Author | Editor: Bragg, B. (NSI, Inc).
This paper reports the theoretical review and framework development conducted by the STRATCOM/J-5 “Concept and Analysis of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) Theory Team. It reports the theoretical review and framework development with two goals in mind:
The CANS project is intended to examine the utility of alternative analytic techniques for assessing nuclear force attributes and sufficiency under a variety of changed conditions. This report captures the essence of a continuing discussion rather than a final assessment of the problem space.
This effort is designed to inform debates in this topical area and to facilitate the related CANS modeling efforts that follow. It is important to note that, as with the entire CANS effort, the theory team was not intended to review or produce policy or force structure recommendations.
More than twenty years after the common dating of the “end” of the Cold War, US military planners and policy analysts continue to grapple with ways to conceptualize and analyze the sufficiency of our nuclear forces. Specifically, their ability to accomplish major policy goals in a multi-polar world where diverse actors – from “major powers” to those that have been all but disregarded – now constitute significant threats to US and allied interest. Not only is it unclear the extent to which traditional models of nuclear strategy still apply, but efforts to extend them run up against an expanded array of potential threats, types of actors, and foreseeable international environments.
The Concepts & Analysis of Nuclear Strategy (CANS) project undertaken for US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) was tasked to examine the utility of alternative analytic techniques for assessing nuclear force attributes and sufficiency under a variety of changed conditions. It was a nine-month effort during which major tasks were divided among three teams:
The following key questions were addressed by the Theory Team’s approach as well as the various deep dive efforts undertaken for the CANS project:
This report outlines the theoretical review and framework development conducted by the CANS Theory Team. The Theory Team Supporting Documents compiles individual pieces written by Theory Team members that focus on specific elements of the framework and their interrelationship. These documents capture the essence of a continuing discussion rather than final judgments, and are best viewed as a “living” product that reflects Theory Team discussions. Both have been refined and amended over the course of the project. The Framework Report and Supporting Documents were designed to inform debate in this topical area, and to enrich and facilitate the Analysis Team’s modeling efforts.
The Theory Team was charged with two goals: first, to frame the problem space surrounding the U.S. policy objectives of deterrence, assurance, defeat, strategic stability, and counter-proliferation in light of varying threats, international environments, and adversary types; second, to develop an intellectual framework within which the alternative analytic and modeling techniques might be evaluated.
It is important to note that, as with the entire CANS effort, the theory team was not intended to review or produce policy or force structure recommendations.
This report represents the Theory Team’s approach to mapping the scope of the nuclear strategy policy space. However, over the course of this effort it became clear to members of the Theory Team that this mapping process generated further questions, as well as answers. Even now, a number of outstanding issues and theoretical issues challenge our understanding of this problem space. Some of these are enumerated in the “Way Ahead” section at the end of this report.
The Framework Report is organized as follows: A broad view of the problem space associated with assessing nuclear force structure and posture – what the team has called the Problem Space Vortex – is introduced. In essence the Vortex imagines the complex collection of factors that define the space within which force posture and structure trade-offs and decisions must be made. This is a first step in articulating a credible, useful way of expressing the value of US military capabilities in deterring or defeating adversaries, assuring allies, maintaining strategic stability, and countering potential nuclear proliferation. This is followed by discussion of the 5-Dimensional intellectual framework that was used in this project for organizing and cataloguing alternative analytic approaches according to the types of contexts to which they apply. Each of the five dimensions–policy objective, actor type, threat, world “future”, and operation/conflict phase – is discussed individually and multiple models for thinking about the different dimensions are provided. The report concludes with an outline of the overall CANS project. This involved two major activities. The first built on the framework tables that are the culmination of this report (see page 23) to identify pertinent questions and the relevant analytic techniques for addressing them. Simultaneously, the Analysis Team – made up of USAF, USN and DNI war gamers, a George Mason University-led multi-modeling team, NSI decision analysis, and Monitor 360 Crowdsourcing Non-U.S. SME sub-teams — worked to produce “deep dive” examples, exercising these approaches specifically for the USSTRATCOM problem set.
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