The Role of Nuclear-Conventional Intermingling on State Decision-making and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation
Author(s): Bahney, B. (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL]); Péczeli, A. (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL])
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Questions Addressed
- What are the implications of nuclear and conventional intermingling on crisis stability and the potential risk of miscalculation?
- Specifically, how might entanglement influence US and competitor decision making during crisis and conflict?
Framing the Problem
In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well.
All three forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, driven by both technological and doctrinal changes. However, there are important differences in the rationale behind, and also the risks associated with these three different forms of intermingling. The mere existence of dual capable systems is not new— deploying such systems can increase the effectiveness of forces, and it can also provide more flexibility. The major powers have both employed and threatened with dual capable systems for decades, and they have done so without nuclear escalation. Similarly, the major powers co-located nuclear and conventional systems in the Cold War, and they did so for variety of reasons that had nothing to do with complicating the adversary’s risk calculus. The Soviet Union, for example, decided to co-locate its nuclear and conventional forces for economic and administrative reasons. Although today it might be recognized as a useful deterrent tool, it was not their primary intention. Major powers want to convince rivals that the co-location of forces creates a high bar for targeting and raises the risk of nuclear escalation, but they also want to have the flexibility of this not being true in an actual crisis or conflict.
Thus, we believe that the front-line of risks is not the weapons systems themselves, or the co-location of nuclear and conventional forces. Instead, the key drivers of instability are the threats to dual purpose command and control and military situational awareness systems. Technological developments in the cyber and outer space domains created a number of new non-nuclear threats against both nuclear forces and their command and control systems. With the rapid advancements in conventional precision-strike capabilities, today there is a wide array of kinetic and non-kinetic threats that could undermine the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and create new sources of crisis instability. As a result of the growing number of threats, command and control systems have also become more vulnerable. Since the end of the Cold War, many redundancies have been eliminated in command and control systems, making them less resilient, and creating strong incentives to strike first in a crisis. Although these actions remain risky, there is a strong potential for a high pay-off. In parallel to these changes, the United States, Russia and China have all increased their reliance on dual use command and control assets that support both conventional and nuclear operations. These overlaps make it more likely that nuclear command and control would be under threat from the early onset of a conventional conflict between the great powers. Lastly, important doctrinal changes have also contributed to increased nuclear-conventional intermingling. All three major powers have military doctrines that in case of a conventional conflict would call for attacks on space- and land-based command and control systems. Due to the dual use nature of these systems, this could also include assets that are essential for nuclear operations, like for example early- warning radars. As a result of these factors, nuclear-conventional intermingling is likely to be a salient factor in U.S. and competitor decision making in crisis and conflict, and threats to dual use command and control will be the significant factor driving up the risk of miscalculation.
The emerging strategic environment between the U.S., Russia and China with cyber and counterspace weapons backed by kinetic strike capabilities presents a new set of options to strike at command and control systems. These threats to command and control present new avenues to first strike instability, in that military actions grounded in emerging doctrine and force structure at the outset of a conventional conflict could very conceivably result in inadvertent nuclear escalation. In a crisis, each side will be considering what risks they can take that will gain them an upper hand in bargaining and a greater potential to win if the crisis escalates. One of the early risks each side will consider is whether to attack the other side’s command and control, specifically using cyber or counterspace capabilities that are largely unseen by the public eye and by third parties. Attacks against these systems that are either reversible or of limited scale—limited to a region rather than the system as a whole—are likely to be attractive as they convey a willingness to run risks in a way that is both unseen by the international community, and that provides a military advantage for the next stage of the crisis. Besides, such attacks can also create disruptive effects without directly resulting in casualties, and the likelihood of delayed attribution could further benefit the attacker. As crisis turns to conflict, these same systems will likely become targets for kinetic or irreversible attack, as will the end weapon system platforms themselves. Thus, dual-purpose command and control is the key intermingling driver for crisis instability and miscalculation in the years ahead, not the co- location of nuclear and conventional forces nor the fielding of dual capable systems.
This report will proceed in four parts. First, we will assess the nature of nuclear- conventional entanglement on the U.S., Russian and Chinese sides. Second, we will assess each state’s means of potential attack against these systems. Third, we will evaluate how these attacks may affect decision making, as well as crisis stability and the potential of miscalculation. And fourth, we will discuss measures that each state can take to reduce these new risks.
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