Speaker: Dr. Matthew Fuhrmann (Texas A&M University)
Date: 21 May 2025
Speaker Session Summary
SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Matthew Fuhrmann (Texas A&M University) as part of its SMA SDF Speaker Series.
Nuclear latency refers to a state’s ability to engage in nuclear deterrence without developing or possessing nuclear weapons. Dr. Fuhrmann illustrated why nuclear latency may be more advantageous for many states compared to becoming a full nuclear power. He emphasized that two primary factors are necessary for a state to effectively engage in latent nuclear deterrence: the possession of sensitive nuclear technology (such as the capacity to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels) and the maintenance of a restrained nuclear program. A restrained program refers to a state that has the technological capability to produce nuclear weapons but chooses not to pursue their development overtly.
Japan serves as an example of a nuclear-latent state. It does not currently possess a weapon but has leveraged its status by signaling potential nuclear weapon development in response to threats—such as stating that if a North Korean missile were to land on Japanese soil, it could initiate nuclear weapons production shortly thereafter.
To test his hypothesis that nuclear latency is preferable for most states, Dr. Fuhrmann conducted an empirical analysis using 20 case studies. He compiled a database of states that built nuclear facilities capable of refining uranium and compared them to those that developed nuclear weapons between 1939 and 2012. His findings indicate that nuclear-latent states far outnumber nuclear-armed states. Moreover, states with latent capabilities and restrained nuclear programs tend to enjoy several diplomatic and strategic benefits. For example, their adversaries are more likely to adopt favorable policies, whereas states actively pursuing nuclear weapons often face entrenched opposition, increased regional instability, and even the risk of preventive strikes against their nuclear infrastructure.
For a more in-depth analysis of this topic, readers are encouraged to consult Dr. Fuhrmann’s recent book, Influence Without Arms: The New Logic of Nuclear Deterrence.
Speaker Session Recording
Briefing Materials
Biography: Dr. Matthew Fuhrmann is the Cullen-McFadden Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University. He has been a Visiting Professor at Yale University (2023-24), Visiting Associate Professor at Stanford University (2016-17), Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (2010-11), and Research Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (2007-08). He was named an Andrew Carnegie Fellow in 2016 by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. His research and teaching focus on international security issues with an emphasis on nuclear weapons, diplomacy and bargaining, and alliance politics. He is the author of three books, including Influence Without Arms: The New Logic of Nuclear Deterrence (Cambridge University Press, 2024) and Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge University Press, 2017, with Todd S. Sechser). His articles are published in journals such as American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, British Journal of Political Science, International Organization, International Security, and International Studies Quarterly. His research has been mentioned in media outlets such as CNN, The New York Times, The New Yorker, and NPR.
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