key objective, it did achieve some strategic success on that front.
- Israel made some strategic gains, the extent varying by session, but these generally involved diminishing Iranian influence. In some sessions it achieved closer relationships with Russia and China while preserving its relationship with the United States.
- The United States did not achieve its strategic goal of reducing military presence in region in three of the four sessions. However, in one session, it forced the Iranians to give up its nuclear weapons and in two sessions, collaborated with Russia. In one session, competition with China decreased a little and in others it escalated.

Although this effort represented only a pilot study, it has demonstrated that Strategic Dynamics Red Teaming is a method to rapidly and at low cost explore complex strategic dynamics in an AOR. Beyond merely narrative output, the multiple simulations involved allow for sophisticated analysis. For example, the study applied natural language processing techniques to the outputs of the exercises. While the results were only illustrative, they indicated that future SDRT studies could benefit from this approach.



Appendix A: Participants

Scholars

Brandon Behlendorf, Ph.D. – Assistant Professor - Criminology
Brian Greenhill, Ph.D. – Associate Professor - Political Science
Brian Nussbaum, Ph.D. – Assistant Professor - Political Science
Bryan Early, Ph.D. – Associate Professor - Political Science
Chris Clary, Ph.D. – Assistant Professor - Political Science
Edmund Stazyk, Ph.D. – Associate Professor - Public Administration
Eric Stern, Ph.D. – Professor - Political Science
Gregory Nowell, Ph.D. – Associate Professor - Political Science
Michael Young, Ph.D. – Assistant Professor - Political Science
Sally Friedman, Ph.D. – Associate Professor - Political Science
Stephen Weinberg, Ph.D. – Clinical Assistant Professor - Economics
Steve Holt, Ph.D. – Assistant Professor - Public Administration
Victor Asal, Ph.D. – Professor - Political Science

Students and Graduates

Anna Wetzel – University at Albany - Alumna
Elisabeth Dubois – University at Albany - Ph.D. Candidate
Inga Miller – University at Albany - Ph.D. Candidate
Jenna Latourette – University at Albany - Alumna
Keith Preble – University at Albany - Ph.D. Candidate
Kyle Lindemann – University at Albany - Graduate Student
Niroshani Ekanayake – University at Albany - Alumna



Appendix B: Red Teaming Exercise Protocol



THE CENTER FOR ADVANCED RED TEAMING

UNIVERSITY AT ALBANY
State University of New York

Strategic Multilayer Assessment Project – Strategic Decision Red Teaming Protocol

A Collaboration between the College of Emergency Preparedness Homeland Security, and Cybersecurity (CEHC) and Rockefeller College (ROC)

Question B14: (Revised) How might Great Power competition and regional dynamics change following the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani?

Participants

The exercise will run four times with four separate groups of Red teams (as indicated below). To the extent possible, participants who play the Green and Blue teams will remain the same throughout the exercises.

Red – People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, Iran

Green – Saudi Arabia (KSA), Israel, European Union (EU)

Blue – United States (US)

Phase 0 – Background

1. One week before the exercise, all participants will receive their appropriate background information on their specific nation/role (i.e. PRC, Russia, Iran, US, KSA, Israel, EU). This document of ~10 pages in length will include:
 - a. Basic leadership profile, identifying leader structure and personality(ies)
 - b. Any evidence of the country’s current strategic orientation vis-à-vis the United States and the CENTCOM AOR
 - c. A list of recent activities / actions by the country in connection with the CENTCOM AOR
2. Participants will also receive a primer on red teaming and how to minimize the biases that experts bring to red teaming.



Phase 1 – Scenario

1. Introduction [00:00-00:10]
2. The simulation will begin with a brief (20 minute) set of de-biasing and role-enhancing exercises. [00:10-00:30]
3. As the first task, all participants will be asked to create a brief “Top Secret” strategic memo detailing their baseline strategic objectives with respect to both the United States and the AOR prior to December 15, 2019. It will also include their initial strategic assumptions (usually about the environment with respect to consideration of blue, green and red) and baseline risk tolerance. This will be provided to the White team only. [00:30-00:45]
4. At the start of the exercise, all participants will receive the scenario summarizing the events of late December, the attack on Soleimani and subsequent events (through the 24-hour period prior to the exercise). [00:45-00:50]

Break: [00:50-00:55]

Phase 2 – Order of Play

Round – 1 [1-year simulated time]

1. All teams will have a chance to reassess their strategic objectives and update their memos if necessary, providing any changes to the White team. Remind them that strategy does not change easily / quickly as opposed to operational objectives. [00:55-01:05]
2. Based on their strategic objectives, teams will establish operational objectives with respect to the U.S. and the AOR for 2020. [01:05-01:15]
3. Teams will be given the opportunity to conduct planning regarding what actions (if any) they would like to initiate. They also have the opportunity to reach out to other players covertly (through email) with any proposals for coordination. [01:15-01:35]
4. At the end of the round, each team will choose an action (or even no action). This can include actions taken through proxies. [01:35-01:40]
5. This action can be either Overt or Covert. If overt, the action is made known to all participants; if covert, it is shared only with the White Team (both covert and overt to White Team by email). Also, any changes in assumptions regarding risk or perceptions of other actors based on their actions (threat perception) should be summarized. [01:40-01:45]
6. Actions can either be unilateral or part of a coordinated effort between two or more countries.

Break – End of Round 1: [01:45 – 01:55]

1. During the break, the White team decides whether the covert or overt actions of the teams have any observable consequences and will share these with the group by posting on the 2020 Whiteboard.



Round – 2 [1-year simulated time]

1. All teams will identify changes to operational objectives in the AOR and regarding the U.S. for 2021 based on their own or the other team's actions in the previous round. [01:55-02:05]
2. All teams will be given the opportunity to conduct planning regarding what further actions (if any) they would like to initiate. They also have the opportunity to reach out to other players covertly (through email) with any proposals for coordination. [02:05-02:20]
3. At the end of the round, each team will choose an action (or even no action). This can include actions taken through proxies. [02:20-02:25]
4. This action can be either Overt or Covert. If overt, the action is made known to all participants; if covert, it is shared only with the White Team (both covert and overt to White Team by email). Also, any changes in assumptions regarding risk or perceptions of other actors based on their actions (threat perception) should be summarized [02:25-02:30]
5. Actions can either be unilateral or part of a coordinated effort between two or more countries.

Break – End of Round 2: [02:30-02:40]

1. During the break, the White team decides whether the covert or overt actions of the Red teams have any observable consequences and will share these with the group by posting on the 2020 Whiteboard.
2. If no team has taken a provocative action (e.g., an attack on another actor) by this stage, the White team will inject a large-scale attack on the U.S. homeland by a regional violent non-state actor (known to have ties to Iran) on the United States as part of the scenario.

Round – 3 [1-year simulated time]

1. All teams will identify changes to operational objectives for 2022 in the AOR and regarding the U.S. [02:40-02:50]
2. All teams will be given the opportunity to conduct planning regarding what actions (if any) they would like to initiate. They also have the opportunity to reach out to other players covertly (through email) with any proposals for coordination. [02:50-03:05]
3. At the end of the round, each team will choose an action (or even no action). This can include actions taken through proxies. [03:05-03:10]
4. This action can be either Overt or Covert. If overt, the action is made known to all participants; if covert, it is shared only with the White Team. Also, any changes in assumptions regarding risk or perceptions of other actors based on their actions (threat perception) should be summarized. [03:10-03:15]
5. Actions can either be unilateral or part of a coordinated effort between two or more countries.

Break – End of Round 3: [03:15-3:20]

Phase 3 – Hot wash and Assessment



1. All participants are provided the final overt and final (and intermediate) covert actions of all other participants. [03:20-03:30]
2. The group will discuss the final actions of all players and discuss the extent to which each Red team actor has achieved its operational and strategic objectives. They will also discuss how their threat perceptions / objectives they attributed to other actors changed based on actions taken during the simulation. [03:30-03:45]
3. The group will discuss whether there are any elements of the simulation which are unrealistic and what would be more likely to occur in an actual situation. [03:45-03:50]
4. The group will discuss what CENTCOM might be able to learn from the outcome and process of the exercise (i.e., implications for the U.S.). [03:50-04:00]

Exercise End



Appendix C: Red Team Exercise Results

1.1 People’s Republic of China – Strategic Objectives

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish ourselves as a political and economic powerhouse, both internationally and in the region; • Secure vital energy and oil sources; • Undermine US dominance in the region through strategic partnerships and economic investments; • Convince regional actors to work with the PRC; • Limit regional risks--broadly construed--that might otherwise destabilize the PRC and its strategic aims; • Create local dependencies that align the interests of neighboring countries with those of the PRC; and • Expand into territories that are strategically (economically, militarily) valuable to the PRC. <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Push at the margins, not enough to warrant serious external intervention. <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is little international interest in direct confrontation, providing an opportunity for subtle maneuvers and manipulations that advance the overarching interests of the PRC. <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In general, nothing has changed...however, on item #2, operationally, I would be thinking about additional ways in which I might (a) 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Become dominant power in Asia. • Secure belt and road initiative. • Prevent Middle Eastern chaos from affecting Chinese sphere of influence. <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Willing to play it safe and focus on long-term, time is on our side. <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US wants to dominate Asia • US is incapable of maintaining any long-term strategy; Trump is transitory threat • Europe is imploding and incapable of maintaining long-term strategies in our sphere of influence • China’s economic power is growing faster than rivals <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increases the importance of keeping Middle Eastern chaos out of our sphere of influence. 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preserve Chinese Communist Party rule • Maintain economic growth at levels sufficient to achieve preservation of Chinese Communist Party rule • Diminish U.S. power globally, but especially near China’s periphery • Revise global institutions to reflect China’s new status • Prevent anti-China actors from using third-parties to gain strength • Prevent Taiwanese declaration of independence <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The U.S. seeks to deny China’s proper place in the world, but is limited in the scope of its ability to do so by its deep interdependence with China, both economically but also in terms of needing China’s help in certain troubled regions (especially North Korea but also Pakistan, Iran, etc.). • Iran seeks to preserve the Islamic Republic and protect and advance Shiite interests throughout the Muslim world. Iran seeks to avoid large-scale conflict, while using proxies to raise the costs of U.S. presence in the Middle East, seeking in the long-run to diminish American presence there. • Russia seeks to reassert itself as a global great power. It is more acceptant of conflict in the Middle East than other great powers because it benefits from spikes in global 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce US influence in the region. • Securing energy projects and exports from the region. • Increasing arms sales to all parties in the region to increase influence. • Moderate Iranian aggression. • Due to the need for the region’s energy, conflict must be avoided. However, if relations continue to deteriorate, China may need to deploy naval forces to region to demonstrate we cannot jeopardize our interests in the region as well as One Belt, One Road Initiative. • Limit but not stop growing Russian influence in the region. <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Saudi-led coalition is in a precarious situation, increasing its reliance on foreign aid, especially from the US and NATO. However, these states will greater establish diplomatic and trade relations with other nations to secure their regimes • Iran is a potential strategic competitor in the region, however, due to our mutual antipathy for the US, they are a potential ally of convenience • Although US-Iranian tensions threaten US influence in the region, destabilization in the region any further would be a threat to our economy • Both the US and Iran are acting erratically



<p>diversify partners from whom we secure energy and oil resources, (b) consider covert actions to support Iran and maintain/build our partnership.</p>		<p>energy prices. It also seeks to diminish American influence globally, though more than Iran or China may view small to medium conflicts with third parties as helpful to achieve that aim.</p> <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I am risk averse in situations not directly involving China (including Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, etc.), though in those situations I am quite risk acceptant. <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Change. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iran wishes to establish itself as a regional superpower, which reduces US influence, but could also be problematic for us <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A show of force may be necessary at some point, but we should do nothing that jeopardizes our interests • Though our naval forces and our global presence are expanding, we must accept the limitations of current military capabilities to become too involved in a potential conflict • Due to trade tensions with the US and the threat of a US-Iranian War, we should not act overly confrontational to the US <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate with Russia to moderate any Iranian reprisals.
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1.2 Russia – Strategic Objectives

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supplant U.S. presence and influence in Middle East. • Diversify economic relationships with Central Asia to reduce the pull of China. • Cultivate close ties to Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to capitalize on tensions with U.S. <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • China seeks expanded global influence and that ambition can lead to tension if we try to expand economically. • United States may be hostile toward expanded partnerships, particularly with the Saudis. <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I am willing to tolerate some risks, afforded by my popularity at home, but I do not want to be pulled into substantial military action. <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce or eliminate Iran's influence in Syria • Iran will be more aggressive in trying to reassert itself in the region. 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase influence with a variety of countries in AOR • Decrease U.S. influence on those same countries in AOR <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High level of distrust is important throughout AOR • Assume all other nations aren't friendlies <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Willing to assume a high level of calculated risk when appropriate. <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Change. 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand Russia's sphere of interests in its near-abroad at the expense of U.S. influence, including the Middle East • Enhance Russia's global diplomatic leadership and stature • Improve Russia's economy via increasingly dense trade relationships in the areas of sensitive military exports, fossil fuels, and conventional trade • Solidify my personal legacy as President and political influence in Russia even as my formal political position undergoes a transition <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The U.S. is not willing to become involved in another large-scale war in the Middle East, but will be willing to engage in lower level uses of military force • The U.S. will continue its overtly hostility position towards Russia, but will avoid direct confrontation • Saudi Arabia and Iran may be willing to go to war • Israel may launch a preemptive strike against Iran if it thinks the country will go nuclear and it can effectively destroy its nuclear infrastructure. This operation may be supported by the US. <p>Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mildly-risk acceptant, as Russia has already solidified major gains via its operations in Crimea and the role its established in Syria. 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Using the existing framework of the CTSO. The CTSO has had reasonable success in ensuring a few peace keeping missions, combatting drug trade and controlling borders. • Using the existing framework of the UN and other international assumptions, acting as a peace broker and go-between. Not only it can present itself as a go-between in domestic rivalries, it can expand its role in addressing refugees from Afghanistan in Central Asia countries. • Increasing its economic leverage by Russian state energy company investments in local energy development. Also, other infrastructure projects regarding water resources <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The existing international organizations in the region will continue to function and no unexpected changes of regimes will happen in the countries involved. <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • These actions involve low risk. They generally conform with international laws and agreements. They should have reasonable support from the regimes of the states involved <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p>



		<p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• No Change.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• In the light of Iran events, Russia publicly announces its general support to Iran -- drumming up international opprobrium to "unlawful killings" and promises of general military and economic support.• Also, would possibly reconsider its relations with the Kurds
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1.3 Iran – Strategic Objectives

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain pressure on Saudi Arabia by (a) supporting Shiite populations in the oil producing regions near the gulf; • Support our brothers in Yemen, which wastes Saudi resources • Occasional incidents to show the Saudis that they cannot shamelessly treat our brothers in that country. Occasional attacks in Saudi Arabia help to increase the price of oil which is important given our limited ability to export. • Maintain pressure on the Americans by continuous low level assaults through intermediaries on American presence in Iraq. There is very little will in the United States to continue a conflict which costs them a few lives a day or month. These assaults are easy to arrange. The Americans do not have patience for a long conflict. • Continue to support Shiite political presence in Iraq • Support for our brothers in Lebanon and Syria. We must not allow a resurgence in any form of Sunni dominance in the tier from Syria into northern Iraq. It does not matter whether it is ISIS or some "modernizer" like Saddam who abhorred Islam. • Maintain protracted diplomatic dance over nuclear program with Europeans <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Information Provided. 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lead the Islamic world • Become dominant power in Middle East • Stable Islamic society <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US is the great Satan and fundamentally opposed to the Islamic Republic. • Trump is fundamentally erratic and anti-Islam. • Population is split, younger generation does not understand the origin, need for and benefit of the revolution. <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moderate. Open warfare is to be avoided--the costs of the Iran-Iraq war are still felt. Standoff weapons on low casualty/American target ok. • Support for Shiite militia in other states cost effective, semi-covert. Yemen, Lebanon, Afghanistan. <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Information Provided. 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain the independence and territorial integrity of Iran • Maintain access to global markets • Develop a nuclear weapons program to deter attacks by the US or Israel • Stay on friendly terms with the government of Iraq <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The US is not serious about negotiating with us under any circumstances and would like to overthrow our government. • Iraq and Syria are amenable to our influence • Saudi Arabia will continue to be hostile to us • Russia's motives are unclear <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Medium (willing to take some chances) <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All strategic objectives and assumptions about the wider region stay the same. But I'm going to change my baseline risk tolerance from medium to low. 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce/Eliminate US military and diplomatic influence in Middle-Eastern affairs • Reduce Saudi Arabian international connections • Support the Shiite minorities in the Middle-East • Make Iraq more dependent on Iranian economic and military power. <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US wants to increase influence in Middle-East by proxy • US wants to avoid a 'second invasion of Iraq' in the middle east • Saudi Arabia is using US to compete with Iran, but is not strongly connected • Middle-east as a whole wants to limit US support, but they currently depend on it <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low to medium. Avoid major risks that could cause superpower intervention, while maximizing gains from smaller risks. <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Change.



<p>Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• No Information Provided. <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Our fundamental strategic objectives have not changed. We should consider soft targets, but nothing that will goad the beast in an election year. The idea is to maintain attrition. The Americans have little patience for this, as was seen in Viet Nam and Afghanistan.			
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1.4 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – Strategic Objectives

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain Internal Stability (survival – short term) • Check Iranian Influence and Expansion (survival related – medium term) regarding Gulf States, Syria/Iraq, Yemen, and Elsewhere (Lebanon, Af/Pak, Africa) • Continue US-Saudi Special Relationship (survival related – longer term) • Diversify Economy Beyond Petrochemical (survival related – longer term) <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US, ally, ongoing debate about Iran relations, currently trending away • Israel, ally-ish, quiet ally, dangerous if publicized – could endanger stability at home • Yemen, support for Sunni Militias is increasingly unsuccessful. May require negotiations • Syria/Iraq, support for Sunni Militias is a mixed bag, some success some decline • Iran, adversary, with increased influence in Iraq particularly (and Syria too) they seem to be making progress at our expense. • Would be valuable if something distracted them and drew their attention (preferably outside our immediate neighborhood) <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compared to the past, we have consolidated a lot, and so are more risk tolerant than historically was the case • On a scale of 1-to-10, 10 being most risk seeking, we are about a 7 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain Internal Stability (survival – short term) • Check Iranian Influence and Expansion (survival related – medium term) regarding Gulf States, Syria/Iraq, Yemen, and Elsewhere (Lebanon, Af/Pak, Africa) • Continue US-Saudi Special Relationship (survival related – longer term) • Diversify Economy Beyond Petrochemical (survival related – longer term) <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US, ally, ongoing debate about Iran relations, currently trending away • Israel, ally-ish, quiet ally, dangerous if publicized – could endanger stability at home • Yemen, support for Sunni Militias is increasingly unsuccessful. May require negotiations • Syria/Iraq, support for Sunni Militias is a mixed bag, some success some decline • Iran, adversary, with increased influence in Iraq particularly (and Syria too) they seem to be making progress at our expense. • Would be valuable if something distracted them and drew their attention (preferably outside our immediate neighborhood) <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compared to the past, we have consolidated a lot, and so are more risk tolerant than historically was the case • On a scale of 1-to-10, 10 being most risk seeking, we are about a 7 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain Internal Stability (survival – short term) • Check Iranian Influence and Expansion (survival related – medium term) regarding Gulf States, Syria/Iraq, Yemen, and Elsewhere (Lebanon, Af/Pak, Africa) • Continue US-Saudi Special Relationship (survival related – longer term) • Diversify Economy Beyond Petrochemical (survival related – longer term) <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US, ally, ongoing debate about Iran relations, currently trending away • Israel, ally-ish, quiet ally, dangerous if publicized – could endanger stability at home • Yemen, support for Sunni Militias is increasingly unsuccessful. May require negotiations • Syria/Iraq, support for Sunni Militias is a mixed bag, some success some decline • Iran, adversary, with increased influence in Iraq particularly (and Syria too) they seem to be making progress at our expense. • Would be valuable if something distracted them and drew their attention (preferably outside our immediate neighborhood) <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compared to the past, we have consolidated a lot, and so are more risk tolerant than historically was the case • On a scale of 1-to-10, 10 being most risk seeking, we are about a 7 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work to diffuse tensions with oppositional forces. • Defuse tensions with Iran • End the war in Yemen • Create a more Saudi backed Middle East <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The initial assumptions are that the Saudis and Iranians alike would want to continue working towards defusing the historical tensions. Also, the Houthi rebels and Yemen are looking to cooperate to reduce the violence and increasing tensions among their people. <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The risk tolerance for the first two strategic objectives are high as we are willing to take the necessary measures – military, political, or economic to reduce tensions and create a more Saudi friendly environment. We have already given billions in loans to Iraq to begin these measures. <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Change.



<p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Post Soleimani killing, we and Israel may be targeted in response. • Iran may target KSA in response to aggressive US action (as they did with Shaman following STUXNET) • Iranian capabilities may be weakened in key areas (Yemen, Iraq/Syria, etc) post Soleimani killing... May be opportunity. 	<p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Post Soleimani killing, we and Israel may be targeted in response. • Iran may target KSA in response to aggressive US action (as they did with Shaman following STUXNET) • Iranian capabilities may be weakened in key areas (Yemen, Iraq/Syria, etc) post Soleimani killing... May be opportunity. 	<p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Post Soleimani killing, we and Israel may be targeted in response. • Iran may target KSA in response to aggressive US action (as they did with Shaman following STUXNET) • Iranian capabilities may be weakened in key areas (Yemen, Iraq/Syria, etc) post Soleimani killing... May be opportunity. 	
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1.5 European Union – Strategic Objectives



Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU seeks to contain conflict, limit proliferation of WMD, promote human rights, secure access to strategic resources and markets. • The policy of the European Union towards the North African and Middle Eastern countries seeks to encourage political and economic reform in each individual country in due respect for its specific features and regional cooperation among the countries of the region themselves and with the EU. • The Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a fundamental interest of the EU. The EU’s objective is a two-state solution with an independent, democratic, viable and contiguous Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors. <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The unpredictability and contrarian nationalist approach of the US is contributing to a shifting the balance towards a Euro-centric as opposed to Transatlantic approach with regard to international security. There is a distrust of Russia but also an awareness of increasing Russo-sympathy among certain Member States. • Increasing skepticism re the Saudi regime and concerns that the US is strengthening the hand of extremists in Iran <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generally risk averse due to the need to balance internal and external priorities and keep the Union together. 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU seeks to contain conflict, limit proliferation of WMD, promote human rights, secure access to strategic resources and markets. • The policy of the European Union towards the North African and Middle Eastern countries seeks to encourage political and economic reform in each individual country in due respect for its specific features and regional cooperation among the countries of the region themselves and with the EU. • The Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a fundamental interest of the EU. The EU’s objective is a two-state solution with an independent, democratic, viable and contiguous Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors. <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The unpredictability and contrarian nationalist approach of the US is contributing to a shifting the balance towards a Euro-centric as opposed to Transatlantic approach with regard to international security. There is a distrust of Russia but also an awareness of increasing Russo-sympathy among certain Member States. • Increasing skepticism re the Saudi regime and concerns that the US is strengthening the hand of extremists in Iran <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generally risk averse due to the need to balance internal and external priorities and keep the Union together. 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU seeks to contain conflict, limit proliferation of WMD, promote human rights, secure access to strategic resources and markets. • The policy of the European Union towards the North African and Middle Eastern countries seeks to encourage political and economic reform in each individual country in due respect for its specific features and regional cooperation among the countries of the region themselves and with the EU. • The Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a fundamental interest of the EU. The EU’s objective is a two-state solution with an independent, democratic, viable and contiguous Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors. <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The unpredictability and contrarian nationalist approach of the US is contributing to a shifting the balance towards a Euro-centric as opposed to Transatlantic approach with regard to international security. There is a distrust of Russia but also an awareness of increasing Russo-sympathy among certain Member States. • Increasing skepticism re the Saudi regime and concerns that the US is strengthening the hand of extremists in Iran <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generally risk averse due to the need to balance internal and external priorities and keep the Union together. 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The strategic objectives to the EU are to maintain peace and security in the region, particularly for the transit of shipping and commerce through the region. The EU would like to see the region stabilize and would prefer to engage countries diplomatically and commercially rather than the use of military means to achieve EU objectives, although the EU is not adverse to using force or military means. The achieve these objectives the EU prefers to partner with the United States and respective governments in the region. The EU believes that doing so is the best way to counter the strategic influence of other states in the region, particularly Russia and China, which it sees as complicating issues in the region (such as terrorism and energy security). • Human rights is another key strategic objectives of the EU, which it sees as important. Exacerbation of conflicts could drive a greater influx of migrants again through the EU. Migration is a complex issue, and this issue has been shown to sow discord among EU members. A key strategic objective in the region would be to provide aid, trade, and other means to help countries remain stable and to deter the influx of migration toward EU Member states. The migration issue also has the potential to create domestic instability within respective countries, since influx of migration has been shown to empower populist attitudes within respective countries (which is itself a danger to the EU). • Keeping nuclear weapons out of the CENTCOM AOR is also of great importance to



<p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent further escalation of or widening of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. 	<p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent further escalation of or widening of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. 	<p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent further escalation of or widening of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. 	<p>the EU given that a potential nuclear arms race could exacerbate tensions between countries in the region, which could then hurt the EU's economic and commercial interests in the region and upset the status quo while also exacerbating the migration issue.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Having a diverse supply of energy resources is vital to EU economic security. The EU cannot rely solely on Russia and a few key states for oil and gas and must ensure that the AOR is free from as much conflict as possible to minimize any issues. <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The region is likely to become more unstable as Iran moves closer to enriching uranium since the US' departure from the JCPOA. • As Russia gains greater sway in the region, this has the potential to affect the prices and supply of oil and energy. • As China's Uighur problem gets worse, the EU might find its relations with China sour somewhat as the EU makes public states and provides shelter to these individuals. China's response could make it hard for the EU to be more forceful or engage in more riskier international relations for fear of the economic repercussions. • Iran will probably continue to work toward enriching uranium in an effort to keep the EU engaged and to minimize the effects of potential EU sanctions and the more punishing US sanctions. <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU's baseline risk tolerance is very low. The EU is unlikely to engage in any behaviors that would jeopardize its bilateral ties with states in the region (in other words, it is unlikely that the EU would engage in unilateral military operations but would be
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			<p>willing to partner with the US and other allies in the AOR.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The EU may take more moderately aggressive responses if the US' unilateral moves in the region affect the core EU interests outlined above. <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• None of our objectives have changed, but we remain even more committed to our strategic objectives and using our operational resources to achieve them.
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1.6 Israel – Strategic Objectives

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain and strengthen Israel’s military dominance in the region • Maintain and continue Israel’s strong relation with the United States • Weaken Iran’s influence in the area • Convert much of Judea and Samaria to being part of the state of Israel <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US extremely important and crucial ally. Very important focus • EU hopefully continues to not really be involved- potential long term threat to our holding J and S • PR is important to build relations and especially trade but hopefully build them into ally • IR curtail their power and in long run encourage revolution for more moderate regime • SA continue long term policy of them avoiding serious pushes against Israel and continuation of their current regime • RU try to build strong relations in a positive direction to help us strategically <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Willingness of risk is moderately high to high depending on the threat <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Information Provided. 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain and strengthen Israel’s military dominance in the region • Maintain and continue Israel’s strong relation with the United States • Weaken Iran’s influence in the area • Convert much of Judea and Samaria to being part of the state of Israel <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US extremely important and crucial ally. Very important focus • EU hopefully continues to not really be involved- potential long term threat to our holding J and S • PR is important to build relations and especially trade but hopefully build them into ally • IR curtail their power and in long run encourage revolution for more moderate regime • SA continue long term policy of them avoiding serious pushes against Israel and continuation of their current regime • RU try to build strong relations in a positive direction to help us strategically <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Willingness of risk is moderately high to high depending on the threat <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Information Provided. 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain and strengthen Israel’s military dominance in the region • Maintain and continue Israel’s strong relation with the United States • Weaken Iran’s influence in the area • Convert much of Judea and Samaria to being part of the state of Israel <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US extremely important and crucial ally. Very important focus • EU hopefully continues to not really be involved- potential long term threat to our holding J and S • PR is important to build relations and especially trade but hopefully build them into ally • IR curtail their power and in long run encourage revolution for more moderate regime • SA continue long term policy of them avoiding serious pushes against Israel and continuation of their current regime • RU try to build strong relations in a positive direction to help us strategically <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Willingness of risk is moderately high to high depending on the threat <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Information Provided. 	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To continue to exist as a state that is both a national home for the Jewish people and a democratic state for the citizens of Israel, including Arabs and Jews • Secure political arrangements with the Palestinians and the Arab states and secure permanent borders • Ensure a peace treaty with the Arabs <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The AOR consist of multiple Arab nations that we are in conflict with but working towards creating a peace treaty with the Arabs will ensure the unity of all. Israel is surrounded by the CENTCOM countries however we will remain in the EUCOM. We assume that working with the Arab counties in the AOR will assist with our treaty. <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We are willing to take any risk in order to secure the borders of Israel and to ensure that we are a separate entity from the Palestinians. We are willing to enforce security measures which include protecting our citizens of Israel. With the ongoing negotiations between Palestine and Israel, we are willing to take a high level of risk to ensure the safety and inclusions of Jewish people in Israel. <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Change.



1.7 United States – Strategic Objectives

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deter Iran from Nuclear Ambition • Defeat and Dismantle ISIS • Strengthen regional partnerships with Saudi Arabia • Reduce domestic reliance on foreign oil while capturing foreign oil sources • Reduce US ground forces in the region due to long war <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iran is my enemy and must be severely deterred • ISIS is already mostly defeated - we are now just mopping up • Syria is a gray zone with proxy influence from Russia - don't want to get too complicated in that area • Kurds are expendable • Russia is our partner in the region • We need to challenge Chinese influence in the region • Israel is our friend and we are her defender • Saudi Arabia as a lot to offer us • EU should be doing more - they are not paying their fair share • NATO is a disappointment and maybe not relevant anymore • We want to leave Afghanistan, but we have invested so much that if we leave now, we might lose it all. But, if the Taliban are willing to deal, maybe there is a way out. • Pakistan is dangerous but less of a concern for us <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p>	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deter Iran from Nuclear Ambition • Defeat and Dismantle ISIS • Strengthen regional partnerships with Saudi Arabia • Reduce domestic reliance on foreign oil while capturing foreign oil sources • Reduce US ground forces in the region due to long war <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iran is my enemy and must be severely deterred • ISIS is already mostly defeated - we are now just mopping up • Syria is a gray zone with proxy influence from Russia - don't want to get too complicated in that area • Kurds are expendable • Russia is our partner in the region • We need to challenge Chinese influence in the region • Israel is our friend and we are her defender • Saudi Arabia as a lot to offer us • EU should be doing more - they are not paying their fair share • NATO is a disappointment and maybe not relevant anymore • We want to leave Afghanistan, but we have invested so much that if we leave now, we might lose it all. But, if the Taliban are willing to deal, maybe there is a way out. • Pakistan is dangerous but less of a concern for us <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p>	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deter Iran from Nuclear Ambition • Defeat and Dismantle ISIS • Strengthen regional partnerships with Saudi Arabia • Reduce domestic reliance on foreign oil while capturing foreign oil sources • Reduce US ground forces in the region due to long war <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iran is my enemy and must be severely deterred • ISIS is already mostly defeated - we are now just mopping up • Syria is a gray zone with proxy influence from Russia - don't want to get too complicated in that area. • Kurds are expendable. • Russia is our partner in the region. • We need to challenge Chinese influence in the region. • Israel is our friend and we are her defender. • Saudi Arabia as a lot to offer us. • EU should be doing more - they are not paying their fair share. • NATO is a disappointment and maybe not relevant anymore • We want to leave Afghanistan, but we have invested so much that if we leave now, we might lose it all. But, if the Taliban are willing to deal, maybe there is a way out. • Pakistan is dangerous but less of a concern for us. <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p>	<p>Strategic Objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work on keeping relationships with Russia intact and coordinate with allies • Improve domestic infrastructure, education, technology, healthcare and environment • Further cooperative foreign trade/involvement in international trade • Deter terrorism and resolve extremism • Influence foreign governments <p>Assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • These objectives are deemed necessary to keep the U.S. in good standing and improve security. <p>Baseline Risk Tolerance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Willing to achieve such objectives by making agreements and not going to measures that create problems that will require military settlements. <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Foster a better in-tact relationship with China • While respecting China and following international rules, enhance U.S. nuclear strategies to ensure safety



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relatively high, given historical trends. Willing to do things to shake up conventional status quo if it is in agreement with political alignments within my administration. <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None of the strategic objectives have changed, but there is now greater tension on the ability to reduce US ground forces in the region due to the killing of Suleimani. • Regarding Strategic Assumptions, none of those assumptions have changed as well. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relatively high, given historical trends. Willing to do things to shake up conventional status quo if it is in agreement with political alignments within my administration. <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None of the strategic objectives have changed, but there is now greater tension on the ability to reduce US ground forces in the region due to the killing of Suleimani. • Regarding Strategic Assumptions, none of those assumptions have changed as well. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relatively high, given historical trends. Willing to do things to shake up conventional status quo if it is in agreement with political alignments within my administration. <p>POST-SOLEIMANI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None of the strategic objectives have changed, but there is now greater tension on the ability to reduce US ground forces in the region due to the killing of Suleimani. • Regarding Strategic Assumptions, none of those assumptions have changed as well. 	
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2.1 People’s Republic of China – Operational Objectives

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue making financial and economic investments in the region, with the aiming of creating regional dependencies; • Ensure investments align with strategic and military aims (e.g., transportation routes, energy networks); • Work to diversify energy and oil resource pool, given the potential disruptions caused by the US/Iranian conflict (and its potential expansion); • Covertly provide military support and military resources to key regional partners, particularly Iran; • Work with Russia to combat, politically, US...do this by demonstrating China and Russia have a common interest in the area and will respond to perceived threats; • Work to prevent greater instability in the region; • Support regional interests that maintain/foster Iran's capacity (e.g., provide financial support and backing in Iraq to political interests that are favorable to Iranian interests) with the aim of crowding our US interests and allies; • Push at the margins, but not enough that it seriously risks/threatens ties (e.g., financial) to the US and other countries. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue making financial and economic investments in the region, with the aiming of creating regional dependencies; 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Get the US out of Syria • Keep US and Iran from getting into a hot war • Quietly expand economic influence in central Asia • Defeat TIP <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Get the US out of Syria • Keep US and Iran from getting into a hot war • Quietly expand economic influence in central Asia • Defeat TIP • Deter US trade initiative in Asia/Pacific <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Get the US out of Syria • Keep US and Iran from getting into a hot war • Quietly expand economic influence in central Asia • Defeat TIP • Deter US trade initiative in Asia/Pacific 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain stability in global energy prices • Prevent tighter sanctions on Iran that might prevent Sino-Iranian trade, especially Chinese energy imports • Decrease US force presence in Asia • If there is a conflict between the United States and a Middle Eastern actor, seek to raise costs (diplomatic, military, and economic) to United States of engaging in that conflict while minimizing danger of retribution against China. • Avoid clear Iranian steps toward nuclear weapons acquisition if possible <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work to cease the illegal US embargo of Iran as quickly as possible and prevent third-parties from supporting it. • Maintain modest levels of Sino-Iranian trade overland through Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Central Asian Republics. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Avoid US escalation of hostilities against Iran despite Ft Dix terrorist attack • Restore modest levels of Sino-Iranian trade • Strengthen Sino-GCC/Saudi Arabia economic ties • Seek to forward base Chinese naval and maritime patrol assets in the region (Djibouti and/or Gwadar). This may require negotiating agreements to build new airfields or berthing arrangements. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Through bilateral and multilateral relations with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, continue increasing economic ties with Central Asian states • Expand the sales of arm throughout Centcom • Increase military presence in Central Asia • Manipulate US-Pakistani relations to secure a stronger alliance with Pakistan. An alliance with Pakistan will not only strengthen China's presence in the region but also counterbalance Indian and US influences • Secure leases for military facilities in Central Asia <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secure leases for naval bases in the Persian Gulf • Expand naval presence in the Indian Ocean • Outbid Russian economic projects in Central Asia • Seek lease for naval and air facilities in Myanmar, Djibouti, Pakistan, and Central Asia to increase presence in the region and to secure energy imports • Encroach further into Russia's Central Asia sphere of influence, such as Kyrgyzstan • Creation of artificial islands in the Strait of Malacca to expand naval outreach • Expansion of deep sea navy • Continue increasing ties with Iran, Syria, Iraq as well as members of the Saudi-led coalition • Work with Russia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the EU to find a lasting peace treaty



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure investments align with strategic and military aims (e.g., transportation routes, energy networks); • Work to diversify energy and oil resource pool, given the potential disruptions caused by the US/Iranian conflict (and its potential expansion); • Covertly provide military support and military resources to key regional partners, particularly Iran; • Work with Russia to combat, politically, US...do this by demonstrating China and Russia have a common interest in the area and will respond to perceived threats; • Work to prevent greater instability in the region; • Support regional interests that maintain/foster Iran's capacity (e.g., provide financial support and backing in Iraq to political interests that are favorable to Iranian interests) with the aim of crowding out US interests and allies; • Push at the margins, but not enough that it seriously risks/threatens ties (e.g., financial) to the US and other countries. • I would continue to urge the importance of brokering peace talks, and situate the PRC as ready to support such talks. I would make new, targeted investments to meet energy needs and look for other low-cost ways to make the PRC energy and tech independent/competitive <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Again, my operational objectives would remain the same. However, I would be more publicly supportive of working together, internationally and with key world leaders, to challenge the threats of extremism. • Continue making financial and economic investments in the region, with the aiming of creating regional dependencies; 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase maritime presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf to divert US naval forces from the South China Sea • Use tensions in the Middle East to increase expansion in the Southeast Asia • Acting as a neutral arbitrator in the region, will improve international reputation, thus promoting One Belt, One Road Initiative <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand naval presence in the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and the Red Sea. • Develop larger presence in East Africa to support activities in CENTCOM • In exchange for reduced US military presence in the South China Sea, China will reduce the trade deficit and partner with the US in seeking renewable energy. Still negotiating over details • Increasing military presence along one belt, one road initiative • Strengthening economic ties with Central Asia • Establish recently acquired bases in Iran and Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere • Objections to EU meddling in Chinese domestic affairs • Deepening relations with Iran and Arab states • Sowing divisions between Iran and Russia • Ensuring there is peace in the Middle-East, but also ensuring there is enough tensions and threat of war to divert US military presence from the South China Sea as well as Chinese activities throughout the Southeast Asia • Tensions in the Middle-East provide a pretext for increased Chinese presence • Beginning containment of India • Ending Russian influence in Central Asia
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<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Ensure investments align with strategic and military aims (e.g., transportation routes, energy networks);• Work to diversify energy and oil resource pool, given the potential disruptions caused by the US/Iranian conflict (and its potential expansion);• Covertly provide military support and military resources to key regional partners, particularly Iran;• Work with Russia to combat, politically, US...do this by demonstrating China and Russia have a common interests in the area and will respond to perceived threats;• Work to prevent greater instability in the region;• Support regional interests that maintain/foster Iran's capacity (e.g., provide financial support and backing in Iraq to political interests that are favorable to Iranian interests) with the aim of crowding our US interests and allies;• Push at the margins, but not enough that it seriously risks/threatens ties (e.g., financial) to the US and other countries.			
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2.2 Russia – Operational Objectives

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dissolve Iran's militias in Syria. • Begin exporting food and non-military technology to Central Asia and Saudi Arabia. • Increase the price of oil to mitigate the effect of sanctions on our economy. • Provide more aid to Iraq to stabilize the country as the U.S. withdraws. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developed a trade deal with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to export agricultural goods and import minerals. I am trying to develop a stronger economic alternative to China in partnerships in the region. This deal allows me to prop up a domestic industry that has strategic value while easing the problems created by Western Sanctions. • Developed a trade deal with Saudi Arabia of services for agricultural goods. • Sold anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems to Saudi Arabia as a defense against potential Iranian aggression. I am trying to develop partnerships in the region to continue to contain Iranian influence without direct confrontation. • Deploy additional troops to Armenia to increase presence. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducted joint military exercises in Armenia with the U.S. as a deterrence toward 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish/Expand as many diplomatic connections as possible. • Begin disinformation campaigns against U.S. or alternatively, in favor of Russia • Bolster military and economic aid to AOR region prior to U.S. being able to take similar action. • Ramp up International intelligence gathering activities <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish/Expand as many diplomatic connections as possible. • Begin disinformation campaigns against U.S. or alternatively, in favor of Russia • Bolster military and economic aid to AOR region prior to U.S. being able to take similar action. • Ramp up International intelligence gathering activities • Increase proactivity <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish/Expand as many diplomatic connections as possible. • Begin disinformation campaigns against U.S. or alternatively, in favor of Russia • Bolster military and economic aid to AOR region prior to U.S. being able to take similar action. • Ramp up International intelligence gathering activities • Increase proactivity 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Solidify strategic relationship with Syria's Assad regime and promote stability in Syria by: eliminating ISIS, stabilize the conflict along the Turkish border with NATO, and preventing Iran from launching proxy attacks against the U.S. in Syria • Develop stronger commercial and strategic partnerships with the governments in the Middle East and Central Asia • Discredit the U.S. political position within the Middle East and Central Asia and make it more expensive for the U.S. to maintain its strategic presence in the region • Prevent a war between Iran and the U.S., as that would create too much instability and increase the U.S.'s military presence <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Solidify strategic relationship with Syria's Assad regime and promote stability in Syria by: eliminating ISIS, stabilize the conflict along the Turkish border with NATO, and preventing Iran from launching proxy attacks against the U.S. in Syria • Develop stronger commercial and strategic partnerships with the governments in the Middle East and Central Asia • Discredit the U.S. political position within the Middle East and Central Asia and make it more expensive for the U.S. to maintain its strategic presence in the region • Prevent a war between Iran and the U.S., as that would create too much instability and increase the U.S.'s military presence 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Upgrading of the existing bases and establishment of new CSTO bases in the border areas, increased budget, increased attention to securing borders between -stan countries and Afghanistan and Iran • Establishing and leading peace-making committees and active diplomatic ties under the UN or another international institution • Rosneft will aggressively work on oil deals with local oil producers and regimes to induce favorable deals for energy development. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The SCO extends a formal invitation for Iran to join. • Russia condemns Iran/NKorea trading, but emphasizes it should be seen as a regional issue and to be resolved between Iran, NKorea, and China with RUssia as a mediator. • Russia denounces the US military presence in Israel, asks for international opprobrium of the Western involvement in Asia. • Significant progress is made between China/Iran/Russia energy companies and they open negotiations with the OPEC as a single bloc. • Russia's financial subsidies to Iran are significantly extended. • Russia conducts secret negotiations with Iran's neighbors to extend their economic cooperation with Iran. • Russian and Iran scientific cooperation has extended into cyber security. Joint cyber attacks on the EU, the US infrastructure



<p>Iranian aggression. I am trying to reduce the influence Iran has in the region.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducted coordinated airstrikes against Hezbollah with US. • Sell weapons to Iraq and Yemen. Continued efforts at supporting other countries in the region against potential Iranian incursion. • Foment Sunni resentment of Shia control in Iraq. Aimed at reducing Iranian influence in Iraq. • Encourage the Assad regime to continue to crack down on Iranian backed militia groups. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia's major operational objectives have not changed but it is seeking to ensure that Iran does not increase its intelligence operatives or proxies presence in any part of Russia. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Solidify strategic relationship with Syria's Assad regime and promote stability in Syria by: eliminating ISIS, stabilize the conflict along the Turkish border with NATO, and preventing Iran from launching proxy attacks against the U.S. in Syria • Develop stronger commercial and strategic partnerships with the governments in the Middle East and Central Asia • Discredit the U.S. political position within the Middle East and Central Asia and make it more expensive for the U.S. to maintain its strategic presence in the region • Prevent a war between Iran and the U.S., as that would create too much instability and increase the U.S.'s military presence • Russia's major operational objectives have not changed but it is seeking to ensure that Iran does not increase its intelligence operatives or proxies presence in any part of Russia. 	<p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased involvement of Azerbaijan as an ally regarding economic and military cooperation with Iran. • Rosneft announces major investments in both Iran's and Kurdistan's oil fields. • Iran is granted an observer status at the SCO, similar to the status of Afghanistan • Increased imports/exports of Iranian goods to and through Russia through private sector. • Negotiations/informal agreements with Central Asian countries to secure their borders with Iran and Afghanistan to control cross-border traffic of people and goods. Again, all are low-risk actions.
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2.3 Iran – Operational Objectives

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support Shiite movements inside Saudi Arabia • Continue support for Yemen • Maintain dominance of Shiite parties in Iraq • We must increase oil based barter agreements with other countries. • We need food and weapons capable of defeating the American arsenal. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Installation of new missile batteries Strait of Hormuz, heavily shielded continuation of small boat harassment and testing of U.S. fleet • Physical attack on Saudi oil production--drones to target pipelines or storage facilities • Offer secret negotiations with Saudis - crucial support for northern Sunni operations in Iraq (ISIS, tribal support, etc) • Reinforce defensive posture of forces in Syria <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Find out who exploded a bomb in NJ. This is counter to Iranian objectives. If they are one of ours, assassinate them. • Get all centrifuges operational, and build additional centrifuges • Cyberattack on U.S. DOD. If there is anything that we can get that the Chinese and Russians haven't gotten already, find the information and sell it to the Chinese and Russians. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce US presence in AOR also Afghanistan, Pakistan • Solidify pro-Iran or at least anti-US government in Iraq, even if reduced visibility is required. • Hinder SA in Yemen, current peace talks give SA too much. • Ease sanctions using nuclear and missile programs as leverage. • Hinder Kurds. • Maintain supply routes through Syria to allied militia. • Hinder traffic in the Strait of Hormuz to pressure US/SA/Kuwait/Iraq. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase ties with PRC • Reduce US presence in AOR also Afghanistan, Pakistan • Solidify pro-Iran or at least anti-US government in Iraq, even if reduced visibility is required. • Hinder SA in Yemen, current peace talks give SA too much. • Ease sanctions using nuclear and missile programs as leverage. • Hinder Kurds. • Maintain supply routes through Syria to allied militia. • Hinder traffic in the Strait of Hormuz to pressure US/SA/Kuwait/Iraq. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase ties with PRC 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a nuclear weapons capability ASAP • Minimize actions in the region that would provoke the US • Pressure Iraq to follow through on expelling US troops <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a nuclear weapons capability ASAP • Try to forge closer ties with Russia and weaken their efforts to help the Saudis • Give up on cooperation with the US <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We're going to wholeheartedly support the tentative peace agreement with the US. We're also going to continue to engage with the US and the West more generally and try to rein in the actions of groups like Kataib Hezbollah. Overall, we're giving up on the nuclear program in return for normalization of our relationship with the rest of the world. That's a bit of a risky strategy domestically but we're going to let the chips fall where they may. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Erode popular support for US in Iraq to put pressure on Iraqi government to cut-ties • Increase support for the Houthis in Yemen to attack U.S. bases in the region and impose costs for the U.S. to have middle eastern bases • Increase support for Iraq's Shiite militias and encourage attacks on U.S. bases <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gain Chinese support to counter U.S. and EU influence. Become part of belt and road economic initiative. • Increase support for Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah • Increase Support for Iraq's Shiite Militias • Work with EU, Russia, China to reduce American aggression in the region <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Begin the process of modernizing Iran's military with Chinese assistance. • Counter the effects of the Ft. Dix attack on Iran's geopolitical influence.



<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cyberattack on Israel• Launch missile attacks on Saudi Arabia from Yemen• Continue secret negotiations with United States. Lay out our terms.• Information campaign against Saudi Arabia - publicize MBS \$500 million yacht, frolics with prostitutes.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Reduce US presence in AOR also Afghanistan, Pakistan• Solidify pro-Iran or at least anti-US government in Iraq, even if reduced visibility is required.• Hinder SA in Yemen, current peace talks give SA too much.• Ease sanctions using nuclear and missile programs as leverage.• Hinder Kurds.• Maintain supply routes through Syria to allied militia.• Hinder traffic in the Strait of Hormuz to pressure US/SA/Kuwait/Iraq.• Explore potential rapprochement with SA, seek to reduce ties to US		
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2.4 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – Operational Objectives

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain Internal Stability (survival – short term): Continued investment in internal police, allow them more latitude in terms of press/dissent (but trying to avoid high profile cases like Khashshogi). Continued low-level liberalization, particularly. • Check Iranian Influence and Expansion (survival related – medium term): In the Gulf States, provide training and materiel to security services in Bahrain and Oman. In Syria/Iraq, continue support to Sunni militia groups. In Yemen, take advantage of Iran’s distraction to either wrap up negotiations favorably, or failing that, to escalate and attempt to win. Elsewhere (Lebanon, Af/Pak, Africa) • Continue US-Saudi Special Relationship (survival related – longer term). Publicly support US actions (Suleimani, etc) and help influence/lobby Sunni militias and government factions to be accepting of escalated activity • Diversify Economy Beyond Petrochemical (survival related – longer term) with expanded oil deals with China and Russia, both with intention to expand broader trade and to offer financial services to both countries growing energy industry <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain Internal Stability (survival – short term): Continued investment in internal police, allow them more latitude in terms of 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain Internal Stability (survival – short term): Continued investment in internal police, allow them more latitude in terms of press/dissent (but trying to avoid high profile cases like Khashshogi). Continued low-level liberalization, particularly. • Check Iranian Influence and Expansion (survival related – medium term): In the Gulf States, provide training and materiel to security services in Bahrain and Oman. In Syria/Iraq, continue support to Sunni militia groups. In Yemen, take advantage of Iran’s distraction to either wrap up negotiations favorably, or failing that, to escalate and attempt to win. Elsewhere (Lebanon, Af/Pak, Africa) • Continue US-Saudi Special Relationship (survival related – longer term). Publicly support US actions (Suleimani, etc) and help influence/lobby Sunni militias and government factions to be accepting of escalated activity • Diversify Economy Beyond Petrochemical (survival related – longer term) with expanded oil deals with China and Russia, both with intention to expand broader trade and to offer financial services to both countries growing energy industry <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain Internal Stability (survival – short term): Continued investment in internal police, allow them more latitude in terms of 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain Internal Stability (survival – short term): Continued investment in internal police, allow them more latitude in terms of press/dissent (but trying to avoid high profile cases like Khashshogi). Continued low-level liberalization, particularly. • Defend Saudi territory from regional threats, especially Iran: focus on air/cyber threats and border protection • Check Iranian Influence and Expansion (survival related – medium term): In the Gulf States, provide training and materiel to security services in Bahrain and Oman. In Syria/Iraq, continue support to Sunni militia groups. In Yemen, take advantage of Iran’s distraction to either wrap up negotiations favorably, or failing that, to escalate and attempt to win. Elsewhere (Lebanon, Af/Pak, Africa) • Continue US-Saudi Special Relationship (survival related – longer term). Publicly support US actions (Suleimani, etc) and help influence/lobby Sunni militias and government factions to be accepting of escalated activity • Diversify Economy Beyond Petrochemical (survival related – longer term) with expanded oil deals with China and Russia, both with intention to expand broader trade and to offer financial services to both countries growing energy industry <p>Round 2 (2021)</p>	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen ties with KSA and the West following the killing of Jamal Kashoggi. • Continue discussions with Iran to defuse the tensions and ensure stability and control for Saudi Arabia given the heightened tensions between them and the West. • Work with Yemen and Houthi by looking at political and economic advantages that could be provided. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue discussions with Iran to defuse the tensions and ensure stability and control for Saudi Arabia given the heightened tensions between them and the West. • Work to move the Houthi out of Yemen and address the humanitarian crisis. • Create an alliance with China to avoid a war in the Middle East. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue discussions with Iran to defuse the tensions and ensure stability and control for Saudi Arabia given the heightened tensions between them and the West. • Work to move the Houthi out of Yemen and address the humanitarian crisis. • Help to promote peaceful exchanges to avoid a war in the Middle East. Work with China and the EU to bring an end to the violence and reach a peace agreement.



<p>press/dissent (but trying to avoid high profile cases like Khashshogi). Continued low-level liberalization, particularly.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check Iranian Influence and Expansion (survival related – medium term): In the Gulf States, provide training and materiel to security services in Bahrain and Oman. In Syria/Iraq, continue support to Sunni militia groups. In Yemen, take advantage of Iran’s distraction to either wrap up negotiations favorably, or failing that, to escalate and attempt to win. Elsewhere (Lebanon, Af/Pak, Africa) • Continue US-Saudi Special Relationship (survival related – longer term). Publicly support US actions (Suleimani, etc) and help influence/lobby Sunni militias and government factions to be accepting of escalated activity • Diversify Economy Beyond Petrochemical (survival related – longer term) with expanded oil deals with China and Russia, both with intention to expand broader trade and to offer financial services to both countries growing energy industry <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain Internal Stability (survival – short term): Continued investment in internal police, allow them more latitude in terms of press/dissent (but trying to avoid high profile cases like Khashshogi). Continued low-level liberalization, particularly. • Check Iranian Influence and Expansion (survival related – medium term): Continue to support the increasing concern in the international community about iran’s status as a rogue state. In the Gulf States, provide training and materiel to security services in Bahrain and Oman. In Syria/Iraq, continue 	<p>press/dissent (but trying to avoid high profile cases like Khashshogi). Continued low-level liberalization, particularly.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check Iranian Influence and Expansion (survival related – medium term): In the Gulf States, provide training and materiel to security services in Bahrain and Oman. In Syria/Iraq, continue support to Sunni militia groups. In Yemen, take advantage of Iran’s distraction to either wrap up negotiations favorably, or failing that, to escalate and attempt to win. Elsewhere (Lebanon, Af/Pak, Africa) • Continue US-Saudi Special Relationship (survival related – longer term). Publicly support US actions (Suleimani, etc) and help influence/lobby Sunni militias and government factions to be accepting of escalated activity • Diversify Economy Beyond Petrochemical (survival related – longer term) with expanded oil deals with China and Russia, both with intention to expand broader trade and to offer financial services to both countries growing energy industry <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain Internal Stability (survival – short term): Continued investment in internal police, allow them more latitude in terms of press/dissent (but trying to avoid high profile cases like Khashshogi). Continued low-level liberalization, particularly. • Check Iranian Influence and Expansion (survival related – medium term): Continue to support the increasing concern in the international community about iran’s status as a rogue state. In the Gulf States, provide training and materiel to security services in Bahrain and Oman. In Syria/Iraq, continue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain Internal Stability (survival – short term): Continued investment in internal police, allow them more latitude in terms of press/dissent (but trying to avoid high profile cases like Khashshogi). Continued low-level liberalization, particularly. • Defend Saudi territory from regional threats, especially Iran: focus on air/cyber threats and border protection • Check Iranian Influence and Expansion (survival related – medium term): In the Gulf States, provide training and materiel to security services in Bahrain and Oman. In Syria/Iraq, continue support to Sunni militia groups. In Yemen, take advantage of Iran’s distraction to either wrap up negotiations favorably, or failing that, to escalate and attempt to win. Elsewhere (Lebanon, Af/Pak, Africa) • Continue US-Saudi Special Relationship (survival related – longer term). Publicly support US actions (Suleimani, etc) and help influence/lobby Sunni militias and government factions to be accepting of escalated activity • Diversify Economy Beyond Petrochemical (survival related – longer term) with expanded oil deals with China and Russia, both with intention to expand broader trade and to offer financial services to both countries growing energy industry <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain Internal Stability (survival – short term): Continued investment in internal police, allow them more latitude in terms of press/dissent (but trying to avoid high profile cases like Khashshogi). Continued low-level liberalization, particularly. 	
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<p>support to Sunni militia groups. In Yemen, take advantage of Iran’s distraction to either wrap up negotiations favorably, or failing that, to escalate and attempt to win. Elsewhere (Lebanon, Af/Pak, Africa)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue US-Saudi Special Relationship (survival related – longer term). Publicly support US actions (Suleimani, etc) and help influence/lobby Sunni militias and government factions to be accepting of escalated activity • Diversify Economy Beyond Petrochemical (survival related – longer term) with expanded oil deals with China and Russia, both with intention to expand broader trade and to offer financial services to both countries growing energy industry 	<p>support to Sunni militia groups. In Yemen, take advantage of Iran’s distraction to either wrap up negotiations favorably, or failing that, to escalate and attempt to win. Elsewhere (Lebanon, Af/Pak, Africa)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue US-Saudi Special Relationship (survival related – longer term). Publicly support US actions (Suleimani, etc) and help influence/lobby Sunni militias and government factions to be accepting of escalated activity • Diversify Economy Beyond Petrochemical (survival related – longer term) with expanded oil deals with China and Russia, both with intention to expand broader trade and to offer financial services to both countries growing energy industry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defend Saudi territory from regional threats, especially Iran: focus on air/cyber threats and border protection • Check Iranian Influence and Expansion (survival related – medium term): In the Gulf States, provide training and materiel to security services in Bahrain and Oman. In Syria/Iraq, continue support to Sunni militia groups. In Yemen, take advantage of Iran’s distraction to either wrap up negotiations favorably, or failing that, to escalate and attempt to win. Elsewhere (Lebanon, Af/Pak, Africa) • Continue US-Saudi Special Relationship (survival related – longer term). Publicly support US actions (Suleimani, etc) and help influence/lobby Sunni militias and government factions to be accepting of escalated activity • Diversify Economy Beyond Petrochemical (survival related – longer term) with expanded oil deals with China and Russia, both with intention to expand broader trade and to offer financial services to both countries growing energy industry 	
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2.5 European Union – Operational Objectives

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent further escalation of or widening of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. • Maintain the functionality of the JCPOA (“Iran Deal”) and prevent proliferation of nuclear and other forms of WMD in the middle East. • Maintain freedom and safety of navigation, trade, and flow of strategic resources (read oil). • Hold Saudi Arabia accountable for human rights abuses while maintaining them as a regional counter-weight <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent further escalation of or widening of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. • Maintain the functionality of the JCPOA (“Iran Deal”) and prevent proliferation of nuclear and other forms of WMD in the middle East. • Maintain freedom and safety of navigation, trade, and flow of strategic resources (read oil). • Hold Saudi Arabia accountable for human rights abuses while maintaining them as a regional counter-weight <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent terrorist attacks on EU assets and citizens at home and abroad. • Prevent further escalation of or widening of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent further escalation of or widening of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. • Maintain the functionality of the JCPOA (“Iran Deal”) and prevent proliferation of nuclear and other forms of WMD in the middle East. • Maintain freedom and safety of navigation, trade, and flow of strategic resources (read oil). • Hold Saudi Arabia accountable for human rights abuses while maintaining them as a regional counter-weight <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent further escalation of or widening of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. • Maintain the functionality of the JCPOA (“Iran Deal”) and prevent proliferation of nuclear and other forms of WMD in the middle East. • Maintain freedom and safety of navigation, trade, and flow of strategic resources (read oil). • Hold Saudi Arabia accountable for human rights abuses while maintaining them as a regional counter-weight <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent terrorist attacks on EU assets and citizens at home and abroad. • Prevent further escalation of or widening of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent further escalation of or widening of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. • Maintain the functionality of the JCPOA (“Iran Deal”) and prevent proliferation of nuclear and other forms of WMD in the middle East. • Maintain freedom and safety of navigation, trade, and flow of strategic resources (read oil). • Hold Saudi Arabia accountable for human rights abuses while maintaining them as a regional counter-weight <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent further escalation of or widening of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. • Maintain the functionality of the JCPOA (“Iran Deal”) and prevent proliferation of nuclear and other forms of WMD in the middle East. • Maintain freedom and safety of navigation, trade, and flow of strategic resources (read oil). • Hold Saudi Arabia accountable for human rights abuses while maintaining them as a regional counter-weight <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent terrorist attacks on EU assets and citizens at home and abroad. • Prevent further escalation of or widening of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We plan to continue to develop alternative trading mechanisms that the EU can use with Iran. The EU does not see value in maintaining blistering sanctions that the US is doing; we prefer engagement and see engagement as the best way to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons. • The EU is working to bolster commercial and trade deals with Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia as well as Central Asian. • We intend to increase our aid and development assistance to the region. Should conflict break out (again) in the region, there's a high chance that civilians will flee the region to the EU for safety. Given the issues that the EU has faced with respect to dealing with migrants, we want to be proactive by providing assistance. • We intend to deploy a small naval force independent of the US at the base of the Straits of Hormuz to protect EU shipping and commercial interests in the region. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU remains committed to peace and security in the region and plans to supply arms and military assistance (quietly) to Saudi Arabia and Israel by approving its member states export control agreements for the transfer of arms equipment. • The EU plans to bolster its naval presence in the Persian Gulf to protect EU shipping and commercial interests.



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain the functionality of the JCPOA (“Iran Deal”) and prevent proliferation of nuclear and other forms of WMD in the middle East. • Maintain freedom and safety of navigation, trade, and flow of strategic resources (read oil) • Hold Saudi Arabia accountable for human rights abuses while maintaining them as a regional counter-weight to Iran 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain the functionality of the JCPOA (“Iran Deal”) and prevent proliferation of nuclear and other forms of WMD in the middle East. • Maintain freedom and safety of navigation, trade, and flow of strategic resources (read oil) • Hold Saudi Arabia accountable for human rights abuses while maintaining them as a regional counter-weight to Iran 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain the functionality of the JCPOA (“Iran Deal”) and prevent proliferation of nuclear and other forms of WMD in the middle East. • Maintain freedom and safety of navigation, trade, and flow of strategic resources (read oil) • Hold Saudi Arabia accountable for human rights abuses while maintaining them as a regional counter-weight to Iran 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU plans to work with oil producing states in the region to develop new and efficient pipelines that will carry oil from Persian Gulf states through Turkey into Greece for distribution to other EU member states. For those Gulf countries that sign in, the EU plans to provide additional development assistance. • The EU continues to implement and development the INSTEX trading mechanism to maintain trade with Iran while working with US negotiators on how this mechanism can keep dual use and illicit goods out of Iran while also protecting the Iranian people from the effects of US sanctions. • The EU plans to increase is educational assistance to citizens in the AOR by providing scholarships and study visas for citizens to travel to the EU to study; they plan to achieve this through an EU external education partnership program with ministries in respective countries. • The EU plans to work more closely with returning Trump Administration to resuscitate the JCPOA and either create a more durable version through amendments or creating a more binding treaty under international law. • The EU plans to development refugee programs for Uighurs fleeing Chinese repression while continuing to provide aid and development assistance to Central Asian states in the region. The EU plans to urge those states to take a stronger line with China on their repressive actions. • The EU plans to scrutinize any One Belt One Road initiatives in member states and institute clear rules regarding investment and ownership in EU ports and rail systems. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p>
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			<ul style="list-style-type: none">• EU will continue to push for fact-finding in China over the Uighur camps; the EU will raise the issue at the UN and with China's ambassador and will push for others in the international community to do the same.• EU will maintain its naval patrols in the Persian Gulf.• EU plans further energy development deals with other states in the Persian Gulf to continue to diversify its energy portfolio.• If the JCPOA holds and Iran abides by the agreement, the EU will scale back INSTEX and eventually deactivate it.• The EU plans to work with NATO Cybersecurity Task Force in Estonia to develop plans and procedures to protect infrastructure from Cyber Attacks (most likely from China, Russia, and Iran).• The EU plans to increase its educational assistance to citizens in the AOR by providing scholarships and study visas for citizens to travel to the EU to study; they plan to achieve this through an EU external education partnership program with ministries in respective countries.• The EU plans to develop refugee programs for Uighurs fleeing Chinese repression while continuing to provide aid and development assistance to Central Asian states in the region.
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2.6 Israel – Operational Objectives

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make Hamas suffer and get people there to revolt against them • Get US to increase pressure on Iran • Try to build relations with EU and Russia • Get more aid from the US <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make Hamas suffer and get people there to revolt against them • Get US to increase pressure on Iran • Try to build relations with EU and Russia • Get more aid from the US • Only addition is focusing on Hezbollah, allows for useful collaboration with the US <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make Hamas suffer and get people there to revolt against them • Get US to increase pressure on Iran • Try to build relations with EU and Russia • Get more aid from the US • Only addition is focusing on Hezbollah, allows for useful collaboration with the US • Continuing efforts 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make Hamas suffer and get people there to revolt against them • Get US to increase pressure on Iran • Try to build relations with EU and Russia • Get more aid from the US <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make Hamas suffer and get people there to revolt against them • Get US to increase pressure on Iran • Try to build relations with EU and Russia • Get more aid from the US • Only addition is focusing on Hezbollah, allows for useful collaboration with the US <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make Hamas suffer and get people there to revolt against them • Get US to increase pressure on Iran • Try to build relations with EU and Russia • Get more aid from the US • Only addition is focusing on Hezbollah, allows for useful collaboration with the US • Continuing efforts 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make Hamas suffer and get people there to revolt against them • Get US to increase pressure on Iran • Try to build relations with EU and Russia • Get more aid from the US <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make Hamas suffer and get people there to revolt against them • Get US to increase pressure on Iran • Try to build relations with EU and Russia • Get more aid from the US • Only addition is focusing on Hezbollah, allows for useful collaboration with the US <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make Hamas suffer and get people there to revolt against them • Get US to increase pressure on Iran • Try to build relations with EU and Russia • Get more aid from the US • Only addition is focusing on Hezbollah, allows for useful collaboration with the US • Continuing efforts 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work with the United States in 2020 to ensure that we avoid direct conflict with Iran, in order to strengthen our relationship with the Arabs • Increase military presence to continue to exist as a separate state from Palestine • Use U.S. and Israeli military to ensure political arrangements with the Arab states and secure the borders from influence from Iran within the coming year <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue to increase military ties with the U.S. now that our ties with the U.S. president is stronger and will be united for another 4 more years. • Israel will work with the U.S. towards joining the JCPOA once again in 2021 and creating a new nuclear deal • Israel will communicate with Iran to join the JCPOA and create the new nuclear deal alongside the U.S. and the other UN powers <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work with the United States in 2022 to ensure that we avoid direct conflict with Iran, in order to strengthen our relationship with the Arabs • Continue working peacefully with China to support trade on the red sea • Communicate with Russia and the U.S. before the special UN Security Session to



			<p>come to an agreement on the U.S. military presence in Israel.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Gain support from Russia to join the SCO as a dialogue partner
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2.7 United States – Operational Objectives

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain US deterrent capabilities regarding Iran and its proxy actions • Retain force presence within Iraq • Stabilize our relationship with Turkey to maintain our nuclear deterrence capabilities at Incerlik • Reinforce defensive capabilities with Israel to ensure their protection • Increase coordinated military training with Saudi Arabia to show greater strength in the region • Strategic discussion with Russia regarding options for stabilization <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain US deterrent capabilities regarding Iran and its proxy actions • Retain force presence within Iraq • Stabilize our relationship with Turkey to maintain our nuclear deterrence capabilities at Incerlik • Reinforce defensive capabilities with Israel to ensure their protection • Increase coordinated military training with Saudi Arabia to show greater strength in the region • Strategic discussion with Russia regarding options for stabilization • Increase regional economic investments or aid to surrounding countries in CENTCOM to deter China's increased influence in the region. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain US deterrent capabilities regarding Iran and its proxy actions • Retain force presence within Iraq • Stabilize our relationship with Turkey to maintain our nuclear deterrence capabilities at Incerlik • Reinforce defensive capabilities with Israel to ensure their protection • Increase coordinated military training with Saudi Arabia to show greater strength in the region • Strategic discussion with Russia regarding options for stabilization <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain US deterrent capabilities regarding Iran and its proxy actions • Retain force presence within Iraq • Stabilize our relationship with Turkey to maintain our nuclear deterrence capabilities at Incerlik • Reinforce defensive capabilities with Israel to ensure their protection • Increase coordinated military training with Saudi Arabia to show greater strength in the region • Strategic discussion with Russia regarding options for stabilization • Increase regional economic investments or aid to surrounding countries in CENTCOM to deter China's increased influence in the region. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain US deterrent capabilities regarding Iran and its proxy actions • Retain force presence within Iraq • Stabilize our relationship with Turkey to maintain our nuclear deterrence capabilities at Incerlik • Reinforce defensive capabilities with Israel to ensure their protection • Increase coordinated military training with Saudi Arabia to show greater strength in the region • Strategic discussion with Russia regarding options for stabilization <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain US deterrent capabilities regarding Iran and its proxy actions • Retain force presence within Iraq • Stabilize our relationship with Turkey to maintain our nuclear deterrence capabilities at Incerlik • Reinforce defensive capabilities with Israel to ensure their protection • Increase coordinated military training with Saudi Arabia to show greater strength in the region • Strategic discussion with Russia regarding options for stabilization <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain US deterrent capabilities regarding Iran and its proxy actions • Retain force presence within Iraq 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contain Iran on a larger scale, winning their support is necessary any long-term success. Combination of military, economic. Use our conventional advantages to challenge where they lack strength. • To build a better relationship with/influence Russia, provide more technical support on economic level. • Defend ourselves from national rivals • Work more with Israel in terms of cooperative counter terrorism efforts <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on a new energy source because less dependence on oil will reduce exposure to Iran and Iraq as a rivalry. • Assist the central region (CENTCOM AOR) in security and economically to help them become more stable (assist foreign government, promote peaceful conflict resolution) <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on a new energy source because less dependence on oil will reduce exposure to Iran and Iraq as a rivalry. • Assist the central region (CENTCOM AOR) in security and economically to help them become more stable (assist foreign government, promote peaceful conflict resolution)



<p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Information Provided. 	<p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain US deterrent capabilities regarding Iran and its proxy actions • Retain force presence within Iraq • Stabilize our relationship with Turkey to maintain our nuclear deterrence capabilities at Incerlik • Reinforce defensive capabilities with Israel to ensure their protection • Increase coordinated military training with Saudi Arabia to show greater strength in the region • Strategic discussion with Russia regarding options for stabilization • Increase regional economic investments or aid to surrounding countries in CENTCOM to deter China's increased influence in the region. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stabilize our relationship with Turkey to maintain our nuclear deterrence capabilities at Incerlik • Reinforce defensive capabilities with Israel to ensure their protection • Increase coordinated military training with Saudi Arabia to show greater strength in the region • Strategic discussion with Russia regarding options for stabilization • Secure continued repatriation of nuclear fuel from within Iran 	
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3.1 People’s Republic of China – Overt Actions

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partner with Russia to create the appearance of a unified front that disapproves of US actions and that stands ready to respond to further US interventions in the future...pitched partly as a supporting national sovereignty and a respect for international law • Expand Belt and Road Investments in Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. • Offer to broker peace talks between the US and Iran and Afghanistan. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Information Provided. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offer a supportive face in the wake of the US' tragedy, and use the attack as leverage for justifying counter-extremist efforts...call for international partners to work together to combat extremism • Continue offering to host/broker peace talks • Continue expanding BRI 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide economic aid to Syria, Iraq, and Kazakhstan • Engage in trade talks with Iran <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invite new multilateral trade deal with Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Australia / New Zealand, do not invite the US; talks are not conditioned on their pulling out of US negotiations. • Otherwise hold steady. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have a major Chinese corporation open a regional HQ in Kazakhstan. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Avoid new sanctions against Iran at the United Nations. • Continue Sino-Iranian trade to the maximum possible extent permissible under UN sanctions and avoiding serious US sanctions. • Avoid any UN Security Council resolutions that would provide legal cover for US use of force. • Express continued "deep concern" over the escalation of hostilities in the Middle East. • Make clear to the United States Chinese concerns with the Middle East and how China is unwilling to sacrifice its interests so long as the unfair trade war continues. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Send a Chinese-flagged naval vessel to the Gulf to observe the blockade. • Work with Russia to negotiate a UN Security Council resolution that condemns the illegality of blockades without UN Security Council authorization. Seek a text that achieves French concurrence in the UNSC or at a minimum their abstention before the inevitable US veto. • Engage in a large-scale effort to publicize the suffering of the Iranian people in Chinese media (and friendly non-Chinese outlets). • Condemn the illegal US blockade publicly. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p>	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No overt action at this time, though if escalations increase, China may deploy some naval forces to the Persian Gulf to act as a buffer between the US and Iran <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negotiating treaty with Saudi Arabia to secure military bases in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea in exchange for peace with Iran and assistance against the Houthis • Peaceful cooperation with Israel • Cooperation with the EU, with severe objection to its interference in China's domestic politics • Talking with US over trade and North Korea • Attempting to secure military base leases with Myanmar and Pakistan • Creating artificial islands in the Strait of Malacca • Treaty with Iran, allowing for military base leases, and supplanting Russian military aid to Iran in favor of China, as well as increased energy exports to China <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unable to secure bases in Saudi Arabia, but have agreed to arms and energy trade. • China will assist the US in peace talks in exchange for decreased US military in the South China Sea, reducing trade deficit and allowing China to continue subsidizing its manufacturers. • Secured a deal with Iran for base leases and arms trade to supplant Russian military aid.



		<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Seek negotiations to resolve the US-Iran crisis.• Continue to improve economic ties with all actors in the Middle East to the extent possible.• Continue to oppose any UN Security Council resolution that supports US hostilities in the Middle East.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Rift between China and the EU over EU attempting to interference in domestic affairs.• Securing energy exports from Middle East.• In exchange for reduced US military presence in the South China Sea, China will reduce the trade deficit and partner with the US in seeking renewable energy. Still negotiating over details• Increasing military presence along one belt, one road initiative• Strengthening economic ties with Central Asia• Establish recently acquired bases in Iran and Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere• Objections to EU meddling in Chinese domestic affairs
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3.2 Russia – Overt Actions

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Send defensive arms to Iraq. I am doing this to reinforce my relationship with Baghdad as relations with the U.S. deteriorate. I would also like to ensure some stability in Iraq. • Visit Riyadh to begin trade talks with the kingdom. I would like to find ways to strengthen my economy in the face of sanctions from the west, and I believe the kingdom is in need of more diverse industries. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developed a trade deal with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to export agricultural goods and import minerals. I am trying to develop a stronger economic alternative to China in partnerships in the region. This deal allows me to prop up a domestic industry that has strategic value while easing the problems created by Western Sanctions. • Developed a trade deal with Saudi Arabia of services for agricultural goods. Same as above. • Sold anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems to Saudi Arabia as a defense against potential Iranian aggression. I am trying to develop partnerships in the region to continue to contain Iranian influence without direct confrontation. • Deploy additional troops to Armenia to increase presence. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p>	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting with Israeli leadership in Norway - early 2020 • Station Naval crafts strategically to make presence felt in AOR, but commit no aggression <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage with U.S. allies to establish relationships. • Increase naval presence in Asia. • Increase the publicizing of our current Nuclear capabilities. • Engaged in bilateral trade agreement with Iran and PRC. • Prepared visit to Iranian nuclear facilities. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand diplomatic presence at Embassy in Tel Aviv. • Position military presence along border of Kazakhstan to prepare for military presence within country. Engage in small scale conflicts across border. • Move troops to the Georgia and Azerbaijan border south of Moscow. • Engage in talks with Iraq to discuss mutual interests in the region. • Back out of trade agreement with Iran. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eliminate ISIS in Syria, strengthen Assad’s territorial control with Syria, and make the operational atmosphere for harder for the U.S. to engage in any operations in Syria. • Arrange a deal to sell anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems to KSA in return for cash and investments. • Explore alternative financial channels to facilitate long-term financial independence. • Establish a working deal with Iran to preserve Syrian stability so that Syria does not become a proxy for US-Iranian conflict. • Solidify Russia’s role as a diplomatic intermediary and powerbroker in the region between the various parties. • Try to discourage the outbreak of a full-scale conflict between the U.S./Israel/KSA and Iran. • Establish a stronger diplomatic presence with Iraq, offering commitments to assist in the case of a U.S. withdrawal. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia supports a broad effort at a UNSCR that condemns blockades and supports the international freedom of trade. Russia pushes for a peaceful settlement to the hostilities in the region. • (Only after a U.S. announcement of sanctions relief against Russia). Russia announces its willingness to support a new nuclear deal with Iran. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The use of Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a neutral go-between Iran and the US. • Trilateral energy negotiations with Iran, China. • Formal cooperation/exchange agreement between Russia’s Ministry of Defense, Energy/Economics Ministry, Education Ministry and corresponding ministries of Iran. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia's trilateral energy negotiations with China have stalled due to China's reluctance. Russia has abandoned the idea to form an energy block in the OPEC and proceeds to cooperate with Iran directly regarding energy supplies and the infrastructure. • Russia continues to support Iran's membership in the SCO in spite of luke-warm support from other members. • Russia has called a special UN Security session regarding the increased US presence in Israel. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia has organized high-level multi-lateral regional talks about the US presence in Israel, thus increasing its pressure on the US. • Azerbaijan has become a third partner in Russo-Iran energy projects. • Russia supports Israel as a member of the SCO, provided Iran is granted a full membership at the SCO.



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducted joint military exercises in Armenia with the U.S. as a deterrence toward Iranian aggression. • Conducted coordinated airstrikes against Lebanese Hezbollah with US. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia agrees to work with KSA, the GCC, and China to create an exchange for oil that avoids U.S. chokepoints for international sales. • Russia works to strengthen military and commercial ties with the governments of Central Asia • Russia engages in high level diplomatic talks with Iraq. Invites Iraq’s president to Russia for an official state visit. • Russia invites the Supreme Leader to Russia for an official state visit to discuss future cooperation. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia offers its condolences to the U.S. over the attack and offers robust cooperation to the U.S. to identify the culprits of the terrorist attacks. • Russia utilizes its connections with Iraqi militias to determine the potential involvement of Kataib Hezbollah. Russia shares specific intelligence on Kataib Hezbollah it has garnered via its covert outreach from the previous year with the U.S. • Russia uses its diplomatic relationship with Iraqi to calm tensions related to the U.S. response to the attack. • Russia agrees to continued discussions with the U.S. about its role in facilitating a nuclear deal with Iran. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia announces its support of China regarding its Uighur policies.
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3.3 Iran – Overt Actions

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use small boats to harass U.S. fleet in Persian Gulf. • Continue proxy attacks in Iraq. These must be limited in scope. The intention is to wear down U.S. will to continue, not provoke massive confrontation. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weapons shipments to Lebanon • Position and launch drone missiles for strike on Saudi eastern oil • Plan and where possible carry out four attacks on U.S. positions in Iraq • Launch attack from Yemen into Saudi Arabia • Negotiate with Kurds for possible coordination--get Iraqi parliament to be bit more generous to Kurds on distribution of revenue <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain highly public facilities in Lebanon - health, education, etc. • Support Yemeni missile attacks on Saudi Arabia, both fixed oil installations and shipping (stay away from Mecca). • Deployments for coastal defense. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain support for Houthis in Yemen • Accelerate nuclear program • Schedule additional missile testing • Approach Turkey about increased trade and cultural exchange • Appeal to UNHCR for additional aid for Afghan refugees • Propaganda against foreign interference in AOR countries. • Question SA legitimacy for Haji etc. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • War games with China in Gulf of Oman. • Launch trade negotiations with China, Pakistan, and Russia. • Reignite conflict in Yemen, arm and fund attacks on SA infrastructure from Yemen. • Deploy coastal patrol vessels to Strait of Hormuz, begin inspections on shipping on Iranian side of the strait. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Missile attacks on US base in Oman as a proportionate response to US drone strike in 2021. • Complain to EU about carrots and sticks, they have peaceful nuclear technology why should Iran not? • Reduce visibility in Iraq, let the US sink in that quagmire. • Extend 2019 trade agreement with Iraq, move as far to free trade as possible. • Extend exchange program with PRC. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Overt Actions. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agreed to a peace deal with the US where sanctions will be lifted and the US will invest in renewable energy in exchange for us ending the nuclear program. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iran and the US have signed the peace agreement. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Begin illicitly trading oil with North Korea for assistance in our nuclear program. Intentionally get caught doing so to pressure China. • Announce to the Iranian public via IRNA that Iran is in talks with China about greater Chinese investment in Iran via the Belt and Road initiative. Foreign Ministry Statement: "Creating better bonds with the far-east is in Iran's best interest. We are hopeful that our talks with China will open many doors." • Announce that we welcome the EU's help in policing the gulf, however we believe that regional stability depends on the Middle East being able to patrol its own waters. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Announce a deal in the works with China under which China will increase imports of Iranian oil, lease Iranian naval bases and airbases, and begin equipping Iran with a modern fighter force. Iran will decrease our export tariffs on oil to china. • Announce that Iran plans to return to compliance under the JCPOA as long as the EU continues to support INSTEX. We plan to stop all enrichment activities which are not in compliance. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iran announces it is willing to work with US investigators to bring to justice those who committed the attack on Fort Dix. Through our openness, we wish to ensure the world



	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Seek membership in PRC-led trading group.• Seek increased ties with Russia, including scientific exchanges.		<p>that we were not involved in the attack. In addition, we will scale back any relationships with Kataib Hezbollah. The US has rejected our offer, but it still stands. We strongly believe that cooperation on this matter is in everyone's best interest and that our help will be indispensable, and regret that the US does not wish to do its best to bring the attackers to justice.</p>
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3.4 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – Overt Actions

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase defensive measures for priority sectors, emphasizes on cyber and air/missile – but also potential from terrorist attack: Government, Military, Energy - Aramco, Aramco Facilities, Aramco Networks down U.S. will to continue, not provoke massive confrontation. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase policing of dissidents - jailing several activists, but having Ministry of Interior communicate publicly about the crimes of the accused, and particularly some ties they have to Iranian intelligence • Purchase of foodstuffs and anti-missile/anti-aircraft weapons from Russia • Purchase of anti-missile/anti-aircraft weapons from China • KSA and China will attend a Counter-Extremism Conference hosted by Indonesia <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Overt Actions. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outreach to several countries regarding the purchase of defensive weapons • Purchase anti-aircraft and anti-missile technologies from Russia, sell petrochemicals to Russia • Purchase anti-aircraft and anti-missile technologies from China, sell petrochemicals and energy finance/logistics to China • Increase defensive measures for priority sectors, emphasizes on cyber and air/missile – but also potential from terrorist attack: Government, Military, Energy - Aramco, Aramco Facilities, Aramco Networks down U.S. will to continue, not provoke massive confrontation. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KSA conducts outreach to Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, and numerous partners in Africa, as well as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to ensure a commitment to KSA’s continued openness to pilgrimage and stewardship of the holy sites. Outreach comes with promises of additional access and educational resources. • KSA increases bombing of Houthi positions in Yemen. Targeting is improved for reasons that are unclear, but there is a decrease in collateral damage. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collaboration with US on reaffirmed support for Saudi Arabia in the region 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic and energy cooperation deal with China, including sale of petrochemicals and related consulting • Public statements showing support for US efforts around the Straits of Hormuz. • Purchase of anti-missile weapons systems and anti-aircraft weapons systems from Russia. • Diplomatic discussions in Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, and Turkey about Saudi educational and religious outreach – both around accessibility to KSA for pilgrims, but also supporting conservative Islamic practices in those countries. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outreach with GCC in attempt to create regional oil trade deal with numerous world and regional powers. Negotiations do not result in a deal. A diplomatic disappointment for the GCC. • Public statements about the horrible behavior and human rights violations of Houthi rebels in Yemen. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purchase 2 fast attack craft from US for our growing coast guard, with 2 more expected in the future. Agree to support increased US maritime presence in the Gulf. Announce new upcoming KSA/GCC maritime exercises in the Arabian Sea. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communicate with KSA to discuss the killing of Jamal Khashoggi and insist that you had nothing to do with the killing. Try to resolve the issue by working to create understanding and offer financial support to the KSA and its economy. • Use oil wealth to help Yemen get out from under the Houthi control. There is no military control that can solve the issue. So building relations and discussing an end to the violence will be beneficial to both countries. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use oil wealth to help Yemen get out from under the Houthi control. We believe there is no military control that can solve the issue. So, building relations and discussing an end to the violence will be beneficial to both countries. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use oil wealth to help Yemen get out from under the Houthi control. We believe there is no military control that can solve the issue. So, building relations and discussing an end to the violence will be beneficial to both countries. • Work diplomatically to achieve a peaceful resolution to disputes with Iran and continue to support the JCPOA and EU efforts to resuscitate the agreement. • Work with the EU to develop alternative industries beyond oil to help the Saudi



		<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Purchase 6 F-15s with air-to-surface missile capabilities, with an expected additional 6 in the future from the US.	economy. Receive a 500 million euro investment and the development of an EU investment council that would work with the respective Ministries to carry out economic development and diversification for the country.
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3.5 European Union – Overt Actions

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make a public call to all parties to behave responsibly and give peace a chance. • Work with EU Member States to prepare military resources for duty in the Persian Gulf to maintain freedom of navigation and provide protection and consular emergency capability for EU nationals in the region. • Pursue dialog and coordination with US/NATO/UK regarding security in the region. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make a renewed public call to all parties to behave responsibly and give peace a chance. • Set up a solo EU Freedom of Navigation mission in the Persian Gulf (with France and Germany in the lead) but with close coordination with US/NATO/UK • Work with Saudi Arabia on an Economic Diversification Initiative and Arms Deals in exchange for symbolic and substantive human rights improvements (e.g. re women's rights). • Shuttle diplomacy between US and Iran. Use carrots and sticks (trade and threat of sanctions) to try to keep Iran from breaking out of the JPCOA. • Engage in public high level dialog with Russia regarding Syria, Iran and Iraq. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Express solidarity with the United States re the terrorist attack and rejection of all forms of terrorism. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make a public call to all parties to behave responsibly and give peace a chance. • Work with EU Member States to prepare military resources for duty in the Persian Gulf to maintain freedom of navigation and provide protection and consular emergency capability for EU nationals in the region. • Pursue dialog and coordination with US/NATO/UK regarding security in the region. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make a renewed public call to all parties to behave responsibly and give peace a chance. • Set up a solo EU Freedom of Navigation mission in the Persian Gulf (with France and Germany in the lead) but with close coordination with US/NATO/UK • Work with Saudi Arabia on an Economic Diversification Initiative and Arms Deals in exchange for symbolic and substantive human rights improvements (e.g. re women's rights). • Shuttle diplomacy between US and Iran. Use carrots and sticks (trade and threat of sanctions) to try to keep Iran from breaking out of the JPCOA. • Engage in public high level dialog with Russia regarding Syria, Iran and Iraq. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Express solidarity with the United States re the terrorist attack and rejection of all forms of terrorism. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make a public call to all parties to behave responsibly and give peace a chance. • Work with EU Member States to prepare military resources for duty in the Persian Gulf to maintain freedom of navigation and provide protection and consular emergency capability for EU nationals in the region. • Pursue dialog and coordination with US/NATO/UK regarding security in the region. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make a renewed public call to all parties to behave responsibly and give peace a chance. • Set up a solo EU Freedom of Navigation mission in the Persian Gulf (with France and Germany in the lead) but with close coordination with US/NATO/UK • Work with Saudi Arabia on an Economic Diversification Initiative and Arms Deals in exchange for symbolic and substantive human rights improvements (e.g. re women's rights). • Shuttle diplomacy between US and Iran. Use carrots and sticks (trade and threat of sanctions) to try to keep Iran from breaking out of the JPCOA. • Engage in public high level dialog with Russia regarding Syria, Iran and Iraq. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Express solidarity with the United States re the terrorist attack and rejection of all forms of terrorism. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU plans to back publicly the INSTEX alternative trading mechanism to circumvent US sanctions. • The EU plans to continue to develop a naval force in the region to protect EU commercial/shipping interests. The US and other countries in the region and those with interests in the region are aware of these developments. • The EU plans to increase its economic aid and development to key countries, notably Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. We see economic aid as the best way to ensure peace and security. • The EU plans to offer automatic asylum to Uighur refugees who are fleeing Chinese repression. We plan to work with Central Asian partners to facilitate the safety and security of all people in their respective countries and urge them to do more. • The EU plans to urge the US to remain committed to salvaging the JPCOA and urges President Trump to reconsider his actions. • The EU is considering a security summit of great powers and other countries in the region to address concerns, either as part of some UN initiative or a form of summit. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU publicly requested from China the ability to conduct fact-finding missions on the status of re-education centers/camps in Xianjing.



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make a renewed public call to all state parties to behave responsibly and respond proportionally to provocations. • Maintain the EU Freedom of Navigation mission in the Persian Gulf (with France and Germany in the lead) but with close coordination with US/NATO/UK • Suspend the Economic Diversification Initiative with Saudi Arabia but maintain arms sales for the time being. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make a renewed public call to all state parties to behave responsibly and respond proportionally to provocations. • Maintain the EU Freedom of Navigation mission in the Persian Gulf (with France and Germany in the lead) but with close coordination with US/NATO/UK • Suspend the Economic Diversification Initiative with Saudi Arabia but maintain arms sales for the time being. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make a renewed public call to all state parties to behave responsibly and respond proportionally to provocations. • Maintain the EU Freedom of Navigation mission in the Persian Gulf (with France and Germany in the lead) but with close coordination with US/NATO/UK • Suspend the Economic Diversification Initiative with Saudi Arabia but maintain arms sales for the time being. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU has requested that Turkey and other Central Asian states accepted without hesitation, Uighurs fleeing China. • The EU continues to develop and implement INSTEX and other blocking regulations to make it illegal for EU companies to comply with US sanctions. • The EU seeks to counter Russian influence in the region by creating educational partnership exchange program with university students in the region providing financial and other support for students seeking education outside the region. • The EU has signed a development deal with energy companies to develop a network of pipelines with Kuwait and Iraq to bring oil through Iraq, into Turkey and then to Greece for distribution. • The EU has made public statements and remains committed to working with the US Administration on resolving the JCPOA issue with Iran and will continue alternative trading schemes for food and other humanitarian assistance. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With Iran agreeing to return to the JCPOA, the EU has scaled back INSTEX and continues to work with US regulators and policymakers are seeing the deal implemented. • The EU has developed a cybersecurity task force while working with NATO's cybersecurity center in Estonia to develop a plan to protect EU and its member states from cyberattacks that harms its infrastructure. • The EU plans to introduce motions in the General Assembly at the UN and Security Council to push for a fact-finding mission by the international community on China's Uighur camps.
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			<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The EU has publicly asked Saudi Arabia and Iran to reconsider opening their territory to Chinese forces and allowing the lease and construction of new bases, arguing that such developments will only destabilize the region and disrupt trade and economic interests for all.• The EU will continue its naval force to protect EU shipping and commercial interests.• The EU announces that it plans to sell military arms and equipment to Saudi Arabia and increase its economic development assistance to promote economic alternative to oil through the creation of an economic development corporation/initiative. The EU sees Saudi Arabia as a critical pillar of stability in the region and a more diverse economy for all states in the region will help them whether geopolitical storms.
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3.6 Israel – Overt Actions

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Overt Actions. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Overt Actions. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Overt Actions. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Overt Actions. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Overt Actions. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Overt Actions. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Overt Actions. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Overt Actions. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Overt Actions. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase U.S. military presence within Israel, in order to ensure protection against Iran. • Enhancing defense by partaking in joint military exercises between the U.S. and Israel. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue the unity with the U.S. and increase military powers within Israel. • Israel will work with the U.S. to "re-join" the JCPOA, given that Israel will be included in the JCPOA and Iran will abide by the limitations of the deal. The U.S. will join the JCPOA on their terms that Israel will also agree with. • Israel will work with China and aid China in terms of trade in the red sea. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue working peacefully with China in 2022 to support trade in the red sea. • Israel, Russia, and the US sit down before the UN Security Special Session to discuss the U.S. presence in Israel. Israel focused on the need for U.S. military presence due to military defenses from Iran. • Israel and other SCO member states sit down and discuss Israel joining the SCO as a dialogue partner for the near future. Russia strongly suggests that Israel should join later in the future, and not to act prematurely and that it may be conditional to Iran becoming a full member of the SCO. Russia agrees and supports Israel joining. • Israel and the U.S. decide to join the JCPOA under these terms: Any current issues with Iran must be resolved prior to signing,



			addressing Iran's missile program, and addressing issues with Syria and Yemen.
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3.7 United States – Overt Actions

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting with Israel to announce new strategic aerial effort in the region - placing advanced tactical fighters at bases in the north and south and conducting joint exercises. • Summit with Russia on Regional security. • Move additional aerial forces to in-theater bases as a deterrent against Iran. • Limited campaign of drone strikes on Hezbollah key leaders. • Meeting with Prime Minister of Iraq to discuss military presence as a maintenance effort within region, promising drawdown of some troops to satisfy domestic pressure for removal. • Meeting with President Erdogan of Turkey to re-affirm commitment to US military presence in his country and provide additional military aid. • Increase forces at Thumrait Air Force Base in Oman, given new Sultan. • Conduct limited and randomized US military escort of ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue joint effort placing advanced tactical fighters at bases in the north and south of Israel and conducting joint exercises. • Summit with Russia on Regional security. • Keep additional aerial forces to in-theater bases as a deterrent against Iran. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting with President Erdogan to reaffirm support in the region and our forces at Incirlik • Meeting with Prime Minister of Iraq to reaffirm our position in the country and provide some drawdown of troops in the region (to appease domestic interests). • Reaffirming support that efforts to deter Iran need to involve many different countries. • United States announces that it is hosting talks on a new multilateral trade deal with Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Australia / New Zealand. China will not be invited. • We are placing additional aerial forces at Thumrait Air Base in Oman and announcing a new 30 year lease agreement with Oman regarding expanded presence at that Air Base. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited drone strikes against key Lebanese Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon. • Drone strike killing Major General Hossein Salami (head of IRGC) while he was in Lebanon. • Continuing cyber-attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities. • U.S. announces an additional \$300 billion in trade with their new South and Southeast Asian trade partners. • US will provide public support/attribution of the Houthis to Iran by releasing key intelligence. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p>	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Announce initial talks with Iran on resolving the tensions in the region. Talks announced on September 1st and starting September 4th. • Conduct naval blockade of Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Indian Ocean. Passage would be allowed for all goods but would require boarding and inspection by US naval forces prior to entry. Naval blockade would start September 4th. • Drone strikes targeting key leaders in Lebanese Hezbollah on September 4th • Increase additional sanctions against Russian financial interests in the United States <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Announce a deal with Russia, Iran, and the United States (with support from China) to begin the repatriation of all nuclear fuel from Iran and the 10-year wind down of Iran's nuclear program • U.S. agrees to lift 1/3rd of the financial sanctions against Russia as a part of the negotiations of this deal, with a future commitment of additional 1/3rd sanctions relief when deal completed and a final 1/3rd when the fuel is repatriated out of Iran over the next few years. • U.S. immediately lifts the naval blockade against Iran • U.S. supports greater petrochemical trade cooperation between Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work to gain Iranian support by providing economic support through a form of agreement regarding the Department of Treasury. • Form an agreement to end the trade war/deficit with China to ensure their support. • Deploy additional troops to Israel to ensure protection Iran and other nations that pose a threat to Israel, while working with Israel on missile defense. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The U.S. military remains in Israel for protection despite Russia's concerns. • The U.S. agrees to and allow Israel to re-join the JCPOA, if Iran abides by the limitations and this is not unilateral. • The U.S. would benefit from less dependency on oil because it would reduce exposure to Iraq/Iran's rivalry. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agreement with China to reduce the trade deficit and partner to seek/invest in renewable energy sources to reduce exposure to Iran/Iraq, the U.S. agrees to reduce naval presence in the South China Sea and respect China's demands in forming the agreements. • The U.S. denies assistance from Iran in investigation of Hezbollah and the Fort Dix attacks, as it is too premature of an action to take. • The U.S. seeks assistance/coordination with EU to investigate cyber attacks



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue limited campaign of drone strikes on Hezbollah key leaders. • Announce continued support for Saudi Arabia and their continued development of human rights efforts, targeting the EU media. • Conduct limited and randomized US military escort of ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. • Announce meeting with China regarding Regional Stability in Beijing in June. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue joint effort placing advanced tactical fighters at bases in the north and south of Israel and conducting joint exercises. • Summit with Russia on Regional security. • Keep additional aerial forces to in-theater bases as a deterrent against Iran. • Continue limited campaign of drone strikes on Hezbollah key leaders. • Announce continued support for Saudi Arabia and their continued development of human rights efforts, targeting the EU media. • Conduct limited and randomized US military escort of ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. • Announce meeting with China regarding Regional Stability in Beijing in June. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reaffirmed support for Saudi Arabia in the region. • Publicly chastised the new China-Iran-Russia trade deal as the new "Axis of Evil Economics". 	<p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Announce completion of the Iranian peace deal - 60 days to sign, 2 years to repatriate fuel, 10 years total to wind down nuclear program. • Sell 2 fast attack craft and 6 F-15s to Saudi Arabia • Lift 1/3 of sanctions with Russia, targeting their energy and nuclear sector to help facilitate the repatriation of fuel. • Announce the development, testing, and certification of new hypersonic missile technology that can evade air defenses. Commit to placing nuclear warheads on this technology to encourage deterrence. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The U.S. plans to redirect overseas military commitment funding to improve domestic infrastructure, ensuring that it will not impact such international relations or the U.S. ability to provide shipping security in the Gulf.
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4.1 People’s Republic of China – Covert Actions

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sell arms and expand military support, covertly, to Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen. • Pursue, at any means necessary, new technologies that reduce energy consumption needs • Look for opportunities to expand/diversify energy needs, keep covert to protect expansion efforts <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I would increase, covertly, the sale of military assets to partners and expand military support, particularly in ways that challenge US air superiority <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Given the window of opportunity presented by the attack, covertly, expand re-education camps at home • Expand military presence in Afghanistan and Yemen, expand military partnerships/collaborations with Saudi Arabia and Yemen • Work on expanding naval and military presence/dominance in the area to prevent US using bombing to establish a foothold in the region • Continue energy and tech expansion efforts • Collect information, covertly and by any means possible, from the US and its allies 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Send forces into Syria to fight TIP • Increase patrols in Afghanistan • Explore Iran’s openness to joint military exercises <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Covert Actions. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Begin several covert social media campaigns (through several cutouts) to spread following rumors: massive increases in trade deficits as a result of Trump’s Asian trade treachery, costing US jobs (target this at US states with senate elections in 2022), Trump’s reported trade flows in Asia are accounting fictions, Fort Dix bomber was a socialist upset about Trump’s financial deregulation, Fort Dix bomber was a Mexican-American upset about Trump’s wall, Fort Dix bomber was a white nationalist upset about losing job to people of color, Fort Dix bomber was a disgruntled former autoworker upset about increased trade deficit with Japan 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deploy air and naval radar, sonar, and munitions experts to the Chinese Embassy in Beijing. From time to time find ways to encourage Iran to share information, especially on any munitions they recover or crashed drones, etc. • Deploy appropriately sized passive sensors to Chinese diplomatic facilities in Iran that have a reasonable chance of avoiding detection. • Request information and assistance from Iran on any anti-Chinese elements (Uighur activists, etc.) in Iran or in areas where Iranian influence is strong (Syria, Lebanon, etc.) • From time to time, discretely share information about US troop movements in the regions with Iran to see what information Iran has that it can share with China. Use satellite imagery degraded to commercially available or somewhat better than commercially available standards. • Continue imports of Iranian oil, including moderate levels illicitly in contravention of UN sanctions • Deploy intelligence trawlers to the Gulf during this period of heightened tensions <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Share information with Iran that China has gained about U.S. troop presence in the region, including any information about security procedures at US facilities. Also share with Iran on a regular basis information we 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offer Iran ballistic missile technologies and other advanced machinery as well as economic aid and additional energy imports in exchange for a detente • Coordinating with Russia to establish a SCO framework to deescalate tensions between DC and Tehran • Communicating with both Israel and the US to cease unilateral action • Offer Saudi Arabia arms sales and energy contracts to reduce tensions in the region <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Covert Actions. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deepening relations with Iran and Arab states • Sowing divisions between Iran and Russia • Ensuring there is peace in the Middle East, but also ensuring there is enough tensions and threat of war to divert US military presence from the South China Sea as well as Chinese activities throughout the Southeast Asia • Tensions in the Middle East provide a pretext for increased Chinese presence • Beginning containment of India • Ending Russian influence in Central Asia • Undermining Russian influence in Central Asia and Iran • Increasing naval dominance in the South China Sea



		<p>have about the location of US naval vessels in the Persian Gulf.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Offer Iran consultations with Chinese cyber experts as they identify any behavior of concern in Iranian systems.• Amplify stories of Iranian suffering through bots, etc., as discussed in overt avenues below. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Seek permission from Pakistan to operate drones from southwestern Pakistan (Gwadar). Build facilities, including airfields, as needed. While not publicizing the effort and doing anything overt to showcase it, the effort will likely generate signatures that indicate Chinese presence and that is okay.• Seek to restore Sino-Iran trade, including through sanctions busting, so long as the scale is sufficient to avoid large-scale US sanctions of China or Chinese entities.	
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4.2 Russia – Covert Actions

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordinate a strike on Iran's militias in Syria with Bashar's regime. I would like to take advantage of the power vacuum left by Soleimani to reduce Iran's presence in Syria. The militias create a great deal of instability and violence, increasing the risk of Russian soldier casualties, which might undermine my support at home. Anything that might reduce the actors present in Syria and stabilize the country is worth trying. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Covert Actions. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sell weapons to Iraq and Yemen. Continued efforts at supporting other countries in the region against potential Iranian incursion. • Foment Sunni resentment of Shia control in Iraq. Aimed at reducing Iranian influence in Iraq. • Encourage the Assad regime to continue to crack down on Iranian backed militia groups. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage in trade talks with Saudi Arabia on Russia purchase of petrochemicals and Saudi purchase of anti-aircraft/anti-missile technology. • Express disgust with US killing of Soleimani to Iran and across AOR. • Increase intelligence gathering operations <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase disinformation campaigns in/against the U.S. • Attempted to purchase new technology from Israel. • Expand intelligence network throughout the U.S. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disinformation campaign in Israel about the US and their loyalties • Cyberattack campaign against government systems in 10 cities throughout U.S. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Export advanced anti-ship missile technology to Iran in return for concessional energy sector investments. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia begins developing relationships with militias in Iraq to deal with ISIS. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia strengthens its investments with political parties in Iraq, which maybe disaffected by the U.S.'s response to the terrorist attack. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial subsidies to Iran's military • Negotiations with Iraq's Kurds to apply pressure to Iraq's govt and the US • Extended exchanges/visiting/consultations between nuclear/military scientists and experts of Russia and Iran. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia has increased its off-the books financial and military assistance to Iran • Russia is conducting economic negotiations through private companies with Iran's neighbors to assist Iran's foreign trade. • Russia/Iran coordinated cyber-attacks have been successful in handicapping European and US power grids and the financial sector. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia increasingly relies on using private enterprises regarding trade with Iran. • Russia increases Central Asian border security and achieves stricter border regulations from Central Asian countries in exchange for unspecified confessions. • Russia receives unspecified compensation investments from China in return for Russia's support for the Uighur policies.



4.3 Iran – Covert Actions

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Send money to brothers in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and dissident movements in Saudi Arabia • Weapons to same, but not Saudi Arabia • Arrange oil-for-goods transfers in both military and non-military goods, and foodstuffs, that will evade international monetary controls • Some pressure must be kept on U.S. attempting to make them withdraw from the region, but it must not be so intense as, during an election year, to provoke a massive response designed to garner votes. For this reason, covert operations on U.S. soil must be avoided <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Covert Actions. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Launch cyberattacks where possible. Investigate vulnerabilities of international settlements system, Federal Reserve, big international banks • Offer support to Iraqi Kurds vs. Russia, Turkey • Distribute funds to friendly political parties in Iraq. • Explore vulnerability of American forces in Zionist Entity 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Propaganda against foreign interference in AOR countries. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deploy submarines to Gulf of Oman and Strait. • Prepare minelayers for duty. • Prepare cyber-attacks against aging and vulnerable US air traffic control system. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited cyber-attack on air traffic control, goal is disruption and proof of concept. • Quietly recruit in Iraq, seek friendly politicians. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Covert Actions. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agreed to allow China to investigate cyber-attacks against Iran. • Agree to investigate Russian claims of suspicious activity by Iranians in Chechnya <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iran has tried to open negotiations with Israel but has been rebuffed. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase funding to Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen but instruct them to stockpile resources for later operations. • Bomb pipelines which Iran uses to provide oil to china, frame it as the US trying to cut off Iran economically. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Begin supporting piracy on oil trade in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Aden, particularly targeting China or US bound vessels. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do not attribute this to Iran, but make overt: Several Chinese military bases in Iran are attacked by extremist elements, causing many casualties, most of which were Iranian personnel working on base. Encourage the pirates we are supporting to attacks multiple Iranian vessels in Straights of Malacca.



4.4 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – Covert Actions

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue secret/quiet negotiations with Iran about Yemeni conflict. Hope to take advantage of their pressing problems (their focus on US tensions, IRGC QF in chaotic situation) to improve bargaining position. Remain willing to walk away from negotiations. • Work to develop a KSA equivalent to IRGC QF. Will support training of both sympathetic govt and non-govt actors in the region. Will support efforts to curb Iran influence. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase policing of dissidents – two bloggers who reported online that KSA had provided intelligence to Israel for targeting Hezbollah military targets in Iraq were detained and removed from the traditional KSA justice system. They’re being held incommunicado • Increased support to anti-Houthi forces in Yemen, in conjunction with US and Oman <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase in targeted intelligence collection in Iraq and Syria. Continued HUMINT, but increased HUMINT-supported SIGINT and cyber targeting. Intention is both to provide better intelligence on Iranian capabilities in theater, but also to share intel with both US and Israel who are targeting Iranian capabilities there directly. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue secret/quiet negotiations with Iran about Yemeni conflict. Hope to take advantage of their pressing problems (their focus on US tensions, IRGC QF in chaotic situation) to improve bargaining position. Remain willing to walk away from negotiations. • Work to develop a KSA equivalent to IRGC QF. Will support training of both sympathetic govt and non-govt actors in the region. Will support efforts to curb Iran influence. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase policing of dissidents – two bloggers who reported online that KSA had provided intelligence to Israel for targeting Hezbollah military targets in Iraq were detained and removed from the traditional KSA justice system. They’re being held incommunicado • Increased support to anti-Houthi forces in Yemen, in conjunction with US and Oman <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase in targeted intelligence collection in Iraq and Syria. Continued HUMINT, but increased HUMINT-supported SIGINT and cyber targeting. Intention is both to provide better intelligence on Iranian capabilities in theater, but also to share intel with both US and Israel who are targeting Iranian capabilities there directly. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purchase of offensive cyberweapons defensive cyber capabilities from Israel • Conduct low level cyber-attacks on Iranian economic targets and especially on communications with proxy groups • Begin development of MBS-Force – the Saudi equivalent to IRGC Quds Force <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purchase of arms from Israel (small arms and rockets) • Begin use of MBS-Force – the Saudi equivalent to IRGC Quds Force – by channeling small arms to Yemen. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cyber-attacks on Iran w/ Israel • Channeling weapons to Sunni Militias in Lebanon and Iraq • Supporting the PKK on Iran’s northwestern border with funding and arms 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue holding secretive talks with the Islamic Republic to ease tensions with Iran. After years of violence and war, the suffrage of the Middle East and its people is of concern. Although religious and political diversity remains among the countries, it is in the best interest of everyone to at least ease the tensions in the Middle East to allow for economic and political growth. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work to rid Yemen of Houthi control. With our new Chinese allies • Continue holding secretive talks with the Islamic Republic to ease tensions with Iran. After years of violence and war, the suffrage of the Middle East and their people is of concern. Although religious and political diversity remain among the countries, it is in the best interest of everyone to at least ease the tensions in the Middle East to allow for economic and political growth. • Work with China to deescalate tensions with Iran. In return for our efforts in deescalating tensions with Iran, we will be receiving arm sales and energy contracts from China. • Work with Chinese allies to eliminate Houthi control in Yemen and work to strengthen international cooperation on de-radicalization to prevent the infiltration and spread of extremism.



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase arms shipments and support to allied militias in Lebanon to counter increased Iranian arms traffic. Hezbollah will remain a major player there, the goal is simply to balance against them – rather than undertake a conflict that is likely to stalemate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase arms shipments and support to allied militias in Lebanon to counter increased Iranian arms traffic. Hezbollah will remain a major player there, the goal is simply to balance against them – rather than undertake a conflict that is likely to stalemate. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allow China to purchase a lease for naval facilities on Saudi soil to aid in deradicalization efforts. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue holding secretive talks with the Islamic Republic to ease tensions with Iran. After years of violence and war, the suffrage of the Middle East and its people is of concern. Although religious and political diversity remains among the countries, it is in the best interest of everyone to at least ease the tensions in the Middle East to allow for economic and political growth. • Work with China to deescalate tensions with Iran. • Work with Chinese allies to eliminate Houthi control in Yemen and work to strengthen international cooperation on de-radicalization to prevent the infiltration and spread of extremism.
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4.5 European Union – Covert Actions

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Send high representative to Saudi Arabia to discuss trade and security issues. Make it clear that cooperation is conditional upon an improved human rights posture. • Offer of mediation between US and Iran. Use carrots and sticks (trade and threat of sanctions) to try to keep Iran from breaking out of the JPCOA. • Open dialogue with Israel but warn that opportunism with regard to settlements etc will have serious consequences. • Open quiet dialogue with Russia regarding IRAN nuclear. • Maintain quiet informal communication with the leading democratic presidential candidates/nominee <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threaten to cease mediation and shift to sanctions strategy if Iranian small boat attacks continue. • Seek to persuade the US to show restraint re the targeted killings campaign, which is highly inflammatory. • Continue dialogue with Israel but warn that opportunism with regard to settlements etc will have serious consequences. • Continue dialogue with Russia and begin dialog with PRC regarding Iran and ask for restrain re Iraq opportunism. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p>	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Send high representative to Saudi Arabia to discuss trade and security issues. Make it clear that cooperation is conditional upon an improved human rights posture. • Offer of mediation between US and Iran. Use carrots and sticks (trade and threat of sanctions) to try to keep Iran from breaking out of the JPCOA. • Open dialogue with Israel but warn that opportunism with regard to settlements etc will have serious consequences. • Open quiet dialogue with Russia regarding IRAN nuclear. • Maintain quiet informal communication with the leading democratic presidential candidates/nominee <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threaten to cease mediation and shift to sanctions strategy if Iranian small boat attacks continue. • Seek to persuade the US to show restraint re the targeted killings campaign, which is highly inflammatory. • Continue dialogue with Israel but warn that opportunism with regard to settlements etc will have serious consequences. • Continue dialogue with Russia and begin dialog with PRC regarding Iran and ask for restrain re Iraq opportunism. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p>	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Send high representative to Saudi Arabia to discuss trade and security issues. Make it clear that cooperation is conditional upon an improved human rights posture. • Offer of mediation between US and Iran. Use carrots and sticks (trade and threat of sanctions) to try to keep Iran from breaking out of the JPCOA. • Open dialogue with Israel but warn that opportunism with regard to settlements etc will have serious consequences. • Open quiet dialogue with Russia regarding IRAN nuclear. • Maintain quiet informal communication with the leading democratic presidential candidates/nominee <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threaten to cease mediation and shift to sanctions strategy if Iranian small boat attacks continue. • Seek to persuade the US to show restraint re the targeted killings campaign, which is highly inflammatory. • Continue dialogue with Israel but warn that opportunism with regard to settlements etc will have serious consequences. • Continue dialogue with Russia and begin dialog with PRC regarding Iran and ask for restrain re Iraq opportunism. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p>	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU diplomats plan to have behind-the-scenes and not yet public discussions with Iranian leadership on the best way to move forward in salvaging the JCPOA. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU continues to work with Iranian negotiators behind the scenes to keep them from developing nuclear weapons and preserving the deal. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU member states have been pushing to resume arms trade with Iran; given their return to the deal, many member states may plan some "quiet sales" to the region in an effort to contain Chinese and Russian interests in the region. • The EU and US through the Cyber Security Center in Estonia work to create a cyber-counter offensive against Russian, Iranian, and Chinese cyber-attackers.



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intensify counter-terrorism intelligence cooperation with the U.S., NATO, UK, Israel etc. • Monitor the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs closely. • Pressure Iran to restrain proxies and condemn the attack on the U.S. • Seek to persuade the US to avoid targeting Iran directly. • Pursue quiet negotiations with Israel re trade, intelligence cooperation, and a roadmap for a two state solution. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intensify counter-terrorism intelligence cooperation with the U.S., NATO, UK, Israel etc. • Monitor the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs closely. • Pressure Iran to restrain proxies and condemn the attack on the U.S. • Seek to persuade the US to avoid targeting Iran directly. • Pursue quiet negotiations with Israel re trade, intelligence cooperation, and a roadmap for a two state solution. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intensify counter-terrorism intelligence cooperation with the U.S., NATO, UK, Israel etc. • Monitor the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs closely. • Pressure Iran to restrain proxies and condemn the attack on the U.S. • Seek to persuade the US to avoid targeting Iran directly. • Pursue quiet negotiations with Israel re trade, intelligence cooperation, and a roadmap for a two state solution. 	
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4.6 Israel – Covert Actions

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Covert Actions. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negotiating peace meeting in china with china about middle east • Arranging air strikes with us and Russia against Hezbollah • Covert attacks against Hezbollah • Share threat info on Iran with SA • Israel is conducting covert attacks against Hezbollah personnel in Lebanon and at their operatives in other countries. we plan to kill them and not take credit. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collaborate with US for covert strike against Iran • Continuing to negotiate with China for meeting there- waiting for invite 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Covert Actions. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In collaboration with the USA we will covertly support for protests, more covert killing of nuclear scientists, incite violence in northern Iraq creating attribution to Ketaib Hezbollah <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Covert Actions. 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Israel is doing covert cyber-attacks and covert killing of nuclear scientists of Iran - and a lot of them we are also selling some cyber capability to SA <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selling weapons to SA to pass on to Yemen allies <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Totally covert cyber-attacks in collaboration with SA against Iran • Killing boat load of more Iranian nuclear scientists totally covertly • Kill key Iranian scientists covertly and by covertly also so US and SA don't know and cyber-attack their weapons production facilities 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhancing defense by partaking in the development of weapons and missile defenses with the U.S. <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Covert Actions. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Israel monitors Hezbollah covertly with the U.S. by means of cyber gathering.



4.7 United States – Covert Actions

Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cyber attacks against Iranian military and nuclear targets secret negotiations with Saudi Arabia for increased Saudi attacks against Iranian proxies in Yemen • Social media misinformation campaign in Iraq regarding Iranian influence in domestic affairs • Misinformation campaign on Russian influence within Armenia to put pressure on Russian presence at Armenian military bases <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand Cyber attacks against Iranian military and nuclear targets • Secret negotiations with Oman to pressure Houthis from the East • Social media misinformation campaign in Iraq regarding Iranian influence in domestic affairs • Misinformation campaign on Russian influence within Armenia to put pressure on Russian presence at Armenian military bases • Pit China and Russia against one another for influence in the region. <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We have reached out to Iran directly to attempt to facilitate talks in September in the United States. We are awaiting their reply. • We are coordinating a massive counteroffensive (cyber + targeted killings) against Iran's nuclear program and Hezbollah, 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We are coordinating increased cyberattacks with Saudi Arabia against Iran • We are providing strategic intelligence on Iranian weapons programs and proxies to Saudi Arabia • We are coordinating cyber attacks with Israel against Iran • We are supporting covert actions by Israel targeting Iranian nuclear scientists • We are taking down an Iranian military plane via cyberattack and causing it to crash into the Fordow enrichment facility, and planting doctored footage to make it seem that the Iranians shot it down via an anti-aircraft missile, mistaking it for a enemy's plane. • We are leaking intelligence that "Saudi Arabia is talking with the Iranians for sharing of nuclear technology, in exchange for greater economic support and trade with their country" <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working with Israel to stage an attack in Northern Iraq and blaming Ketaib Hezbollah • US will provide better targeting intel (for tactical reasons) to Saudi Arabia <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encouraging Saudi Arabia to make public statements dispelling rumors of their deal with Iran 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supported Israel in targeted killings of Iranian nuclear scientists • Cyberattack against Karun-3 dam bringing it down for 4 days • Release disinformation that Iranian citizens living in Russia have been arrested by Russian authorities in Chechnya for supporting "Islamic jihad" <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning, but not yet executing, attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities and infrastructure should a deal not follow through <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assassinate key leaders of Ketaib Hezbollah, based on intelligence shared by Russia 	<p>Round 1 (2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plan for Military installations abroad with a goal of undermining rivals to deter invasion • Plan to revamp U.S. nuclear strategies to ensure safety of the states <p>Round 2 (2021)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plan to negotiate with China about more renewable energy investments <p>Round 3 (2022)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work with NATO in Estonia to investigate the cyber attacks. • Work with Israel to monitor Hezbollah and uncover the Fort Dix perpetrators.



<p>to coincide with their (hopeful) participation in US talks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We are brokering with China and/or the EU to host the talks • We are conducting cover actions against key Hezbollah financial institutions and freezing additional Iranian assets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stage smuggling event using CIA whereby Iranians living in China would be accused of forced human trafficking, including male children, of individuals in China into Iran, using the relaxed regulations around the new trade deal with China to facilitate their operations. Use the event inflame dissension between Iran and China • Release disinformation on Weibo that Iranian's are using the new trade deal to help arm their Uighur brothers in Western China • Release disinformation in Iran that China has forcibly detained Iranians living in China because of suspected ties to the Uighurs, and sent them to re-education camps and forced them to eat pork • CIA-coordinated clandestine assassination of Tajik military officials in Tajikistan and Turkmeni military officials in Turkmenistan, planting evidence it was done by Russia coordinated cyber-attack against Iranian military healthcare system (wiping health care records for military personnel), Iranian transportation agency (taking out street lights), and the operators of the Karun-3 hydroelectric dam (one of the largest in Iran) 		
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5.1 Three-Year Summary Assessments

Country	Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4 - Students
People's Republic of China	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generally better off, wanting to fly under the radar as much as possible. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emphasis on Belt and Road initiative, small progress, keeping US Iran out of hot war, helping Iran not be so isolated, achieved because of no war. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modest goals, suffered some setbacks due to US naval blockade but made modest progress. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Achieved their goal. Used the crisis to expand long-term objectives and took advantage of the chaos to keep expanding influence.
Russia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Approached with a strategic goal to solidify relationships with Central Asia to counter economic surgency. Trade deal in roads at the end, tried to exploit Iranian death to disrupt Iran influence in Syria. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased influence of Russia and decrease of US influence was successful and where the US did not have influence. Unsure about forward progression but definitely no regression. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Made enormous progress with strategic objectives, expanded role in solidifying Syria • Got sanction relief that improved economic status, negotiated arms agreement with Iran and SA, negotiated a great deal for sanction relief with US in future, bolstering presence in Iran both covert and overtly, made good progress. • At the end of 2022, Russia and US are still in negotiation process. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interesting development with Israel, served Russian interests and opened doors, moved towards goals.
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Artificial divisions, divided international systems on religious lines, better position now, Shiite not subjected to Ottomans or western powers, control of some part Iraq, claim to parts of Syria, Lebanese relationship connections, imposing low-level incremental costs of adversaries and avoiding an Iraq situation, looking at 50 year increments. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Want to be regional power and stability, did not go backward, a little bit forward with trade, economy and young pop with sanctions, trade should have increased, building to Israel tensions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Main goal is to not be invaded, did that, positive for the future, in spite of the blockade, collateral damage. • Injected comment from IS: *IR was epically more conciliatory to cut peace deals in S4*, Iran was trying to be peaceful with Israel which made US look to Russia to build ties because of Iran reaching out, different turn of events. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Worked sideways, get the US out of the region but ended up bringing China into things and got messy fast.



<p>Kingdom of Saudi Arabia</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Between Israel and the US, made progress on several key strategic goals, no worse off, slightly better for the main goal of internal stability. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not make a ton of progress, did not go back, internal stability went well, control of region went well, similar place as start regarding territorial control, less offensive fighting, did not make good progress on diversifying economy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal stability and defend territory, increase influence in region vi-a-vi Iran, *stable resources to Iran situation, Iran was not meddling as much, they were playing in great power politics rather than regional*. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Worked towards objectives, diffuse tension with operational forces, did not work backwards.
<p>European Union</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Looking to contain turbulence and insecurity, not terribly successful and instead saw gradual escalations, trying to push KSA to be better on the human rights front, difficult on freedom of navigation side, developing strategic relationships with Israel, moving in the right direction. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Looking to contain turbulence and insecurity, not terribly successful and instead saw gradual escalations, trying to push KSA to be better on the human rights front, difficult on freedom of navigation side, developing strategic relationships with Israel, moving in the right direction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Looking to contain turbulence and insecurity, not terribly successful and instead saw gradual escalations, trying to push KSA to be better on the human rights front, difficult on freedom of navigation side, developing strategic relationships with Israel, moving in the right direction. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Got what it wanted, stay economic power in a quiet way, stayed on goal path reserved, wanted to avoid migration influx like what happened Syrian issue so it was mindful of staying reserved.
<p>Israel</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Achieved major goals, operational objectives made good progress, collaborated with wanted actors about threats, strategic objectives pushing progress as well, little better off with strategic objectives now. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relationship with US went well, significant progress on destabilizing Iran and derailing Iran effort on nuclear front, a little cooperation with Saudis regarding Iran, Iran is not a big threat so success. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Made moderate progress, less than prior sessions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did not reach internal goal but met goals with US and Iran, made new goals and accomplished of creating ties with Russia and Iran.



<p>United States</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic, more engaged in ME, did not achieve drawdown of US forces or extrication within ME, did recent relationship with Israel by placing joint strike fighters and tactical support in the country, collaborate with Russia and Armenian bases as deterrent against Iran and to protect against Turkey relationships, more odds with Iran yet attempted communication. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Got more involved than we wanted to in ME, reaffirmed power of getting away with things, trade deal with red group that was unintended, aggressive efforts in trade to compete with China. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Doing good, pathway towards a deal with Iran, renewed cooperation with Russia, maintaining a presence in the region without reinforcing or increasing military, solidified arms sales with KSA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moved a little bit forward, not resulting in war and reinforce relations with China.
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