In June 2021, USSTRATCOM posed a series of questions to the Joint Staff J-39 Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) office regarding the implications of the increasing numbers, and expanding capabilities, of US nuclear adversaries, to include the integration of nuclear weapons into some of their operational concepts for future warfare. The request notes that Russia, China, and North Korea have devoted significant resources to modernizing their strategic forces, including developing theater-range, nuclear-capable delivery systems in violation of international agreements, which provide their national leaders with expanded options to threaten regional states and put US and allied targets at risk in ways that can confound US deterrent options. This is particularly true for deterrent options based on US threats to use strategic nuclear forces in response to the use of theater weapons. The request highlighted the need to better understand how the number of opponents and their range of capabilities influence, and potentially limit, USSTRATCOM’s and other Combatant Commands’ abilities to mitigate threats to US and ally security. 

Prioritized Questions

1. Does deterrence theory change if the US faces two nuclear-armed, near-peer competitors? If so, how? What are the impacts to strategy? If not, what impacts to strategy still exist in that scenario? What are the implications for US strategic defense, escalation control options, and the deterrent value of the nuclear triad? In a game theoretic approach, how can the three-body problem be applied to this scenario?
2. How do US competitors undermine US political and strategic regional objectives through strategies that leverage non-kinetic or informatized means as well as nuclear and non­nuclear weapons?
3. How should we model the risks to future US strategic deterrence? What are the indicators of potential failure of strategic deterrence, and how can these risks be best explained to the US Congress and the think tanks that inform their perceptions of the problems?
4. What political, economic, social, or other environmental factors, both internal and external to US nuclear competitors, might increase their costs of restraint and lead to crisis and/or conflict?

Project Overview

The SMA Team conducted a literature review, expert elicitations utilizing the Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa[1]) and the Survey for Eliciting Expert Knowledge (SEEK)[2] methodologies, a dedicated speaker series, and a modeling effort to address these questions. The work of the SMA team was augmented through collaboration with partners including Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Center for Global Security Research (CGSR), National Strategic Research Institute (NSRI) at the University of Nebraska, and experts from George Mason University, the Stimson Center, and the Brooking Institution. The effort began in July 2021 and concluded in January 2022 with a three-part panel series with the project researchers.

Lines of Effort

The following is the list of reports completed in support of this effort. Reports and events can be accessed via the links provided

*Reports without a link can be requested by emailing mariah.c.yager.ctr@mail.mil from a .mil or .gov email address

SMA held a speaker series to support the “Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure” effort. Links to the recorded events, when available, are below:

• 21 July 2021: Dr. Anna Peczeli (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) – Key Elements of the 2021 Nuclear Posture Review
• 27 July 2021: Ms. Egle Murauskaite (University of Maryland), Mr. Devin Ellis (University of Maryland) –Escalation Management in Gray Zone Crises: The Proxy Factor
• 2 September 2021: Mr. Benjamin W. Bahney (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) & Dr. Braden C. Soper (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) – The Delicate Balance of Survivability: New Insights from Game Theory on How Missile Defense and Counterforce Impact Strategic Stability and Deterrence
• 21 September 2021: Dr. Brandon Kirk Williams (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) – A Resilient Cyber Policy for the Indo-Pacific
• 29 September 2021: Dr. Vipin Narang (Frank Stanton Professor of Nuclear Security and Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) – The Challenges of Multipolar Deterrence: Theory and Evidence
• 30 November 2021: Dr. Anna Péczeli (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), Mr. Benjamin Bahney (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), Dr. Melanie Sisson (Brookings Institution) – Challenges to 21st Century Deterrence (Part I)
• 9 December 2021: Lt Gen (Ret) Robert Elder, PhD (George Mason University), Mr. James Siebens (Defense Strategy & Planning Program, Stimson Center), & Dr. Christopher Yeaw (National Strategic Research Institute, University of Nebraska) – Challenges to 21^st Century Deterrence (Part II)
• 7 January 2022: Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI) & Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI) – Challenges to 21^st Century Deterrence (Part III)