SMA hosted a speaker session with Ms. Egle Murauskaite (University of Maryland) and Mr. Devin Ellis (University of Maryland) as part of its SMA STRATCOM Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure Speaker Series.
This research, supported by the DoD’s Minerva Research Initiative, looked at International Crisis Behavioral Project data on how crises evolve over time. The team asked what do we understand from the data on the role that proxies (often violent non-state actors) have on determining the direction and outcome of a crisis; that is, does the use of a proxy escalate a conflict, make violence more likely, and/or shield the patron state from retribution. Mr. Ellis defined a proxy conflict as a state acting as a patron to a client and offering funding, training, support, and protection. A patron state is likely to support a proxy for two reasons: a) to gain a supplementary military force, and b) to avoid attribution and counter attacks from the defending state.
A crisis was defined as “when a state believes there is a challenge to an existential value.” Ms. Murauskaite stated that of the 369 crisis examined, most were triggered by violent actions. Furthermore, 88% of crisis initiated by proxies were triggered by violence. Proxies were also frequently more violent than their state counterparts. The defending state usually responded with an equal amount of force to which they were attacked, and violence would usually be responded to by violence. In conclusion, the use of military proxies increases the likelihood of a conflict becoming more violent. Also, the use of proxies shields the patron from retribution: however, the defender is more likely to target the patron if the proxy uses violence.
Note: We are aware that many government IT providers have blocked access to YouTube from government machines during the pandemic in response to bandwidth limitations. We recommend viewing the recording on YouTube from a non-government computer or listening to the audio file (below), if you are in this position.
Egle E. Murauskaite is a senior researcher and simulations designer for the ICONS Project with the University of Maryland. Presently based in Lithuania, she is responsible for high-level political-military crisis simulations in Europe, alongside academic research and government consulting projects. Murauskaite has been working with unconventional threats for the past eight years. She is the author of numerous academic publications, book chapters, op-eds, and professional blog posts, and regularly speaks on security issues in the media.
Devin Ellis is a senior faculty specialist in the College of Behavioral and Social Sciences at the University of Maryland, and the Director of the ICONS Project — a simulation research and training program affiliated with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). He is also a Faculty Affiliate of the university’s Applied Research Laboratory for Intelligence and Security (ARLIS). Ellis’ work focuses on helping organizations use simulation to study and plan for complex problems, train employees, and rehearse for crises. He is a policy analyst by training, specializing in East Asian security issues and crisis management. Ellis has designed or consulted on simulation projects for USAID, the World Bank, the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), DHS, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Brookings Institution, CSIS, National Defense University, the Kennedy School of Government, the Fletcher School of Diplomacy, Ford Motor Co., Swire, Michelin, ABInBev, and various parts of DOD including the Joint Staff, OSD, PACOM, EUCOM, SOCOM and CENTCOM. Over the past decade he has been privileged to participate in several groundbreaking Track II dialogues on U.S.-China crisis management. Ellis is an external reviewer for the interdisciplinary journal Simulation & Gaming, and serves as associate editor of the PAXsims blog.
This speaker session supported SMA’s Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure project page.
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