GCC Nations: Impediments to Cooperation

July 2017 No Comments

Question (R4.8): Are there impediments to cooperation amongst GCC nations that reduce their effectiveness towards undesirable or adverse regional issues? If so, how could impediments be overcome?

Author | Editor: Aviles, W. (NSI, Inc.).

Executive Summary

At the time of the writing of this executive summary, the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) has experienced a diplomatic crisis with three GCC member states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain) cutting diplomatic ties with Qatar (another GCC member state) and remaining GCC members (Kuwait and Oman) attempting to mediate. This event begs the discussion of factors and dynamics that obstruct or cripple cohesion among GCC nations and possible solutions to overcome such obstacles. A thorough understanding of the threats facing the GCC and more specifically, their limitations in responding to them, are crucial to attaining a vigorous and holistic comprehension of the Gulf region.

No SMA contributor contests that there are significant impediments to GCC cooperation. Furthermore, there are no significant disagreements among the authors; rather, each author emphasizes different points of contention and solution. Caban, Feierstein, Ulrichsen, and Sager all agree that the GCC is not a monolithic enterprise; instead, each nation is subject to varied and often competing interests (e.g., economic resources, international political capital, territory etc.). Serwer then further elaborates, “[GCC states] need to all hang together or they’ll all hang separately,” and all authors agree, or at least hint, that effective cooperation among GCC members would benefit each nation domestically and/or internationally. Disagreements and conflicts within the GCC go back decades, and Ulrichsen contends that the formation of the GCC as an institution was completed in such a poor and hasty manner that internal friction was inevitable from the start. The PiX Team provides an overview of the structure of the GCC and explains the purpose and functions of the GCC that span from a forum for joint infrastructure projects to a high level political assembly.

Iran, Foreign Policy, and Political Islam

Continuing the criticism of the design of the GCC, Ulrichsen points out that “the GCC has no explicit treaty- based foreign policy-making power as its founding charter called only for a coordination of foreign policy,” and the rest of the authors all agree that disagreements over foreign policy are a significant source of division within the GCC. Evidence of this division is exemplified by all authors agreeing that Iran is source of attenuation of unity among the GCC (e.g., through proxy conflicts in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, as well as encroaching on territory in the Gulf). Feierstein and Sager posit that GCC members cannot come to a unified response to Iranian antagonism for a variety of reasons, ranging from various economic interest in Qatar, to Shia extremism in Bahrain and Kuwait. Feierstein provides a useful model of a spectrum with Saudi Arabia on the extreme anti-Iranian side and Oman on the more Iranian friendly side, with the remaining GCC states in between. This spectrum is evident in the current Qatari diplomatic crisis where Feierstein has contended prior to the rift that Iran is exploiting an opportunity in friendlier Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar to sow discord within the GCC and “isolate the Saudis.”

Iran manifests roadblocks to GCC cooperation through the sectarian conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and most prominently, Yemen; however, these flashpoints of conflict can also be viewed through the mechanism of radical/political Islam, through which Iran manipulates them. In this context, the variance among GCC nations in geographical location, socio-economic factors, religious populations and others, present the cracks in GCC cooperation that Iran is able to exacerbate—all to the detriment of the GCC’s ability to produce and implement a coherent and unified foreign policy. The role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Yemen is a source of strife among GCC states where the Saudis and Emiratis both “opposed the rise of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood” in opposition to Qatar (Feierstein). And yet in Yemen, the UAE is far more opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood presence than Saudi Arabia (Ulrichsen). Political Islam is particularly concerning to GCC nations that must balance religious extremism with the legitimacy granted by religious institutions to the monarchies. Serwer and Caban recognize the divergence of domestic pressures of GCC nations that in turn deviate the interests of GCC nations from one another; different problems necessitate different solutions that make for weak and compromised policies on the international level.

Military Institutions and Security Structures

GCC nations face a diverse set of geopolitical and socio-economic challenges; foremost among them are concerns about security. Given the internal turmoil of sectarianism and external threat of Iran, coupled with the threat of terrorism that plagues GCC nations on all levels, the need for a cogent and reactive security force is paramount for Gulf regimes. Caban argues that GCC nations are “deficient of professional military forces [which] indicates an inability to perform joint operations; because [they] have limited and ad hoc professional military forces, they have insufficient capacity to work together effectively to thwart undesirable or adverse regional issues.” Caban goes on to describe that many GCC nations have a high ratio of migrant workers to “natural-born citizens vested in the sovereignty of the homeland,” which make recruitment difficult and outsourcing security forces necessary. Efforts by GCC nations to have their officers trained and educated outside the Gulf are being explored by the UAE, as well as hiring foreign military professionals, but there are adverse political and logistical consequences still unfolding as a result of these measures (Caban).

Feierstein agrees with Caban that an inability to perform joint operations is a monumental issue facing GCC nations, but instead emphasizes the root of the problem in the political structures of cooperation among member states. Feierstein notes that the disagreements of member states over the brevity of various threats can be explained through a political perspective. Feierstein argues, “GCC cooperation works best when the issues are apolitical and technocratic in nature, and can be framed in a way that benefits rather than challenges the power and authority of individual states,” and cites historical examples of such cooperation.

Solutions/Overcoming Challenges

Each author has proposed solutions to the challenges they each respectively highlighted in their contribution, again, with a high degree of concurrence. Sager asserts that a tenacious and unambiguous US policy in the region is critical to GCC success. Feierstein concurs with Sager’s point of the need for clear US policy in the region, but explicitly stresses Iranian issues as an area of focus. Feierstein also suggests that US must not try to force policy onto the GCC, but rather to cultivate it from within, so as to not feed the propaganda of Gulf regime submission to Western governments. Ulrichsen maintains that political and structural reform of the GCC would be helpful, and the GCC as an organization should focus on ameliorating “administrative mechanisms and less on big-ticket items that are perceived to impinge on sovereignty.” In regards to the problems facing GCC security forces that Caban describes in detail, “Developing a program for military officers at the war colleges and a series of annual military exercises would bring together GCC- only armed forces to promote greater familiarity and the development of common doctrine” (Feierstein).

Contributing Authors

William Cabán (Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, Marine Corps University), Gerald Feierstein (Middle East Institute), PiX Team (Tesla Government Services), Abdulaziz Sager (Gulf Research Institute), Daniel Serwer (Middle East Institute), Kristian Coates Ulrichsen (Rice University)