This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.
This paper is structured around four key sections, each answering a core question. First,
what is the relationship between Russia’s core strategic goals and the foundations of Russian strategic deterrence? Second, how has Russian strategic nuclear thought evolved from the Stalinist era to the present and, third, how can Russia’s approach to deterrence be contextualized within Moscow’s larger strategic competition with the US? Fourth, how does Russia’s approach to deterrence in the context of the Ukraine war currently impact the ways in which the West engages Russia? The paper argues that western “calibrated escalation” support for Ukraine now poses greater risks regarding Russian collapse than “all-in” support to promote Ukrainian battle-field victories. The sooner Russia is defeated, the greater the chance of a controlled or “soft-landing” post-Putin power transition in Russia. The West needs to develop a theory of managing a defeated, weak, but not-yet-collapsed Russia.
This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.
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