Gaming Gray Zone Tactics: Design Considerations for a Structured Strategic Game

February 2020 No Comments

“Gaming Gray Zone Tactics: Design Considerations for a Structured Strategic Game“

Speakers: Pettyjohn, S. (RAND); Wasser, R. (RAND)

Date: 25 February 2020

Speaker Session Preview

SMA hosted a speaker session presented by Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn (RAND) and Ms. Becca Wasser (RAND) as a part of its SMA EUCOM Speaker Series. Dr. Pettyjohn first stated that the gray zone is “more usefully conceptualized as a tactic rather than a phase in conflict.” This is in part because it is difficult to identify which actions fall into one phase versus another as Russia, for example, takes gray zone actions across the spectrum. She explained that framing the gray zone as a tactic can help NATO and the West develop more appropriate responses to particular events. There are different types of gray zone tactics, each of which require different responses. To address this issue, Dr. Pettyjohn and Ms. Wasser created a framework to distinguish some of Russia’s gray zone tactics from one another. Two distinct variables are important for distinguishing these tactics: violent versus non-violent intervention, and diffused versus focused targets. Everyday, non-violent tactics are employed to weaken the West and increase Russian influence, but it is unclear how or whether they will work. Diffuse, violent tactics implicitly involve the threat of violence and include Russian efforts to form ties with criminal and paramilitary organizations. Targeted, non-violent tactics leverage the results of “everyday” actions and are employed to achieve a specific near-term goals. Finally, aggressive and directed short-term tactics have a specific objective and involve the threat or actual use of force. Dr. Pettyjohn then stated that Russia’s ability to achieve its objectives through gray zone tactics is largely dependent on the vulnerability of the target country. This vulnerability can be indicated by state fragility and polarization. Next, Ms. Wasser advised that NATO compel, not deter, Russia to stop engaging in “everyday” gray zone tactics. NATO retaliatory threats against non-violent gray zone tactics lack credibility, however, NATO often cannot come to a decision about what constitutes a certain threshold for response or what that response would be. The attribution of gray zone tactics also isn’t sufficient enough to change Russian behavior, and doing so imposes costs on the West. Ms. Wasser advised that NATO improves the resiliency of target nations, which will reduce their vulnerability to Russian gray zone tactics. NATO can also impede Russian violent gray zone tactics through deterrence by denial and Russian non-violent gray zone tactics through supporting civilian organizations, which are best positioned to counter non-violent tactics. To conclude, Ms. Wasser stated that the West may be winning the gray zone competition without realizing it. She also stated that NATO should focus on strengthening conventional deterrence, and the West should not ignore or overreact to Russian gray zone tactics; the West should recommend a better course of action instead.