ISIL’s Intangible Influences and Resolve

September 2015 No Comments

ISIL Influence and Resolve.

Author | Editor: Astorino-Coutois, A. & Canna, S. (NSI, Inc).

During FY 2014, the SOCCENT Commander requested a short-term effort to understand the psychological, ideological, narrative, emotional, cultural, and inspirational (“intangible”) nature of ISIL. As shown below, the SMA1 team really addressed two related questions: “What makes ISIL attractive?” or how has the idea or ideology of ISIL gained purchase with different demographics; and “What makes ISIL successful?” or which of the organization’s characteristics and which of the tactics it has employed account for its push across Syria and Iraq.

The effort produced both high-level results and detailed analyses of the factors contributing to each question. The central finding was this: While military action might degrade or defeat factors that make ISIL successful, it cannot overcome what makes ISIL’s message and idea attractive. The complete set of products from the effort is available by request from Mr. Sam Rhem in the SMA office (samuel.d.rhem.ctr@mail.mil).

For the follow-on effort, the SOCCENT Commander has requested an effort to address the following question: Given that when the dust settles and some degree of durable stability has been established in the Middle East, it will no longer look as it did prior to the start of the Syrian civil war and the rise of ISIL; therefore, the question is what will the Middle East look like, and how is it likely to operate both within its own regional community and in interactions with external powers and actors, after the ISIL threat has been defeated and the Syrian Civil War has come to an end.

The articles in this white paper summarize work on going and completed by different SMA-affiliated teams in response to this request. The focus is primarily on one of the regional actors: ISIL and the nature of that organization’s interests, influence capabilities, support, and resolve. There has not yet been an effort to consolidate the insights presented by each of the pieces. Rather, they are presented as stand-alones from which analysts and practitioners might gain insight. A final project report including additional regional actors will be available from the SMA office in December 2015.

The question posed for follow-on SMA support to the SOCCENT Commander broadens the look at ISIL undertaken during the first phase, and considers the group in the context of regional dynamics. Essentially, this is a question about the relations embedded in the dynamic, multi-actor system that comprises the Middle East region, and will determine the outcome of regional events. Figure 2 represents the analytic model that serves as the framework for the larger study. It posits that how the system evolves over time is a function of the interests at stake for the actors, their ability to pursue those interests, and the alignment of interests between actors.

An individual actor’s ability to influence the outcome of regional events is a function of three resource factors: its capability, popular support, and resolve, relative to other actors in the system. However, how actors chose to influence the course of regional events will be a function of how well their interests can be met by specific event outcomes. We assume that actors will prefer outcomes that protect or further their interests.

The alignment of interests between actors will determine the set of potential outcomes for any particular regional or sub-regional event. However, common interests or alignments between actors may vary across events or conflicts; we cannot assume that a preference for the same outcome in one event will result in shared interests among the same actors in other events. While the alignment of actor interests determines possible outcomes, the distribution of actor capabilities, popular support, and leadership resolve across those outcomes will govern the likelihood that an outcome will emerge. The framework also accounts for the potential effects of exogenous factors on the region (such as environmental or demographic changes) and how these may influence the individual actors.

Analytic Framework

Evaluation of the range of possible futures that the region may see begins with identifying the relevant set of actors. The framework includes five types of actors:

Status quo (ante bellum) regimes – current state governments within recognized borders (for example, the monarchy in Saudi Arabia, the elected parliament in Turkey);
Parasitic organizations – such as trans-national criminal organizations that operate in the area;
Government opponents – challengers to the status quo from within. This includes opposition parties or groups who are opposed to a current government but seek change through existing institutions, rather than regime change (e.g., the Iraqi List in Iraq; Labour in Israel);
Regime opponents – groups fighting for significant change in the type of regime or political system either within or across existing borders (e.g., ISIL, Free Syrian Army); and,
Population groups – many of whom have limited political or ideological interests but seek mainly to survive in the midst of the conflict ranging around them.

The ability of each actor to influence the evolution of the system toward different outcomes is a function of its relative capability, popular support, and resolve.

Capability. There are many types of capabilities that an actor might use to achieve its ends in a conflict. These include: material resources and coercive capabilities (e.g., money, weapons); non-physical means of influence or coercion (such as salient narratives and persuasive messages); a reputation for horrific violence; possession of territory; and alliances including external funding sources and the allegiance of local elites. Importantly not all influence capabilities are equally relevant to all conflicts or objectives. For example, the United States is certainly the world’s greatest military power, but may not have the non-physical influence capabilities needed to achieve its desired ends. Similarly, ISIL may have significant ability to control populations through the threat of horrific violence, but lack the organizational capability needed to occupy and control large population areas.

Popular Support. Some degree of popular support for or acquiescence to the programs or policies of an organization or government can be a critical enabler. Likewise, a population that does not see a leadership as legitimate or is at odds with its priorities can pose a significant barrier to action and place limits on the resolve of a government to sustain certain actions.

Resolve. Finally, a government or organization’s willingness or need to fight to the bitter end for an objective or principle has been shown to a deciding factor in achieving one’s preferred outcome in a conflict—even when capabilities are lacking.

The framework assumes that actors are motivated to protect and further their interests. To determine how an actor will apply its ability (capability, popular support, and resolve) to an event or conflict, therefore, we need to understand which of that actor’s interests are at stake in the context of a particular event or conflict. Once we identify those actor interests, they can be linked to a specific outcome, or outcomes, where we can then construct a map that specifies the sub-set of actors that prefer different outcomes and estimate the total resources and resolve behind each outcome. This is a critical element of the framework, as, by definition, the outcomes of conflicts are not the result of a single actor’s actions or desires, but are a product of the interactions of opponents. In other words, the forces that determine one or another future reflect the confluences of actors’ capabilities, resolve, and popular support. How stable that outcome is likely to be, however, will be determined not so much by the resources of those who support it, but the resources of those who oppose it. By considering the resources of the actors whose interests are blocked or destroyed by a particular outcome, we can also estimate the potential durability of a particular outcome. In effect, the framework posits that the outcome of an event will be a function of the preferences of the subset of actors with the greatest resources, while the durability of that outcome will be determined by the resources of those whose interests remain unfulfilled.

Contributing Authors

Astorino-Courtois, A. (NSI), Barr, N. (Valens Global), Bedig, A. (Monitor-360), Canna, S. (NSI), Chinn, J. (Texas A&M), Eyre, D. (System of Systems Analysis Corps), Gartenstein-Ross, D. (Valens Global), Jensen, B. (Marine Corps University), Kluver, R. (Texas A&M), Kuznar, L. (Indiana University, Purdue University, Fort Wayne), Ligon, G. (University of Nebraska, Omaha), Miles, D. (TRADOC G-27 TBOC), Moreng, B. (Valens Global), Moreno, C. (TRADOC G-27 TBOC), Munch, R. (TRADOC G-27 TBOC), Norton, A. (Monitor 360), Parhad, R. (Monitor 360), Potter, P. (University of Virginia), Spitaletta, J. (JS/J-7 & JHU/APL), TRADOC G-27 OEL, Venturelli, S. (American University), Watts, J. (Noetic), Willcox, J. (System of Systems Analysis Corps), Worret (TRADOC G-27 TBOC), Wright, N. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)