Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA)
and NSI, Inc.

Survey for Eliciting Expert Knowledge (SEEK)

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Findings from SMA's inaugural SEEK outreach

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Introduction

In August 2021, the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) team launched its inaugural **Survey for Eliciting Expert Knowledge (SEEK)** outreach effort.

SEEK is a new, online capability for tapping into the collective knowledge, experience, and wisdom of the 5000+ person SMA community of interest to generate crowdsourced insights on targeted questions of interest.

As part of this inaugural SEEK effort, SMA conducted two separate surveys. This report presents the results of those two surveys.

SURVEY 1

FOCUS
Deterrence and strategic stability

DESIGN
Three targeted multiple-choice questions

PARTICIPATION
199 survey respondents

SURVEY 2

FOCUS
Threats and opportunities:
Perceptions of China, Russia, Iran, and DPRK

DESIGN
16 open-ended questions

PARTICIPATION
24 survey respondents

Survey 1: Overview of Questions and Respondents

Survey 1 focused on **deterrence and strategic stability**.

Respondents were presented with three primary questions (listed below) and asked to select one of the presented multiple choice answers offered for each question.

[Q1] *Please indicate which of the following statements most closely represents your view of force posture required to maintain strategic stability among the US and Russia and the US and China into the future.*

[Q2] *In your estimation, within the next fifteen years, what is the likelihood of the US being involved in a conflict with China or Russia in which any side seriously considers using nuclear weapons?*

[Q3] *In your estimation, within the next fifteen years, what is the likelihood of the US being involved in a conflict with a regional nuclear state in which any side seriously considers using nuclear weapons?*

Respondents were also asked several demographic questions (affiliation, age, level of relative expertise). The general breakdown of the respondents is presented here.

Survey Respondents
Segmented by Affiliation (count; n=119)

Affiliation	Count
Academia	18
Private Industry, Think Tank	30
USG	21
US Military	41
Foreign Military	5
Other	4

Survey Respondents
Segmented by Age (count; n=119)

Age	Count
21-35	9
36-45	22
45-60	64
61+	24

Survey Respondents
Segmented by Self-Identified Relative Expertise (count; n=119)

Expertise	Count
1 (no familiarity)	3
2	1
3	6
4	5
5	15
6	14
7	23
8	21
9	16
10 (SME)	15

Survey 1, Question 1: What We Asked

Q1 asked about preferences in relation to US nuclear force posture required for maintaining strategic stability, asking:

Please indicate which of the following statements most closely represents your view of force posture required to maintain strategic stability among the US and Russia and the US and China into the future.

- **PRC + RU**: The US must possess a nuclear force capable of delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Chinese and Russian nuclear attack, even at the expense of fueling a serious three-party arms race.

- **EXPANSION BEYOND PRESENT**: The US does not need a nuclear force capable of delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Chinese and Russian nuclear attack, but it will need to expand its nuclear force beyond current levels in order to deter both.

- **PARITY WITH WEAKER**: The US does not need a nuclear force capable of delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Chinese and Russian nuclear attack. Such a force is unnecessary for deterring China and Russia individually, acting in concert, or conducting simultaneous but independent attacks. Rather, the US needs a nuclear force at parity with the weaker of the two.

- **NO EXPANSION**: The US must avoid conducting nuclear force modernization or other programs in ways that expand its nuclear capabilities, as doing so would undermine strategic stability by incentivizing Chinese-Russian coordination to counter the US.

Survey 1, Question 1: Overall Response

An overwhelming majority of respondents (**79%**) selected that some level of *expansion of US nuclear force capability* is necessary to maintain strategic stability among the US, Russia, and China into the future.

Nearly half of the respondents (**48%**) specifically selected that the US should *expand its nuclear force capability beyond present levels* but not necessarily to a level required for delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Russian and Chinese nuclear attack.

Preferred Nuclear Force Posture
Percentage of Response Received (n=92)

PRC + RU
The US must possess a nuclear force capable of delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Chinese and Russian nuclear attack, even at the expense of fueling a serious three-party arms race.
30%

EXPANSION BEYOND PRESENT
The US does not need a nuclear force capable of delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Chinese and Russian nuclear attack, but it will need to expand its nuclear force beyond current levels in order to deter both.
48%

PARITY WITH WEAKER
The US does not need a nuclear force capable of delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Chinese and Russian nuclear attack. Rather, the US needs a nuclear force at parity with the weaker of the two.
15%

NO EXPANSION
The US must avoid conducting nuclear force modernization or other programs in ways that expand its nuclear capabilities, as doing so would undermine strategic stability by incentivizing Chinese-Russian coordination to counter the US.
7%

0%   10%   20%   30%   40%   50%

Survey 1, Question 2: What We Asked

Q2 asked about perceptions of the likelihood of US-PRC or US-Russia conflict in which a side seriously considers nuclear use, asking:

In your estimation, within the next fifteen years, what is the likelihood of the US being involved in a conflict with China or Russia in which any side seriously considers using nuclear weapons?

- **Highly likely** (75%-100% chance)
- **Very likely** (60%-74% chance)
- **Quite possible** (45%-59% chance)
- **Not very likely** (25%-44% chance)
- **Improbable** (10%-24% chance)
- **Highly unlikely** (0%-9% chance)

Survey 1, Question 2: Overall Response

Perhaps not surprisingly, a majority of respondents (**63%**) selected a likelihood in the range of *highly unlikely* to *not very likely*.

However, perhaps surprisingly, **38%** of respondents selected a likelihood in the range of *quite possible* to *highly likely*.

Perceived Likelihood of US-PRC or US-RU Conflict With Serious Consideration of Nuclear Use

Percentage of Response Received (n=119)

Survey 1, Question 3: What We Asked

Q3 asked about perceptions of the likelihood of US v. regional nuclear state conflict in which a side seriously considers nuclear use, asking:

In your estimation, within the next fifteen years, what is the likelihood of the US being involved in a conflict with a regional nuclear state in which any side seriously considers using nuclear weapons?

- **Highly likely** (75%-100% chance)
- **Very likely** (60%-74% chance)
- **Quite possible** (45%-59% chance)
- **Not very likely** (25%-44% chance)
- **Improbable** (10%-24% chance)
- **Highly unlikely** (0%-9% chance)

Survey 1, Question 3: Overall Response

Here again, perhaps not surprisingly, a majority of respondents (**63%**) selected a likelihood in the range of *highly unlikely* to *not very likely*.

However, perhaps surprisingly, **36%** of respondents selected a likelihood in the range of *quite possible* to *highly likely*.

Perceived Likelihood of US v. Regional State Conflict With Serious Consideration of Nuclear Use

Percentage of Response Received (n=119)

Category	Percentage
Highly likely (75%-100% chance)	5%
Very likely (60%-74% chance)	10%
Quite possible (45%-59% chance)	21%
Not very likely (25%-44% chance)	34%
Improbable (10%-24% chance)	14%
Highly unlikely (0%-9% chance)	15%

Survey 2: Overview of Questions and Respondents

Survey 2 focused on **perceived threats and opportunities, and the constraints preventing the use of force to resolve and/or realize them, for China, Russia, Iran, and DPRK**.

Respondents were presented with four primary questions (listed below) for each country and asked to provide a brief open-ended response.

[Q1] *What does [country of focus] perceive to be the most significant threat to its regime security?*

[Q2] *What is the primary constraint stopping [country of focus] from using force to resolve this threat?*

[Q3] *What does [country of focus] perceive to be the biggest opportunity for bolstering its governing authority and legitimacy?*

[Q4] *What is the primary constraint stopping [country of focus] from using force to realize this opportunity?*

Respondents were also asked several demographic questions (affiliation, age, level of relative expertise). The general breakdown of the respondents is presented here.

Survey Respondents
Segmented by Affiliation (count; n=24)

Survey Respondents
Segmented by Age (count; n=24)

Survey Respondents
Segmented by Self-Identified Relative Expertise of Country (count; n=24)

Survey 2, Questions 1-4 (China): What We Asked

Q1-Q4 asked about China's perceived most significant threats to its regime security and opportunities for bolstering its governing authority and legitimacy, asking:

[Q1] What does China perceive to be the most significant threat to its regime security?

[Q2] What is the primary constraint stopping China from using force to resolve this threat?

[Q3] What does China perceive to be the biggest opportunity for bolstering its governing authority and legitimacy?

[Q4] What is the primary constraint stopping China from using force to realize this opportunity?

Survey 2, Questions 1-4 (China): Overall Response

The most frequently cited Chinese perceived threats by the respondents relate to *domestic opposition and instability* and *external malign influence inside of China*.

The most frequently cited Chinese perceived opportunities by the respondents relate to *economic growth*, *territorial expansion*, and *increased Chinese influence*.

Most Significant Chinese Perceived Threats and Opportunities
As Cited by Respondents (count of number of times cited)

Category	Count
Domestic opposition & instability	7
External support/amplification of domestic opposition groups	4
Areas of self rule (Hong Kong, Taiwan) & territorial dispute...	2
Internal power struggles within CCP	2
Military competition	2
Successful Western models/actions	2
AI and cyber security	1
Climate change	1
Demographic challenges	1
Economic competition	1
Uncontrollable aspects of international environment	1
US opposition to China's agenda	1
Economic growth	5
Territorial expansion	4
Increase economic dependence on China	2
Relative decline of US power and influence	2
Western democratic/economic failures	1
Demonstrate ability to stand up to US	1
Sustain nationalist, anti-US narrative	1
BRI	1
US domestic polarization and instability	1
Build influence in Eurasia	1
Consolidation of domestic political control via anti-corruption...	1
Bolster influence over diaspora communities	1
Control of international organizations (UN, WHO)	1
Undermine regional perception of US strength	1

■ Threat   ■ Opportunity

Survey 2, Questions 5-8 (Russia): What We Asked

Q5-Q8 asked about Russia's perceived most significant threats to its regime security and opportunities for bolstering its governing authority and legitimacy, asking:

[Q5] What does Russia perceive to be the most significant threat to its regime security?

[Q6] What is the primary constraint stopping Russia from using force to resolve this threat?

[Q7] What does Russia perceive to be the biggest opportunity for bolstering its governing authority and legitimacy?

[Q8] What is the primary constraint stopping Russia from using force to realize this opportunity?

Survey 2, Questions 5-8 (Russia): Overall Response

The most frequently cited Russian perceived threats by the respondents relate to *domestic opposition to the Putin regime, increasing Western influence,* and *economic instability.*

The most frequently cited Russian perceived opportunities by the respondents relate to *increasing Russian influence*, *decreasing Western influence*, and *ensuring the domestic control of the Putin regime*.

Most Significant Russian Perceived Threats and Opportunities
As Cited by Respondents (count of number of times cited)

Category	Count
Popular oposition	9
Influence of the West	5
Elite opposition	4
Economic instability	4
US/NATO	2
Foreign interference in domestic affairs	2
Successful democratic regimes in near abroad	2
Facts	1
Cyber attack against weapons systems	1
Weakening of Western alliance	5
International influence	4
Domestic control	3
European energy dependence	2
Partnership with China/Iran	2
Increased economic performance	1
Success of authoritarian regimes globally	1
US missteps	1

☐ **Threat**   ☐ **Opportunity**

Survey 2, Questions 9-12 (Iran): What We Asked

Q9-Q12 asked about Russia's perceived most significant threats to its regime security and opportunities for bolstering its governing authority and legitimacy, asking:

[Q9] What does Iran perceive to be the most significant threat to its regime security?

[Q10] What is the primary constraint stopping Iran from using force to resolve this threat?

[Q11] What does Iran perceive to be the biggest opportunity for bolstering its governing authority and legitimacy?

[Q12] What is the primary constraint stopping Iran from using force to realize this opportunity?

Survey 2, Questions 9-12 (Iran): Overall Response

The most frequently cited Iranian perceived threats by the respondents relate to *competing regional powers*, *domestic opposition and instability*, and *foreign malign influence*.

The most frequently cited Iranian perceived opportunities by the respondents relate to *expanding Iranian international relationships and influence*, *quelling domestic discontent and instability*, and *strengthening the Iranian economy*.

Most Significant Iranian Perceived Threats and Opportunities
As Cited by Respondents (count of number of times cited)

Category	Count
Regional powers (KSA, Israel, US)	4
Organized political opposition, social movements	3
Foreign military intervention (US, Israel)	2
Foreign influence over domestic politics/population	2
Proxy wars with Gulf States	1
Generation gap	1
Economic challenges	1
Economic & miltary rivalry with Gulf States	1
International cooperation to constrain Iran's regional ambitions	1
Diminished regional presence (MENA)	1
Nuclear weapons	1
Information and cyber security	1
Build trade partnerships	2
Pacify domestic discontent	2
Improve quality of life for Iranians	2
Partnerships with Russia & China to build international presence	1
Reduce capacity of US and allies	1
Progress toward nuclear capability	1
Decreased US presence	1
Expansion of Shiite power in region	1
Internal control of information	1

■ Threat   ■ Opportunity

Survey 2, Questions 13-16 (DPRK): What We Asked

Q13-Q16 asked about Russia's perceived most significant threats to its regime security and opportunities for bolstering its governing authority and legitimacy, asking:

[Q13] What does DPRK perceive to be the most significant threat to its regime security?

*[Q14] What is the primary constraint stopping DPRK from using force to resolve this threat?*

[Q15] What does DPRK perceive to be the biggest opportunity for bolstering its governing authority and legitimacy?

[Q16] What is the primary constraint stopping DPRK from using force to realize this opportunity?

Survey 2, Questions 13-16 (DPRK): Overall Response

The most frequently cited DPRK perceived threats by the respondents relate to *decreasing domestic power and control of the Kim regime*, *interference in DPRK-China relations*, and *economic instability*.

The most frequently cited DPRK perceived opportunities by the respondents relate to *advancing DPRK-China relations*, *strengthening the DPRK economy*, and *increasing DPRK international influence*.

Most Significant DPRK Perceived Threats and Opportunities
As Cited by Respondents (count of number of times cited)

| Category	Count
Loss of control over elites; coup	3
Interruption of China-DPRK relationship	2
US	2
ROK cultural and economic power	1
Information dominance	1
Loss of control over mass population	1
Economic collapse	1
Well-being of KJU	1
Attempts to reverse nuclear program, reduce KJU's int'nl standing	1
Support of China	2
Improving quality of life for domestic population	2
Perception DPRK is a credible military threat	1
Control of internal messaging	1
Progress on nuclear program	1
International diplomatic attention	1
Economic progess	1
Chinese dominance in East Asia	1
Maintaining nuclear umbrella and missile capacity	1

■ Threat   ■ Opportunity

Survey 1, Question 1: Segmented Response

The following slides in this section provide additional insight into the survey 1, question 1 response by detailing the respondent selections across demographic segmentations (affiliation, age, level of relative expertise).

Survey 1, Question 1: Segmented Response (Affiliation)

**When the Q1 response is segmented by affiliation, we find that:**

An overwhelming majority of US military (**91%**), USG (**73%**), and private industry and think tank (**75%**) respondents selected that some level of *expansion of US nuclear force capability* is necessary to maintain strategic stability among the US, Russia, and China into the future.

Preferred US Nuclear Force Posture
Segmented by Affiliation (count; n=92)

PRC + RU
The US must possess a nuclear force capable of delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Chinese and Russian nuclear attack, even at the expense of fueling a serious three-party arms race.

| 1 | 9 | 5 | 11 | 1 | 1 |

EXPANSION BEYOND PRESENT
The US does not need a nuclear force capable of delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Chinese and Russian nuclear attack, but it will need to expand its nuclear force beyond current levels in order to deter both.

| 5 | 22 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 1 |

PARITY WITH WEAKER
The US does not need a nuclear force capable of delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Chinese and Russian nuclear attack. Rather, the US needs a nuclear force at parity with the weaker of the two.

| 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 |

NO EXPANSION
The US must avoid conducting nuclear force modernization or other programs in ways that expand its nuclear capabilities, as doing so would undermine strategic stability by incentivizing Chinese-Russian coordination to counter the US.

| 3 | 2 | 1 |

0   5   10   15   20   25   30   35   40   45

☐ **Academia**   ☐ **US Military**   ☐ **USG**   ☐ **Private Industry, Think Tank**   ☐ **Foreign Military**   ☐ **Other**

Survey 1, Question 1: Segmented Response (Age)

When the Q1 response is segmented by age, we find that:

An overwhelming majority of those age 21-35 (**100%**), 36-45 (**95%**), 46-60 (**69%**), and 61+ (**76%**) selected selected that some level of *expansion of US nuclear force capability* is necessary to maintain strategic stability among the US, Russia, and China into the future.

Preferred US Nuclear Force Posture
Segmented by Age (count; n=92)

PRC + RU
The US must possess a nuclear force capable of delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Chinese and Russian nuclear attack, even at the expense of fueling a serious three-party arms race.

2 | 5 | 12 | 9

EXPANSION BEYOND PRESENT
The US does not need a nuclear force capable of delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Chinese and Russian nuclear attack, but it will need to expand its nuclear force beyond current levels in order to deter both.

5 | 13 | 19 | 7

PARITY WITH WEAKER
The US does not need a nuclear force capable of delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Chinese and Russian nuclear attack. Rather, the US needs a nuclear force at parity with the weaker of the two.

10 | 4

NO EXPANSION
The US must avoid conducting nuclear force modernization or other programs in ways that expand its nuclear capabilities, as doing so would undermine strategic stability by incentivizing Chinese-Russian coordination to counter the US.

1 | 4 | 1

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45

■ 21-35 ■ 36-45 ■ 46-60 ■ 61+

Survey 1; Question 1: Segmented Response (Self-Identified Relative Expertise)

When the Q1 response is segmented by **self-identified level of relative expertise (1 = no familiarity with deterrence and strategic stability; 10 = subject matter expert on the topic),** we find that:

An overwhelming majority of respondents who self-identified their expertise as a 6 or above (**80%**) selected that some level of *expansion of US nuclear force capability* is necessary to maintain strategic stability among the US, Russia, and China into the future.

Similarly, a majority of respondents who self-identified their expertise as a 5 or below (**73%**) selected that some level of *expansion of US nuclear force capability* is necessary to maintain strategic stability among the US, Russia, and China into the future.

Preferred US Nuclear Force Posture
Segmented by Self-Identified Level of Relative Expertise (count; n=92)

PRC + RU
The US must possess a nuclear force capable of delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Chinese and Russian nuclear attack, even at the expense of fueling a serious three-party arms race.

2 | 4 | 11 | 7 | 4

EXPANSION BEYOND PRESENT
The US does not need a nuclear force capable of delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Chinese and Russian nuclear attack, but it will need to expand its nuclear force beyond current levels in order to deter both.

4 | 9 | 12 | 17 | 2

PARITY WITH WEAKER
The US does not need a nuclear force capable of delivering retaliatory strikes against simultaneous Chinese and Russian nuclear attack. Rather, the US needs a nuclear force at parity with the weaker of the two.

1 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 2

NO EXPANSION
The US must avoid conducting nuclear force modernization or other programs in ways that expand its nuclear capabilities, as doing so would undermine strategic stability by incentivizing Chinese-Russian coordination to counter the US.

1 1 1 1 | 2

0   5   10   15   20   25   30   35   40   45

- Self-identified relative expertise (1 = no familiarity)
- Self-identified relative expertise (2-3)
- Self-identified relative expertise (4-5)
- Self-identified relative expertise (6-7)
- Self-identified relative expertise (8-9)
- Self-identified relative expertise (10 = subject matter expert)

Survey 1, Question 2: Segmented Response

The following slides in this section provide additional insight into the survey 1, question 2 response by detailing the respondent selections across demographic segmentations (affiliation, age, level of relative expertise).

Survey 1, Question 2: Segmented Response (Affiliation)

When the Q2 response is segmented by affiliation, we find that:

- At least one respondent from every affiliation selected *highly likely*.

- Perhaps surprisingly, just **6%** of academia respondents, **5%** of USG respondents, **7%** of US military respondents, and **0%** foreign military respondents selected *highly unlikely*.

- US military respondents most frequently selected *improbable* (**29%**), *not very likely* (**27%**), or *quite possible* (**24%**).

- USG respondents most frequently selected *not very likely* (**43%**) or *quite possible* (**33%**).

- Private industry and think tank respondents most frequently selected *highly unlikely* (**33%**) or *improbable* (**27%**).

- Academia respondents most frequently selected *improbable* (**33%**), *not very likely* (**33%**), or *quite possible* (**22%**).

Perceived Likelihood of US-PRC or US-RU Conflict With Serious Consideration of Nuclear Use
Segmented by Affiliation (count; n=119)

Survey 1, Question 2: Segmented Response (Age)

When the Q2 response is segmented by age, we find that:

- At least one respondent from all age groupings except 21-35 selected *highly likely*.

- Respondents age 21-35 most frequently selected *not very likely* (**33%**) or *quite possible* (**33%**).

- Respondents age 36-45 most frequently selected *improbable* (**32%**), *not very likely* (**23%**), or *quite possible* (**23%**).

- Respondents age 46-60 most frequently selected *quite possible* (**27%**), *not very likely*, (**25%**), or *improbable* (**23%**).

- Respondents age 61+ most frequently selected *not very likely* (**33%**) or *quite possible* (**21%**).

Perceived Likelihood of US-PRC or US-RU Conflict With Serious Consideration of Nuclear Use
Segmented by Age (count; n=119)

	21-35	36-45	46-60	61+
Highly likely (75%-100% chance)		2	1	3
Very likely (60%-74% chance)	2	1	5	1
Quite possible (45%-59% chance)	3	5	17	5
Not very likely (25%-44% chance)	3	5	16	8
Improbable (10%-24% chance)	1	7	15	4
Highly unlikely (0%-9% chance)		2	10	3

When the Q2 response is segmented by **self-identified level of relative expertise** (1 = no familiarity with deterrence and strategic stability; 10 = subject matter expert on the topic), we find that:

- **93%** of respondents that selected *highly likely* or *very likely* self-identified their expertise as a 6 or above.

- Respondents who self-identified their expertise as a 6 or above most frequently selected *quite possible* (**27%**) or *not very likely* (**25%**).

- Respondents who self-identified their expertise as a 5 or below most frequently selected *not very likely* (**33%**) or *improbable* (**27%**).

Perceived Likelihood of US-PRC or US-RU Conflict With Serious Consideration of Nuclear Use
Segmented by Self-Identified Level of Relative Expertise (count; n=119)

Legend:
- ■ Self-identified relative expertise (1 = no familiarity)
- ■ Self-identified relative expertise (2-3)
- ■ Self-identified relative expertise (4-5)
- ■ Self-identified relative expertise (6-7)
- ■ Self-identified relative expertise (8-9)
- ■ Self-identified relative expertise (10 = subject matter expert)

Survey 1, Question 3: Segmented Response

The following slides in this section provide additional insight into the survey 1, question 3 response by detailing the respondent selections across demographic segmentations (affiliation, age, level of relative expertise).

Survey 1: Q3 Segmented Response (Affiliation)

When the Q3 response is segmented by affiliation, we find that:

- At least one respondent from every affiliation grouping except the USG selected *highly likely*.

- Perhaps surprisingly, just **5%** of USG respondents, **7%** of US military respondents, and **0%** of foreign military respondents selected *highly unlikely*.

- US military respondents most frequently selected *not very likely* (**37%**).

- USG respondents most frequently selected *not very likely* (**43%**) or *quite possible* (**38%**).

- Private industry and think tank respondents most frequently selected *highly unlikely* (**37%**).

- Academia respondents most frequently selected *not very likely* (**39%**).

Perceived Likelihood of US v. Regional State Conflict With Serious Consideration of Nuclear Use
Segmented by Affiliation (count; n=119)

Legend: ☐ Academia   ☐ US Military   ☐ USG   ☐ Private Industry, Think Tank   ☐ Foreign Military   ☐ Other

Survey 1: Q3 Segmented Response (Age)

When the Q3 response is segmented by age, we find that:

- At least one respondent from all age groupings except 21-35 selected *highly likely*.

- Respondents age 21-35 most frequently selected *not very likely* (**56%**).

  - Respondents age 36-45 most frequently selected *improbable* (**32%**) or *not very likely* (**23%**).

- Respondents age 46-60 most frequently selected *not very likely* (**31%**) or *quite possible* (**25%**).

  - Respondents age 61+ most frequently selected *not very likely* (**46%**).

Perceived Likelihood of US v. Regional State Conflict With Serious Consideration of Nuclear Use
Segmented by Age (count; n=119)

Survey 1: Q3 Segmented Response (Self-Identified Relative Expertise)

When the Q2 response is segmented by **self-identified level of relative expertise** (1 = no familiarity with deterrence and strategic stability; 10 = subject matter expert on the topic), we find that:

- **94%** of respondents that selected *highly likely* or *very likely* self-identified their expertise as a 6 or above.

- Respondents who self-identified their expertise as a 6 or above most frequently selected *not very likely* (**33%**).

- Respondents who self-identified their expertise as a 5 or below also most frequently selected *not very likely* (**40%**).

Perceived Likelihood of US v. Regional State Conflict With Serious Consideration of Nuclear Use
Segmented by Self-Identified Level of Relative Expertise (count; n=119)

Legend:
- Self-identified relative expertise (1 = no familiarity)
- Self-identified relative expertise (2-3)
- Self-identified relative expertise (4-5)
- Self-identified relative expertise (6-7)
- Self-identified relative expertise (8-9)
- Self-identified relative expertise (10 = subject matter expert)