Towards a Framework for Dealing with Potential Unintended Consequences of Influence Activities

December 2011 No Comments

Towards a Framework for Dealing with Potential Unintended Consequences of Influence Activities

Authors | Editors: Ackerman, G. (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism); Asal, V. (University at Albany, State University of New York); Canna, S. (NSI, Inc.); Davis, P. (RAND and Pardee RAND Graduate School); DeRouen, K. (University of Alabama); Helfstein, S. (Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point); Knopf, J. (Naval Postgraduate School); McAdam, M. (University of California, Berkeley); Pate, A. (University of Maryland); Pinson, L. (SAIC); Rethemeyer, K. (University at Albany, State University of New York); Sawyer, J. (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism); Young, J. (American University)

Executive Summary

The purpose of this project was to gain a better understanding of how United States Government (USG) actions influence violent extremist organizations (VEOs). It is important to understand how actions taken by the government to suppress a VEO might result in negative, unforeseen consequences such as making a VEO stronger or increasing its public support.

The work conducted by the project team, coordinated by Dr. Scott Helfstein at the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, is one component of a larger effort to better understand how VEOs are, or can be, influenced. The overall Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations (I-VEO) effort was conducted by the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) Office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The SMA Office provides planning support to Commands with complex operational imperatives requiring multiagency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are not within core Service/Agency competency. Solutions and participants are sought across USG and beyond. SMA efforts are accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff (JS/J-3/DDGO) and executed by STRATCOM/J-9 and DDRE/ASD (R&E).

The project team included the following contributors.

• Dr. Gary Ackerman, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

• Dr. Victor Asal, University at Albany, State University of New York

• Dr. Paul K. Davis, RAND and Pardee RAND Graduate School

• Dr. Karl DeRouen, University of Alabama

• Dr. Scott Helfstein, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point

• Dr. Jeffrey Knopf, Naval Postgraduate School

• Ms. Melissa McAdam, University of California, Berkeley

• Dr. Amy Pate, University of Maryland

• Ms. Lauren Pinson, SAIC

• Dr. Karl Rethemeyer, University at Albany, State University of New York

• Dr. John Sawyer, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

• Dr. Joseph Young, American University

The objective of the I-VEO effort is to provide the Department of Defense (DoD) and its USG partners with a holistic understanding of intended and unintended effects of influencing violent extremist organizations that can be transferred to a usable analytic framework that inform decision-makers and planners. The resulting holistic analyses derived analytic confidence from the examination of sound theoretical knowledge, conceptual modeling, and testing in historical cases. The effort ran from February through October 2011.

The intended payoff of this project was a deeper, more reliable understanding of the secondary effects of U.S. government efforts to influence VEOs. The results of the I-VEO study will aid the Joint Staff and COCOMs at strategic and operational levels by providing a conceptual framework grounded in sound theoretical concepts and analyses (albeit, with large uncertainties). This report presents and integrates findings from portions of the overall project, namely: a review of theoretical hypotheses and the degree of empirical support that they enjoy; quantitative analysis of selected data relating to the hypotheses; new thinking on how to understand how influence works or fails to work; related models of human behavior; highlights from an integrative literature-based discussion of systemic theory; discussion of alternative approaches to both theory and empirical research; other sources of knowledge and insight; and implications for the body of knowledge.

For detailed information about any of the other core components, please contact Mr. Sam Rhem at Samuel.Rhem.ctr@js.pentagon.mil.

Conclusions

The results of this project do not produce an answer to the problem that the U.S. government and its allies face in incentivizing VEOs to abandon violence or punishing them for using violence and may be disappointing to some as a result. No amount of research or analysis can ensure that negative consequences will not arise from a given influence action. The costs and benefits of courses of action (COAs) must be weighed and this project hopefully provides some assistance to those responsible for assessing the range of consequences that arise from government action.

We hope that this project has made a useful contribution in compiling a list of (sometimes-contradictory) rules of thumb about how violent organizations act and react. The effort to synthesize and analyze data from a diverse set of fields that could pertain to violent actors helps identify different forces that might guide the response of influence targets, making it important to consider how different models of behavior could produce an array of outcomes. This may well be of use to the policymaking community tasked with assessing and making these difficult decisions. The military community already has a very sophisticated way to think through the utility of different actions, develop COAs, and adjudicate among them. This effort should fold into that process by raising questions about commonly held assumptions and providing rules of thumb for how violent actors behave.

In making decisions, the best one can expect is to 1) be informed about how similar actions have influenced similar groups, 2) be explicit about the how the actions actually trigger desired and undesired influence effects, and to 3) carefully think through how USG actions impact the target audience and other audiences. Ultimately, however, influencing VEOs is not a science. Actors and environments can be unpredictable. The most ideal course of action (COA) is one that produces the most good for the least negative consequences, recognizing that the cost-benefit is often a subjective assessment. No USG action will be free from negative consequences. The hope, however, is that those negative consequences will not be surprises, but rather events that are predicted, understood, and part of the planning assessment.