Regime Collapse in Syria: Expectations and Implications

Authors: Ali Jafri (NSI, Inc.); and Alex Goncharova (NSI, Inc.)

This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.

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At present, collapse of the Assad regime in Syria is generally considered to be a remote possibility for three reasons: the Syrian government’s consolidation of power, a fragmented opposition, and the resolve of international actors who are strongly committed to the survival of the regime. The 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment authored by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence noted that the Assad regime held momentum and was supported by Iran and Russia as it continued consolidating territorial gains (Coats, 2019). Furthermore, an October 2019 study estimated that the Assad regime holds control over 60 percent of Syria, though “its control outside Damascus is tenuous” (Syria Study Group, 2019). Since that time, the regime has embarked on a campaign against rebel forces in Idlib, which only recently ended in a ceasefire (Al Jazeera, 2020).

Iran and Russia are strongly invested in the Syrian regime, and signs of an impending collapse would likely prompt a decisive response from one or both. This reflects Russia’s strategic economic ties with Syria, ability to project power and enhance its international prestige, and desire to protect basing agreements negotiated with the Assad regime. Iran, relatedly, seeks a geographic link with Hezbollah, understands the Assad regime to be a bulwark against Saudi (and Sunni) influence in the region, and also can use Syria as a basing area for activities against Israel. Furthermore, the Assad regime’s Alawite background is related to the Twelver branch of Shi’a Islam championed by Iran (Khalaji, 2013; Smyth, 2018).

Because of these dynamics, a good case can be made that absent a meaningful and deep political resolution, large numbers of the Syrian population will continue to be subject to many of the regime-initiated horrors that have been inflicted on them for decades. Sadly, if the regime were to collapse, the immediate result for many Syrians would be the same: widespread economic, political, and social chaos in Syria generated by post-Assad warlordism and internecine and state-sponsored violence. Conventional wisdom holds that there are too many conflicting political agendas supported by violent means to produce an inclusive political settlement in the near- to mid-term. In short, the suffering of the Syrian people will likely continue whether the regime remains or collapses from internal pressure (e.g., competition among sub-state power centers) or external interference.

Again, for reasons described in subsequent sections of this report, most scholars see very little possibility of a collapse of the Assad regime in the foreseeable future. Relatedly, it is difficult to identify specific entities or individuals that might assume power if the regime does collapse. This is due to the number of competing interests in Syria today, including tribal affiliations, which for reasons of scope, are not included in this report. These dynamics combine to forecast continued chaos and fragmentation of the country in the event of a regime collapse. The key findings of this report suggest that if a collapse of the regime were to occur:

1. Precipitating factors are likely to include a number of internal pressures including an ongoing financial crisis and competition for resources and influence among the myriad Syrian government and externally- funded security services operating in Syria.
2. Collapse would probably activate armed groups across the country including violent non-state actors and state actors alike.

There are forces at work in Syria that both work to shield the Assad regime from collapse and, if those should fail or recede, could precipitate a collapse. Each is discussed in more detail in the report.

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This publication was released as part of the SMA project, “CENTCOM Regional and Population Dynamics in the Central Region.”  For more information regarding this project, please click here.