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for Aerospace Studies



Combined-Effects Competition & Warfare: Strategies from China and Russia

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Problem: Our Strategy Language is too Restrictive

Democracies need “combinable effects” beyond coercion theory


More options than these three general effects:

Coercive deterrence and Coercive compellence
via denial and punishment, and Brute force

Why? Authoritarians wage all-effect, all-domain warfare while we restrict ours to “when deterrence fails”


↑ of violence

Solution: expanded language:





Combined Effects are not new



There are no more than five cardinal notes, yet in combination, they produce more sounds than could possibly be heard;




There are no more than five cardinal colors, yet in combination, they produce more shades and hues than could possibly be seen;

There are no more than five cardinal tastes, yet in combination, they produce more flavors than could possibly be tasted.



For gaining strategic advantage in battle, there are no more than 'surprise' and 'straightforward' operations, yet in combination, they produce inexhaustible possibilities. 孙子






How to Design Combined Effects?

**THREE
BASIC
QUESTIONS**

Confront / *cooperate* using **psychological - physical** activities on Will & Capability targets for preventative or causative effects






Examples of Activities

Confront / *cooperate* using psychological - physical activities on Will & Capability targets for **preventative** or **causative** effects

Confrontational
[Cooperative]





PRC Combined Effects

diplomatic - d
informational- i
military - m
economic - e
social - s

Deter Dt – Compel Cp
Dissuade Ds – Persuade P
Defend Df – Coerce Cr
Secure S – Induce I





PRC Combined Effects—Basic Effects, Types & Targets

diplomatic - d
informational- i
military - m
economic - e
social - s

Deter Dt – Compel Cp
Dissuade Ds – Persuade P
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PATTERN?
Coercive
Inducement

s i / Cp m Cr d P

USSR
1966-1976

m Dt Df i P Cp

USSR
1960-1989

d / m Cr

Pakistan
1965

d e s Ds m Dt d i s P e / m e Cr

Japan (Senkaku),
US
1970's—

d / m Cr

India
1950's 1962

m Cr d Cp e / s Cp

Tibet
1950 1965

i Cp m Cr

Taiwan (Tachen), US
1950

m Cr d P ... d Ds e /

Burma, Myanmar
1955 1960 1988-2000

m Cr d P

India
1965

d i e s P m Dt m e / Cr

Taiwan, US
1996 —

m Cr Df s P Cp

Vietnam
1978-1979

e Cp d m Cr

RP, US
1992 —

m / Cr Df

Vietnam (Paracel)
1974

e / d m e s Cr Pac Is.
2006

d S m Cr Df e /

SCS Claimants
2017 —

e / m Cr d Cp

Vietnam (Spratly)
1980's 1992




Attributes of PRC Combined Effects

diplo - d
info - i
mil - m
econ - e
soc - s

Deter Dt – Compel Cp
Dissuade Ds – Persuade P
Defend Df – Coerce Cr
Secure S – Induce I

- Re-expansion of dynastic China’s imperial boundaries
- Lawfare, Exclusionist Regional Organizations, Narrative Warfare (NW)
 - NW interprets: the *meaning* of events, Chinese *identity*, and selective *content* as revealed truth; *structures* that as messages and themes to fit audiences
- Overt nth-gen conventional and covert nuclear buildups (until parity)
- End-state: CPC-defined “Common Community of Destiny”
- Militarizes and commercializes seized territories; exploits competitors with trade/finance-led authoritarian pol-mil influence
- Many comply: UN Human Rights Council vote, Oct ‘22



The Economist




PRC in SCS v Other Claimants: “Coercive-Compellent Security, Inducement & Defense”

diplo – d
 info – i
 mil – m
 econ – e
 soc – s

m Cr d S Cp e I m Df

Deter Dt – Compel Cp
 Dissuade Ds – Persuade P
 Defend Df – Coerce Cr
 Secure S – Induce I



dimensions elements	Cooperative-Confrontational		Physical-Psychological		Preventive-Causative	
	<u>Induce</u>	<i>“Secure”</i>	<u>Coerce</u>	<u>Compel</u>	<u>Defend</u>	<u>Induce</u> <u>Coerce</u>
Ends	develop territory	establish sovereignty	seize territory	claim territory	block access	annex territory
Ways	free trade zone	nationalize energy	occupation	lawfare	control points	proxy governance
Means	no-tax incentive	control assets	civ-mil hybrid	rule <i>by</i> law	cyber air sea land	bribes, coercion

Compare to coercion theory’s language:
 coercive compellence and coercive deterrence.



diplo – d
 info – i
 mil – m
 econ – e
 SOC – S

Rus v Ukraine 2014 - 2021


Deter Dt – Compel Cp
 Dissuade Ds – Persuade P
 Defend Df – Coerce Cr
 Secure S – Induce I

Rus Fed: i P Ds Cp e / d i S m Cr

UKR v Rus: i Cp e Cr d Cp m Df Cr

NATO/EU v Rus: e Cr d Dt i Ds

“Compellent Coercion”



Dimensions Elements	Cooperative-Confrontational		Physical-Psychological		Preventive-Causative	
	<u>Persuade</u> Dissuade	<u>Compel</u>	<u>Coerce</u>	<u>Compel</u>	Secure	<u>Coerce</u> <u>Induce</u>
Ends plus Supporting Effects	Gain active support of ethnic Russians	Weaken Ukrainian government influence / resolve	Territorial annexation of Crimea and Donbas	Successful reflexive control against Int'l, RF, Ukraine	Minimize US, EU, NATO help for Ukraine	Maximize unofficial and deniable military support to Donbas
Ways	Narratives: “Return to Russia,” “things are better here”	Narratives: “Ukrainians hate you,” “Ukraine is not a country”	Fast surprise operations in Crimea and Donbas	Narratives: “Peaceful and popular,” “our business,” referendum	Energy blackmail, highlight NATO/EU “aggression”	Wagner Group, “volunteers,” clandestine weapons deliveries
Means	Technology + Interpersonal focus on patriotism, grievances	Technology + Interpersonal focus on patriotism, grievances	Little Green Men, proxies, insiders, use/threat of military force	social media, official media, FSB/GRU, “Cyber Cossacks”	social media, official media, FSB/GRU, “Cyber Cossacks”	cash to troop/family, perquisites, enhanced training and weapons



Ukraine 2022 -


Rus Fed: i P Ds Cp e / d i S Df m e s Cr

Differences from previous slide are underlined

UKR: m i Df Cp Cr d e Cp

NATO/EU: e Cr d Dt i Ds
m Df Dt Cp Cr

“Coercion” becomes Coercive Defense



Dimensions Elements	Cooperative-Confrontational <i>Persuade Dissuade</i>		Physical-Psychological <i>Coerce Compel</i>		Preventive-Causative <i>Secure Defend Coerce Induce</i>	
Ends plus Supporting Effects	Gain active support of ethnic Russians	Weaken Ukrainian government influence / resolve	Conquer Ukraine (fallback: annex four oblasts)	Successful portrayal of invasion as “anti-Nazi” spec mil op	Minimize US, EU, NATO, Int’l help for Ukraine	Maximize all military means to conquer Ukraine
Ways	Narratives: “Return to Russia,” “things are better here”	Narratives: “Ukrainians hate Rus,” “Ukraine is not a country”	<u>Nuc threats, new government, annexation</u>	Narratives: “Ukrainian fascists,” “abused Russians”	Energy blackmail, highlight NATO/EU “aggression”	Wagner Group, “volunteers,” <u>overt</u> weapons deliveries
Means	Technology + Interpersonal focus on patriotism, grievances	Technology + Interpersonal focus on patriotism, grievances	<u>RF military, proxies, insiders, expansion of conv. weapons</u>	social media, official media, FSB/GRU, “Cyber Cossacks”	social media, official media, FSB/GRU, “Cyber Cossacks”	cash to troop/family, perquisites, <u>financial confiscations, mass conscription</u>



Combined-Effects Competition and Warfare:

A Question of World Order and Values: when is coercion the difference between the two and when is it foundational to both?




- Simultaneous confrontation and cooperation
- Combined effects > combined arms
- Concepts of influence > concepts of operations
- Require whole of government-plus collaboration

Concepts of influence:


Effects

Targets

Activities




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What's Next? 3-D-plus modeling, AI apps



Combined-
Effects
Competition
& Warfare:
Strategies
from China
and Russia



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