Evolution of Deterrent thinking in USSR and Russia: A Look through Military Reports

Authors: Dr. Asya Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Rosemary Avance (Oklahoma State University); Dr. Sumin Shin (Oklahoma State University)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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This comprehensive qualitative analysis examines the evolution of Russian articulations of deterrence by analyzing over 250 Russian military documents spanning from the Soviet era to the present. The research
identifies seven periods that reflect paradigmatic shifts in the intellectual discourse of Russian military strategists regarding deterrence. These periods are not rigidly defined but serve as markers for transformations in military thinking. The analysis is supported by insights from relevant academic
literature.

• The first period, from 1954 to 1959, witnessed a transformative phase as the Russian armed forces acquired nuclear weaponry, leading to significant shifts in perspectives on conflicts and military operations.
• The second period, from the 1960s to the 1970s, was characterized by a fervent nuclear arms race and a comprehensive restructuring of the Russian armed forces to balance the role of nuclear missile weaponry.
• The third period, from the 1970s to 1991, focused on attaining nuclear parity with potential adversaries and viewing strategic nuclear weapons primarily as tools for deterrence rather than actual weapons of combat.
• The fourth period, from the 1990s to the 2000s, explored the challenge of deterring conventional threats using nuclear weapons, particularly when Russia’s conventional capabilities were significantly inferior. The concept of de-escalation1 emerged as a strategic approach during this period.
• In the fifth period, from the 2000s to the 2010s, Russian military thinkers shifted their attention to strategic deterrence, which encompassed both nuclear and conventional capabilities to counterthreats of various natures.
• The sixth period, from the 2010s to the 2020s, introduced the concept of cross-domain deterrence, recognizing the limitations of nuclear deterrence and exploring a broader framework that includes non-nuclear and informational influence domains. The current emerging period, referred to as hybrid strategic deterrence, is characterized by Russia’s focus on countering pressure from the US through its military capabilities, collaboration with allies, and anticipation of emerging disruptive technologies. Hybrid strategic deterrence involves a range of implicit coercive measures to counter hybrid warfare, combining both forceful and non-forceful influences.

This project also investigates contrasting perspectives between Russia and the United States (and the West) regarding deterrence, according to Russian military documents. The US military organization is portrayed as aggressive and interventionist, while Russia is seen as peaceful. The US aims to maintain global dominance and the ability to launch nuclear strikes against countries that challenge its hegemony. On the other hand, Russian deterrence focuses on protecting national security rather than pursuing expansionist goals. Military theorists argue against large-scale reductions in nuclear weapons, suggesting that they encourage aggressive plans by the US and pose a threat to global security. Another point of contention is the purpose of strategic weapons, with one document asserting that US missile defense systems are not solely defensive but rather are hazardous components of offensive capabilities. Contrasts also arise in understandings of nuclear de-escalation, with the US shown as relying on conventional military superiority and the possibility of nuclear escalation if faced with deescalation. Additionally, Russian military theorists perceive the deployment of US missile defense systems as encirclement strategies targeting Russia and China, although this does not cause substantial concern in the US.

This research also addresses effective and ineffective deterrence from the Russian perspective. Russian military discussions place great emphasis on the effectiveness of deterrence, with a focus on nuclear status. Effective deterrence, according to texts, requires a clear understanding of red lines, the ability to respond with overwhelming losses to the aggressor, and the persuasiveness of determination to fulfill obligations. The role of nuclear weapons is seen as crucial for Russia, deterring both nuclear and conventional conflicts, preventing large-scale wars, and ensuring international stability. However, the development of precision weapons, information warfare, and new physical principles may reduce the role of nuclear deterrence in the future. Non-nuclear deterrence is also considered effective, with regional commands increasing flexibility, but proper political and diplomatic support is essential. Asymmetric responses are seen as valuable tools for deterrence. Ineffective deterrence challenges include limitations against major geopolitical centers, ineffectiveness in preventing conflicts and addressing new threats, and diminished effectiveness due to the deployment of US missile defense systems, which disrupt the strategic balance and risk catastrophe.

Overall, this analysis demonstrates the evolution of Russian understandings of deterrence and highlights the importance of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, as well as information warfare, in shaping Russia’s strategic thinking. It underscores the significance of adapting to changing geopolitical dynamics and technological advancements to maintain effective deterrence strategies.

This publication was released as part of the SMA project “21st Century Strategic Deterrence Frameworks.” (SDF) For more information regarding this project, please click here.