SMA hosted a speaker session with Dr. Vipin Narang (Frank Stanton Professor of Nuclear Security and Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), as part of its SMA STRATCOM Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure Speaker Series..
More countries building nuclear weapons forces the US to conduct multipolar nuclear deterrence and balance its political relationships in a way that it never has before. During the Cold War, classic multipolar nuclear deterrence between peer, or near peer, competitors with equal nuclear capabilities occurred between the US and Russia. However, after the Cold War, more states—with varied nuclear capabilities—gained possession of nuclear weapons. Dr. Narang commented that China is one such state. China has greatly industrialized and modernized since 1990, but is still not a nuclear peer to either Russia or the US. Even though China is strengthening its nuclear capabilities, its nuclear disadvantage to the US and Russia forces the US to participate in asymmetrical multipolar nuclear deterrence. This asymmetry increased the complexity of deterrence operations as actors are forced to compare their nuclear capability to their opponents while managing complex political relationships.
The complex political relationships and asymmetric nuclear capabilities of countries attempting to compete with their peers may result in clouded judgment and an increased risk of nuclear escalation. Furthermore, assistive nuclear deterrence, or a stronger country coming to the aid of a smaller state can increase tensions between actors or allow a state—like North Korea—to act recklessly. Also, countries view each other’s capabilities and nuclear actions differently. For example, a country’s growing stockpile of nuclear weapons may seem aggressive to some countries but not others.
Note: We are aware that many government IT providers have blocked access to YouTube from government machines during the pandemic in response to bandwidth limitations. We recommend viewing the recording on YouTube from a non-government computer or listening to the audio file (below), if you are in this position.
Vipin Narang is the Frank Stanton Professor of Nuclear Security and Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
His first book Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era (Princeton University Press, 2014) on the deterrence strategies of regional nuclear powers won the 2015 ISA International Security Studies Section Best Book Award. His second book Seeking the Bomb: Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation is forthcoming with Princeton University Press. His work has appeared in a variety of outlets including International Security, Journal of Conflict Resolution, The Washington Quarterly, International Organization, Foreign Affairs, The Washington Post, and The New York Times. He was the recipient of the 2020 ISSS Emerging Scholar Award from the International Studies Association awarded to the scholar who “had made the most significant contribution to the field of security studies.”
He received his Ph.D. from the Department of Government, Harvard University in 2010. He holds a B.S. and M.S. in chemical engineering with distinction from Stanford University and an M. Phil with Distinction in international relations from Balliol College, Oxford University, where he studied on a Marshall Scholarship. He has been a fellow at Harvard University’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, a predoctoral fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and a Stanton junior faculty fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. His research interests include nuclear proliferation and strategy, North Korea’s nuclear weapons, South Asian security, and general security studies.
This speaker session supported SMA’s Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure project. For additional speaker sessions and project publications, please visit the Risk of Strategic Deterrence Failure project page.
Comments