


# **Caveat Emptor: The Pros and Cons of Strategic Culture as an Analytical Concept**

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
## N of hits in Google Scholar referencing "strategic culture"



# N of hits in CNKI articles referencing “strategic culture”

📌 Data Sources: Total Number of Articles: 12677 Piece; Search query: (全文='战略文化' or 全文='戰略文化'); Search Range: 中文文献。

## General Trend Analysis



# Four generations of strategic culture research

## 1st generation (1970s-1980s)

definition: "modes of thought and action with respect to force" that resulted in a unique set of "dominant national beliefs" with respect to strategic choices.

problems: everything explained strategic culture, unfalsifiable, prone to stereotyping

## 2nd generation (1980s)

definition: widely available orientations to violence in order to legitimately use violence against putative enemies

problems: SC was a political justification for strategic choice, not an explanation

## 3rd generation (1990s)

definition: taken-for-granted concepts on the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs that establish a strategic preference ranking that seem uniquely realistic and efficacious

problems: focused on grand strategy, SC as an explanatory variable not a context

## 4th generation (2000s-)


definition: shared beliefs about collective identity that defines threats, role of military in providing security, operational concepts; expands to non-great powers, non-state actors; possibilities of change in SC


problems: too much eclecticism; elements of all previous generations; persists in focusing on national level SC, though acknowledges role of sub-SCs


**But, shared skepticism of rationalist, realist theories about strategic choice**

# **The central paradigm of a strategic culture**


taken-for-granted concepts on the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs that establish a strategic preference ranking that seems uniquely realistic and efficacious

















## Strategic cultural artifacts

- metaphors (“peace genes” — 和平基因)
- analogies (e.g Munich, Vietnam, ‘century of humiliation’)
- cause-effect statements that are consistently present (e.g. taken for granted axioms — “if you want peace prepare for war” “with sufficient preparation there will be no catastrophe (有备无患)
- cause-effect statements that are consistently missing (revealing the ignored, the unsaid, habitual)

# Strategic cultural as an independent variable

- It is bad analysis to assume a factor explains an outcome without testing it against other factors
- Why might SC exist but not explain behavior?
  - disconnect between SC and actions (organizational SOPs, domestic opposition, leadership personalities, adversary's actions)
  - SC might change due to socialization or rise of alternative power sources
  - competitive SCs within a single country

# Elements of different strategic cultures in China

- hyper-militaristic
  - conflict ubiquitous and zero-sum
    - Maoism - struggle, martial spirit
    - Leninism - threats of ideological contamination
    - ethno-national stereotypes of Self and Other (predicts to conflict)
- more standard realpolitik SC
  - conflicts of national interest, elements of shared interest
  - force and institutions to defend sovereignty
- liberal internationalist-oriented
  - development generally positive-sum
  - economic interdependence can regulate conflict
  - multilateral institutions can regulate conflict

# Strategic culture: Pros

- treats the realm of strategy as having cultural properties (like religion, ideology)
  - deeply ingrained, sticky, taken-for-granted, habituated concepts and ranked preferences over behavior
- a check on mirror imaging
- self-awareness about your own unquestioned, habituated ways of answering the central paradigm questions

## Strategic culture: Cons

- the opposite problem to “mirror imaging” — “maximum difference imaging”
  - stereotyping of Other, blind essentialization of Self
- US-China relationship may be especially prone to maximum difference imaging
  - common US stereotype of “Chinese”
    - excel at long-term strategic thinking, deception, due to tradition of non-linear thinking
      - Kissinger and ‘weiqi’/Go
  - common PRC stereotype of “Americans” as hegemonist, and common self-stereotype as inherently peaceful



## How to reduce the 'cons'?

- being aware of the possibility of multiple SCs within one society
- being aware that the dominant SC in another country can change
- being aware that the dominant SC in another country may be similar to your own.
- avoiding national names to describe a SC.
  - e.g. at this point in time, PRC decision-makers have a type X strategic culture (or SCs) NOT Chinese strategic culture is X