Alternative Ukrainian Future Trajectories: Implications for Russia and the West

Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) 1100 EDT/Washington DC time and 1700 CEST

Dr Graeme P. Herd 22 June 2023



Project Design

- AUG 22 Tasking by SACEUR/EUCOM Combatant Commander
- SEP Develop initial ideas
- OCT 22 JAN 23 4 virtual seminars
- FEB 1-week Workshop I (ICW PlgABw and BAKS) + virtual seminar
- MAR APR 2 virtual seminars
- MAY 1-day Workshop II (ICW PlgABw and BAKS) + virtual seminar
- MAY Presentation of mid-term results to stakeholders
- JUN Virtual seminars
- JUL Virtual seminar
- SEP 2-day Workshop III presentation of results



Scenario Overview

"When the war has ended..."



Pathways, Assumptions, Implications, Considerations

Protracted Conflict Characteristics

- Conflict continues
 - Combat operations with limited wins and manageable losses
 - \succ Attritional stalemate;
 - Continued suffering of civilians
- **RF** and **UKR** ability and will to fight and West support mantained

Assumes:

- Western support: sufficient for UKR defense but not victory;
- 2. Weak external UKR security guarantees vs strong belief UKR territorial integrity non-

negotiable;

3. UKR not capitulate; War Putinism as management tool.



- Long-term pathways:
 - UKR/RF "Victory" scenarios
 - "Frozen Conflict" scenario
 - "Negotiated Peace" scenario
- Implications:



- Further militarization of **RF/UKR** state and society
- Increased UKR dependence on NATO/EU but cohesion issues
- RF needs resources unlikely disrupt energy infastructure?



RF Victory Characteristics

- **RF** claims victory as
 - Maintain territorial control of
 - occupied territories
 - ➢ UKR military capitulation
 - Ongoing hybrid ops in rump UKR
- UKR unsustainable losses, military culmination
- Western fatigue, support for UKR diminished

Assumes:

RF has offensive ability and/or will to use tactical nuclear

strike?

- UKR surrenders/capitulate war not existential;
- 3. Victory declarative loser does

not decides when war over.





• Pathways



- Implications
 - UKR rump state imposed neutrality, foreign assistance dependent
 - **RF** has reestablished its great power position in Europe
 - West destabilized/delegitimised



UKR Victory Characteristics

- **UKR** battlefield dynamics/break through:
 - "De-occupy" 4 regions/Crimea -

liberation not reoccupation

- Restore state authority
- Resilience to RF ongoing hybrid operations
- **RF** unable/unwilling continue fighting culmination/capitulation;
- Western support for UKR sustained

Assumes:

- UKR "theory of sustainable victory" force structure with credible mix of capabilities to deter Russia;
- 2. RF regime change **not** lead to war end - scapegoat Putin/Shoigu ...
- 3. RF narrative shift: continue hybrid,
 stand-off missile attacks and
 reconstitute, regroup to Central front

and Global South ...





- Pathways Security guarantees & UKR domestic developments
 - "EU UKR" NATO fast-track integration

---- "Big ISR" democratic, nuclear, resilient, non-EU/NATO

"Illiberal UKR" resilience first, nuclear garrison state, martial law

- Implications
 - UKR agency restored, UKR-POL-LTU-ROU greater weight?
 - **RF** political collapse unlikely, regime change possible, increasing dependence on CHN very probable; 3rd Chechen war almost inevitable
 - West Liberal Order strengthened authoritarian axis weakened



Frozen Conflict Characteristics

- Attritional stalemate: high intensity conflict exhausted;
- Parties resort to irregular means of warfare and local de-facto ceasefires;
- RF and UKR "time out" to rebuild/reconstitute conventional combat capabilities.

Assumes:

- Western support: too little too
 late; RF cannot win; UKR cannot
 lose;
- RF quantity vs UKR quality equilibrium;
- 3. UKR domestic backing for war

costs (blood & treasure)

maintained despite increasing

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- UKR: NATO/EU accession diminished, relations deteriorate,
- RF: reconstitutes conventional combat capabilities;
- West: long-term support for UKR, but identity crisis



Negotiated Peace Characteristics

- Benefits of negotiated peace outweigh costs of war - "mutually hurting stalemate" - declining domestic support for war in RF and UKR;
- International initiatives for peaceful settlement - CHN pressure on RF; US pressure on UKR;
- "Enlarge the pie" territory, security guarantees, justice, reparations,

architecture ...

Assumes:

- Sufficient UKR/RF trust, principles of reciprocity and deterrence: demilitarized zones, 3rd party guarantees, peacekeeping, dispute resolution joint commissions, justice ...
- UKR attitude shift/psychology unthinkable becomes thinkable (Berlin 1944 vs 8 May 1945);
- 3. US-RF negotiation track Great Power compact
 - China brokered RF-UKR settlement; US
 engage RF re "post-Putin" (?) Euro-Atlantic
 Yalta-Potsdam II ...



Negotiated Peace Pathways and Implications



- > UKR partially restores statehood
- **RF** re-integration into new Euro-Atlantic security architecture
- West high political investment to ensure a new security architecture, concessions to RF







Scenario-specific Considerations

- **RF Victory** even minimalist definition, least likely and most destabilizing;
- UKR Victory predicated military breakthroughs, RF military defeat but most stable in longer term with security guarantees;
- Intermediate Scenarios inter-enabling, run in parallel, all beneficial for RF differences around extent and how:
 - Protracted Conflict most likely, Western material and psychological support

critical but reduces over time - misunderstandings and risks increase;

- Frozen Conflict in some areas (local ceasefires) and
- Negotiation while fighting/punch to negotiate/dictate to improve bargaining position vis-à-vis UKR/West and rally domestic support – hard to calculate.



- Euro-Atlantic West:
 - Power shift to East within NATO (POL, Baltics as a new center of gravity);
 - TUR focal hedging actor (facilitator, more assertive regional middle power);
 - US pressure on European allies to take primary responsibility for Eastern Flank defense (US priority focus in Asia-Pacific).
- Russia:
 - RF conventional capability reconstruction timeline critical;
 - Belarus nuclearization and creeping annexation;
 - "Wild Card": RF nuclear submarine catastrophe probability ("Kursk II") much higher – blame and escalation risks.



Discussion

RUSSIA' IMPERIAL STRATEGIC CULTURE AND PUTIN'S OPERATIONAL CODE: Explaining Change and Continuity in Russian Foreign and Security policy



Pathways





"Frozen Conflict" Pathway







