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Concepts of Influence Beyond Punishment and Denial: Combined Effect Analysis of China, Russia, and Iran

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Brief Review from 19 Apr 23 slide 1 of 2




# What's "Combined Effect" Strategy?


## Democracies need "combinable effects" beyond Coercion Theory

More options than:

Coercive Deterrence and Coercive Compellence via Denial and Punishment, and Brute Force

Why? Adversaries wage all-effect, all-domain warfare (PRC: "unrestricted warfare") while we restrict ours to "when deterrence fails"





Compare to coercion theory's language: coercive compellence and coercive deterrence.

But HOW do we expect the means and ways to achieve the ends? That's today's subject. PREV. PRESENTATION FOCUSED ON COMBINED EFFECTS— RESULTS OF MERGING THE ELEMENTS AND DIMENSIONS OF STRATEGY



- Introduce Concepts of Influence (COI) and compare examples across contemporary China, Russia, and Iran
  - A "concept of influence" explains how we expect an activity or task to interact with a target's will and capability for desired effects—how a strategy's ops *influence behavior*
  - Definitions of eight basic effects come from merging three strategy dimensions (preventcause, psychological-physical, cooperate-confront) with three strategy elements (ends, ways, and means)

#### THIS YIELDS DISTINCT, COMBINABLE EFFECTS-MORE ASSESSABLE AND COMPETITIVE

- Show examples of COI and Combined Effects (CE) across cases
  - Distribution of COI across 12 People's Republic of China (PRC)/16 Russian Federation (RF)/14 Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) cases
  - Distribution of CE in this sample



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
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Strategy Competes Armed by **Concepts of Influence** which explain HOW means and ways interact with targeted will and capability to achieve desired effects

Generally, confront / *cooperate* using **psychological** - **physical ACTIVITIES** on Will & Capability targets
for preventative or <u>causative</u> effects
Confrontational

Specifically, an **ACTIVITY** affects and is affected by a target's will or capability as we create effects





### Definitions: Concepts of Influence, Effects, and Examples

in *cooperative* contexts




(confrontational is next)

**Cooperative-Psychological Concepts of Influence**: assure will / enhance capability to *dissuade* or *persuade* 

*Dissuade*: use psych means in coop way to prevent beh

Ex: US objects to Turkey buying S-400 air defense by emphasizing common defense against RF ("defensive

Concepts of Influence beyond Punishment and Denial



**Figure 6.2** Concepts of influence and effects. This figure depicts the eight basic effects and sixteen concepts of influence. Each effect pairs with its means and ways that influence will and capability. For instance, the left forward quadrant shows the two effects, dissuade and deter, paired with four psychological-confrontational-preventive concepts of influence: assure will or enhance capability to dissuade; intimidate will or neutralize capability to deter.



persuasion") and no F-35 for Turkey
Persuade: use psych means in coop way to cause beh

Ex: Russia pitches S-400 as way to assert independence/get S-500 ("persuasive inducement")

#### Cooperative-Physical Concepts of Influence:

demonstrate will / exercise capability to secure or induce


Secure: use phys means in a coop way to prevent beh Ex: US secures Turk, Azeri & Georgian oil ag. dependence on RF via BTC pipeline ("induced security")

<u>Induce</u>: use phys means in coop way to cause beh Ex: Russia spts Azeri domestic crackdown on civil society to leverage contracts requiring RF/IRI approval of oil/gas sales to Europe and the use of RF pipelines ("coercive inducement")




### Definitions: Concepts of Influence, Effects, and Examples

in **confrontational** 





Concepts of Influence beyond Punishment and Denial



**Confrontational-Psychological Concepts of Influence**: intimidate will / neutralize capability to deter or <u>compel</u>

Deter: use psych means in a confront'l way to prevent beh Ex: PRC nuclear threats / PLA violate Taiwan territory instill fear to deter independence / compel unification (compellent deterrence)

<u>Compel</u>: use psych means in confront'l way to cause beh Ex: Iranian theocrats mobilize extremist beliefs and reduce support for dissidents by invoking divine authority to spread intolerant and victimization/hate-based narrative

**Confrontational-Physical Concepts of Influence**: Punish will / deny capability to defend or <u>coerce</u>


Defend: use phys means in a confront'l way to stop beh Ex: offensive & anti-tank, -sub, -aircraft, missile systems; counter-air, -land, -sea, -space; cyber activities to detect, attribute, attrit, destroy adversary capabilities / will

<u>Coerce</u>: using phys means in confront'l way to cause beh <u>Opportune & Planned Ex</u>'s: Russian Darkside attacks US infrastructure for ransom and, as an expedient proxy, RF indirectly coerces US restraint ag. intervention; RF invades Ukraine to break gov't will and eliminate capability to resist



**Summary of Definitions**: Concepts of Influence, Effects, and Examples in cooperative and confrontational contexts

Concepts of Influence beyond Punishment and Denial



**Cooperative-Psychological Concepts of Influence**: assure will / enhance capability to *dissuade* or *persuade* 

<sup>ical</sup> Cooperative-Physical Concepts of Influence: demonstrate will / exercise capability to secure or <u>induce</u>

**Confrontational-Psychological Concepts of Influence**: intimidate will / neutralize capability to deter or <u>compel</u>

#### Confrontational-Physical Concepts of Influence:

Punish will / deny capability to defend or coerce

**Figure 6.2** Concepts of influence and effects. This figure depicts the eight basic effects and sixteen concepts of influence. Each effect pairs with its means and ways that influence will and capability. For instance, the left forward quadrant shows the two effects, dissuade and deter, paired with four psychological-confrontational-preventive concepts of influence: assure will or enhance capability to dissuade; intimidate will or neutralize capability to deter.



- Introduce concepts of influence (COI) and compare examples across contemporary China, Russia, and Iran
  - A "concept of influence" explains how we expect an activity or task to interact with a target's will and capability for desired effects—how a strategy's ops will *influence* behavior.
  - Definitions of eight basic effects come from merging three strategy dimensions (prevent-cause, psych-phys, coop-confront) across three strategy elements (ends, ways, and means). This yields distinct and combinable effects, as we'll see in examples.
- Show COI examples across different domains and cases
  - Distribution of COI across 12 People's Republic of China (PRC)/16 Russian Federation (RF)/14 Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) cases
  - Distribution of combined effects in this sample



### Distribution of Concepts of Influence

 Table 11.2
 Concepts of influence in China, Russia, and Iran strategies

Octant Number and Type of Cooperation or Confrontation	Option to Influence Will or Capability	China	Russia	Iran
1: Cooperative Psychological to Cause (Persuade)	A: assure will	5	1	13
	B: enhance capability	0	1	0
2: Confrontational Psychological to Cause (Compel)	A: intimidate will	4	9	11
	B: neutralize capability	5	3	2
3: Cooperative Psychological to Prevent (Dissuade)	A: assure will	2	0	1
	B: enhance capability	0	0	0
4: Confrontational Psychological to Prevent (Deter)	A: intimidate will	2	4	3
	B: neutralize capability	1	6	2
5: Cooperative Physical to Cause (Induce)	A: demonstrate will	3	3	0
	B: exercise capability	6	4	0
6: Confrontational Physical to Cause (Coerce)	A: punish will	3	3	2
	B: deny capability	9	8	0
7: Cooperative Physical to Prevent (Secure)	A: demonstrate will	0	0	0
• •	B: exercise capability	0	0	0
8: Confrontational Physical to Prevent (Defend)	A: punish will	2	0	1
(Deterior)	B: deny capability	1	2	2

This compilation from chapters 7–9 compares concepts of influence locations in the combined effect framework (octants 1–8), dimensional types (cooperative-confrontational, physical-psychological, preventive-causative), an A or B option to influence will or capability, and number of occurrences or count.

#### **COI** Patterns

No instances of demonstrating will and exercising capability for an ally (absence of mutual commitment in PRC-Rus)

Most Common Concepts of Influence

- China: 35% is exercise or deny capability, more phys than psych
- Russia: 55% is intimidate will or neutralize or deny capability; more psych than phys
- Iran: 71% is assure or intimidate will; much more psych than phys

### **Distribution of Combined Effects**

e 11.1 Combined effect strategies from China, Russia, and Iran

C: China R: Russia I: Iran	Compel	Coerce	Deter	Induce	Defend	Persuade	Dissuade
cases	C 7	C 6	C 1	C 4	C 2	C 3	C 0
	R 12	R 9	R 5	R 7	R 0	R 2	R 0
Compel	I 11	13	I 3 C i1	Ι0	I 1	I 10	I 0
types	C d1 i4 e1 s3	C d1 i3 e1	R d1 i3 m1s2	C d1 i2 s3	C i1 s1	C i2 s2	
	R d4 i11 m4	s 3	Ii3 m1s1	R d2 i6e1 s2	I i1 s1	R i1 s1	
	e2 s4	R d3 i6 m4				I d2 i9 m1	
		e1 s3 I i3 s3				s8	
cases	C 6	C 10	C 1	С7	C 1	C 4	C1
	R 9	R 11	R 5	R 4	R 1	R 1	R 0
Coerce	13	I 3	I 0	Ι0	Ι0	13	Ι0
types	C d1 m6 s1	C m10	C m1 e1	C m7 s1 e1	C m1	C m4 e1	C m1 e1
	R d2 i7 m5	R d2 i9 m6	R i4 m3	R d1 i2 m1 s1	R i1	R m1	
	e1 s3 I i3 s3	e1 s3				I i3 s3	
cases	C 1	C 1	C 2	C 1	C 1	C 2	C 1
_	R 6	R 5	R 8	R 3	R 2	R 2	R 0
Deter	13	I 0	15	I 0	I 2	15	I 1
types	C m1	C m1	C m2	C m1	C m1	C m1	C m1
cases	C 4	C 6	C 1	C 7	C 1	C3	C2
	R7	R4	R 3	R 7	R 0	R1	R 0
Induce	10	Ι0	I 0	I 0	I 0	10	I 0
types	C i1 m1 e2	C d2 i1 e3	C e1	C d2 i1 m1 e4	C m1	C i1 m1 e1 s	1 C e2
	s1	s1	R d1 i2 m1 s1	s1		R e1	
	R d2 i6 e2 s1	R d1 i3 e1		R d2 i 6 e2 s1			
cases	C 2	C 1	C 1	C 1	C 2	C 2	C 0
	R 0	R1	R 2	R 0	R 2	R 0	R 0
Defend	I 1	I 0	I 2	I 0	I 3	I 2	I 1
types	C m2	C m1	C m1	m1	C m2	C m2	I i1 s
	I i1 s1	R i1	R i2 Id1i2 s1			Id1i2 s1	
cases	C3	C 4	C 2	C 3	C 2	C5	C 1
eubeb	R2	R1	R 2	R1	RO	R2	RO
Persuade	I 10	13	15	I 0	I 2	I 13	Ι0
types	C d3 i2 s 2	C d3 i2 s2	C d1 i2 s1	C d2 i1 s2	C i1 s1	C d3 i2 s2	C d1 i1 s
	R i2	R i1	R i2	R i1		R i2	
	I i10 m1 s8	I i3 s3	I d1 i5 m1 s2		I d1 i2 s1		
cases	C 0	C 1	C 1	C 1	C 0	C 1	C 2
	R 0	R 0	R 0	R 0	R 0	R 0	R 0
Dissuade	Ι0	I 0	I 1	Ι0	I 1	I 0	I 0
types		C d1 i1 e1	Cd1 e1 s1 I i1 s1	C d1 e1 s1	I i1 s1	C d1 i1 s1	C d2 e1 :

This compilation from chapters 7–9 displays (a) the number of times from each sample (China—12, Russia—16, Iran—14) that the effect in the column combines with the effect in the row and (b) the column effect's type (diplomatic, informational, military, economic, social) and frequency.

#### **CE Patterns**

> Combined Arms & Always On

#### Most Frequent Combined Effects

- Persuade and Compel (Iran-10)
- Compel and Coerce (Russia-9)
- Coerce and Induce (China-7)

Most Common Types (diplo, info, military, econ, social) of these CEs

- Iran: Persuasion-Compellence is info and social; religious authority cloaks Compellence as Persuasion
- Russia: no Persuasion; Compellence is info shaped by Coercion (info, then military) and Inducement (*kompromat*)
- China: Compellence is info and social, shaped by Coercion (military and para-military) and Inducement (econ); Coercion is military, Inducement sets conditions

Concepts of Influence Beyond Punishment and Denial: Combined Effect Analysis of China, Russia, and Iran





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