Iraq: Coalition or Bilateral Approach?

Question (R6.3): What is most favorable for the stability and the future of Iraq after the defeat of Da’esh: continued presence of an international Coalition or normal state-to-state bilateral relations? If a Coalition is the preferred option, what could be the “unifying factor” for a post-OIR coalition in Iraq and what situations could exist/emerge to prevent/dissolve this unity?

Author | Editor: Jafri, A. (NSI, Inc).

Executive Summary

As the United States and its Coalition partners examine the situation in Iraq and Syria after a sustained military campaign against Da’esh, they face a significant inflection point regarding the nature of their engagement. In the United States, policymakers must decide whether continuing to work within the existing Coalition is preferable to normalizing the relationship between the United States and Iraq. The central question is whether the Coalition or a bilateral relationship would best ensure the region’s stability and secure Iraq’s future. A number of the respondents argued that continuing within the Coalition framework is preferable to pursuing a normalized bilateral relationship with Iraq. While there exist benefits and drawbacks of both relationships, it is important to examine the potential contributions and risks of each path for post-Da’esh stability in Iraq.

Working Within a Coalition

In the case of US engagement with Iraq, respondents generally preferred the prospect of continuing to work within the existing Coalition. The table displays selected responses from experts on questions related to coalition or bilateral relationships in general. Experts cited resource pooling as a significant benefit of continuing to work with the Coalition. Dr. Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy suggests that a coalition, including Iranian commercial partners such as Germany and France, could limit malevolent Iranian actions that run counter to Coalition interests. Dr. Nicholas O’Shaughnessy of the University of London also recognized that a coalition would serve as a capabilities multiplier and would be able to offer more collective military capabilities.

As already noted, Mr. Hamasaeed argues that any sincere effort to bring stability to Iraq must work beyond the just the military dimension. For this reason, he suggests that a coalition would be better equipped to handle a wider mission set. Ambassador James Jeffrey of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy also supported this point, noting that an expanded Coalition will also allow states whose polity may not support a “boots on the ground” engagement to contribute to the effort. Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler, of the University of Akron and Case Western Reserve argues that the United States can use help to develop the capacity of Iraqi security forces with a possible a second-order effect of preventing Iranian entities from filling that vacuum. He also believes a coalition effort would also be viewed more favorably and would be imminently more “sellable” to skeptical populations. Separately, leading the Coalition could give international legitimacy to the United States’ objectives in Iraq, according to Dr. Kimberly Kagan and Ms. Jennifer Cafarella of the Institute for the Study of War. They argue that maintaining the Coalition would give the United States more leverage in pursuing its policy objectives. They also suggest that the domestic climate in Iraq would not favor a long-term US military commitment absent a Coalition-style framework.

Continuing the Coalition effort would not come without some drawbacks. A concern shared by a number of experts was that organization, management, and maintenance of a coalition is a complex endeavor. To that point, each member of a coalition has its own risk tolerance and domestic political limitations. Therefore, a coalition effort to stabilize Iraq may be relatively more fragile and susceptible to rupture, particularly as the narrow goals of a battlefield victory against Da’esh become actualized (Cafarella, Kagan). Additionally, working within a coalition could also pose tactical challenges to the United States. Several experts1 argue that such an environment would limit the United States’ freedom of action. Specifically, a coalition could create conditions wherein the Iraqi government and its citizens fall victim to the costs associated with being perceived as a rentier state, namely the cycle of dependency that is triggered after the receipt of large amounts of foreign assistance, and the resultant stunted development of domestic political organizations.

Operating Within a Bilateral Context

Despite the elucidated benefits of continuing with the Coalition, some respondents suggested that a managed bilateral relationship was a clearer path to stability in Iraq. Mr. Hamasaeed suggested that a bilateral relationship could hasten reconciliation between the Kurdistan Revolutionary Government (KRG) and the Government of Iraq because fewer stakeholders involved may result in a smoother process. It might also increase freedom of action on the part of the United States (Cafarella, Jeffrey, Kagan). To that end, a bilateral relationship could allow partners to efficiently map resources to their areas of expertise and orient towards their strategic interests (Hamasaeed, O’Shaughnessy). The primacy of this sentiment was also echoed by Dr. Abdulaziz Sager of the Gulf Research Center who argued for the efficiency of a bilateral relationship. This context also creates conditions that are favorable for Arab partners. AMB Jeffrey notes that bilateralism offers a level of credibility with those who seek an open-ended US commitment in Iraq. Similarly, a bilateral relationship can help the United States fend off allegations of occupation if it is not permanently basing troops in country (Kaltenthaler). Bilateralism also allows for local institutions to mature, particularly when a main source of discontent (i.e., the very existence and presence of the coalition) is allayed (Meredith).

The drawbacks to a bilateral context remain significant. Such an environment could create even more space for Iran to operate according to their interests (Jeffrey, Kaltenthaler). There will be attendant political risks, and the sum of bilateral efforts would, by nature of its lessened capabilities, be outpaced by a coalition effort (Hamasaeed). Focusing on a purely bilateral effort would also risk marginalizing United States efforts (Jeffrey, Meredith). The United States also opens itself up to having to negotiate a new Status of Forces agreement, a process that has been fraught in the past (Cafarella, Jeffrey, Kagan). Furthermore, it also opens up the United States to the possibility of being made a scapegoat if progress is stalled or difficult to establish (Meredith).

Contributors

Ms. Jennifer Cafarella, Institute for the Study of War; Mr. Sarhang Hamasaeed, United States Institute of Peace; Ambassador James Jeffrey, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Kimberly Kagan, Institute for the Study of War; Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler, University of Akron & Case Western Reserve University; Dr. Michael Knights, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Ian McCulloh, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory; Dr. Spencer Meredith III, National Defense University; Dr. Nicholas O’ Shaughnessy, University of London; Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf Research Center; Mr. Mubin Shaikh, Independent Analyst

 

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